Burma Policy Briefing Nr 5 February 2011 Ethnic Politics in Burma: The Time for Solutions Burma remains a land in ethnic crisis and political transition. In 2010 the military Conclusions and Recommendations State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) laid out the landscape for a new era An inclusive endgame has long been of parliamentary government. In 2011 the needed to achieve national reconcilia- authorities face the challenge of intro- tion. But political and ethnic exclusions ducing the new political system. Ethnic are continuing in national politics. If divisions and political exclusions, however, divisions persist, Burma’s legacy of state are emerging in national politics, threaten- failure and national under-achievement ing a new cycle of impasse and conflict. will continue. Ethnic peace and political inclusion are The moment of opportunity of a new essential if Burma is to overcome its post- government should not be lost. It is vital colonial legacy of state failure. Since that the new government pursues independence from Great Britain in 1948, policies that support dialogue and political and ethnic strife have continued participation for all peoples in the new through all eras of government. The social political and economic system. Policies and humanitarian consequences have been that favour the armed forces and mili- immense. Burma is one of the world’s tary solutions will perpetuate divisions poorest countries, with population and instability. displacement, drug-related problems and infectious disease rates disturbingly high in Opposition groups must face how their the ethnic borderlands. diversity and disunity have contributed to Burma’s history of state failure. If they Under the SPDC, there has been no inclu- are to support democratic and ethnic sive process of dialogue involving the reforms, national participation and unity conflicting parties in national politics. over goals and tactics are essential. All Groups as diverse as the National League sides must transcend the divisions of the for Democracy (NLD) and ceasefire Kachin past. Independence Organisation (KIO) have been pressured out from the SPDC’s politi- As the new political era begins, the cal roadmap, while the Karen National international community should Union (KNU) and other militant forces prioritise policies that promote conflict continue armed struggle in the border- resolution, political rights and equitable lands. opportunity for all ethnic groups in national life, including the economy, For their part, SPDC leaders have largely pursued a two-fold strategy. A new political health and education. Continued system has been drawn up to ensure the repression and exclusion will deepen continued dominance of the armed forces grievances – not resolve them. Burma Policy Briefing | 1 2 | Burma Policy Briefing in government. In the ethnic conflict- three eras, political impasse and ethnic zones, meanwhile, a militia-building policy conflict continued and were integral to the has been mobilised to try and pacify local failures of the post-colonial state. As one of resistance. the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia, non-Burman nationalities make up a The consequence is that, at a time of third of the estimated 59 million popula- promised democratisation and reform, tion. militarisation has increased in many areas of national life. Equally important, major Under the military SLORC-SPDC, a new economic deals have been agreed with approach was promised in the building of a Asian neighbours in the ethnic borderlands multi-ethnic, multi-party democracy. A before nationwide peace, political reform general election was held in 1990 that was and real inclusion in decision-making have overwhelmingly won by the NLD and allied been established. ethnic parties. Meanwhile an ethnic cease- fire policy was introduced in 1989 and, in A critical moment is approaching. A new the following years, came to include a political system is being introduced, and majority of the country’s armed opposition progressive decisions can yet be made. But forces. uncertainty is increasing. Will the new government be the SPDC in new guise or Political impasse and repression, however, continued, leading to a new generation of divisions and exclusions within national “ I would like to urge you to build on the national politics. There were moments when new opportunities for national reconciliation reconsolidation that has been achieved and avoid all appeared, marked, for example, by the ceasefires or release of NLD leader Aung thoughts and notions that might lead to the disintegration San Suu Kyi. SPDC chairman Snr-Gen. Than Shwe frequently claimed “national of the Union. ” reconsolidation” as the goal of the regime’s Snr-Gen. Than Shwe, New Light of Myanmar “political roadmap” for reform in which all 25 December 2010 citizens were urged to take part. Behind the scenes, however, the SPDC will it be a platform from which ethnic continued the long-standing practice of peace and multi-party democracy can truly tactics to maintain the dominance of the spread? The stakes could not be higher. The armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) in decisions made by Burma’s leaders in the government. Tatmadaw interests were coming year could well decide the country’s promoted, while opposition groups were future for a generation. repressed or marginalised, including the NLD and ethnic parties of different back- BACKGROUND grounds. As a result, hopes for “tri-partite” dialogue between military, democracy and With the February 2011 announcement of a ethnic leaders were never fulfilled. new government, a new political epoch has been heralded for Burma/Myanmar.1 This Fundamental to the SPDC’s strategy was follows previous eras since independence: the formation of a new political movement of parliamentary democracy (1948-62), that will outflank non-Tatmadaw parties military socialism (1962-88) and the and dominate future legislatures. As a military State Peace and Development further guarantee, under the 2008 consti- Council (formerly State Law and Order tution a quarter of all seats were reserved Restoration Council - SLORC). During all for Tatmadaw appointees in the new Burma Policy Briefing | 3 A. Ethnic Parties January 20112 1. Elected to the legislatures 2010 All Mon Regions Democracy Party Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic Party Chin National Party Rakhine Nationalities Development Chin Progressive Party Party Ethnic National Development Party Shan Nationalities Democratic Party a Lahu National Development Party Taaung (Palaung) National Party b Inn National Development Party Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin c Kayan National Party State Kayin People's Party Wa Democratic Party Kayin State Democracy and a. party from 1990 election b Development Party b. ceasefire group origin-connection Pao National Organization b c. government-backed: ceasefire group connection 2. Electoral parties that did not win seats All National Races Unity and Northern Shan State Progressive Partyb Development Party (Kayah State)a Rakhine State National Force of Kachin State Progressive Partyb Myanmar Kaman National Progressive Party Wa National Unity Partyc Khami National Development Party a. withdrew due to political pressures c Kokang Democracy and Unity Party b. registration not accepted due to ceasefire group connection Mro or Khami National Solidarity c. party from 1990 election Organisationc 3. Parties from 1990 election in 2002 United Nationalities Alliance (boycotted 2010 election) Arakan League for Democracya Mon National Democratic Fronta Chin National League for Democracy Shan Nationalities League for Democracya Kachin State National Congress for United Nationalities League for Democracy Democracy a Kayah State All Nationalities League for Zomi National Congress Democracy a. allied in the 1998 Committee Representing the Kayin (Karen) National Congress for People’s Parliament with the National League for Democracy Democracy 4 | Burma Policy Briefing assemblies. At the same time, opposition political extinction. Like their NLD ally, ethnic forces in the conflict-zones were they boycotted the 2010 vote in protest at faced with the alternatives of surrender or election conditions and the detention of compromise with the new political system political leaders (see Chart A). As a result, and the integration of their troops into their future now is highly uncertain, and Border Guard Forces (BGFs) under the new government may well consider Tatmadaw control. A deadline of 1 Septem- their activities illegal. ber 2010 was given. Similar complexities exist in the ethnic During these events, opposition groups had borderlands. For while five ethnic ceasefire the potential for influence through the groups and four local militia agreed to choices that they made, but there was no become Border Guard Forces, eight groups common strategy. For example, while the refused (see Chart B and C). Subsequently, ceasefire KIO attended the National Con- some of the BGF rejectionists resumed vention that drew up the new constitution, relations with the KNU and others of the the KNU continued armed struggle in the dozen non-ceasefire groups and factions Thai borderlands. Similarly, while the NLD that still proclaim armed struggle in the boycotted the National Convention and borderlands (see Chart B). 2010 general election, the National Unity Party (NUP - successor to Gen. Ne Win’s Complicating the landscape further, there Burma Socialist Programme Party [BSPP]) are over 50 other local militia (pyithusit)