Coversheet for Thesis in Sussex Research Online
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis Available online via Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/ This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details PATRONS, BROTHERS AND LANDLORDS: COMPETING FOR THE VOTE IN RURAL PAKISTAN Shandana Khan Mohmand Doctor of Philosophy Institute of Development Studies University of Sussex May 2011 ii I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree. Signature iii University of Sussex Shandana Khan Mohmand Doctor of Philosophy Patrons, Brothers and Landlords: Competing for the Vote in Rural Pakistan SUMMARY How do citizens vote in rural Pakistan, and how much agency do they have in relation to local landlords, patrons and kinship networks in making electoral decisions? I explore this question in this dissertation through an empirical investigation of the voting behaviour of Pakistan’s rural majority in its most populous and politically important province, Punjab, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods and original data on the voting behaviour of about 2300 households in 38 villages. The results of this dissertation counter the notions that rural Punjabi voters are dependent and that national elections can be won on the basis of extended kinship networks. My data reveals that the dependence of rural voters that so captivates popular discourse about Pakistani politics describes only about 7 percent of voters, and that kinship networks function more as forums for local collective action than as extended political organisations. I found that a vast majority of rural Punjabi citizens vote as members of village-level vote blocs that are organised by the landed village elite. Nevertheless, most rural Punjabi voters do not participate in vote blocs because of socio-economic dependence. Instead, I found that they are benefit- seeking political actors who organise within their kinship networks to strengthen their bargaining position and then give their collective votes to vote bloc leaders who act as broker-patrons and provide access to state officials and services. I also found that voting behaviour varies significantly across villages and across households within the same village. Most of the variation between villages is explained by differences in social structure and varying levels of historical and current land inequality, while the fact that households that lie within the same village behave differently from one another is explained mainly by their wealth and caste status. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary iii List of Figures and Tables vii Acknowledgements viii Glossary x 1. Voting in Rural Punjab - An Introduction 1 1.1. Introduction 1 1.1.1. Pakistani Politics in a Comparative Context 1 1.1.2. Exploring Voting Behaviour in Pakistan 6 1.2. Two Villages, Different Worlds 10 1.3. The Logic of Voting in Rural Punjab 13 1.3.1. Preliminary Observations 13 1.3.2. The Variously Described Voting Behaviour of Rural Punjab 16 1.3.3. What Questions to Ask and of Whom? 18 1.4. Investigating Voting Behaviour 21 1.4.1. Why Sargodha? 21 1.4.2. Setting up the Research, Sampling Villages and Designing Survey Instruments 22 1.5. Inequality, Social Structure and Status 25 1.5.1. Findings 26 1.6. The Plan 29 PART I - National Politics 2. Colonial Constructs and Post-Colonial Politics 32 Introduction 32 2.1. The State and the Village Under Colonial Rule — 1849-1947 33 2.1.1. Revenue Base and Extraction 33 2.1.2. ‘Agencies of Rule’ and Intermediaries 36 2.1.3. Expansion 39 2.1.4. The Impact of Partition 42 2.2. Post-Colonial Politics and the Rise of Class and Party Identification — 1947-1977 43 2.2.1. Colonial Politics and the Partition of 1947 43 2.2.2. Continuation of Landed Power — 1947-1970 44 2.2.3. Class Divisions and the Rise of the Pakistan People’s Party 46 2.2.4. Agrarian Reforms During the Bhutto Years — 1970-1977 49 Conclusion 52 3. Landlords, Brothers and Patrons in National Politics - 1977-2008 54 Introduction 54 3.1. ‘Feudalism’ 55 3.2. Biraderi-ism 59 3.2.1. Defining Biraderi — The Traditional Social System of Pakistan 59 3.2.2. Biraderi-ism and Politics in Pakistan 61 3.3. Clientelism 65 3.3.1 Two Types of Clientelism 65 3.3.2 Clientelism in Pakistani Politics 67 3.4. Politics Today — A Mixed Bag 72 Conclusion 74 v PART II - The Village 4. From Domination to Intermediation: The Landed Elite of Sahiwal 78 Introduction 78 4.1. Sahiwal in the 1960s: Domination 80 4.1.1. Physical Layout and Structure 81 4.1.2. Economic Structure and Relations 82 4.1.3. Sources of Dependence 84 4.1.4. Pattern of Politics 85 4.1.5. Power and Monopolistic Control in Sahiwal 87 4.2. Sahiwal in the 1980s: Transformation 88 4.2.1. Changes in Physical Layout and Structure 89 4.2.2. Changes in Agrarian Relations of Production 90 4.2.3. Transformation of Dependence and Power 93 4.2.4. Politics: From Factionalism to Class 96 4.2.5. Inequality, Class and Power in Sahiwal 98 4.3. Sahiwal in the 2000s: Intermediation 99 4.3.1. Changes in Physical Layout and Structure 100 4.3.2. Changes in Agrarian Relations of Production 102 4.3.3. Circumscribed Independence 104 4.3.4. Politics, Factions and Intermediation 108 4.3.5. Intermediation and Political Control in Sahiwal 111 Conclusion 112 5. Beyond Sahiwal: Different Contexts, Different Politics 114 Introduction 114 5.1. Sampling Case Villages 115 5.2. Five Contexts 117 5.2.1. Tiwanabad 117 5.2.2. Badhor 122 5.2.3. Chak 1 123 5.2.4. Chak 2 127 5.2.5. Chak Migrant 131 5.3. Varying Politics 133 Conclusion 138 PART III - The Household and its Village Context 6. Bargaining with Landlords: Conceptualising Voting Behaviour in Rural Punjab 141 Introduction 141 6.1. Defining Vote Blocs 142 6.2. Profiling Vote Bloc Leaders 146 6.3. Unravelling Vote Bloc Membership 149 6.3.1. Four Ideal Types of Relationships 150 6.3.2. Empirical Evidence 154 6.4. Operationalising Voting Behaviour and Bargaining Power 156 6.5. Constructing the Index of Bargaining Power 160 6.5.1. Measuring Variation in Bargaining Power 160 6.5.2. The Index of Bargaining Power 168 Conclusion 169 vi 7. Inequality, Social Structure and Status: The Uneven Political Arena of Rural Punjab 172 Introduction 172 7.1. Sampling Villages and Households 173 7.2. Defining Independent Variables 176 7.2.1. Village-level Independent Variables 177 7.2.2. Household-level Independent Variables 183 7.2.3. Empirical Strategy 185 7.3. Explaining Voting Behaviour through Village Characteristics 188 7.3.1. Results for Vote Bloc Membership 189 7.3.2. Results for Types of Linkages between Members and Leaders 190 7.3.3. Results for Bargaining Power of Members vis-à-vis Leaders 191 7.3.4. Conclusion 192 7.4. Explaining Voting Behaviour through Household Characteristics 193 7.4.1. Results for Vote Bloc Membership 194 7.4.2.Results for Types of Linkages and Bargaining Power between Members and Leaders 194 7.4.3. Results for Vote Bloc Leader 196 7.4.4. Conclusion 197 7.5. Making Sense of Voting Behaviour 197 Conclusion 203 8. Bargaining with Oligarchs 205 8.1. Summary of the Argument 205 8.2. Vote Blocs and the Oligarchy of the Landed Elite 208 8.3. Paths of Change 214 8.4. Future Research 216 Bibliography 217 Annexes 225 vii LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES Table 3.1. Land inequality 57 Table 3.2. Land ownership distribution in Pakistan and Punjab (in acres) 57 Table 3.3. Changes in farm sizes (1972-2000) (% of farms reported by size) 58 Table 3.4. Tenure classification of farms – declining rates of tenancy 58 Table 3.5. Number of seats won by the main political parties (1970-2002) 72 Table 4.1. Occupation of household heads in Sahiwal 102 Table 4.2. Landownership by quom 103 Table 4.3. Socio-economic indicators by quom 106 Table 5.1. Sample of case studies 116 Table 5.2. Pair-wise comparisons of six villages 134 Table 5.3. Dimensions of political organisation in six villages 136 Table 5.4. Percentage people voting as part of a vote bloc 137 Table 6.1. Percentage voters that were part of a vote bloc 144 Table 6.2. Basis of leadership of vote bloc leaders 147 Table 6.3. Basis of alignment between vote bloc leader and candidate 149 Table 6.4. Four types of relationships between vote bloc leaders and voters 151 Table 6.5. Basis of participation of a household head in a vote bloc 155 Table 6.6. Measures of bargaining power 160 Table 6.7. Dimension 1 – Do members have a choice between vote blocs? 161 Table 6.8. Dimension 2 – Can members switch between vote blocs? 162 Table 6.9. Dimension 3 – Can members form their own vote blocs? 163 Table 6.10. Dimension 4 – Can members participate in the decisions of a vote bloc? 164 Table 6.11.