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Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the US Position on the Independence of Ukraine

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Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the US Position on the Independence of Ukraine Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the US Position on the Independence of Ukraine Olexiy Haran 95-09 August 1995 Olexiy Haran is Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Kiev Mohyla Academy. This paper was prepared while the author was a research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA). His fellowship was supported by a grant from the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX). Additional research support was provided by the CSIA Cooperative Security Project, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. POSITION ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE INTRODUCTION A) UKRAINE: TERRA INCOGNITA? B) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. APPROACH TOWARD UKRAINE I. THE RISE OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE AMERICAN REACTION Perestroika and nationalities problem: American perceptions. Rukh proposes new Union treaty, the West expects "Bulgarization" of Ukraine. Crisis in Sovietology. Ukrainian Studies in the West. II. DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION: CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES Popular movements shift to the idea of independence. Events in the Baltics and the Gulf War. American perceptions of the possibilities of disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Congress and Ukraine. The White House on Union Treaty. 'Chicken Kiev' speech. Baker and Cheney: difference of approaches. Ukrainian referendum. Creation of the CIS: American reaction. III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND INDEPENDENT UKRAINE The "Russia-first" and "Russia-second" approaches. Domestic situation in Ukraine. Russia's "Monroe doctrine": appeal to the West. Ukraine's mistakes. U.S. accent on nuclear problem. Ukraine is bargaining on nuclear issues. Changes in Ukrainian public opinion. Stalemate in American-Ukrainian relations. CONCLUSION: LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES INTRODUCTION The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new states have created a new geopolitical situation, not only in Eastern Europe, but on the global level as well. The United States lost its main enemy, the Cold War is over, and many Americans believe that there are no grounds for U.S. involvement in the affairs of the former Soviet Union. However, Russia remains a great power with a huge nuclear arsenal, and the future of economic and political reform is unclear, as is its foreign policy, especially in the so-called "near abroad." The conflicts in this region influence the domestic and foreign policies of Russia and destabilize the situation in Eastern Europe, providing new challenges for Western policy in this region. Independent Ukraine, with a population of more than fifty million, has emerged as one of the main players in Eastern Europe, and Ukrainian-Russian relations are crucial for the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The interest in Ukraine is increasing in Western capitals. This paper covers the period from 1989 to 1992. In order to understand the evolution of U.S. policy towards Ukraine, it is important to assess the position of the Bush administration, which was challenged by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. I intend to analyze the broad geopolitical background of American-Ukrainian relations, America's perceptions of Ukraine, and the implications for relations with Ukraine and Russia. Before analyzing the policy of the Bush administration, it is important to briefly cover two issues: (1) insufficient knowledge about Ukrainian history in pre-perestroika times; (2) historical background of American policy towards Ukraine. (A) UKRAINE: TERRA INCOGNITA? During the first years of perestroika (1985-87) the overwhelming majority of politicians and scholars (including Mikhail Gorbachev and many Ukrainian intellectuals) could not have predicted the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This was true for the West as well. Therefore, the question arises: why were these changes unexpected? Ukraine was to a great extent terra incognita, and not only for the West. The history of Ukraine was distorted by Soviet propaganda; many documents describing the most tragic aspects of Ukrainian history were concealed from the public, as well as from most of the scholars. Only with the advent of glasnost (which reflected the desire of the Soviet leaders to overcome "stagnation" and to "improve" the Soviet system) was it possible to reveal the real course of Ukrainian history, the role of the Ukrainian national movement, and its dynamics. At the beginning of this century Ukrainians in the Russian empire were prohibited from publishing any materials in their language. During World War I, revolution, civil war, and the foreign invasions of 1917-20, Ukrainians were on different sides of the barricades. Then came years of Poland's political and cultural domination (Polonization) for Western Ukraine and Stalinism for Eastern Ukraine; the famines of 1921, 1933, and 1947 (the 1933 famine, as we now know, was artificially created by Stalin and cost Ukrainians from 3 to 5 million lives1 ) ; the Great Terror of the 1930s; World War II, when Ukrainians, finding themselves between Stalin and Hitler, created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to fight on both fronts (their resistance was suppressed by the Red Army only at the beginning of the 1950s); the subtle and extremely dangerous Russification of the 1960s-1980s; and finally, Chernobyl in 1986. One can find people who lived in Austria-Hungary, Ukrainian People's Republic, and Poland, under Soviet, German and once again Soviet rule. Many people (including many Ukrainians) believed that the process of Russification was historically objective and irreversible. But in every period of history we can also find examples of resistance, and with the first signs of liberalization during perestroika the latent energy was freed, involving in the process of nation- and state-building many Russified Ukrainians, as well as Russians and Jews living in Ukraine. B) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. APPROACH TOWARDS UKRAINE During the turmoil of 1919-20, the Allies generally ignored the pro-Western Ukrainian People's Republic. More than seventy years later, House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt stated, in a speech on April 22, 1993, that the West had provided no support to Ukraine when it had fallen under the Bolshevik rule.2 Part of the explanation for it can be found in Ukrainian politics: a split in the Ukrainian national movement because of different political orientations; a struggle among its leaders; internal instability and rapid changes of different regimes; naiveté of socialist leaders in their belief in lasting peace; delay in building a Ukrainian army; the inexperience of Ukrainian diplomats; and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany in February 1918, followed by German occupation and establishment of a pro-German regime in Ukraine for six months. However, the main reason for the Allies' policy was the option to support the White Russians, the main force against the Bolsheviks, whose aim was to restore the Russian empire. Despite the fact that President Woodrow Wilson included the idea of self- determination of nations in American foreign policy, the united States withheld recognition of the Baltic states until 1922. The problem of self-determination of nations was not the reason for America's initial refusal to recognize the Soviet Union. Before and after recognition, criticism was directed at the undemocratic Soviet system in general, not the subjugation of nations in particular. The U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, in the year of the artificial famine imposed on Ukraine by Stalin, was dictated by geopolitical factors. However, the United States never accepted incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, which occurred after its diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. This provided legal and moral grounds for support of the struggle of Baltic republics for independence during perestroika. The situation gradually began changing with the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. The U.S. intelligence services provided some assistance to guerilla movements in the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine. Displaced persons who became postwar immigrants were highly politicized and aware of their Ukrainian identity. Having created several diaspora organizations in the West, they became a factor in American domestic and foreign policy; the CIA and Radio Liberty also used them in the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.3 As a result, in 1959, at the end of his second term, President Dwight Eisenhower added the Captive Nations resolution to his policy of "rollback." Following the demands of ethnic lobbies, he signed this resolution three weeks before his meeting with Nikita Khrushchev. Congress passed the resolution unanimously. It stated that the independence of submerged nations was in the vital interest of the United States, and called for an annual week of commemoration of "Captive Nations.”4 However, the drafts of the resolutions appealing for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Ukraine proposed several times after World War II by members of Congress were never passed5: broadening of American contacts with Ukraine could be complicating negotiations with Moscow on security issues; at the same time it could be used in Soviet efforts to create the image of a "successful Soviet nationalities policy" with which to woo the countries of the Third World. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the main purpose of the Captive Nations resolution
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