Ethnic Politics in Burma: the Time for Solutions

Burma Policy Briefing Nr 5 February 2011

Ethnic Politics in Burma: The Time for Solutions

Burma remains a land in ethnic crisis and political transition. In 2010 the military Conclusions and Recommendations State Peace and Development Council  (SPDC) laid out the landscape for a new era An inclusive endgame has long been of parliamentary government. In 2011 the needed to achieve national reconcilia- authorities face the challenge of intro- tion. But political and ethnic exclusions ducing the new political system. Ethnic are continuing in national politics. If divisions and political exclusions, however, divisions persist, Burma’s legacy of state are emerging in national politics, threaten- failure and national under-achievement ing a new cycle of impasse and conflict. will continue.

Ethnic peace and political inclusion are  The moment of opportunity of a new essential if Burma is to overcome its post- government should not be lost. It is vital colonial legacy of state failure. Since that the new government pursues independence from Great Britain in 1948, policies that support dialogue and political and ethnic strife have continued participation for all peoples in the new through all eras of government. The social political and economic system. Policies and humanitarian consequences have been that favour the armed forces and mili- immense. Burma is one of the world’s tary solutions will perpetuate divisions poorest countries, with population and instability. displacement, drug-related problems and infectious disease rates disturbingly high in  Opposition groups must face how their the ethnic borderlands. diversity and disunity have contributed to Burma’s history of state failure. If they Under the SPDC, there has been no inclu- are to support democratic and ethnic sive process of dialogue involving the reforms, national participation and unity conflicting parties in national politics. over goals and tactics are essential. All Groups as diverse as the National League sides must transcend the divisions of the for Democracy (NLD) and ceasefire Kachin past. Independence Organisation (KIO) have been pressured out from the SPDC’s politi-  As the new political era begins, the cal roadmap, while the Karen National international community should Union (KNU) and other militant forces prioritise policies that promote conflict continue armed struggle in the border- resolution, political rights and equitable lands. opportunity for all ethnic groups in national life, including the economy, For their part, SPDC leaders have largely pursued a two-fold strategy. A new political health and education. Continued system has been drawn up to ensure the repression and exclusion will deepen continued dominance of the armed forces grievances – not resolve them.

Burma Policy Briefing | 1

2 | Burma Policy Briefing in government. In the ethnic conflict- three eras, political impasse and ethnic zones, meanwhile, a militia-building policy conflict continued and were integral to the has been mobilised to try and pacify local failures of the post-colonial state. As one of resistance. the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia, non-Burman nationalities make up a The consequence is that, at a time of third of the estimated 59 million popula- promised democratisation and reform, tion. militarisation has increased in many areas of national life. Equally important, major Under the military SLORC-SPDC, a new economic deals have been agreed with approach was promised in the building of a Asian neighbours in the ethnic borderlands multi-ethnic, multi-party democracy. A before nationwide peace, political reform general election was held in 1990 that was and real inclusion in decision-making have overwhelmingly won by the NLD and allied been established. ethnic parties. Meanwhile an ethnic ceasefire policy was introduced in 1989 and, in A critical moment is approaching. A new the following years, came to include a political system is being introduced, and majority of the country’s armed opposition progressive decisions can yet be made. But forces. uncertainty is increasing. Will the new government be the SPDC in new guise or Political impasse and repression, however, continued, leading to a new generation of divisions and exclusions within national “ I would like to urge you to build on the national politics. There were moments when new opportunities for national reconciliation reconsolidation that has been achieved and avoid all appeared, marked, for example, by the ceasefires or release of NLD leader Aung thoughts and notions that might lead to the disintegration San Suu Kyi. SPDC chairman Snr-Gen. Than Shwe frequently claimed “national of the Union. ” reconsolidation” as the goal of the regime’s Snr-Gen. Than Shwe, New Light of Myanmar “political roadmap” for reform in which all 25 December 2010 citizens were urged to take part.

Behind the scenes, however, the SPDC will it be a platform from which ethnic continued the long-standing practice of peace and multi-party democracy can truly tactics to maintain the dominance of the spread? The stakes could not be higher. The armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) in decisions made by Burma’s leaders in the government. Tatmadaw interests were coming year could well decide the country’s promoted, while opposition groups were future for a generation. repressed or marginalised, including the NLD and ethnic parties of different back- BACKGROUND grounds. As a result, hopes for “tri-partite” dialogue between military, democracy and With the February 2011 announcement of a ethnic leaders were never fulfilled. new government, a new political epoch has been heralded for Burma/Myanmar.1 This Fundamental to the SPDC’s strategy was follows previous eras since independence: the formation of a new political movement of parliamentary democracy (1948-62), that will outflank non-Tatmadaw parties military socialism (1962-88) and the and dominate future legislatures. As a military State Peace and Development further guarantee, under the 2008 consti- Council (formerly State Law and Order tution a quarter of all seats were reserved Restoration Council - SLORC). During all for Tatmadaw appointees in the new

Burma Policy Briefing | 3 A. Ethnic Parties January 20112

1. Elected to the legislatures 2010

 All Mon Regions Democracy Party  Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic Party  Chin National Party  Rakhine Nationalities Development  Chin Progressive Party Party  Ethnic National Development Party  Shan Nationalities Democratic Party a  Lahu National Development Party  Taaung (Palaung) National Party b  Inn National Development Party  Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin c  Kayan National Party State   Kayin People's Party Wa Democratic Party

 Kayin State Democracy and a. party from 1990 election b Development Party b. ceasefire group origin-connection  Pao National Organization b c. government-backed: ceasefire group connection

2. Electoral parties that did not win seats

 All National Races Unity and  Northern Shan State Progressive Partyb Development Party (Kayah State)a  Rakhine State National Force of  Kachin State Progressive Partyb Myanmar  Kaman National Progressive Party  Wa National Unity Partyc  Khami National Development Party a. withdrew due to political pressures c  Kokang Democracy and Unity Party b. registration not accepted due to ceasefire group connection  Mro or Khami National Solidarity c. party from 1990 election Organisationc

3. Parties from 1990 election in 2002 United Nationalities Alliance (boycotted 2010 election)

 Arakan League for Democracya  Mon National Democratic Fronta

 Chin National League for Democracy  Shan Nationalities League for Democracya  Kachin State National Congress for  United Nationalities League for Democracy Democracy

 a Kayah State All Nationalities League for  Zomi National Congress Democracy a. allied in the 1998 Committee Representing the  Kayin (Karen) National Congress for People’s Parliament with the National League for Democracy Democracy

4 | Burma Policy Briefing assemblies. At the same time, opposition political extinction. Like their NLD ally, ethnic forces in the conflict-zones were they boycotted the 2010 vote in protest at faced with the alternatives of surrender or election conditions and the detention of compromise with the new political system political leaders (see Chart A). As a result, and the integration of their troops into their future now is highly uncertain, and Border Guard Forces (BGFs) under the new government may well consider Tatmadaw control. A deadline of 1 Septem- their activities illegal. ber 2010 was given. Similar complexities exist in the ethnic During these events, opposition groups had borderlands. For while five ethnic ceasefire the potential for influence through the groups and four local militia agreed to choices that they made, but there was no become Border Guard Forces, eight groups common strategy. For example, while the refused (see Chart B and C). Subsequently, ceasefire KIO attended the National Con- some of the BGF rejectionists resumed vention that drew up the new constitution, relations with the KNU and others of the the KNU continued armed struggle in the dozen non-ceasefire groups and factions Thai borderlands. Similarly, while the NLD that still proclaim armed struggle in the boycotted the National Convention and borderlands (see Chart B). 2010 general election, the National Unity Party (NUP - successor to Gen. Ne Win’s Complicating the landscape further, there Burma Socialist Programme Party [BSPP]) are over 50 other local militia (pyithusit) took part in both. Already new divisions under the Tatmadaw regional commands were appearing in the landscape of national in a counter-insurgency programme 6 politics. developed by the SPDC (see Chart C). Like the BGFs, some have been formed from It was only, however, following the 2010 ceasefire units; others were formed as local election and announcement of a new auxiliaries. But their importance in ethnic government that the full scale of complex- politics should not be under-estimated. ity in national politics became apparent. A Several are led by candidates that stood or snapshot of the post-election landscape won seats in the 2010 election and, in the reveals the difficulty of challenges as the new political era, they are likely to continue country enters a new political era. playing a strategic buffer in blocking opposition against central government As expected, the three legislatures (lower authority. and upper houses of parliament and 14 state/region assemblies) will be dominated Against this backdrop, the sense of inclu- by the SPDC-created Union Solidarity and sion or exclusion from Burma’s new poli- Development Party (USDP) and military tical system is growing. Who will be “in” appointees.3 The only exception will be the and who “out” is causing a conflicting array ethnic state assemblies (notably Chin, of sentiments from opportunity to fear. It is Karen, Rakhine and Shan) where the 16 an unpredictable and dangerous mix. ethnic parties that won seats in the polls hope to have influence.4 But at this critical For their part, at a very time when unity moment in national transition, only three and consensus are needed, opposition of the 22 parties elected in 2010 have any groups accuse the Tatmadaw authorities of history as political or electoral movements;5 “divide and rule” to dissipate ethnic and 7 all the rest are new (see Chart A). political resistance. In response, SPDC officials warned opposition groups that no In contrast, the nine ethnic parties in the tactics will deflect the Tatmadaw-backed United Nationalities Alliance, that won government. “Any ways to achieve national seats in the 1990 polls, could be faced with reconsolidation through non-violent,

Burma Policy Briefing | 5 B. Armed Opposition Forces, January 20112

1. Ceasefire groups (rejected Border Guard Force status)

 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (5th  Shan State Army-North/Shan State Brigade) Progress Partya b  Kachin Independence Organisationa b  United Wa State Army  Kayan New Land Partya  National Democratic Alliance Army (eastern Shan state)  KNU/KNLA Peace Council a. Former National Democratic Front member  New Mon State Partya b b. Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union member

2. Non-ceasefire groups

 Arakan Liberation Partya  National United Party of Arakan  Chin National Fronta b  Palaung State Liberation Fronta  Hongsawatoi Restoration Party  Pao National Liberation Organisationa  Karen National Uniona b  Rohingya Solidarity Organization  Karenni National Progressive Partya b  Shan State Army-South a a   Lahu Democratic Front Wa National Organization  National Socialist Council Nagaland a. Present or former National Democratic Front (Khaplang faction) member b. Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union member A number of other small groups, including ethnic Burman militants, also exist on the borders. Some, such as the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, no longer pursue armed struggle. Most are affiliated to the National Council Union of Burma or Ethnic Nationalities Council.

violent, indirect and direct approaches communities across the country. Asian designed to control the ruling government investments also indicate that there will be will never come to fruition,” a commentary a steep acceleration in energy and infra- in the state media claimed; instead, the structural projects in the ethnic border- government should be regarded as a lands in the next few years. But as the new “democracy ally”.8 government assumes power, vital questions remain unanswered. After decades of conflict, a critical time has thus arrived for Burma’s peoples. The Among many challenges, the way the new country is slowly modernising, and it is government pursues ethnic policies could undoubtedly more open than the well determine the stability of the country. isolationist state under Gen. Ne Win’s The critical question is whether the new BSPP (1962-88). In the intervening years, government uses suppression against political understandings have spread, and perceived opponents and those outside the the desire for dialogue and peaceful SPDC’s roadmap for reform or will it solutions has long been apparent in develop policies of dialogue and inclusion

6 | Burma Policy Briefing to support a new era of democracy and linguistic. Religious-based groups are also peace? For the moment, Burma’s future is influential, and there has been a growth in far from clear. non-governmental organisations in the past two decades, reflecting the cultural ETHNIC PARTIES AND OPPOSITION dynamism of Burmese society. But, behind GROUPS the scenes, there are many common aspirations and connections between the varied After the 2010 general election, hopes ethnic-based organisations in political remain for a peaceful resolution to Burma’s terms. Many contemporary differences are long-standing conflicts. The challenges of the divisions of survival, resulting from the national reconciliation are certainly not legacies of conflict and the SPDC’s political new, and many different groups and stake- roadmap. holders must take responsibility. The legacies of political grievance and national dis- A sense of urgency is therefore growing unity have continued through every politi- among ethnic and political leaders that cal era, and they have been marked by the these divisions must be addressed if all emergence of military government at the nationalities are to enjoy equitable rights in centre and armed opposition groups in the the union. For the moment, opinions are borderlands. divided between those who believe that the new political system marks a first step from which democratic progress can be made “ We think everything can be solved by dialogue, and not and those who are outside the SPDC’s political roadmap and argue that the new by fighting. We need development and to improve our government must be opposed.

agriculture and education system for the next generation. The warnings from history are clear. Previ- ous periods of government change (in But this can only be achieved by peace. Once civil war 1948, 1962 and 1988) have all been follow- occurs, none of our goals can be achieved.” ed by cycles of conflict, and there are already signs that the threat of violence Yuan Shenbin, head of UWSA education department could escalate again in 2011. Fighting has 2 December 2010 been increasing in the ethnic borderlands during 2009-2010, and many community leaders fear that it could spread further in What, then, is notable about the present the coming year. landscape is its organisational complexity. It will be vital, therefore, that national divisions are resolved and ethnic parties are not In 1988, for example, when the SLORC- marginalised again from Burma’s latest SPDC assumed power, ethnic aspirations generation of reforms. In particular, the were largely represented by the nine armed role of two groupings will be crucial: those opposition forces of the federal-seeking of armed and political opposition groups. National Democratic Front (NDF - formed With over 50,000 ethnic troops under arms 1976). In 2011, however, as the SPDC is and a new generation of parties in forma- succeeded by the USDP-majority tion, the political landscape is at its most government, over 50 ethnic parties exist in important in decades. name, all seeking to establish meaningful roles in the new political era. MILITARY-BASED GROUPS

Such organisations can appear bewildering A dangerous uncertainty presently exists in in their differences: small-large, new-old, the ethnic borderlands. At a time of prom- rural-urban, electoral-armed, community- ised reform, militarisation and warnings of

Burma Policy Briefing | 7 greater conflict have been increasing. This by dialogue, and not by fighting,” said is partly due to the militia and counter- Yuan Shenbin, head of the UWSA educa- insurgency tactics of the SPDC. But it is tion department.10 also due to reviving militancy among ethnic organisations that oppose the political and Many of the various non-ceasefire groups economic direction of the country under also had peace talks with the SPDC. Under Snr-Gen. Than Shwe. For many opposition constant military pressure, most lost con- groups, the 2010 election result and reality siderable ground and influence during the of the new government are wake-up calls SLORC-SPDC era. Several suffered cease- that cannot be ignored.9 fire breakaways, while refugee numbers passed the 200,000 mark in neighbouring Against this background, a transformation Thailand, India and Bangladesh. Neverthe- is under way among armed groups that less militant strategies persisted, with could be as defining as those that occurred leaders determined not to end armed during previous periods of government struggle until political agreements had been change. Many political relationships are achieved.11 unravelling and reforming. Equally important, the veteran KNU (established 1947) preferred to continue “united The KIO will work hand in hand with any organization front” strategies against the military gov- “ ernment, utilizing border areas to promote or individual who is committed to a genuinely democratic anti-SPDC activities in Burma and abroad. The main vehicle became the National Union of Myanmar to be built upon the principle of a Council Union of Burma, which included ethnic Burman groups, NLD supporters, ‘sustainable perpetual peace’. ” and the National Coalition Government KIO Central Committee Statement Union of Burma, made up of exile MPs- 30 August 2010 elect from the 1990 election. As a result of these developments, Burma’s political landscape remained divided. As For much of the SLORC-SPDC era, an the years went by, an assumption contin- uneasy status quo existed. Armed opposi- ued among different parties that an inclu- tion centred around two main blocks: sive dialogue process would eventually ceasefire and non-ceasefire forces (see begin. But from 2004, political trends were Charts). The ceasefire groups eventually driven by Snr-Gen. Than Shwe in a much came to number 30 different forces and more uncompromising fashion. factions, of which 17 were recognised as “official” or major groups. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi was not released from house arrest, despite United These largely divided into two groupings by Nations entreaties; prime minister and which they represented themselves at the military intelligence chief Gen. Khin National Convention: a larger bloc led by Nyunt, who was the ceasefire architect, was former members of the NDF, including the deposed and arrested along with his col- KIO and New Mon State Party (NMSP), leagues; and tough tactics were resumed that sought a federal union; and a smaller against ethnic opposition groups. Most bloc, headed by the 20,000-strong United notably, nine Shan leaders were arrested Wa State Army (UWSA), made up of and given draconian jail terms for alleged former members of the insurgent Com- sedition after they met to discuss the SPDC munist Party of Burma which collapsed in political roadmap. Those imprisoned in- 1989. “We think everything can be solved cluded Hkun Htun Oo of the electoral Shan

8 | Burma Policy Briefing Nationalities League for Democracy The SPDC, however, pre-empted discus- (SNLD) and Gen. Hso Ten of the ceasefire sion by its surprise order in April 2009 that Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) who the ceasefire groups transform into BGF received 93 and 106 years respectively. battalions under government authority. Thirty Tatmadaw soldiers would join each Despite these events, most ceasefire groups 326-troop battalion, including one of the continued to attend the National Conven- three commanding officers. Many of the tion to draw up the new constitution. Their smaller groups ultimately agreed, and the claims for a “union” rather than “unitary” SPDC also accelerated its local militia state were not accepted. But many ethnic (pyuthusit) programme in adjoining areas.12 leaders still believed that, after decades of During 2009-10, ceasefire groups and impasse and conflict, a new election and government-organised militia were vari- system of government marked a better ously ordered to become BGFs or pyuthisit starting point for democracy than a con- according to SPDC criteria (see Chart C, tinuation of fighting Tatmadaw rule. next page). But veteran ethnic leaders from Importantly, too, there were parties, such as such movements as the KIO, NMSP and the ceasefire Pao National Organisation UWSA refused and called for further talks with Tatmadaw leaders. “ We affirm our determination to fight on hand in hand The political climate then worsened further in August 2009 when the SPDC sent in with the people inside the country, the international forces troops against the ceasefire Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in the and the allies, until the emergence of a genuine federal Kokang region to support a breakaway union.” faction that agreed to the BGF orders. 37,000 refugees fled into China, and as 14th KNU Congress Statement many as 200 people were killed or 21 December 2010 wounded.13 Messages continued to be exchanged between the different sides. But an influential core of ceasefire groups re- and Palaung State Liberation Party, which mained determined in their refusal, allow- welcomed the delineation of new “self- ing a final SPDC deadline of 1 September administered” territories for their nation- 2010 to pass. alities. This is the first time they have been acknowledged on Burma’s political map. In a last-minute statement, the KIO reiterated its commitment to dialogue and desire Relationships with the government, for a “sustainable perpetual peace” on equal however, began to break down and new ethnic terms, as envisaged by the historic divisions emerged during 2009-10 as the Panglong Agreement in 1947.14 SPDC offi- SPDC accelerated its political roadmap. cials, however, notified the recalcitrant Controversies erupted on both the military ceasefire groups that their ceasefire status and political stages. was now on “pre-agreement” terms.

Many ethnic leaders had wanted ceasefire Political divisions deepened, and all sides groups to maintain their forces and began to increase troop training and territories until the new political system deployments. Ceasefire groups and militia was introduced when the issues of forces that had agreed BGF or pyithusit disarmament and reorganisation of their terms, such as the Pao National Organisa- civil administrations (such as health and tion or Democratic Karen Buddhist Army education) could be negotiated with the (DKBA), were allowed to form new parties new government. or put up candidates for the 2010 polls. In

Burma Policy Briefing | 9 C. Border Guard Forces and Militia, January 20112

1. Border Guard Forces (established 2009-10)

BGF Battalion Number Former Name/Description BGF 1001-3 New Democratic Army-Kachina b BGF 1004-5 Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Fronta BGF 1006 Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army-Kokanga b BGF 1007 Lahu militia, Mongton (Maington), Shan state c BGF 1008 Akha militia, Mongyu (Maingyu), Shan statec BGF 1009 Lahu militia, Tachilek, Shan statec BGF 1010 Wa militia, Markmang (Metman), Shan statec BGF 1011-22 Democratic Karen Buddhist Armya b BGF 1023 Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16th battalion) a b a. former ceasefire group b. connected party or leaders won seats in 2010 election c. former Tatmadaw-controlled militia

2. Ceasefire groups or factions that have become militia (pyithusit)

 Kachin Defence Army (ex-KIO splinter  Pao National Organisationb group)  Palaung State Liberation Partyb  Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group (ex-KIO  Rawang Militia (ex-Rebellion splinter group)a Resistance Force)a  Mon Peace Defence Group (ex-NMSP  Shan State Army-North (3 and 7 splinter group) Brigades)  Mong Tai Army Homein (Homong) a. Connected leader stood in 2010 election Region b. Connected party or leaders won seats in the 2010 election

3. Other local militia under Burma Army Regional Commands, Shan state

There are over 50 local militia. Their strengths vary. In north Shan state, the best known include:

Common Name Location Pansay Militiaa Muse-Namkham Kutkai Militiaa Kutkai Tar Moe Nye Militiaa Kutkai Mongpaw Militiaa Muse-Kyukok Mangpang Militia Tangyan Monekoe/Phaunghsai Militia Mongko Monhin/Monha Militia Mongyai a. leader won seat in 2010 election

10 | Burma Policy Briefing contrast, parties that were suspected of that opposed the BGF order seized control political opposition or anti-SPDC agendas of the key border towns of Myawaddy and were restricted and harassed. Three Pagodas Pass further south.15

Most noticeably, the registration of the To escape the fighting, more than 20,000 Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP) by a refugees fled into Thailand. Both towns group of ex-KIO leaders was rejected by the were quickly retaken by the Tatmadaw. But Election Commission, while the All in the following months, clashes continued National Races Unity and Development to spread, with hundreds of casualties being Party (Kayah State) withdrew under reported.16 The SPDC rushed up reinforce- pressure from USDP officials. This meant ments, using artillery and conventional that no independent Kachin or Karenni warfare tactics. In response, the DKBA nationality party stood for the polls in two militants re-allied with the KNU, from of the most restive ethnic states in the which they had broken away in 1994, and country: Kachin and Kayah (Karenni). both forces stepped up guerrilla attacks in the Karen state. With civilian casualties Meanwhile United Nationalities Alliance increasing, Human Rights Watch and other parties like the SNLD that had won seats in international organizations reiterated calls the 1990 election decided, along with their for a UN Commission of Inquiry into war NLD ally, not to contest the polls on the crimes.17 But as the countdown to a new ground of political restrictions. Their aim government continued, there was no let-up was to make a historic protest; it is also in the fighting. Ethnic tensions only in- uncertain whether their registration would creased. have been accepted. But their absence only increased the likely dominance of the Against this backdrop, different ethnic regime-backed USDP, led by prime forces began making anticipatory moves for minister Thein Sein and other SPDC the new political order. In private, hopes generals who resigned from the military to remained that the new government would enter politics. wipe the slate clean from the SPDC era and be responsive to new initiatives to resolve The perception then grew that the SPDC the political impasse. But the mood was was manipulating the polls in the USDP’s growing that parties also had to be pre- favour when it was announced that no polls pared for future conflict. would be held on security grounds in over 300 village tracts in 32 townships in the A diversity of tactics were explored by the ethnic states. Only six constituencies were different ethnic forces. At its 14th Congress, affected in toto (four Wa, two Kachin). But for example, the KNU pledged to “fight on” the scale of these exclusions was a reminder with the people “until the emergence of a of the continuing instability within the genuine federal union.”18 The SSA-N, country. Almost overlooked, more than a which had seen troops defect to become dozen insurgent ethnic forces and factions BGFs or militia, restored its 1971 political still maintained armed resistance to the front, the Shan State Progress Party. And SPDC in the borderlands (see Chart B on p. for the first time in 15 years, talks resumed 6). between ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups about joint cooperation. In the event, none of the leading ceasefire or non-ceasefire groups attempted to Meetings are still continuing. But poten- disrupt voting on polling day. Instead, not tially the most important discussion has for the first time in Burma’s history, vio- been the formation of a “Committee for the lence broke out from an unexpected Emergence of a Federal Union”, compris- quarter when a breakaway DKBA group ing three ceasefire groups (KIO, NMSP and

Burma Policy Briefing | 11 SSA-N) and three non-ceasefire (KNU, pledged themselves ready to promote Karenni National Progressive Party and democracy and ethnic rights through the Chin National Front). Leaders explained new parliamentary system. that the committee is only a first step in trying to create a new platform for dialogue It will be important therefore to observe and national reconciliation.19 But with the whether the new parties can really develop UWSA (ceasefire), Shan State Army-South influential roles of their own. Many reflect (non-ceasefire) and other armed opposition the continuing struggles in ethnic politics. groups waiting in the wings, the new For example, three parties (Kayin State alliance was also a warning to the govern- Democracy and Development Party, Pao ment that ethnic resistance groups have not National Organisation and Taaung gone away. [Palaung] National Party), have been formed by ex-ceasefire groups,20 while As the new government was formed in Nay others (e.g. All Mon Regions Democracy Pyi Taw in early February, the stage was Party) include supporters with armed delicately set. Burma’s new leaders claimed opposition histories. Other parties mark a mandate to determine the country’s political innovations, such as the Kayin People’s Party led by a Tatmadaw veteran and a KNU peace go-between. Similarly, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party is What I see now as the most important thing for our “ headed by a former MP-elect from the country is the emergence of an all-inclusive political process SNLD, which successfully contested the 1990 election but was repressed by the in which all of our people can participate. I would like SPDC. everyone to work for this purpose with unity.” Counter-balancing these trends, the SPDC sought to maintain its authority in areas Aung San Suu Kyi, Radio Free Asia where ethnic opposition remains strong. Its 11 January 2011 main vehicle was the USDP, but quiescent armed ethnic leaders were also promoted. In the northern Shan state, for example, political course. But militant groups that five BGF and militia leaders were elected on had fought for ethnic rights since Burma’s a USDP ticket. In contrast, in the Kachin independence still persisted in the border- state, where the registration of the KIO- lands and were once again proposing to backed KSPP was rejected, the father and challenge the country’s political system in son leaders of the ceasefire New Demo- pursuit of their goals. cratic Army-Kachin were elected as an independent and member respectively of POLITICAL GROUPS the Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State, which was supported by the SPDC. It remains to be seen how Burma’s new sys- Such representatives are expected to follow tem of elected government establishes itself the new government line. in the coming year. Election restrictions and the last-minute addition of “advance Many doubts thus exist as to whether the votes” by the authorities were widely new ethnic and political parties can truly perceived as ensuring victory for the USDP, make impact in the new legislatures. With which claimed nearly 77 per cent of elected 25 per cent of seats already reserved for seats in the legislatures. Nevertheless ethnic military nominees, USDP-Tatmadaw parties constituted 16 of the 22 parties domination will be overwhelming in the elected and, along with the National Demo- lower and upper houses of parliament. The cratic Force (formed by ex-NLD members), government will also be an executive sys-

12 | Burma Policy Briefing tem under the new president, ex-Gen. example, would represent the different Thein Sein, the former prime minister who ethnic and ideological groups in the frac- originally led the USDP. The appointment tious political landscape? For their part, of an ethnic Shan, Sai Mauk Kham, as vice- government officials are strongly opposed. president alongside another senior regime A rebuttal in the state media called the idea official, ex-Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo, is not “a fantasy extremely opposed to reality”, expected to make a political difference; because such a proposal overlooked the both are also USDP representatives. economic infrastructure and political achievements of the SLORC-SPDC.24 For this reason, the main ethnic attention in the life of the first legislatures will be Nevertheless hopes for such a new meeting focused on the new state assemblies and have not retreated. The goal of a new Pang- self-administered areas. In particular, with long was initially proposed at a meeting in the exception of the Kachin and Kayah Kalemyo last October by ethnic and poli- states, “other” elected parties could poten- tical leaders opposed to the 2010 election.25 tially ally in the ethnic states to control But the call has subsequently been sup- anywhere between 29 per cent (Mon state) ported by other ethnic parties, including 21 and 45 per cent (Chin state) of seats. Few both elected and armed groups.26 They do parties expect such assemblies to immi- not want to confront the new government, nently become political debating grounds they say, but to return to the principles of for ethnic legislation. And the news that the national equality promised by Aung San. chairs and speakers of all 14 state and “Everybody would be happy if the same region assemblies will have USDP-Tatma- attitude and the same approach could daw backgrounds has been negatively actually be implemented in coordination received. with the new government,” said Nai Han Nevertheless ethnic leaders assert that their Thar, General-Secretary of the ceasefire 27 victory in the 2010 polls provides them NMSP. with a legitimate platform to promote Such calls for extra-parliamentary initia- ethnic rights in the coming years.22 As a tives, however, are likely to be controversial first step, five parties issued a joint state- and risk government suppression in the ment in January calling for the lifting of coming months. The NLD has already economic sanctions, proportional ethnic given general support.28 But as Aung San representation in the state administrations, Suu Kyi explained after her release from and a “general amnesty” to illustrate mili- house arrest, if real national reconciliation tary government has ended and “demo- and progress are to be achieved, the critical cratic transition has begun”.23 need is to bring all Burma’s peoples to- At the same time, opposition parties out- gether in the same processes of reform. side the parliamentary process have also “What I see now as the most important attempted to bring ethnic issues to centre thing for our country is the emergence of stage. A popular theme of discussion is the an all-inclusive political process in which call for a new Panglong conference (Pang- all of our people can participate,” she said. long-2). The aim is to bring into the 21st “I would like everyone to work for this century the historic 1947 agreement by purpose with unity.” 29 which the ethnic principles for the new Union were agreed by frontier area leaders These are sentiments with which every with the independence hero Aung San. citizen would agree. But as the new government started up in Nay Pyi Taw, There are many reasons why such a new there was no indication that such an meeting would be problematical. Who, for inclusive process will yet begin.

Burma Policy Briefing | 13 PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS been greater. Continued conflict and exclusion will deepen grievances – not Burma’s political landscape is at its most resolve them. critical and poignant in over two decades. A general election does not resolve conflict, In early February, UN Secretary-General but it can produce important outcomes and Ban Ki-moon issued a statement, hoping indicators towards reform. Many un- that the announcement of a new govern- certainties, however, presently exist in the ment “marks the beginning of a change in country. the status quo”. The key, he said, was that this “important opportunity” leads to an There is still time for solutions. Nothing is “inclusive civilian government that is yet set in stone. But the manner by which broadly representative of all parties relevant the new government addresses the coun- to national reconciliation and more re- try’s challenges in the coming months sponsive to the aspirations of the people”.33 could well decide Burma’s fate for another generation. Real peace and prosperity will The world is now watching what Burma’s only come by national inclusion. But as new government will do. Burma’s troubled history since independence has forewarned, unresolved political and ethnic crises will only provide a legacy NOTES of failure for the future. In essence, the 1. In 1989 the military government changed the choices come down to two avenues: dia- official name from Burma to Myanmar. They logue or force. can be considered alternative forms in the Burmese language, but their use has become a st In the 21 century, Burma’s peoples are also politicised issue. The UN uses Myanmar, but it faced by a host of challenges of modernity is not commonly used in the English language. as the country opens up to international Therefore Burma will be mostly used in this affairs. In recent years, progress has begun publication. This is not intended as a political in addressing Burma’s health crises through statement. cooperation with international aid 2. The charts in this report are only intended as programmes.30 But in many ethnic a snapshot of the diversity of the ethnic land- borderlands, there remains serious conflict scape during a time of historic change. Burma is and humanitarian emergency, with a land in transition, as one military and political continuing loss of life and deep poverty. era ends and another begins. Some ethnic party or organisation names remain the same, while Around 140,000 refugees remain in official others are transforming or retiring. Parties also camps in Thailand, while there are over vary considerably in size, orientation or influ- 400,000 internally displaced persons in the ence. Not all details will be exact, and more 31 eastern borderlands. change appears certain in the coming year.

Equally urgent, a series of mega economic 3. The USDP won 883 of the 1,154 possible seats in the different legislatures. The NUP projects with Asian neighbours are on the came second (62 seats) and the Shan drawing boards or underway. These inclu- Nationalities Democratic Party third (57 seats). de the Dawei (Tavoy) Development Project 4. In these four states, the combined vote for to Thailand, the oil and gas pipelines from ethnic parties came to between 37 (Shan) and the Rakhine state coast to Yunnan in 45 (Chin) per cent. For an election analysis, see, China, and numerous hydropower dams on “A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma’s rivers. Many of these projects are Burma’s 2010 polls”, TNI Burma Policy Briefing located in ethnic borderlands, where local No.4, December 2010. resentment and the sense of margi- 5. The NUP (ex-BSPP) and Lahu National 32 nalisation have been growing. The need Development Party, both of which were formed for peace and local consultation has never in 1988 and stood in the 1990 election, and the

14 | Burma Policy Briefing Pao National Organisation. The PNO took its 18. 14th KNU Congress Statement, 21 title from the ceasefire group of that name and December 2010. joined with the Union Pao National Organi- 19. See e.g., Interview with NMSP General- sation that won seats in the 1990 election. Secretary Nai Han Thar, “We must speak in one 6. Since independence, the Tatmadaw has often voice”, Mizzima, 25 January 2011. created local militia or “pyithusit”, including the 20. DKBA, PNO and PSLP. KaKawYe in the Shan state in the 1960s-70s. Their role is to stop or co-opt militant 21. See note 4. opposition groups in local communities. For a 22. For an interview with Dr. Aye Maung, 2005 analysis and maps through the spectrum chairman of the Rakhine Nationals of narcotics, see, Shan Herald Agency for News, Development Party, see, “And the Winner Is “Show Business: Rangoon’s ‘War on Drugs’ in …”, The Irrawaddy, 5 February 2011. “We, the Shan State”, (S.H.A.N., 2nd edition, 2005). pro-democracy forces, want our country to be 7. For example, Hseng Khio Fah, S.H.A.N., developed and peaceful,” he said. “Senior Shan resistance leader: Junta out to 23. Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, divide and rule the Wa”, 20 September 2010. Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, Chin 8. Kyaw Myint Naing, “What is requirement for National Party, All Mon Regions Democracy national reconsolidation in Myanmar”, New Party, Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party, “Joint Light of Myanmar, 25 December 2010. Statement by Ethnic Brethren Parties”, 15 January 2011. 9. See e.g., Hseng Khio Fah, "Ceasefire armed groups ‘thank’ Burma Army for bringing them 24. Banyar Aung, “Don’t trivialize the national back to reality", S.H.A.N., 10 December 2010. cause”, New Light of Myanmar, 9 December 2010. 10. Interview, 2 December 2010. 25. Myint Maung, “Suu Kyi floats Panglong II 11. See e.g., “Address by KNU President Saw via modern technology”, Mizzima, 17 Tamlabaw on 61st Anniversary of Karen November 2010. Revolutionary Day”, Office of the Supreme Headquarters Karen National Union, 31 26. See e.g., Ko Htwe, “Pro-election Parties January 2010. Support Second Panglong Conference”, The Irrawaddy, 26 October 2010. 12. See note 6. 27. See note 19. 13. Tom Kramer, “Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace 28. See note 25. and Democracy”, Transnational Institute, Peace 29. Aung San Suu Kyi, Radio Free Asia, 11 & Security Briefing No. 1, September 2009. January 2011. 14.Central Committee, Kachin Independence 30. See e.g., Three Diseases Fund, “Annual Organization, “Statement, 30 August 2010”. Report 2009”, (3DF, Yangon, 2009). 15. For an interview with Col. Saw Lah Pwe, the 31. See e.g., Thailand Burma Border breakaway DKBA leader, see, “Surrender is Out Consortium, “Protracted Displacement and of the Question”, The Irrawaddy, 9 November Chronic Poverty in Eastern Burma/Myanmar”, 2010. (TBBC, Bangkok, 2010). 16. There are no reliable statistics for casualty 32. Kachin Development Networking Group, numbers. The state media rarely acknowledged “Resisting the ﬂood: Communities taking a the fighting. For reports of battles based on stand against the imminent construction of opposition claims, see e.g., Kyaw Kha, “Clashes Irrawaddy dams”, continue between DKBA faction and junta www.burmariversnetwork.org, 2009; and Shwe troops”, Mizzima, 1 December 2010; Saw Yan Gas Movement, “Corridor of Power: China’s Naing, “Clashes Continue in Karen State”, The Trans-Burma Oil and Gas Pipelines” (Chiang Irrawaddy, 27 January 2011. Mai, 2009). 17. Human Rights Watch, "Burma: Eyewitness 33. Agence France-Presse, “UN chief calls on Accounts of Abuses in Eastern Fighting: Thai Burma to recognise opposition”, 6 February Authorities Should Ensure Protection of 2011. Refugees Fleeing Conflict", 4 December 2010.

Burma Policy Briefing | 15 TNI-BCN Project on Ethnic Conflict in Burma Burma Policy Briefings

Burma has been afflicted by ethnic conflict and civil war since Burma in 2010: A Critical Year independence in 1948, exposing it to some of the longest run- in Ethnic Politics, Burma Policy ning armed conflicts in the world. Ethnic nationality peoples Briefing No.1, June 2010 have long felt marginalised and discriminated against. The Burma’s 2010 Elections: situation worsened after the military coup in 1962, when mino- Challenges and Opportunities, rity rights were further curtailed. The main grievances of ethnic Burma Policy Briefing No.2, June nationality groups in Burma are the lack of influence in the 2010 political decision-making processes; the absence of economic Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s and social development in their areas; and what they see as the Election Landscape, Burma military government's Burmanisation policy, which translates Policy Briefing No. 3, October into repression of their cultural rights and religious freedom. 2010 This joint TNI-BCN project aims to stimulate strategic thinking A Changing Ethnic Landscape: on addressing ethnic conflict in Burma and to give a voice to Analysis of Burma's 2010 Polls, ethnic nationality groups who have until now been ignored and Burma Policy Briefing No. 4, isolated in the international debate on the country. In order to December 2010 respond to the challenges of 2010 and the future, TNI and BCN Ethnic Politics in Burma: The believe it is crucial to formulate practical and concrete policy Time for Solutions, Burma Policy options and define concrete benchmarks on progress that Briefing No. 5, February 2011 national and international actors can support. The project will aim to achieve greater support for a different Burma policy, which is pragmatic, engaged and grounded in reality. Other Briefings The Transnational Institute (TNI) was founded in 1974 as an independent, international research and policy advocacy Alternative Development or institute, with strong connections to transnational social Business as Usual? China’s movements and associated intellectuals concerned to steer the Opium Substitution Policy in Burma and Laos, Drug Policy world in a democratic, equitable, environmentally sustainable Briefing No. 33, November 2010 and peaceful direction. Its point of departure is a belief that solutions to global problems require global co-operation. Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk; Consequences of the Kokang BCN was founded in 1993. It works towards democratisation Crisis for Peace and Democracy, and respect for human rights in Burma. BCN does this through by Tom Kramer, TNI Peace & information dissemination, lobby and campaign work, and the Security Briefing Nr 1, September strengthening of Burmese civil society organisations. In recent 2009. years the focus has shifted away from campaigning for economic Neither War nor Peace; The isolation towards advocacy in support of civil society and a Future of the Cease-fire solution to the ethnic crises in Burma. Agreements in Burma. Tom Kramer, TNI, July 2009.

Transnational Institute Burma Centrum Netherlands From Golden Triangle to Rubber PO Box 14656 PO Box 14563 Belt? The Future of the Opium 1001 LD Amsterdam 1001 LB Amsterdam Bans in the Kokang and Wa The Netherlands The Netherlands Regions. Tom Kramer, TNI Drug Tel: +31-20-6626608 Tel.: 31-20-671 6952 Policy Briefing No.29, July 2009. Fax: +31-20-6757176 Fax: 31-20-671 3513 Withdrawal Symptoms in the E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Golden Triangle; A Drugs www.tni.org/page/tni-bcn- www.burmacentrum.nl Market in Disarray. Tom burma-project Kramer, Martin Jelsma, Tom www.tni.org/drugs Blickman, TNI, January 2009.

16 | Burma Policy Briefing