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The London School of Economics and Political Science The Political Logic of Status Competition: Cases from China, 1962-1979 WANG, Ziyuan (professionally known as William Z.Y. Wang) A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, July 2018 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of < 85,570 > words. Abstract Why do state leaders adopt competitive strategies in pursuit of great-power status? Competitive status-seeking acts incur tremendous risks for a state’s geopolitical security as it entails challenging a higher-ranked power. To explain why leaders opt for such risky policies, this study underscores the instrumental importance of great-power status for states and that of personal prestige for the leaders. My central assertion is that leaders undertake competitive status-seeking measures in hopes of furthering their interests in both geopolitical and domestic political arenas. Competitive status-seeking strategy is a preferable policy for leaders who rely upon personal prestige as a dominant vehicle for political survival at home while regarding great-power status as a route to geopolitical security. Through an in-depth study of three cases from the 1962-1979 period of China’s foreign and security policy, this thesis illustrates how this political logic informed the leadership decision on competitive assertions of status. During this period, China’s policy illustrates three varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy—namely, offensive alliance, delegitimation strategy, and display of military power. These strategies respectively display diplomatic, ideological, and military aspects of state power, which serve as central vehicles for leaders to assert great-power status. Invariably they were motivated by leaders’ pragmatic concerns for great-power status in geopolitics and personal prestige in domestic elite politics. As demonstrated by the case studies, competitive stats-seeking measures provide a critical vehicle for leaders to cope with imperatives of geopolitical competition and domestic political survival simultaneously. This study seeks to make three original contributions to the literature on status ambitions and international conflict. First, it treats status aspirations as a variable rather than an invariant driver of state policy as often assumed. Second, it claims that leaders may assert great-power status on their nation’s behalf with a view to enhancing geopolitical security. In this regard, status and security are treated as complementary rather than antithetical. The final aspect of originality in my argument lies in its integration of rationalist and psychological microfoundations. While my argument highlights the instrumental rationality of state leaders in trying to advance geopolitical security and legitimize their authority in domestic elite politics, it also addresses how leaders inspire emotional reactions from domestic audiences to support their risky policy. 2 Table of Contents Introduction, 4 Research questions. Significance of the matter. The literature. The argument. Conceptual clarifications. Contributions. Plan of the thesis. Chapter 1 The Security Rationale of Status Competition, 30 The Puzzle of “assertiveness.” Seeking status for security. Distinctiveness of competitive status-seeking strategy. Varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy. Critique of existing theories. Chapter 2 The Political Logic of Status Competition, 50 Social preeminence and power politics. Hypotheses on competitive status-seeking strategy. Falsifying the argument. Case selection issue. The case study methods. Caveats. Summary. Chapter 3 The “Left Turn” in China’s Security Policy: Beijing’s Pursuit of Offensive Alliance in the Vietnam War, 1962-1965, 81 The international context. China’s security strategy prior to 1962. Failure of the Great Leap Forward. Authority contests between Mao and Liu. China’s shift to offensive alliance with the Hanoi regime. Evaluating alternative explanations. Conclusion. Chapter 4 China’s Delegitimation Strategy against the Soviet Union: 1965-1969, 119 The international context. The emergence of delegitimation strategy in China’s Soviet policy. The radicalization of Chinese politics. The climax of China’s pursuit of delegitimation strategy. Toward the Ninth Party Congress. Conclusion. Chapter 5 China’s Use of Military Force: From the 1969 Border Conflict to the 1979 Invasion of Vietnam, 153 The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict. The US-China rapprochement. A resurgence of competitive status-seeking strategy. Conclusion. Conclusions and Implications, 193 Status competition in international security affairs. Theoretical implications. Empirical findings. Contemporary relevance. Limitations and avenues for future research. Bibliographical List, 206 3 Introduction When those who are in office behave arrogantly, and seek their personal advantage, people start factional intrigues against each other and against the constitution which permits this to happen……It is also clear what influence honor exerts and how it may be a cause of faction. People form factions when they suffer dishonor themselves and when they see others honored. Aristotle1 Actually, the policy of prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may have been at times, is as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between individuals……Its purpose is to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or want the other nations to believe, it possesses. Hans Morgenthau2 While the literature……convincingly shows that those who manage the affairs of states are likely to place a value on positive status comparisons, we still do not know how strong this preference is. William Wohlforth3 Status is a positional good in world politics as well as our daily life. In theory, one’s acquisition of status means a relative loss by others in the field where the actors strive for social preeminence.4 Status competition tends to be zero-sum. “Social competition [for status] aims to equal or outdo the dominant group in the area on which its claim to superior status rests,” Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko note. “In international relations, where status is in large part based on military and economic power, social competition often entails traditional geopolitical rivalry, such as competition over spheres of influence or arms racing.”5 Status competition thus could be a crucial source of international conflict. In spite of this, social competition does not have to be the dominant strategy for states aspiring to status preeminence vis-à-vis others. As some prominent scholars have noted, status-enhancing strategies do not necessitate competitive acts of displaying state power; 1 Aristotle, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 183. 2 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1985), 86-87. 3 William Wohlforth, "Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict," in Status in World Politics, ed. T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 124. 4 Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 5 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy," International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 72. 4 rather, leaders can also try to advance national status by emulating the competent practices of status achievers (e.g. social mobility strategy) or by creatively carving out a realm of social activities in which the status aspirant can outperform others (e.g. social creativity strategy).6 Strategies of social mobility and creativity are conductive to the peaceful change of international order, in that pursuing them entail lower risks of conflict escalation and the means involved tend to facilitate reciprocal accommodation between the status seeker and the conferrer.7 In the final analysis, acquiring status by competition is not the only choice for status seekers. Given that competitive strategy represents perhaps the staunchest effort at status seeking, it is theoretically interesting and practically imperative to investigate why it is in policymakers’ interest to advance great-power status vis-à-vis other nations at the risk of conflict escalation and even war.8 Thus, why do leaders adopt competitive policies in pursuit of great power status—thus undertaking acts to display state power? Such acts could incur tremendous risks for a state’s geopolitical security as they entail challenging a higher-ranked power. Importantly though, competitive status-seeking acts may help enhance long-term security for the status-aspiring state.