House of Commons International Development Committee
Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect
Fifth Report of Session 2004–05
Volume II
Oral and written evidence
Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 16 March 2005
HC 67-II [Incorporating HC 67-i to -vi] Published 30 March 2005 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £18.50
The International Development Committee
The International Development Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for International Development and its associated public bodies.
Current membership Tony Baldry MP (Conservative, Banbury) (Chairman) John Barrett MP (Liberal Democrat, Edinburgh West) Mr John Battle MP (Labour, Leeds West) Hugh Bayley MP (Labour, City of York) Mr John Bercow MP (Conservative, Buckingham) Ann Clwyd MP (Labour, Cynon Valley) Mr Tony Colman MP (Labour, Putney) Mr Quentin Davies MP (Conservative, Grantham and Stamford) Mr Piara S Khabra MP (Labour, Ealing Southall) Chris McCafferty MP (Labour, Calder Valley) Tony Worthington MP (Labour, Clydebank and Milngavie)
Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk
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Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the International Development Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 1223; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]
Witnesses
Monday 29 November 2004 Page
Dr Suliman Baldo, Africa Program Director, International Crisis Group Ev 1
Tuesday 14 December 2004
Ms Maniza Ntekim, Parliamentary Officer, Amnesty International UK, Mr Steve Crawshaw, London Director, Human Rights Watch, and Mr Toby Porter, Emergencies Director, Save the Children UK, representing the Sudan Advocacy Coalition Ev 13
Tuesday 21 December 2004
Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International Development, Dr Alistair McPhail, UK Special Representative for Sudan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Mr Brian Thomson, former Head of FCO/DFID Sudan Unit Ev 26
Wednesday 9 February 2005
Mr Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, and Mr Oliver Ulich, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Ev 40
Tuesday 22 February 2005
Dr Mukesh Kapila, Former UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Sudan Ev 48
Wednesday 23 February 2005
Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State, and Ms Anna Bewes, Head of the Sudan Unit, Department for International Development Ev 60
List of written evidence
Department for International Development (DFID) Ev 71; Ev 92; Ev 96 The Aegis Trust Ev 97 Mark Pallis, All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention Ev 99 Amnesty International UK Ev 100 Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan Ev 103 Suliman Baldo, James Morton, Roland Marchal and Alex de Waal Ev 105 Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (DRDC) Ev 110 ECHO - The Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid of the European Commission Ev 128 Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan (London) Ev 133 The European Sudanese Public Affairs Council (ESPAC) Ev 137 Human Rights Watch (HRW) Ev 145 International Crisis Group (ICG) Ev 149 Liberation Ev 152 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Ev 154 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Ev 155 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Ev 159; Ev 165; Ev 166 UN World Food Programme (WFP) Ev 168 ; Ev 172 Alex Vines, Chatham House Ev 174
List of unprinted written evidence
Additional papers have been received from the following and have been reported to the House but to save printing costs they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to the Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1. (Tel 020 7219 3074). Hours of inspection are from 9:30am to 5:00pm on Mondays to Fridays.
Report by the Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan: Sudan’s Opportunity for Peace and Development? Visit to Sudan 27 June- 4 July 2004 (this includes a chapter on Darfur, pages 48-64)
Letter to the Chairman from the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International Development, following questions raised on the WHO mortality survey and White Nile Ltd.
International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 1 Oral evidence
Taken before the International Development Committee
on Monday 29 November 2004
Members present:
Hugh Bayley Mr Tony Colman Mr John Bercow Mr Quentin Davies Ann Clwyd Tony Worthington
In the absence of the Chairman, Tony Worthington was called to the chair
Witness: Dr Suliman Baldo, Africa Program Director, International Crisis Group (ICG), examined.
Q1 Tony Worthington: You are very welcome, Dr Q3 Tony Worthington: Thank you very much; I Baldo, and we are very much looking forward to think that was helpful. Again, before we start, just a your evidence on behalf of the International Crisis point of clarification which Ineed—and Ido not Group. As Iam sure you know, as a Committee we know if my colleagues do as well—but there are are going to Sudan at the end of January and your references to the Sudan Liberation Army and the help in preparing us for that visit, alongside all the Justice and Equality Movement; perhaps you could other material that we are receiving, will be very put those in context? The Justice and Equality welcome indeed. Could Ijust say to start with that Movement, in my reading, is associated with Turabi, we have heard a great deal about the work of the who leads an Islamic Party; I understand that much. International Crisis Group and read a great deal in Could you talk about whether there is any link at all the past. It would be helpful to start with if you could between the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement talk a little bit about what the ICG is and how it and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/ comes to be involved? Movement with the SPLA, with which we have been Dr Baldo: Many thanks for having me, your familiar for years? What is that relationship? Is Honour, and ladies and gentlemen. Iam pleased to there one? be here and very honoured. Iappreciate this Dr Baldo: Starting with the Justice and Equality opportunity and thank you for having me. Iam here Movement, it is associated with al-Turabi’s Popular representing the International Crisis Group. It is a Congress in Sudan, but not in a way that, again as non-profit, private multi-national organisation, the government is arguing, is the armed faction of with headquarters in Brussels, whose mission is to the Political Popular Congress of Hassan al-Turabi. help and contribute to conflict prevention and So there is a loose association. Senior members of containment through advocacy, field-based research Turabi’s group have joined the game and are and investigations. The organisation has about 100 V pursuing their policy objectives that are national and field-based analysts in di erent parts of the world— that are overlapping with those of the Popular Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, Asia, South Y Congress. So there is that kind of intimate East Asia, and advocacy o ces in Brussels, New relationship between the two. With regard to the York, Washington and Moscow, with the aim of Sudan Liberation Army/Movement, it was founded engaging the international powers and international by young Darfurians who were exposed, in urban players to help with conflict prevention and centres to which they migrated as young workers containment. Our work in Africa is again based on and graduates, to the ideology of the SPLA and their this model of field research and we have field oYces interaction with migrants who became displaced in Dakar, Pretoria and in Nairobi for Central and from southern Sudan in these urban areas, and as East Africa. The work in Sudan was launched in such the SLA is very much influenced by the 2002, accompanying mainly— ideology of “a new Sudan”. That is the ideology that John Garang, chairman of the SPLA, had Q2 Mr Davies: While we are talking about the formulated when founding the SPLA in the mid-80s. Agency itself, can you just tell us what are the Later on we have had reliable reports that the SPLA, sources of funding of the International Crisis the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army, had Group? helped establish the SLA in its infancy by training Dr Baldo: The main funding comes from private fighters for the SPLA and for the SLA—for the foundations and individuals. ICG also is an agency Sudan Liberation Movement and Army, and that receives government funding and in that therefore Darfurian recruits to the tune of 1,500— capacity it receives considerable funding, for and arming them. When the Southern SPLA started example, from the Canadian government, the in negotiations with the government for a peace Norwegians, several Member States of the agreement they distanced themselves from directly European Union, the EU itself, Britain and Ireland. helping the SLA, according to our information, at a There is a vast variety of donor players of the military level. But the SPLA never made a secret of organisation. its political sympathy and support for the cause of Ev 2 International Development Committee: Evidence
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo the Sudan Liberation Army of Darfur. There is the International Crisis Group with a description of therefore again this ideological, political sympathy recent developments and political descriptions2.I between the SLA and the SPLA, much as it exists did want to focus on the most recent developments, between the Justice and Equality Movement and the basically as of late October and in the course of this Popular Congress of Hassan al-Turabi. month. We are very, very concerned—and Icannot underline it suYciently—by certain trends, certain Q4 Tony Worthington: The SPLA has split or has patterns in the violence that is continuing now in had many factions over the years, it has just kept on Darfur, because of the prevalence of ethnic revenge happening, and John Garang’s ambition was as a motor, as a fuel for much of the violence that is always, as Iunderstand it, for a united Sudan? occurring currently. Several incidents have occurred Dr Baldo: Yes. that highlight this concern, this development. The background: the government has politicised Q5 Tony Worthington: But he has now been part of ethnicity in Darfur instead of acting as an arbitrator negotiations that are seeing there being a less than and as a neutral guarantor between communities unified Sudan, one which has a lot of control in the that in dispute over resources or over access to land south for the south. What is happening now in terms or grazing ranges. It has decided to side with of the attitudes by the SPLA to the activities of the particular groups, in this case the groups of Arab SLA? Are they pursuing a common purpose or has origin. That identity is indeed a politicised identity. the purpose changed? It has been used by local elites in Darfur for political, Dr Baldo: At a certain level the SPLA is a national social promotion in the government, at the level of movement. Many in the north of Sudan identify with the government of the three states of Darfur and the the cause of the SPLA. The SPLA has been in a national government. That has increased the level of political alliance and military alliance of the north frustration of communities of African background, Sudan opposition groups under the umbrella of the and this was a major factor in creating the National Democratic Alliance and SPLA soldiers environment for the explosion of the insurgency. are the main contingent of opposition forces that The government in its counter-insurgency campaign have been fighting the government in north eastern relied on ethnicity again by raising the Janjaweed Sudan since 1995, since the foundation of the united militia from amongst certain clans of some Arab V military command of the National Democratic groups, but the Janjaweed are di erent things at the Alliance. So the level of identification with the cause same time; they are also people who are serving of the SPLA is shared by many diVerent terms in government prisons for grave crimes such as marginalized constituencies in the north of Sudan, murder, robbery, highway robbery, which is an including in Darfur, and the example of the Sudan aspect relating to a certain situation in the region, Liberation Movement and Army is a good example and who were freed if they repented. There was a of that. The SPLA has been presenting its own national campaign which was called Repentance, negotiations with the government for a permanent, and those were integrated in this government militia. comprehensive peace agreement, as an avant garde The Janjaweed include also groups of Arab or as an opening of the way for other marginalized background from Chad, and all that amalgam was groups to benefit. The way the negotiations were thrown against the civilian base of the rebellion, and structured, basically privileging the actions of the therefore instead of fighting citizens who rose and crisis in Sudan that is North-South, has indeed opposed the government in armed fashion, the created a lot of frustration and agitation among Sudanese Army and its allied militia attacked other marginalized groups who believe that the civilians to punish collectively what is considered as Sudan government and sharing in political power the population base of those insurgents. Hence, this and wealth is going to be done bi-laterally by the is the trigger which is the cause of the devastating government and the SPLA, leaving out anyone else. humanitarian disaster that occurred with today 1.6 According to these concerns we have witnessed the million people displaced and the like. But the aspect eruption of the insurgency in Darfur because they of Arab versus Africans never occurred as a people feel that if they stay outside this process they may not against people in the conflict thus far. The major have suYcient share of the wealth sharing and the Arab groups in Darfur have actually deliberately— political sharing arrangements for national power. and in many cases tried very hard—to stay out of The same level of concern and agitation is now conflict and not to take sides in it. This is the case of happening in eastern Sudan, unfortunately. several major Arab groups in Darfur, such as the Rizeigat in southern Darfur. The reason that they Q6 Tony Worthington: That was certainly helpful to have not cooperated with the government strategy of me. Could Ijust, before handing over to my this Popular Defence Force is that in the war against colleagues, ask you to bring us right up to date with the SPLA in southern Sudan they found nothing of what has been happening in the last week or so in the promises that the government said it would Darfur, so that we know the present context? deliver to them. This time around they said they will Dr Baldo: Ihave made two written submissions, one stay outside, despite pressures, intimidation and in a joint paper on the root causes of the conflict and incentives for them to join the fight. So what is the diVerent dimensions and multiple layers of this happening right now is that there is a gradual slide conflict situation1, and a submission in the name of towards the tribalisation of the conflict, the reason
1 Ev 105 2 Ev 149 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 3
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo being therefore the emergence of ethnic revenge, Darfur; there has been a campaign of indiscriminate attempts to solicit and to stoke collectively actions attack against civilians—all against international by a group against another. humanitarian law and international human rights law. Q7Tony Worthington: Could Iask you to talk about the last week or so because we have read the papers Q10 Ann Clwyd: For those of us watching on on the background, for which we are very grateful? television the horrible pictures that have come out of What we do not have is what has been happening Darfur, and seen the suVerings of the people, most over the last week. of us feel that the response of the international Dr Baldo: Over the last few weeks there have been community, for instance setting up safe areas which incidents of hostage taking; they signal a breakdown you have said does not work, Icannot understand in the rebel command, because it was rebels, why you should be reluctant to describe what you particularly of the SLA, that were involved in have just talked about as genocide. stopping buses, commercial convoys and singling Dr Baldo: This is the evidence as we have established out people for detention and they have abducted, for it. We cannot call this genocide until we are certain example, in late October, a group of 18 people of in investigations that are now underway by an Arab origin in North Darfur. The response has been independent international commission of inquiry, of Arab militia detaining several people of African that is publicly mandated to do it by the UN Security origin in retaliation. So this indicates a trend of Council. But Iwant to come back to the point you polarisation along these lines, as Isaid earlier in my raised about the policy of safe areas. The explanation. It could also be argued that the entire international community here is not the only one population of the internally displaced people (IDPs) that has failed to respond adequately. In the case of of 1.6 million plus is in a hostage situation of a sort. the policy of safe areas, which were initiated by the This is a population which is over one million of Secretary-General’s Special Representative to African origin. They are in these camps and they are Sudan and the Government of Sudan, it was in fact unable to leave the camps out of fear of concern for a total disaster. It backfired. Why did it backfire? their own safety because they are subjected to Because the government used the pretext of harassment, detention, attack by the Janjaweed that establishing these safe areas and of extending the continue to roam these camps. But there have been several incidents over the last few weeks of the perimeters of the safe areas to actually increase its Janjaweed and other government militia roaming military presence and to encroach on areas under the through camps discharging firearms as IDPs tried to control of the rebels. Therefore, there was a pattern leave. These incidents of collective intimidation, of increased violations of the ceasefire between terrorisation of IDP groups were often linked to August and September, which has started actually attempts by the government to break down the the current surge in the violence, directly linked to larger IDP camps; to force, therefore, IDPs to leave the policy of safe areas, and each time the UN turned these camps, for areas where the government would around and asked the government why is it fighting, prefer to relocate them. The motivation of the they say, “We are simply enforcing the safe areas government here is one of security. The large camps that we have agreed to establish.” It was this level of of 50,000 plus, 60,000 internally displaced people in cynicism that has led the government to use a some of these camps are actually very near or humanitarian clause for military purposes, and this sometimes within city premises of the three capitals is the response of the international community that of the Darfur states. has totally backfired and was a fiasco and Icould not condemn it suYciently. Q8 Tony Worthington: These are so-called “safe areas”? Q11 Ann Clwyd: In the past the Government of Dr Baldo: These are what the United Nations tried Sudan established in the Nuba Mountains, for to establish as safe areas and that policy has terribly example, peace villages. Given that Iremember backfired, and Iwill come back to this. trying to visit the Nuba Mountains some years ago Tony Worthington: Can Ihand over to Ann Clwyd when Iwas in the Sudan, of course there were no-go to take that forward? areas for outsiders and we were not able to visit them, what is the situation in these so-called peace Q9 Ann Clwyd: Before Iget on to that, what you are villages in the Nuba Mountains now? describing is genocide, is it not? Dr Baldo: The Nuba mountains, since 2002 have Dr Baldo: Ido not want to go into the legalistic witnessed a certain calm, a certain claim to normalcy definitions and the like. What Iam observing is a thanks to the ceasefire agreement between the SPLA situation of massive violation of human rights that and the government in the Nuba Mountains. That have led to the uprooting of these huge numbers and was an agreement that was initiated even before the the entire tearing apart of the social fabric in Darfur. initiation of the IGAD process. Therefore there has There is an international commission now looking been a movement of return of IDPs to their villages, into these war crimes and one of its points of there have been cross line exchanges between mandate is to establish whether this is genocide or populations and between governments and SPLA not. But Ido not want to go into this. For me there oYcials. The situation is still there but there has been has been, definitely from our perspective, a much improvement since the period you have visited campaign of ethnic cleansing that took place in in these areas, in this policy of peace villages. Ev 4 International Development Committee: Evidence
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo
Q12 Ann Clwyd: But is this not forcing people to live negotiations with the SPLA. Again, that was an in particular areas where they may not necessarily opportunity for the government to really slow down want to live? and drag its feet in the Naivasha process with the Dr Baldo: This was indeed a policy of, Iwould say, hope that it would get oV the hook in Darfur. So it social engineering at this time; that was in the mid is a game of manipulation in which the government 1980s. The government physically transplanted has been very successful with its performance so people who were displaced by the violence in the far—far better than the international community, I Nuba Mountains to areas in the north of Darfur— would say. that is to say areas that are totally diVerent from their home regions—placed them in these so-called Q14 Mr Colman: You are describing a situation peace villages, subjected them to intensive where you appear to blame the Government of programmes of repatriation, culturisation, Sudan for everything that has happened, yet at the Islamisation. Even if they were Muslim it was not beginning of this meeting this afternoon you were judged of the right quality. They were taught how to talking about the fact that the rebel movements had dress, how to circumcise, how to bury their dead, taken up arms against the government to the how to conduct their rights of marriage and birth- country two years ago. In the south there has been a giving and the like. And then when people wanted to terrible war that has gone on for some 30 years, leave it was only men who were allowed to leave to many hundreds of thousands, nay millions of people search for work—families were kept behind. It was have died in that war of 30 years. Darfur was at an elaborate policy that was done during a certain peace. Is there a responsibility for the rebels who period of time with a view to really change the social have destroyed that peace rather than perhaps what construct, the intellectual construct of this you keep emphasising, which is that it is the population. It is a policy of engineering, in much the Government of Sudan who has destroyed that peace same way as imposing fashion as imposing in Darfur? colonisation during the colonial period, with the Dr Baldo: Iwould beg to di Ver with the appreciation intent here being one of imposing Islamic/Arabic that Darfur was at peace. The origin of this conflict culture on this population. It is true that the policy goes back to the 1980s and since then Darfur has not of safe villages is in a way an indication of this known peace. It has been living in a situation of continued pattern of conduct of the Government of destabilisation and of violence that has received little Sudan right through. What is happening now, in attention. Particularly the communities of Darfur, Darfur there has been a lot of focus on what the the Massaleit and the Zaghawa, whose sons rose government is doing and therefore it is showing with this rebellion, have been subject to constant compliance while at the same time being faithful to attacks by marauding nomadic groups of Arab its objectives, whilst at the same time pursuing the origin that have been, in many cases, armed and same strategic objectives using the same type of recruited into government supported militias, and tools. whenever this community complained to local garrisons, to policemen, to local oYcials of the Q13 Ann Clwyd: Do you think that the international Government of Sudan they did not receive the community has been reluctant to pressurise the attention or the protection they felt that they were Government of Sudan on Darfur because they are entitled to. The response has been the Darfur afraid of disrupting the North-South peace insurgence. That being said, Iwould never claim that agreement? It looks as though that war may the rebels do not bear a share of the responsibility. eventually be coming to an end? Do you think they In particular over the last few weeks there have been are afraid of putting pressure because it may upset signs of the collapse or even in some cases loss of that? control and command by the Sudan Liberation Dr Baldo: This has indeed been the case in late 2003, Army—and that is very worrying—leading to early 2004. The international communities, when we incidences, as Iwas saying, of hostage taking, did advocacy in the United Nations and with the incidences of attacks on humanitarian convoys, Security Council members, actually that was the incidences of livestock rustling from groups that are argument too; that it is not the right moment, we are of Arab background. Therefore, in creating the risk very near the conclusion of a comprehensive peace of frontal communal fighting between Arabs versus agreement, when that agreement is reached we are non-Arabs that did not compose a substantive part going to resolve all these problems and Darfur of the conflict so far. But Darfur has been in turmoil should really wait. There was pressure put on the for quite a long time and it is only now becoming Darfur rebels really to resist and disengage and the known. like. The government has deliberately used that window of opportunity to pursue its counter- Q15 Mr Colman: What do you believe the insurgency strategy. Except that the response was Government of Sudan should be doing to resolve totally disproportionate to the threat posed by the this crisis? insurgency and the response has created a huge Dr Baldo: The Government of Sudan should really humanitarian disaster which was impossible to stop using ethnicity for political purposes, for ignore. Therefore, the response of the international ideological purposes. It should really become a community has swung to the other extreme. A lot of neutral player amongst the communities of Darfur. focus on Darfur, disengagement, lack of attention, It should disband the Janjaweed and all other lack of follow-up on Naivasha, on the peace ethnically recruited militias in Darfur and elsewhere International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 5
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo in the country. It should hold oYcials of the that the international community move beyond Sudanese government in the security sector, who threats and firm words, to considering steps to hold engineered this policy of the Janjaweed, responsible the government accountable and implement some and end impunity overnight by really giving the tough measures to draw the attention of Khartoum. example of holding the people who committed war In particular we believe that steps that could draw crimes, for example, in Darfur responsible. It should the attention of Khartoum should include the cooperate with the eVorts of the international extension of the arms embargo that was decided community to deliver aid and assistance to the against the non-governmental actors, the armed victims of the conflict. What the Government of groups and therefore the rebels and the Janjaweed, Sudan needs to do is very clear, very logical, but the should be extended to cover the government as well. government is not doing it, it has its own We are calling for the African Union (AU) to be calculations, it has its own objectives and the cost is given the mandate to monitor compliance with that what we are witnessing. That is to say, its own arms embargo. The government has signed to a citizens are being attacked by its agents and by its flight ban drawn in their security protocol signed in own Army. Abuja on 9 November. There are no measures to enforce or to monitor compliance with that Q16 Mr Bercow: Iwonder, Dr Baldo, what your commitment. The African Union could take that own assessment is both of the latest in the series of role by, for example, being given the authority to be the United Nations Resolutions and of the two past, on government planes or military planes without respectively, if Iremember rightly, in July and notice, and this would help to encourage the September? Iam sympathetic to that body of government to abide by that commitment. We are opinion that says the international community has calling for selective sanctions such as directing done so far too little too late with too little eVect. But government oYcials who are responsible for the Iwould be interested to know what your own security measures that accompanied the counter- assessment of that latest resolution is because insurgency campaign in Darfur and generated all Amnesty International, for example, described it as this level of suVering and of the violations of a big step backwards, focusing, as it has done, international humanitarian law. Therefore, the primarily on the North-South debate and largely international community has yet to do a lot. The ignoring the situation in Darfur. So the previous two situation calls for it and if you do not pay attention, resolutions upset quite a lot of people because they the current trend of escalation of the violence will did not seem to do anything; they talked about only lead to further suVering and to further additional action and appropriate measures being destruction of civilian life in Darfur. taken, if they wanted improvement, but they did not do anything immediately to bring the government to heel. But this latest resolution focuses on North- Q17Mr Bercow: Can Ibriefly follow-up on that? South. What does the ICG say about all that? From my own point of view it is extremely Dr Baldo: The latest resolution in the meeting at depressing to reflect that Icame back from a short Nairobi was meant really as a combination of spell in Darfur nearly five months ago, and when I carrots and sticks in terms of oVering the was there the government was anxious to assure us government some incentives to conclude the peace that the problem was not that grave and it was being process with the SPLA, the idea being that if that contained and the situation was improving and that agreement was concluded it would oVer a model for the situation was not their fault, and all the rest of it, resolving other conflicts, particularly the Darfur and now we witness just how many lives have since conflict, which is really what is preoccupying us. We been lost. So it is extremely frustrating that progress have called for the international community to has been minimal, non-existent and in some cases approach the two problems at the same time, even negative. What Iwould like to try to get from simultaneously. Therefore, to demand that the you, as you are an authority on the field, Dr Baldo, government on the one side conclude the in so far as you can quantify it, is precisely how much comprehensive peace process with the SPLA but impact each of the individual sanctions would be also on the other side to comply with all the likely to have on the situation and how long it would obligations which it has signed to under the various take to have that impact? Some of us fear that things UN Security Council resolutions in the previous like travel bans and asset freezes, which are talked two resolutions, and in the agreement they signed about often, which apply to all sorts of badly with Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his behaving regimes, including Zimbabwe and Burma representative in July and August of this year, which and so on, are very often rather token gestures the government is not doing. The government is not because there is no great enthusiasm on the part of meeting any of its security obligations, it is not the government to travel to Europe anyway and they disbanding the Janjaweed and in fact it has often do not have very large personal assets in incorporated them in Popular Defence Forces, Europe. So, do you see what Imean, that these are border intelligence units, Popular Police, and token gestures in many cases unless you can explain therefore it continues to arm and support them. The to me otherwise. How long do you think it would government has not stepped in to end attacks on take for an oil embargo on the one hand and an arms civilians and on internally displaced people of embargo very rightly extended to apply to the Darfur, and it is not meeting any of its obligations Government of Sudan on the other to bite, so that that it had formally signed to. We are demanding the people in the Government of Sudan, who are not Ev 6 International Development Committee: Evidence
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo going to be swayed by arguments based on morality, the capability of their peace and security structures will be swayed by the application of ferocious and it is the new mandate that was created after the pressure. How long will that take? transformation of the Organisation of African Unity Dr Baldo: It will take longer than we would wish for (OAU) into the African Union. Therefore they because of the reality of the situation in the Security have a larger peacekeeping force, ceasefire and Council with several permanent members having monitoring force on the ground, let us say, and this interests in the Government of Sudan, in the area of force has been expanded of late. They are also the oil, for example, like China, like Russia in the area mediators in political talks between the government of sales of arms and commercial interests for those and the Darfur rebels. Ibelieve the AU is very keen in the country. China has specifically threatened to to keep the Khartoum government engaged with the veto oil sanctions if they came before the Security hope that they could, on the one side, contribute Council and Ibelieve that is the record of China, to directly to the protection of civilians by their mere oppose and try to derail any attempt to impose presence in Darfur, although they do not yet have sanctions anywhere in Africa. The latest sanctions many troops in Darfur, and, on the other side, help that were voted by the Security Council on the Ivory find a permanent political solution to the problem. Coast were done under direct request from the If they call for sanctions, they may be feeling—and African Union and therefore China could not be this is speculation about the thinking of the AU— more catholic than the Pope and they did not oppose that the government has shut them out or not co- this particular sanction. So that is the exception to operated at the security level and at the political the rule rather than a new trend of conduct from the level. Having said that, Iam most surprised at the Chinese. So Iwould believe that the Government of attitude of the UN Security Council in acting with Sudan is of course very much aware of all this and it such speed and resolve, after the bombing of the is doing its level best to really maintain the current French peacekeepers in Ivory Coast, to impose status quo in terms of its status before the Security sanctions, while in Darfur over 18 months there has Council. But some of these measures would really been a massive campaign of killings without really draw the attention of the government in Khartoum decisive action of this nature being considered. because this is a regime that is really very pragmatic; it is really very business orientated to a degree which may not be known internationally, and it is not, for Q19 Mr Colman: You have said that in the case of example, an irrational set of minds such as that of the Ivory Coast, the AU had asked the Security Iraq and Saddam Hussein or the Taliban in Council to take the sanctions, but in the case of Afghanistan. They would listen and register if the Darfur, the AU have not asked the Security Council international community says it is wrong, to address to take the actions. That is why nothing has them, as we say, in a fashion that would bite. happened. Therefore some of these measures are actually meant Dr Baldo: The Security Council has its own mind to draw that level of attention. Targeting oYcials— and could have taken the initiative, given the level of and they are in the very core of the system—who are mass human rights violations in the country. responsible for this disastrous security policy in Darfur would really send a very strong message that there is no longer any tolerance for impunity, there Q20 Mr Colman: You have pointed out that China is no longer any tolerance for those who engineer has said that they would veto any sanctions. The massive violations of human rights and hope to get only reason why China has not vetoed the actions on away with it. This is what is happening. It may not the Ivory Coast is because the African Union have be eVective but it will send the right message to the asked for those sanctions. Why do you not support, government in Khartoum. if that is the way you would lead, a request from the African Union to the Security Council saying, “Please, please, support this oil blockade” that my Q18 Mr Colman: You mentioned in the case of the colleague Mr Bercow was mentioning, because that Ivory Coast that China had not vetoed the Security would, if you like, jolt up the Government of Sudan Council Resolution because the AU had actually to say: one, we must listen to the AU; two, we must asked for the Security Council to pass such a listen to the world community? resolution. What do you think is holding back the Dr Baldo: Iwould definitely support such a position AU from asking in the same way for action on by the AU, but haven’t seen it coming so far, and V Sudan? You have described the ine ectiveness of the obviously this is a direction that we should consider. situation. Nobody seems to be suggesting a direct At the same time, the lack of initiative by the AU on intervention by the United States Army or the this particular issue should not be an excuse for the British Army or the French Army. This is an AU Security Council to fail to face its responsibility of situation where the AU is calling the shots. Ithink maintaining peace and human security in Darfur. that you are describing them as being somewhat They are really failing in that region to meet these V ine ective in terms of mobilising not just the world responsibilities. community but also their own resources, to step in and to sort out the situation. Dr Baldo: The AU’s mission and involvement in Q21 Mr Colman: What more do you think the Darfur is one of the rare bright spots in this international community should be doing to help the otherwise very gloomy situation. For the AU, African Union force on the ground, to ensure that Darfur is really a test ground. They want to prove peace is maintained, that the people on the ground International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 7
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo are protected? Are you suggesting there should be in Iraq, are there not circumstances in which it military intervention from the United Kingdom or would be here? In your own evidence you talk about from the United States or from France? “twice in the last two weeks the government raided Dr Baldo: That would not happen because of the al-Geer displaced camp, as well as Otash camp” in deficit of political will from the international powers clear breach of commitments the Government of to be involved in African conflicts. Sudan has already made. The African Union had to stand by and observe apparently—Isuspect in Q22 Mr Colman: Iam asking if you would think it daylight, but whether it was in daylight or night, Ido was a good idea? not know—all this happening. Dr Baldo: It is not going to happen. I am a realistic Dr Baldo: That was in front of BBC TV cameras. observer of the international scene and Ido not believe that the international community or these Q25 Mr Bercow: Dr Baldo, Iam asking you and the powers would act in this fashion. In fact, that is one ICG if morally you think that there would be a case reason why the AU is being propped up to play the for a substantial intervention of a peacekeeping role of peacekeeper or mediator in various countries character, as opposed simply to an intervention of a on the continent. In Darfur this is a fully-fledged monitoring sort that we have at the moment. Would operation that they are undertaking at this moment you personally favour intervention? in time. Ibelieve the international community has Dr Baldo: Iwould favour intervention from the helped the AU this time in planning for this perspective of the right to protect. When a operation with logistics and resources. In particular, government attacks its own civilians, when a the input from the European Union has been government massively breaches international considerable, from the Member States and from the humanitarian law and human rights law and fails in UK. What the African Union needs more of is help its primary duties of protecting its own civilians, the with military planning, with command line international community has that right and duty to improvement, with the headquarters in Addis step to the fore and intervene to stop these Ababa. They really need to build many of these massacres. The steward for intervention is now the institutions from scratch. African Union ceasefire observers on the ground in Darfur. That is not enough. They do not have Q23 Mr Colman: In your report is an initiative that suYcient number, the required capabilities or the Libya is leading on. Ihave never heard of that right mandate. A first step therefore would be to before. Could you give us a few sentences about strengthen all these components of the operation on what Libya is doing to try to get this resolved? the ground by making sure that the African Union Dr Baldo: Libya is facilitating an initiative by a few is given a mandate to protect civilians specifically hundred leaders in Darfur from across the various and a second step, which again would send a strong groups—traditional tribal leaders, modern people, message to the government in Khartoum, to have students, intellectuals and professionals—to bring stand-by tactical support capability to intervene in them together to consider the crisis and come up situations where civilians are under direct attack. with solutions. Libya has helped them by hosting the This should be a capability provided by an first meeting in Tripoli, by chartering flights for them international partner nation, again to send that to go to Abuja during the talks to speak to the rebels message to Khartoum and to show that under these and the government delegations. The next meeting is conditions the world will not stand by while civilians scheduled for 5 December. There is a consensus are being massacred. emerging from these parallel discussions, which are people-to-people peace negotiations between these Q26 Hugh Bayley: Are you arguing that there is a communities to arrest the conflict and stop the trend right for people from outside the Sudan to protect of deterioration. Iwould not call it a Libyan the people in Darfur or a respo nsibility to protect initiative but a Libyan facilitation of a home-grown them? initiative by local groups. Dr Baldo: Iam calling for the responsibility to protect them. Q24 Mr Bercow: Dr Baldo, Iam sorry to press you but it does seem to me that my colleague Mr Colman Q27Hugh Bayley: How do you assess Britain’s did raise this very important question: to intervene response to this crisis, and perhaps in particular to or not to intervene. Iknow that you are telling us the five points which our Pr ime Minister put when he that it is not going to happen, there is not support for visited Khartoum last month? What is Britain doing it. Simply as a matter of establishing your that is right and what is Britain doing that is wrong? preference, and perhaps the ICG’s preference, I Dr Baldo: The response has been within the would like to press you. It does seem, does it not, parameters that we have discussed of the that there is a grave danger that if the international international community’s response to the crisis. community does not think that it can ever be worth Therefore, it is one that has suVered from the same intervening in any circumstances, no matter how limitations, not really going far enough to indicate great the scale of the ethnic cleansing and the resolve and a willingness to push for biting measures genocide, people who feel for the victims in Darfur and biting resolutions of the kind for which we are will conclude that the international community does calling. Britain has been involved bilaterally with the not give a stuV because these are black African lives government and under the EU initiative—for that are being lost and if it was justified to intervene example, in the deployment of phase two of the Ev 8 International Development Committee: Evidence
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo
African Union forces to Darfur, in funding and have said that the African Union does not have a providing resources and capabilities for the suYcient mandate to solve the problem, that it is not humanitarian operation in Sudan. At the level that going to make any progress in solving the problem addresses the root causes of the conflict that would with its present level of equipment or its present really achieve a reversal of this situation, for mandate. You have said that the European Union, example a reversal of the ethnic cleaning, that is to say Britain and France as members of the guaranteeing the return of the IDPs to their home Security Council, cannot actually get a better United areas in safety and dignity, there is a lot yet to be Nations mandate in the form of a Security Council done by Britain, other members of the European resolution because China will always veto it unless Union and the international community. the African Union is supporting it. Let me ask again the question that one of my colleagues put to you a Q28 Hugh Bayley: You were speaking a moment or moment ago. Is not the way we should start in this two ago about how important the African Union’s conundrum to try to persuade the African Union military presence is, that it is important in its own themselves to support such a resolution so that we right and a test for the African Union, but is it get from the Security Council the mandate that is enough and is Britain right in policy terms to rely required for the African Union to increase its upon the African Union to provide a military commitment, to extend its responsibility and its role presence or is the African Union never in fact going and, if they want additional support from advanced to be able to mount a significant enough, mobile countries in the form of logistics or fire power or enough, military presence to prevent the conflict? radar for a no-fly zone or what have you, we could Dr Baldo: The whole concept of the operation is then contribute those. The first thing we have got to really to protect civilians by presence, what they call get, Ithink, on you r analysis, is a Security Council proactive protection. Just by being there, the resolution. We only get that if we have African African Union, with the international community Union support, am Iright? So we should start behind it, is hopeful that this will provide a deterrent talking to the African Union about it? Is that where and dissuasion from attacks on civilians. This is not we start? going to happen because of the cynicism and the Dr Baldo: It did not take that much for the Security daring and provocative nature of the initiatives by Council to take a resolution in various other types government forces on the ground and by aligned of crises. militias and now increasingly rebel groups on the ground. Therefore, in many of the recent incidents of attacks and forcible evictions of people from IDP Q30 Mr Davies: Yes, but they do not get through in camps, no-one was hiding; it was happening in the case of Africa, they do not avoid a Chinese veto broad daylight before BBC televisions cameras, as I in the case of Africa—you have already given us that was saying, and the African Union was standing by testimony—unless the African Union is going to without being able to intervene. It does not have the support such a resolution. Ithink what you are mandate to protect civilians, to use force for the saying to us this afternoon is that it is a waste of time protection of civilians. It needs to be provided with for us in the European Union to start to try to draft a such a mandate. There are insuYcient numbers. new Security Council resolution. We have to get the Darfur, it is often said, is the size of France. African Union to support an initiative; then we have Currently the force should be 3,000; they are a chance of getting it through the Security Council building to that level but it is not yet the case. They without the Chinese veto and then we can actually will need a lot of mobility and therefore helicopters do the things you want us to do. Is that right? and four-wheeled drive vehicles are making their Dr Baldo: This is not quite the point of view Iwas way to Sudan. It will take over a month to get them trying to convey here, and Iam sorry if Idid not there. Therefore, things are happening but at a very explain myself well. Definitely Iam not supportive slow pace and even this limited idea of protection by of the use of the African Union as an excuse for V presence is not yet e ective or taking place. What we inaction by the international community and the are calling for is a real re-thinking, a reinvigoration, Security Council, and the permanent members of the of this shot that we have on the ground, the African Security Council in particular. The African Union is Union; supply of logistical communications; a young institution. It is only two years old. The mobility facilities; and then a stand-by tactical Peace and Security Council of the African Union support unit from a military force of an advanced was created only last July, a few months ago. Ido nature, therefore definitely from an industrial not expect the African Union to step into roles that country. We do not have any preference provided the international community is unwilling or the capability of that nature is provided. reluctant to undertake from diVerent strategic considerations of the various permanent members of Q29 Mr Davies: All my questions are going to be the Security Council. under the heading of what we have got to do now, what we ought to be doing now. We have gone over a lot of that ground. Let me just clarify one or two Q31 Mr Davies: Nobody is suggesting that. of the points that you have already made in answer Dr Baldo: It would be a very positive step if the to my colleagues. You have said that Great Britain African Union understood that initiative of and the European Union’s reaction is nothing like clarifying what the Security Council should be doing considerable enough. There is a lot to be done, you about the situation in the same fashion as they did in International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 9
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo the Ivory Coast. As I said, there is a diVerent line of underway now to establish the extent of these crimes priorities now for the African Union. Ido not think and try to define those who are responsible; this is they are focused along these lines. one aspect of the mandate. Several options are open when such oYcials are named by such an Q32 Mr Davies: If Britain and France draft a investigation. One is for the Security Council to refer resolution and take it to the African Union at the the case to the International Criminal Court. Sudan present time saying, “Look, we are all concerned is not a member of that. It has not ratified the Rome about this, and we all agree that the problem is Convention that created the International Criminal getting worse rather than better. We all agree you do Court, and therefore there is little chance of Sudan Y referring the case to the International Criminal not have a su cient mandate to do any more than Y you are currently doing and you need more forces to Court, particularly because these o cials are at the do it, let us have a new resolution. We will draft a heart of the regime and the cornerstone of the ruling resolution for you, if you like, but we would like you party and the regime in Sudan. There may also be an to support it”, the African Union would then say, option to establish special courts, but this is unlikely “No, no, we are not sure we want to go down that because of the experience with the special courts for road because we are cutting across the Government Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia, and the slow of Sudan.” Therefore we cannot do anything processing, the pending prosecutions for example because we face a Chinese veto. That is the analysis because of sending civilians to arrest and to hand to you have given us this afternoon, is it not? the court the people indicted who fall under Dr Baldo: In a way, I was trying to give a realistic international law and the like. The most likely reading of the situation in the Security Council, and course of action would be referral by the Security therefore the reluctance of countries that are Council to the International Criminal Court. Permanent Members, such as China, to side with the tough measures that are requested and this is the Q34 Mr Davies: As you have said yourself, since situation. There is a need for countries to face their Sudan is not a party to that Convention, that will be responsibilities. With what is happening, there without eVect because Sudan can refuse to refer any should be a moment when people are required to of their citizens to the International Criminal Court take a vote, even at the risk of a veto, just to show and there will be no progress. where they stand. If they are willing to tolerate Dr Baldo: The decision could be taken but Sudan massive human rights abuses and violations of would have the option of not co-operating with that international human rights law, then let that be the decision. Again, that would have real weight. case. Ibelieve if that choice was given, that may be a dissuasive factor in countries that are willing to Q35 Mr Davies: You think that would be veto a decision. Perhaps they would abstain rather psychological weight? than put themselves on the spot like that. There are Dr Baldo: It is legal because these oYcials will be diVerent approaches to this situation rather than indicted under international law and would be liable tying it to a blanket cover from the African Union. to arrest and presentation before the Court wherever they go. The message would really have serious Q33 Mr Davies: That is very helpful. That is clear. I implications on the Government of Sudan. think we see now how we can try to break out of this circle. You are saying that really it should be for the Q36 Mr Davies: The implication of what you are Permanent Members of the Security Council to take saying is that the International Criminal Court can that initiative. Let us look at other ways that we can have a jurisdiction even in a country which has not move forward at the present time. You have already ratified the Convention? referred to making people accountable for the Dr Baldo: This is provided for. The preferred system atrocities that have taken place. How do we do that? is that of country referrals but the Security Council In the case of Kosovo, we set up an international has the mandate to refer cases when there are grave court. In the case of Rwanda, we had a mixture of violations of international law. international and national legal systems put in place to bring to justice the people who had been Q37Mr Davies: Finally, quite a diVerent but more responsible for these terrible atrocities. Are you immediate matter, Ithink: what should we be doing suggesting the same kind of thing or a diVerent kind on the ground? You have already given evidence this of initiative for Darfur? How do we make progress afternoon that the safe areas which were established in achieving what you have said this afternoon ought have not worked at all. What should we be doing— to be an urgent objective? and Isay “we” but what should anybody be doing, Dr Baldo: In the case of Darfur, the policy that was NGOs, governments, EU governments, the adopted, the counter-insurgency policy, was Government of Sudan—in order to try to improve engineered by top security oYcials in the the security for the inhabitants of Darfur who live in Government of Sudan, sometimes against the good terror of another attack by the Janjaweed or some advice of colleagues in the regime and in the ruling other militia or violent group? As we have just heard, party, probably because someone spoke out after the the safe areas are not working. What would have a fact. These people have pursued that policy, better chance of working? basically setting up the Janjaweed militia and Dr Baldo: The United Nations Secretary-General unleashing them to attack civilians with total and his representative in Sudan have recently impunity. An international investigation is reversed their position on these safe areas. They have Ev 10 International Development Committee: Evidence
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo clearly indicated to the Government of Sudan that it Q41 Hugh Bayley: What lessons do you draw from would not be given a green light to proceed with the this appalling crisis about the responsibility of exploitation and manipulation of the concept of safe people from outside the country in question to areas. Therefore, there is containment of this issue intervene in a case of genocide or gross violation of by the government. Since then, there have been all human rights? these other aspects: escalating violence due to Dr Baldo: Ithink the most important lesson is never hostage-taking, increased banditry, attacks on to wait until you are facing this type of situation and humanitarian convoys; cattle rustling and ethnic to intervene as early as there are the first signals of revenge as practised. One way of improving security real trouble brewing in a particular area. In this case, on the ground is to ensure a large air force for the these signals occurred in the middle of last year that AU, a stronger mandate for the AU forces on the a campaign was building up to use ethnic factors in ground, and that there is an international a counter-insurgency campaign and the ground was humanitarian presence on the ground. By their mere really being prepared for inflagration, for a real presence in assisting the victims of the conflict, the breaking out of ethnic conflict. international humanitarian workers are providing eVective protection to many of the IDPs, Q42 Hugh Bayley: That would mean putting troops particularly in the controlled environment of IDP on the ground? camps, and they are travelling between IDP camps Dr Baldo: It does not necessarily mean that. If you to provide neutral objective observation of wait until the last minute, then there would be that developments on the ground and early warnings. type of intervention to which Ihave referred. Early Khartoum is very aware of that. Khartoum has intervention could achieve better results. never stopped trying to intimidate humanitarian workers. Ihave seen in the news, but Ihave yet to Q43 Hugh Bayley: This would be early intervention confirm it, a decision by the Government of Sudan up to and including the use of military force if to expel from Sudan the directors of Oxfam UK and necessary? The “if necessary” means if the genocide, Save the Children UK, a decision taken yesterday. or the violation of human rights, does not stop? There should be strong reaction when such actions Dr Baldo: Exactly. are taken, a denunciation and public diplomacy that Khartoum cannot continue to manipulate humanitarian interventions for strategic and Q44 Mr Bercow: On a similar theme, and this is political purposes, as is the case now. In this case, it talking about the criteria for action and the need for is for diplomatic purposes because they were reform, do you think under Article 6 of the UN angered by a statement that was perhaps attributed Charter or the UN Declaration of Human Rights of to one of the agencies that there was a bombing near December 1948 that Sudan would currently qualify a food distribution site. These are actions that could for expulsion on the grounds of persistent violations be taken now to help to improve the security of human rights? In other words, is the UN making situation. a mockery of its own Charter? Iam not a lawyer, by the way, and Isay that as a matter of pride. Should the UN simply apply the existing Charter or does the Q38 Mr Davies: May Itake you up on that final Charter need to be toughened? Iwas looking at it the point? You say that action should be taken in other day and it just seems to me that, with a number response to the expulsion of the leaders of NGOs of notable exceptions, very few countries have and of Oxfam and so forth. Do you mean action actually been kicked out of the UN, despite the most when you say “action” or do you just mean a bestial violations of human rights. Iam not quite declaration, a statement? If you mean action, what clear how the UN expects to be taken seriously if it kind of action? makes these highfalutin declarations which it then Dr Baldo: By “action” Imean logistical support, as proceeds completely to ignore in practical situations. Ihave said, aid the AU mission on the ground, and Dr Baldo: We were reminded again recently of the resources for AU to increase forces on the ground. limitations of the international system when, a couple of days ago, the General Assembly voted not to take action on the situation in Darfur. There was Q39 Mr Davies: We should take these actions in a draft resolution before the General Assembly to response to the expulsions. These are actions you are condemn Sudan for mass violations of human rights recommending anyway, are they not? and the motion was to take no action. Ibelieve that Dr Baldo: Political action and public diplomacy is was done through political calculation because of also action when you speak out strongly and other considerations of the balance of power and the forcefully. prevailing anti-Americanism that people seem to consider more important than the protection of Q40 Mr Davies: You are not recommending any humans of the type for which international law concrete action, any sanction, against the provides. government? Dr Baldo: Sanctions form part of the package of Q45 Hugh Bayley: Could we go back, Dr Baldo? recommendations we made in the submission to you You were saying that there is a responsibility on but we are not calling for blanket, indiscriminate people from outside Sudan to intervene early with sanctions. We are calling for targeted, selective interventions up to and including the use of military sanctions. force to prevent gross violation of human rights and International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 11
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo genocide. You were talking, in answer to an earlier Darfur, but if the current chaos is allowed to question, about a responsibility to protect human continue, then a situation may develop and we may beings against violation of human rights. In this get to a worst case scenario. particular case, who has that responsibility? Is it the African Union? Is it neighbouring countries? Is it the Q49 Hugh Bayley: Does that not conflict with what wider community? you were saying earlier about the need to intervene Dr Baldo: It is the wider international community. early? Dr Baldo: Exactly, and the level of intervention that Q46 Hugh Bayley: Then why are we only talking Ihave been calling for is to arrest this trend, to about an African Union military presence and not, address what is happening by calling for graded for instance, a Russian, or NATO, or American, or responses for action to be taken immediately. Your British, or French military presence? colleague was asking me what needs to be done now Dr Baldo: There is a certain history of to arrest these developments. disengagement of the northern countries from peacekeeping in Africa. Q50 Tony Worthington: Dr Baldo, Ihave been listening to you with great interest. Iwent to Sudan Q47Hugh Bayley: Not in Sierra Leone, which is a twice about a dozen years ago during another good example of a British intervention which has conflict. Ihave been asking what we are saying now prevented gross violation of human rights and has that we did not say then and where is history allowed a good measure of security and order to be repeating itself and where is it just the same. There returned? are two points Iwould like to make. One thing that Dr Baldo: Yes, in the case of Sierra Leone and the intrigues me is that it would not have been possible British force there, in the case of Ituri in the Congo a dozen years ago to talk for an hour and half and with the intervention of the French in operations. I not mention Sharia law as a source of conflict within may have missed one. Here we had historic links Sudan. We have gone for an hour and a half and that between certain international powers and particular issue has not come up at all. Iknow Darfur is countries in Africa. The prevailing model now, since diVerent from a north-south situation. Is that the Rwandan genocide and the most infamous because that issue has been settled or is on the failing of the international system, is really to try and backburner, or what is it? push regional powers to intervene and contain Dr Baldo: This has not come up in the context of conflicts on the continent. This has been for several Darfur because Darfur is uniformly Muslim. All the years in West Africa the role of the sub-regional parties in the conflict are uniformly Muslim. The organisation there, ECOWAS, under the leadership Sudan Liberation Movement and Army are more of of Nigeria. Now, with the African Union, the a secular mind. Ihave mentioned the influence of the African states have the political will to develop peace SPLA on the Darfurian Sudan Liberation Army. and security organs and mandates and, unlike the That is an intellectual and ideological influence, OAU, to intervene in Member States’ aVairs when including to the level of commitment to separation there are gross violations. This has provided a of religion from the state. convenient means for the others to say, “All right, we support you. You can take care of that”. This is Q51 Tony Worthington: If I understood your the attitude now. remarks about JEM correctly, that would be less secular; they would be fighting in order to have a Q48 Hugh Bayley: Let me say that Iagree with you more Islamic party in control as a sort of that there should be an escalation process and that disillusionment with Bashir’s government. Is that one should expect African institutions and African right? armed forces, if armed force is necessary, to take the Dr Baldo: That is indeed the case. The SLA is more lead. The reason why Iasked you earlier to make the locally rooted; it is more about Darfur. JEM is more distinction about whether outsiders have a right to about national politics and the seat of power in protect or a responsibility to protect is because to my Khartoum and what should be happening there. mind the word “responsibility” implies that it is They co-ordinate on the ground militarily and something you have an obligation to do. If the politically in negotiations, except on the point of responsibility to protect was taken, as has been the Sharia law, with SLA demanding as its political case in this instance, by the African Union, Ithink it platform a separation between the state and religion is quite right that they should be the first to take that and JEM preserving the right to deny that and to responsibility but if the violation of human rights say, “You are not ready for that; this should be left does not end, and it patently has not ended, then to the population to decide”. surely others have responsibilities too? Dr Baldo: This is indeed the case. What Iam Q52 Tony Worthington: Would that be about concerned about—and this was in my opening bringing back Hassan el-Turabi? statement—is that there are dynamics now in play Dr Baldo: Exactly. that if allowed to develop wildly could carry the conflict, which is already very messy and quite Q53 Tony Worthington: The other bit that intrigued disastrous for civilians, to an even more destructive me, and Ann Clwyd referred to it earlier, is that at phase. We have not reached that point yet. We do that time an area of great concern was the Nuba not have people against people, a war situation, in Mountains and the concern was about the Ev 12 International Development Committee: Evidence
29 November 2004 Dr Suliman Baldo destruction of the Nuba people by the Baggara the Nubas likewise have adopted many of the Arabs rather than the Janjaweed. Iam very intrigued practices of the Sudan. What has happened since the by these groups and the relationship with the outbreak of war in 1983 is that Khartoum’s military Sudanese government. When you have a conflict and establishment and Khartoum’s successive you may be wanting to divide and rule, what is the governments, not only the current government but nature of the deal that you are oVering the Arabs? Is successive governments since 1982, have seen an it a contract to go and kill and maim or is it a opportunity to use these groups as informal contract to say, “This is about land disputes, and paramilitary forces. The idea behind that is that they you are pastoralists and these other people are would be capable of adopting the same guerrilla sedentary farmers,”? What is the element of the tactics as the rebel groups; that is to say, to have relationship? Everyone alleges that there is a very mobility, strike and run and scatter quickly. The close relationship between the Sudanese government incentive for the militias is cattle looting and the and sundry para-militias. What is the nature of the Dinka are very rich in cattle and therefore they are contract between the government and the militias? as poor as the Dinka. The government gave them Dr Baldo: In the case of the Baggara Arab militias, blanket cover to go and loot whatever they want in those of south Kurdofan in relation to the Nuba the Nuba Mountains. Mountains and of South Darfur in relation to Q54 Tony Worthington: “You can loot and we will Rizeigat in southern Sudan, these were the not do anything about it”? Rachamin. These are communal groups of young Dr Baldo: Exactly. This is a cornerstone in the war men who accompany the herds in their regular economy in Darfur today; that is to say, looting of nomadic movements between areas in the cattle in Darfur is providing a material incentive to transitional zone and parts of the northern section of continue the war for the Janjaweed. It is the same southern Sudan. They have always existed. They type of functional, ruthless and inhumane thinking have had generations of intermarriages and which is still dominating the military establishment exchanges of interests with their neighbours, either in Darfur now. in the Nuba Mountains or in the north in Rizeigat. Tony Worthington: Dr Baldo, thank you very much If you see the Baggara Hawazma Arabs of south indeed. You have given us a great deal to think Kurdofan, they are physically indistinguishable about. You are Sudanese yourself and it is rare from the Nubas because of intermarriages and indeed to have, as it were, an outside observer who divisions. The Arab groups have adopted many of is also an insider. That is very useful. Thank you very the traditional African practices of the Nubas and much indeed. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 13
Tuesday 14 December 2004
Members present:
Mr Tony Baldry, in the Chair
John Barrett Mr Tony Colman Mr John Battle Tony Worthington Mr John Bercow
Witnesses: Ms Maniza Ntekim, Parliamentary OYcer, Amnesty International UK, Mr Steve Crawshaw, London Director, Human Rights Watch, and Mr Toby Porter, Emergencies Director, Save the Children UK, representing the Sudan Advocacy Coalition (CARE, Christian Aid, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, Save the Children, and Tearfund), examined.
Q55 Chairman: Thank you very much for coming assistance is being delivered now than was being and helping us with the work that we are doing on delivered earlier in the year and while the situation is Sudan and Darfur. Firstly, Iwould note that I still of grave concern from a h umanitarian understand that two staV from the Save the Children perspective it is not currently the spectre of Fund working in Darfur were killed earlier this week catastrophe that we had in purely humanitarian and Ithink everyone on this Committee wishes to terms that we were concerned about earlier in the extend our condolences to their families. Ithink it year. The second trend , which is moving the other highlights the increasing danger to those engaged in way, is a deteriorating security situation that humanitarian activity nowadays. Can you help us threatens to completely derail the humanitarian with this: it seems to me the more that one looks at operation in Darfur and therefore all the gains of the what has been happening in Darfur the more there last few months would be lost and would come to is a question about how does the international nothing. Although Save the Children has suVered community collectively impose humanitarian the two most serious security incidents in the last two standards on a sovereign state when a sovereign months—we also had two staV killed on 10 October state is not willing to co-operate with the suggestion in a land mine incident—the fact we have suVered of decent humanitarian standards? So what does one those two most serious security situations is have? One has the possibility of sanctions but in this something that we agonise over and the fact is that particular instance the diYculty, it seems to me, is all humanitarian agencies—all—have witnessed a that there are a number of countries that appear to tremendous deterioration in their operational be dependent on oil from the Sudan so for reasons security environment over the last weeks and of real politik the suggestion of sanctions does not months. The concern now is that the deterioration in work. One can suggest UN intervention or the the security situation will lead to a deterioration in intervention of other peace keepers such as the the humanitarian situation and what has been African Union, but that does not seem to have had achieved by the intervention of the UK Government very much impact. Not just in this specific instance and other governments in opening up access to but generally. There seems to me to be a great humanitarian agencies, which was undoubtedly a conundrum for the international community which Igreat deal improved up u ntil recently over anything think Kofi Annan was seeking to address in a recent that was there before that action was applied, will speech he gave on new threats and situations. How prove in vain. As for your earlier reflections, for does the international community respond when reasons of operational neutrality Imyself on behalf confronted with a situation of a humanitarian crisis of the coalition of aid agencies would rather not where one feels that the sovereign government of the answer specific questions on those issues. country concerned is not necessarily doing Ms Ntekim: You started oV asking about what role everything to resolve that crisis? Iwould welcome there would be for the international community in your thoughts on that. Do you feel that there has addressing issues as serious as what is happening in been an improvement in the humanitarian situation Darfur. Amnesty International has for some time and has that come about by negotiations or is all we now been calling for, for example, concrete action are seeing is the eyes of the world moving on and such as an extension of the arms embargo which is people getting bored with this as a topic so there has currently in place for non-government entities, not been any improvement, it is just that people have agreed in September. We feel that this would be a stopped watching? Who would like to have a crack concrete action that would send a strong message at that? and would be the first clear censor to the Sudanese Mr Porter: Thank you very much for your government about their actions in Darfur and would condolences. Iam travelling to Sudan tonight so I also have a practical e Vect on the ground in terms of will convey them personally to our team there. I stemming the flow of arms which is currently going would like to answer part of your question which is on in the region. Iam sure Members were concerned, that what you are seeing currently in Darfur is in a for example, about reports in July of Russia selling way two trends going in diVerent directions for the MiG planes to Sudan at the same time as Darfur was time being. The first is a stabilised humanitarian being discussed within the Security Council. We also situation on the ground in that much more have called for concrete measures to deal with Ev 14 International Development Committee: Evidence
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter impunity. We produced a report two weeks ago really that we know.” There is of course evidence where we have done an analysis of the Sudanese absolutely of a connection between the Janjaweed judiciary’s capacity to deal with perpetrators of and the government. They appeared to think that human rights violations and the extent to which the they themselves could not be held to account. When Sudanese judiciary so far has dealt with these issues. we started pressing the point that the Security There is definitely wide scope for the international Council would be able to make a referral to the community to take a lead in addressing the situation International Criminal Court and then the people of the judiciary in Sudan, which is a prime concern who have been responsible for giving the green light and should be a central aim of the peace process as to the Janjaweed, sometimes directly or just giving well as other mechanisms for instituting peace the green light to the command responsibility, which throughout the whole of Sudan, not just focused on is clearly involved with crimes against humanity, Darfur. Those are the two main ways in which we that is something that puts them on the spot. If they would see a role for the international community in think that is real (and at the moment Ido not think making progress in these areas. they are convinced that push will ever come to shove) and they actually believe that, that is a very, very strong pressure. If people like Slobodan Q56 Mr Battle: Is there any evidence or reports—I Milosevic in the past knew very well that they were am not suggesting there are, Iam just asking an going to be brought to court and if they had thought objective question—of British companies supplying it would ever happen, Ithink one could argue they arms to Sudan? would have behaved diVerently. Ithink that is very Ms Ntekim: Ido not know if Members will be aware important either now or later but the British of reports that were in the Sunday Times only a few Government could have a very, very key role to play weeks ago detailing the case of a UK arms broker on that. As you know, the Commission of Inquiry who may have been involved in brokering a deal. I which is reporting in January looks very likely to cannot comment on the specifics of those cases but I mention a possible referral to the ICC. Again, as you can say that the UK Government is currently know, the United States is not likely to be investigating those claims and we would support enthusiastic about that prospect, although it has that and would hope that this could be one of the been so strong in terms of what it has said on Sudan. first cases where we see whether there are any teeth We would hope that the hostility of the United behind the Export Control Act, which came into States may be trumped, if you like, by its existence on 1 May. commitment to doing something in Darfur and an Mr Crawshaw: Very largely echoing what we have ICC referral and Britain’s backing on that will be just heard, in particular about that division, if you very, very important. Specifically ICC, not one of like. On the one hand, there is certainly the the ad hoc tribunals which are being mentioned at possibility of pressures and you mentioned sanctions the moment as a possibility which would be much Y often have political di culties, but we are concerned more complicated and more expensive. Iwould and disappointed that although this has been certainly flag that up as something which the British constantly the suggestion in recent months and Government could play a key role in, and if Britain through the summer that if something does not does not stand up strongly for that referral it will be happen then certain measures will be taken, in very regrettable for Darfur and it will be very practice what quite often has happened is at the next regrettable for the future of the Court itself, which of V hurdle the Security Council backs o and it loses its course would be implicitly weakened if it does not own courage, if you like, and that sense of that is even mention this. what is happening has sent quite a strong message to the Sudanese government. They play very good poker. We know this with authoritarian Q57Tony Worthington: In approaching this inquiry governments all around the world, they are Iam having di Yculty getting to grips with the extremely good at playing poker and they rely on the Government of Sudan. Bashir has been in power for fact that they will eventually be able to call the other 14 or 15 years, something like that. Ihave no picture side’s bluV, and Ithink it would be very worrying if of any personality at all, any identity to it. What are that were to be the case. One can clearly have they about? targeted sanctions and pressures that can be put on Mr Crawshaw: Ipersonally—and Ithink it is true of a range of diVerent issues but it cannot be something all three of us, certainly speaking for myself as where the focus is there and then it is removed, it Human Rights Watch—have been to Southern needs to be consistent pressure. On the Sudan and been to Khartoum but it is colleagues at accountability, it often sounds like a pie-in-the-sky Human Rights Watch who have done the detailed idea when you are in the middle of such horrendous work on the Sudan who would be able to give you a things going on but it is a very, very real pressure. We much more lively and personal answer. All Ican say were struck when Human Rights Watch was in is Ithink the bottom line of what we are seeing Khartoum a couple of months ago when the there—and again in other countries around the Executive Director and colleagues were having world—is the interest in power, frankly. There is not conversations with senior Sudanese oYcials and a very strong sense of ideology of what matters. ministers that there was a calm confidence from the What does matter is power. The pressures need to be Sudanese that nothing really could happen, “We do very, very strong indeed in order for that person to not really know who is doing this stuV. Terrible realise that the other side is really serious about this things are happening in Darfur but there is nothing and that at this moment they need to back down. To International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 15
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter go back slightly to your earlier question, they have Ms Ntekim: Ihave to say in our dealings and in our of course backed down on certain small issues, evidence and in our research that has not actually including the opening up to the humanitarian aid been an issue that has come up. There has not agencies, including, with the help of the British necessarily been an agreement that these are Government, the fact that Amnesty and Human Sudanese people that are being attacked and the Rights Watch gained visas which seemed government has a responsibility to defend them, unthinkable before that. Thus pressures that are partly because the government has not admitted that made when the cards are played well do have an there is anything going on or that they are eVect. Simple power would be my short answer. responsible for arming the militia that are creating Other colleagues might have other things to say. the situation that we are discussing. That has not Ms Ntekim: Ivery much echo what Steve has said. necessarily come up in those kinds of discussions, It has been very diYcult for Amnesty to get access to from the very basic fact that they are reluctant to Sudan and Darfur since we were there in January acknowledge the part they are playing in the 2003. The last time we were allowed in was systemic violence which we have outlined. September 2004 after the intervention of the Foreign Secretary during his visit. When we have met with Q60 Tony Worthington: But they must have oYcials in Darfur and in Khartoum there has very acknowledged the scale of the damage that is being much been a denial of the extent of the violations done to the people. Do they express any regret that we have been reporting. For example, when we about it? went on our high-level mission, our Secretary- Ms Ntekim: As Ihave said in the example of the rape General, Irene Khan, raised the issues of widespread cases, because this is what Amnesty does whenever rape and systematic sexual violence which we had we have produced our reports if we are in the picked up in our reports and were told, “No, no, no, country at the time, we produce our findings and there are one or two cases. Rape is not going on. You enter into a dialogue with the authorities to discuss are clearly misguided.” So it has been diYcult to get ways of dealing with that. We were told that our the government to admit any violations that have evidence on rape was not correct, that there were not occurred due to its support. The lack of access has these mass cases that we were talking about. There made it even more diYcult for us as an organisation is a denial about the scale of some forms of violation to enter into that dialogue and to get to the picture that we are talking about. Then there is also a denial that you are asking for. of their responsibility for violations that do occur. “It is armed militia who are committing this, that and the other, it is nothing to do with us, and you Q58 Tony Worthington: A few years ago there was cannot blame us for what they are doing because we more of a clarity when Al-Turabi was part of the have no control over them.” We have not got that scene. Clearly there was an ideology then of initial admittance that the Sudanese government is Islamisation but that has now receded and we have responsible for the violations that we are talking now got Muslim against Muslim whereas previously about. the issue was North against South and was portrayed, perhaps facilely, as Arab against African Q61 Tony Worthington: Ideplore but Ican and Muslim against Christian. Now, you are seeing understand the denial of rape because you cannot it as divide and rule? They have to hang on to power produce hundreds of thousands people out on the and so there is almost a virtue in causing a group of streets, but in the case of the displacement of people pastoralists to attack the sedentary farmers as a way in their hundreds of thousands, the involvement of of maintaining their own power? Chad and so on, that cannot be denied. Is there any Ms Ntekim: It is a pattern that has been quite regret about it? prevalent over the last two decades of war in that a Mr Crawshaw: What one of course so often hears particular group, if we look at the situation in the is—and again it is a pattern it is not only here— Darfur, which perceives it has been marginalised, “These things are terribly regrettable. Terrible takes up arms against the government and then the things happen in war,” and treating this as though government arms a local militia to put that down. In this were simply the regrettable result of rebel the case of Darfur on this particular occasion that conflict and, “We wish the conflict was at an end and has escalated into the scales that we are talking unfortunately it is not.” Again, as Maniza indicated, about now. So Ido think that it is a case of the a complete denial of responsibility for what I government, as Steve has said, and as you have imagine all in this room would agree are very, very already suggested, clinging on to power. If that serious crimes against humanity. There are vast means certain human rights violations have to occur numbers of civilians dead and you can absolutely then that is what will happen in order for power to put to one side the issue of a rebel conflict with the be maintained. government, which also exists but is in parallel to these very serious crimes that are being committed. It is not just the Khartoum government because it is Q59 Tony Worthington: Is there any sense of “these again a familiar pattern, but what the Khartoum are our people that are being damaged, these are our government has done is to merge those two and say people that are being killed”? Is there any allegiance because there is conflict with rebels therefore it is to the people of whatever background at all now or very sad that people die while at the same time (and does anything justify power? this again echoes Amnesty’s findings with the rape) Ev 16 International Development Committee: Evidence
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter denying the scale repeatedly, absolutely denying the implication of this is that in this, like in many scale. This is also true of the humanitarian disaster. conflicts in the developing world, there are elements Repeatedly refusing to address the scale of the of underlying marginalisation and exclusion and humanitarian disaster. On a small footnote—and competition over scarce resources and growing again Iam sure the Committee very much has a sense impoverishment and growing desperation at the of this—it has been regrettable that sometimes, local level that contribute to the conflict taking root. especially to some extent now, the humanitarian Ithink the important implication of there being two catastrophe, the multiple tragedies that we have seen dynamics to the conflict, or two separate conflicts, is have been treated as though they could be seen in that both elements need to be addressed in any isolation, something, if you like, which came from eventual solution. So, for example, it will not be the sky as opposed to something that was very suYcient for there purely to be a political solution directly related to human rights abuses on a very between the SLA/M and the JEM and the gross scale. Ithink that it is a very dangerous trap to government because that does not address the fall into and it of course does not help those who are underlying economic marginalisation and doing their best at the front-line to ameliorate the impoverishment of the Greater Darfur region. In position of those facing humanitarian catastrophe if terms of the UK Government’s role in particular, the underlying cause of these human rights abuses many of you have been involved in aid for many continues and people are being driven out and so on. years and there are patterns to aid flows, one sees a tremendous volume of assistance that is channelled Q62 Mr Bercow: Iwant to raise a question too but I to countries when there is a major humanitarian wonder if Icould just say in passing to Steve and crisis and in a sense you are reflecting the Maniza that it is interesting to hear what you said compassion that the population of UK feels for a about the government denying the scale of atrocities particular crisis when it is in front of their eyes every committed or claiming ignorance of them or saying other day on a television screen. What then happens they might have taken place but we are not when the conflict is solved is often the flows of aid responsible. There does seem to be something of a evaporate as quickly as they have begun, so for the tension in those statements on the one hand and the UK, which has been so generous relative to most commitment of the Government of Sudan donors in the funding of the humanitarian response nevertheless “to rein in the Janjaweed militias” on in Darfur, what we would be saying is please do not the other hand. Iam struck by the fact that this is the walk away from this as and when you have evidence response that you have consistently had because I that a political solution has actually been signed and was in Darfur in late June/early July and from reached. We are saying stay engaged. At the moment Mustafa Osman Ismail downwards I got precisely obviously the most pressing needs are the need for the same, Iwould not say unintelligible but at any survival and the need for protection from violence in rate inconsistent and unsatisfactory, message. I Darfur but this was one of the poorest areas of the wonder if Icould just ask Toby this question. The world before this crisis erupted. As you will have memo from the Sudan Advocacy Coalition1 talks seen in many of the submissions, many of the attacks about there being two conflicts in Darfur. According were not just killings or attacks on people’s physical to that analysis one is between the Government of integrity, they were also attacks on their means of Sudan on the one hand and the SLA/M and Justice production, attacks by poisoning of wells, burning and Equality Movement on the other. The second, of houses, looting of livestock, removal of land, if which is linked to it but not indistinguishable from you like, and the implications of what it would mean it, is the conflict between African tribes on the one to take these 1.6 million people who have been hand and Arab tribes on the other. Potentially—and seriously aVected by this conflict even back to a Isay “potentially” because Iam a bit uncertain baseline which was utterly below, for example, the about this—this analysis could go some way to aspirations represented by the Millennium explaining the complexity of the situation, although Development Goals in terms of basic livelihoods is one has to be careful, does one not, that it cannot be both very complex and very diYcult and extremely allowed to absolve the government and the militias expensive. History tells us that donors that are very of their huge and overwhelming burden of generous in major humanitarian emergencies tend to responsibility? If such an analysis is broadly correct be rather less generous in the post-conflict stage. what do you think it implies, Toby (and if other This would be relevant here, particularly as the UK colleagues want to contribute) in terms of resolving has already shouldered a disproportionate share of a conflict or conflicts in terms of what the UK the relief assistance. It is important that some of the Government in particular should be doing to help to larger donors are brought in and share a sense of resolve the crisis? responsibility for reconstruction of livelihoods in Mr Porter: Yes, we do believe there are two strands Darfur, as and when this does end. of the conflict. What is important to add also is that Mr Crawshaw: Iwould echo all of these things. In there are some African tribes who are in conflict with the political context as well there is that sense of some Arab tribes but equally there are some other follow through. It is diYcult to overstate the tribes that have stayed out of the conflict all of this importance of that follow through. When things fall time which is grounds for optimism. In terms of out of the headlines, as inevitably Darfur has already resolution of the conflict, Ithink the most important begun to do and will continue to do, that is precisely the moment when the political follow through will 1 Not printed be very badly needed, which does include what we International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 17
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter were discussing earlier, the accountability and other for me to judge whether or not that was a mechanisms. It is important for Darfur itself and it satisfactory diplomatic assessment but it was a is important for messages to be sent for the future. profoundly unhumanitarian assessment, the notion Just as we would certainly argue that there was a that the fate of one group of people has to be very slow reaction at the beginning, equally the predicated on the successful outcome of peace talks problem of moving on and no longer wanting to involving two other sets of people. Isuspect that it look at an issue is clearly very serious, and Ithink was a logic that many of t he civilian population in that that is one lesson. It has been said so many times Darfur, as they fell victim to savage attack in early before, but really one would hope that Darfur makes 2004, would probably have found a very us understand not only the danger of coming to unsatisfactory and unjust sequencing of the events, something too late but also of leaving a problem too and Ithink that there ar e lessons in that for all of us. early, not thinking that when Naivasha is possible, Of course, it is a good thing that peace agreements the sun comes out and Darfur is done, we can wash have been signed between North and South. Imyself our hands. That would be an absolutely disastrous have worked in South Sudan for many years and message to send. there are needs there, but it was really only in March and April this year when Darfur started to get the Q63 John Barrett: If I could follow up on what you levels of attention that the situation deserved, and I are saying, Steve and Toby, talking about funding in think that the most frenzied period of violence was the future. You mentioned things got oV to a slow probably between February and April this year, so it start as far as the humanitarian response eVort was was too late in that respect. concerned. The Government in its memo2 was very Ms Ntekim: Iwould really follow on from what critical about the response being insuYcient, unco- Toby has said. From January 2003 Amnesty ordinated and said that really there was a lack of a International was raising its concerns about what strategic approach. Could you comment on what was happening in Darfur and said at that point that happened and also what the role of the UK the international community should not let what Government played itself to make sure that our was happening escalate into all-out war. By April input into that humanitarian response was eVective, 2003 we were calling for an international on time, and then learning from the past what can be commission of inquiry. Whenever we had improved as the situation develops? discussions with members of the diplomatic Mr Porter: Just one clarification, that was the community we were told that, yes, they were aware Government of Sudan that you referred to? that violations were occurring in Darfur and that these were being raised privately with the Government of Sudan but not publicly in order not Q64 John Barrett: No, the UK Government. to jeopardise the North/South process which we Mr Porter: Isee, sorry. There have been problems have just been discussing. On our part we do think with the humanitarian operation. Many agencies that that was short-sighted because we believed then were slow to scale up. There was a critical absence of and we believe now that unless there is an attempt to leadership in the United Nations after Dr Kapila resolve all aspects of the crisis, lasting peace in the was required to leave Sudan and that post of Sudan will remain a pipe dream, which is also why Humanitarian Co-ordinator. At a time when there we were so concerned about the latest UN Security were so many issues about negotiation of access and Council Resolution 1574 which appeared to be removal of restrictions and articulation of taking a step back. The previous Council resolutions humanitarian principles, it was so important to have had made clear that the Government of Sudan had that leadership there. We had no leadership and I a duty to disarm and disband the Janjaweed. Clearly think that was a very critical deficit at that time. It is that had not happened. By the time this discussion interesting because there are two dynamics that do was occurring we were noticing on the ground an not particularly add up which is firstly that there increase in insecurity and yet on that occasion the were a number of aid agencies who had been ringing decision was taken to encourage the government and the bell about Darfur since halfway through 2003, encourage the peace process. Like Toby, of course as some even earlier, and that was certainly the case for an organisation we do not disagree with peace some members of the coalition who have been processes but doing that without acknowledging operating in Darfur for years. It was very clear that what was seriously going on in Darfur was a an extremely serious situation was developing back mistake. then. If I would be critical of the response of the international community, and indeed the UK in this, Ithink it would probably be the factor of not Q65 Mr Colman: Again pursuing this point in terms appreciating early enough the gravity of what was of whether the UK Government is at fault and going on in Darfur and the urgency with which a whether it has done enough to ensure timely and co- robust and concerted international response was ordinated responses is the crucial question that we required. There was a prevailing view that the keep going back to. Should we have pushed the UN problems in Sudan were best dealt with sequentially, more? You talked about the fact that there was a loss in particular that the peace deal between North and of leadership of the United Nations in Sudan and South had to be dealt with before the crisis in Darfur this was a critical deficit. Should not the UK have would receive the attention that it deserved. It is not been shouting about it? Should they not have oVered secondment? Is it the view that the United Nations 2 Ev 71 failed in Darfur? How did the UN agencies do there? Ev 18 International Development Committee: Evidence
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter
Could they cope with very large numbers of be framed in the context of the fact that what the internally displaced people? UNHCR, crucially, British Government has been doing through look at refugees over state boundaries. Did the summer and through the autumn where there has United Kingdom fail to blow the whistle, been pressure it has been fantastically useful, there particularly when you had talked about a critical has been no question that the personal engagement deficit for some time, and did the United Kingdom by Hilary Benn and Jack Straw and indeed the Prime fail the people of Darfur in terms of getting the UN Minister has been very helpful and very useful. Iwas to behave more eVectively? Perhaps Toby could interested to see from the memo from the Secretary answer that. of State that there was a lot of talk about responses Mr Porter: Ithink that to reach such a strong being too slow and other people doing things wrong. conclusion would be rather unfair because Ithink Idid not have a sense, although Iperhaps read it that what the UK did do is that—and this is entirely wrongly, that there was very much self-reflection on consistent with the fact that DFID does overall have this. You will have seen from our submission there a much better understanding of the nuts and bolts of was, for example, the London-cleared Embassy what is needed for eVective delivery of emergency speech. That was a speech that was made in late assistance than most other donors—they took a April at a time when all of us at this table and many number of very practical steps to improve the co- other NGOs were trying very, very hard to get this ordination of the United Nations’ assistance in more onto the agenda. Because of the desire (at least Darfur. One illustration of that would be that while Iinterpreted it this way) to emphasise the Naivasha many donors were concerned about the lack of co- peace process so much, and the word that Toby ordination and wanted to see the UN strengthened mentioned earlier “sequential”, which we have and up and running, DFID I think seconded really heard again and again, could really be interpreted as a very large number of its own experienced aid “we need to sew this one up before we even think personnel whom it recruited, put under contract, about a big problem over there”. That speech seems and then seconded them into OCHA. to me to be interesting in that it does send a message. It talks about Sudan being on the threshold of a new Q66 Mr Colman: The UN system? era, talking in very optimistic terms about British Mr Porter: Yes, and they were immensely significant economic trade figures and so on. In terms of the in getting assistance going in March and April and Government as a whole, as opposed to one May. As Iunderstand it, and this is true of many of particular department, they did need to confront at us NGOs and is also true of some UN agencies, we an earlier stage quite how grave the problem was found it harder than we had foreseen to scale up our there. Another phrase that was in the note from the operational response, initially because of the Secretary of State talks about how there were donors constraints but also because we have had trouble “without a strong presence in Khartoum” who did with getting experienced personnel because there is a not have all the information. Britain of course is not tremendous demand for experienced aid workers in part of that category. There was a great deal of a crisis such as this, and we are all essentially after information in Khartoum coming directly from the the same pool of people, which is well below the field and one cannot seriously argue that people amount needed. Ithink that the UN system as well who—and of course the general public had no as the broader humanitarian system is engaged in knowledge and few had probably heard the name taking a very long look at itself to see what it can Darfur back in April—had reason to be interested in learn and change for the future. The United Nations, the Sudan that they did not know what was going for example, are currently involved in a real-time on. It was entirely to do, as Toby mentioned, with evaluation which is an important study led from New York, to look at things like the fundamental the sequential thinking “we do not want to look at capacity of the system. this other issue until we have finished with the previous issue”, and that really is a most misleading and unhelpful way of proceeding, just as of course Q67Mr Colman: Is it set to deal with large numbers one has heard the criticism if one only looks at of IDPs? Darfur and forgets about the North/South that Mr Porter: The IDP question is complicated because would be equally problematical. However there is no agency which has institutional complicated it may seem, these things have to be responsibility for IDPs within the UN system or seen in the round and to try to parcel them oV really indeed any other, and UNHCR have come to a does not make any sense at all. It seems to me that modus operandi whereby they accept the invitation that was at the heart of where some of the gravest to deal with that in some contexts and in other problems came from. contexts decline the invitation. Iam not sure, Iam afraid Ido not have the information about whether or not they were asked to take on that role in this context but— Q69 Mr Colman: If you are talking about a speech made in April this year, earlier on you said that a Q68 Mr Colman: Would Maniza or Steve know? number of members of the coalition had actually Mr Crawshaw: Not on that specific question. Idid raised all of this in early 2003, 12 months earlier. Did want to pick up on the question of diplomatic the United Kingdom Government totally fail to take response both from the previous question and from this on board? Did they fail to alert the media? Did yours as well. Everything Iam about to say should they put any stories out in terms of what was going International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 19
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter on in 2003 when they should have done so? Is the UK Q72 Mr Colman: But you are also saying the Government’s failure in terms of telling the media Government failed to set the news agenda on this and therefore the media did not speak out? and they should have done? Mr Crawshaw: It is a very personal interpretation Mr Crawshaw: Yes, and would have done if either but Ithink the short answer to that question is yes. I the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister had think there is enormous self-reflection that the media taken any opportunity to stand up, whether at a need to do. Imyself am a former journalist and Italk press conference or in Parliament, it really does not to many other journalist colleagues. There are matter what context. Governments are able to stand failures there which can be analysed at great length up and say, “Terrible things are going on in a and they are all very interesting about why the media particular place at the moment, we are very worried do not pick up so quickly. It has happened before. the rest of the world does not seem to be focusing suYciently on this.” That is something of news interest, that would make television news, even if it Q70 Mr Colman: Would you like to oVer that? was about a place which the news agencies had not Mr Crawshaw: Iam happy to o Ver it. In crude until that moment heard about. So Ithink a greater terms if you have got an expensive story, because intellectual political courage, if you like, is needed to you have to send people out there to do it well, and speak out. Just as journalists should not be following other people’s agendas, so politicians should not be it sounds like a “familiar story”, lots of terrible following the media agenda as well. things are happening, especially in Africa but also out there somewhere, crucially in terms of a news editor’s judgment—and this is my personal view— Q73 Mr Battle: Could Iask about a remark Toby one has a sense that “If this was as big as these Porter made, Ithink, about the capacity of NGOs? NGOs were saying to us, everybody else would be As Steve was speaking Iwas thinking about the running this story. Since Icannot see it on South African crisis two years ago, on which we everybody else’s editorial Iam not going to get into wrote a report, and the Ethiopian crisis and Malawi trouble if Ido not run this story.” That is a natural and the famine there which got very dramatic response of journalists: “Am Igoing to be caught coverage but did not work out in the terms in which short by not running this story?” Iwould be it was highlighted, and Idid not then pick up any pleased to think that can change, but you do need references to NGOs struggling with their capacity of to reflect that it was the same with Rwanda, experienced personnel. Is this a new thing? Could identical with Rwanda; Rwanda did not get you say a little more about NGOs’ capacity to reported properly until later; the same, you will respond? remember, as we say so often, with the Ethiopian Mr Porter: There seems to have been something famine back in 1984. Crucially, if we leave that to particularly diYcult about getting people to Darfur one side for the moment, that is an important as well as what we have had to do several times over media issue and the way the media works, but I the last ten years, which is to get huge numbers of think the lesson which must be learnt is that it people to any place in a short period of time. should not be necessary to wait until it is on the Humanitarian aid is an interesting profession front page of all the main newspapers and on the because almost all of the activities we do are tightly TV and voters are writing letters because they have defined by timing and by donor funding and by location, and one thing that it is harder than getting seen it on the television news and are saying, “This resources together is to train and retain staV in the is terrible, what are we doing about it?”. The profession or in the individual agencies in the quite Government is in a position to know the facts, in large slack moments that you have. It is a curious this case because it was already there and because V system in that you suddenly get tremendous peaks of many di erent organisations, humanitarian, aid demand for experienced personnel and then if, in a and human rights organisations, were drawing the hypothetical situation, in six months’ time Darfur UN’s attention to it. calms down, it will be a completely diVerent dynamic for aid agencies to recruit because they will have all the people who have had their experience—many Q71 Mr Colman: So the Government failed? people will have had their first experience—in Mr Crawshaw: The Government ought to be able Darfur and then they will have more people than to react. It does not need to wait for the story to there are jobs for at any one time. It also appears be on the front pages. It was so very obvious; there that there were specific diYculties in getting is no single person who was interested and involved experienced people to go to Darfur. If one were to in the issue of Darfur earlier, before it was on the speculate as to the reasons why that might be, one front pages, who did not know. Everybody who would be it is an extremely tough operating knew about it knew this would be acknowledged, environment. During the period April, May and when it was recognised, to be a truly horrendous June, you are having temperatures of over 50), you series of events. That Ithink should have been clear had some of the hardest and most frustrating to all those in government and so one does not need restrictions which have been placed on aid agencies to wait for the pressures which, quite rightly come, for many years, you have a dangerous security when things are on the television. That is a good situation, you have some people who say, “And to reaction but one really should not need to wait cap it all, you can’t get a beer”. It seems to have been for that. a lot of experienced people maybe did not want to go Ev 20 International Development Committee: Evidence
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter to Darfur. Iwas speaking with a friend from one of had gone out there and aid h ad been promised and the agencies in the Coalition a few nights ago who they were waiting for the bird in the sky from the had just been recruiting water engineers to go to the west with the food. So we have aid workers out there Philippines—and you will have seen there was and money had been promised but food had not serious flooding there last week—and he has spent arrived yet. What have the flows been like? Have the last four or five months ringing up everyone he they been timely? Are they flexible enough for the knows a hundred times to try and get people to go to NGOs to handle and get on with the job? Darfur and found it very diYcult, but he found five Mr Porter: Yes. In this case, and again with special people who would go to the Philippines in the space appreciation of the role that DFID have played in of a day. Ihope that answers the question. this, resources were never the issue in Darfur.
Q74 Mr Battle: What kind of numbers are we talking Q78 Chairman: The BBC World Service had a fairly about? Roughly? Hundreds of people? Fifty? A lengthy programme on the region not so long ago, thousand? two or three weeks ago, and one of the concerns Mr Porter: There are now about 700–800 raised in this programme was that if the internally international aid workers in Darfur. It is diYcult to displaced people actually in the camps moved out say precisely what numbers are needed, but and went collecting firewood they were at risk of probably that is about half the optimal amount. being raped or indeed being murdered. Of course security in camps for internally displaced people Q75 Mr Battle: So you would not have these people must in the first instance be the responsibility of the on the books, as it were, back in central oYce? You Government of Sudan and be the responsibility of would have to recruit cold and ring up people who the sovereign state, but as Iunderstand it the NGOs may have been there before? That is how it works? have been deploying quite large numbers of Who knows whom and you get as many hands on protection oYcers, and Ijust wondered, relying deck as you can and get them out there? upon that enhanced protection, how have NGOs Mr Porter: Exactly. taken into account the issue of rape and gender- based violence in the work which has been done in Q76 Mr Battle: Again, not under-estimating the Darfur? access problem, which may well put a lot of people Ms Ntekim: Amnesty has been very concerned oV, and with some good reason, but also the about the prevalence of rape and gender-based diYculties for yourselves as organisations, have you violence. As Imentioned earlier, from our research had enough help from the British Government on the ground, our report in July pointed to the trying to get access? Have they put enough pressure widespread use of rape as a form of humiliation, the on the Government of Sudan to get them to allow raping of pregnant women and girls as young as 10, people to go in? women forced into sexual slavery and, of course, Mr Porter: Yes, Ithink the UK Government in evidence of women still not being safe when they particular was very instrumental in the easing of were in internally displaced camps. One of our main some very real and widespread restrictions on access concerns is that no one yet, to our knowledge, has to displaced populations early on in the crisis. Ithink been brought to justice for these crimes. So there is that was a real achievement. It made a huge a current consistent level of insecurity in Darfur, diVerence. In the last couple of months the main which is why, when we have been on the ground, one constraints on access in Darfur and the fact we are of the main things which has come out is that the now again retrenching and reducing the areas in overarching human rights concern has to be the which we work—let us be quite clear on this—are protection of civilians on the ground and in not due to the reimposition of bureaucratic particular those in internally displaced camps. Even restrictions and so forth, but because of a though the Sudanese government did send in an deteriorating security situation in which the rebels increased police force to police the camps, we were have actually been responsible for more than their always told throughout all our investigations that fair share of security incidents in the last couple of the IDPs did not trust these forces. A consistent months. Certainly it is the first time Ican ever comment we had was, “The Janjaweed are the remember in my career, which goes back 13 years, police, they are the same” so there is a distrust of the specific range of operational concerns of those forces, which is why we have been calling for a humanitarian agencies in great detail—visas, travel long time for an increase in the amount of permits, et cetera—being taken up at Secretary of international presence which is actually on the State level. It is extraordinary really to see this. But ground because that, for us, is the main way for IDPs the counter to that is, was similar weight attached on to feel safe. People can only start to return home the “political” side to address the underlying causes voluntarily when they are not in any fear of being of the conflict. That is why people talk about attacked and that currently is not the case. Even humanitarian aid possibly occupying a fig leaf in this though there is an AU force at the moment, it is not situation. fully deployed and the real issue there is the resources which are there and the fact there are just Q77 Mr Battle: Can Imove to the UK funding not enough people on the ground. From our streams? Icame across the other day—and it is not evidence, and the last time we were allowed in was the first time in Sudan, Iremember this happened October, and unlike you we have bureaucratic last year—people in the camps waiting, aid workers blocks which mean we cannot go back in, what we International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 21
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter did feel was that the AU force on the ground was the ceasefire agreements, where it is clear that breach professional but the main issue was there just were has occurred it would be important for members of not enough people. Until that international presence the international community—the UK as well—to is increased and until it is able to professionally carry publicly denounce that and to publicly suggest their out the mandate which has now been expanded by support for the AU. Iwould arg ue what is needed, the African Union, the IDPs will still remain regardless of who does it, is a professional, vulnerable and women will still remain vulnerable competent force to protect civilians. That is what leaving the camps to go and look for firewood. they say they need and that is what we are pushing Mr Crawshaw: We would strongly echo everything for. The AU is currently on the ground taking the we have just heard from Maniza. Certainly in terms lead on that and we think they are perfectly capable of the support for the AU, it is enormously of doing that as long as they have adequate support important these things are not done in isolation, they from the rest of the international community. cannot be sub-contracted, if you like. Otherwise, just to second everything you have just heard. Q80 Tony Worthington: That was the point Iwas Mr Porter: The point you raise is very important. going to get to. It needs to be done, regardless of who Aid agencies do a lot of protection activities now. does it, in a sense, but how diVerent is it for the The distinction Iwould like to make is, for example, Sudanese to see African faces there doing the job as a child protection activity in a camp in Darfur might against European faces? be to ensure children who are separated from their Ms Ntekim: There is absolutely no doubt it is parents are re-united, it might be to ensure children preferable to have an African Union force leading are not exploited when they are in the camps or on an issue which is taking place in Africa. We have children who do not have adults present in the camps been aware of certainly the IDPs being supportive of still receive their rations, that they do not get subject what the African Union is doing as well as what we to or at risk of harm in fending for themselves, but have seen on the ground. Iwould come back to say, we cannot stop children being shot, we cannot stop the issue is about increasing the number of AU children being loaded on to trucks and driven away. monitors and ensuring they are supported in doing It is similar to the firewood question, we can have that. Yes, Iwould agree, in the first instance it makes advisers who can make recommendations that the a big diVerence having the AU leading on this on the aid delivery is factored into the fact it is extremely ground and it is something Ithink the international dangerous for people to go and collect firewood community and certainly Amnesty would support. outside the camps, but we cannot stop people from being attacked when they go for firewood outside Q81 Tony Worthington: There have been the camp. It is balancing those responsibilities which unfortunate incidents in the past of UN peace- is important. keeping forces being sent there unequipped, untrained and unled. The Sierra Leone episode was The Committee suspended from 3.31pm to 3.57 pm a reasonably good example of that, of where it was for divisions in the House not just the logistics but the reason people were Chairman: Let’s go on to the role of the African being sent there was not linked to it but that they Union. could get training there by the UN rather than have to train their own forces. Those sorts of issues. Has Q79 Tony Worthington: Ithink this is probably the there been any evidence of that this time? first humanitarian crisis where the African Union Ms Ntekim: Ithink it is too early to say. Not all the has figured so greatly in people’s discussions and I monitors are on the ground at the moment, there are am wondering to what extent it is convenient, as it meant to be 3,000 by the end of the year. All Ican say were, for the western powers to say, “We would from our evidence, which as Isay is pretty limited, is rather the African Union was dealing with this than that we have not had those kinds of concerns which ourselves.” Are we clinging on to the African Union you have raised expressed. We have seen as far as as a means of avoiding doing more ourselves? possible a professional force, and it is a question of Ms Ntekim: Iwould say we certainly would not see supporting and bolstering that force. Of course it is the African Union taking a lead in this role, its first important that monitors on the ground adhere to mission, as necessarily meaning the international international standards as well, but as yet that is not community or the UN or the EU is let oV the hook a threat which we have seen from the African Union and it is now up to the AU; not at all. We have been forces in Darfur, they have coped competently but impressed, as Isaid earlier, by the professionalism of with limited resources. the AU team we have seen on the ground when we were last in Darfur in October. What is missing, as I Q82 Tony Worthington: What does “bolstering” have said before, is that there clearly is not enough mean? of them. The African Union need support, not just Ms Ntekim: From the international community? logistically and financially. There are only 3,000 on the ground in an area the size of France and, as of Q83 Tony Worthington: Yes. last week, only ten UN human rights monitors on Ms Ntekim: There needs to be more logistical the ground, so clearly there is an issue about not support in terms of technical expertise on how to enough bodies there. They also do need the support implement the increased mandate they now have. politically of the international community. For There needs to be support in encouraging AU example, the AU have been investigating breaches of members to increase the number of monitors on the Ev 22 International Development Committee: Evidence
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter ground as 3,000 is not enough. There needs to be Mr Crawshaw: Isaid that. financial support which Iknow the UK Government has been quite vocal in saying they will be giving. Q89 Mr Colman: Can Iask if there is anything you There also needs to be that political support Iwas wish to say on the public record in terms of this area? talking about: constantly referring to the AU work The United Nations established an Independent in this area, supporting what they are doing and Commission of Inquiry, it is due to report early next condemning any violations of the ceasefire or peace year. If neither Mr Porter or Mr Crawshaw is willing protocols which have been signed when the AU says to make any comment— that is what has occurred. Mr Crawshaw: Iam happy to follow it up. Obviously an operational agency cannot speak in the same way. Q84 Tony Worthington: Do they have a limited shelf To follow up on what Iwas saying earlier, we do think accountability clearly is enormously life in terms of credibility, in that there have been important for prosecutions, and the role of the UK some pretty horrific stories recently of attacks on will not be direct because the framework is already villages with very large numbers of Janjaweed in place, the Commission is already at work which involved and so on? If more of that occurs then there we very much welcome. It will report back on its is going to be a credibility problem about peace- findings which one can confidently assume will be keeping. that very grave crimes against humanity have been Ms Ntekim: When the AU monitors were first sent committed, and if they have been committed then out, they did not have such an extended mandate, there are perpetrators of those crimes and they and now the Peace and Security Council of the AU should be brought to account. Then the question is has extended the mandate so the AU monitors are what happens next, and we would pretty much able to protect civilians in imminent danger. What expect and hope for the suggestion of an ICC we would hope would happen in the future is that referral. Then comes the potential diplomatic that mandate is understood and implemented as far problems which Ireferred to earlier which Britain as possible. You are quite right, if as time goes on will need to confront, and we hope Britain will civilians are not being protected then the credibility confront those and say, “This is a battle which can of the AU will come into question, but that is why at be won.” It is very, very important that one does not this early stage it is important to support what they do half measures there and say, “There might be are doing at the moment. some prosecutions but maybe one should select who should be prosecuted because it is too sensitive in diplomatic discussions.” If people are responsible Q85 Tony Worthington: You are saying, expand the for those crimes against humanity, then they really role, that begins to sound like mission creep. do need to be brought to account. That is the Ms Ntekim: No, it means that they enforce the absolute bottom line. mandate fully, which means when civilians are in imminent danger they take whatever action they can to protect them. Our overarching role is the Q90 Mr Colman: Would you like to expand further protection of civilians and IDPs. on what you think the barriers are to the United Kingdom Government pressing this to a special tribunal or to the International Criminal Court? Q86 Tony Worthington: Apart from the numbers, Mr Crawshaw: Ivery much hope the British you are saying the job has been pretty well done so Government will be sympathetic to the idea that one far? does not pick and choose those who might be Ms Ntekim: So far our limited evidence is that the prosecuted according to what seems to be, if you AU is doing its best on the ground. like, the diplomatic needs of the moment, but that those who are seen to be responsible will be held responsible. The second issue is in what forum any Q87Tony Worthington: Who are the AU? Which prosecution should take place. Imentioned earlier nations are involved? the United States is very hostile to the International Ms Ntekim: The country to have sent the most Criminal Court but equally it has spoken out very, troops so far has been Rwanda, but definitely very strongly on the issues of Darfur. It does not Nigeria is also sending monitors as well. need to vote in favour of a referral, it could simply abstain and there will be others on the Security Council who would be very eager that referral Q88 Mr Colman: Going on to ask what needs to be should take place. The British Government, and we done to ensure those responsible for the atrocities in do not need to go back over that, in the past has Darfur will be held to account, Ithink, Mr always said it is a strong supporter of the ICC but at Crawshaw, at the beginning you were saying you the times when it was most clearly under assault hoped the United Kingdom Government would from the United States Britain stood back, if you ensure action was taken on the atrocities and the like, from the important battle; a battle which the cases should be taken to the International Criminal Americans lost when it was trying to force through Court. Was it you saying that or Mr Porter? the resolution in June, which was because all the Mr Porter: Iwould not have answered that question other members of the Security Council took a strong and Iwould not answer the next for reasons of stand. Britain was the only country which had operational neutrality. ratified the Court Treaty which did not take a strong International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 23
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter stand at that time. This will be the first important test Q93 Mr Bercow: Some of the territory Iam about to of the Court itself—the Court has already begun explore has been partially covered before and it investigations on both the Congo and Northern refers to the question of diplomacy. In 2003 the Uganda—this will be a very high profile case on Embassy in Khartoum reportedly pressurised what are generally agreed to be crimes against journalists and aid agencies not to raise the profile of humanity which have been committed. If the Court Darfur so as not to annoy the Sudanese government is not seen to be appropriate on this occasion, one and risk throwing the international peace accords oV wonders when it will be appropriate. That, as Iam track. In the Human Rights Watch memo,3 you refer sure all the members will be aware, is the underlying to a speech made by the British Ambassador, philosophy of the United States. They would like to presumably William Patey, in Khartoum on 27 April weaken the Court enough so when it comes up for this year, in which he spoke optimistically about review in a few years’ time, people will say, “This being on the threshold of a new era, emphasised the wasn’t a very useful Court, we do not need it any desire of the UK to remain a true friend of Sudan, longer.” It is our very strong view, on the contrary, and boasted about increased trade with the UK and it is the most important judicial institution in the the resumption of British Airways’ flights to world in many ways. This is something which can— Khartoum. In your view, did the Embassy firstly do not just prosecute—by its existence discourage and enough to raise the alarm over Darfur, given the help to prevent appalling crimes against humanity in centrality, literally, the geographical centrality, of its the future because people will know the Court exists position? Secondly, did it pursue the right strategy in and was set up for that purpose. The British terms of trying to influence the Government of Government played an important role when the Sudan to take its responsibilities in Darfur seriously? terms of the Court were first agreed in 1998. In Mr Crawshaw: You will appreciate Ido not think it Washington there may certainly be a desire not to is appropriate to personalise the position or even see the ICC brought in but one of the one-oV locate it specifically in the Embassy. Iwill see it tribunals such as we have seen in Yugoslavia and merely as government policy. What an embassy does Rwanda and so on, which were fine for what they is part of government policy. Clearly discussions did—there was not an ICC at that time, the ICC take place between missions and London but could only prosecute after 2002—but Ithink they broadly this was a government issue. The speech would not be appropriate this time. The British which, as you say, Iquote in our submission, will Government itself has repeatedly said that these ad have been under normal practice something which hoc tribunals are expensive. Ihope this will not be should have been cleared in London as the view of the case but if the British Government were to argue the Government. So to answer your question in that in favour of the ad hoc tribunals instead of the ICC, sense, do Ithink the British Government at that time there could not really be a logical case which could was treating the issue with suYcient seriousness, no be made for making that case except for the fact it is the short answer. Iwas struck by another phrase might please the US administration more than an when Darfur was mentioned, it was entirely in the ICC referral. We do feel very strongly there is almost context of the humanitarian issues there, the need no issue on which it could be more important for the for emergency assistance in Darfur. Emergency British Government to play a leading role. Clearly assistance was, as we have already discussed in a Britain has the ear of Washington, it is in a privileged diVerent context, very badly needed but that really position in that sense, it is very important, so that makes it sound as though there was a friendly would be broadly the framework. government to which some terrible cataclysm had happened and which needed assistance from the outside world, which of course was not the case in Q91 Mr Colman: Would you like to see an Darfur. So Ithink that was a misleading way of international outcome? saying it. Iwill bring it back again to the issue which Ms Ntekim: Ithink Steve has probably covered it we have been discussing earlier, the problem of the from our side as well. sequential approach, not wishing to look at what was happening in another part of the country because you had a peace process which they thought Q92 Mr Colman: You could have a treaty-based could be destabilised. Iwould like to think, and Iam court, as you had in Sierra Leone. not confident of it, that the grave misunderstanding, Mr Crawshaw: That is absolutely right. Again, the if you like, that that represented has in the meantime same things apply. It is a mixed tribunal, which is been understood. Iwould like that to be the partly international, partly domestic, judges, which conclusion which has been reached. makes it less cumbersome and expensive than the purely international ones which have played an important role. The fact is though, as Isay, the Q94 Mr Bercow: Iunderstand your desire not to Court was brought into being precisely in order that personalise the issue or to create a distinction which one did not need to go through all kinds of you regard as artificial or inappropriate between the procedures, creating a new court, which takes time, Embassy and the Government, but the reason why I which takes extra money. The ICC is already there dragged it up is simply that although of course it and waiting, and of course it can have patience. If the should be a seamless operation, it is an unavoidable cases do not come immediately, the ICC is in a fact and a relevant consideration that the Embassy position to bide its time while the wheels of justice are working. 3 Ev 147 Ev 24 International Development Committee: Evidence
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter is based there and therefore is not just told what to needing to look at the decisions at the same time, I do by the Government in London but feeds in its think the issues of importance—accountability and own thinking. Yes, Idare say the Ambassador has to justice—are the thread which also links them. get his speech cleared, but equally there was a responsibility on his part perhaps to take a lead. Can Ipush you on this question of a tension between Q96 Mr Bercow: Iwonder if Ican ask you, what is what some of us will regard as the robustness of the your overall assessment of the international humanitarian eVort on the one hand and the, dare I community’s response on the diplomatic and say it, hand-wringing impotence of the foreign political as distinct from the humanitarian front? policy, although it is dependent on other countries as Given the rather painful and frustrating realities of well, on the other? Iwonder if you have been the Security Council, which in this context is likely conscious of distinct tensions between the Foreign veto or embargoes, what pressure should the OYce and its understandable and perhaps excessive international community apply to the Sudanese pre-occupation with the peace process North-South government now? Arms embargoes? Asset freezes? on the one hand and DFID with its very, very keen Oil embargoes? Has the United Kingdom awareness of the scale of the humanitarian and Government done all it can to bring about pressure human rights crisis in Darfur on the other? Did you in the Security Council? Iam conscious of the very pick up on that? Do you even now continue to pick negative verdict of Amnesty on the November up on any sense of a tension between the two? resolution, describing it as a big step backwards. Mr Crawshaw: Iapologise for what may seem like Ms Ntekim: Yes. evasiveness, but Ifeel it is not appropriate for us as an organisation to start picking oV particular bits of the Government and what they were or were not doing or indeed the oYcials in that government. I Q97Mr Bercow: What impact has all this had? Ido think we have to take the overall eVect of what the not want to get into trouble with the Chairman or Government has or has not done, and on that Ihave with you, but Iwonder if Ican elide into that already expressed my concerns. question, do you have a view about the future UN reform, indicative voting, greater transparency, making the UN’s consideration of these matters Q95 Mr Bercow: Iunderstand and respect that. On altogether more focused and transparent? You will the holistic question, how do you now see the be aware of that report which was published interlinkage between the two issues, Darfur on the recently. one hand and the Naivasha/IGAD peace process on Mr Crawshaw: Yes. Clearly in the recent report4 the other? there are lots of issues which overlap and Iam wary Mr Crawshaw: You use the word “holistic” which I about taking up too much of the Committee’s time think is exactly right, and in my mind sequential and on that. To go back on the pressures, echoing a lot holistic can be seen in this context as being the twin of what Amnesty International were saying earlier, poles. Ithink they do have to be seen absolutely both we have exactly the same concerns, that you need to with regard to the other. There was a very serious push forward, and when you see a sense of rowing problem of not wishing to look at the issues of backwards, that sends all the wrong signals. What Darfur because of the North-South issue, and Ican has happened so far is that the Sudanese government see it would be problematic if focusing on Darfur is good at playing poker and says, “Well, if you press meant people would not be focusing on the Y Y that hard, things can get di cult”, and then at that di culties of Naivasha. Ithink they are point the international community backs oV, and I unmistakeably interlinked and, again, it does come think that is absolutely the wrong idea to take. Very back to the same theme we have had several times, briefly on the UN, there are many good things within the sense of accountability and people needing to that and one, among others, is that when it says take responsibility for things which have been done. “Genocide or serious crimes against humanity are One of the problems from our point of view on the being committed”—so it is not just the genocide Naivasha Accord is that human rights is not in there. word—it suggests the Security Council members There is no accountability stuV, there is no human should not be able to use their veto to prevent rights language of any kind, so it is just a way of actions going ahead on the Security Council, and we moving on without really addressing wrongs which would very strongly support that. That would mean have been done. Ithink that one can certainly make that whatever reason the Security Council members an argument for saying each time this happens—and might have for blocking certain things, if there are this is not of course the first time—it leaves open all grave crimes against humanity being committed, those wounds which have not really been dealt with then the Council ought to be able to go ahead and in any way. It sounds like cliche´ language but it is take action—not military action but pressures of absolutely true that without justice there is no diVerent kinds. stability, and that merely thinking one can reach an Mr Bercow: agreement but not look at the issues and moving on That is most helpful. Thank you. is not a way forward. If Naivasha sends that signal 4 to Darfur, or the other way round, Darfur sends that Report of the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, AMore Secure World: signal to Naivasha, let alone more broadly in the Our shared responsibility, United Nations, 2004. Available region, that is important. Apart from the fact of at http://www.un.org/secureworld/ International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 25
14 December 2004 Ms Maniza Ntekim, Mr Steve Crawshaw and Mr Toby Porter
Q98 Mr Battle: We have talked a lot about the past Q99 Mr Battle: That is a very powerful argument for and where we are up to, but could Iask you briefly, why we should make more eVort, and Iam grateful what would be your priorities the Government and to you for mentioning the soldier as well, that we do yourselves ought to be addressing now? not give up in the face of what we are up against, that Mr Porter: Security. That is the over-arching some people pay with their lives. If you were in the concern of the humanitarian community. The position of asking the Prime Minister and Hilary insecurity prolongs and increases the humanitarian Benn—and you have been remarkably generous so crisis; the insecurity diminishes in some ways and far and our job as a committee is to be as robust as sometimes eliminates our ability to respond to a we can in holding the Government to account and to humanitarian crisis. Then the insecurity can impact do more—what more should they be doing in the directly on our own agencies and our own staV.So light of that story? What should they be doing next the three priorities for Darfur at this time, to coin a week before we are up for Christmas? What more phrase, are security, security, security. All of the should happen? Should they go somewhere? Should sides to the conflict have signed numerous they represent to someone? What should we be agreements and each agreement reiterates their pushing for? commitment to respect the operational security of Ms Ntekim: From Amnesty International’s humanitarian agencies working in Darfur, and gives perspective, if we were going to pick two key things a full commitment to facilitate the delivery of we would expect the UK Government to lead on humanitarian assistance. Ithink all of the now, the first would be for the UK to push within the signatories to the agreements need to be made UN Security Council for an extension of the arms accountable to this which, in the case of the non- embargo to not just cover non-government entities, governmental actors involved in the conflict, may it must be extended to cover the Government of mean identifying and using new channels of Sudan. Already the Security Council has said they communication and influence on them because it is are responsible for disarming the Janjaweed, they absolutely out of control. What happened on have not done that, they are arming them, they have Sunday was that our staV were going on a well- given other logistical support, it is incoherent to travelled road and were held up by two armed men; have a policy just for non-governmental entities and the people were ordered out of their cars but it was not the Government of Sudan. That is one clear, a normal checkpoint of the kind you routinely come concrete thing the UK Government should be across in areas like this and the team were confident they would successfully negotiate it. Then another pushing for. The next is an issue which Steve has man appeared who had not been present before and already brought up in terms of impunity. The UK ordered one of the two armed men to shoot all of our has, as we are constantly reminded, a special staV. It was as simple and as quick as that. One of the relationship with the US. If that is what it takes to armed men refused and was killed, before any of our ensure a referral can be made to the ICC from the staV were, by his commanding oYcer, which is a UN Security Council, then the UK should be reminder that at all levels of these situations there instrumental in trying to make sure that is pushed are people who do know the diVerence between right through, and should also be pushing to ensure the and wrong. Then two of our staV were executed, Sudanese judicial system is reformed so it has the because that is what it was; execution is an capacity to bring people to justice. So far no one of appropriate term. In light of the agreements which significance has been brought to justice on this. have been signed and the commitments which have Thirdly, a point which has been raised earlier about been made, to have aid agency personnel in clearly- the concrete support politically, logistically and marked humanitarian convoys executed by armed financially given to the AU, it is very important the men whose leaders have signed these commitments, UK leads in ensuring the AU can robustly live up to is beyond belief. Action needs to be taken because the mandate they have now got. otherwise so far the international community has Mr Battle: That is very helpful. Thank you. invested in the region of half a billion dollars in Chairman: There are a couple of questions we want keeping the population of Darfur alive over the past to ask Toby in private so will everyone else please six months and all of this money and all of the eVort leave the room. Steve and Maniza, thank you very which has been enlisted will be lost. much for coming and giving your evidence. Ev 26 International Development Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 21 December 2004
Members present:
Tony Baldry, in the Chair
John Barrett Mr Quentin Davies Mr John Bercow Tony Worthington Ann Clwyd
Witnesses: Rt Hon Hilary Benn, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for International Development, Dr Alastair McPhail, UK Special Representative for Sudan, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, and Mr Brian Thomson, former Head of FCO/DFID Sudan Unit, examined.
Q100 Chairman: Thank you very much for giving up the first two because of a land mine and the second time on what is the last day of sitting of the House two were killed by someone from it now seems the before the Christmas adjournment, but Ithink this SLA—Iunderstandentir ely why they have taken the is for all of us an important and increasingly decision that they have, because Save the Children’s distressing topic. Firstly, we thought, if it is all right primary responsibility is the safety and security of its with you, we would include the speech you made last staV. Ihope very much it may prove possible—and week to the Humanitarian Policy Group of the ODI1 certainly Save the Children will do all that it can; in the evidence of the Committee’s inquiry in its obviously, its operations have been suspended since entirety, as it is actually rather relevant. the murder of the two staV—to find others to pick up Hilary Benn: That is absolutely fine by me. Thank that work. Iam not aware of any sign of other you. humanitarian agencies pulling out, but in the end each agency has to take a decision based on its Q101 Chairman: Ido not think, this afternoon, assessment of circumstances on the ground. Now, anyone in this room doubts the sincerity on your you are absolutely right that the principal priority, part or, indeed, on the part of the UK Government at the moment, is to try and get the agreements— for trying to see what they can do in Darfur. Ithink both the original ceasefire agreement of April of this the issue is, pretty much, what can be done. We have year and the Humanitarian Security Protocol which seen today Save The Children, rather was signed, Ithink Iam right in saying, in unprecedentedly, in the sense that Ido not think it November—honoured by the parties. In the last has been done before, withdrawing their team, and couple of months, what we have seen is that the the immediate issue seems to be how does one make degree of attacks that the SLA/SLM have been the ceasefire stick? Who, actually, is monitoring this responsible for is increasing (that has come across ceasefire so that one does not get rogue groups just very clearly from Jan Pronk’s reports) and that is a going and ...as seems to have happened in the change from where it was before, where the principal terrible tragedy with Save the Children? concern was about what the Janjaweed militia and Presumably, that is meant to be what the African the Government of Sudan was doing. Ihave, in fact, Union (AU) are doing. As Iunderstand it, they have just come from a meeting with Said Djinnit, the got something like 850 people in the country when it Peace and Security Commissioner who, as you should be about 3,500. Iunderstand there is a rather know, is in London at the moment. Iasked him the good Nigerian now running the AU team in the question you have just asked me about when he Sudan, but Ijust wonder, Secretary of State, when thinks that the full 3,320 will be deployed. He said did you think the African Union were going to get the plan was and, in his view, it remains to do that— up to strength and what can we do to further help the Ithink he described it—as D !120. It was, from African Union? Unless one can enforce the ceasefire, memory, 20 October when the decision was taken to then the whole thing is going to be totally chaotic. go with AMIS2 II and that will be, if my maths is Hilary Benn: Thank you very much indeed, Mr right, around 20 February, and he told me that Chairman. Can Ibegin by just concurring with what today or tomorrow a further 190-odd of the soldiers you said at the beginning about all of us being will be arriving. So they are still working very hard to concerned about what has been happening in stick to that deadline. The other thing Ican tell you is Darfur. The truth is we are all wrestling with the that today it appears—and we are waiting until issues which the Select Committee is wrestling with. 4 o’clock when, Ithink, the parties are going to That is the first thing. Secondly, to say about Save reconvene in Abuja (Ihope this is helpful because the Children that Imet Mike Aaronson yesterday this is hot oV the press, so to speak)—that following because he came to tell me about the decision and, a meeting with President Obasanjo this morning in frankly, given the two separate incidents in which Abuja the parties have agreed the following: one, they have lost four of their staV—as you will know, reaYrming their commitment to peaceful negotiations under the auspices of the AU; two, the 1 Reform of the international humanitarian system: speech Government of Sudan reiterated its firm given by Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development, addressing the Humanitarian commitment (Isay, in parentheses, it is made to Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute, Wednesday 15 December, (Ev 22). 2 African Union Mission in Sudan. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 27
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson others who have spoken over the last couple of days) Said Djinnit is proceeding with all three of those. It to end the current oVensive and to withdraw its is about the practical support that can be provided. forces to their previous positions, as agreed at the One of the things that the UK has done, if Imay say Joint Commission. The SLA and the JEM so, is to have been very swift in providing support at undertook to cease attacks against humanitarian the time it is needed in the way in which the AU has and commercial (it says here “actors” but Ithink you asked for it, so we were the first country in the world know what Imean) and to refrain from attacks to give financial support to the deployment of, as it against government infrastructure, including police turns out, AMIS I. I discussed with Said Djinnit this posts, and to withdraw their forces to their previous afternoon the use to which they are now going to be positions as agreed at the Joint Commission. able to put the 143 vehicles that we have provided Thirdly, the parties requested the AU to ensure out of the additional funding that we have put in rapidly (the point you have just raised, Chairman) because that was the practical support that they the operationalisation of AMIS—in other words, required. I think, in all honesty, they are doing their getting them on the ground. “The parties call on best, recognising that there have been logistical contributing countries to ensure the speedy problems—because when people arrive they need to deployment of the remaining troops”, and “. . . in have somewhere to stay, they need to get food and order to verify the parties’ commitments (that is rations and that is not just in the places where they point two) the Joint Commission should convene as first arrive but they have wanted, as you know, to soon as possible to ensure more proactive increase the number of places from which they can monitoring of the situation on the ground. Finally, operate. They do now have vehicles in large the parties undertook to return to Abuja in January numbers, they now have access to more helicopters, at a date to be confirmed by the AU for a fourth and Ican say that the latest reporting is, round of negotiations.” Now, that is what they notwithstanding the incident in which an AU appear to have agreed today in Abuja, but the key helicopter was fired at in the last couple of days, it is question is: are people going to stick by the not the case that they have ceased operations. commitment they have entered into? Iapologise for Obviously, they had to make inquiries into what the length of the answer but Ithought it would be happened in that particular circumstance, but the helpful to begin by bringing the Committee bang up- latest reporting Ihave seen just before coming to the to-date with what is happening3. Committee this afternoon is that this has not stopped their operations. Ithink they are trying their best to get people on the ground as quickly as Q102 Chairman: In your speech on the international possible, and Ithink we should unreservedly humanitarian system one of the things you said was welcome the fact that the AU has taken this initiative V that: “Mobilising sta and financial resources for because Ithink it makes some things possible that Darfur has taken far longer than the urgency of the might have been more diYcult if other people were situation demanded. UN agencies need to be more trying to do it, in what is a very complex and a very flexible to move operations quickly from diYcult situation, as Ithink the Committee development to dealing with an emergency.” If I recognises. heard you right, you are talking about full mobilisation of the AU peacekeeping by everybody. This does not seem to reflect the urgency of the Q103 Ann Clwyd: Ifind it hard to put into words the situation because no-one else seems to be able to urgency that people feel about the lack of success in eVectively police or monitor this ceasefire. February getting the AU more quickly on the ground and in is still a fair few weeks out. How do we actually suYcient number, the slow reaction of the impress upon everyone that speed is of the essence? international community and the suspicion that the Hilary Benn: To be fair, Ithink the AU is very Security Council has the same old self-interest that conscious of that point. One has to recognise that has actually dominated decision-making there. this is the first big operation that the AU has While everybody cries “Never again” after Rwanda, undertaken. It is a question both of getting the truth is it is happening again, and the contributing nations to come up with either the international community does not seem to have troops or the monitors or the police personnel, and learnt any lessons at all. How urgently do you feel your own response has been as a department that it 3 Note by Witness: As Mr Djinnit (AU Commissioner for will take action in the area and keep oV our Peace and Security) reported to the Secretary of State for television screens the kind of terrible pictures we International Development in December, the parties agreed have been seeing for so long of the suVering of a joint statement at the end of the latest round of talks in people? Abuja, in which they: agreed to stop attacks and withdraw their forces; requested the full and speedy deployment of the Hilary Benn: You raise a number of, obviously, AU Ceasefire Commission; agreed to an early meeting of the connected but diVerent points in that question. Can Joint Commission; and agreed to return to Abuja in Ideal, firstly, with our own response because, as you January. However, at a later stage, the representative from will see from the memorandum that we submitted4, the JEM stated, on behalf of both JEM and SLM/A, that the statement did not contain the exact wording agreed and the the UK first began to give humanitarian assistance parties would therefore not agree the statement. The AU to Darfur in October 2003, so we are talking a year mediator assured the parties that the wording was exactly as and two months ago. Ivisited Khartoum in agreed with President Obasanjo. The AU is assuming that December, it was the first trip that Imade to Africa both parties have agreed the commitments in the statement, and the UK Government has subsequently made clear to both that we expect them to fulfil these commitments. 4 Ev 71 Ev 28 International Development Committee: Evidence
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson having become Secretary of State, and, frankly, Q104 Ann Clwyd: Do you think that the looking back on it, Iwish Ihad gone two months Government of Sudan at this moment is committed earlier, but that is down to me—Itake responsibility to the safe return of the refugees and internally for that. Having gone, it was very clear to me from displaced people (IDPs)? meetings Ihad and the discussions that something Hilary Benn: Well, there is what the Government of bad was going on. It was very clear, of course, that Sudan says but, in the end, like all of us, we should the Government of Sudan at that time, as Ihave be judged by what we do. In view of the oVensive said, was in denial about what was happening and, that has taken place over the last few days, it is very as we all know, was making it very, very diYcult for hard to reconcile that oVensive, which is contrary to people to see what was happening on the ground. the commitments the Government of Sudan has That is part of the reason why the whole of the entered into, with a commitment to do the things international community was slow to do something that will create relative stability, which will allow the about this. There are slightly diVerent political process to happen, which we hope would circumstances, in some respects from Rwanda lead to a deal that, in my view, is the only way people because there has been a ceasefire agreement. The are going to be able to return to their homes, because question is, how do you get the parties to honour the they are not going to do that unless they think it is ceasefire agreement? Ithink we have to recognise safe to do so. You or Iin the circumstances would that. Undoubtedly, what the international say “Let’s see whether the deal is done and we see community—the UK and others—did as far as the peace and security and there aren’t any more attacks humanitarian operation was concerned was after a and then we will think about going home.” That is slow start, and the speech Imade at ODIwas what the people that Ispoke to in the camps Ivisited principally motivated by my experience in Darfur in in June said very clearly to me. It is about people’s June when Iwent, not to Khartoum but to Nyala actions that everybody should be judged, including and El Fasher to visit three of the camps, because it the Government of Sudan. was clear to me, even at that stage, with all that had happened, that the system was not working as eVectively as it might to get the help that was needed Q105 Ann Clwyd: Do you think that the other at the right time and in the right places. We have seen players in the response to Darfur share with you the real progress on that front. Ithink, from the goal of what actually means reversing ethnic evidence Ihave seen that you have received from cleansing? Is it a common goal or a shared goal? others, the international community has made Hilary Benn: As far as the international community eVorts to get access, which was the point Ifirst raised is concerned, there is no doubt that the world has when Iwas there in December 2003, and to get more belatedly given significant attention to what has humanitarian assistance on the ground, and the fact been going on in Darfur. The resolutions that the that we are now not looking at the humanitarian Security Council has agreed have been passed. I catastrophe that many people feared earlier this year think the Government of Sudan now gets, and has is because, in the end, the system did respond. You had for sometime, a very clear message from the might want to explore in more detail exactly what international community about the expectations Y some of the obstacles and di culties were that we that we have. In my experience it has been consistent experienced. The other thing that comes across very pressure which has resulted in movement. On the clearly, of course, is that this is a crisis that is humanitarian front, and you had evidence on this, political in origin and how do you find a political there is no doubt that a lot of people working are solution in the complex environment both of Darfur very hard to, frankly, take up individual cases. Iwill with all of the things that have been going on and never forget being told by Me´decins Sans Frontie`res against the background of the North-South peace when Iwas there in June that they still had, as I talks? Ijust say, on that point—and you might want remember, 30 metric tonnes of medicines and to come on to it—that Ithink it has been absolutely medical supplies still stuck in a container in Port right and proper to hang on to that North-South Sudan, Ithink, for the past month. Iraised that peace process—absolutely right and proper— when Iwas there, and the question of travel visas and because if that can be fully concluded by the end of the year, as the parties have undertaken to do, then permits, and so on. If I may pay tribute to our that will, for part of Sudan, be an enormous step embassy in Khartoum and the Ambassador William forward. One just has to think about the huge Patey, he has been absolutely relentless in pursuit of V suVering that there has been. We have to learn the this—and it has had an e ect. There is no question V lessons, but Iwish we had been quicker—Iwish I it has had an e ect. So in that sense, Ithink, the had been quicker—and we need to ensure that now international community has been united in trying we do the right things. The final point Iwant to to improve the conditions for humanitarian access. make, since you have raised the UN Security There are, as we know from discussions on the Council, is that it is the case that not all people who Security Council, some diVerences of view about sit on the Security Council share the same view as the what should be done, if you like, on the political Government of the UK and the Government of the track, but in the end people have to face up to the United States of America. We might as well be question: “Are we doing the right things to maximise honest about that. Getting a unanimous Security the chances that people will honour the Council view or getting people not to vote against— commitments that they have entered into, which is or, in some cases, potentially to veto—proposals is the only way of enabling peace and security to return one of the things that, frankly, we have to deal with. to the people who have suVered so grievously?” International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 29
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson
Q106 Mr Bercow: Secretary of State, to what extent Q108 Mr Bercow: We all hope that firm progress will is UK government policy towards Darfur and the be made in Darfur, but Ithink we are duty bound to Sudan driven by (a) fear of Sudan becoming a failed consider the scenario in which it is not. Iwould just state and (b) by preoccupation—justified or like, Secretary of State, to press you on this otherwise (Imake the point neutrally)—with the particular point. Let us s uppose, for the sake of the pursuit of UK commercial interests? argument, that there is goodwill on one side and not Hilary Benn: On the latter point Ihave not seen any on the other or that there is insuYcient goodwill and evidence whatsoever that that figures at all (Iam determination to broker a deal in Darfur as a whole slightly taken aback by the question)—none for that deal to be achieved. What then? Your whatsoever, in my experience, at all. Are we Government colleague in the Foreign OYce, Chris concerned about what may happen to Sudan if Mullin, interviewed for the recent Panorama things go wrong? Of course we are, and it is precisely programme on Darfur said, with his characteristic for that reason that the UK has been tenacious. It is directness: “The odds are that if any western force also an opportunity for me to pay tribute to the did intervene it would become bogged down and oYcials and others who have worked consistently that some new cause for all the Jihadists in the world hard on this over a long period of time to help would emerge and we would find ourselves very shepherd, nurse and encourage the Naivasha quickly being shot at by all sides, plus we would process forward, because it is of fundamental probably destabilise the whole of Sudan, which is the importance to the future of that country. size of Western Europe, and the last thing we want is a failed state the size of Western Europe on our hands in Africa.” Did that amount, and was it Q107Mr Bercow: Iam grateful for that. Ican intended to amount, to a declaration that under no understand other people’s commercial interests circumstances would the Foreign OYce (and, might have driven their actions but Iwas rather therefore, the British Government) be prepared to hopefully expecting that Iwould get the robust consider a western military deployment in Darfur? denial that Ihave just received. Ifwe are Hilary Benn: We have said very clearly that we are apprehensive, as you are and the Government as a not considering that currently, and Ishall come on whole is, about the dangers in humanitarian terms to the reasons why. It is a hypothetical question, and the wider international community of Sudan which you fairly put, Mr Bercow, and what may becoming a failed state, Ithink a logical corollary of happen in the future, depending on how things that must be that the longer the crisis politically is develop, in all honesty, Icannot say. However, the unresolved the greater the chance of that descent reason that Isaid that what the African Union was into failed state status. doing was so important is because it seems to me that Hilary Benn: One of the great complexities of the the African Union, to date, has been able to achieve current situation is you have these two things things that in a sense have not run the risk that you happening in parallel. The Naivasha process is the posit in that hypothetical question. In a sense, I put result of politicians and those who were fighting, in the same question to Said Djinnit in the the end, deciding that they should do something else conversation that Ihad this afternoon—what if?— to bring to an end what we know has been Africa’s because this reflects the thoughts that we are all longest-running civil war. So the fact that a deal was having. The options, in those circumstances, if done and now the parties, as we speak, are trying to things were to continue to deteriorate, are, firstly, negotiate the completion of that, is a very positive the question: would the AU wish to look again at the sign in the context of what has happened in the mandate of its force? Question (and these are all Sudan over a long period of time. So that is why it genuine questions): would the AU wish to consider, is right and proper to do everything to continue to at some point, increasing further the size of its support that process to its successful conclusion. At force—just as it has done from the 500 it did have to the very same time as that has been happening, the getting on for 1,000, in view of today’s or politicians and former combatants getting round a tomorrow’s deployment, to the 3,300 they hope to table to negotiate their way out of a very bitter have there by the end of February? Question: what conflict that has led to a huge loss of life, one has in would the UN Security Council then choose to do if Darfur a civil war breaking out. One of the the situation were further to deteriorate? Ithink that arguments that we have made—and Ithink there is is the order in which we should take it. That is why enormous force in it—and one of the other reasons we have been so keen to give support to the AU who we are so keen, not just for the North-South process, are there on the ground and are arriving in larger that Naivasha should complete is because within numbers, because that is what we have got available there are negotiating principles that can be used if currently to try and ensure that the parties honour the politicians and currently the combatants to the the commitment they have entered into. Icannot say conflict in Darfur so wish to be used to find a what the future is going to hold or how we, or other resolution to the very complex in origin and countries, or the UN Security Council are going to political, economic and social problems that there react; it depends on the circumstances. However, I are in Darfur. So you have got both of these things am clear about what we now need to do and Iam happening, and what we and others have been trying clear about one other thing: if the situation to do is to nurture one while trying to deal with the continues to deteriorate then the UN Security other. That is one of the reasons that it is a complex Council will have to look at this again and will then and diYcult issue to deal with. have to decide what action it is going to take, Ev 30 International Development Committee: Evidence
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson because it seems to me the parties have been given people will say “There isn’t a humanitarian quite a long time to demonstrate that they are going catastrophe.” There is a big challenge but the world to honour their commitments, and if we are going to has got round to gearing up to make sure that we maintain the credibility of what the UN Security could deliver food and medical supplies to people in Council has been doing then we have to demonstrate very diYcult circumstances, and part of the security that if the parties fail to do that there are some problems that have arisen have been as the consequences. That is my view. humanitarian operation has spread its operations into parts of Darfur which it was not possible to get Q109 Mr Bercow: If the increased AU deployment access before. That is part of the story. Ithink that either does not materialise or is not eVective, is an is one of the lessons to be learned, and it is very international deployment of police an alternative important that we do learn the lessons. Secondly, option under consideration? frankly, the world is seeing what is going on; it is a Hilary Benn: As you will know, part of the increased sad reflection but if there are television pictures of what is going on then it does tend to have a very AU deployment—part of AMIS II—is a policing V element. As we speak, the AU is in the process of powerful motivating e ect. Now, it should not be pulling together the people that they need; the target like that but it is. Therefore, when Iwent in June a remains 800 or so—800 police people who would modest contribution that arose out of that was the come in. If I may say, there is one other option, fact that Hilary Anderson of the BBC came with me and stayed and filed a lot of reports, which have had potentially. If the North-South process is concluded, V then the UN, of course, will be turning its attention a very powerful e ect. So that is the second lesson. I to deployment of peacekeepers in the south, and one think the third lesson has been having the capacity other potential option in due course (and it depends to gear up when a situation like this arises so we can bring in help in suYcient quantity at the right time in part on what view the AU will take of this) is Y V whether, as some people have suggested, the AU and in an e cient and e ective way. There are basic force might be blue-hatted. We are just exploring problems, like recruiting enough people to come and what the potential options are. As part of that, if that work in those circumstances. Iam just reflecting on were to occur, you could look at the policing needs. the lessons that we do need to learn. Fourthly, The other thing that we are looking at ourselves at making sure that the UN system, which is at the the moment is the extent to which we might be able heart of this, is fit for purpose, and that is why Imade to do more for the policing front, because the the proposals that Idid in the ODIspeech, because it seemed to me, based on that experience, that it was immediate priority is, indeed, security for those V around the camps; that is what has been the subject not as e ective as it could be in doing something of a lot of discussion over the last few months, and, about the problem that it was having to deal with. frankly, we should be prepared to look at the practical steps we can take to try and deal with the Q111 Tony Worthington: Iam excluding you from problem. One other thing, while Iam up-dating the this because it does seem to me that you were very Committee: the UN Security Council will be alert to what was going on, but you did say that no discussing Darfur today. Ihope that is helpful. one knew what was going on. With respect, that government has been “going on”, doing that, since Q110 Tony Worthington: Iwant to return to what it came in. There is no evidence that there is, as it Ann Clwyd said earlier where, post-Rwanda, we were, a united foreign policy on that government; we said “Never again”. What this has demonstrated is are not at the stage yet, for example, of thinking that it can happen again and again and again. That about what sanctions could have been imposed upon is what we have somehow got to put right, because the leading lights in that government over a this is not a surprise thing with the Sudanese considerable period of time. When Rwanda was on, government; they are recidivists. This happened from reading about Rwanda afterwards, one of the before in the Nuba Mountains and it has happened striking things was that a lot of people in the world North-South; we know the nature of that were doing their best not to see what was going on in government, and expecting them, after 15 years, or the Security Council; they were finding ways of however long the Bashir government has been in, to doing nothing. What has changed? have reformed and to keep their word is a little Hilary Benn: Notwithstanding what Ihave said optimistic, is it not? about the world having been slow to respond—and Hilary Benn: Ihope no one will be accused of naivety Ithink we all acknowledge that—Ido not think you in this. What we have to do is to take what we think could describe what has happened, certainly over the are the right steps in the circumstances. In answer to last 12 months, as the world finding lots of reasons the earlier question, Isaid we have to judge people, not to know what is going on or to do anything in the end, by what they do rather than just by what about it. Ido not think that would be a fair they say they intend to do. Ido believe that what the characterisation—Iam not suggesting that you are international community has done by way of making that point—of what has gone on, both in pressure has had an impact; the fact is that the terms of the humanitarian and, also, the humanitarian situation has moved from where it considerable political eVort that has gone in both to was, where nobody had any access and it was very shepherding Naivasha on (and it would not be hard to see what was going on, and it was while all happening if the parties were not prepared to be that was happening that the humanitarian crisis negotiating and to reach agreements) and in relation emerged. The fact is that that has changed, that now to what the AU has done. It is very significant. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 31
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson
Everybody is frustrated about the speed with which than others, you can even it out. It seems to me those things happen or do not happen—everybody—but I are two practical lessons that Ihave tried to learn in think we just do have to recognise that this is a very making these proposals. significant moment in the history of the AU. They sense it and we should sense it. Why? Because this is Q113 John Barrett: One thing that has come through Africa saying, “We have responsibility for dealing from every speaker is the feeling of frustration with conflict on our own continent and we intend to everybody has at the speed that things have or have take the lead.” That is why the UK has worked not moved over the months and years. We are now really, really hard to give political and practical waiting on the AU building up to February the support to the African Union as it has sought to do number of monitors moving in, and you have that. They, of course, have brokered the talks in mentioned that the Security Council is discussing Abuja which have led to some agreements not today the situation. How can we make sure that the honoured, but agreement we hope is being reached V AU is not a “get out of jail card” and that everybody as we speak, and Ithink that is di erent from says, “It is up to the AU and we will sit back?” Or Rwanda. So, in that sense, lessons have been are the Security Council, or others, saying “Well, we learned. Has it been perfect? Are there other things will monitor and see how things go from now on and that we can reflect upon about what has not gone if action is not taken quickly enough we will have a right? No, it has not been perfect, and, yes, of course, plan B in place”? My concern is that come February we can reflect upon those lessons, and it is important V we will be more concerned and more frustrated and that we do so, so we can be more e ective in the we will be in exactly the same situation in the end. future. Ido not think it is, in that sense, a parallel Hilary Benn: Ihope very much that is not the case. with Rwanda because Rwanda the world did watch, Ireally would not describe the AU as a “get out of frankly, and did nothing while it went on; Ido not jail card”. One, for the reasons Ihave just indicated, think you can say that the world has done nothing. Ithink this is a very important moment, the fact that they have taken the lead, and the fact they have been Q112 Tony Worthington: It has been very, very slow able to do what they have done, in very, very to get under way. For example, if you ask me what challenging and diYcult circumstances. Ithink the has Europe done, apart from ourselves, Iam finding best thing for the international community is, yes, to it diYcult to think of anything. look and see what the AU is doing and encourage it Hilary Benn: The three largest donors—if you talk but, frankly, to give practical support. That is the about the humanitarian eVort—have been, first of best thing. If we really want more people on the all, the United States of America, the European ground quicker the initial funding we gave is an Community (ECHO) and, thirdly, ourselves. At one example but the fact that we helped to pay to airlift point, we were bearing—Ithink Iam right in some of the, as Irecollect, Nigerian peacekeepers in saying—about 75% of the responsibility.5 The last the first round, that we put in money for ration packs figures that Ihave seen put those three at about just and that we put 143 vehicles on the ground is my idea under two-thirds—57%. One of the things Ihave of really practical support to help the AU to do what done since December last year is to say to my precisely you are looking for. You are right, it does colleagues and others “Come on, come on, come on; not absolve the UN Security Council from its you need to do something too”; it is a shared responsibility, having passed three resolutions, to responsibility, but it has not stopped us doing what then follow up what it says to the Government of we thought was the right thing. Not to be immodest Sudan and to the JEM and the SLA because they are about it, Ithink the UK contribution, both in terms very much part of the problem. Frankly, in the last of political support, support for the AU and few months, they are an increasingly important part humanitarian eVort—colleagues of mine from of the problem because they have been stepping up DFID who have gone out and used their expertise to their level of attacks, including attacking provide practical support to OCHA6 to help with the humanitarian workers—the killing of the two Save logistics—all of that which flows from the visit that the Children staV, which is a terrible crime—and Imade in December, Ithink, has made a real interrupting convoys. The international community contribution to what has happened. You are right, it has to be clear that on the parties you have has not been an even response from the international obligations, you have to fulfil them and we will get community, hence one of the recommendations in to a point where there are consequences if you do not my ODIspeech that we need to find a mechanism for do that. It seems to me essential for credibility. ensuring that crises like this are properly funded. One practical proposal is to give OCHA some Q114 John Barrett: Can Ialso touch on something money it can call on straight away; the second is for that was mentioned when we had witnesses giving ECHO to act as a sort balance funder—funder of evidence a week or so ago? You mentioned yourself last resort—so that when you add up all of the earlier about the Naivasha peace process. One of the contributions that have been made by people, and concerns was that Darfur was, eVectively, put on the you find that some emergencies are funded better back burner and people did not want to rock the boat over the Naivasha peace process and Darfur 5 The “we” in “we were bearing” refers to the top three would have been dealt with afterwards. Is that a donors—the USA, the European Community Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) and the UK. feeling of concern that you share? We now know 6 United Nations OYce for the Coordination of what the priority is and the emphasis has changed, Humanitarian AVairs. and with the benefit of hindsight do you think these Ev 32 International Development Committee: Evidence
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson two processes were correct to be dealt with Hilary Benn: Ithink the answer is yes, in terms of sequentially or whether, knowing what we know identifying the government-backed forces, the now, we may have had a diVerent emphasis? regular forces, but not in relation to the militia, as I Hilary Benn: Clearly, knowing what we know now, understand it. Iam sorry, Iam receiving instructions if we went back in time, Iwould certainly do some from Dr McPhail on my right here. Obviously, that things diVerently—let us be honest. That is a luxury has had an impact on the ability of the AU to we have. Isaid what Isaid earlier about those who monitor them. Clearly where it has got the were supporting the Naivasha peace process being information it is able to monitor, and where it has absolutely right to maintain their attention and not it cannot. focus on it, and Iwould not utter a word of criticism of that because two million people—two million Q117Ann Clwyd: The third point is: agree to confine people—have lost their lives in the last 20 years in the Government of Sudan forces to barracks and the use Sudanese North-South civil war. One just has to of wholly civilian police for internal security. reflect upon that and say “Should we do everything Hilary Benn: Following this and following earlier we can to ensure that that peace process comes to a commitments given to, for example, the UN successful conclusion?” Ithink that is the first thing. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the Government of Secondly, it was a process that was already under Sudan has deployed additional police to Darfur, as way before Darfur blew up. Thirdly, Ido believe Ithink we know. Confining forces to barracks, no, very strongly that successful conclusion of Naivasha in relation to the recent incidents, and ditto for the can provide part of the answer to the conflict in rebels. Darfur. So that is right and proper. As Isay, Iwould make absolutely no criticism of anybody; Ithink Q118 Ann Clwyd: The fourth: commitment to people have done it absolutely right in dealing with it conclude the comprehensive peace agreement by the in that way. Looking back on it, could we have been end of 2004. louder earlier about Darfur? Yes, we could—Icould Hilary Benn: Yes, they are negotiating as we speak, have been, actually, if Iwas being self-critical—and and there has been a very clear commitment on it is important that we do learn those lessons. My that front. eyes were really opened when Iwent in December; things flowed from that in terms of the activity that Q119 Ann Clwyd: The fifth is the immediate we entered into and then, again, when Iwent in June. implementation of the Abuja humanitarian We have had six British ministerial visits, the Prime protocol. Minister has been, and Ithink that has been a lot of Hilary Benn: On the security protocol, which is not eVort and attention. The final point Iwould make, mentioned here, obviously there have been because it does go to the heart of this, is that you are diYculties. Imight ask Brian Thomson here. Iwas trying to balance a number of things here, because very rude at the beginning; Idid not introduce Brian you need to continue to motivate the parties to the Thomson, who until very recently was Head of the Naivasha process to do the deal to bring to an end Sudan Unit, and Alastair McPhail, who is our the civil war in which two million people have lost Special Envoy. In terms of the humanitarian their lives while, at the same time, saying to some of situation, overall, and the Government of Sudan’s the same parties “Come on, Darfur, this will not commitments? do.” Iwant to be honest with the Committee, it is Mr Thomson: In terms of facilitating access, a key quite a diYcult process and one is having to make issue is security, which we have been talking about. judgments and having to balance diVerent In formal terms they have loosened up their considerations. That is the best answer Ican give to restrictions on humanitarian access but the security situation has deteriorated recently and that has been what is a very fair question. the main constraint. Hilary Benn: So Isuppose mixed would be the Q115 Ann Clwyd: You mentioned the Prime answer. Minister’s visit to Khartoum in October and presenting the Government of Sudan with a five- Q120 Ann Clwyd: What is the nature of the aid point plan for increasing aid from the UK. Iwonder carrot oVered to the Government of Sudan? if we could go through the points. Perhaps you could Hilary Benn: We have been very clear about that: give a tick or a cross as Iput them to you. Number only if there is a comprehensive peace agreement and one was active co-operation with an expanded AU if there is progress in dealing with the problems in mission. Has that happened? Darfur. Ihave certainly made that point very, very Hilary Benn: Isuppose, in one sense yes, in enabling clear in the conversations Ihave had with the the mission to deploy, but in terms of honouring the Government of Sudan. One of the motivating ceasefire in the light of, particularly, the events of the factors, and it is a good motivating factor, behind last few days, no, we have not yet seen that, so I the Naivasha process is this is a country in desperate suppose that is a mixed answer in relation to that. need of development. In the south of the country, I think Iam right in saying, 98% of children do not complete their education. The development need is Q116 Ann Clwyd: Secondly, the identification of the huge, and part of the reason is they know it is going location of Government of Sudan forces and militias to be very hard to progress that if they do not reach in Darfur. a political deal, and that is a good motivating reason International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 33
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson behind trying to negotiate a peace deal. What Ihave clear distinction betw een the response of the made very clear is if anybody thinks in negotiating European Community and ECHO to this crisis, Naivasha that Darfur carrying on as it has is going which Ithink has been— to unlock long-term development assistance (which is what people want) no, it is not. So both of those Q124 Tony Worthington: Iam sorry, but in the issues have got to be dealt with. In return for peace speech Ihave got it is ECHO, the world’s second and stability and a new future for Sudan, of course, largest donor. the international community is going to be willing to Hilary Benn: Ibeg your pardon, there are two come in and give support to enable development separate points. The fourth proposal in my speech which is desperately needed to take place. However, was a substantial humanitarian fund under the it is on those two principal conditions. control of Jan Egeland (that is the one above), which would allow OCHA to draw on funding to get on Q121 Ann Clwyd: Can you tell us what proportion of with dealing with crises first of all. The second is that the Government of Sudan’s spending is on defence ECHO’s role should be, as Idescribed it, a stronger compared with other items? role as financier of last resort. Those were the two Hilary Benn: OV the top of my head Icannot. Ido proposals. Can Ijust finish the point about the EC? not know whether, Alastair, you can help? The response of the EC has been very good, and one Dr McPhail: It is very diYcult to say. Estimates should distinguish between what individual Member range from 40% to 80%. Ithink most of us take it as States have chosen to do bilaterally and the fact that read that it is probably more than half. the EC has provided ƒ57 million through ECHO. The peace support facility (Iam sorry, this was the Q122 Ann Clwyd: Will the aid be made conditional other point) that Poul Nielson originally thought of, on reducing the percentage spent on military and enormous credit to him for doing so, has hardware? provided very substantial support to the AU Hilary Benn: Idiscussed two issues when Imet, from operation. So Ithink it is important, for the record, memory, the state minister of finance in Khartoum to praise the EC for what it has done; not all the a year ago. One was about transparency of the Member States have put in as much cash bilaterally budget. Dr McPhail has just made the point that as Iwould have liked. nobody is entirely sure, and, clearly, transparency of that budget spending is going to be very important. Q125 Tony Worthington: This expression about Clearly, one of the benefits of a comprehensive peace “financier of last resort”: is it not a “financier of first agreement that means there is an end to the conflict resort” we want, in the sense that when nations are is that the government can spend less on defence. In too slow to respond you realise there is a crisis, those circumstances, one would certainly expect to whereas what we need is somebody with a large pool see that there would be a reduction in the share of of money which bridges that gap, because money expenditure that was going on defence. The straight spent now may prevent problems? answer is we will come to that when we get to the Hilary Benn: What Iwas getting at here was, in a point, but what Iam interested in, if we get to the sense (and, maybe, “financier of last resort” was an point of providing long-term development infelicitous phrase) trying to address the issue that assistance, is it will then support prioritisation by the you have identified, Mr Worthington. The problem new Government of Sudan, which is what we have is not the humanitarian crisis that gets a lot of been talking about, when Naivasha becomes a funding, and Igave an example in the speech of the comprehensive agreement, which can increase contrast between the Mozambique response and the expenditure on health and education, reduction of response to Chechnya where there were vast poverty, which is what everybody wants for that disparities. In a sense, the ones that are well-funded country—above all the people. and can get on shows exactly why we need more funding for the forgotten crises, the awful crisis, and Q123 Tony Worthington: Iwant to look at the is why Iam proposing that ECHO should take on European Union response here. Ithink we agree that that particular respon sibility. Idid not mean, by it was unsatisfactory, but to link with that and your “last resort” (and that is why, perhaps, Icould have speech at the ODIlast week, where you were saying picked a better phrase), “ wait until we see that that ECHO was one of the more eVective bits of the nobody has given anything, wait a bit more and then European Union development system, as Isay ‘okay, here’s the cash’”; you a ct as a balancer of understand it you have been saying that to overcome international contributions so that we get more politics and to energise various states in order to get evenly funded responses to humanitarian crises. resources going into somewhere like Sudan you This is not just an issue in humanitarian operations, would be providing ECHO with something like a it is also a much bigger issue of development. One of float, Isuppose, to say, “We are going to give you a the things that we need to address in the system is budget and you, as commissioner (whoever the imbalance of development assistance, because at the commissioner is) will do what you think appropriate moment there is no mechanism globally which says, for these crises.” Is that what you think? “We add up all of the decisions taken bilaterally with Hilary Benn: What Iproposed in the speech was the multilaterals and country X gets X dollars per that, in eVect, a float be given to OCHA not to head in development assistance and another country ECHO. Can Ijust say, on the European gets Y dollars”, and they can be very disparate. I Community, Ithink it is very important we have a think that is an issue we wil l need to address over Ev 34 International Development Committee: Evidence
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson time. In relation to the OCHA proposal, I suggested Hilary Benn: Iam not sure that Iknow. a fund of $1 billion per year, to which the UK would Mr Thomson: Iam not sure that Iknow either. be prepared to contribute £100 million, and that Hilary Benn: Iwill have to give you an answer. 7 would also be available to allow OCHA to respond quickly to whatever it regarded as being an important crisis that currently was not receiving Q129 Mr Davies: On that point, Chairman, Ithink suYcient funding from the bilaterals that have been the United Nations, like any other institution is made. Ihope that is clear. responsible to its constituent bodies. Iwould hope that each member of the Security Council knew why there had been such an obvious case of Q126 John Barrett: Secretary of State, you may be mismanagement: either he had done a bad job and aware that between March and June 2004 the UN’s he had to be removed, in which case we should know Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan left and there about it, or, if that is not the case, we should also was a gap then. Are you content that there is enough know why he had to be removed. Ihope, perhaps, we leadership and enough eVort taken to make sure that can hear, when the British Government finds out, gaps in leadership do not arise again and keep the what the explanation for that abrupt termination pressure on so that things do move forward? was. Can Ialso say, as my colleagues have already Hilary Benn: It was very unfortunate that was the said, how much Iappreciated your speech, Secretary case because it did mean there was a gap, and Ithink of State? Ihave given up reading ministerial if we are doing what we are doing, which is reflecting speeches; they are mostly full of nothing but the on the lessons, then one of the lessons is that it is very most predictable platitudes and you actually came important that you do have continuity. up with some rather striking and concrete suggestions. So it was certainly worth reading. As I understand it, your proposal for OCHA, if that is Q127John Barrett: Is there somebody at the UN right, is really inspired by the success of ECHO, is it now who hears the discussions today who you feel not; that you are suggesting setting up a kind of has got a grip on the situation at the UN and can say, ECHO on an international level under the UN really, “This is where the buck stops”? There is a structure? sense of frustration and not just within the Committee and the Government but Ithink the Hilary Benn: Thank you for what you said about the general public now are saying, “Who has actually speech. Iwould not quite describe it like that. Ithink got a grip on the situation out there? Who is it was trying to address two things: one is to give representing us at the EU, the UK Government and OCHA greater clout in the process, because if at the UN? Who is driving this?” OCHA has money to spend then it can have Hilary Benn: Ithink, to be fair, the UN tried to fill influence on the purposes on which that money is spent, and, secondly, to try and speed up the process. the gaps. Kevin Kennedy and Eric de Mul both came V and did, in a sense, periods of cover. My first What happens at the moment is all the di erent proposal in the speech, to give OCHA, in these agencies, the NGOs and the UN bodies, make their circumstances, greater power is, in my view, the own assessments and sometimes they overlap or they most important lesson, and Iproposed the do not ensure that all the gaps are filled, so it gives Secretary-General should designate in those OCHA, in the form of the Coordinator, the means, circumstances. What was most striking to me at my having identified what the needs are, to then bring meeting in June with the UN agencies was that there some resource to bear on doing something about it. were bits of things that needed to be done that did not clearly fall within the mandate of the existing Q130 Mr Davies: Is that not what ECHO does—a institutions, and the system did not seem, even after rapid reaction capability which currently is lacking those months had passed, to have found a way of at the international level? That is the point. Can I ensuring that someone was going to take come on to the African Union? It has been the responsibility for that. So it was out of that position of the Government for a long time, and very experience that Icame away and reflected and said: sensibly so, that, where possible, African problems “Actually, if you have got a range of tasks that need are solved by Africans. It makes complete sense. Is to be undertaken the sensible thing to do is to have it not the case that ceasefire monitoring and peace- someone who is going to say, ‘Right, this is what we keeping require some technical capabilities which need to do; you are going to do that, you are going the African Union might not have? One thinks of to do that and you are going to do that.’” It is a strategic lift and the more traditional logistic sensible way to operate and then you can ensure that problems. One thinks of tactical lift which probably all of the things get covered, including shelter. The means the availability of quite substantial Chinook- other thing Iwould say is that now, of course, there type helicopters. One thinks of surveillance—aerial is a very strong team: Jan Pronk is doing a good job, surveillance, satellite surveillance. Those are but, yes, the lesson is do not have gaps like that capabilities which the African Union does not have. because it makes it more diYcult. That is the reality. You cannot simply lend these things. You would have to put in your own troops Q128 Ann Clwyd: Iam not quite clear about why Dr and your own manpower to run these things if you Mukesh Kapila was required to leave at that time. were going to contribute. Is that not the case and is Why was that leadership vacuum at that very important time allowed to happen? 7 Ev 96 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 35
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson that not the problem with the concept of letting the their immediate reach. If I can move to another African Union take responsibility hereinafter for aspect of the African Union’s role, you yourself have ceasefire monitoring and peace- keeping in Africa? said at the end of the day no ceasefire monitoring Hilary Benn: It is undoubtedly the case that because process makes any sense unless there are sanctions this is the first big mission that the African Union for non-compliance and sanctions for non- has done, it is learning its way and trying build its compliance means basically a Security Council own capacity to address the issues that you have resolution. We are thinking here possibly of the rightly identified, Mr Davies. It is understandably Government of Sudan but in other contexts there keen because it is its first big operation to try and do might be other people whom we need to focus on in it for itself. Ijust have to be honest about that. What this way. Ithink you used the phrase this the international community has been trying very afternoon—Inoted it down—if the parties failed to hard to do is to oVer practical support to help build observe their obligations there must be that capacity so that it can be more eVective in doing consequences, you said, and Ithink you were really the job that it has taken on. Undoubtedly over time, using your own language to say the same thing. Is it as this peace and security capacity increases down not right that the best chance of getting a Security the line with proposals for an African Stand-by Council resolution would indeed be if the African Force, the AU will need to build more of the Union formed that judgment and urged the capacity that you have just described to be able to do permanent members and the other members of the such operations in the future. Yes, it is the case that Security Council to go along those lines? Am Iright this is the first time and therefore it is taking them in thinking that at the present time there is no some time to get that capacity together to do it. We indication that they have formed such a judgment? should praise them for what they are doing and give Hilary Benn: If you mean, Mr Davies, have they them support to help them address the issues that requested that specifically in relation to sanctions of you have identified. the UN Security Council, no, they have not. If I could just finish on the earlier question to say that Q131 Mr Davies: Of course we should but let’s be one of the things we have done practically is to realistic, the African Union is not going to develop deploy military planners to help them set up AMIS, the capabilities that Ihave just described—the just as an example of the way we are trying to AWACS capabilities, satellite surveillance, even the provide practical support on building that capacity. large helicopters—nor would we want African What the AU is now going to have to do in the light countries in their present state of economic of what has happened, after what we hope is going development to spend their precious resources on to be today’s agreement confirmed, from memory, such things and nor would they have the technical just to get this right, the Joint Committee will need bases to actually run the training of the programmes to meet and then there will be the Peace and Security for spares and logistics. Let’s just be realistic. Those Council, which is meeting in early January (and I things are not possible purely in an African Union discussed this with Said Djinnit today) and what the context in the foreseeable future. If we had to AU will then have to do is look at what the situation contribute them, however, that means we have to is in early January, have the parties honoured the contribute the trained personnel to run them at the commitment that we hope will be agreed today, and same time, so this is where Iam saying it is very nice if they do not, then Ithink everybody recognises that to assume that the African Union can do everything the AU and ourselves and the UN Security Council but in practice, as my colleague Mr Bercow has are going to have to decide what do we do if the already suggested, we may from time to time need to deploy our own equipment and personnel because security situation worsens. In saying it would be the technical challenge may be such that it is helpful if the AU formed a judgment about what necessary as a part or as an adjunct to an African ought to be done, Iwould welcome that because I Union peace-keeping or the ceasefire supervision think they are playing, rightly, a very important role role. Do you accept that logic? in trying to do something about this. Hilary Benn: Iwould not disagree with that argument and we have said consistently to the AU if Q133 Mr Davies: Is it not the case that we are most you require support from us do ask. The second unlikely to get a Security Council resolution unless thing is Iwould just say in fairness to the AU that it is clear that the African Union as a whole there are examples of the way in which they have supports it? gone about their work in Darfur which have diVused Hilary Benn: That goes back, Isuppose, to my situations that they have found, and Ithink one earlier point that not all the countries represented on should acknowledge the eVort they are already the Security Council have been as keen on pushing putting in on the ground to try and ensure that the parties do hold to the ceasefire. more strongly, if Imay put it like that.
Q132 Mr Davies: Ido pay tribute to that e Vort and Q134 Mr Davies: Precisely. If there was African we know to some extent quantitative improvements Union support some of those reservations might will help, just getting more numbers there, and they be— are doing that, as you have explained to us already. Hilary Benn:—The more there is international My point is that in addition certain qualitative agreement about what needs to be done, clearly that enhancements of their capability may be beyond would be helpful, yes. Ev 36 International Development Committee: Evidence
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson
Q135 Mr Davies: Let me be more specific then and relative obscurity are the block on any eVective put forward my judgment if you do not want to put pressure. If they want to oppose action it ought to be forward yours, and that is you will not get a Security very publicly known and open to condemnation. Council resolution unless there is visible African Can Ijust pursue this question of the AU mission? I Union support, and it would be sensible for the feel sure that you would be the last person, Secretary Foreign OYce to be working towards that end if in of State, to suggest for one moment that the African fact we do think that sanctions are going to be Union should be allowed or encouraged or would required as a weapon in our armoury before we wish to treat Darfur as a guinea pig for its fledgling finally solve this problem in Sudan. Can Ijust finally operations. Iam sure y ou would not suggest that it ask you a question the answer to which clearly should and doubtless it would not want to do so, but cannot be exclusive guidance to us (we have to use it is incredibly important, is it not Secretary of State, our own judgment) but Ithink it would be very when we are talking about the African Union helpful to have your own views. As you know, the mission in light of the fact there is still so much Committee is visiting Sudan next month. You might progress to be made, to focus on two things over and say a little belatedly. Ipersonally think that we over and over again with m onotonous regularity. should be looking ourselves, as a committee, to see One is numbers and the other is mandate. Nobody how we can improve our rapid reaction capability to doubts your commitment but a lot of us feel international crises. More of that in due time. We are that we have done well on the humanitarian aid going next month, God willing, and Ishall be there front; we have not, frank ly, as an international as well. What is your view as to what we might community done remotely well on the foreign usefully focus on, the questions we ought to have policy front. Can Ijust as k you on numbers, how do uppermost in our minds and generally how we can the number of troops in Darfur today compare best help constructively towards the solution of this with the number of troops utilised in cases which are problem which we all desire? similar in terms of geographical extent, the level of Hilary Benn: Iwould normally be very reluctant to insecurity, and the scale of humanitarian need? give advice to the Select Committee which knows its Hilary Benn: It depends what comparisons you are own mind only too well but since you have invited making. me Iwill do so. Iam sure that you would want to be clear in your own mind about the continuing Q137Mr Bercow: Can Io Ver one? capacity of the humanitarian operation to ensure Hilary Benn: Yes of course. that the people who are in camps are getting what they need. Secondly, to send a very clear message to all of those whom you meet that the international Q138 Mr Bercow: Just as a prompter because it does community remains focused on what is happening, seem to me important. Take Bosnia, a much smaller remains determined that progress should be made. area, Secretary of State, you will tell me if my Thirdly, to stress the importance of participating in memory serves me wrongly but Ithought the NATO the political process as a solution. Iwould have troop deployment there was of the order of 15,000 thought that you would want to look very carefully and here we are knocking it back and forth as to at the AU operation because it is the key, if the whether we can scrabble together 1,000 or 1,500 parties are willing to honour the commitments they people. have entered into, to ensuring that is the case. To ask Hilary Benn: The answer is smaller undoubtedly some of the questions you have asked me this given the size of the area and the nature of the afternoon about the AU’s capacity and how the challenge. That is self-evidently the case. Ihope Idid world can help. Ithink part of the continuing flow of not give the impression that somehow the AU was people going to Sudan is about continuing to send treating this as a guinea pig at all. Iwas just reflecting the message that the world is watching what is going on the fact that this is their first operation. It is a on. All my experience has been that pressure, eVort, hugely important one and Ido believe that we support and encouragement applied on diVerent should unreservedly welcome what the AU has people in diVerent measure according to the done. Ifeel that very, very strongly. Itis very circumstances is essential if we are going to keep this important we do not send the message that, “Ah show on the road so that it is not going to deteriorate well, this is the African Union” because, let’s be in the way that none of us wants to happen because honest, one of the problems—and your question the consequences, frankly, do not bear thinking goes absolutely to the heart of this, Mr Bercow—in about. Isuppose that would be my shortlist of things a broad sense is a lack of capacity in the world, and Iwish you a very successful visit because it is a however you care to define it, to do something about very important one. these problems, so when the African Union comes along and says, “Hey, we want to build our own capacity to do something,” Ithink we should Q136 Mr Bercow: Iwant to come in, Secretary of absolutely welcome it with open arms, both because State, if Imay, in amplification first of what Mr it adds to the total sum of the capacity and because Davies has just said. Ido not wish to plagiarise him it is a sign of Africa taking responsibility and, nor to misrepresent him but Ithink what he is saying frankly, we could have done with this kind of eVort on the importance of sanctions and the need to up a long time ago and Ithink the AU should be the pressure is that we do need to be prepared—and supported and applauded for that. Ijust think it is Iwould certainly go along with this—to name and very important in terms of tone that while everybody shame those members of the Security Council who in recognises the important point you are making, in a International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 37
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson sense the numbers depend on the extent to which Q140 Mr Bercow: We come back to our old friends people are going to do the things that they have Mr Resources and Mr Capability, do we not, and it promised because we have seen in the Sudan, as you seems pretty clear that Mr Mandate is very much the will know, say in the Nuba Mountains when Iwas in son, if Ican put it that way, of Mr Resources? Khartoum and met General Wilhelmsen, it was very Hilary Benn: Clearly the two are inter-linked but I clear with a very small number of people and think the AU has already demonstrated its capacity to move about that the joint verification willingness to reflect upon the mandate, has already mission, or whatever its title was, was incredibly reflected its willingness to reflect on the resources, eVective in making sure that the agreement was and it has strengthened one and increased the other. honoured. So it does depend on the circumstances. Ihave no doubt if the situation were to deteriorate further—and we hope that it does not—that the AU would be perfectly capable of doing the same thing Q139 Mr Bercow: Ivery much take the spirit of what again. you have said and a great deal, Secretary of State, of the content, but very briefly, before Iget into trouble Q141 Mr Bercow: Just lastly, Secretary of State, with the Chairman, on the subject of the mandate what lessons need to be learned about IDP crises and you will be aware, Iam sure, in the interview that he the ability of the international humanitarian system did for Panorama programme that Commander to deal with them, very much down the street of your Mensah of the African Union Ceasefire Commission recent oration? Specifically is it not ridiculous that a stated: “We do not have the capacity as at this time person whose safety and security is being threatened to go and act as a buVer force between the armed by his or her own state has to cross that state’s parties, but most of the times it happens before we borders before the international community accepts know. At this level what we do is just respond to the responsibility for looking after him or her? complaints, investigate it and submit our report, but Hilary Benn: A very blunt answer, yes it is, and if one we cannot go and stop the fighting, no.” Dr Suliman looks at what has happened, the number of refugees Baldo told us three weeks or so ago8 that a first step internationally, Ireferred in the speech to this, has would be to strengthen all the components of the gone down and the number of internally displaced operation on the ground by making sure the AU is people has gone up and, frankly, it should not matter given a mandate to protect civilians specifically and whether people cross the border. Some of them may a second which would again send a strong message not know where the border is. What should matter to Khartoum would be to have stand-by tactical is that we have an eVective system in place that support capability to intervene in situations in which provides for people’s needs wherever it is they civilians are under direct attack. Do you agree and happen to flee to. That is my view. what are we doing about it? Mr Bercow: That could not be clearer. Hilary Benn: Can Ijust refer to the current mandate because it partly answers your question. Part of the Q142 Chairman: Secretary of State, getting back to mandate is “to protect civilians whom it encounters capacity, perhaps we ought to at some stage, and we under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity may well not have time to this afternoon, look in within resources and capability;” It then refers to the greater detail at the report of the UN High-level responsibility of the Government of Sudan and it Panel9 because it seems to me before you get capacity having overall responsibility for protection. “To for the mandate there needs to be some decision protect both static and mobile humanitarian taken by the UN. One has the impression at the operations; to provide visible military presence by present moment that the only view the Security patrolling and the establishment of temporary Council is taking round that table is who is friends outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed of whom. You earlier on today said let’s be honest groups from committing hostile acts against the about it, not everybody around the Security Council population.” May Igive you one practical example has the same view as Her Majesty’s Government of what happened in Kebkabiya on 2 December? about how to approach this so one has the veto. If The AU learned of an impending attack by a large the High-level Panel is right and there should come a number of Arab militia on the market. The AU time when the international community collectively fortified its base there, let the NGOs into the should be able to take a judgment about whether to compound, a separate AU team flew to meet the prevent genocide, large-scale killing, ethnic militias, informed them of their readiness to protect cleansing, and serious violations of international citizens—Ijust give this as an example—if attacked humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved unable or unwilling to prevent—and as per their mandate and managed to persuade them you talked in your speech about the Peace Building against attack. One of the consequences was that 500 Commission and the peace-building support which I women marched a few days later outside the AU HQ assume, as we are a collective government, to say thank you very much for what they had done. represents the Government’s views collectively— That shows what they can do in those circumstances. what kind of oomph do you think there is in New Isaid in answer to an earlier question one of the York particularly amongst colleagues in the United things that Iam sure the AU will want to reflect upon States and elsewhere to actually give that bit of the if the situation deteriorates further is, one, their mandate and, two, their numbers. 9 Amore secure world: Our shared responsibility : Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: http:// 8 Oral evidence taken on Monday 29 November. www.un.org/secureworld/ Ev 38 International Development Committee: Evidence
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson
UN architecture some real substance and reality? Hilary Benn: In answer to your specific question, We say “Rwanda: never again” but one of the from memory, those who are providing participants reasons why the international community has been in AMIS II are Rwanda, Nigeria, I think, and The slow on this, as you said yourself, is that the Gambia. Iremember Said Djinnit said today that Sudanese were in self-denial, their particular friends they are hoping to get police oYcers from South assisted that self-denial in the UN institutions, so it Africa. was only very late in the day when the overwhelming Mr Bercow: And Senegal. burden of international public opinion has forced a diVerent set of realities upon them. Q144 Tony Worthington: So they are sub-Saharan Hilary Benn: Well, this is the really big question that Africans? you have raised, Chairman, and this is indeed what Hilary Benn: That is correct. That is the first point. the High-level Panel was all about and it flowed from Ithink the second thing is just to acknowledge that Kofi Annan’s “fork in the road” speech where he Libya has taken an initiative, as Iam sure the said the challenge is the international system needs Committee is aware, to try and promote dialogue to be more eVective. In one sense when it comes to and reconciliation between the tribes of Darfur. We taking decisions, as your question implies, the UN is might be able to say a bit more about this Libyan as eVective as the Member States allow it to be. I initiative, but that is a step which one North African draw a parallel with the Trades Union Congress country has done to contribute to the process of (TUC) because Ispent many years of my working tackling this conflict because there are issues that are life in the trade union movement and people would part of the origins of the conflict in Darfur. The AU say, well, the TUC has not done this, and people itself has its Peace and Security Council. To be would point out, actually, the TUC is as powerful as honest, Icannot remember who is on it, but it its aYliates permit it to be. That is one truth that we represents the whole of the African Union. Iam sure have to recognise. Ithink there is an appetite because it would be very interesting at some point for the this issue is not going to go away, of that Iam Committee—and Ido not know whether he is absolutely convinced because we have talked about coming to give evidence—to take evidence from Said Rwanda today, we are grappling with Darfur, there Djinnit, the Peace and Security Commissioner, are other countries we could talk about, and the because certainly in discussions Ihave had with him world is going to have to find more eVective ways Ihave found him extraordinarily useful and Ihave ideally of trying to prevent these conflicts before they been very impressed by what he is doing. It is not for me suggest who you see but since they are developing arise but, if they do, more eVective ways of dealing this capacity and they are very committed to the with them because we cannot stand on one side and peace and security work with the African Stand-by watch these things happen and do nothing. Ithink Force (and we are going to see more of this) and how the establishment of the High-level Panel was a clear they do it is very, very important. In the end the indication of Kofi Annan’s appetite to do something Peace and Security Committee forms a political view about this and it is up to us as members of the UN on what it is it wants to do but, to be honest, Icannot to respond, which comes back to Mr Bercow’s point remember who the specific members are. Iassume about the will to do something and then providing there will be North African representation but we Y the means to do it. It is di cult. These are really need to check and let you know, if that would be Y di cult problems that we are grappling with. helpful.10
Q143 Tony Worthington: Can Istick, first of all, with Q145 Tony Worthington: That would be very the African Union and what we mean by that. Ican helpful. see the appeal of saying let’s build up the African Hilary Benn: Of course Iwill do that. Union because it takes the white colonial bit out of it, it is taking responsibility for your neighbours, but Q146 Tony Worthington: In this there is the area what do we mean by the African Union? When I which we have been talking about right through have an image of the African Union it is of not the which is DFID’s area of responsibility—the Arab African part of the continent. Who are the humanitarian response and so on—but going into troops who are involved? Who are the forces that are the political area is it really a dead duck to say there coming? What Ihave heard is that they are from can be any kind of eVective sanctions and who is Rwanda and so on. Are there any North African doing the work on that? states involved because you have got this tension in Hilary Benn: You are talking about potentially Sudan going back generations between the Arab through the UN? Africans and the Negro Africans. What role is being played in this by the North Africans and, taking it Q147Tony Worthington: Iam talking about further, by the Middle East and Egypt and so on to targeted sanctions, asset freezes, oil embargoes, and put pressure on the Government of Sudan to act. We the extension of the arms embargo which, as far as I may say that it is good the Africans are looking after am aware, is not the currency in which DFID works. it but the tension in Sudan has been between those It is going to need other players to move those who are now the peace keepers and those who are in areas forward. the Government of Sudan. The role of the Arab Africans seems to be a missing element in this. 10 Ev 96 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 39
21 December 2004 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Dr Alastair McPhail and Mr Brian Thomson
Hilary Benn: Clearly a decision on sanctions would international community who do not share an be a matter for the UN Security Council and you enthusiasm for an International Criminal Court. In have listed most of those that could potentially be the end what is most important is that we find an looked at. There is of course an EU arms embargo eVective venue at which people can be called to which has been in place, Ithink Iam right in saying, account for what they ha ve done. That is my view. for a decade, and certainly were a decision to be taken to implement some sanctions we would Q150 Mr Bercow: The reason why Iinserted the welcome as part of that the arms embargo that the words “without qualification”, suggesting that the EU has currently got and which we are observing referral should be unqualified, was that there is some being extended more widely, but it would obviously concern amongst people Ihave spoken to, who are fall to the Security Council to take those decisions anxious that this should take place and we should and for the UK Government to form a view on what take the lead in sponsoring it, that we should not we do in those circumstances. start from a position or even, frankly, settle lightly for a position which says that some relatively key Q148 Tony Worthington: What is our view? people could be referred to the court but the ‘big Hilary Benn: My view is if the situation were to cheeses’ cannot possibly be referred because apart continue to deteriorate then it seems to me the UN from anything else they have got important Security Council is at some point going to have to negotiations to take part in on the North-South weigh in the balance, firstly, the benefit it has got peace accord, big limousines to climb into, press from threatening sanctions, which is what it has conferences to hold, and so on and so forth, and that done up until now, bearing in mind it is a delicate therefore they would be allowed to get oV scot-free. balance because it is important that we see what is That would not be satisfactory, would it? happening in Darfur (which we are very focused on) Hilary Benn: No, it would not be satisfactory. What in the context of the Sudan as a whole and the prize this is about in the language is making people realise in the North-South peace agreement fully done (two that they cannot behave with impunity and we million dead in 20 years) is a very, very important should support what the Commission of Inquiry thing not to lose, as against demonstrating that the comes up with. As you know, we were very strong international community means what it says and if supporters of the Commission of Inquiry being people do not honour their commitments then what established in the first place and Ido believe people are we going to do about it. That is the dilemma have to be called to account for what they have done. which people have been wrestling with. Let’s be absolutely straight about it. That is the dilemma. At Q151 Chairman: Secretary of State, thank you very some point if it were to get worse, and Ipray it does much. We promised to finish by four o’clock and I not, it seems to me that what the UN Security think we are nearly there. Ithou ght it was very Council would then have to consider is what form interesting in a speech in the chamber to which Iwas those further steps might take because it would be listening earlier on today that a parliamentary about credibility. What Ihope is that the deal today colleague when commenting on Africa made will stick and we can retrieve the deterioration there reference simply to The Sudan and to Zimbabwe. It has been in the last couple of months. That is what seems to me that with the Commission for Africa everybody hopes as AMIS increases its deployment and the work that you are hoping to do on the and gets on with its job of trying to ensure that the Commission with the Prime Minister and others, parties stick to the things that they have promised actually all these issues we have been discussing this to do. afternoon are crucially important because all the good work that is done on the Commission and so Q149 Mr Bercow: Secretary of State, you will be forth will not only set against this but with people’s aware that the report of the international inquiry appetite to engage on Africa it is also important they into human rights abuses in Darfur is due at the end do not just look at the worst case examples. That is of January 2005. Will the United Kingdom support, always the danger, which is why it is crucially without qualification, a Security Council referral of important that the African Union and others can the perpetrators and instigators of crimes against make some progress on this. humanity in Darfur to the International Criminal Hilary Benn: Icould not agree with you more. Just Court? let’s balance that with Mozambique which is a Hilary Benn: Yes, we are very strong supporters, as country which having got peace and stability is on its you know, of the International Criminal Court. We way and making progress. That is why Ihave said have said all along that those who are responsible for that one of the tasks for the Commission and indeed crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, whatever for the world is to see Africa in all of its potential as the Commission of Inquiry finds, should be called to well as its problems, and if we can tap the potential account. We have this mechanism. We are also then that is the best way of dealing with the aware of course that there are some in the problems. Thank you very much for this afternoon. Ev 40 International Development Committee: Evidence
Wednesday 9 February 2005
Members present:
Tony Baldry, in the Chair
Mr John Battle Mr Tony Colman Hugh Bayley Mr Piara S Khabra Mr John Bercow Tony Worthington
Witnesses: Mr Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian AVairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr Oliver Ulich, Humanitarian AVairs OYcer, United Nations OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs (OCHA), examined.
Q152 Chairman: Mr Egeland, thank you very much against humanity, it is on-going, it is armed men for coming and giving evidence to us this afternoon. fighting defenceless unarmed civilians and it has to Iknow that you need to get away fairly promptly stop. and so, if it is convenient to you, we will start fairly promptly. Isuspect that a number of my colleagues Q153 Hugh Bayley: Can you just give us an will join us shortly. If you do not mind, we are going overview, your assessment of the international to take this in two parts, although a lot of the humanitarian response, its speed, its eVectiveness, answers may have read across, but we will start, if we and how within that the UN itself has performed? may, with Darfur and go on to the tsunami. On Mr Egeland: Yes, Iwould be delighted to do so. I Darfur, as you know, most of the Committee (six of may actually refer briefly to the note that we have us) were in Darfur last week. We spent a day, prepared for you and which Ihave just distributed. respectively, in North, South and West Darfur. We It was made by my oYce in the last couple of days were, Ithink, as distressed by what we saw as we for this occasion.1 were impressed by the response of the international community: distressed by the huge numbers of Q154 Chairman: Iwill make sure that this note is internally displaced people, impressed by the work attached as part of the evidence to the Committee. being done by the international community, NGOs Mr Egeland: Thank you very much. First, Ibelieve and others. During the time we were there the it is important to see over this two-year period that International Commission of Inquiry reported, and the emergency has been building. We have we noted the very careful wording of their report, developed a time-line for you, and you will see that that, whilst not being genocide, these were crimes in the course of the year 2003 it started as an against humanity, war crimes as heinous as if they insurgency. There was a disproportionate reaction were genocide. My understanding is that the UN by the government and their allies, the Janjaweed Security Council was meeting, Ithink, both militia. The UN alerted the world, together with yesterday and today on Sudan. Ido not know non-governmental organisations like the MSF, from whether you have any information on where they September onwards, that this was indeed the worst have got to on a referral to a special prosecutor on humanitarian crisis in the world, which Icalled it all of that, or do you have any further information and my colleagues and the Secretary-General in about what the UN Security Council has done so far November and December. We did already in as Sudan is concerned, either yesterday or today? September of 2003 launch the first Great Darfur Mr Egeland: Thank you very much, first of all, for Initiative, which was an appeal for $23 million from inviting me and the United Nations here. Iam joined the international community. It was a slow donor by Oliver Ulich, who is heading the Sudan desk in response, unfortunately. The world had not yet OCHA (the OYce for the Coordination of woken up to the gravity of the situation. In 2004 this Humanitarian AVairs). The situation in Sudan and situation slowly changed. Iwas still myself feeling it Darfur is bad, and Ifear it is going to be even worse was hard to get attention in January and February. in the future unless the security situation improves. Our special envoy, Ambassador Tom Vraalsen, The Security Council has, in dealing with it over the repeatedly visited Darfur. We did, however, have last couple of days, discussed the new UN operation complete access failure in the sense that the there. They have certainly also been looking at the Government of Sudan denied the humanitarian Commission of Inquiry. The attitudes in the Council community, including the UN, to operate freely vis-a`-vis the International Criminal Court are well- within Darfur, and people were dying at an known. One of the main recommendations of the increasing rate. Finally, Ihad success in appearing Independent Commission of Inquiry of the UN is to before the Security Council on 2 April, and Ibelieve refer the situation in Darfur and the crimes against that was a very important turning point, because the humanity there committed to the International Security Council, which before had been reluctant to Criminal Court. There are key Member States in the hear about Darfur, then had a full briefing in an Security Council who do not recognise the court, informal session. Iwent to the noon briefing and it and Ibelieve they are still consulting on the issue. was very well attended by the international media Seen from the humanitarian point of view, what is happening in Darfur certainly amounts to crimes 1 Ev 159 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 41
9 February 2005 Mr Jan Egeland and Mr Oliver Ulich and we got headlines. In April we asked for $150 case of whoever got there first gets on and organises million. Many countries started to react very things. Is that inevitably how things work when you positively, including the United States and the face a humanitarian crisis: you deploy diVerent United Kingdom, the European Union. The people to diVerent areas, or you look at how people Security Council started to discuss the possibility of deploy themselves and then capitalise on the sanctions. Ithink that was crucial in the access capacity they have on the ground? Are there lessons restrictions being lifted finally in May and June, first the UN should learn from the way you have for the UN agencies and then for our non- responded to this very large crisis? governmental partners. In the course of the summer Mr Egeland: There are a number of lessons, and I and the early autumn our response built, in my view will be very blunt, open and frank with you. Ihave too slowly. We had too little money and some of the not been satisfied either with the donor response nor humanitarian partners were too slow in deploying with the humanitarian community’s response to the when access restrictions were lifted. In the course of Darfur emergency. Ithink we were late as a UN the autumn, however, we got a bigger humanitarian community, Ithink the donors were late, Ithink the response and we were at one point close to being able Security Council were late, Ithink most of our to cover all needs. At the end of the year the situation Member States were late in recognising the gravity worsened, and you will see that in the course of this of the crisis and really addressing it in a forceful winter the situation has actually worsened again. On manner. In terms of coordination, I think, however, page 52 you will see a very important indication of it has not been as bad as it may seem. Already in the number of new internally displaced people. February of last year, OCHA (the OYce for the There are three very bad periods, the one period of Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs) deployed a November to December of 2003 where in North sizable group of people within 48 hours after we got Darfur the number of IDPs really exploded, then the our first access to the area thanks in a large part to period from March to April of last year where in DFID here, who provided much of the stand-by West Darfur the Janjaweed militia burnt down personnel that we used. Since that time we have had countless villages and we reached one million coordination teams in all Darfur capitals, the three internally displaced by June of last year. Since last provincial capitals, and now in several other areas. autumn there has been a relentless increase in the Camp management has been one of the gaps in our number of new internally displaced, both in South response. There is no one agency with responsibility Darfur and in West Darfur, and we now have 1.8 for internally displaced as there is for refugees million displaced in Darfur. We have also mapped through the High Commission for Refugees. What for you our access to the internally displaced. We we have done, however, is to assemble all the non- had our best access defined as restrictions, or lack governmental organisations and all the agencies thereof, of both a political and security nature last from that February response and urged, requested, June, July when we were able to reach 90% of the recommended agencies to take on camp people in need. This has worsened of late and we are management in the various diVerent areas; and I now able to reach 88% of a much greater population. would say now we have much better, not ideal in any Altogether we are not reaching some 400,000 way as you could see, camp management in all the civilians. The international response, and Iwas very major camps in Darfur, and we are blessed with a pleased to hear that you were impressed by the work good relationship with the non-governmental of my humanitarian colleagues on the ground, have organisations who are providing 80% of the been able to employ around 1,000 new aid workers, personnel on the ground. Sudanese and international, every month since April of last year and we now have 9,100 humanitarian workers on the ground. Still we are behind in many Q156 Hugh Bayley: You said that it was fortunate areas, as you will see on page 83, in terms of food, that DFID had a stand-by team of people to work clean water, primary health, etc. We are covering it on humanitarian crises which you were able to from half to three-quarters. The area where we are deploy. Is that something that there is a shortage of? really behind is outside of the camps where the How many major donors have similar teams and general population are seeing worsening conditions. why was DFID able to deploy their people but other In terms of food, we have been able last month donors were not able to deploy in the same way? (January) to reach 1.2 million. Our capacity would Mr Egeland: The UK is one of our main partners in be to actually give more than two million people emergency response. Ihave to admit also that the food, and, as you will see, also in sanitation we are Norwegian government, which is my own behind, mostly because of security problems in government, has a good response capacity, as do the these regions. Swedes. We are working with the Dutch; we are working with Canadians. Iwould say maybe six, Q155 Hugh Bayley: Could you say a little bit about seven countries—the Danes as well—now have that how the UN coordination operations work? Iknow kind of stand-by capacity. This is not enough, and it you have OCHA and they are doing a good is too much north-west. In Darfur we should have coordination job, but in practice in an individual had more Arabic speakers; we should have had more V camp—Ithink we visited five—what you see on the Muslim sta members to put in early on. This is why ground appears to an outsider visiting briefly to be a Ihave initiated a humanitarian response review as well as a real-time evaluation of the Darfur eVort. 2 Ev 162 The latter is specific for Darfur—what lessons are 3 Ev 163 there to learn?—and the former is a big global Ev 42 International Development Committee: Evidence
9 February 2005 Mr Jan Egeland and Mr Oliver Ulich initiative to fill the gaps we presently have in the stand-by capacity personnel and in-kind resources. system. We have a gap in terms of camp That is the whole purpose of this humanitarian management for internally displaced—glaringly response review, and Iam very happy to see that the clear in Darfur in the early days—we have a gap in UK Government also now has an initiative of terms of water and sanitation, we have a gap in terms looking at predictable funding. Minister Benn has, of shelter for IDPs and we have a gap in a terms of for example, proposed a fund that will be at the stand-by arrangements within Africa, within the availability of the Secretary-General, me as much as Arab world, Asia and Latin America. Iam confident the relief coordinator, that we could use in the we will be able to fill several of these gaps in the Darfur kind of situation or in Eastern Congo and course of the next months, and Iam in contact with which would not have been used in the tsunami several donors, including the UK Government, on response because the money was coming by itself. I that. Ihad a meeting with Hilary Benn this morning hope we will in the course of these coming months on this precise matter. get such a donor response, a predictable agency response as well with more stand-by capacity. Q157Chairman: You have conceded that the UN, indeed other donors, were late, but could Itake you Q158 Chairman: But we also need to have agreement back to page 24 of your briefing. On page 2 you very from the UN machinery that there is a mechanism kindly tell us that on 7 November 2003 OCHA whereby you can say a particular crisis has got into warns that Darfur is going to be facing its worst the red stage or a stage one stage, or some signalling, humanitarian crisis since 1988 and access for flagging up mechanism, where the whole humanitarian workers is non-existent some areas. international community has to recognise this is No-one seems to take any notice of that. No-one in extremely serious, this is critical, this is one of the the international community seems to take any worst humanitarian crises; otherwise it all becomes notice of that. So on 5 December you say Darfur very subjective, often depending upon people’s “has quickly become one of the worst humanitarian historic associations in a particular part of the world crises in the world”. Iam not quite sure how you and it all becomes very hit and miss. could actually have phrased that more strongly, and Mr Egeland: You are so right. If I am, as Emergency yet again no-one seems to take any notice. We seem Relief Coordinator with the General Assembly to live in a world where the only way in which people mandate, the one supposedly in charge of take any notice is if the television cameras arrive and coordinating humanitarian eVorts in the world, if I actually start to take footage and to put it on our say it is one of the worst humanitarian crises in the screens. Of course, if you have, as clearly happened world we should have gotten more money from here in Darfur, the Government of Sudan donors to our already issued appeals, we should preventing access, as we know, for a long time have seen an initiative from the Security Council in humanitarian workers, NGOs and others, it is very, asking for a briefing and we should have ideally seen very diYcult for the television cameras to get in. pressure on the Sudanese government to giving What Iwould like your help on is this. How within access. Ithink the trend line is a positive one. Ihave the machinery of the UN or the Security Council can more and more governments now coming to us we improve the mechanism whereby if you say, saying, “We recognise that there are too many “This is a humanitarian crisis”, there is some kind of forgotten and neglected emergencies and we are flagging, either a red flag or some sort of alert that willing to give more attention to it.” Ihave been no-one can then pretend afterwards that they did not invited, for example, much more in the last few know the seriousness of what you were telling them? months to the Security Council than in my first Mr Egeland: Ithink you are pointing a finger at one months to address such crises, and Ihave also of our biggest global problems at the moment. We alerted them to some early warning situations, and I have at the same time 20 neglected and forgotten could say that Chad and Guinea in Africa are crises and some of them are appallingly bad. Icould rapidly deteriorating and could become crises. now say Eastern Congo is probably the worst crisis in the world at the moment; 10 or 100 times worse Q159 Chairman: Ido not in any way want to add to than the tsunami crisis at the moment on the Indian your work load, but Ithink we would be interested Ocean beaches. A 1,000 people die every day from in knowing from you by way of a written note what preventable disease in Eastern Congo; that is you now consider to be significant humanitarian 365,000 per year; it is more than three million people crises which are not being followed through and the dead since the late 1990s, and still our response early warning system: because Ithink some of the is inadequate and the international attention is things that we are going to have to try and work out inadequate. In a way Darfur of last winter is is how do countries such as the UK make the happening to an extent in the Congo today. What we situation diVerent.5 We are all conscious when a need is a predictable response, even though we do crisis blows up the response of the UN Secretary- not have the television cameras to help us as we had General or the lead agencies is to appoint a in the tsunami response. We need a predictable representative in the country concerned, who, by donor response. We should be able to push an alarm hook or by crook, has to bludgeon, bluV and cajole button and we should then get money, and we everyone to coordinate and actually get something should be able to push an alarm button and then get going. When DFID submitted evidence to us on
4 Ev 159 5 Ev 165 and 166 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 43
9 February 2005 Mr Jan Egeland and Mr Oliver Ulich
Darfur they said, and Ithink it is only fair to put this like, blind to the ori ginal nationality of someone quote to you in full, “The UN in Sudan suVered a holding a UN passport, because eVectively you leadership vacuum between March and June 2004 become a member of the United Nations team? and the work of the various agencies needed much Mr Egeland: Yes. more eVective coordination (Ev 71).” They also said in their evidence to us, “The change of local UN Q161 Chairman: But does this not flag up perhaps leadership at critical times with no real plans to the need for us all collectively to be building up bridge the gap made it hard for the UN Country humanitarian leadership capacity both at a UN level Team to reorientate themselves towards Darfur.” I and also at an NGO level in Africa as a whole? appreciate that Dr Kapila leaving the Sudan as the Mr Egeland: Yes, we should, and we will hope in the humanitarian coordinator is an internal matter for course of this humanitarian response review Ijust the UN, and Iam not particularly interested in the mentioned to build up a greater number of details about why he left. What Iam concerned experienced humanitarian coordinators. We have about is that four months, according to DFID, seem too few of them at the moment. Of course, you do to have passed with no-one actually having an not get unlimited people who want to subject eVective grip on what was happening in Darfur. Is themselves to that kind of around the clock work in there not a lesson to be learned here? If one of the non-family stations where, you know, you basically Secretary-General’s personal representatives or the get little gratitude and a lot of work. However, we key player is not, for whatever reason, gelling with need more of them. We have some excellent ones, the government, those sorts of changes should but there are too few and we will pick up more. happen more quickly and that having a situation where it is limping along is really unacceptable? Q162 Mr Khabra: As you know, you have heard Mr Egeland: Again, you are right. We should fill all about the UN leadership crisis and the problems leadership gaps immediately in that kind of which the UN is facing in Darfur at a time situation. There should even be an overlap between particularly when the bulk of various agencies needs humanitarian coordinators, as we call them. Ithink much more eVective coordination. The question DFID’s account is incomplete, however. Mukesh is why has it taken such a long time for Kapila left at the end of March. Before that time we the humanitarian community to agree on had identified his successor, another Briton, Alan responsibilities for camp coordination? Is the UN Doss, who was perhaps the most experienced and the international humanitarian system more humanitarian coordinator and had led very broadly equipped to deal with the internally successfully the eVort in Sierra Leone, which is one displaced persons’ crisis? of our success stories. We asked the Sudanese Mr Egeland: There are gaps in our response to crises government, as we have to in the case of resident/ of internal displacement, yes. Iwould say the areas humanitarian coordinators, for the approval of the where the gaps are clearest is in camp management, Sudanese government and they rejected his where we have to have more agencies having more candidature because he was British, being from one capacity similar to the one we have through the High of the troika of the coordinators of the peace Commission for Refugees in refugee situations. The process. This was a completely new thing, that High Commission for Refugees is unable or without Norwegians, Brits and Americans could not be a mandate in many of the internal displacement accepted as such. Ithink it was because they did not situations to take this kind of responsibility, so we want necessarily a strong leader in place at the time. have to build up elsewhere. Iwould not accept that We did also put, from OCHA Headquarters there was a coordination vacuum in Darfur; there immediately in March, Kevin Kennedy in charge. was more a general response vacuum. When OCHA He is the most experienced field operator we perhaps deployed 15 staV from headquarters, DFID and have had. He was the one who took over all others, to Darfur as early as February 2004 it was to operations the day after the bomb killed our Sergio coordinate a response. There were as many Viera de Mello in Baghdad and has a lot of coordinators as we were people from UN agencies in experience. Again, the Sudanese government did not total, and there were also only a handful of NGOs recognise his credentials in this period and they said, at that time in Darfur. What was inadequate was the “No, he is American and he is interim”, and so on. general availability of willing and able agencies to So this was the bleakest period for us. We had no come to Darfur. Ithink some agencies were too late; access to Darfur and they, the government, made all Ithink many NGOs were too late. They simply did sorts of problems for us. The Security Council had not get people to go to Darfur at the time. Some non- not really started to put the kind of pressure they government organisations who would be able to should have on the Sudanese government, which deploy 100 people to the tsunami victims in two they later did when they threatened with sanctions, weeks got 10 people to Darfur in two months. All of and, when they did that, immediately we got more this we have to self-critically look at now as a access and we got also the humanitarian coordinator humanitarian community, and camp management is (which was the second or the third we had one of those issues. nominated) approved, which is Manuel da Silva, who is there now. Q163 Mr Khabra: The next question Iwant to ask you is you know that there was a need for Q160 Chairman: Iwould have thought within the international agencies involved in the production of UN family the receiving countries should be, if you internally displaced people that they must Ev 44 International Development Committee: Evidence
9 February 2005 Mr Jan Egeland and Mr Oliver Ulich coordinate their activities. There was a need for Q164 Mr Khabra: In relation to the same issue, developing a strategy. Therefore the question is: which is an important issue actually, could you tell what is the UN OYce for the Coordination of us what role the International Organisation for Humanitarian AVairs doing to ensure that IDPs are Migration played in Darfur particularly as regards able to participate in the planning and management the planning and management of the IDP’s of their return or resettlement and integration, voluntary return, because they have got to return to which is important because they are the people who their place of birth or wherever they have lived for are aVected? They must be involved in the decision- years. How eVective and accountable is the IOM, an making process; they should be part of the strategy organisation which is not formally part of the UN itself? system. Would you tell us? Mr Egeland: Indeed; you are so right. I would like Mr Egeland: Yes, the International Organisational my colleague, Oliver Ulich, to complement my for Migration is not a UN agency; it has an answer here. We do need to consult with the independent mandate. However, it participates in internally displaced to make sure that their return our UN Country Team meetings. The International and relocation is voluntary. They have no trust and Organisation for Migration is now responsible for confidence in the Government of Sudan at all and overseeing voluntary return and relocation, as we there have been too many cases of enforced just described it, they are also responsible for camp relocation. At the same time our collective eVort and management in some regions and they are providing aim is, of course, that people should return to the general assistance in a number of areas. They are villages when it is safe to do so. We are trying to part of the Country Team, they work well as a team consult with the elders, we are trying consult with the player and they are funded in the normal way by UN people, we are trying to make them visit the villages Member States. There was concern, Ishould be and then discuss among themselves if they want to frank and honest to say, with the way the relocation go back, and then we want to have prescience among agreement came about, because it was at the request them when and if they go back. Fewer people go of the Sudanese government that the IOM accepted back than are displaced at the moment. What is this. However, it was also raised with the Special happening is still ethnic cleansing, “scorched earth” Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, techniques in many places, and we see more and who agreed to this general initiative. This initiative more IDPs. There is an agreement between the should, however, have been first discussed with Government of Sudan and the IOM (the the Country Team and the non-governmental International Organisation for Migration) to organisations so there was a general buy-in to the oversee it being a voluntary return, and there is also agreement before it was announced as a bilateral now an agreement between us, as the UN, through agreement by the Sudanese government and the UNHCR with the government to ensure that it is IOM, and I think we have all learnt from that. assisting in voluntary future return. Mr Ulich: Just to add two quick points. One is that Q165 Mr Khabra: Could you tell me, Iknow that if the same principle that IDPs have to be fully people have been victims of violence, rape or consulted, including women, applies also to mention anything disparate regarding their relocation. At the moment, because of the lack of property, it is a big task to convince them to return security, as Mr Egeland said, return is happening to wherever they have lived their years and their only in very small numbers, but a lot of the camps, place of birth because some of them will be reluctant because of the new arrivals coming in, are becoming to come back for reasons of security? overcrowded and cannot sustain the huge numbers Mr Egeland: Yes. in those camps—Kalma camp, which you may have visited, was one example, Abu Shouk in the North Q166 Mr Khabra: Ido not know whether the United as well—and, when the local authorities want to Nations or the rest of the international community relocate IDPs to other location, that in the past has are going to provide them with the reassurance that created a lot of tension because a lot of the relocation they will be safe. How will they be protected? They sites were in areas that the IDPs did not think were must have lost lots of property as well to help them secure, there were no water sources, etcetera, survive. Sometimes they are small communities and etcetera. Ithink we have made progress on that as they would like to stick together, to return to the well. There is much more consultation now with the same place. Is there any process which has been local authorities and also with the IDPs themselves. started already to talk to these people if that They are being taken to the alternative sites, the local happens, “Would you like to go back to your place authorities have started listening to their views and or would you like an alternative settlement Ithink that tension has gone down quite a bit; so somewhere else?” So these are big issues actually? relocation is in the same kind of category as return Mr Egeland: These are very big issues. People will in that sense. As Mr Egeland also said, the standards not return before the violence has ended, before the and the mechanisms have been agreed; they are in Janjaweed and other militias have been disarmed, these two agreements with IOM and UNHCR. We before the rebels stop their provocative attacks have to make sure they are fully applied and against the police and going in and out of the villages implemented, and we need the full cooperation of attracting counter attacks on the villages, when the the authorities for that and will continue to seek that guerrillas retreat and never fight but let the civilian and alert others when we do not get that population take the full brunt of the attacks by the cooperation. militias. All of these things have to end. Then we International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 45
9 February 2005 Mr Jan Egeland and Mr Oliver Ulich have to have people in all of the return places, community is doing a big job. Iam proud of our aid- overseeing, monitoring, being among the people to workers there, who are burnt out in the course of ensure that they are not re-attacked, and we need to months and we have an enormous turn-over, but we have a big assistance programme so that they can are the plaster on the wound, the wound has to be have food every day as they return and also can have healed and it can only be healed by much tougher help to restart their livelihoods. A lot of things have political pressure against the parties, including the to happen. employment of sanctions, Ithink, and much stronger military presence. There should be many Q167Mr Bercow: Mr Egeland, Iapologise for thousands of soldiers there from the African Union missing your opening remarks and answers. What is who are doing a great job, the few who are there. your estimate of the current death-rate on a daily They are taking risks, they are proactive, but they basis in Darfur? are far too few. Mr Egeland: We have been prevented from having new mortality surveys, so we do not know. Q171 Mr Bercow: Can Ifinally press you a little bit on this question of numbers? We all agree about the importance of logistical back-up and satellite Q168 Mr Bercow: By whom? equipment, and so on and so forth, but on the Mr Egeland: By the government. We have asked question of numbers would you go along with John through the World Health Organisation—this is my Garang, who has called Ithink only yesterday for a understanding of the situation—to do a new force of up to 30,000 Sudanese and international mortality survey. We did one last summer and we troops to stop the fighting, or, indeed, the person found at that time that there were around 10,000 who Ithink led the peace-keeping operation in deaths per month among the internally displaced, Rwanda who suggested that a figure of 44,000 might which was around that time 1.2 million people. I be required? We are talking, are we not, about know now that the mortality within the camps is piddlingly inadequate numbers of the African lower, but it is probably as high or higher in parts of Union force, notwithstanding the tremendous work the countryside, and in the future it may go up that they are trying to do and the weight of further because people’s livelihoods are gone, responsibility on their shoulders. Are you not because of the lack of security and the continued concerned that they might be being set up? violence. Mr Egeland: It is far too late. Remember there was some talk of a force of 5,000 last autumn. They seem Q169 Mr Bercow: Do you have any idea of the to have settled for about 3,300. No, it is too small, numbers of deaths taking place daily as a result, not but we are just halfway even to that and we are now of humanitarian failing, but of violence? in February 2005. There has to be a better way of Mr Egeland: No, we do not know, but Iwould say making the African Union deployable, and the UN that it is in the many thousands every month. How as an institution and you as Member States should many we do not know. be really looking at possibilities for making them deployable. Maybe 5,000 might be more or less Q170 Mr Bercow: We went to Kalma camp and adequate; Ithink more than that is needed if we are found the conditions there horrifying. We also went to disarm the militias. to Abu Shouk, sometimes regarded as the so-called five-star camp. Ithink we were struck by a rather Q172 Mr Bercow: This is very revealing. Ido not alarming sense that there was a semi-permanence to know whether in the course of your visit you might that camp, with marginally better housing; and the have a chance to pop along to 10 Downing Street in combination of that marginally better housing and the hope that the Prime Minister will aVord you the the palpable lack of security outside the camps hospitality of a cup of tea, because if you were to do meant that, frankly, the prospect of any substantial that and he were to oblige, perhaps you might put it voluntary return was years, if not, God forbid, to him that, remembering the very important point decades away. Recognising that your responsibility that he made three years ago that if ever there were is a humanitarian one but also that the link between a repetition of Rwanda Britain would have a moral the humanitarian crisis and the crisis of butchery, for duty to act, it might be a good idea for him to have want of a better term, is an inextricable link, may Ia word with General Jack son to see if we can ask you whether you think the African Union force produce five, six, seven thousand troops from needs greater numbers, more equipment, or an Britain? extended mandate or a combination of all three? Mr Egeland: Ithink the UK Government is sharing Mr Egeland: It is probably a combination of all the frustrations that you are expressing, that I three. Iwould say the mandate is the least of the express, and there have been many oVers to the problem, but we have now 1,800 soldiers, observers African Union to help them deploy. It is one of the and police from the African Union there. We were big lessons learned from Darfur, that it is not supposed to have more than 3,000 by November, the deployable at the moment. It should become latest December. Iagree with your general deployable. Whether a western force would be able assessment. The world is failing Darfur and it is to avoid future blood-shed and chaos and insecurity, beyond me that one year after the world woke up to we do not know. Darfur has now become a place of the Darfur horrors we are still having the situation so many militia groups, so many ethnic groups, so out of control. Iwould say that the humanitarian many fundamentalist groups, so many rebel groups Ev 46 International Development Committee: Evidence
9 February 2005 Mr Jan Egeland and Mr Oliver Ulich that, yes, it would take a very big force and the that you say. It is, however, wrong to say that you immediate priority should be to make the African have bad guys and good guys and the good guys are Union a much stronger force. the rebels. The rebels have killed aid-workers; they have set up their own people to be massacred in the V Q173 Mr Battle: Iappreciate the answers you have way they behave; they are splintering o more recently given, but to imagine in a slightly better rapidly than you can believe. There is no unity of world there is more done on security, even if there command, there are more and more groups, and are more helpful responses for peace-keeping troops, they are not negotiating either with the government even if that were to happen, the “scorched earth” in good faith or in good fortune; so Iwould say that policy, the destruction of over 800 villages, even with the world has to put much more pressure on all. people returning, they are not planting now. To my There are bad buys and bad guys and bad guys now mind, that suggests that even if people are and they should all be under sanctions. There should encouraged to return from the camps they will have be a big stick and a big carrot for them. We also have no livelihood at all. Do you anticipate a general food a big underlying resource crisis there and an shortage, do you anticipate a food security crisis in underlying conflict between farmers and the Sudan next year and are you flagging that up herdsmen—there is not enough place for both of now? them—so the ethnic tension is also part of this. Mr Egeland: Ido, indeed, foresee a food security Probably we have to negotiate local agreements, crisis in large parts of Sudan in the course of this year regional agreements and a national agreement and next year and Darfur may well be the worst of between the guerrillas and the government. these areas. However, there are other parts of Sudan too where we have all sorts of alarm clocks ringing Q175 Tony Worthington: Can Iturn to the UN and lights blinking; even in the east there are not very security guidelines and what you think about them? positive developments. The one glimmer of hope is You get NGOs who are critical of them as being too that we have a peace agreement North/South and we stringent, but you know there have been deaths of need to make that become a reality, we need to invest humanitarian workers. You have got a UN now in the return of the internally displaced. We organisation (UNSECOORD Ithink it is) which is launched last autumn a work plan, as we called it, there to make judgments about whether areas are which is a big appeal to the international community secure or not. Does it have the resources? Do you for $1.5 billion. If we get that fully funded, I think we feel those UN guidelines are working well? Here you will be able to cater for the return of the internally have a situation where the main enemy is the displaced, to secure livelihoods for most of them and government. How do you make a country safe from also to provide food for those in need. At the its own government? moment we are really under-funded in this appeal; Mr Egeland: We are torn here. We have enemies on we are not even close to the kind of donor response all sides in Darfur. Your British Save the Children that there was to the tsunami victims. The workers were actually killed by guerrillas, or former International Red Cross, which is doing a very good guerrillas, as they are now called, and the mines may job outside of the camps and in the countryside, say well have been planted also by the guerrillas that that famine-like situations could arise soon, killed other aid-workers. Iam frustrated by our especially in this hunger period, which is just before security apparatus, because we have too little the summer, our summer. We could have famine- resources to put in, we are not well enough funded by like situations in the countryside of Darfur. our Member States to put enough security personnel there and we end up by declaring roads no-go all the Q174 Tony Worthington: Pursuing that a little bit, time. Iam also torn between the moral imperative to trying to get your head round what is going on in help the civilians and the moral imperative of not Y sitting in New York or in London and sending my Sudan is very di cult—Ithink we have all struggled V with that—but it seems to me that the people who unarmed humanitarian field sta into impossible are winning are the Sudanese government. What situations where they may be killed. We are at the they have is a strategy of clearing the land of people moment not assisting hundreds of thousands who are opposed to them or about whom they are because we think it is too dangerous to go places, not certain with their agents who come to be called and we have an obligation to cater for all. My the Janjaweed, and so on, and now that it is working conclusion is we should have a more robust force to so eVectively they do not have to burn the villages, protect our humanitarian workers from the African they just have to frighten the villagers. They go to Union, or whoever, we should have more capacity camps and there they are looked after by the on the security side and we should really have much international community with no Sudanese input of more pressure on the parties to behave. any significance whatsoever. The camps are ringed by Sudanese Army and Police Force, who give no Q176 Tony Worthington: There is a wider issue service, as does the rest of the Sudanese government which is very disturbing in the world at the moment, gives no service, to their own people. Is that a totally the world that you work in and the world that we unfair assessment? examine, about humanitarian space and recognition Mr Egeland: No, Ithink that is a fair assessment, but of, if you like, untouchables, peo ple who are above one needs to add a few other things. The central the fray. In Iraq the attack on the UN was the most government has failed, they have failed their own appalling example of that, the feeling that in Iraq people in Darfur systematically and along the lines there were no safe people, the symbols had gone. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 47
9 February 2005 Mr Jan Egeland and Mr Oliver Ulich
How do you feel about that issue within Sudan? Do the early days. Cooperation with military forces in you feel that there is a respect for the Red Cross or war situations is highly controversial in the for humanitarian organisations, or is that going? humanitarian community. Some of our non- Mr Egeland: Touch wood, we are not being targeted governmental partners reject the idea altogether and up to now like we have been systematically in Iraq feel it is totally counterproductive for our safety and Afghanistan by groups who see us as not because we will cease to be seen as neutral. In impartial, as we are, but as part of some western Northern Uganda and many places we have to take plan. In Darfur we are in the kind of situation where military transport to be able to deliver food because you, the international community, and we ourselves we are attacked by the Lord’s Resistance Army and feel we should be there helping everybody others, of course. It is a dilemma which is there even everywhere, and we take too much risks or we are though we have guidelines. exposed to too much. The situation in Sudan is one where we are more put into a cross-fire situations, Q178 Mr Colman: Briefly following Mr mine situations, criminal gangs are not targeted Worthington’s comment and your comment, which because we are UN, not as of yet. was that the rebels, the former guerrillas Ithink you called them, were themselves in some cases killing the aid workers and the people they were supposed Q177 Chairman: Finally on that point, is there a to be representing. Do you think there is a problem, need for some new protocols, some new working, in as happened with the Interhamwe in the aftermath that in the past if you had a humanitarian crisis such of the Rwandan massacres, that in some way the as that in Ethiopia in 1985, humanitarian workers humanitarian aid is going to feed the former went in with the full support of the state concerned. guerrillas or rebel forces and in some way is Increasingly, humanitarian workers, whether it be prolonging the distress in Darfur and are there needs Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, are having to go in and to have humanitarian aid guidelines which will the key issue is security. The only people usually who ensure that the UN is not prolonging, if you like, a provide security are troops. Then we have concerns civil war and is not simply feeding the troops on the by NGOs and others about their role getting rebel side, i.e. the non-government side? confused with that of the military, and so forth. Is Mr Egeland: It is a very real concern in all war there not a need for actually looking at these issues situations. It is my clear impression that we are and coming up with some new protocols about how avoiding this problem in Darfur at the moment. We everyone responds to security in the relationship do not have the situation which was occurring in the between the military and humanitarian workers? Camp at Goma, for example, in the Great Lakes Mr Egeland: We do have military civil defence crisis, when guerillas were all over, inside of the protocols that we, the humanitarians, have camps, and we fed them really and thereby part of developed; we have also a framework for the various rebellions. In Darfur the rebel forces are cooperation with military and civil defence assets. It very small, they are very mobile, they go all over. worked wonderfully in the Tsunami response where They seem to be getting arms and supplies easily— the UK and the US and Singaporean military assets all armed groups, all over—but it is not our food. As saved a whole humanitarian operation when we Isee that, we have good monitoring of it. were operating in the roadless areas, for example, in Chairman: Thank you very much. Ev 48 International Development Committee: Evidence
Tuesday 22 February 2005
Members present:
Tony Baldry, in the Chair
John Barrett Mr John Bercow Mr John Battle Tony Worthington
Witness: Dr Mukesh Kapila, Former United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Sudan, examined.
Q179 Chairman: Dr Kapila, thank you very much Ihave mentioned and the other cause was inevi tably for coming and giving evidence to the Committee one expended an enormous amount of personal this afternoon. The acoustics in this room are not political capital in trying to bring this horrendous brilliant. Although they look like microphones, situation to the world’s attention and Iguess my these are not actually microphones. Iam not sure utility was over. quite what they are but they are certainly not microphones. If you could be very kind and speak up. Also, Iapologise that we are not as full a Q180 Chairman: Ithink when we were there our Committee as we usually are but that is because collective experience was finding ministers, fellow quite a number of my colleagues are in Iraq at the parliamentarians and others in Khartoum in a sort present moment. We divided our resources, so some of state of denial about what was happening in of us went to Sudan and some are now in Iraq. It Darfur. Did you experience a similar state of denial would be helpful for the Committee to understand and, if so, why do you think that was? why you left the Sudan in 2004 and what the reasons Dr Kapila: You mean a state of denial within the were for that because Ithink that would help us in Sudanese— terms of the texture of your involvement in the Sudan. If you could just help us a little bit with that, that would be much appreciated. Q181 Chairman: A state of denial within the Dr Kapila: Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for government in Khartoum, within parliamentarians inviting me to be here. Iam very happy to speak in Khartoum, a state of denial as to what was about my time in the Sudan as the UN Resident happening to internally displaced people in Darfur, and Humanitarian Co-ordinator in charge of what was happening in terms of government development and humanitarian activities for the 13 helicopter gun ships going out and beating up month period between 2 March 2003 and 1 April villages, not wishing to recognise in any way this was 2004. Coming to your question, the reason Ileft at the responsibility of the Government of Sudan and that time, on 1 April to be precise, was because I just simply being dysfunctionally unconnected with guess my job was done. Ihad to do what Ihad to do the realities on the ground. and a certain price had to be paid, so Ihad to leave. Dr Kapila: No, Ido not agree. To define the situation In substance, you know the oYcial reason that has as a state of denial is to give an excuse or comfort to been presented by the UN which is that a new mission was expected to be headed by a Special those who are the hideous perpetrators of these Representative of the Secretary-General, and it is crimes against humanity. There was perfect not unusual for new missions to have new teams awareness of what was going on within the Sudan coming in, so that was par for the course, but behind government, within many organs of the Sudan that background lay other circumstances. One was government. In my time there I made many contacts that since about October 2003 Ihad taken an and friends at very high levels and at other levels, in increasingly vocal line, raising my concerns in all segments of society, within the military, within increasingly strident ways about the atrocities and the government administration, including senior the abuses of human rights and international ministers, senior oYcials, right to the President’s humanitarian law that were being committed. oYce, and in my conversations with them—and you Gradually Imoved from just expressing concern will accept that Icannot name individual towards making accusations against the Sudan conversations but Ican be open about the facts— government, the perpetrators of these crimes against there was perfect awareness about what was going humanity. It became quite clear that my position in on. Ican only refer to the period that Iknow about. Sudan would no longer be tenable. In fact, at the end This was a highly eYcient military dictatorship it was a close run thing between whether Iwould be whose pervasive tentacles reached throughout thrown out of the country, ie declared persona non Sudanese society and have done so for decades. grata, or would leave before they had the pleasure of There was no denial, there was perfect awareness. doing that. There were also threats against me, The external representation was, of course, denial particularly in the last six weeks of my time there, that anything was going on based on the foundation and my security advisers felt it wise that Ishould that because access was denied to anyone from leave. That was the immediate trigger, if you like, for outside with any degree of objectivity they would not the timing of my departure. The causes were the one get found out until events had moved on. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 49
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila
Q182 Chairman: DFID in a memorandum to us colonisation and so on, managed to retain a tolerant said: “The UN in Sudan suVered a leadership sense of themselves as a diverse community. vacuum between March and June 2004 and the work Therefore, this “ethnicisation” that we see is very of the various agencies needed much more eVective much a modern phenomenon, it has happened co-ordination”1. What impact do you think your perhaps in the last 10 years, and increasingly in the departure—the loss of the United Nations Resident last three or four years the militarization has and Humanitarian Co-ordinator—had on the certainly happened. It is very much something that eVectiveness and co-ordination of the humanitarian is imposed upon the Sudanese people by a group of response to the crisis in Darfur? You give the self-seeking and vicious leaders who have impression that it was a seamless transition from you manipulated the Sudanese people for their own to a new mission but, in fact, was that what power seeking interests. Iam opt imistic about happened or was there eVectively a vacuum of Sudan, that it will remain a united country, as a leadership for a few months? united nation, and it is very important for the world Dr Kapila: Obviously Icannot directly vouch for as a whole that this strategically important country what happened after Ileft, but my impression from at the crossroads between the Arab world and Africa contacts and ongoing information at that period of remains as a tolerant society. By removing some time—Iremained involved in Sudanese a Vairs for a people who are behind these crimes and allowing month or two after leaving the country—was that society to come out and express its views, maybe this undoubtedly the departure of the UN Co-ordinator will happen. If not, then the country will continue to had an eVect on the way the UN could assert itself fragment. There are other conflicts that are there in its ongoing discussions and negotiations with the that are only just under the surface and they will authorities and other interested parties. This was ultimately take their toll. partly because the Sudanese government—they said this to me very openly as Iwas leaving—did not Q184 Tony Worthington: Is it your impression that want a strong head to create the sort of trouble that I the North-South element having become a no-win had created for them and, indeed, they said that they game where there had to be some kind of settlement, were going to delay accepting any replacement for as there has been a deliberate start to East-West long as they possibly could. That was one factor. I conflicts in Darfur or Port Sudan, that for some had to leave when Ihad to leave, there was no way reason the government does not want peace? that Icould stay on, partly because of my personal Dr Kapila: Again, Irefer to the period Iknow about. safety and partly because Iwould have been thrown Ineverything Isay Iam not making comment on the out if Ihad not left voluntarily, so to speak. current Sudanese government or the current “Voluntarily” in these matters is a relative issue. evolution of aVairs but speak with full frankness There was a gap in the sense that the strategies that about the period that Iknow about. What Ifound we were working upon at that moment in time to in dealing with the government at that time was that increase our access and our ability to confront some there was not a unitary view. Undoubtedly, certain of the issues, particularly on the human rights side, groups were in powerful positions, especially in inevitably had to take a backseat while the system relation to military and intelligence matters, which figured out what it wanted to do for the future and ultimately ruled the roost but there were many good subsequently, as you know, the Special people, including in the military, who were Representative of the Secretary-General was completely dismayed by what was going on within appointed. their own government. Ihad ministers who said to me, “Iam deeply ashamed to be part of a Q183 Tony Worthington: Could Ijust ask a further government that treats its own people like that”. question about the Sudanese government. Whereas There was an ideological struggle within the Iwould agree with what you have said, Iwonder government and Ithink certain people have whether it was your experience that there is such a benefited from these conflicts, in a sense, but there deep ethnic antagonism between those who are in were very, very many other people who were the Sudanese government, but not just in the completely dismayed and depressed by what was Sudanese government perhaps in alternative going on. In terms of whether it was a very great, governments as well, that makes the prospect of a centrally organised attempt, Ithink it is more united Sudan remote? complicated than that. Dr Kapila: Having travelled up and down the country, so to speak, and having dealt with Sudan Q185 Tony Worthington: Obviously because of your over many years before in my previous capacity in resignation you were despairing at alerting the world DFID in London, and indeed I was a medical to the scale of what was going on, so you thought the student at Khartoum University many years ago, humanitarian response was too slow. How would that was when Ifirst got to Sudan, the Sudanese you allocate responsibility for that between the people who come from many diVerent communities, controls on access brought in by the Sudanese diVerent backgrounds and so on, are some of the government and the UN’s response, the most gentle and some of the most tolerant people in international community’s response? the world. Over the centuries they had evolved a way Dr Kapila: To answer that in a more comprehensive of working and, through the successive waves of way it is important to start oV by saying that it despairs me, and it was so even when Iwas in my 1 Ev 71 previous role as head of humanitarian aVairs in Ev 50 International Development Committee: Evidence
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila
DFID, that every time there is a major political crisis the world community and you were not that—that anywhere it is categorised as a humanitarian was not your title—but in the end you left because problem and those who are in charge of you were speaking politically. humanitarian operations are then burdened with the Dr Kapila: Yes. You raise a very, very interesting task of doing something about it and when they point which is worth exposing. Yes, my mandate as inevitably fail the blame is put on the humanitarians the UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator and those whose responsibility it is to seek political was very much on the resident co-ordinator side in solutions get oV scot-free by saying that the charge of development activities, what little there humanitarians did not do their job, that is the was of that in the country, and on the humanitarian implication. Iwill come to the humanitarian impact. side you know. Iwas also the o Ycial for security, My great struggle in Sudan was to get the conflict in meaning the safety and welfare of the staV and their Darfur portrayed as what it was, a vicious ethnic families as well as various other roles. There was no struggle which Iultimately described as ethnic political role given to the UN as a whole because the cleansing. As you know, legally there is very little Naivasha peace process was contracted out to this diVerence between ethnic cleansing and genocide, it troika of Member States, which is the US, UK and is a form of genocide, as stated by the General Norway. The UN was an observer at the peace talks Assembly itself. Every time people kept on saying to but that very often meant being in the antechamber me, as the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator, why Ior and being allowed in under suVerance, but certainly my staV or my colleagues could not be more creative, it had no direct presence at the talks. The UN had no more eYcient, work harder to find humanitarian formally mandated political role in that. Ithink also solutions, the truth of the matter was that was there comes into this a question of personal virtually impossible. Even if twice the money came interpretation, how one interprets one’s role. My in from the world and we had all the resources and personal ideology in this and any other work Ihave the support we needed, the arguments would have done is that when it comes to struggles for achieving been the same. To come to your question, which is human development or meeting basic humanitarian related to that, undoubtedly Iwould say that 75-80% needs these are fundamental political struggles, so of the problem we had on the humanitarian side was the dichotomy between that and what is an certainly due to the systematic obstruction by the improvement in the human condition, if that is not Sudanese government of humanitarian access. a political condition Ido not know what is. There is absolutely no question about that. Ispent However, that said in a philosophical sense, in a hours, weeks, months, personally negotiating at the practical sense it really did promote real dilemmas, highest levels of the Sudanese government and their especially as the UN was reluctant to raise its bureaucratic restrictions and their military and political voice because it did not have a mandate to intelligence restrictions and their constant do so and partly because certain Member States rescinding on their promises and so on, were an said, “Leave it to us, we will solve the political organised and systematic attempt at humanitarian problem and then you come and do the obstruction which, as you know, also is a form of peacekeeping afterwards”. That was the broad crime against humanity, which was eVectively what picture but as the situation evolved my attempts at happened. Yes, the humanitarian response was drawing the attention of powerful Member States of slow, one could have done a bit more of this, that the Security Council and others to what was and the other, but this is tinkering at the margins. evolving in Darfur failed through private Fundamentally the issue was that the Sudan diplomacy, and Ivisited all the major capitals of government refused to allow us access when we most permanent Security Council countries myself, needed it most. If the access had been allowed we as well as one or two others in the period from had enough resources and stocks and people in the October onwards. Of course, Iwas also present in country to deploy from other theatres. After all, I, as Rwanda immediately after the genocide on that a UN Co-ordinator, was heading one of the UN’s occasion for DFID, or ODA as it was in those days, largest operations in the world, including the largest and we had all the speeches about never again and never again, but here Iwas, the most senior UN UN air force, if you like, the fleet of aircraft that was Y at my disposal as a UN Co-ordinator, which is the o cial in Sudan, and it was happening on my patch. largest anywhere in the world. We had thousands of Having tried all the private channels of diplomacy staV, we had vast stocks of supplies. Even if the and all the bureaucratic mechanisms that were open world had been slow to respond specifically to the to me, in all conscience Ihad no alternative but to additional resources, we had the capability to deal follow the recommendations of the Commission of with the issue by redeployment, at least temporarily, Inquiry into the Rwanda genocide which said that so that was not the issue, it was very much when it comes to crimes against humanity every obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudan individual in any position of authority is personally government. responsible for his or her actions. Coming back to your question, as an elaboration of your question, you have to ask the question whether or not it was Q186 Tony Worthington: What Ithink you are right to disempower the United Nations from that saying is very interesting, that your appointment was political role at a critical stage in the evolution of as UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator— Sudan’s history. The private diplomatic measures that was your title—but people, Isuppose, were that were being taken in the troika and other looking at you as a political leader also on behalf of countries, well meaning as they might be, and Iwas International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 51
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila fully supportive of them and worked very well with government had to do their deadly work in Darfur them and Ihave got nothing but praise for the e Vorts was reducing, so in fact the violence got worse. As that were made, whether that was the right way and you can see if you trace the events that took place whether that dichotomy that was created eVectively between April last year [2003] and the critical led to a weakening of the international ability to months of November [2003] to February [2004] respond to the political aspect of the crisis in Sudan. before the UN regained access, it was basically people doing the last act, if you like, before they had to come to the table and turn the chapter. That was Q187Tony Worthington: This is fascinating but the obvious to anyone. Ifind it extraordinary that this resemblance to Rwanda, it seems to me from what was seen as some sort of great insight. This was very you have said, is that in both cases there was a much the evolving political situation at that moment conspiracy not to see. in time in those critical six to nine months. Dr Kapila: Correct. As Ihave said publicly, and I welcome this chance to say it here, what happened in Darfur was becoming increasingly evident from the Q188 John Barrett: You mentioned the Sudanese middle of last year [2003]. This was no secret. This government were doing their deadly work in Darfur, was known in the chanceries of the major capitals but were you able to establish during your time there around the world. Iknow because Iwent and visited as to whether they had a plan or strategy as to how and spoke to all these places myself. We had reports they wanted to see this issue come to an end, or was coming from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty and it, as someone put it to us, a dysfunctional many other organisations, and even if you discount government that drifted into this? them because they are campaigning organisations, Dr Kapila: Both are true to some extent. It is a they still alert you and put upon you a duty to do dysfunctional government in a sense but the something about it. However, the feeling was there dysfunction is a saving grace. As Isaid earlier on, were two forces in play at that particular moment in there are many, many heroic people in Sudan oYcial time. One was, “We do not believe you. Yes, Iam circles, people who are biding their time for a better sure horrible things are happening but so what, this day. These are heroes because every day they quietly is Africa, this is Sudan, and horrible things have mount their resistance within the Sudan structure. happened for centuries so what is special about this They are trying to keep faith for the future. It is one?” Within my own UN family there were UN dysfunctional and that is a saving grace, if you like. agencies who were reluctant to upgrade their Having said that, please have absolutely utterly no operations because they felt it would compromise doubt that the Sudanese military machine and their operations in other parts of Sudan and because intelligence machine is as eYcient and ruthless and of their scepticism at what was going on. That was organised as anywhere else in the world. After all, one element of that. The second element was the you do not survive in power for so long, you do not distraction one, let us sort out the North-South do what they have done in southern Sudan—even peace talks in Naivasha and when that is done that though they did not win the conflict in southern will give us a framework for lasting peace all over the Sudan although they came very close to it, it was country. As Ikept on saying to anyone who would eVectively a stalemate—you do not do that without listen to me at that time, there would be no peace in having a degree of coherence and organisation. To Sudan, and it is two years later that the agreement characterise the organised attempts to do away with was signed at the beginning of this year. This was a group of people in Darfur on the grounds of their because, as Ikept on saying at that time in my own ethnicity—my words which Irepeat here—ie ethnic talks with both the Sudan government senior cleansing, a form of genocide, you cannot do this oYcials and SPLM in the South, who were involved without some carefully orchestrated leadership, in the Naivasha talks at the highest levels, the SPLM some very careful planning and organisation and said that they would be very reluctant to be part of strategic intent. Isaw evidence of all of that in my a government of national unity post-agreement that interactions at diVerent levels of the system. Ihope was still fighting in Darfur because they would then that one day an International Criminal Court will become part of the problem because they would look into these particular matters and will invite have to solve it and everyone knows you may have a people like me to give evidence on these particular government of national unity following the signing matters. of a piece of paper but they know who commands the real power, which is the same military force that Q189 Mr Bercow: Dr Kapila, Iwould like to ask was there before, so the moral high ground which the you, if Imay, about both the humanitarian and SPLM had in relation to the South would be lost human rights aspects of the crisis because it seems to because they would be dragged into the mess, so they me that the dichotomy between them is essentially would rather they sorted out Darfur before they false, they are inextricably linked one to the other. signed the peace agreement. In the case of the Sudan On the humanitarian side, and again with reference government it was obvious that as soon as there was obviously above all to the period of your a peace agreement with a peacekeeping force under stewardship, how eVectively do you think the the full attention of the Security Council and the various UN development and humanitarian Member States and all of this, their room for agencies worked together in late 2003 and early manoeuvre in Darfur was going to be limited. What 2004? Do you think that there was a recognition, happened was that as the Naivasha talks intensified, tacit or express, that the UN is one family, working the window of opportunity that the Sudan for a common cause? Was that suYciently Ev 52 International Development Committee: Evidence
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila understood and was it institutionalised into the ways movement from certain countries and, not of working? What lessons can be learned from this? surprisingly, the government in Khartoum looked This is really very fundamental to our inquiry to try upon that part of the UN with suspicion and the to establish exactly what happened and what did other way round as well. So we had a situation when not happen. Igot there where people would not even talk to each Dr Kapila: Indeed, it is a very fundamental question other. We had reports coming from southern Sudan and Ianswer it openly but carefully. Iwant to make which would be censored from our colleagues to sure that you reach the right conclusions. Iam sure their own colleagues, so I, as UN Co-ordinator, had you will. Let me answer more generally first and then great trouble in accessing information from my own come to the specifics. Ihave learned in my short but staV, if you like. We had a real struggle to overcome very intense time as a UN Co-ordinator that it is very that particular culture and to create one UN diYcult to run a UN machinery on the basis of a approach, and Ibelieve we succeeded towards the single organised company or civil service or unitary end of it but at a very considerable cost. Also, there government machine. This is because in a were issues about competition for resources which multinational system what is at your disposal is a happens amongst organisations that are funded in a range of interests and forces and pressures upon you. way which is reliant on what sort of image you can When we say “the UN”, we have to distinguish present and so on. That means that we had $100 between the signals and the incentives that the million available for food aid but we had only Member States send and, therefore, the behaviour $1 million available for human rights. that generates, and the behaviours that are generated as a consequence of procedures and Q190 Mr Bercow: Sorry, $100 million for? systems that are within the purview of the UN. It is Dr Kapila: For food, and $1 million for human very, very important to distinguish between the two. rights. Juggling those types of considerations, ie the My own experience was that if the Member States supply side which follows the lines individual had been more disciplined in the way they allocated Member States choose to take, together with the resources and did not use resources to pursue incentives on individual agencies that do not particular ends, which would be either perceptions necessarily reward corporate behaviour but reward of their own analysis of the situation or particular an ability to represent a particular agency’s interests political ends, then on the bureaucratic side of the or issues, creates for a very diYcult mix. Put that in UN we might have a more rationally disposed the context of Sudan, which was a fractured country system which would be able to work objectively north and south, there are a couple of things which according to an analysis of the problems and are specific to add to that which are systemic. One is approaches which follow from that particular that after many decades we still do not know how to analysis. That luxury is denied to us so what happens look after IDPs. I had a real struggle and I got into is donors decide that their favourite organisation is a lot of hot water trying to find an organisational this or their favourite issue is that, or their favourite arrangement that was acceptable within the UN part of the country is this, or their favourite political system as to who would take responsibility for imperative is the other, and then the flow of internally displaced people because no particular resources follows that. Then it is left to the poor UN entity was responsible. When Iproposed one entity Co-ordinator and the system to juggle these diVerent there was an outcry from other entities, so this forces and pressures to try and make some sense of remained, if you like, something that was done by them within a framework of impartiality and matrix management which in a situation like that objectivity and the standards that are expected of an basically amounts to very high transaction of costs, international civil service, knowing at the same time you spend more time co-ordinating than actually you are under almost daily attack from one Member delivering services. That was one issue. The other big State or another because you have not done their gap was the management of camps, which is an particular bidding. All that was true in Sudan at the ongoing problem. More strategic than that was the moment of time you are referring to. Not only that, big divide between the humanitarian and the we had problems of a Khartoum-based UN and a development people. The traditional view of the Nairobi-based UN which was doing its very best development of Sudan is because we do not have a with some very good colleagues, and nothing Isay is normal relationship with the Government of Sudan intended as a criticism of anybody, it is a reflection in this war torn country, we do not do any of the system for which the whole world, including development in it—that is the sort of conditional the United Kingdom Government, bears view of Member States—but we do humanitarian responsibility, so this should not be seen as anything aid. Both humanitarian aid and development aid other than that, and that is why Isay Iam anxious have their own rituals, their own bureaucracies, their that you come to the right conclusions and this is not own systems for working. When you are actually in portrayed in an incomplete sense. We had a situation Sudan and you see large parts of the country are at where even though Iwas the head of the UN North peace, and even during the time Iam talking about and South, there were certain traditions that had large parts of the country were at peace, when you grown up over the previous 17 years. There was look at the content of what you do, if you are trying Operation Lifeline in Sudan, which was an to get a clinic running or girls into school, is that a organisation within an organisation, very closely humanitarian programme or is that a development allied with the Southern movement and very closely programme, Ido not know. Inpractical terms you allied with the resource flows to that Southern are relying on the same infrastructure, the same local International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 53
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila counterparts, the same NGOs, the same Q193 Mr Bercow: So it was a nonsense? organisations on the ground. What Itried to do as Dr Kapila: Absolutely. UN Co-ordinator was to use the title “UN Co- ordinator” rather than “Resident and Humanitarian”, just to bring the two sides together Q194 Mr Bercow: So it was dishonest? and to have problem driven approaches rather than Dr Kapila: Absolutely. Not only dishonest, it was to have category approaches. In my view, the only worse than dishonest. It was a deliberate attempt to diVerence between humanitarian work and obfuscate, avoid and hoodwink the rest of the world development work in certain countries is not what so they could continue with their deadly deeds, as I you are trying to achieve but the methods by which mentioned earlier on. Iwould say this is where I you achieve them. You do not have development think a comprehensive approach is necessary. A health projects and humanitarian health projects, in ceasefire is a good thing and to say the right things, the end you have the Millennium Goals that are and one should encourage them even to at least say fundamentally about achieving certain objective those things, but that should not be the end of the targets. To answer your question, a huge gap and a story. One needs a comprehensive and determined problem with the way we are organised, both in approach to address all the dimensions of the Sudan and maybe generally, is this split between the problem and that way try to hold people humanitarian world and the development world. It accountable for what they have promised to do. makes sense if you are digging people from an earthquake or rescuing people after tsunami when you are literally into a very narrow definition of Q195 Mr Bercow: Let us just pursue that theme very humanitarian aid, but in most of the crises aVected briefly because it is hugely important, in fact it is countries one deals with, fundamentally you are pretty central to any serious understanding of this dealing with a mixed situation. To disengage from issue. You said a few moments ago in response to a Sudan over the previous 20 years and say, “We do question from Mr Worthington that you hoped one not do development, therefore we cannot build day that the human rights abuses, the war crimes, capacity for human rights, we cannot build human and the crimes against humanity would be the capacity”, fundamentally what do you get? You get subject of an ICC inquiry, and indeed you held out what you got, ie a marginalised country going its the prospect that you might give evidence to that own way. It is a very short-term and narrow view of inquiry, and Ihope that your application to do so when you do development and when you do not. will be noted in the appropriate quarters, but can I just press you on that. You said quite loosely “one day”. Would Ibe right in thinking that you would Q191 Mr Bercow: Ihave the absolutely agree with those who say that there is indeed a great unmistakable impression from what you have said urgency about referral of the Government of Sudan that probably as a result of the huge political and senior members of the armed forces of Sudan to pressures for North-South peace and the potential dividend therefrom, there simply was not an the ICC in relation to crimes against humanity and overwhelming sense of political urgency about crimes described by the international inquiry as no tackling the crisis that was erupting in Darfur. less heinous and serious than genocide? It needs to Dr Kapila: Yes. happen sooner rather than later, does it not? You talked about your experience of Rwanda and, of course, by the time it has finished, the ad hoc, Q192 Mr Bercow: In that case I would like to lead extremely expensive, rather cumbersome, tribunal in on, if Imay, Dr Kapila, from the humanitarian issue relation to Rwanda will have taken something like to the human rights issue because you made the 14 years to deliberate. really rather interesting point that you felt there was Dr Kapila: Again, everything Isay refers to my an argument about the way in which you deliver period of oYce so Icannot comment on this objectives on the humanitarian front and the subsequently, but Ican tell you that when Iwas in development front, that there should not be a my particular oYce Istrongly argued for justice Manichaean divide between the two, but equally, of course, one could say if you are to have any chance through the International Criminal Court of Inquiry of promoting development you have first to tackle following a Commission of Inquiry and I was the most egregious abuses of human rights that delighted when an inquiry was finally set up. Ihad would in any case be an obstacle to the promotion asked for that myself as far back as October 2003. I of that development. Iwonder if Ican just ask you a would say that justice delayed is justice denied. I number of things on the human rights side. First of would also say that the capability of the indicted all, if you look back to the period of your tenure, was people to evade justice can only be strengthened as it not rather incongruous and almost certainly the months pass. In all our experience of sustaining another example of governmental dishonesty for the peace and peace agreements, peace without justice Sudanese government even to commit as part of the remain fragile and if the aim now is to ensure that the ceasefire to reining in the Janjaweed militia when it North-South peace agreement and the other seemed that they either had no serious intention of agreements are held and that we turn the chapter doing so or probably knew that the genie by then on Sudan and have a peaceful country in the future being out of the bottle they would be unable to put then that objective is compromised without it back in? accountability of the perpetrators of these Darfur Dr Kapila: Yes. deeds. It is not just a question of justice for justice’s Ev 54 International Development Committee: Evidence
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila sake, that justice is essential for our international Q197Mr Bercow: The man responsible for the objectives to sustain a peaceful solution and peace peacekeeping operation in Rwanda speculated that in Sudan. an African Union force of 44,000 was required whereas at the moment there are somewhere between 1,800 and 1,900 African Union troops on Q196 Mr Bercow: Ido not want to get into trouble the ground and a commitment to get to 3,000. Imust with the Chairman because that is always a very say progress seems to be pitifully slow. Iam inclined dangerous thing to do but Ido just want to push you to think of Kafka’s castle where every time you take on two final aspects, if Imay, before Ishut up and a step nearer the castle you find you are a step further let colleagues proceed. First, Ido not know whether away. Iknow you are not a military logistician, you you have picked up some of the messages which I are a humanitarian aVairs co-ordinator, but, have picked up from the Foreign OYce in the UK, nevertheless, what is your best estimate of the scale but are you not disturbed by talk on the part of some of the force needed in terms of numbers of troops public figures which suggests or implies that there is and levels of logistical support, possibly even a sort of balance of responsibility between clarifications of mandate needed if the human rights government and the rebel forces for what is taking abuses, the killings, the maiming, the rapes, the place? Personally, as a Member of Parliament, I tortures, are to stop? have asked a number of questions of ministers, Dr Kapila: From first principles, a mandate has to be ministers Ipersonally rather like and in many ways an enforcement mandate rather than a peacekeeping respect, and have been a bit shocked in recent times mandate and it needs to have enough capacity to be to hear answers along the lines of “Right and wrong able to cover the diVerent areas of the region, which on both sides, abuses being committed on both sides, is as big as France as you know. Having said that, abuses by the rebels, abuses by the government”. It the tactical question is whether it is a doable job. In does seem to me that there is really a rather a sense it is a paradoxical question. If suddenly there important distinction, and that is that the rebels are were 100,000 troops, international peacekeepers, in starting from a very low and weak base. The rebels Darfur as opposed to 3,000, would that mean that do not have Antonov aeroplanes and they do not they would be able to work eVectively? Iwonder. have helicopter gun ships. Do you not think that the The point here is that because of the sheer size of the danger of that, however well intentioned, country and the logistical challenges and the nature apportionment of blame, or attempt to get equitable of the opposition that is going to happen, unless one distribution of blame, could be yet a further excuse had a very, very robust presence, and we know even for impotent hand-wringing? robust presences in Iraq do not succeed easily, and Dr Kapila: Ithink anybody who commits abuses, so the debate here has to be between what is doable rebel or government, should be held accountable. If and the size of it. Yes, a robust presence is needed the rebels are doing that sort of thing now then they but lots more numbers will not necessarily deliver should be held equally accountable. Having said that. In the end, I think probably it is a question of that, undoubtedly Ithink the Government of Sudan, other measures to be applied on the Sudan certainly from my experiences at the time, bears the government, including what Iasked for in the past lion’s share of the responsibility. Those who have in my time there, which was targeted sanctions. authority have an extra responsibility. Even if the After all, this war costs money and it is bankrolled rebels did things, the Government of Sudan is the by the oil wealth and other resources and it is Government of Sudan and, therefore, has the bankrolled through the pockets of a few individuals particular responsibility that goes with that role as at the very top and these people should be hurt where it matters most, their pockets. This would have a the Government of Sudan. In that sense there is no V equivalence there at all and those who put salutary e ect on the conflict more than anything themselves in a position of power have to be judged else would. by those standards in a sense. Ihave been out of the Mr Bercow: Thank you very much. country so Ihave not heard what the Foreign O Yce have said but all Iwould say from a general Q198 Mr Battle: Could Iswitch the focus from the perspective would be that there is no trade-oV last remarks you were making about the internal between peace and justice. This country should workings of Sudan and try and reflect what you have know better than to say that if people are saying said about the political aspects of the international that. What it means is that a bad peace agreement or community’s response. Iwas very taken by a remark a compromised peace agreement will unfold sooner that you made at the beginning which was this or later. We have seen this before. Remember Sierra separation of the political from the humanitarian Leone. Iwas involved in that myself in my DFID and then you made a distinction between the days and we had a succession of bad peace humanitarian and the developmental. Ido not agreements where immunities were given to people distinguish any of those and Ilook to ask myself is and so on and war unfolded. Of course, bringing the UN an agency for peace and development justice does not mean being punitive and locking (including humanitarian when there is a crisis people up in jail forever or hanging them and so on. whether natural or caused by human beings). You There are forms of justice and reckoning and referred to the need for a comprehensive and accountability but without that reckoning, without determined approach and Ithink, if Imay say, Dr that acknowledgment, without justice being done, Kapila, you have been courageously outspoken, and peace is not worth having and it will not be a help. continue to be so, and you reminded us as International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 55
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila politicians—Iwill check back on the record—on recent years, particularl y in the last five or six years, Rwanda that all who know something and do for various reasons there has been a massive loss of nothing hoping that those who are suVering may go faith in the capacity of the UN to be able to either away are actually compounding and are part of the prevent intense conflicts or deliver fast enough. Ijust responsibility for what happens, and Itake what you wonder what your view of the UN is now. Do you have said today very, very seriously. But if Iwere hold out the possibility of its re-formation, its then to push that, am Idetecting in what you are transformation, to form the kind of agency that we saying a deeply political—in the best sense— dreamed about after the Second World War? challenge to the structural functioning of the UN Dr Kapila: Iam optimistic and remain optimistic but and the Security Council? When you say to us that also Iknow that we will get the UN we deserve and the relationship between the humanitarian and the UN we fight for. As long as the UN is used, political was separated out, DFID in a memo said: abused and manipulated by Member States for “Humanitarian and political aspects of the crisis narrow interests dressed up in all sorts of rhetoric were not always considered in the round by some in and wider sentiment, do not be surprised if the the international community”. Could we go further oYcials of the UN, who are no more than civil and identify and say who and what those forces were servants, continue to have their own preoccupations that were arguing against the fusing together of with survival and with the pressures upon them, and humanitarian and political aspects? Iknow something of that, and will continue to Dr Kapila: Yes. Let me just say, so it is on the record, behave in the way that the organisation behaves in that the failure of the UN to take a political the way it does. The question you have to ask, and approach to Darfur is fundamentally responsible for this question has to be directed equally to Member the fact that we could not deal with ethnic cleansing States as much as to the UN civil service—Iam not and ultimately the judgment of history—to me this avoiding it—is whether or not the standards of will be the greatest regret to my dying day—will be conduct of the Member States are ones that comply that we failed in Darfur. However much we may with the highest ideals and principles of the United express outrage now, and having come from Nations’ Charter. Obviously by asking this question Rwanda myself and having witnessed all those Iam saying the answer is it does not, but nobody things, and the smell of those dead bodies still comes actually asks that question and when people criticise to me 10 years after the event, Iconsider myself to it they criticise the bureaucracy of the UN and when have failed. It is kind of you to say that I am you look at the bureaucracy it consists of rules and courageous but Iconsider Ifailed in Darfur because regulations that have been imposed on the ethnic cleansing did take place and it happened on organisation by Member States, that have been part my patch and we failed. Ifailed and we failed. of the checks and balances of the trade-oVsof V Essentially the pressures which separate the di erent interests of diVerent groupings and one is lumbered, elements are national interests of Member States therefore, with machinery that in certain and a failure of vision and imagination on the part circumstances is unworkable. Then if you happen to V of the political leadership to bring these di erent feel as strongly as Isometimes foolishly do on these elements together. By that Imean that because there matters you get into trouble because you are trying V was this fragmentation of thinking in the di erent to make the system work by going round and finding centres of power that were exercising their influence other mechanisms that bypass it and so on, but that on the Darfur/Sudan situation, and because the is not the way in which to work. Iwould say that the United Nations’ political arm was disempowered UN ideals remain worth fighting for. There has to be from this process in large measure, and even if it had greater accountability. For example, Ithink some of been empowered the mechanisms for political the parliamentarians of diVerent Member States analysis and political action are not as strong as they should be asking their representatives—Ido not could be, there was no way that the weaknesses that refer to the UK, the UK has a very good and ethical you saw would not have expressed themselves. If you position, Iam talking more generally—how is the are asking me to name who was responsible for this, position they take in respect of the UN considered. Iwould say that it was a collective failure and that There is an accountability and democracy deficit, if every Member State has its own share of you like, in governments, in relation to the position responsibility because of the way they perceived the they take on the UN. Ihave had some experience of particular problem. this simply by observing some of the pressures upon me. Every day in my oYce in Khartoum Ihad Q199 Mr Battle: Going even wider, because for delegations, senior people from powerful Member some of us who were born after the Second World States, coming to me and pressing me to pursue this War and during the early days of the formation line or that line. If I did not pursue this line, because and development of the United Nations that it happened to be their favourite client group or their organisation encapsulated great hope that the world favourite agencies then Iwas a bad co-ordinator and could get together and address problems in common they would report me in New York, and eVectively and not go quite as far as an agreed democratically a couple of powerful donors did that. If I did that, elected world government that made all the another group would be dis-enfranchised and then decisions for us but at least some mechanism you would be pressured to employ people in your whereby justice and peace could be disseminated, oYce or whatever based on certain considerations there would be co-ordination between those nations which further complicates the way you operate. that would help to bring it about, if you like. In Fundamentally, I think if the UN is flawed it is Ev 56 International Development Committee: Evidence
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila simply a reflection of the way Member States’ signals was the eVect of a bandwagon which had not only are sent and the way they govern the organisation. It rolled but had corralled a whole lot of other wagons is not fair to blame the oYcials of the UN system. around it, so they were all together. Not only was it They can be blamed for some acts of omission or flawed, it was wrong and certainly the people of commission certainly but Ithink there is a much Darfur su Vered as a consequence. Ihave no doubt bigger issue about how we view the UN. whatsoever that if attention to Darfur had been given in the corridors of Naivasha by the very high level people that were involved in it, by the Q200 Mr Battle: Thank you very much for that presidents and prime ministers who were urging the encouraging answer. Could Iperhaps go back a little two parties to sign up to that particular piece of bit over comments that you have made about the— paper, then quite possibly the course of events might Ithink this is the expression some of the NGOs have have been diVerent. We may not have the peace used—sequencing, that the North-South peace agreement between the North and South now, but process should be the first priority and Darfur on the the peace agreement between the North and South backburner. That is the kind of language they have was only a piece of paper at the time. There was no used. You have made some remarks about that war going on between the North and South, there already. Ijust want to ask a little bit further about was peace. The circumstances on the ground made that because, to draw an analogy, Ionce recall a very little diVerence. Basically we had peace in group of people who were very anxious to tackle the southern Sudan, apart from a few warlords here and issue of homeless, not in the south of the world but there creating trouble now and then and Ihad my in the north of the world, and there were people share of trying to sort that out. EVectively there was knocking on the doors all night and they decided to no war. In fact, people were returning back to do something about it and build a hostel, so they school, there was life going on and the more it went were turning people away all night because if they on the more people would find it diYcult to go back could not get any sleep they could not get up in the to war. What was happening in Darfur was mass morning and do the work and the hostel would never rape and “ethnic cleansing” and so on. Undoubtedly get built. It was the immediate crisis of the person on this collective bandwagon which led to a de facto the street versus the structural issue of building a policy of sequencing contributed to the people in hostel for the longer term. Was that what the Darfur suVering more than they need have. It does sequencing was about or were lives in the short-term not mean that the problem would not have in Darfur sacrificed to the hopes of the peace happened in its entirety. Iwonder whether or not we process? would have had less suVering and less entrenched Dr Kapila: Certainly there was a policy of positions which would have made solving it much sequencing in the sense that when the question of easier. Darfur was brought up, and Idid it myself in my travels around the world, including to London and in United Nations fora, Iwas told, as others have Q201 Chairman: Did you have any suggestion from been told, “We sympathise with the problems of the UK Government that you should ease up your Darfur but do not make too much noise and trouble comments and your criticisms on Darfur until the now, let us sort this Naivasha thing out and then Naivasha agreement was concluded? everything will be alright”. When Iraised the Dr Kapila: Yes. question that this was anti-humanitarian, that it was also bad analysis because there would be no peace Q202 John Barrett: It seems to me to be clearly without Darfur being on the way to resolution and accepted that there was sequencing and Darfur was so on, there was understanding of the point of view put on a back-burner. Are you surprised that there but fundamentally an unwillingness to accept it. is still a stout defence that has been put forward, You have got to understand that there are a lot of which is that this was the right way to progress? Are national egos and personal egos tied up in peace you not surprised that people have learned the making. After all, Nobel Peace prizes are won on the lessons? You are saying that the suVering was basis of peace agreements. When you are a country intensified in Darfur while this course of action was or an individual engaged in what you think means being followed, are you not? you are on the threshold of solving Africa’s longest Dr Kapila: Now we are learning all sorts of lessons, crisis, et cetera, then there is a natural tendency that but that is after the event. anyone else who comes along with an irritating distraction is going to get short shrift. Sadly, egos, Q203 John Barrett: You were quite strong in saying including national egos, got in the way of seeing this the sequencing which took place was in fact the picture clearly and as a result the people of Darfur wrong thing to do, but we have taken evidence on suVered. There is no question in my mind and that this Committee that has defended that. The of anyone who actually knows what is going on that Secretary of State put up quite a stout defence to say there was a policy of sequencing. Ido not think it that this was the correct way to proceed. Are you was an orchestrated policy, in other words Ido not surprised at that? think people sat in the chanceries of the Security Dr Kapila: Ican only say that both Clare Short and Council countries and said, “We’ll deliberately then Valerie Amos and Hilary Benn have been fully ignore Darfur and deliberately let the people of supportive and very concerned about what goes on Darfur suVer and we will turn a blind eye to them in Sudan. Without their support at diVerent critical until we have sorted out the Naivasha process.” It stages my life would have been very, very diYcult. So International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 57
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila
Iwould like to pay tribute to DFIDand the supportive of all this and we tried very hard to get Secretaries of State that were here during the time I this matter referred and it turned into a political was there. issue and we failed. It is the members of the Security Council that must ask the question in their Y consciences and in the reckoning of history as to why Q204 Chairman: Your di culty on this policy is that they did not do so and in my opinion that is a failure, while they were very supportive, the actual policy so including a failure of British Government foreign far as HMG was concerned in Khartoum was being Y Y policy. Iremember saying to the Foreign O ce, led by the Foreign O ce. “Please refer this matter. As a UN coordinator Iam Dr Kapila: Ithink it is a question of what you call bringing to your attention that there are crimes policy. Policy implies a carefully considered analysis against humanity being committed. This must be resulting in an explicitly articulated set of objectives brought to the Security Council’s attention”, and I which are then executed in a systemic way by all was told “Not yet”. elements of the concerned government. Ithink the UK Government had a policy, it was stated and it said all the right things, but the problem on this Q205 John Barrett: Following the signing of the particular aspect was that there was a certain peace agreement expectations are now high as to the ambivalence of approach. There was not a policy of volume of aid that will be poured into the South and sequencing. Ido not think Hilary Benn or anyone sat other parts of Sudan, but one of the real dilemmas is here and said, “My God, let’s let the people of dealing with the Sudanese government. Do you Darfur suVer.” On the contrary, they were very think there is any wisdom behind the thought of concerned about what was going on and so was the linking, withholding, aid to development towards a Foreign OYce. Ican only sing the praises of the peaceful resolution in Darfur because the one ray of Ambassador in Khartoum, William Patey, and the light has been the signing of the peace agreement in DFID staV in Khartoum because without their the South? When the Committee met people in the personal and professional energy and concern we South we found their expectations are now almost would not be so far on. There was still an that money is going to roll in. The expectation from ambivalence of saying this is serious, it is getting the Sudanese government is that very large sums are worse, but let us gamble on the Naivasha thinking being held up until they move forward on Darfur. working soon and resulting in a positive outcome in Do you think that is an option worth exploring? Darfur. It is a risk people chose to take and it is a risk Dr Kapila: Ithink this must be carefully looked at. that was morally and ethically wrong, but in any Withholding funds for health, education, water and case it backfired. Ido not think it was a formulated so on from ordinary people who have suVered policy, which means in a sense that people did not enough is a bad idea. Our quarrel is not with the want to do it except in one case. Icame to London people of Sudan. In fact, the people of Sudan are to have meetings with the Foreign OYce in October themselves fed up with this. The sooner they achieve of last year and Ihad the same meeting in a state of development in which they can be more Washington, Oslo and Paris etc and Iexplicitly powerful to address these sorts of issues, including asked for the matter to be referred to the Security better health, education etc, etc, the better it will be. Council. There had been no discussion with the Also, it is a basic human right to have health and Security Council on Sudan for a very, very long education etc, etc. Ithink the long lesson to learn period of time and Isaid this was a threat to from history is that failure to engage with the people international peace and security because by then the of Sudan in a meaningful way and to address their numbers of refugees going into Chad was mounting human development needs basically helped to create up, there was the alleged involvement of other the conditions whereby a certain clique established a countries, therefore this was a threat to international monopoly and we had no other channels to operate. peace and security etc, etc. Apart from Washington, This is not simply an argument for using NGOs, it is who was open to this, all the other capitals that I a more complex argument. Iwould say that attended said, “We hear you, but not yet. Give it assistance for human development should be more time. We do not want to disrupt the Naivasha provided in all the constructive and creative ways process.” Washington said to me, “We think what is possible and to as many people as possible without going on in Darfur is terrible. We should apply the preconditions. When it comes to other forms of highest pressure on Khartoum including sanctions development aid like, for example, capacity building and much stronger measures,” but unfortunately the for government institutions, economic aid, the problem was that at that period of time the messages benefits of which accrue to organised groups within emanating from Washington, the right messages in Sudan, the elite groups, then that should be withheld my opinion, got confounded with the wider until we have this situation in Darfur sorted out. I Washington position on world aVairs including Iraq think we have to be very careful what aid we and so anything that emerged from Washington at withhold and what aid we continue to give. It is that time, even though in my opinion they were the possible to continue to give assistance in ways that right things, were not necessarily going to find will help the people of Sudan without strengthening favour elsewhere. The one person who gave me the the elements of war. greatest support in the UN Secretariat was Jan Egeland, the Under-Secretary-General, who Q206 Mr Bercow: Dr Kapila, the Chairman asked addressed you a few weeks ago. He also wanted a you a few moments ago whether anybody in the referral to the Security Council and he was very British Government had urged you to tone down Ev 58 International Development Committee: Evidence
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila your public criticisms of the Government of Sudan have access to the sort of intelligence and other pending progress on Naivasha and you answered information that individual Member States do. So very simply yes. Who? there is plenty of knowledge going on and there is Dr Kapila: Iwould find that very di Ycult to answer plenty of concern going on. The policy that was because Iwill have to name names, but su Yce to say adopted was well meaning in its own particular way. that that was the perspective Ihad from London on There were some who were skeptical about the my visits that Imade here. Ihave to say that in seriousness of what was going on in Darfur, some democratic governments, and Britain enjoys one, governments were more skeptical than other there is a diversity of opinion and rightly so. There governments, but they were trying very hard to do are other elements of the British Government who the right thing. History is now sadly telling us that were very, very supportive and they even urged me that was misguided and it was un-humanitarian. to do and say more because Iknow quite a lot more Why is it that we are saying this now and why did we than has been revealed here. The British Embassy in not say it then? Some of us were saying it then as Khartoum was a very, very strong advocate of well. If you believe in an ethical foreign policy then taking a very strong line on the Darfur issue and the you work according to certain principles. The British Ambassador was one of the flag bearers for general verdict of history is that by following certain seeing justice happen. In the end I think the principles the right solutions emerge. If the perception was that this was a distraction that would Naivasha process had resulted in success earlier and undermine the wider eVort and therefore Ishould a stoppage of the Darfur carnage earlier etc, etc then maybe not make too much noise about this. Of we might have concluded that that was the right course, this was also beginning to be linked in some policy. The chances of being right and for that way to the tenability of my own position because process to have worked were minimal and every saying all these things does not win you many friends single commentator was saying this. Therefore, one either in your host country, Sudan, the country to can only deduce from this that there was (a) a which you are accredited, or amongst Member collective faulty line that people had gone down and States. You may want to pursue a line which you a faulty bandwagon or (b) there was a wider goal not perceive as your best judgment in line with what you to address this for reasons that Ido not want to believe to be the interpretation of the United speculate on here. This is more the conspiracy theory Nations Charter and you believe in being an to which Ido not personally subscribe. international civil servant without fear or favour, but that is not necessarily appreciated by Member States which may have diVerent perspectives and Q208 Tony Worthington: Ijust want to go back to something you said earlier about what you took over tactics and your approach is not convenient to them Y at particular moments in time. Reforming the in terms of a divided o ce. You said that you had organisation into better aid delivery and so on the Kenyan bit and the Nairobi bit and then you had generates its own tensions which also have a bearing the Khartoum section of it. By the Nairobi bit I on this. When you do not have a political mandate assume you mean Operation Lifeline Sudan set up and people are saying to you that you are interfering from Lokichokio and Nairobi. Iremember going in political matters, you argue back at them and say, there a dozen years ago and at that time it seemed “Look, I’m trying to save lives and trying to draw quite dangerous that you were flying in what was the the world’s attention to acts of genocide and that this most expensive food in the world in relatively small is an individual human responsibility.” This is what planes and dropping it there and taking nurses in in the inquiry of Rwanda and Srebrenica found out the morning and out at night. Flick on a few years and what the Secretary-General and others and it sounds like that had got into a ritualized acknowledged, that it is an individual responsibility situation where there was no war going on and you to act when such crimes against humanity are had got the Sudanese government in the towns and the rebels in the countryside. The best way of doing committed. In that context I think one had to do Y what Ihad to do. that e ciently is to get into an arrangement with the troops on the ground, the rebels, so that there is no danger to anybody and so what you are doing is Q207Mr Bercow: Ivery much appreciate the extent ringing up the local commander and saying, “Here is to which you have been prepared to share your the food coming in to such-and-such.” Is that what assessment with us and Icertainly would not want to was happening? press you any further than you have already been Dr Kapila: People certainly got into a way of pressed. Would it be right to characterise your view working, but there were also severe practical as follows, which is that the advice that you were diYculties. For example, when John Garang and I oVered was misguided rather than malign and that it had a discussion about post-conflict reconstruction was folly rather than knavery? he laughed and said “What reconstruction? There is Dr Kapila: Yes, absolutely. Iam glad you said that. no construction here at all. Look around you. There Iwould want to emphasise that people in the UK has not been a single tarmac ro ad built in southern Government and in other governments were Sudan since creation.” Even if we had not been concerned about Darfur. Let no one go away with dependent on aircraft, the practicality of bringing the impression either that these capitals were road access would have been a horrendously unaware of what was going on or they were complicated thing to do and then there were mines unconcerned about what was going on. In fact, the and then there were various militia groupings and UN is very often the last to know. The UN does not various combinations of insecurity and control of International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 59
22 February 2005 Dr Mukesh Kapila the territory to consider. Ithink a more logical pursuing those in the Suda nese government who had approach would have been, and this is where the been responsible for this because they were part of authorities got in the way, to supply food from the the peace process. When we were out in Sudan it was north. The logical way to supply food into southern suggested to us by the Ambassador that there was a Sudan is the way it has been supplied in history, ie trade-oV between peace and justice. Do you think if not from the Kenyan end of the shore but down the we accepted that there was a trade-oV this would be River Nile, this is a mighty waterway, but the river playing into the hands of the Sudanese government got closed down in the late 1990s when people got who would want us to accept that? Would you hold killed. One of my objectives which did succeed was on to your original line? to re-open the Nile for North-South transport, but Dr Kapila: Yes, and not just the Sudanese the southern authorities found it politically government. After all, the Sudanese government has unacceptable to accept food that was coming in from its backers as well, international backers and so on. the North even though it was under the control of There are issues of precedents that might be the United Nations and this was a big problem. The established for other countries. Within the other problem we had was that after we successfully geopolitical context there would be those who would opened the Nile corridor in the summer of 2003 Iset ascribe to that particular viewpoint. It does not my sights on opening three road corridors and we mean that tomorrow the case will be strong enough succeeded with one of them but not with the others against the 51 individuals that are on the sealed list. because they were going through territory which With the best scenario it is going to take time, but to belonged to successive people and negotiations for add further delays to it would certainly not help our Y access made life very di cult. The second problem cause. People should learn from history. What was that no one was going to fund mine clearance examples are there of good peace agreements around and build roads until there was a peace agreement the world which have held by trading oV peace and that was really on the table because that was justice? They do not exist. Where they have existed construed as development and, as Iwas saying on a temporary fix things have unraveled in time, earlier on, people do not do development in conflict they have unraveled after five years or after 10 years, situations. So basically we were locked into an but by then people have achieved their Nobel Prizes extremely expensive food aid delivery operation by air for both political reasons as well as practical and retired with fame and honour. One has to take circumstances. a long-term view of this. Idefy anyone to give us an example of a successful long-term sustainable peace Q209 Tony Worthington: It was called UN, but it got agreement that has traded oV justice and peace; it construed as a pro-southern operation. does not exist. That is a lesson that people should be Dr Kapila: It certainly got construed as a southern learning and they should take that long-term view operation, which was unfair in large part, but that is while addressing some of the urgent and immediate the way it was. Pragmatically you had to balance the problems. access you had with the access you might obtain. In other words, you gained certain access over many Q211 Chairman: Thank you very much for coming years of negotiations and one did not want to give that up in return for something else because if you and sharing your views with us and for being so gave that up you would have nothing. There was this candid and so forthright. constant juggling act to do on the one hand of Dr Kapila: May Ijust say for the record that my Y regaining a reputation for impartiality and trust but remarks concerned my period of o ce. Imade no at the same time not giving up the privileged access comments or pass any judgment on the current in the South which had been carefully worked up Sudanese government or international bodies or over the years. international processes, but Iam referring entirely to the period that Iknow of and events and Q210 John Barrett: You mentioned earlier on that circumstances at that moment in time. It is in that you thought there was no trade-oV between peace context that you should consider my comments. and justice and that we ought not to hold back on Chairman: Thank you very much. Ev 60 International Development Committee: Evidence
Wednesday 23 February 2005
Members present:
Tony Baldry, in the Chair
John Barrett Mr John Bercow Mr John Battle Mr Piara S Khabra Hugh Bayley Tony Worthington
Witnesses: Rt Hon Hilary Benn, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for International Development, further examined, and Ms Anna Bewes, Head of Sudan Unit, Department for International Development, examined.
Q212 Chairman: Secretary of State, may we thank UK Government was concerned, shortly after the you and your colleagues very much for giving us first attacks in Spring of 2003 by my predecessor- your time on this. Ithink, firstly, we are slightly but-one, the Rt Hon Member for Birmingham lower on numbers than usual simply because half the Ladywood, and it is a process we have continued to Committee are in Iraq; we split, and half went to be engaged in, both on the political and on the Africa and half went to Iraq—simply a budgeting humanitarian, ever since. Ithink the second thing I thing and trying to fit everything in at this end of the would say is that there have been false dawns with year. For those of us who went to Darfur, Ithink it the various ceasefires that have been signed; so it has has been quite diYcult trying to describe to people been in a slightly diVerent situation to some other the scale, the size of these internally displaced crises involving conflict that have taken place. The persons camps. The nearest Igot to trying to problem, as we know, has been to get the parties to describe it at various church groups at home was those agreements actually to honour them, and there that it was as if every single constituent of mine had has been a repeated failure to honour commitments been driven out of their homes into IDP camps. One that have been entered into. Ithink the third thing of the things to which we got an answer, but it was has been for a period of time, as we know, not an entirely satisfactory answer, from our particularly around the turn of the year last year and Ambassador—who Ithought was excellent and into the early Spring of 2004, the Government of everybody paid tribute to him; he has done a Sudan made it very diYcult for anybody to see what brilliant job—was how do we manage to get to a was going on because of the problems of access situation where 1.5 million people were driven out of either for the purposes of discovering the extent of their homes without the international community the displacement of people—although obviously actually doing very much diplomatically about that? that began to manifest itself, especially as people Whatever the international community is doing in went over the border—and then a huge eVort to get terms of humanitarian support now in terms of humanitarian access improved and, Iaccept, to get medical care and food and so on and so forth, there the world to then say: “What are we going to do?” is an issue that for quite a while those people were being driven out of their homes and there was no and to form the AU operation. Ithink, from diplomatic or other intervention. What lessons do memory, the Secretary General of the UN first you think there need to be learned? Egeland said to expressed his alarm over human rights violations us that he was putting up warning signs and he was and lack of humanitarian access on 9 December. I not being listened to. Do you think there needs to be think the other thing we need to recognise, to be some kind of system, almost, of the UN flagging up really honest about this, is not all of the countries in red or amber, or kind of alerts that people have to the UN have necessarily seen the crisis in the same respond to in some way? How do you ensure that way. Ithink the UK has played an honourable role that kind of situation does not happen again? in being very upfront in what we have done, the way Hilary Benn: First of all, can Isay that Ishare the we have done it, the consistency with which we have view you expressed, having visited three of the raised the issue but not everyone has been persuaded camps myself in June of last year [2003], about the (1) that this was a great humanitarian crisis and (2) scale of it. Climbing up the incline at Abu Shouk that something could be done about it, and we see camp, almost as far as the eye could see (a that reflected even in the discussions going on as we particularly well-organised camp in terms of the way speak in the UN Security Council where there is a it has been laid out and, if my memory serves me draft resolution before the Security Council which right, managed by the Red Cross), not for nothing does propose a mechanism for introducing potential has this been described as the greatest humanitarian sanctions. My firm conclusion is that that is a road crisis in Africa. Ido not think it is true to say that down which we should go because Ithink, frankly, nothing had been done diplomatically. The given the consistent failure of parties to abide by the frustration expressed, which Ithink we all share, is commitments they have entered into, the world how to deal with this extremely complex crisis that community has got to show that we are serious has gone on for quite some time. However, Ido not about this, but not all members of the UN Security think it is the case that the world was not aware and Council actually agree with doing that. That is part was not raising it; it was very first raised, as far as the of the problem. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 61
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes
Q213 Chairman: Can Ijust disentangle this? The UN and I can understand entirely why that is the case. not so long ago produced this High Level Panel One of the reasons—there is a whole host of reasons, report on threats, in which it says: “. . . there should some of which Iallude d to in my first answer—is the be an emerging norm of a responsibility to protect question of capacity to do things. Even assuming civilians from large-scale violence”, and this clearly there is the will, there is limited capacity, as was large-scale violence. Is there not, clearly, a evidenced by people’s willingness to put troops and responsibility on the UN Secretary-General and on police people and others on the ground. What the key players in the humanitarian field in the United African Union has done, and why we have given it Nations system to indicate if they believe that there such strong support as the UK, having been the first is—to use that phrase—large-scale violence to the country in the world to provide financial support to civilian population, and then a responsibility on the the AU, is precisely because firstly this has been international community as a whole to respond to about Africa taking responsibility for dealing with that? There are two extraneous lots of players in this: the crisis on its doorstep, and a very serious one, and, there is the Government of Sudan, whom Ithink we secondly, by doing that it has increased the capacity would all acknowledge are in denial— of the world to respond. That is why we have put so Hilary Benn: Yes. much time, eVort and energy, once the AU force began to deploy, into supporting it, to helping them to increase their numbers. As we know from Jan Q214 Chairman: Mr Bercow, who is not here today, Pronk’s reports and the reports of others, they are V said to the Minister for Humanitarian A airs: doing an increasingly eVective job but they need “What is it like to be a political leper?” and the guy more people on the ground. They themselves just smiled; so they are clearly in denial. Then there recognise that as they are busy trying to deploy are other parts of the United Nations community additional people. who for various reasons in relation to oil and so forth have their own agendas. One has got the Q215 Chairman: We will come on to the African Secretary-General who has objective responsibilities Union in a second, Secretary of State. There is a and we, as a member of the Security Council, have a quote which Icommend to you by Michael Walzer responsibility to respond if those concerns are from Intervention and State Failure (a chapter in the raised. Ijust wondered whether there are lessons that New Killing Fields1), in which he observes that (the need to be learnt from this about how those systems logic, Ithink, of what you are saying): “There are work and how we respond to those calls. Otherwise, many failed and failing states; the ones that will all that has been happening on this—and Ido not actually receive sustained international attention criticise you for it—is that we kind of say: “This was will be those that directly threaten the national the best that could be done in all the circumstances, Y interests and national security of powerful states”, given the di culties of the Government of Sudan because we have a limited number of states that have preventing people from getting there and given unlimited capacity—ourselves, the United States, possible vetoes from members of the Security France and one or two others—and if we are not Council.” There is, surely, some objective tests immediately concerned about helping or threatening where the international community intervenes—by to help then there is the danger that governments “intervention” Ido not necessarily mean military such as that of Sudan think they can act with intervention but by all means available, diplomatic impunity. and otherwise? Hilary Benn: Iwould not accept, in relation to the Hilary Benn: Iaccept your premise, because your United Kingdom, the suggestion that somehow first point was that the UN and the humanitarian because the crisis in Darfur has not directly aVected system do have an obligation to tell it like it is. I our own interests we have not given it the attention think that looking back on what has happened, and it deserves. Iwould refute that unreservedly, because given the number of people who have been forced to Ithink any fair assessment of what we have done on flee their homes, then the primary responsibility rests the political front and on the humanitarian front with those who attacked them and forced them to would show that we have put a lot of time and eVort leave their homes (and it is very important that we and energy into trying to do something about it. Ido do not lose sight of that) but Icannot but help share not say that defensively, but if the argument is that your frustration that the international community, the international community in general is not in this case, needs to have found a way to be more V interested because its security is not threatened by e ective. It is no good pretending otherwise. In this, that certainly cannot apply in the case of the saying that, Iwould say that the response of the UK UK; others will have to answer for themselves. Government has been as good if not better than anybody else—not because Iam interested in getting Q216 Chairman: Ido not think we, as a Committee, into a competition—but we cannot act on our own, are having a go at HMG. and as the UN Secretary General would point out Hilary Benn: Just getting it on the record. very forcibly he is dependent on the decisions that members of the UN Security Council are prepared Q217Chairman: Maybe if you abandon the “if to take. If you asked the people in the camps who pressed” bit of the briefing, okay? have been forced to flee their homes: “What do you think of the role which the international system has 1 The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of played in trying to prevent this happening to you?” Intervention, compilation of essays edited by Kira Brunner then they would not, frankly, be terribly impressed, and Nicolaus Mills. Ev 62 International Development Committee: Evidence
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes
Hilary Benn: That came from the heart, not from the Q219 Tony Worthington: What commitments, for “if pressed” briefing, because Ibelieve it to be the example, have we got from the Government of case! Sudan about their helicopters? Chairman: Your point is a very fair point: that there Hilary Benn: No commitment is the honest answer, are a limited number of countries with the capacity. because that was my second question, having So that then takes us on, Ithink, to the AU and what welcomed the fact that they had announced that the AU can do. they were going to withdraw the Antonovs. Isaid “Are you going to withdraw the attack helicopters?” and Idid not get an answer to that. One of the things Q218 Tony Worthington: Taking the AU, we met the that we are looking to do in the resolution is to say: AU and Ithink we were impressed by them; they given the undertaking which the Government of were a proper outfit; these were real soldiers, Sudan entered into in the autumn not to engage in disciplined and going about their task in a sensible, aerial attacks, what role could the AU play in organised way. However, when you look at the scale eVective enforcement? The issue with either ensuring of this, it is like saying “Private Benn, you are that people honour the commitments they have responsible for Belgium; you are the peacekeeper for entered into or enforcing decisions of the Security Belgium.” All right, so we double the number, and Council—whatever they may be when the resolution you are responsible for half of Belgium. It is that is finally adopted—is how do you check whether scale of things, is it not? There comes a credibility people are doing it? Ithink the AU could potentially problem. What is the step beyond this? play a role, going to the airfields, seeing what goes Hilary Benn: The step beyond this is firstly to out and counting them back. Ithink that is a role support the AU in deploying all of the people that that the African Union (AU) could play and would they have said they want to deploy, and that is the enable all of us to be in a better position to know 3,300. Iunderstand that General Okonkwo, who is when there were reports of attacks what exactly went the AU commander, has recently suggested to the on. At the moment the AU is, of course, having to AU that they should further increase the number chase up on those reports after the event. above 3,300. Ido not know whether you met him during the course of your visit. Ihave said throughout, and the British Government has said Q220 Tony Worthington: There was a report on the throughout, that if the AU decides it wants to BBC this morning that the attacks were still going on increase the size of its force there then we will with the Janjaweed supported by attack helicopters. support that process as we have done right from the Certainly when we were there, on the airfields you very beginning. Ithink the second thing Iwould say would see four helicopters and an Antonov is that with the draft UN resolution that is now alongside each other, ready for the next scheduled before the Security Council, and the fact that with flight, or something like that. It ought to be, with a the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement willing government, very, very easy to monitor in Naivasha the resolution now looks to establish the flights, as to whether actually the aircraft take oV peace support operation in support of that, I and what they do. Could we get that degree of co- welcome very much what the resolution has to say operation from the Sudanese government? about ways in which the deployment of that UN Hilary Benn: Ido not know which reports you are blue-helmeted force might be able to provide referring to, relating to this morning. support in Darfur. Ithink that would be a logical thing to do if the situation worsens again. As we sit here today, our current assessment of the position Q221 Tony Worthington: The Today programme. since the beginning of the month has been—I Hilary Benn: We have checked with the British suppose Iwould describe it—an “uneasy calm”, Embassy in Khartoum. As Iunderstand it, there has again, because we have had these periodic outbursts. been a claim by one of the rebel movements that Ihope that period of uneasy calm will hold. The there has been an aerial bombardment of Labado by withdrawal of the Antonov bombers which the Government of Sudan forces. The African Union Government of Sudan has now undertaken to do is refutes this. Indeed, the AU peacekeepers are a welcome step, but as Isaid to the Foreign Minister actually in the town at t he moment, and that has Mustafa when Isaw him about a couple of weeks enabled 10,000 IDPs to resettle there in the last ago, what we are interested in is not what people say week. So Ithink there is some dispute about what they are going to do but what people do. Ithink, in may have happened today. Ijust thought that up-to- those circumstances, the best thing we can do is date information might be of assistance, and that is support the AU force, to encourage them to get what we have been told this morning. Iagree with everyone there as quickly as possible, to look at how you; in theory it should be possible; the problem the UN might then be able to support it in the light throughout has been ensuring that the Government of the decisions which the Security Council is now of Sudan, and indeed more recently the rebels also, going to look at, but, at the same time, politically, to do what they have said they are going to do, and that say very strongly to the parties to the conflict: “You is why Ithink it is very important the international have part of the solution in your hands, and the community, looking at the new UN Security question is are you going to do what you said you Council resolution, does send a very, very clear were going to do?” signal by our actions that we are serious about this. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 63
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes
Q222 Tony Worthington: Could Ijust switch to the the board, really, in a whole variety of sectors. I tis south, for a moment, because we visited there as reporting at the moment (we are starting to see draft well. Ido not know whether you have the detailed reports) and over the next few weeks we are going to answer on this but Iam sure you could write if not. be discussing with the government, with the parties Ihave never been anywhere where Ihave been so and with other donors how we can best help and how overwhelmed by the scale and seen what happens to we and other donors can best meet those needs. Of a country if it has been at war for nearly 30 years, course, given the scale of the needs in the south where your roads disappear and transport, and compared to the north, the majority of the assistance everything—there is a retreat of the state. That area will go to the south, at least to begin with, and that is going to clearly need, as part of the consequences will include capacity-building for the government of the peace agreement, a lot of assistance. Is that institutions in the south because they are setting up going to be able to be done with the southerners the Government of South Sudan. Our own alone, or does it have to go through Khartoum? Will assistance is going to, perhaps, focus particularly on the emphasis be on building up the institutions of a capacity-building in the justice sector in the state within the southern area, which will have the Government of South Sudan. So, yes, we are very right to decide whether it secedes in six years’ time, aware of the diVerent needs within the south or is that all going to Khartoum and then being compared to the north and there is a concerted deployed? donor eVort to address those needs. Hilary Benn: Obviously, there will be a new government and a new set of circumstances as a result of the Comprehensive Peace Deal, and Ithink Q223 Tony Worthington: Do you think it is a very, what you saw in southern Sudan (and Ihave not very important issue that there is going to be this been there because Ihave been to Khartoum and vote on whether there is to be an independent Darfur on my three visits to the country in the last southern Sudan. Are we anticipating that there will year) illustrates just why concluding the be in the interim, like a minister for health in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was so important. south, a minister for education and a minister for We discussed this when we talked about this in justice, and that what we will be seeking to do is to December. Ithink it was absolutely right and proper liaise with the, hopefully, growing political that alongside doing what we have done in relation institutions in the south rather than it being dealt to Darfur we also worked very hard to help shepherd with through the overall government in Khartoum? that peace process to a conclusion, because without Ms Bewes: Yes, the Government of South Sudan that then the possibility of development assistance in will have a variety of ministries dealing with the south in the new circumstances (and it is for the southern Sudan aVairs. The things that should be SPLM and the Government of Sudan in forming the dealt with by the national government in Khartoum new administration to work out exactly how they are will be things like foreign aVairs and defence— going to do it, and the SPLM has very strong and things which are of national interest—but the very clear views about how they want it to southern Sudan government will have health, happen)—that opens up that possibility. There education and justice, and we will be dealing with continues to be a balance to be struck between, on them. Separately, in the north, we will be dealing the one hand, demonstrating that there is a peace with, perhaps, the health and education ministries in dividend to the Naivasha process while, on the other the north. Certainly it is a separate Government of hand, as Ihave said very clearly to the Government South Sudan in the south. of Sudan, it is not all going to happen as long as Darfur remains in the state that it is—in particular on the question of debt relief, because debt relief is Q224 Chairman: Coming back to the African Union, very important, as we all know, to the Government peacekeeping troops—or, in this case, ceasefire of Sudan. Ihave made it very clear there is not going monitoring troops—if they are UN troops they are to be movement on debt relief until the problem of paid for by the UN; with the African Union, they Darfur has been sorted out. Throughout there has, have to be paid for by the Member States. We, I of course, been a balance that has had to be struck, think, contribute 143 vehicles. One got the but the needs in the south are enormous, and Iam impression from talking to the AU oYcers that we sure that the SPLM’s part of the new government is met that there was no shortage of being able to going to be very vigilant in ensuring that that is used recruit potential troops; the diYculties are financial in the right way and to the best eVect. Iwould be very constraints on the part of African states to happy to write to the Committee if that would be of committing troops that they are going to have to pay assistance, to provide some further details about for and so forth. If the African Union peacekeeping what we have already got on the way. Ido not know operation is going to work, would it not be sensible whether, Anna, you would like to add anything? for the international community to see if it could not Ms Bewes: There has been a UN-led Joint set up a peacekeeping fund which is within the Assessment Mission over the past year or so which control of the African Union but which will enable has included both the SPLM and the government as them to access more peacekeepers? Ithink there is a part of the teams and donor representatives have concern Ihave that if we are not careful South also been involved. The aim of that has been to look Africa, in particular, after a while, is going to feel at the needs throughout the country, both in north they are being particularly heavily leant upon to take and south, and to come up with a list of needs across the lead on so many of these operations, and we will Ev 64 International Development Committee: Evidence
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes then start to see African Union missions failing Q227John Barrett: What then follows from that is simply because there is not the willingness to devote the debate about the trade-oV between pursuing troops from within Africa to those operations. those guilty of what has happened in the Sudan and Hilary Benn: Ithink this is exactly something that putting that slightly to the backburner while the the international community has got to look at. We peace agenda is pursued. He was, really, of the have given, Ithink Iam right in saying, £14 million opposite view from our Ambassador, who Ithink is so far. There has been considerable support from the doing an excellent job, that we must be seen to be in Peace Support Facility, as you know, which was hot pursuit of those who have been guilty of these Poul Neilson’s idea, as the EU Commissioner, and crimes, rather than feeling that, “Well, we want the Ithink we need to find a mechanism that will allow peace discussions to continue so that can be slightly funding to support AU peace support operations on put oV the accelerator—the pursuit of the justice a more consistent and long-term basis. Ithink that aspect.” is self-evidently an enormous need that has got to be Hilary Benn: Ido not think the two are incompatible dealt with and it is something the AU itself is very because what the International Commission of conscious of, and it is one of the ways in which we Inquiry has done very clearly is to answer the can oVer practical support. Ithink that is a very question: what has gone on? That is why we, and important suggestion and we are going to need to others, were very strong supporters of establishing find a way of doing that. the International Commission of Inquiry, as proposed by the Secretary General. It is essential Q225 Chairman: Perhaps we could commend it as a that the Security Council sends a clear message that Commission for Africa, G8— there is not going to be any impunity and people’s Hilary Benn: Watch this space for a little bit longer. past activities and crimes are going to catch up with them, because it acts as quite a powerful incentive, one hopes, on people if they are still doing it to stop Q226 John Barrett: Yesterday we had a very because they get a greater sense they are not going to compelling evidence session from Dr Mukesh be able to get away with it. At the same time (as Isay, Kapila, the former Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Ido not think they are mutually incompatible, so the Sudan. It was quite clear that the evidence he was there has to be a clear process which is going to set giving related to the time he was over there, but he out how that is going to happen and then it is for the did make some very strong claims and allegations, judicial process to do its job), we have to find a which have been denied by the Sudanese political solution to this problem, because we know government, not least of all that when we, the that it is only a political solution that is going to Committee, spoke to the Sudanese government and bring this to an end and allow the people to go home. they were in denial, he was alleging that they were That is exactly what has been successfully achieved actively promoting the killing, the systematic rape of in relation to the North/South civil war, which is women, and the burning and destruction of villages. why it was right and proper—and it is not When we were over there, we saw from the air these defensiveness—to continue to work very hard to destroyed villages, we went into the camps (like you) help bring that to a successful conclusion because it and took the evidence; we saw the Antonov bombers is the only way you can open up dealing with the and the gun ships on the same airstrips as the African legacy of lack of development, trauma, suVering and Union helicopters. We saw it at first hand and we death that has bedevilled the south of the country. I heard evidence. What Iwould like to find out is: are think both need to take place and Ido not see an you content that Dr Kapila’s evidence, which, as I incompatibility between the two. say, Ifound absolutely compelling yesterday and I would recommend anybody reading it—do you believe his version of the story? His version of the Q228 John Barrett: Finally, following on the point story does put the Sudanese government, quite on the African Union, when Imentioned that clearly, into that group of war criminals, or helicopters were on the same airstrips as the gun whatever, and that there are a whole number of ships, have you given much consideration to the events that have to flow from that because of what is mandate of the African Union? Clearly, there seems trying to be negotiated in the south and in the west to be agreement that increased numbers and in Darfur. You must be aware of what he has said in logistical support is something that everyone would the past. back. Are you content that the existing mandate is Hilary Benn: If the straight question is: do I think detailed enough? that the Government of Sudan did not know what Hilary Benn: Ithink there are two issues: one is the was going on? No, Ido not think that they did not AU has shown an astonishing capacity to be flexible know what was going on. Ithink that would be in the way that it is worked. To use the non-technical stretching credulity too far. However one describes term, “they put themselves about”, and they have it (and the Chair of the Select Committee has used received praise from a lot of quarters for putting the phrase “in denial” and Iused that when Icame themselves about, including, as Imentioned earlier, back from my visit), Ithink it is very clear that they from Jan Pronk and others, and that is enormously know what is going on. Of course, the International to their credit. Ido pay tribute to them. The second Commission of Inquiry has looked into that, has point Iwould make in relation to two lots of reached its conclusions and, in the sealed annex, has helicopters on the airfield, is that that is exactly why a list of names. That is my answer to a very fair we are now keen to explore ways in which the AU question. could play a role in making sure that things that International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 65
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes people have said that they will not do they do not do, undertake a further assessment, and has, as I by monitoring movements in and out, because I understand it, faced some obstacles from the think that is a really valuable task that the AU could Government of Sudan in trying to do that, but the undertake to give us some reassurance that aircraft latest information Ihave is that they want to and gun ships—and the Government of Sudan has undertake that next month or the month after. There said the Antonovs are being withdrawn, so assuming is a dearth of hard, accurate information. That is the that is the case and remains the case—are not used in best that Ithink is avai lable currently, and certainly a way that the Government of Sudan has promised that Iam aware of. previously that they will not be used. Ithink that is a role the AU could very usefully take on. Q231 Mr Bercow: It is always very diYcult, Chairman, to argue with the intelligence available to Q229 Mr Bercow: Iwould like to press the Secretary the Secretary of State, and one should take great care of State on the issue of the AU mandate. With fairly in doing so, but Imust say that my impression was predictable and, some might say, monotonous that the 70,000 estimate made by the WHO did not regularity now, we hear tributes to the African include victims of violence. At any rate, let me just Union force, and we know the personnel that make put it to you in these terms, Secretary of State, terms up the force are doing everything they can and we with which Iam sure you will be very familiar: that applaud that. However, it is quite important that we WHO estimate was on the basis of figures between do not end up with a situation in which the AU is March and mid-October 2004, so there is a very simply set up for a fall. Can Ijust ask you: what do substantial period of the conflict before then and you think of the idea of a peace enforcement since then which those figures do not cover. What I mandate as opposed to a monitoring mission or a am really driving at—we all share the same peacekeeping force? humanitarian and human rights objectives, Ithink, Hilary Benn: The AU’s mandate is, clearly, for the around this table—is this: there is a sense amongst a AU to determine. It is a diVerent kind of mandate to lot of people who are desperately unhappy about the one that they have got. If you are talking about what was taking place in Darfur that a certain sort shooting at people—it depends what you mean by of stability of death rate is coming to seep into the “peace enforcement mandate”. It is for the AU itself subconscious and to be regarded as, if not to determine what its mandate should be. Clearly, acceptable, something that one just has to tolerate in there would be diYculties and issues that would arise the short term. Can Iput it to you that the in those circumstances. The Peace and Security significance of the peace enforcement mandate is Committee of the AU has asked the AU to look at that unlike the peacekeeping mandate it does not the mandate again currently. The question, really, is depend upon the existence of a peace agreement what is the most eVective way of providing the peace (there is not a peace agreement, as you know, there and stability that the people of Darfur want? This is merely a ceasefire agreement). Is there not an was before you came in, Mr Bercow, but the argument for saying that if regular killing on a indication we have since the beginning of the month substantial scale by helicopter gun ships and by is that there is an uneasy calm. There were some Antonov aeroplanes and by Janjaweed militias reports of an attack this morning but it is not entirely continues simply the present mandate, the present clear that that actually took place. If the situation numbers, the present deficiency of logistical and were to get worse then Ithink all of us would have to satellite support, is going to make permanent that consider what else might need to be done. The other loss of life, which none of us wants to see and which thing Idid refer to earlier, again before you came in, all of us should take action to demonstrate is was with the deployment of a peace support unacceptable? operation from the UN in the south of the country, Hilary Benn: Clearly, that would not be acceptable the draft UN resolution links the way in which that were that to be the case. It is my best information might be able to provide support to what the AU is that the WHO estimate for the period March to doing in Darfur. Ithink, frankly, those are the October—it is the same number of months—2004 options that are open to us, including to the AU. did include deaths from injuries and from violence. The honest answer is we do not know because that is Q230 Mr Bercow: Iam sorry Imissed the earlier the only estimate that we have had. We do not know, information and Ilook forward to picking up on but the AU’s job there is, in part, of course, to that later. Let us just pursue briefly this discussion respond to reports about attacks. Now, the best about what is most eVective. Leaving aside death estimate we have of the current situation since the from malnutrition or other health-induced causes, start of the month has been one of uneasy calm; what is your present estimate of the monthly death should the situation change and we return to a rate in Darfur? pattern of attacks in which people lose their lives Hilary Benn: The last and best figure that we have, then of course the international community, and the as Irecollect, is the estimate that the World Health AU and others, will have to say to themselves: Organisation produced when they came up with “What are we going to do if it starts to get worse their 70,000 total, which as Iunderstand it includes again?” Ido not know the answer to how many both those who have died as a result of disease and, people have died as a result of violence in the last also, by way of violence. Ithink, at the time, people three months. The truth is nobody knows, but the said that was running at between 7,000 and 10,000 a AU itself investigates all of the reports that it month. The World Health Organisation wants to receives, and certainly the number of deaths, if one Ev 66 International Development Committee: Evidence
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes looks at what the AU itself has looked into and Q234 Mr Khabra: Secretary of State, with the reported (and it is no consolation but that is the current mandate, and also the numbers, the AU is case), it is a lot less than it was a year ago, which was not able to provide protection to the civilians in again, as far as we know, the period when a lot of Darfur; therefore, the international community has people were being killed during that time when it was got an obligation. In your evidence on 21 December very diYcult for anybody to get into Darfur to see to the Committee you said: “We are looking at the what was going on and when the AU was not there. extent to which we might be able to do more for the policing front.” What conclusions were reached about this and what action has been taken so far? Q232 Mr Bercow: Mr Barrett has already pressed Hilary Benn: The straight truth is the bit of the AU you on the issue of bringing people to justice and a deployment they have had most diYculty with in referral to the ICC—and I apologise if I cut across finding the right numbers of people has been the anything that my colleague asked. Ithink Irightly police deployment. Now, Ithink, currently, 100 of understand the Government’s position to be that the 815 that they were looking to deploy have you support a referral to the ICC—I think there arrived of the police element, and Ithink another have been written parliamentary answers from your 100 are due to come from South Africa in the next colleague Chris Mullin to that eVect. Can Ijust couple of weeks. The AU itself has drawn up a plan establish the strength of commitment that the British for its civilian police component, which will monitor Government has to trying to build a coalition of the activities of the Government of Sudan police, and we have been pressing ourselves for an EU support for that position through the UN? The assessment mission to look at what help the EU Prime Minister’s very close relationship with might be able to provide to the AU and whether President Bush is well-understood and by some of there is any value in getting involved more directly us, at least, on all sides of the House, admired and in building the capacity of the Government of Sudan respected. Is it your intention that the Prime police, and that might fit into the point that Anna Minister intends to exert his very considerable Bewes made a little earlier about working on security persuasive powers over the President? Is there not a sector reform as part of the Comprehensive Peace certain obscenity about the fact that, on the one Agreement, but it is an area in which the AU has hand, the United States is, rightly, the most found it most diYcult to get the right people to do denunciatory of the Government of Sudan for its the job of work. commission of crimes against humanity that may be no less serious and heinous than genocide (to quote the report) but, on the other hand, speaking with the Q235 Mr Khabra: Following the same theme, on the authentic voice of self-interest, it opposes the ICC protection of civilians, you also, in your evidence on and is, therefore, more likely than not to oppose a the same day, said that the international community referral? Is this not a case in which your good friend has to make clear to the parties to the dispute that the Prime Minister could intervene to very, very they have obligations which they have to fulfil and good and eVective consequence? that there will be a point where there are Hilary Benn: The Government’s position is, indeed, consequences for the parties if they fail to meet the very clearly set out, as you alluded to at the start of obligations. That is a sort of challenge. When will the question, Mr Bercow. We have been a very long- that point be reached? What might those consequences be which you consider are necessary? standing supporter of the International Criminal Hilary Benn: Well, indeed Idid say that. We, as the Court (ICC), as you know, and our clear preference UK, want to extend the arms embargo across the in this case is for the case to be referred to the ICC. whole of Sudan and to include the current The position of the Administration of the United government. We are very strongly in favour of a States of America is, also, equally well-known, monitoring mechanism because it goes back to the namely one of opposition to the ICC. It is for the UN earlier point about being able to enforce whatever Security Council to take that decision, and you put in place. We support the idea for a sanctions discussions are taking place, as we speak, on what committee and an expert panel, and that would look that outcome is going to be. Our view is very, very at, for example, the potential for travel bans. Slightly clear: what is essential is that those who have been more diYcult, because there is a question of responsible for these crimes, as reported in the eVectiveness, is the question of asset freezes, but a International Commission of Inquiry report are panel would have the chance to look at that in detail. brought to justice. Ican assure you that all parts of We think that is a road down which we should go the British Government are working very, very hard but, as Iindicated in answer to an earlier question, to ensure that that is the case. not all members of the Security Council necessarily share that view, and that is part of the diYculty here, but Ithink it is inconceivable that having made very Q233 Mr Bercow: Taking 14 years about it, as will be clear for a long period of time that we expect the the ultimate eVect of the ad hoc tribunal in relation to parties to the conflict to do what they promised to Rwanda, would be quite unacceptable, would it not? do, Ithink the international community would lack Hilary Benn: That is one of the reasons why our clear credibility—and that is the issue which all members preference is for the case to be referred to the ICC. of the Security Council are going to have to face up Mr Bercow: You have much support for that to—if we end up wagging our fingers one more time position, Secretary of State. at those who had been responsible for not doing International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 67
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes what they promised to do. That is why Ithink this Nairobi for the signing of t he peace agreement I UN Security Council resolution is particularly spoke to John Garang, the leader of the SPLM, important, because it is also the case that—certainly about what part the SPLM might be able to play in reflecting on the activities of the Government of encouraging the rebels, in particular, to come to the Sudan—we have seen movement in response to table and use politics to find a way of solving this. intense pressure. That is how we moved on humanitarian access, because a lot of people worked very, very hard, did not let go, pushed and pushed Q238 Mr Battle: When our Prime Minister put the and pushed and, eventually, we saw some progress. five-point plan to the Sudanese President in October Ithink pressure does produce results. 2004 it actually included targets, if Irecall rightly, and those targets were about co-operation with the Q236 Mr Khabra: With your knowledge of the AU, they were about identifying the location of situation, how hopeful are you and what do you troops, confining the Government of Sudan’s forces think the timescale is in which any settlement of to barracks and implementing the Abuja peace can be achieved? humanitarian protocol, for example. You have Hilary Benn: Excuse me, Mr Khabra, were you mentioned, Ithink Iheard rightly in your com ments asking in terms of hopeful about the resolution that earlier on, that you told Sudanese ministers there is currently being looked at or more generally, or would be no debt relief until Darfur was sorted out. both? Iwas not quite clear whether you were asking Now that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has about how hopeful Iwas about the resolution or been signed, (and, obviously, Sudan would expect to about finding peace in Darfur, or both. receive large volumes of aid, and it is much needed) will aid disbursements to Sudan actually be Q237Mr Khabra: Iwas asking the question that conditional on progress against specific and time- with your knowledge of the situation—you have bound targets in relation to action on Darfur? personally visited the area—do you think that there Hilary Benn: As Iindicated in answer to an earlier is going to be a solution to the problem, and your question, Ithink there is a balance to be struck here. estimation of what is the timescale of that, and Iwant to be very straight about this, because in whether the civilians which have been caught up in order to demonstrate that the argument that politics the situation like that will continue to suVer. and a political solution is the way out of problems Hilary Benn: The honest answer is Ido not know. I one also has to be able to demonstrate that once do not know and none of us knows. What is clear is people have chosen the political path then there is that pressure can help to produce results and that is some benefit as a result of having done that. That is why the answer Igave in relation to the Security why throughout there has been a task of trying to Council resolution and what the international balance these two problems: bringing to an end the community does is, in my view, very important; that North/South conflict and dealing with the problem is why a political process is, in the end, the only way in Darfur. So if we were to say—and we are not this is going to be solved. That has to be a pressure saying that—that none of the fruits of the North/ both on the Government of Sudan—because we South peace agreement in terms of development have not talked a great deal so far about the rebels— assistance in southern Sudan was going to flow but undoubtedly one of the features of the last few because of the problems in Darfur, well, the first months has been the increasing extent to which the thing, of course, you would encounter is the rebels have been part of the outbreaks of violence southern Sudanese would say: “We do not control and insecurity and that is why making sure that any what has been going on in Darfur, so we have used steps that the Security Council takes apply also to politics to find a solution and now you are going to the rebels as they do to the Government of Sudan deny us any of that.” So we have to make some because it is a way of demonstrating to all of the progress on that front, there is no doubt. On the people causing the trouble: “There is a consequence other hand, we have to use the right carrots with the to you”. In the end, politics is the only way this is Government of Sudan in order to ensure that they going to be solved. That involves the rebels being clear about what it is they want. Coming back to the understand that all the fruits, from their point of Naivasha process, which always features—and, in view, are not going to flow unless they deal with the my view, rightly—in these discussions, what bit that they continue to have responsibility for. Can Naivasha has demonstrated is that politics can find Ijust say, very quickly, since you raise specifically a solution to the most intractable problems, it has, the undertakings that were given, in terms of co- and the Naivasha agreement contains all of the operation with the AU, Ithink increasingly one can elements which could be drawn upon to find a say, yes, the Government of Sudan is co-operating resolution to the problems of Darfur; there are other with the AU. As the example of Labado, which I ones that are there that make it more complex, but mentioned earlier, illustrates, the Government of if there is a will then it is possible for people to find Sudan withdrew from there and the AU went in. a solution if they are prepared to stop fighting, start That is something that all of us should welcome. talking and use politics to bring to an end the Identifying troops—yes, they have done that. nightmare that the people are suVering. The Barracks, no, but then neither have the rebels, so question is do they have the will to do it? The one there is a bit of a problem there. On the Abuja other thing that has changed, of course, is that the protocol, no they have not done that, and that SPLM is now in the government and when Iwas in remains a continuing di Yculty. Ev 68 International Development Committee: Evidence
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes
Q239 Mr Battle: That is a crucial one, really, is it not, crimes that have been committed in Darfur just because, at the end of the day—even if you draw a because the passage of time since the report was not very fair parallel, and Iwould not want to push published deflects the in ternational media’s the analogy too far—in any situation where a attention? ceasefire is negotiated, to pull violence back to Hilary Benn: Ithink it is very important that the politics, you have to have targets, and you can then spotlight does not turn away from Darfur. Ithink it have sticks and carrots. Irefer to the Northern will continue to be very important that we get good, Ireland situation which has gone on for some years; hard, accurate information about what is happening yes, an improvement but there have to be targets and in Darfur, including as far as human rights is there have to be some sticks as well as carrots, as we concerned. As Irecollect (and Istand to be have seen in the last few weeks. Ijust wonder corrected), one of the things that we did quite some whether you feel that there is any way in which any time ago was to oVer support to the United Nations pressure could be applied, or whether any pressure to help human rights monitors to deploy in Darfur— at all would simply undermine the political talking— this is back during the course of last year, Icannot and Ido not use that phrase pejoratively at all. quite recall exactly when it was—because Ithought Hilary Benn: We are endeavouring to do that, and it was important that we got that. Having had the that is why what Ihave said, and what the International Commission of Inquiry we need to Government has said, on debt relief is a very continue to get good reports, and Iwould be very powerful stick or carrot—depending on which end keen to look at all the ways of ensuring that we can you are looking at—because it does demonstrate get good, sound, accurate information about what is that there are things that the Government of Sudan happening, because it is one of the ways we continue has got to do. We shepherd both of these processes to demonstrate to people who might be thinking of forward, and that has been one of the challenges engaging in human rights abuses that the world is throughout this whole diYcult business. Ithink it is going to continue to watch what is going on and that right and proper to do both, because to have lost the impunity does not just apply to the crimes that have Naivasha process and the chance to end the civil war already been committed, but will also apply to that has killed two million people—Ido not think crimes that people might be thinking of committing history would have been very kind to us if that had in the future. gone down the pan, frankly. Q242 Hugh Bayley: Could Iturn to the south, to Q240 Hugh Bayley: Iwas very pleased, Secretary of southern Sudan. The peace is an enormously State, to hear you saying the UK Government sticks important opportunity but my impression at least is firmly behind the International Criminal Court as that it is a very fragile peace. The SPLM leaders being the right forum to bring people accused of war whom we met have plenty of experience of local crimes before. However, there is an impasse in the military operations but the SPLM leaders in Security Council, with the United States, China and southern Sudan have no experience whatsoever of Algeria proposing alternatives. What is the strategy running schools, building roads, keeping accounts of the UK Government to reach agreement quickly of public money, running customs regimes, of on where those guilty of war crimes are to be running a regional authority and they are going to arraigned? need an enormous amount of capacity building and Hilary Benn: This is not a flippant answer but technical assistance. What will DFID be doing to diplomacy and talking, and there is a lot of give them the capacity to run an eVective regional diplomacy and a lot of talking going on as we speak, administration in southern Sudan? and we are working very hard to try and ensure that Hilary Benn: Iwill ask Anna Bewes to say a bit about there is the right outcome. the detail on that, but could Iadd to the last question first? To point out that the UN High Commissioner Q241 Hugh Bayley: The International Commission for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, gave a of Inquiry made a strong recommendation that the presentation to the Security Council a couple of preferred forum would be the International weeks ago, which those who were there said certainly Criminal Court, but it also made proposals for had an impact on those who were present. You raise action which should be taken by the Government of a very important point because it is about how you Sudan to sign up to international human rights switch inside your head from all of the things you standards in its own legislation, and action that have done—the fighting, the political struggle to get could be taken by other bodies. For instance, it to the peace agreement—to a very, very diVerent called on the Commission on Human Rights to challenge which everybody in the SPLM accepts, consider the re-establishment of a mandate for the which is making the deal which has been negotiated special rapporteur on human rights in the Sudan and work, and that is as diYcult again as the process they it proposed that the High Commissioner for Human have just been through in order to sign the peace Rights should issue public periodic reports on the agreement. Indeed, what we are proposing to do in human rights situation in Darfur. If there is a risk, as southern Sudan is to provide support to capacity. there seems to be, of a delay until a tribunal is Indeed, while the Naivasha Process was going on, we established because of the diplomatic process, will were encouraging the SPLM at the time. Iremember the UK Government be pressing for some of these at a meeting which the Rt Hon Member for additional measures to be taken to ensure that the Ladywood and myself had with John Garang when spotlight does not disappear from the appalling he came to London, which must have been a year International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 69
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes and a half ago, one of the things we talked about which will be accepted by the administrations north then was to begin to prepare for the fruits of a and south. As part of the Naivasha Process, some of successful Naivasha Peace Agreement, in other the SPLM leaders will obtain posts in Khartoum in words starting to think about the very issues you the Government of Sudan. That provides an have now raised. Ido not know, Anna, whether you opportunity for political change; a change in not just want to say a little more about what we are planning people at the top but in the culture in Khartoum. in the south? How can that process be supported so that over the Ms Bewes: As Imentioned earlier, there is this Joint next six years, if the South were to vote to secede, the Assessment Mission which is coming to an end now Government of Sudan would say, “We are and that is setting out the needs within southern committed to accept this” rather than start another Sudan as well as elsewhere in Sudan. It is in the war? How will the political process in the South be context of that, we are talking to the SPLM and the supported so if there was a decision to go for unity, UN and other donors about what we can best do. the separatist movements would not break away and Our thoughts at the moment are that the area where start a new war? How can this process which comes we have the most comparative advantage and where out of Naivasha of a change in the ranks of others are the least likely to be able to involve government in Khartoum be used as a key to themselves is in the justice sector, and that will be unlocking a process for political change which very much capacity building, a big focus on that, in brings forward more pluralism and non-polar- terms of police and in terms of the legal sector as well politics so that in six years’ time Sudan can find a as a little bit about capital expenditure, providing way forward? the bicycles and uniforms and so on for the police, Hilary Benn: Ithink as far as the UK is concerned, and there is a lot of capacity building and training by continuing to do what we have done throughout, going on in there. The other main area of capacity which has been to oVer really strong and sterling building will be service delivery. A lot of donors say support to the Naivasha Process; our role in the they are going to come in to provide health and Troika, the role that particular individuals have education support, but what we see a need for is played in helping to keep the show on the road. assistance to the SPLM to see how they can improve When the history books come to be written, Ihope their own management of service delivery, to make the historians will give due weight to the sure they know what is happening across the board contribution that certain people played. and they are the ones who say, “Here is a gap, let’s make sure people within that area get the health, get Q245 Chairman: Iwant to reassure your team the education, they need on a sustainable basis.” So behind you that we will finish at 4.45 pm, so we will we will not necessarily ourselves be getting involved talk about the tsunami when you come back to see in health and education projects but will be working us on 10 March. While we are on Hugh’s question of with the government to help them establish North-South, and Ido not expect you to respond to networks and see how most eVectively they can this because Isuspect it is market sensitive, but if one ensure these services are delivered. We have a team reads today’s business pages it is not good news in out there at the moment looking at this, looking at that a company called White Nile on the AIM what is happening on the ground. Because of the Exchange, claims it has contracts for oil in the south, situation you have just described, most of the and they say the SPLM say they can sign contracts services are now already provided through NGOs for oil, but the government in Khartoum say, “No, and through the UN— no, any oil contract has to be agreed in Khartoum”. If there is already a dispute as to who can grant licences for oil between North and South, that does Q243 Hugh Bayley: With respect, they are not Y provided by anybody. It is the most under- not bode well. You and your o cials might just like developed place. to look at that and ask our post in Khartoum what Ms Bewes: Absolutely, but what is provided is by the is going to happen there because this will clearly be UN and NGOs. a company—actually its share price shot up—which will obviously be of some profile. Hilary Benn: Iwill gladly look at that 2. Obviously Q244 Hugh Bayley: Yes. Compared with other the wealth-sharing agreement was an important part places Ihave visited in Africa, it is the part of Sudan of the negotiated settlement. or the part of Africa which has nothing. War over the last 49 years with a big gap in the middle has Q246 Mr Bercow: Returning to Darfur, Secretary of meant developments such as we have seen in other State. Ihave much appreciated, as always, your places in Africa have not taken place, so there is an answers, but Ithink it is very important to be enormous catch-up job which is needed. Looking accurate about the historical record not least in then at the North-South process, the Government of relation to deaths. Iput it to you earlier that my Sudan does not have a good record of standing by understanding was the WHO estimate of 70,000 the commitments it makes. What is happening now, deaths did not include victims of violence. You were the peace agreement, is not the culmination of a advised and you told the Committee that it did process but the start of a six-year process. Ithink include victims of violence. Iam since told that the that political change is needed, north and south, if Committee has been advised by the WHO that that the conditions are going to be there in six years’ time—whichever way the vote goes, secession or 2 See letter from the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP. Placed in the maintaining a united country north and south—and Library. Ev 70 International Development Committee: Evidence
23 February 2005 Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP and Ms Anna Bewes
70,000 does not include deaths due to the violence Council or a final Resolution in the Security Council from which people have fled, which is obviously the there will be a mother and father of a row about vast bulk of the violence, it includes only that that? violence which has come about through fights over Hilary Benn: We have made our position absolutely the distribution and allocation of food within the clear about what it is we want to see and each IDP camps. I do not sniV at that, but it is very much country is going to have to examine its own a minor part of the equation, which Ido think is conscience when the Resolution is finally in a form quite important. Iam not trying to score a point on which it is going to be voted as to what it is they here— do in support or in opposition to that Resolution. What Iam very clear about is the international Hilary Benn: No, absolutely not. Istand corrected community would be failing in its job if it did not and Iapologise to the Committee if Igave the 3 now take steps which Ithink all of us know need to wrong answer . be taken to demonstrate to those who are continuing Mr Bercow: That is very fair. to cause insecurity, including leading to people dying in Darfur, that they cannot go on doing that with impunity. We come back to where this evidence Q247Chairman: The next matter in all of this is session started which was your opening question, going to be the Security Council Resolution, and on which was about the international community being a number of occasions you have very diplomatically able to demonstrate that it can do something about said, “There are those on the Security Council who this, and that is why it seems to me this Resolution take a diVerent view”, but perhaps we can be is a particularly important moment in the history of somewhat blunt about this. Our understanding is this sorry crisis. that what we have got is China, a permanent member of the Security Council, which has Q248 Chairman: Secretary of State, we have not had substantial oil interests in Sudan eVectively treating time to deal with the tsunami, not because we are not Sudan as a client state. We cannot have a situation interested in it, we are very interested, but it would not be in anybody’s interests to either truncate whereby certain members of the Security Council for questions on Darfur or truncate questions on the their own national interests are perverting objective policy implications of some of the things coming international norms of humanitarian law. So can we from the tsunami. You have very kindly agreed to have an understanding that if it looks as though that come back on 10 March and perhaps we can address is what is preventing progress on the Security the tsunami on that occasion, if that is all right. Hilary Benn: Iwould be very happy to do so. 3 ibid Chairman: Thank you. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 71 Written evidence
Memorandum submitted by the Department for International Development (DFID)
Summary 1. The conflict in Darfur has a number of underlying causes: marginalisation, tribal disputes, incentives to escalate the violence, conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists, and issues of land ownership / native administration. It has led to a total vulnerable population of 2.3 million and has involved widespread abuses of human rights. Darfurians have suVered from chronic food insecurity and under-development for many years. Humanitarian needs are acute and are likely to continue for the next 18-24 months. 2. The UK is one of the leading international supporters of peace in Sudan. The peace talks between North and South oVer the best solution to conflict and under-development across Sudan. The UK lobbied the Government of Sudan immediately following the rebel attack on El Fasher airport in April 2003, raising concerns about the Government arming tribes in response. Several UK Ministerial visits to Sudan, including by the Prime Minister, have taken place over the past year to press our concerns at the highest levels to the Government of Sudan. UK Ministerial lobbying of the Government resulted in reduced bureaucratic constraints on access to Darfur. The UK has played a key role in getting the Government to consider a political, rather than a solely military, solution. 3. Our humanitarian response to Darfur is consistent with our Country Engagement Plan objective to “meet life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery and reintegration needs”. We were one of the first donors to contribute to the response to the emerging crisis in Darfur—as early as October 2003. Our total commitment is now £62.5 million—the second largest bilateral donor. Our approach has focused on supporting the UN-led response (funding, provision of personnel and humanitarian supplies) as well as significant funding for international non-governmental organisations and the Red Cross. 4. Our political and humanitarian response to Darfur is integrated through the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit and British Embassy in Khartoum. We are working closely with the international community, including considerable support for the African Union’s eVorts and support for human rights organisations. 5. The international humanitarian response to Darfur has generally been slow and insuYcient. Access to the population aVected—due to bureaucratic restrictions, insecurity and rains—has been poor but is improving. Humanitarian agencies have struggled to find suYcient staV for Darfur. Coordination between humanitarian agencies has not always been adequate, resulting in a lack of strategic coordination of some sectors. The UN in Sudan suVered a leadership vacuum between March and June 2004 and the work of the various agencies needed much more eVective coordination. Donors have been slow to commit resources and funding remains inadequate. We have consistently lobbied other donors for greater contributions. 6. The AU has taken the lead both in monitoring the ceasefire and chairing further talks between the rebels and Government. Humanitarian and political aspects of the crisis were not understood in the round by some in the international community. The UN Secretary General’s reports to the UN Security Council and the series of UN Security Council Resolutions have maintained the pressure on the Government of Sudan to comply. The UK has provided strong support to the AU, both bilaterally and through the EU. We also co-sponsored the UN Security Council Resolutions on Sudan.
Origins and Nature of the Crisis in Darfur 7. Darfur is a relatively poor area of western Sudan (population about 6 million) with a history of conflict. The Darfur rebellion started in February 2003 as a conflict between farmers and pastoralists over access to land and water. It quickly escalated following an attack on El Fasher, North Darfur, by rebels. Against a backdrop of the failure of both the Khartoum government and the traditional leadership to address the region’s problems, the political ground for rebellion was fertile. There are two principal rebel movements, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLM and JEM recruited fighters from the disenchanted populace of Darfur, drawing principally on the “African” Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes. 8. The Chadian government has brokered two cease-fire agreements between the rebels and the Government. After the second, in April 2004, the Government agreed to the deployment of an African Union-led monitoring mission to ensure all parties observe the cease-fire. In spite of this, both sides continue to violate the cease-fire and proxy militias still operate with apparent impunity. The underlying causes of the conflict have yet to be addressed. The Justice Africa Background Briefing of June 2004 is annexed (Ev 76). 9. The reasons behind the crisis in Darfur are many. — Marginalisation: The political agenda of the rebels focuses around marginalisation, lack of investment, development and power and wealth sharing (not necessarily for themselves but for Darfurians as a whole). Ev 72 International Development Committee: Evidence
— Tribal Disputes: When the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) emerged in February 2003 it was primarily made up of the Fur tribe which had been angered by the Government’s inadequate response to attacks on it by Arab tribal militias. Conflict between the Zaghawa tribe and some of the Arab tribes in North Darfur have also contributed to the conflict. — Incentives: When regular forces were making little progress against the rebels (around summer 2003) the Government called on Darfurians to join them in fighting the rebels. Many of the Arab tribal militias answered the call and see themselves as part of the regular army or Popular Defence Forces. — Pastoralists vs Agriculturists: Due to the shortage of water and land resources and increasing population there have been increasing clashes over these resources. This conflict has led to conflict between the settled farming tribes (mostly African but some Arabs) and the nomadic tribes (mostly Arab but some Africans). — Land Ownership/Native Administration: A big motivational factor for some of the Arab tribes that make up the “janjaweed” is the desire for land. Under British rule land was allocated to some tribes and the other tribes that lived on it paid tribute to the land owners. With land ownership came positions in the native tribal administration (and the tribal titles and ranks). Those tribes without land are therefore fighting for land and positions within the native tribal administration.
Current Humanitarian Situation 10. The UN estimates that the conflict has led to a total vulnerable population of 2.3 million. This includes over 1.5 million people internally displaced within Sudan, and at least a further 200,000 people who have fled to Eastern Chad. Urban poor and host communities make up the remaining vulnerable population. These numbers are increasing, particularly in outlying areas, and their food security status is deteriorating as a result of the conflict. The conflict has involved widespread abuses of human rights, including forced displacement, destruction of villages, arbitrary killing of civilians and rape. 11. The humanitarian situation in Darfur and Eastern Chad at present remains dire, with large numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) living in camps and host communities with poor water and sanitation and health facilities. Essential food and non-food supplies are, in some places, intermittent or non-existent and there is considerable risk from outbreaks of communicable disease. Even before the crisis broke out, many areas of Darfur suVered from chronic food insecurity and under-development. Many IDPs do not wish to return to their homes because of widespread insecurity across Darfur. This is a complex and acute crisis, with protection of civilians at its heart, which is likely to continue for the next 18–24 months. 12. Current humanitarian needs are significant in all sectors. — Protection: Reports indicate that security of IDPs within the camps is improving, but areas around the camps are still insecure. Reports of rape, sexual and gender-based violence are widespread. Some IDPs have recently been subject to forced relocation to new camps around Nyala, South Darfur. — Food and Nutrition: The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that approximately 2.3 million people are in need of food assistance in Darfur, but this is likely to increase as more areas of Darfur are accessed. WFP estimated that it provided food assistance to 1.3 million IDPs in September. An inter-agency food security survey has suggested that levels of malnutrition are significantly above emergency thresholds. — Health: The health of the IDP and refugee population is in a critical state. The World Health Organisation has estimated that between 6,000 and 10,000 people are dying each month in Darfur. Outbreak of Hepatitis E, measles, polio and cases of meningitis have been diagnosed. There are serious concerns about cholera. Vaccination campaigns against measles, meningitis and polio are underway. — Shelter: Provision of adequate shelter is vital for protection against the harsh desert climate. Some temporary shelter has been provided but it has not reached all IDP settlements. — Water and Sanitation: The lack of clean water remains acute. Poor sanitation (alongside malnutrition, lack of healthcare and high disease prevalence) is a significant factor in child mortality and the vulnerability in the displaced population.
UK Approach 13. Since 2000, the UK has been, along with US and Norway, one of the leading international supporters of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace talks in Kenya between the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan (GoS), which should bring to an end 21 years of war between the North and South of Sudan. These talks oVer the best solution to conflict and under-development in all marginalised areas of Sudan. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 73
14. The UK began to lobby the Government of Sudan on the problems in Darfur as early as April 2003 following the rebel attack on El Fasher airport and early reports that the Government was arming tribes in response. The Secretary of State for International Development has visited Sudan three times over the past year. During his December 2003 visit he lobbied the Government about Darfur and encountered general denial of the problem. In his second visit in June 2004 he was able to press a number of issues relating to access for the humanitarian eVort, which subsequently improved substantially. The most recent visit was alongside the Prime Minister in October 2004. During Summer 2004, the Foreign Secretary undertook a visit to Sudan focussed on Darfur and the Minister for Africa visited a number of locations in the country. These visits have involved detailed discussions with the Government of Sudan and resulted in steps being taken by the Government in a variety of areas, in particular greater engagement with the rebels at the peace talks and better co-operation with the African Union.
15. The UK played a key role in persuading the Government to abandon sole reliance on the military option and to consider a political solution. UK oYcials have been present at talks between the Darfur rebels and Government of Sudan in N’Djamena, Addis Ababa and Abuja. We have maintained contact with rebel groups and pressed them to abide by humanitarian protocols, allow access for humanitarian workers and reach a political settlement with the Government of Sudan.
16. The first objective of the UK’s Country Engagement Plan for Sudan (published November 2003) is to “meet life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery and reintegration needs”. Our humanitarian response to the Darfur crisis is consistent with that objective. The Darfur Forward Humanitarian Strategy (July 2004—annexed) (Ev 80) has as its immediate goal to: “stabilise the acute humanitarian crisis faced by the war-aVected people of Darfur and ensure their protection from further violence, sexual abuse and forced movement”; and in the medium term to: “support the return of the displaced to their communities in safety and dignity and the rehabilitation of the livelihoods of war-aVected populations”. These goals have remained in later versions of the strategy.
17. We made our first contribution to the humanitarian eVort in early October 2003. We had committed £9.5 million by the end of March 2004—before many donors had become active. Further commitments followed this financial year, bringing our total commitment to £62.5 million and making us the second largest bilateral donor. In January 2004 we seconded a senior humanitarian adviser to UN OYce for Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs in Khartoum, plus three others to establish OCHA oYces in the three Darfur states. This was the first of many secondments that have enabled UN agencies to get up and running before their recruitment procedures might have otherwise allowed. To date, we have provided seven staV to UNICEF, eight to OCHA, five to WFP and five to WHO. We have also increased our own staYng in Khartoum and London to deal with the crisis. A timeline of the UK response and table of UK humanitarian commitments are annexed (Ev 85/Ev 88).
18. Our approach has focused on support of the UN-led response as well as significant funding for international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the Red Cross, which are undertaking the bulk of the delivery of humanitarian provisions and services. In some cases we were instrumental in getting humanitarian agencies into Darfur. Our support to the UN has been characterised by considerable support for common services (such as security, co-ordination, information management and logistics) as well as funding for the UN’s sector-based activities, including direct provision of humanitarian supplies. In many cases we have provided seed funding to get UN operations up and running. We have consistently lobbied other donors for greater contributions and worked with the humanitarian agencies to improve their performance. The UK is working with UNICEF on an evaluation of its response. Our objectives for October–December 2004 are to: consolidate humanitarian aid to those already being helped and to enhance the quality of delivery; expand operations into newly accessible and remote areas, and meet the needs of non-displaced populations; and increase our understanding of the local context to ensure more strategic and coherent programmes and initiate recovery planning and preparedness. We are beginning work to look at ways to support livelihoods in Darfur in the longer term.
19. Our political and humanitarian response to Darfur is integrated through the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit and the British Embassy in Khartoum. This has enabled us to ensure a co-ordinated political and humanitarian response while we engage with the Government of Sudan and others on key issues of humanitarian access and security. This has been supported with significant funding and other support for humanitarian agencies.
20. The UK is working closely with the international community (particularly UN, EU and G8) on Darfur to reinforce our messages on finding a political solution to the crisis and improving security on the ground. Our approach (consistent with our support to the IGAD process) has been to find African-led solutions to African problems. We were the first donor to support the African Union (AU) mission in May 2004, enabling it to get established in Darfur. We have recently agreed a further £12 million from the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and successfully pressed for the EU to release a further ƒ80 million from the Peace Facility for the AU’s expanded mission. Ev 74 International Development Committee: Evidence
21. We have also remained close to those working on human rights, funding UN human rights monitors and lobbying for access for human rights NGOs. The Foreign Secretary was able to secure access for both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch during his visit to Sudan in August 2004. We co- sponsored UN Resolution 1564 which established an International Committee of Inquiry to determine whether the crisis in Darfur is genocide. The BBC television team that accompanied the Secretary of State for International Development to Darfur in June 2004 provided some of the first television footage from camps in Darfur.
International Response
22. With some exceptions, the international humanitarian response to Darfur was too slow and remains insuYcient. Nevertheless, the humanitarian response is making progress in an extremely diYcult operating environment. There are a number of reasons for the generally slow build up in response—lack of access, insecurity, problems recruiting humanitarian staV, lack of co-ordination and insuYcient donor resources—as set out below. 23. The UN estimates that, until February 2004, the humanitarian community had access to less than 10% of the population of displaced people (estimated at 600,000 by February 2004) and only 250,000 received any assistance before April 2004. This was due to widespread fighting particularly between December 2003 and February 2004, as well as bureaucratic restrictions imposed by the Government of Sudan on humanitarian agencies. There are still about 250,000 known displaced people not being accessed by humanitarian agencies, particularly in areas controlled by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). The rainy season between June and September added to the access problems, particularly in West Darfur and Eastern Chad. 24. Aid agencies are also facing continuing diYculties because of insecurity. Major roads in Darfur are often closed due to banditry, hindering delivery of assistance. On 10 October two staV members of Save the Children UK were killed and another seriously injured when a mine exploded; the UN has since restricted movement to the west of Kutum in North Darfur. 25. There are now 66 international NGOs operational in Darfur, and about 700 international and 5,500 national staV employed by the UN, Red Cross and NGOs. It has taken many months to reach this level of staYng and it is still not suYcient for an operation of this magnitude. Humanitarian agencies have struggled to find experienced and qualified people in suYcient numbers. This is partly due to the poor living conditions, but also because of a general overstretch of humanitarian workers world-wide. The recent security problems involving humanitarian workers are likely to make recruitment even harder. Until about June 2004, some humanitarian agencies also had considerable problems getting visas, work permits and travel permits for their staV.Atthestartofthecrisis,agenciesthathadbeen operational in Darfur were following longer-term development approaches and across the country there was a lack of capacity for acute crisis response. 26. While coordination on the ground has generally been satisfactory, coordination at national level has not always been adequate. Areas of sectoral responsibility were not always defined quickly enough and therefore some sectors lacked strategic coordination throughout the crisis. There has been a collective lack of good analysis of the situation throughout. The UN suVered a leadership vacuum after the departure of Mukesh Kapila as Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in March 2004—a critical moment. 27. Finally, donor resources have not been suYcient. Donors have so far made firm commitments totalling $678 million. The US, EC/ECHO and UK have contributed 57% of this total. The UN reports unmet requirements of $235 million for the period March-December 2004–44% of its appeal. This does not include unmet requirements for NGO programmes. Latest UN funding tables are annexed (Ev 91). 28. The AU has taken the lead in monitoring the ceasefire agreed in N’Djamena in April 2004 and in taking forward peace talks between the rebels and Government. The AU ceasefire monitoring mission is mandated to investigate alleged violations of the ceasefire agreement and to report back. The AU’s strategy is to use monitoring to reduce the scope for the parties to violate the cease-fire with impunity. 29. In order to have a more direct impact on the security situation, the AU has decided to increase the size of its mission from less than 500 to more than 3,000 staV and to have a more proactive monitoring role. We are working to help deploy these people quickly, and to ensure that they have the equipment they need. We have allocated £12 million for this purpose (in addition to the £2 million we provided to the initial mission in May). The EU has also agreed to provide the AU ƒ80 million from the Africa Peace Facility for the expanded mission. Mobilising an eVective AU mission has not been straightforward. Darfur is a huge area to cover with massive logistical challenges. Planning and deploying the mission has stretched the nascent capacity of the AU Peace and Security Secretariat. Nonetheless the mission has begun to provide an objective view of the continuing conflict. The expansion currently in progress should produce a much stronger impact on the security situation. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 75
30. The peace talks between the Government and the two rebel factions in Darfur are vital: only through political negotiation will there be a sustainable solution to the conflict. The AU and the observers, including a UK representative, have helped secure the agreement of the parties to a humanitarian protocol, committing themselves to improved humanitarian access. Both the Government and the SLM have now committed to signing and implementing the protocol, though they have yet to do so. Progress has also been made towards an agreement on security issues. 31. The international community has not always displayed suYcient understanding of both the political and humanitarian aspects of the crisis. The delicate interplay between the causes of the crisis in Darfur and the negotiations between the Government and SPLM in Kenya was not fully understood. Messages and incentives to Government and rebels in Darfur to find a political settlement to the crisis were not always consistent or co-ordinated. 32. The UN has established regular political discussions with the Government of Sudan through the Joint Implementation Mechanism to monitor progress against the UN-Government communique´ of 3 July. The Mechanism has met monthly since then and undertaken two verification missions to Darfur. Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, reports monthly to the UN Security Council. His reports have shown a mixed picture of compliance by the Government of Sudan and rebels to the commitments they have made.
Lessons Learned (i) Reaction of the international community to the Darfur crisis was too slow. The extent of the crisis was slow to be revealed, including in the media, meaning those donors without strong presence in Khartoum were not suYciently aware of the needs. A critical mass of support for action was slow to build up and humanitarian actors slow to engage. Limited international presence on the ground meant that analysis and information on the extent of crisis was patchy. (ii) UN Response to humanitarian crises requires stronger leadership.DiYculties in collaborative approach to IDP crises are all too evident in Darfur. Clarity over which agency is in the lead in certain sectors (protection, returns and camp management) has still not been achieved. The change of local UN leadership at a critical time with no real plans to bridge the gap made it hard for the UN country team to reorient themselves towards Darfur. (iii) Need for greater surge capacity in international humanitarian system. UN agencies, NGOs and donors such as DFID struggled to deploy suYcient experienced staV quickly enough. (iv) Agencies need to have better systems for mobilising resources in emergencies. Slow and insuYcient disbursements from donors hampered agency performance. Donors need to give more money faster, and not wait for the political circumstances (eg access constraints) to be addressed before disbursement. (v) Coherent approach to the crisis (humanitarian and political aspects) and country-wide engagement is essential. The UK approach has linked the humanitarian and political response not just in Darfur but in relation to the Sudan peace process as a whole. The Sudan Unit has reduced bureaucratic obstacles through an interdepartmental approach and provided a one-stop-shop for policy on Sudan. (vi) Consistent political pressure from the international community yields results. Once the international community had begun to engage consistently and at a high level, improvements were seen in some key areas, eg reduction of bureaucratic constraints on access, increased delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, there have been problems in getting all members of the UN Security Council to agree to apply consistent pressure. (vii) Need to support constructive role of African Union. There were advantages of AU engagement with the Government of Sudan where other international engagement had been rejected (eg monitors) and of mobilisation of African pressure on the Government. But there is a critical need to support capacity building in the AU Secretariat to enable an eVective peacebuilding/peacekeeping role. November 2004
Annexes 1. Justice Africa Background Briefing. 2. UK Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance for Darfur. 3. Timeline of the UK response. 4. Table of UK funding commitments. 5. UN Donor funding tables. Ev 76 International Development Committee: Evidence
Annex 1
Justice Africa Background Briefing Note: Darfur Conflict, June 2004
Overview 1. The war and massacres in Darfur have shocked the conscience of the world. The atrocities and humanitarian crisis are a rebuke to humanity. However, in contrast to the international response to the comparable massacres and forced displacement in the Nuba Mountains in 1991–92, and the Rwanda genocide of 1994, the international community has been quick to react, and condemn. It has been somewhat less quick to provide assistance and put in place a mechanism for a political settlement.
Causes of the War 2. The origins of the conflict in Darfur lie deep in the history of the region. Although there are links to the war in the South and parallels with that war, there are also marked diVerences. It is temptingly easy to analyse the Darfur conflict through the lens of the South and describe it as (another) attack by “Arabs” on “indigenous black Africans”. This is simplistic, misleading and can be dangerous, in that it feeds into a racist dynamic that is in danger of tearing apart the Sudanese state. This section will analyse three elements to the causation of the war: land, unresolved local disputes, and national political factors. First, an overview of Darfur’s ethnic composition is needed.
Ethnicity in Darfur 3. From the 16th century to 1916, Darfur was an independent sultanate. The ruling group was the Fur, occupying the slopes of Jebel Marra mountain and surrounding areas. The Fur expanded south and west, and absorbed other smaller ethnic groups. Both Arab and non-Arab groups (who are almost all physically and racially indistinguishable from the Fur) intermixed with the Fur, with intermarriage and complementary economic activities. The Fur are mostly farmers, the Arabs are mostly herders; though richer farmers could invest in livestock and become herders (even “becoming Baggara [Arabs]”) and herders could settle and “become Fur”. Entire clans straddle ethnic divides. In addition to the Fur there are numerous other ethnic groups (about 35 in total), including Masalit, Zaghawa, west Africans, Berti, Tama, Gimir, Tunjur, Meidob, Daju, Birgid, Burgo, etc. The concept of “indigenous Africans” is unknown in Darfur and would be a laughable notion had it not been seriously introduced by outsiders during recent years.
Land in Darfur 4. A key issue in the conflict is land. When the British colonised Darfur in 1916, they introduced the idea of tribal “dars” or homelands. Under this arrangement ethnic groups were given defined territories, within which their paramount chiefs had jurisdiction over land allocations. This arrangement had two major problems. One was that it was never formally recognised in Sudanese land law. The second was that in the central belt of Darfur, nomadic groups were not granted their own dars. (The Baggara Arabs of southern Darfur were awarded dars.) This was because the northern herders utilised pastureland adjacent to villages. An ethnic map of this region, which includes most of the lands dominated by the Fur, Masalit and Berti, would resemble a chequerboard, with one set of squares representing farms and inhabited by Fur, Masalit or Berti, and the other representing pastures, across which the nomads would traverse with their animals. The nomads in question would include Zaghawa and Meidob from the desert edge, plus Arab camel herders, namely Beni Hussein, Zayadiya and the three clans of the northern Rizeigat: Jalul, Ereigat and Mahamid. 5. The land issue became a source of conflict in the early 1980s, due to expanding population pressure using up reserves of cultivable land, farmers encroaching on pasture land (and enclosing pastures with thorn fences for their own livestock), and ecological degradation forcing herders to look further afield for pastures for their animals. Relatively amicable relations between diVerent communities began to deteriorate. This was especially a problem for the Arab camel herders who had no land they could call their own “dar”: they had inadvertently been denied one of the basic requirements for customary citizenship, namely jurisdiction over an area of land. 6. The camel-herding Arabs’ search for land is one of the principal reasons for the current conflict. The fact that militiamen are cutting down fruit trees and destroying irrigation ditches—both signs of a claim to land ownership in the region—indicates their land hunger. The fact that it is the northern camel-herders who are the spearhead of the Janjawiid, while the southern Baggara cattle herders are less engaged or wholly uninvolved, indicates the importance of the award of a tribal “dar”. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 77
Dispute Settlement 7. Crime and inter-communal dispute are routine in complex rural societies such as Darfur. The question is, how are they resolved? In the 1980s in Darfur, basic law and order and inter-communal mediation began to break down. In 1980, the newly established regional government was given responsibility for services in Darfur, but was given a wholly inadequate budget for providing them. Without a functioning police force (and due to the presence of Chadian rebel factions in the region), armed robbery escalated. Communities- especially nomads—armed themselves in self-defence. Since then, regional/state government in Darfur has compensated for its infrequency in apprehending criminals with the excessive brutality of punishments meted out (including crucifixion, amputation etc). 8. As noted, inter-communal disputes became more frequent from the 1980s. Governments were unable or unwilling to convene inter-tribal conferences, which were expensive and time consuming. In belated reaction to serious conflict during 1987–89, the then-government of Sadiq el Mahdi did finally convene such a conference in May 1989 (it was concluded shortly after the coup of June 1989). But the government was never able to implement the resolutions of the conference including compensation payments for loss of life and destruction of property. 9. Since 1990, the problem of unresolved inter-communal disputes has escalated. The sub-division of Darfur into three states worsened the problem. This has led to organised militia groups among many ethnic groups, which form the basis for the forces in the current war.
National Political Factors 10. There are a number of key political factors at work, overlapping and interacting with the local factors. The first of these is the historic marginalisation of Darfurians in national political life. This has caused resentment from the 1960s onwards. In this context it is important to stress that both non-Arab and Arab Darfurians are equally marginalised, with the possible exception of leading families from the Rizeigat of south-eastern Darfur, who have held influential positions in national government (and who are not involved in the current conflict). Prominent Darfurians who have lamented the marginalisation of the region include the former governor, Ahmed Diraige, who is founder of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance and a member of the National Democratic Alliance, and Sharif Harir, a more radical member of the SFDA who is closely associated with the SLA. Ahmed Diraige has sought a peaceful settlement to the war, based on the principle of federalism. Sharif Harir has been based in Asmara, Eritrea, and has played a role in linking the SLA with the SPLA and Sudanese in Eritrea. 11. Darfur’s position adjacent to Chad and Libya has been unfortunate. During the 1970s and 1980s, a number of Darfurians aligned with the Ansar (followers of the Mahdi) were in exile in Libya, where some of them joined the Libyan Islamic Brigade and fought in Chad. Some also nurtured dreams of an “Arab corridor” into central Africa. Insofar as there is an ideology of Arab supremacism or racism to be found in Darfur, it can be traced to this group. Most exiles returned after the fall of President Nimeiri in 1985. Some joined the army or pro-government militias. Some helped form the “Arab Alliance” in Darfur, a group that has avowed an agenda of Arab domination of the region. During the 1980s, Chadian factions of various political colours used Darfur as a rear base, contributing to escalating violence. The links between Darfurian members of the Arab Alliance and some Chadian Arabs, are causing great concern to President Idris Deby of Chad. 12. Darfur has a special place in the Sudanese Islamist movement. One of the political innovations of Hassan al Turabi, in his role as leader of the Sudanese Islamists, was to broaden the Islamist base away from its traditional heartland among the Sudanese Arabs of the Nile Valley, to the Muslim western Sudanese, including Darfurians and Sudanese of west African descent, mostly Hausa-Fulani, and known in Sudan as Fellata. In fact, the national Islamic government corrected a long-standing anomaly by awarding citizenship to the Fellata in the 1990s. The piety and Islamic devotion of most “westerners” impressed the Islamist leadership, and it tried hard (and with some success) to bring them into the Islamist movement. When the Sudanese Islamist movement split in 1999, with President Bashir dismissing Hassan al Turabi, the split took on regional/ethnic lines. Most of the “westerners” went into opposition, while most of the riverain Arab leadership stayed with the government. Darfurian Islamists, now in opposition, published a “Black Book” that documented just how they had been marginalised in Khartoum. This set the stage for the emergence of the JEM and the intimate civil war within the Sudanese Islamists that is now taking place. 13. The final major political factor is the strategy of a group of senior security oYcers who control Military Intelligence and other security entities. This group is powerful and accountable to no one, and has had a free hand in the war areas. It has built up alliances with militias in western and southern Sudan, and has at various times sought to block or derail the peace process in the South. When the SLA/JEM insurgency began in Darfur in 2003, members of the government initially made eVorts to find a political solution. When these failed, and there was no political consensus at the highest level on how to approach the problem, the compromise was to seek a military solution. The security leadership and its allies were given a free hand. They made an opportunistic alliance with the Janjawiid militia in northern Darfur and the Fursan militia in southern Darfur. The former have no historic links with the National Islamic Front, while the latter were mobilised in 1991 in response to an SPLA incursion into the region. The poor Islamic credentials of the Janjawiid are emphasised by their habit of destroying and desecrating mosques. Ev 78 International Development Committee: Evidence
The Humanitarian Crisis 14. Darfur threatens to descend into a major famine. More than two million people are aVected by the war and associated massacre. Darfurians are famous for their resilience and coping strategies when faced with hardship and hunger, but the current crisis will test them to their limits. 15. Darfur has regularly suVered drought, food shortage and famine over the last century. Major famines occurred in 1913–14 and 1984–85, with less severe crises at various times in between, most recently in 1987–88, 1990–91 and 1994. In only one of these cases was there a significant food relief operation (1984–85), and that made a relatively small contribution to saving the lives of the two-and-a-half million drought- aVected Darfurians. During that crisis, the great majority of people survived through their own skill at coping, including gathering wild foods (which are plentiful in most parts of the region), working for money or food or selling livestock. The major cause of increased mortality (about 100,000 excess deaths are estimated for that famine) were outbreaks of infectious disease including measles, malaria and waterborne infections. 16. By contrast, the 1988 famine that struck displaced Dinka from Bahr el Ghazal, and several subsequent famines brought about by the civil war, have witnessed far higher death rates. For example, the death rates in the displaced camps of south Kordofan in 1988 were 60 times higher than the death rates in the general Darfurian population in 1984–85. The reason for this is that the displaced people were deliberately starved to death by army garrisons and militia, which had stolen their property and food, prevented them from receiving food aid and (even more importantly) prevented them from collecting wild foods and working for money. 17. The current Darfur crisis is more similar to the war-famines that aZicted Southern Sudanese than the drought famine of 1984–85. There are some instances of people being deliberately starved (eg in Keilak). There are many cases of people being unable to move freely and utilise the wild foods plentifully available, or return to their farms to cultivate. Therefore we can expect pockets of extremely serious suVering and excess mortality, alongside hunger and impoverishment across a much larger population. For this reason, the current estimates for likely excess mortality in the region of 100,000–350,000 must be considered credible. 18. A major humanitarian relief operation can undoubtedly save many lives. In such an operation, basic health services are at least as important as food. But the greatest contribution to Darfurians’ survival would be to provide security so that people can utilise their own skills at survival, and can begin to return to their villages. In the medium- and long-term, it is essential that emergency assistance to displaced and refugee camps does not become a mechanism for cementing ethnic cleansing.
The Genocide Question 19. Is it genocide? This is a complicated question. In order to identify an event as genocide under the definition of the Genocide Convention of 1948, several conditions need to be met. The implications of deciding that it is genocide also warrant attention. 20. First, do the actions appear, prima facie, to meet the conditions of the Genocide Convention? Here we must begin by noting that “genocide” is a legal term of art, and the actions covered by the Convention are considerably wider than the lay definition of “genocide”, which is dominated by the paradigmatic case of the Nazi Holocaust. The definition of “genocide” in Article II of the Convention is “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” The numbers of killings may not yet come close to those perpetrated in Rwanda or Nazi Germany, and the entire destruction of the targeted ethnic groups does not seem in prospect, but these extreme manifestations are not legally necessary for a crime to count as genocide. 21. Second, are the groups that are targeted suYciently clear and distinct to warrant the name “ethnic groups”? There are no national or religious distinctions. While some commentators have spoken of “Arabs” versus “Africans” there are in fact no racial distinctions. Ethnic boundaries are blurred. An even greater problem was faced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in prosecuting Jean-Paul Akayesu for genocide. In that case, the tribunal concluded that “a stable and permanent group, whose membership is determined largely by birth”, was a suYcient criterion, along with the fact that Rwandese subjectively identified individuals as belonging to the categories “Hutu” and “Tutsi”. A similar argument will work in Darfur, with the additional factor that most of the targeted communities speak languages that are not Arabic. 22. Third, is the question of intent. Given that there is unlikely to be any admission of genocidal intent by any perpetrator, how is it to be ascertained? Again, the ICTR decision on the Akayesu case is helpful. It found that intent could be inferred from a number of presumptions of fact, namely the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against some group. This context can include the scale and nature of the atrocities and the deliberate and systematic targeting of people because of their membership of a certain group. Again, the events in Darfur appear to meet, prima facie, the conditions. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 79
23. What are the implications of a diagnosis of genocide? The 1948 Genocide Convention is silent on this issue. However, we must note that by using the broader (Convention) definition of genocide, we are also implicitly arguing that an extreme response (such as military intervention or regime change) may not be necessary or appropriate. Having recognised that an event is genocide, intervention is one option, but not the only one. In the case of Darfur, if we recognise that the causes of the genocide lie in a range of complex factors, many of them local, and culpability for the crime resides in a certain set of leaders, that does not necessarily include the highest echelons of the state, then a range of appropriate actions is implied that does not include military intervention or regime change. These actions include: disarming and encamping the Janjawiid and Fursan militias, removing senior oYcials in the security apparatus from their posts, addressing the issues of land ownership and establishing a police force and dispute resolution mechanism in Darfur. 24. We should also note that while there may perhaps be a moral or legal case in favour of intervention, there is likely to be a prudential case against it. It would need to work. There is a real fear that an attempt at regime change would backfire and lead either to a military coup or to an intensified civil war.
Steps to a Settlement 25. A timely settlement is important. It will minimise a humanitarian disaster, make the moral point that ethnic cleansing cannot be allowed to stand, and prevent a likely hardening of positions on the rebel side (as young refugees, their bitterness nursed in exile, join the fighters’ ranks). A settlement has several preconditions: agreement on the substantive issues, internal Sudanese unanimity on an approach, and international consensus on an approach.
Substantive Issues 26. Darfur lacks the “literature of accord”—the accumulation of incomplete agreements between the parties—that provided a foundation for the successful IGAD peace talks between the GoS and the SPLA. But documentation on past proposals to settle the Darfur problem (eg the 2003 draft framework of Ahmed Diraige) can be compiled. This briefing has also suggested that the following issues need to be addressed: (i) Creation of a regional/state government that has adequate authority and budget to provide essential services in Darfur. There are strong arguments in favour of reconstituting Darfur as a single entity, reversing its division into three states. (ii) Security of land tenure and clarification of land jurisdiction, including the rights of pastoralists to move their herds and obtain water and pasture in areas where they have traditionally done so. (iii) Creation of a professional civilian police force in the region, adequately equipped and trained. (iv) Convening regular inter-group conferences with the authority to adjudicate on important issues of dispute, and the implementation of their resolutions. 27. The lack of a literature of accord also means that the parties to the conflict have little experience in negotiating. The inexperience of the SLA and JEM was clear in several mis-steps they took during the Ndjamena peace talks in 2003 and 2004. For this reason, it is important that mediators convene consultations with the belligerent parties, civilian political parties representing Darfurians, civil society organisations, scholars and traditional leaders, in order to air the key issues and move towards a common definition of the major problems in the region and potential solutions.
ASudanese Political Consensus 28. A consensus among the Sudanese parties is essential. In this respect, the key step is a common commitment by President Bashir and SPLM Chairman Dr John Garang, shortly to become First Vice President. These two parties have the power and influence to stop the fighting and to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table. It is important that all sides also acknowledge the status of the JEM, and that the JEM not be excluded because of its alleged links to the opposition Popular Congress Party headed by Hassan al Turabi. 29. The GoS can take some important unilateral steps to address the crisis. These include the following: (i) Mobilizing the national grain reserve, stored mostly in eastern Sudan, for distribution to Sudanese citizens in Darfur in need, and organizing a national campaign to collect millet and sorghum seeds for Darfurian farmers. The Sudanese people, famous for their generosity, should take the lead in responding to Darfur’s humanitarian crisis. (ii) Immediate implementation of President Bashir’s promise, made on 19 June, to disarm the Janjawiid militia, including monitoring of this commitment. (iii) Immediate participation of SPLA units in the provision of security for citizens of Darfur and humanitarian agencies. Joint security provision by SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces units should help provide the necessary confidence in the impartiality of these forces. At a later stage, SLA and JEM forces should also be brought into these arrangements. Ev 80 International Development Committee: Evidence
(iv) Accelerated implementation of the security arrangements provided for in the framework agreement signed at Naivasha, including bringing the security services under joint control of President Bashir and SPLM Chairman John Garang. 30. President Bashir should invite Dr John Garang to be a member of the Sudanese delegation to the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in July. This will be an opportunity to make a common commitment to the resolution of the Darfur crisis, and cement the peace agreement reached at IGAD.
International Strategy 31. An international consensus is needed. The African Union has been designated as the lead negotiator. Other international stakeholders including the UN, the troika supporting IGAD (US, UK and Norway), the European Union and the League of Arab States, should ensure that their eVorts are coordinated with, and supportive of, the AU eVorts. While the severity and urgency of the Darfur crisis warrants rapid attention, it is important to avoid simplistic approaches and overlapping and possibly contradictory initiatives. 32. The AU military observer mission in Darfur needs to be expanded and strengthened, with financial, logistical, personnel and diplomatic support. The number of sites for military observers should be increased. A mechanism for the expedited investigation of reported violations of the ceasefire should be put in place, with rapid feedback to the international mediators for them to put pressure on the parties. 33. The AU Summit, convening in Addis Ababa in early July, is an opportunity for the AU to bring together the major Sudanese and international stakeholders to obtain a statement of common commitment to resolving the Darfur crisis. This is a major test for the AU’s Peace and Security Council and Peace and Security Directorate. 34. The visit of the UN Secretary General to Sudan, followed by his attendance at the AU Summit, is an opportunity to emphasise the linked political and humanitarian aspects of the crisis, and remind the GoS of its obligations under international law. In particular, the UNSG can emphasise the need for a coordinated political strategy to address the causes of the conflict. 35. The appointment of Jan Pronk as the Special Representative of the SG is an opportunity for a strategic, hard-headed and comprehensive approach to the challenges of implementing peace in all parts of Sudan. The SRSG will have a complex and challenging task ahead of him, not least in Darfur. 36. Negotiations for humanitarian access (led by the US, UN and EU) should not contradict or undermine political negotiations. In the past, the GoS has made concessions on humanitarian issues precisely so as to remain intransigent on political issues: this should not recur.
Annex 2
Darfur: Revised Forward Humanitarian Strategy October 2004–March 2005
Summary 1. The humanitarian situation remains precarious. The response has incrementally improved over the last three months, but remains insuYcient to stabilise the situation fully. Protection remains paramount. Concerted eVort is required to consolidate assistance to existing beneficiaries and expand operations to address the needs of the newly displaced and increasingly food insecure, non-displaced populations. 2. The broad thrust of the Forward Humanitarian Strategy (July 2004) remains valid. The focus on supporting interventions that enable the rapid expansion of delivery is starting to bear fruit. Logistic capacity is now in a better position to support agency delivery, particularly in the food and non-food sector. There is a need to continue frontloading operations, filling critical gaps and allowing agencies suYcient resources to drive forward their programmes.
Introduction 3. A review of the Darfur Forward Humanitarian Strategy (developed in July 2004) was undertaken from 21–28 September by the Sudan Unit and the British Embassy Khartoum (BEK). This involved consultation with donors and humanitarian agencies. This revised strategy takes stock of the impact of actions undertaken over the past three months and recommends further measures to be adopted. The focus of these is on the next three months. This strategy reflects only part of the UK eVorts on Darfur and is designed to inform allocations from the financial resources available. The UK is also intensively engaged on the political and security aspects of the crisis. (See information available on DFID and FCO web sites) International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 81
Review
Current humanitarian situation 4. The humanitarian situation remains precarious. At the start of September, the UN estimated that there were 1.45 million internally displaced, with a new caseload of 230,000 appearing in August. The number of non-displaced, including host communities, requiring assistance is not known, but is thought to be in excess of 0.5 million. Many people are not receiving adequate assistance, because of security concerns, operational capability and logistical constraints faced by agencies. In summary, the humanitarian response is still gearing up and moving forward, though struggling to keep pace with the growing number of people requiring assistance. Humanitarian capacity is improving, but insecurity remains a key constraint. There have also been diYculties in sustaining experienced humanitarian personnel to deliver eVective assistance.
DFID strategy and response 5. This review of the Forward Humanitarian Strategy (July 2004) revealed that DFID funding is having a positive impact on the emergency response. The focus on supporting interventions that enable the rapid expansion of delivery is starting to bear fruit. There is still however a long way to go in order to stabilise the situation. There is a need to maintain close engagement with agencies in Darfur, Khartoum and at headquarters to help drive forward and support the consolidation and expansion of humanitarian operations. This requires continued frontloading of operations, filling critical gaps and allowing agencies suYcient resources to drive forward and sustain their programmes. At the same time there is a need to engage in and support planning and preparedness for returns and recovery.
Donor response 6. The UN estimates that donors have contributed a further $349 million to the UN, INGOs, Red Cross and the AU over the last quarter (July–September 2004). Although this represents a step change in resources compared to that provided previously, it still falls short of the mark. The UN revised up its appeal for the Darfur crisis (covering Darfur and Chad) in late August to $530 million. This remains (as of end September) 56% funded, with unmet requirements of $234.8 million. This appeal does not include contributions to NGOs and the Red Cross, which have been provided $155 million and $37 million respectively. The UK’s contribution to the crisis from Sept 2003 to date is 12.4% ($116 million) (including pledges), which makes it the second largest donor. 7. One of the greatest problems to be faced will be in sustaining significant contributions for the next 12–24 months. The Darfur component of the UN appeal in 2005 is expected to be larger than current requirements in Darfur. It is also critical that the significant needs elsewhere in Sudan continue to be supported and that timely and appropriate resources are made available.
Assumptions and Futures 8. The overarching assumption continues to be that there will be a slow and gradual improvement of the political and security situation. This represents what is currently being aimed for by HMG and reflects the current strategy and plan of action. The actions presented in this revised strategy reinforce these. Progress can still not be guaranteed, with the potential for deterioration in the security situation, GoS cooperation and concerted international political engagement. These would have a significant impact on the humanitarian situation.
Forward Goals,Objectives and Outputs
Goals 9. The goals remain unchanged:
Immediate — Stabilise the acute humanitarian crisis faced by the war-aVected people of Darfur and ensure their protection from further violence, human rights violations, sexual abuse and forced movement.
Medium term — Support the return of the displaced to their communities in safety and dignity and the rehabilitation of the livelihoods of war-aVected populations as part of a broader returns process in Sudan. Ev 82 International Development Committee: Evidence
Objectives 10. The following objectives are set, which should be the focus of actions over the course of the next three months. — Consolidate humanitarian response to beneficiaries already served and enhance the quality of delivery. — Expand operations into newly accessible and remote areas, and meet the needs of non-displaced populations. — Augment engagement in Darfur with a better understanding of the context to ensure more strategic and coherent programming and initiate recovery planning and preparedness.
Outputs 11. Outputs from the previous forward humanitarian strategy remain the same. Added to these is: — Analysis and planning for return and recovery in Darfur is taken forward.
Key Actions 12. The following outlines revised actions and support that should be considered to achieve our objectives. All these actions (divided by sector) are designed to support an eVective humanitarian response, led by UN strategic oversight, direction and sectoral leadership and co-ordination. All sectoral interventions must also be designed to complement interventions in other sectors and make the most of the linkages between them.
Protection and security 13. Protection and security remain paramount for relieving the humanitarian distress of war-aVected people in Darfur and eastern Chad. There are continuing reports of violence, including rape, against civilians.
Key actions: — Sustain high-level political engagement with the GoS and SLM/JEM and support expansion and management of the AU monitoring mission. — Engage with and support the UN on issues of protection and engage with and support OCHA and UNHCR strengthen protection roles and capacity in Darfur. — Continue to support ICRC operations. — Support robust security management and co-ordination for UN and NGOs.
Access 14. GoS is complying with agreements set for the entry and movement of humanitarian staV, commodities and equipment. There are increasing reports of SLM/JEM causing diYculties. The UN is in the process of negotiating access protocols.
Key actions: — Continue to ensure that access is facilitated in line with the humantarian protocols.
Donor coordination & lobbying 15. There is a need for the UN to continue to take the lead in catalysing a more eVective donor response. A key requirement will be to galvanise support for sustaining humanitarian operations with significant resources for the next 12–24 months.
Key actions: — Continue to lobby other donors to contribute. — Encourage the UN to take a strategic overview of the resource needs for Sudan and including critical pipeline requirements in key commodities and set out its strategy for mobilising adequate resources. — Maintain close donor coordination in Khartoum. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 83
Common services, fuel and logistics 16. Logistics remain a major challenge, and common services will continue to be essential to the humanitarian response. Fuel is currently less of an issue, but UNJLC is looking into this further.
Key actions: — Provide further support for sustaining UNJLC operations for Darfur and maintain surge capacity support for UNJLC and UNHAS where appropriate.
Food 17. WFP is increasing the number of beneficiaries receiving food. With other donors we will need to continue to support eVective systems for targeting and post distribution monitoring. The food pipeline appears to be nearly full for the next three months, but the upward revision of beneficiary requirements will increase the need. The EMOP is still under-funded and the pipeline breaks in early 2005. WFP also has shortfalls in transport augmentation, humanitarian air services and security communications.
Key actions: — Continue to provide support to WFP operations in Darfur to address immediate humanitarian needs. — Sustain engagement with the EC for further food aid support and assess potential EC contributions for 2005. — Support WFP to strengthen post impact distribution monitoring and the targeting of beneficiaries.
Nutrition 18. Nutrition should be linked to wider public health indicators. The number of children admitted to therapeutic (TFC) and supplementary (SFC) feeding centres remains high across the region. Discharge, mortality and defaulter rates remain high. Agencies need to ensure the quality as well as quantity in the delivery of nutrition and feeding programmes. Low cure rates and high mortality in feeding programmes should not be seen in isolation of the wider context (ie gaps across other sectors). Routine EPImust be strengthened, outreach screening improved and wat/san interventions expanded.
Key actions: — Encourage the standardisation of care and training in feeding centre protocols. — Support a three-month training programme on the usage of community feeding practices in Darfur. — Continue to support NGOs and UNICEF on nutrition interventions.
Camp management 19. Greater engagement in the management of the larger IDP camp and settlements would have a dramatic impact on the well being of the displaced and their protection. It is currently being undertaken on an ad hoc basis.
Key actions: — Engage with the RC/HC Coordinator in Khartoum and OCHA and IOM in Geneva to establish clear leadership, coordination and a plan of action for addressing IDP camp and settlement management.
Shelter, NFI and cooking fuels 20. Despite an upsurge in coverage over the last three months, there remains a 46% gap in the provision of shelter and NFIs. The pipeline remains precarious with no buVer stock available in country to respond to any new displacement. There is a need for additional NFIs. The bulk of previous DFID support to the common pipeline has been as in-kind contributions. Ev 84 International Development Committee: Evidence
Key actions: — Additional support for procurement of non-food items and eVective registration of recipients. — Maintain regular coordination with UN agencies and key donors over the management and requirements for the non-food pipeline.
Water and sanitation 21. There are long-term chronic problems of access to safe water supplies and adequate sanitation services throughout Darfur. Over the last three months agencies have worked hard to reduce the risk of water borne disease. Poor rainfall will compound the problem of water supply further. 22. In recognition of the link between wat/san and nutrition, many agencies are sensibly linking are carrying out complementary wat/san programmes in order to help deliver adequate supplies and therefore maximise the impact of feeding programmes.
Key actions: — Sustain support to UNICEF to enhance its interventions in water and sanitation. — Encourage the relevant agencies to focus their response on water and sanitation and ratchet up their response to meet critical shortfalls.
Health 23. The public health situation across Darfur remains acute, but progress is being made in improving access to primary and secondary health care, disease outbreak preparedness and control, epidemiological surveillance and reporting. Despite these improvements, there is a need to focus on quality of assistance as well as quantity.
Key actions: — Encourage WHO to complete its survey in South Darfur and undertake regular monitoring surveys of morbidity and mortality throughout the Darfurs. — Provide additional support to WHO to sustain its operation. — Continue to support NGOs engaging in the health sector.
Agriculture, food security and environment 24. An FAO/WFP food and crop assessment is due to be undertaken by the end of November. FAO predicts that those that have been able to engage in agriculture will have been further impacted by the below average rains, particularly in North Darfur. The major focus is now on preparations for the May cereal season, as well as continued emergency support to the livestock population (notably donkeys retained by IDPs).
Key actions: — Finalise agreements with FAO for the provision of support for emergency veterinary assistance and cost-eYcient bulk buying of seeds and tools. — Consider support to livelihoods/recovery based programmes where appropriate.
Recovery and returns 25. The issue of returns will play a large role in humanitarian planning in the medium to long term. When conditions are deemed appropriate for voluntary return, agencies and donors will come under new pressure to support the return process and to expand activities into communities over a wide geographical area. During this transition, the war-aVected population will continue to need significant assistance in all sectors. In addition, recovery in Darfur could occur at the same time as that in other parts of the country. This will further stretch agencies. To respond to these demands, planning needs to be advanced and agencies prepared and resourced.
Key actions: — Engage with OCHA, IOM and UNHCR to promote eVective co-ordination between agencies leading the return process. — Consider support UNDP engagement in Darfur. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 85
Refugees (Chad) 26. A mission to monitor operations in eastern Chad was undertaken in August. Of particular concern were the camps in the central and northern areas of eastern Chad. Emphasis was placed on assistance being provided to host communities, whose livelihoods have been aVected by the influx. As a result of the mission it was recommended that approximately £5 million be allocated for support to the international humanitarian response.
Key action: — Programme funds for humanitarian operations in eastern Chad including UNHCR, WHO and and WFP, targeting the priority Central and Northern camps in the sectors of health and nutrition and water and sanitation.
NGO funding 27. With the funds we have available and critical needs on the ground, we must continue our NGO engagement as they represent the bulk of the operational capacity. However, sustaining this level of engagement well into 2005 will be an issue if other donors do not increase their funding. 28. Further NGO funding should also look to establish programmes outside the major settlements and into the poorly serviced rural areas. We should consider support to NGOs that can clearly demonstrate that they have the ability to deliver services rapidly.
Risks 29. The following risks are envisaged. — Collapse of the ceasefire agreement and deterioration of security within Darfur and eastern Chad. — Militia are not contained and continue to undertake violent attacks and sexual abuse of civilians. — Lack of progress in reaching a political settlement in Darfur and the IGAD (North/South) peace process. — Delays in the expansion of AU ceasefire monitors — GoS and SLM/JEM renege on agreements and obligations to allow unfettered humanitarian access. — Reduced access means that more people are attracted to fewer distribution points and acute problems for public health. — Tensions and violence breaks out in overcrowded camps. — Targeting of humanitarian workers and the contraction or suspension of humanitarian delivery. — Collapse of international political consensus on sustaining political pressure on GoS and SLM/JEM. — Government forcibly resettles or relocates civilian populations. — Agencies fail to expand operations and increase the number of experienced and professional humanitarian workers. — Impact of increased aid allocation for Darfur on other humanitarian and development programmes (Sudan and elsewhere). — Overstretch of aid agencies and the impact for recovery in the event of a comprehensive North- South peace agreement. Sudan Unit/British Embassy Khartoum 30 September 2004
Annex 3
Timeline of key UK Engagement on Darfur
April 2003 Secretary of State for International Development meets Vice-President Taha in London and writes to press for humanitarian access in Darfur. UK initiates fortnightly meeting in Khartoum to discuss access to Darfur with Government of Sudan, UN and donors. Ev 86 International Development Committee: Evidence
September 2003 UK supports Chadian brokered cease-fire agreement as an international observer.
October 2003 Following UN launch of the Greater Darfur Special Initiative, UK begins funding humanitarian response in Darfur. The first contribution was £1 million to UNHCR for Sudanese refugees in Chad. (see funding table for contributions to date).
By December 2003 UK humanitarian commitments total £4.5 million directed at the UN and key NGOs already operationally engaged in Darfur. UK participates in deployment of UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination team to determine with other donors strategic inputs of specialist technical support and equipment to bolster capacity of UN response. First UK OCHA secondee started in Khartoum January 2004.
December 2003 Hilary Benn visits Khartoum and presses the Government including President Bashir on humanitarian access in Darfur.
January–March 2004 UK plays key role in Khartoum in galvanising pressure from international community on Government of Sudan in Khartoum to increase humanitarian access to Darfur.
April 2004 UK acts as observer at Ndjamena Humanitarian ceasefire agreed mediated by Chad. UK humanitarian commitments for 2003–04 total £9.5 million. Secretary of State for International Development announces further £10 million allocation to be committed in support of the UN-led response, to UN agencies and to enable NGOs to start and expand operations in Darfur.
May 2004 Secretary of State for International Development writes to Utstein Colleagues urging more humanitarian contributions for Darfur. UK supplies strategic inputs of essential non-food items by air-lift for distribution by UN agencies including rope, plastic sheeting and blankets. Sudanese Foreign Minister visits London. Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for International Development press on improving humanitarian access and improving the security situation. Secretary of State for International Development speaks to Sudanese Foreign Minister on his return to Khartoum. Sudanese Government then announce relaxation on restrictions on humanitarian access to Darfur. UK encourages more NGOs to take become operational in Darfur. AU Peace and Security Council agrees plans for deployment of Ceasefire Commission to Darfur including 120 Observers. UK commits £2 million in support and starts lobbying EC to release 12 million euros from African Peace Facility.
June 2004 UK welcomes signature by Sudanese Government and SPLA rebel leaders of power-sharing protocols to end over 20 years of civil war. The protocols follow earlier breakthroughs on division of oil and non-oil wealth. Prime Minister writes to President Bashir following signature of the protocols and presses on the need to make progress in Darfur. Secretary of State for International Development visits Khartoum and Darfur, including three IDP camps. Presses the GoS on the need to improve humanitarian access. Meets with UN and NGOs to discuss how to improve humanitarian response. Announces further humanitarian funding of £15 million. Speaks to Minister for Humanitarian AVairs and Sudanese Foreign Minister on return to UK to pursue issues on access for humanitarian agencies. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 87
Foreign Secretary speaks to UNSG and raises need for better UN leadership in Darfur. Secretary of State for International Development discusses how to bolster UN performance in Darfur with heads of UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR. Secretary of State for International Development raises need for more funding for Darfur at Informal meeting of EU Development Ministers. Following his visit to Darfur, he writes to all donor countries attending the Annual Tidewater meeting of Donors and raises Darfur in discussion at the meeting. UK supports G8 statement on the need for progress by the Government of Sudan and more humanitarian assistance for Darfur. Hilary Benn calls Commissioner Nielson to urge more humanitarian aid including food aid from the European Commission.
July 2004 Prime Minister and Secretary of State for International Development discuss Darfur with UN Secretary General. Hilary Benn meets with the Heads of UNICEF and OCHA to discuss how UK can support UN performance in Darfur. UK Special Representative and HMA Khartoum meet President Bashir and Foreign Secretary speaks to Sudanese Foreign Minister to urge progress in improving security in Darfur. UK co-sponsors UN resolution 1556 which inter alia imposes an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities, including the Janjaweed operating in Darfur. It also threatens further measures under Article 41, should the GoS fail to comply with the international community’s demands. UN and GoS agree an Action Plan to tackle the crisis in Darfur. UK participates in Joint Implementation Mechanism agreed to monitor progress. UK produces humanitarian strategy for Darfur including additional £28.5 million. UK allocation for humanitarian assistance now £62.5 million from September 2003 to March 2005. UK, Ireland, Germany and Denmark write jointly to Commissioner Nielson about the need for more food aid for Darfur. Hilary Benn writes to urge more funding from Canada and Japan. Foreign Secretary raises need for more funding for Darfur with Switzerland and discusses Darfur with Colin Powell.
August 2004 Foreign Secretary visits Sudan and presses on the security situation and access for human rights NGOs. Meets with UK NGOs before and after visit. UK finances air-lift of Nigerian troops as force protection for AU mission.
September 2004 UK co-sponsors UN resolution 1564 which inter alia maintains the threat of further measures, including actions to aVect Sudan’s petroleum sector, unless Sudan complies with the requirements of resolutions 1556 and 1564 and extends full co-operation to the expansion of the African Union monitoring mission in Darfur. Secretary of State for International Development meets the Heads of WHO, UNHCR and ICRC in Geneva to discuss how to improve the humanitarian response in Darfur and the need for a coherent plan on returns. Foreign Secretary discusses human rights in Darfur with UN High Commissioner on Human Rights following her visit.
October 2004 Prime Minister visits Sudan and obtains commitments from the President of Sudan on improving the security situation in Darfur. Prime Minister writes to President Bush and EU Presidency on the need for the international community to provide more humanitarian assistance. Prime Minister announces additional £12 million to support forthcoming African Union expansion of monitoring mission in Darfur. Secretary of State for International Development raises need for more funding for Darfur at Informal meeting of EU Development Ministers. Chris Mullin, Minister for Africa, meets with leadership of SLM to press them on adhering to the ceasefire agreements and to sign the Humanitarian Protocol and make progress on security issues at the peace talks in Abuja. Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Secretary of State for International Development discuss Darfur with UN Secretary General during his visit to the UK. AU PSC mandates the expansion of its mission in Sudan to 3,320 personnel. UK with EU Member States successfully lobbies for further support from the EC Peace Facility. Ev 88 International Development Committee: Evidence
November 2004 Foreign Secretary condemns forced relocations of Internally Displaced People near Nyala.
Annex 4
UK Government-funded Humanitarian Interventions in Darfur, Sudan
UK FUNDING TIMELINE FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO DARFUR Sept 2003—March 2004 UK committed £9.5 million in response to Darfur. April 2004 Secretary of State announces further £10 million June 2004 Secretary of State announces further £15 million during his visit to Darfur. July 2004 Secretary of State announces an additional £28 million Total DFID Humanitarian response £62.5 million In addition, the UK has also contributed £2 million to the AU monitoring mission from the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. Total UK Response £64.5 million The table below represents funding commitments for interventions that have been agreed with humanitarian agencies. The current total of agreed funding commitments is about £52.9 million. We are currently agreeing further commitments for the remaining £10 million.
Date Agency Description Total Cost (£) Agreed Commitment To UN Agencies October to December 2003 UNHCR Supplementary Appeal for Emergency 1,000,000 Assistance to Sudanese Refugees in Eastern Chad—2003. March 2004 to January 2005 UNHCR Emergency Assistance to Sudanese 3,000,000 Refugees in Eastern Chad. November 2003 to March 2004 WFP Additional Contribution to 2003 UN 2,000,000 Appeal, due to Crisis in Darfur, to Provide Emergency Food Assistance to Sudanese Populations AVected by War and Natural Disasters. March to December 2004 WFP Emergency Distribution of Food Aid 1,000,000 Commodities to Sudanese Refugees in North East Chad. May 2004 to December 2004 WFP Emergency purchase and distribution 2,000,000 of Food Aid for internally displaced Sudanese in Darfur. February to December 2004 UNICEF Emergency Assistance to Humanitarian 1,000,000 Crisis in Darfur for Health; Water Supply; Water and Environmental Sanitation; Relief and Shelter Items; and the Protection of Children. May 2004 to December 2004 UNICEF Additional support to humanitarian 1,500,000 assistance for crisis in Darfur; emergency nutrition; emergency health care and the protection of children. May 2004 to November 2004 WHO Emergency primary health care and 1,500,000 response to communicable diseases in Darfur; support to measles vaccination programme. May 2004 to July 2004 UN Joint Support to enable UNJLC to co- 250,000 Logistics Centre ordinate the logistics of an eVective humanitarian response in Sudan. June 2004 to September 2004 UNOHCHR Support to OYce of the High 250,000 Commissioner of Human Rights for deployment of Human Rights monitors in Darfur. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 89
Date Agency Description Total Cost (£) July 2004 to December 2004 WFP Logistics Augmentation in support of 3,850,000 emergency operation in Greater Darfur. July 2004 to December 2004 UNHAS (WFP) Expansion of humanitarian air services 600,000 WFP has been operating due to increased requirements in response emergency situation in Darfur. July 2004 to December 2004 UNJLC (WFP) Establishment of a UN Joint Logistics 150,000 Centre (also see below*). Sept 2004 to December 2004 WFP Logistics Augmentation in Support of 300,000 Emergency Operations with Eastern Chad. July 2004 to December 2004 UNHAS (WFP) Humanitarian Air Services to Sudanese 450,000 refugees in North-East Chad. July 2004 to December 2004 WFP Emergency food assistance to Sudanese 1,250,000 refugees in North-East Chad. September 2004 to February WHO Interventions to prevent and respond to 1,000,000 2005 communicable diseases. September 2004 to March 2005 WHO To protect health and monitor 357,175 nutritional status of the Sudanese refugees and resident population Octotber 2004 to December 2004 WFP Emergency food assistance for 6,000,000 internally displaced people in Darfur May 2004 to December 2005 UNJLC (WFP) Additional Support to UN Joint 500,000 Logistics Centre (also see above*) October 2004 to December 2005 UNICEF Support to conflict aVected children in 1,915,000 Darfur October 2004 to September 2005 UNSECOORD Field Security coordination 820,000 Support to the ICRC November to December 2003 ICRC Contribution to the ICRC 2003 1,000,000 Emergency Appeal for Sudan June 2004 to December 2004 ICRC Contribution to the ICRC 2003 2,000,000 Emergency Appeal for Sudan Agreed Commitment to NGOS October 2003 to September 2004 SC-UK Emergency Response to Conflict 500,000 Related Internal Displacement in North Darfur January to April 2004 MSF-F Emergency Assistance to IDPs in 491,369 Darfur—through increasing access to health care in conflict areas, disease prevention, halting nutritional deterioration and treating malnourished children June to December 2004 MSF-F Emergency Assistance to IDPs in 1,006,860 Darfur—through increasing access to health care in conflict areas, disease prevention, halting nutritional deterioration and treating malnourished children January to December 2004 MSF-H Darfur Components of Emergency 1,301,822 Health Interventions in Northern Sudan Project February to November 2004 GOAL Emergency Assistance to Population in 575,963 Kutum Province, North Darfur— through a combined Health, Nutrition and Shelter Intervention March to December 2004 ACF Emergency Nutrition Programme in 250,000 North Darfur March 2004 to January 2005 ACF Emergency Nutrition Programme in 623,326 North Darfur Ev 90 International Development Committee: Evidence
Date Agency Description Total Cost (£) April 2004 to December 2004 OXFAM Public Health Humanitarian Response 2,193,161 Darfur (Water/Sanitation Programme) May 2004 to October 2004 MSF- Belgium Emergency Health Care for IDPs in 1,338,600 North Darfur May 2004 to March 2005 CARE Logistics operation to improve access 603,195 to shelter and non-food items for IDPs in Greater Darfur June 2004 to March 2005 International Provision of Environmental Health, 728,849 Rescue Primary Health and Child Protection Committee Services for War AVected Communities in North Darfur June 2004 to June 2005 SC-US Emergency Water and Sanitation 676,206 Intervention in West Darfur June 2004 to May 2005 SC-UK Emergency Response to Conflict 1,068,777 AVected Population in South Darfur July 2004 to June 2005 Medair Emergency Assistance to IDPs 1,032,500 Through the Provision of Primary Healthcare, Improved Access to Clean Water and Improved Sanitation in West Darfur July 2004 to September 2004 CAFOD Emergency response programme in 400,000 South and West Darfur July 2004 to April 2005 Medecins du Emergency medical aid for displaced 456,151 Monde populations in Kalma camp, South Darfur Aug 2004 to April 2005 Tearfund Emergency Nutrition and Sanitation 447,692 August 2004 to January 2005 World Vision Emergency Sanitation for internally 495,835 displaced persons and war-aVected communities in Darfur October 2004 to February 2005 Valid Raising standards amongst agencies 98,595 International implementing community-based therapeutic care in Darfur, Sudan November 2004 to July 2005 International Health care for refugees and local 515,535 Rescue populations in Eastern Chad Committee September 2004 to August 2005 MSF—Belgium Health care and nutrition for refugees 350,000 and local populations in Eastern Chad November 2004 to July 2005 International Health care and nutrition for refugees 469,090 Medical Corps and local populations in Eastern Chad In-Kind Support March to January 2005 OCHA Secondments of eight experts (1 in 358,759 Khartoum, 7 in Darfur) May to November 2004 UNJLC Secondment of three experts to 301,257 UNJLC June to December 2004 UNICEF Secondment of seven experts to 314,834 UNICEF June to September 2004 WHO Secondment of five experts to WHO 233,000 August 2004 NGO Airlift Two airlifts of humanitarian 160,000 equipment for NGOs June 2004 to January 2005 UNICEF Airlift of one truck-mounted drilling 664,000 rig, truck, pick up and three water tankers International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 91
Date Agency Description Total Cost (£) Non-Food Items May to June 2004 WFP Provision of 264,800m of rope, 31,500 1,008,000 tarpaulins and 86,000 blankets June 2004 OCHA Humanitarian Information Centre 110,000 July 2004 WHO Three Landrovers 178,911 July 2004 OCHA Three Landrovers 178,911 September 2004 UNICEF Contribution to the common pipeline 122,000 Total Humanitarian Assistance (DFID) Committed to Darfur since September 03 £52,945,373 Africa Conflict Prevention Pool May 2004 AU Monitoring Support for swift deployment of AU 14,000,000 Mission monitors (From Africa Conflict Prevention Pool) Total UK Response to Darfur to date £66,945,373
November 2004 Annex 5
OYce of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Sudan—Resource Tracking
FUNDING OVERVIEW—DARFUR CRISIS Accumulative Donor Pledges Towards the Darfur Crisis The following table provides an overview of total pledged funding towards the Darfur crisis by individual donors. It covers pledges made towards both Darfur and Chad and to all humanitarian actors including African Union ceasefire monitoring activities. Other Donors cover all donors that have pledged less than US$ 1 million. Unspecified are contributions for which donor information is not available, this typically being UN agencies allocating existing un-earmarked donor contributions to Darfur crisis activities. The label Private covers non-institutional donors and are for the main part contributions made through public appeals by joint humanitarian organisations,1 but also includes contributions made directly to individual organisations. Darfur Crisis since September 2003—All amounts in US$
Total % of Further Total % of Donor Chad Darfur Allocated Total Pledged Pledged Total
United States 46,076,190 175,519,331 221,595,521 32.7% 175,000,000 396,595,521 42.3% EC/ECHO 14,374,003 72,828,707 87,202,709 12.9% 15,240,439 102,443,149 10.9% United Kingdom 9,720,000 67,772,241 77,492,241 11.4% 38,592,819 116,085,060 12.4% Private 4,794,751 49,600,000 54,394,751 8.0% 0 54,394,751 5.8% Canada 4,904,344 31,346,603 36,250,947 5.3% 0 36,250,947 3.9% Netherlands 10,899,000 24,489,513 35,388,513 5.2% 0 35,388,513 3.8% Germany 9,168,151 16,030,027 25,198,178 3.7% 13,561,823 38,760,000 4.1% Norway 4,728,457 13,400,353 18,128,810 2.7% 0 18,128,810 1.9% Australia 4,865,760 9,199,418 14,065,178 2.1% 0 14,065,178 1.5% Saudi Arabia 460,488 11,718,178 12,178,666 1.8% 0 12,178,666 1.3% France 6,552,675 5,583,000 12,135,675 1.8% 0 12,135,675 1.3% Ireland 1,629,180 7,638,879 9,268,059 1.4% 0 9,268,059 1.0% Switzerland 3,612,650 4,956,450 8,569,100 1.3% 157,480 8,726,580 0.9% Sweden 2,573,376 5,374,708 7,948,084 1.2% 0 7,948,084 0.8% Denmark 1,714,415 6,200,416 7,914,831 1.2% 0 7,914,831 0.8% Italy 1,188,718 6,221,688 7,410,406 1.1% 0 7,410,406 0.8% Japan 1,663,438 4,295,555 5,958,993 0.9% 15,000,000 20,958,993 2.2% Belgium 720,000 2,730,166 3,450,166 0.5% 0 3,450,166 0.4% Spain 23,769 3,036,787 3,060,556 0.5% 0 3,060,556 0.3% Finland 857,512 1,770,967 2,628,479 0.4% 0 2,628,479 0.3% New Zealand 636,943 1,910,943 2,547,886 0.4% 0 2,547,886 0.3% Luxembourg 438,277 1,258,000 1,696,277 0.3% 0 1,696,277 0.2% Austria 120,000 1,200,000 1,320,000 0.2% 1,320,000 2,640,000 0.3%
1 For example DEC (Disasters Emergency Committee) in the UK who through a public appeal so far has received more than £21 million (as of August 18). Ev 92 International Development Committee: Evidence
Total % of Further Total % of Donor Chad Darfur Allocated Total Pledged Pledged Total
Kuwait 0 1,000,000 1,000,000 0.1% 0 1,000,000 0.1% Other Donors 1,064,816 5,975,492 7,040,308 1.0% 0 7,040,308 0.8% Unspecified 12,125,050 1,790,000 13,915,050 2.1% 0 13,915,050 1.5% Total 144,911,963 532,847,422 677,759,384 100.0% 258,872,561 936,631,946 100.0%
Unallocated Pledges Broad long-term pledges announced by donors are listed under Further Pledged in the table above. These are typically funds earmarked for the Darfur Crisis covering a long time period2 and not yet allocated to specific activities. These pledges are not included in the funding figures of this report. Only contributions for which recipient organisation and target activity have been announced are included in the general funding figures.
Top 10 Donors Based on contributions registered and included in this report (excluding broad unspecified pledges) the 10 largest donors towards the Darfur Crisis have been listed in the following table. Donors are ranked according to total contributions (Cash and in-kind) towards assistance in Chad, Darfur and to the crisis overall.
Chad Darfur Crisis Overall
1 United States United States United States 2 EC/ECHO EC/ECHO EC/ECHO 3 Netherlands United Kingdom United Kingdom 4 United Kingdom Canada Canada 5 Germany Netherlands Netherlands 6 France Germany Germany 7 Canada Norway Norway 8 Australia Saudi Arabia Australia 9 Norway Australia Saudi Arabia 10 Switzerland Ireland France
Speech given by the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International Development, addressing the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM The Humanitarian Policy Group at ODIis one of the most respected humanitar ian policy and research thinktanks in the world. You have made an important contribution to DFID’s evolving thinking on humanitarian policy reform, so Ican’t think of a more appropriate place to be for what Iwant to talk about this evening. Iwould like to begin by paying tribute to the extraordinary e Vorts of humanitarian staV; those who work tirelessly for the Red Cross Movement, NGOs and UN agencies around the world, in increasingly harsh and dangerous conditions in a noble endeavour. Their independence, as well as their humanitarianism, is particularly important and we must protect it at all costs, especially from those who no longer wish to recognise either. Iam sure therefore that we would all want to express our s adness at the deaths of the two Save the Children Fund (SCF) staV in Darfur earlier this week. Humanitarian action is an increasingly big business. It costs $4 billion or $5 billion a year. Humanitarian agencies deliver assistance and protection to 100 million people in 100 countries, providing food, water, sanitation, shelter and health services to save lives, alleviate suVering and maintain dignity. DFID’s humanitarian assistance programme was £381 million last year, making us the second-largest bilateral humanitarian donor. Yet despite the sums of money involved and the profound consequences of our actions for vulnerable people, the international system is not working well. Rightly, we look to the UN to lead the international response. But without reform, the UN is at risk of losing credibility. And without reform, we will let down the thousands of brave humanitarian workers who work in the most diYcult circumstances and the millions who depend on them to survive.
2 US has pledged US$ 175 million covering the period from October 2004 to September 2005 and UK have pledged £ 21 million covering the period until April 2005. All other unallocated pledges in the table are assumed to be shorter-term pledges that will be allocated in the near future. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 93
Humanitarian funding is insuYcient to meet all the needs there are. The response in each crisis is the product of lots of separate funding decisions by donors. These decisions are reasonable in themselves, but they don’t add up to a sensible whole. Some crises receive a lot of funding while others are severely under- funded. For example, the 2003 UN appeal for Chechnya was 91% funded and beneficiaries received approximately $40 per person of support. The 2003 UN appeal for Mozambique was 15% funded and beneficiaries received approximately 40 cents per person of support. How do we justify this huge disparity? When a major crisis occurs, agencies spend time and eVort approaching diVerent donors for funds. Donors can be slow to respond. So the system fails to get suYcient relief supplies to where they are needed quickly enough, resulting in unnecessary death and suVering. There are lots of agencies involved in most crises. The number has rocketed in the last 10 years. They often operate in an unco-ordinated way. Some have unclear and overlapping mandates; for example, the confusion between the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Iraq. There is a lack of prioritisation and leadership. Now Irecognise and pay tribute to the exceptional performance of organisations like Medicine Sans Frontier (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), but overall performance by agencies is somewhat patchy. The United Nations oYce for the co-ordination of Humanitarian AVairs (OCHA) is supposed to co- ordinate but doesn’t have the power or resources to do the job eVectively. When co-ordination is weak, undefined and under-resourced, the overall response suVers. Agencies struggle to get the right people with the right skills in place quickly. UN recruitment procedures are bureaucratic. The sector as a whole does not have suYcient human resource capacity. The UN has found it diYcult to recruit suYcient staV in Sudan. And the early exit of emergency personnel, for example from the Pan American Health Organisation and UNICEF from Haiti in March, has damaging consequences for the most vulnerable people. Needs assessments are not as objective, strong or sophisticated as they could be. Individual agencies often assess needs on their own, in an unco-ordinated manner, and then appeal for funds to meet those needs. This does not produce a comprehensive assessment of need or eVective response; and it can provide an incentive for needs assessments to be overstated. Recent UN Flash Appeals in Grenada, Haiti and Bangladesh involved little coordination and suVered from duplication and confusion over which agency leads in which sector. Some UN agencies see Appeals as an opportunity to seek funding for development projects. Humanitarian data is not good. Not all donors and agencies report what they are doing to OCHA. DiVerent donors use diVerent definitions of what to classify as humanitarian. Despite the achievements of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance, we are not good at learning lessons. There are few good evaluations. There are no clear means of holding donors or agencies to account. There are no agreed goals or performance indicators. Donors impose complex reporting burdens on agencies. Not enough is spent on prevention. Disasters have a huge impact on development, and this challenge will increase as the impact of climate change becomes more widely felt. The World Bank estimate that losses from disasters in the 1990s could have been reduced by $280 billion if $40 billion had been invested in mitigation and preparedness. They also estimate that every pound spent on risk reduction can save £7 in relief and repair costs. An earthquake of the same magnitude that killed tens of thousands in Gujarat or Bam only loosened a few tiles in San Francisco. No wonder Jim Wolfensohn has said “Reducing disaster vulnerability may very well be the most critical challenge facing development in the new millennium”. The number of refugees has declined over time and now amounts to fewer than 10 million. The number of Internally Displaced People (IDP) has increased and now totals some 25 million. As Kofi Annan has said “internal displacement has emerged as one of the great human tragedies of our time”. Yet no international agency has an explicit global responsibility for IDPs. UNHCR covers only about 20% of IDPs. The Representative of the UN Secretary General on IDPs has done a great deal to raise awareness of IDPs, but he lacks operational capacity and resources. The OCHA Inter Agency Internal Displacement Division has neither operational capacity nor formal authority to achieve co-ordination. Darfur exemplifies many of these problems. If there is one event that has motivated me to make this speech, it was my visit to Darfur in early June. That’s where this comes from. The whole international community was slow; for most donors, Darfur was a low priority until the suVering appeared on television. The UN system was slow; it lacked strong authority, leadership and political clout. Some agencies didn’t do what they should have done. No one is questioning the diYcult environment facing humanitarian workers in Darfur. Lack of access, insecurity, logistical challenges and lack of local implementing capacity present enormous obstacles. But the humanitarian community—us—has to get better equipped to operate in challenging environments. For example, the lack of clear responsibility on IDPs has led to confusion and poor delivery, as Isaw for myself in June. Even now, IDPs are not being protected adequately; and camps are not being managed consistently well. We urgently need to find a better way of assisting and protecting IDPs than we have collectively achieved in Darfur. We should look closely at the institutional arrangements. Is it really sensible that we have diVerent systems for dealing with people fleeing their homes depending on whether they happen to have crossed an international border? Ihave my doubts. Ev 94 International Development Committee: Evidence
Mobilising staV and financial resources for Darfur has taken far longer than the urgency of the situation demanded. UN agencies need to be more flexible to move operations quickly from development to dealing with an emergency. A crisis like Darfur needs experienced senior humanitarian personnel on the ground fast, backed up by equipment and resources. This means being prepared for emergencies, planning the response before it is needed and knowing that the capacity is there when the situation demands. Donors cannot be complacent. For too long at the start of this crisis, the international community was focused—for good reason, in that it was Africa’s longest civil war—on the North/South peace process. Without contributions from donors, UN agencies struggled to get the money they needed. Before August, the US, UK and EC contributions alone accounted for 75% of the total world response. Even now, these three donors account for 65%. Crises on a scale of Darfur cannot be carried by three donors alone, however generous. We need to learn the lessons from Darfur and to prevent suVering we have seen happening elsewhere. Iwelcome the work that is already under way to improve the humanitarian sys tem. Istrongly support the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative which the Swedes launched last year and the Canadians now lead. This reaYrms our collective commitment to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. Pilot exercises are taking place in DRC (led by the US and Belgium) and Burundi (led by DFID) to deliver a stronger humanitarian response. In addition, Jan Egeland has called for a review of global humanitarian capacity to find out what’s hindered the speed and eVectiveness of our response, identify gaps in expertise and resources, and recommend steps to improve speed and eVectiveness. Iwelcome this initiative and have agreed to co-finance his review. This is a valuable step forward. But Ido not believe this action alone can ad dress all the problems we saw in Darfur, and that could arise in a future crisis of similar proportions. Ihave six specific proposals for change. — First, Ibelieve that, to improve leadership at the country level, in part icularly serious crises, the UN Secretary General should provide UN humanitarian co-ordinators with emergency powers to direct other UN agencies. Ibelieve the UN Secretary General should decide which crises are suYciently severe to warrant this action, on the basis of advice from Jan Egeland. For this to work, the best UN humanitarian co-ordinators must be deployed in the most urgent situations. Iurge the UN to enhance its eVorts to strengthen the quality, selection and training of humanitarian co- ordinators. — Second, Ibelieve that UN humanitarian co-ordinators, with the support o f a better-resourced OCHA, should take lead responsibility for sharper needs assessment, planning and allocation of resources. The humanitarian co-ordinator should produce a Common Humanitarian Action Plan which costs the achievement of targets and standards. Ibelieve donors sho uld put their money through the Co-ordinator. He or she should then pass the funds on to other UN agencies for the programmes within the Common Humanitarian Action Plan that he or she judges most critical. — Third, to inform Jan Egeland’s review of sector capacity, Ibelieve we nee d to set benchmarks for the scale and speed of response we require the humanitarian system to provide. Jan’s review should set standards against which we can hold agencies to account, for example, that agencies will monitor threats to the survival of a vulnerable population once a week; will stabilise threats to survival within two months of a crisis developing through fulfilling basic needs; and will achieve access to basic needs by 80% of target populations within three weeks of the start of a crisis. — Fourth, Ipropose that we establish a substantial new humanitarian fund, under the control of the UN Secretary General, and administered by Jan Egeland, into which donors pay and from which humanitarian co-ordinators can draw funds early on, when a crisis threatens or occurs. Ipropose a new fund of $1 billion a year. In order to provide suYcient incentive for Governments to contribute, the UN would have to attribute donor contributions pro rata and give credit for them in the media. To set the ball rolling, Iam prepared to contribute £100 milli on from DFID. More flexible finance will need to be accompanied by a credible proposal for performance measurement and monitoring. Iinvite OCHA to work with donors to put together such a prop osal. — Fifth, Ipropose that to balance unequal allocation of resources by donor s (think back to my examples: Chechnya and Mozambique), ECHO, the world’s second largest humanitarian donor— and in my view one of the most eVective parts of the EU development architecture—should take on a stronger role as a financier of last resort, focusing more of its funds on forgotten crises. ECHO should assess which crises are most poorly-served by other donors and use this as a criterion in determining its own resource allocation. — Finally, given the evidence in support of increased investment in disaster risk reduction, Ipropose to increase the funding provided by DFID to international eVorts to reduce disaster risk and to allocate 10% of the funding provided by DFID in response to each natural disaster to prepare for and mitigate the impact of future disasters, where this can be done eVectively. Donors should build disaster reduction into their development programming. The World Bank and regional International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 95
development banks should consider how disaster risk can be incorporated into Poverty Reduction Strategies. And the UN should look carefully at whether its current institutional set-up is adequate for the scale of the challenge. Iintend to promote these proposals during the UK Presidencies of the G8 and the European Union. I will discuss them with Kofi Annan and senior UN leaders when Ivisit New York i n February. Iattach very high priority to improving the international humanitarian e Vort to save lives and alleviate suVering. But as well as addressing the eVects of conflict, it is equally important that we look at the context in which humanitarian assistance is often provided. As we know, the most diYcult humanitarian situations are those characterised by conflict. We must find better ways of meeting humanitarian needs in such environments. And we must find better ways of addressing the underlying causes that give rise to conflict and suVering. That is why Iwelcome so strongly the recognition of the UN High Level Panel that security and development go hand in hand. Icongratulate Kofi Annan for the leadership and vision which he showed in se tting up the Panel. It came out of his “fork in the road” speech last year at the General Assembly, with a mandate to look at new “threats, challenges and change”—not least in the wake of disagreements over Iraq. As you will be aware, it reported just a couple of weeks ago. Ithink the Panel is a once in a generation opportunity to seize the chance fo r reform, and the international community needs to respond boldly. Istrongly support the recommendations of the High Level Panel on the “resp onsibility to protect”. The Security Council has a duty to respond swiftly when a Government is unwilling or unable to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. None of us can forget that 10 years ago, Rwanda experienced the equivalent of three September 11ths a day for a hundred days. Two weeks into that genocide the Security Council withdrew its peacekeepers from the country. As Kofi Annan has said “The issue is not one of a right to intervene, but rather of a responsibility of the whole human race to protect our fellow human beings from extreme abuse wherever and whenever it occurs”. Iam concerned about lack of progress on peacebuilding. 40% of post-conflic t countries quickly slide back into conflict. The whole international community’s activities on peacebuilding need more coordination and coherence. The Bank and IMF are not as involved as they should be. Change is badly needed. Therefore I very much welcome in principle the Panel’s attempts to improve our approach to peacebuilding through their recommendations for a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support OYce. There is a need for debate amongst Member States about the details of how these can best work in practice. But Ithink the proposals need to be taken very seriously. There has been progress on peacekeeping since the Brahimi report. But there is much, much more to do. One challenge is to improve the quality of UN peacekeeping troops. The UK plans to spend £21 million over the next two years on strengthening DPKO’s training modules and training of third-country peacekeeping troops and police. Peacekeeping missions must also be well led. The quality of Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General (SRSGs) is too variable. Training and briefing are ad hoc. We must improve selection and training of SRSGs. Another challenge is to make sure that UN forces’ mandates are clear. Some peacekeeping missions currently have a degree of ambiguity in their instructions from the Security Council: where, for instance, it may be unclear how far UN forces should go to re-establish peace if it is disrupted. But most important of all is the need to make sure that there are adequate numbers of peacekeepers— above all if we are moving towards more demanding mandates. If a comprehensive peace deal is reached in Sudan—as we all hope—then demand for UN peacekeepers will rise to unprecedented levels. But as the High Level Panel bluntly states, “in the absence of a commensurate increase in available personnel, UN peacekeeping risks repeating some of its worst failures of the 1990s.” The experience in DRC demonstrates many of these problems. The international community has entrusted the UN, through United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), to deliver peace and security to a country the size of Western Europe, a country that has not had a functioning state for decades and has been mired in ethnic conflict across the region. Despite the increasing resources committed to MONUC, the situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region remains very fragile. MONUC must interpret its mandate more actively and make more of the people and equipment available to it on the ground to ensure that there is not a repeat of the appalling loss of life that we have seen in recent years. Part of the answer to the challenges we face—as the Panel acknowledges—is for developed countries to transform their existing forces into suitable contingents for peacekeeping. That is part of the rationale for the reorganisation of British forces that GeoV Hoon has announced—and also why the new concept of European “battlegroups” is so important. But we must also do everything we can to assist with the creation of regional peacekeeping capacity, and Iwelcome the Panel’s recommendations in this area too. The African Union e Vorts to establish African peace and security, including the African Stand-by Force, are very important. Isupport them, and encourage the European Union to continue to support African initiatives and build African capacity. The Ev 96 International Development Committee: Evidence
AU is already showing a significant will and ability to mediate in African disputes. A fully functioning Stand-by Force will strengthen its hand. But Darfur has underlined that the African Union lacks basic capacity in a number of areas. Setting up the Darfur planning task force is having immediate benefits in Sudan, and is also helping to strengthen the AU’s overall capacity to plan and run operations in the long term. The UK Government will continue to provide advice and support to the Darfur planning task force and the African Stand-by Force. It will be important to ensure that UN and African peacekeeping eVorts are in tune with each other regarding doctrine and training. But we must do more to prevent conflicts from beginning in the first place. The world, including the UN, has insuYcient early warning and strategic analysis capability. We are not good at foreseeing the need for or reacting swiftly to develop peace support, preventative and peacebuilding operations. In the past, developing countries have been opposed to development of such capacity at the UN, perceiving it as an intelligence capability. To compensate, donors have funded external capacity within academic institutions in New York which the UN has used. This is no substitute for internal UN capacity. We must convince developing countries of the case for strengthening the UN’s information gathering, analysis and policy capacity as we grapple with what to do about states that are failing. And we must do more to control the flow of the 639 million small arms and light weapons in the world that sustain conflict and take innocent lives. Icall upon UN member states t o commit to a Transfer Controls Initiative at the UN review conference on small arms and light weapons in 2006. And in the longer term, I strongly support an Arms Trade Treaty as proposed by Amnesty International, Oxfam and SaferWorld amongst others, as well as Jack Straw in his speech to the Labour Party Conference earlier this year. In conclusion, I regard strengthening the humanitarian system as a key objective for 2005. Above all because vulnerable people deserve much better of us than we have given them in Darfur. Ivery much hope Ican build consensus around the reform proposals Ihave set out today befor e the end of the UK’s Presidencies of the EU and G8. Above all, because we have a clear moral duty to do our utmost to improve the eVectiveness of the assistance and protection that we collectively provide to the many millions of people struggling to survive in appalling conditions in emergencies across the world. 15 December 2004
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for International Development
During the evidence session on 21 December 2004, Ipromised to write to you w ith the answers to your questions regarding Dr Kapila’s departure from the United Nations in Sudan, and the membership of the African Union Peace and Security Council.
Dr Kapila
You asked about the circumstances surrounding Dr Kapila’s departure from the UN in Sudan. As Dr Kapila was (and is) a serving UN oYcial, we have approached the UN on the reasons for his departure. The UN has explained that senior staV in UNDP are regularly reassigned to diVerent posts and locations subject to the exigencies of the service and corporate demands of the organisation. In this case, with the prospect of a seemingly imminent CPA, the UN decided to establish a new team in Sudan, headed by a Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), and to reassign Dr Kapila. Regrettably, as a CPA was not signed as initially thought, and the Government of Sudan delayed in agreeing a candidate oVered by the UN, there was a subsequent delay in the appointment of a SRSG.
African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) The current members of the AU PSC are: Gabon, Ethiopia, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Sudan, Libya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Ghana, Senegal and Togo. The 15 members of the AU PSC are elected by the African Union Assembly, which comprises all 53 member states. Ten of the 15 are elected for a term of two years, the remaining five for three years. The “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union”, which contains the rules and procedures for the operation of the AU PSC, states that all 53 member states must be treated equally, and that the Assembly should aim for an equitable representation of all regions. Ihope that this is helpful. 14 January 2005 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 97
Memorandum submitted by the Aegis Trust
DARFUR: MANAGEMENT OF A GENOCIDAL CRISIS The Aegis Trust, founded in 2000, developed from the work of the Holocaust Centre in Nottinghamshire, (opened in 1995). Aegis addresses causes and consequences of genocide and crimes against humanity. It works closely with survivors, educationalists, academics and policy makers in areas relating to genocide education, research and prevention. The role of the UK Holocaust Centre and the genocide memorials in Rwanda are important to the work of Aegis. They are a reminder of the terrible consequences that ensue when the world does not prevent genocide. They also give dignity to the victims and provide a voice for survivors, who are often overlooked. This helps reverse some of the dehumanisation that takes place during genocide and contributes to rehabilitation. It recognises that the legacy of genocide continues long after the killing stops.
Executive Summary International law allows wide scope for preventing genocide. There are huge moral and political obligations to do so. The United Nations Genocide Convention (1948) sets a clear legal framework enabling prevention. Resolve and action to prevent depend, however, on the political will to do so. The presence of an exclusionary ideology (usually meaning institutionalised or organised racism) helps to diVerentiate a genocidal situation from a two-sided conflict. Genocide is organised violenceonamassivescale, but it is more akin to extreme racism than extreme conflict. Exclusionary ideology sets the scene for future genocide. It justifies in the mind of a dominant group extreme measures that can be taken against the perceived inferior and vulnerable group. What matters in a genocidal situation is how a dominant group perceives both itself and the vulnerable group. Perpetrators of genocide do not invent the identity of groups, but they are obsessed with identify. They augment it, simplify it and create an enemy. Darfur is suVering the outcomes of ethnic and tribal conflict, power struggles and competition for land. In recent decades, however, an exclusionary ideology has driven policies of the current and previous Government of Sudan (GoS) that have led to jihad and outcomes that can be regarded as genocide. The crisis in Darfur is happening in that context and is also driven by the supremacist/racist ideas of the Arab Gathering, ideas congruent with those of central government in Khartoum. (Arab Gathering documents which as yet Aegis has not been able to authenticate are presented in the Appendices (Appendices referred to have not been printed). However, we believe it is likely that these are genuine documents and regard it as important that they are seen.) Since the emergence of these ideas in a letter addressed to the Sudanese Prime Minister in 1987 (See Appendix D), violence against Africans in Western Sudan has increased and become more organised. In Darfur, despite the complexity of ethnicity that exists, Arab supremacists are now promoting the words “Zurga” (nigger) and “Abid” (slave), drawing on stereotypes and discrimination of the past where an “African” identity was regarded as being synonymous with slave. When civilians are being systematically targeted during a crisis and an exclusionary ideology exists, recognising the genocidal threat is more important than defining a situation as genocide. In such a situation, the crimes being committed may be referred to as crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide. Such instances should be described as genocidal regardless of whether a consensus is reached about whether it is genocide or not. The political and moral obligations to prevent are as strong when genocide is threatened, as when it is agreed that it is happening. Indeed by the time the situation is defined, it may be too late to prevent. So the term genocidal may be used to indicate a risk assessment, not provide a legal conclusion. The term genocidal should signify a change in the priorities in the management of the crisis. In such a situation, security for those at risk must be regarded as much a priority as providing humanitarian aid and achieving political settlement. In a genocidal situation, compromising security in favour of peace-talks may cost lives. In Darfur either the GoS was actively supporting the Janjaweed or it had lost control of them. Both scenarios demanded outside help. The International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty concluded in 2001 that when sovereign states are unwilling or unable to protect their own citizens, the responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. Yet it was the Government of Sudan that was asked by the United Nations (UN) to provide protection for the vulnerable. Attacks on internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in November by Sudanese security forces demonstrate that the need for security is as pressing as ever. Insecurity for those under threat of genocide and impunity for international crimes is a combination that allows governments to get away with murder. When a conflict is recognised as genocidal in nature, addressing this duo must become central to the management of the crisis. Both have been insuYciently prioritised in managing the crisis in Darfur; this has impeded eVorts to prevent genocide. The British Government has been careful not to blame the GoS. But if there is broad consensus that the GoS bears responsibility for mass murder, why is there not an unequivocal message that the perpetrators will be brought to account? Granted it is not helpful or practical to indict the Government. But the senior figures involved directly in the atrocities in Darfur should be brought to account. Ev 98 International Development Committee: Evidence
Asking the GoS to “rein in” those responsible must have given the Janjaweed perpetrators great comfort. Because the world does not have the moral strength to end impunity or protect the vulnerable, we have to rely on probable sponsors of genocide to provide security.
Now that the mandate of 3,000 African Union (AU) soldiers in Darfur has been slightly extended, wealthy nations should support an increase in the number of AU troops to around 10 times the current number, in line with the recommendations of General Romeo Dallaire. A no-fly zone is now really too late, nonetheless should be imposed and monitored.
The UN and member states hid behind the humanitarian aid eVort. The need to protect citizens in Darfur was understood more in the African Union than it was among the wealthy member states, including the UK. However, the AU mission languished in an under-resourced state, atrocities continued and even the recently expanded force is still a sub-optimal arrangement to avert the threat of “genocide by attrition”.
Political settlement will always be harder to achieve if security for those under threat is not provided concurrently. In a climate of fear it has been predictably hard to keep the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement around the negotiating table.
Justice is often perceived as a post-conflict issue. Impunity, though, in a genocidal situation is a brother to insecurity; both tell the perpetrator that there is insuYcient resolve or political will to stop genocide. Allowing impunity for past atrocities in the South of Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains has contributed to the crisis in Darfur.
Documentation is the first step in bringing about accountability. But a library of reports will not end impunity if there is no resolve for it to lead somewhere. International inquiries have in the past led to the formation of ad hoc tribunals. The US refusal to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) is not helpful in ending impunity in Darfur and the Security Council should have referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC once the systematic nature of the atrocities was known. Once the International Commission of Inquiry has finished, Member States should be encouraged not to veto or abstain regarding an ICC referral.
While we are focussed on the crisis, we need to be mindful that long-term, the problems of Sudan lie in the neglect, underdevelopment and inequality in the regions that allow the racism and hostility to be fostered. Sudan will never be at rest until these are addressed together and aggressively. Aegis Trust views a federal Sudan as a helpful, stable way forward but that is for the Sudanese to determine. Whatever route they take, justice and equality will be a good foundation for the future.
Upholding international law at an early stage in this genocidal process by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC could have deterred the perpetrators. So far, the perpetrators are not trembling in fear of justice.
Despite the 1948 Convention (Appendix A) and the signing of the Stockholm Declaration in January 2004 (Appendix C), and despite many great eVorts by governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in respect of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, the genocidal crisis remainsextremelydiYcult to contain or mitigate without a massive shift in political will. Leo Kuper’s contention continues to bear truth: that governments still have the “sovereign right to commit genocide”.
The Aegis Trust recommends that: — Security for civilians subject to genocidal acts in Darfur to be prioritised through: — a 10-fold expansion of the AU force and a strengthening of its mandate to include disarmament of the Janjaweed militia, or at least supervision of disarmament by the Government of Sudan. — A no-fly zone to be imposed immediately by the UN, to be enforced by the AU with finance and resources from wealthy UN member states. — Serious eVorts shall be made to address impunity: — Preferably the UN Security Council should refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC. — If referral to the ICC proves impossible due to political opposition, a viable alternative should be put forward to end the impunity of perpetrators of acts of genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. — Long-term underlying causes of the crisis must be addressed: — Long-term, a comprehensive plan should be agreed to reverse the underlying causes of the crisis, namely the inequality and marginalisation within Darfur. A significant development package is required that benefits all groups equally. — Political empowerment plan through a federal system in Sudan may prevent a movement towards autonomy in the West which would lead to greater conflict and the fragmentation of Sudan in the future. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 99
Authors Dr James Smith is Chief Executive of the Aegis Trust and founder of the UK Holocaust Centre. He directed the project to establish the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre in Rwanda which opened in April 2004, and was co-editor of Will Genocide Ever End? published by Paragon House in 2003. Ben Walker is a Development Studies graduate of Leeds University and Research Assistant at the Aegis Institute. Both the summary and the full report can be found on the Aegis Trust website at www.aegistrust.org November 2004
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee submitted by Mark Pallis, All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention3 1. One of the aims of the present inquiry by the International Development Select Committee is to “examine the eVectiveness of the international community’s response to the crisis [in Darfur] and promote a more eVective response”.4 This letter will comment upon the role played by the UK, and problematise the UK’s characterisation of the conflict as a “humanitarian crisis”. The objective of the letter is to persuade the Committee of the importance of examining the suYciency of the UK’s political responses to the crisis, at a UN and EU level, and also bi-laterally with Sudan. 2. In public statements, the UK usually refers to the events in Darfur as a “humanitarian crisis”, or “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today”. This categorisation has led to the perception that the UK’s primary concern is the humanitarian eVects of the conflict. This perception is largely true. 3. Much of the UK’s diplomatic attention appears to have been focused on practical questions attendant to the mounting of an aid operation: pressuring for a relaxation of the customs regime for aid goods, and for quicker delivery of visitors’ permits, for example. This is understandable, especially given that the UK led the way in providing humanitarian assistance to Darfur. Without the UK’s pressure, it is doubtful that international aid would be reaching those in need today; the UK is to be congratulated for its eVorts in this regard. 4. However, the narrow focus on “consequences” means that the causes of the conflict have not been suYciently addressed—it seems as if the people of Darfur were involuntarily displaced by the forces of nature, rather than by men with guns. This is not the case. The conflict is political, and there should be more Parliamentary scrutiny not only of the UK actions to find a political solution—where it has played a positive role in negotiations and talks—but also of its actions to prevent further violence and bring security to the people of Darfur. 5. This focus on causes and security is essential. Giving aid whilst failing to resolve the ongoing security issues and the underlying problems is akin to pouring water into a bucket with holes: Darfuri people continue to be displaced by new attacks, such as that which took place in El Geer, near Nyala on 10 November 2004, which was witnessed by the BBC, “The police staged two assaults on displaced people, and wouldn’t desist from bulldozing their camp, despite the presence of representatives of the UN, AU and international aid agencies.”5 6. In light of the above, in order to consider how to make the UK response to the Darfur crisis more eVective, Ihope that the Committee will examine the UK’s political response s to it. Whilst such terrain may normally be the grounds of the Foreign AVairs Committee, in this case, a thorough understanding of the eVectiveness of the UK’s humanitarian/development response can only arise from a detailed appreciation of the UK’s past and continuing political responses to the crisis. 7. Below are some suggested questions for witnesses:
Past actions — When did the UK become aware of the gravity of the situation in Darfur? — How was the security status of the people of Darfur assessed? — Has the Sudan Unit been successful, and is it a model that should be replicated elsewhere in Government?
3 The Author is the Coordinator and Policy Director of the All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention. The views expressed in this letter do not represent the oYcial view of the APPG. They are the opinions of the Author, informed by his work in Parliament, but made in his capacity as an academic barrister, specialising in international human rights law and international policy. 4 http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary–committees/international–development/ind040916––41.cfm Checked 10 November 2004. 5 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4000705.stm. Ev 100 International Development Committee: Evidence
— What steps did the UK take at an EU and UN level to ensure that other states were aware of the gravity of the situation in Darfur? — Why was a peacekeeping mandate not given to African Union observers in the UN Resolution 1564 in September 2004? — Why is Darfur being treated as a humanitarian crisis rather than a political conflict?
Future actions — Should the UK support a Security Council referral of the case of Darfur to the International Criminal Court? — In the face of overwhelming evidence pointing to the direct involvement of the Government of Sudan, and the grave humanitarian eVects of the continuing actions against the Darfuri people, should the UK take the lead in supporting more robust measures from the Security Council, such as the imposition of a no-fly zone? — Has the situation in Darfur been assessed against the UK’s guidelines on humanitarian intervention—developed after the Kosovo crisis? If so, what was the result; if not, where does this leave the Guidelines? — Does the UK need to improve its early warning mechanisms? Mark Pallis LLM Barrister (Lincoln’s Inn) November 2004
Memorandum submitted by Amnesty International UK Amnesty International is a worldwide membership movement. Our vision is of a world in which every person enjoys all of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We promote all human rights and undertake research and action focussed on preventing grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression and freedom from discrimination.
Introduction 1. Amnesty International has followed the human rights situation in Sudan and Darfur closely for many years. In January 2003 Amnesty International delegates visited Sudan, including Darfur, and held discussions with the governor in North Darfur State and leaders of the police and judiciary. At the time, one month before the formation of the opposition Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) triggered militia and government attacks on sedentary populations, Amnesty International called on the government to set up a national commission of inquiry into the deteriorating human rights situation in Darfur and to implement its recommendations. It also urged the international community not to allow the conflict to “escalate into all-out war.”6 2. In April 2003, as attacks on civilians increased, the organisation called for an international Commission of Inquiry. In a report in July 20037 Amnesty International raised human rights concerns in northern Sudan, including the deteriorating situation in Darfur. Amnesty International also requested that the peace process, underway to resolve the conflict in southern Sudan, address human rights issues in all parts of Sudan. Without having received access from the Sudanese government to visit Darfur at the height of the conflict, Amnesty International delegates carried out research among Sudanese refugees in Chad in November 2003 and May 2004 and published five reports between February and August 2004 detailing human rights violations.8 3. When Amnesty International raised its concerns about rising attacks on civilians in Darfur with the diplomatic community, it was repeatedly told that Darfur was raised privately with the Sudanese government but not publicly as this could jeopardise the North-South peace process. It is only in February 2004 that foreign governments started to voice their concerns over Darfur publicly. Amnesty International thinks that international condemnation and attention over the abuses in Darfur has come very late.
6 Sudan: Urgent call for Commission of Inquiry in Darfur as situation deteriorates (AFR 54/004/2003, 21 February 2003). 7 Sudan: Empty promises? Human rights violations in government-controlled areas (AFR 54/036/2004, 16 July 2003). 8 Sudan, Darfur: “Too many people killed for no reason” (AFR 54/008/2004, 3 February 2004); Sudan: Darfur: Incommunicado detention, torture and special courts (AFR 54/058/2004, May 2004); Sudan: At the mercy of killers—destruction of villages in Darfur (AFR 54/072/2004, June 2004); Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war—sexual violence and its consequences (AFR 54/076/2004, 19 July 2004); Sudan: Intimidation and denial—Attacks on freedom of expression in Darfur (AFR 54/101/2004, August 2004). International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 101
4. International attention has shifted from one area to another in Sudan in a “fire-fighting” pattern rather than a coherent, comprehensive approach to the overall situation in the country. However, lessons must be learned and solutions developed that oVer timely, eVective and long-lasting protection of human rights. Similar patterns of attacks against civilians and forced displacement have occurred and are still occurring in other areas of Sudan. In order to break this cycle, it is therefore crucial that respect for human rights is strengthened in Sudan as a whole. 5. Amnesty International views the crisis in Darfur Sudan as a humanitarian, human rights and political crisis. Unless it is addressed on all three levels it remains unlikely that there will be a sustainable peace throughout Sudan. The key messages of this submission are that: — human rights abuses are still occurring in Darfur; and — protecting human rights throughout Sudan should be a priority for the government of Sudan, the armed opposition groups and the international community.
Human rights abuses are still occurring in Darfur 6. An Amnesty International delegation led by Irene Khan visited Khartoum and Darfur between 13 and 21 September. The delegation met with a range of individuals, including senior Sudanese government oYcials, members of civil society and UN oYcials. They spoke to hundreds of displaced persons in camps and towns in North, South and West Darfur as well as in Khartoum. They found that civilians are still at risk of unlawful killing and other human rights violations as conflict continues in many parts of Darfur and as other areas come under attack. 7. The lack of protection for civilians remains Amnesty International’s overarching concern. There is a total lack of confidence among the displaced populations in Darfur towards government institutions. The Sudanese government has introduced new police oYcers into Darfur yet the internally displaced populations still do not trust the police. In addition there are multiple testimonies that former government-aligned Janjawid militiamen have been integrated into the formal government security forces, including the army and the police. 8. Amnesty International delegates also received further reports of large-scale rape and sexual slavery dating from the period before the ceasefire of 8 April 2004. They were also told of recent individual rape cases, usually of women gathering wood or grass outside displaced camps, which had been inadequately followed up by police. No one is known to have been convicted of rape in relation to the conflict. 9. People continue to be detained without trial and often tortured for giving information or for speaking out about the situation in Sudan, and the government has failed to respect international standards for law enforcement and for fair trial. In some places, such as Abu Shouk camp in al-Fasher, scores of displaced people were arrested in July and August 2004 reportedly for speaking to foreign delegations or African Union monitors. Some detainees were allegedly beaten or ill-treated. In Omdurman and Khartoum in September 2004, two people died on the day of their arrest, reportedly after being beaten. They had been arrested with scores of members of the Popular Congress, an opposition party said to be linked to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), on suspicion of plotting a coup. A month later, none of the detainees was known to have had access to lawyers. Arrests of civilians suspected of links with the armed groups, often on account of their ethnicity have continued throughout October 2004. 10. Armed opposition groups have also committed human rights abuses. Amnesty International delegates visited Musai camp, near Nyala, and heard testimonies from displaced members of nomadic groups of killings and rapes by the SLA. JEM and SLA forces have attacked humanitarian convoys and abducted humanitarian workers, therefore preventing free movement of humanitarian aid. Though most of those abducted have eventually been released unharmed, some Sudanese civilians have reportedly been killed, including two members of staV of the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children.
Protecting human rights throughout Sudan should be the priority 11. The crisis in Sudan must be addressed in a comprehensive manner that ensures the protection and respect of human rights for all. Impunity for human rights violations, the lack of freedom of expression or association, harsh conditions of detention, routine torture, unfair trials and an unreformed judiciary, human rights violations against women, the misuse of militias and arms proliferation are all issues that need to be addressed urgently. 12. All parties to the conflict should commit publicly to respecting international human rights and humanitarian law in Sudan. The Government of Sudan, the JEM and the SLA should issue clear instructions to all combatants under their control not to kill civilians or use rape or other forms of sexual violence against women. Human rights should be placed at the centre of the peace talks and the international community should put its weight behind the peace process to ensure that it is based on respecting, protecting and upholding human rights. 13. Tackling the human rights crisis in Darfur requires concrete action from all parties to the conflict and the international community. The Sudanese Government should protect citizens by: Ev 102 International Development Committee: Evidence
— disarming and disbanding immediately the Janjawid militias including those members who have been incorporated into the Popular Defence Forces, the People’s Police and other paramilitary forces and which have been involved in attacks on civilians; — removing anyone suspected of violations of international human rights or humanitarian law from a position where they could continue to commit such acts; — ensuring that the Sudanese police are properly trained in international human rights standards, and that they investigate promptly all allegations of human rights abuses; — cooperating fully with the monitoring missions of the African Union (AU) and the UN and other international monitors; — allowing full and free access for humanitarian and human rights organisations to all parts of Sudan; and — abandoning the concept of “safe areas”, as defined in the August Plan of Action agreed by the UN and the Sudanese government. There is a risk that “safe areas” will institutionalise the displacement of people, and that government plans to extend existing “safe areas” will lead to additional confrontations with the armed opposition groups. 14. The armed opposition groups must stop human rights abuses. The SLA and the JEM must respect international humanitarian law. In particular they should refrain from all attacks on civilians or civilian objects and humanitarian convoys. Anyone suspected of violations of international humanitarian law should be removed from positions where they can continue to commit abuses. 15. The Sudanese government should reform the justice system. The system of justice in Sudan has failed to protect those who have suVered human rights violations by the state and by government-supported militias. Reform of the justice system in Darfur is essential to restore confidence in the rule of law. The Sudanese government should: — release immediately and unconditionally all prisoners of conscience, arrested solely for the non- violent expression of their opinions; — amend the decrees instituting the Specialized Criminal Courts in Darfur to ensure fair trial without the possibility of the death penalty or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments; — ensure that all detainees have prompt access to a judicial authority, lawyers and families. Article 31 of the National Security Forces Act, which allows detention without charge for up to nine months, should be amended immediately as well as Article 33, which gives immunity to members of the security forces; and — ensure that all places of detention are registered and inspected by an inspectorate service under the Ministry of Justice. This inspectorate should have access to every detention centre in Sudan; investigate promptly and impartially cases of torture and other human rights abuses and bring perpetrators to justice. 16. Impunity is a major impediment to the realisation of human rights in Sudan. The Sudanese government should end impunity. It should acknowledge its responsibility for the crisis in Darfur. It should condemn attacks against civilians and other grave human rights violations committed by armed militias, government ground forces or the Sudanese air force during the conflict. To date impunity has not been addressed by the Sudanese government. A failure to tackle this issue can only result in the continuation of human rights violations in Darfur and elsewhere. Therefore the government should ensure that: — past and present allegations of human rights violations, including killings and sexual violence, are promptly, thoroughly and independently investigated, and that those suspected of being responsible are brought to justice in trials that meet international standards of fairness without the possibility of the death penalty or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments; and — victims are protected and have access to redress, including compensation and restitution. 17. If the national justice system is not able or willing to bring those suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity to justice, the newly established UN international Commission of Inquiry should consider other mechanisms of international justice. 18. Amnesty International welcomes the establishment by the Security Council of an independent UN international Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights and determine whether acts of genocide have occurred. The Commission of Inquiry has strong expertise in human rights and international law. The international community should ensure that the Commission is eVective. The Commission’s specific terms of reference should include: — an investigation into the extent of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by all parties, including through forensic examination of graves; systematic documentation of sexual violence and rape; compiling lists of people killed and mapping of villages that have been destroyed; — the development of a comprehensive plan for ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice including by examining the capacity of the Sudanese justice system to do so and exploring transitional and complementary approaches to ensure justice for the victims. As part of these International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 103
transitional and complementary approaches, the Commission should consider the exercise of jurisdiction: before the courts of third states; or by the International Criminal Court, either through a declaration by Sudan under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, or by a referral by the Security Council according to Article 13(b) of the same instrument; and the establishment of mixed Sudanese/international tribunals; — the development of a method for eradicating impunity and achieving full reparations for victims of the human rights abuses, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non repetition; — a commitment to making public its findings and recommendations within a reasonable period of time; and — ways to protect victims of human rights violations and those giving evidence to the Commission. 19. The international community should commit to a strategy to protect civilians. The safe, voluntary and sustainable return of all displaced people to their homes must remain the ultimate human rights goal to solve the Darfur crisis. International agencies involved in the protection of the internally displaced must coordinate their actions eVectively setting common objectives and clearly defined roles and responsibilities. These agencies should: — develop a comprehensive inter-agency strategy for the protection of the internally displaced population in Darfur, which fully respects the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The Sudanese government, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the International Committee of the Red Cross should all be involved in the development of this strategy; and — take into account the particular needs of vulnerable groups, including women and children. Medical care including counselling should be available to victims of torture and rape and other forms of sexual violence. 20. The international community should also stress the importance of the right to free expression and guarantees of safety for people in Darfur who speak to others including those who speak to international delegations, journalists and monitors. 21. The international community should increase its monitoring presence. Internally displaced persons, who have suVered so much at the hands of government-supported militias and the armed forces, have a total lack of confidence in government institutions, including the police and the judiciary. They are relying on an increased international presence. This requires: — the international community to assist the AU to deliver on its extended mandate; — the presence of AU monitors to be extended to every administrative unit in Darfur. AU ceasefire monitors should monitor not only ceasefire violations but also breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law. They should report their findings fully, and the consent of the parties to the conflict should not be required for the public release of monitoring reports; — UN member states to provide the support necessary for the OYce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to strengthen its monitoring capacity; and — the international police monitors that will support the national police forces to be deployed rapidly and to reconstitute confidence in the national police authorities. The international policing body should not only provide advice and training, but should also monitor the system of police recruitment in Darfur to ensure that those who may have committed serious human rights violations are not included in the police force, and are brought to justice. 22. The government of Sudan is responsible for the violations committed by its armed forces and the Janjawid militia in Darfur. The UN Security Council arms embargo, at present in place for non- governmental entities only, should be extended to include a suspension to the Sudanese government of all transfers of military equipment that are likely to be used to commit human rights violations. A strong monitoring mechanism should be established to investigate possible violations of the arms embargo and report periodically on its findings. A suspension on transfers of arms to the Sudanese government and all parties to the conflict in Darfur, would help contain the conflict and ensure that no further arms are used to commit human rights violations. Such a suspension would also send a strong signal to the Sudanese government that the international community can take decisive action when massive atrocities are being committed. October 2004
Memorandum submitted by the Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan A cross party delegation including Hilton Dawson MP, Jenny Tonge MP, David Drew MP and John Bercow MP visited Sudan between 27 June and 4 July 2004 under the auspices of the Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan (APG). The Group visited El Geneina, West Darfur on 1 July and Nyala, South Darfur on 2 July. The Group met with a wide constituency of people including UN and humanitarian Ev 104 International Development Committee: Evidence
agencies, Government of Sudan (GoS) representatives, Darfur Arabs and people in displacement camps. Below is a summary of the Group’s findings and recommendations on Darfur and the relevant chapter on Darfur from the Group’s report Sudan’s Opportunity for Peace and Development. Enclosed is also a copy of the full report as the APG strongly believes that the crisis in Darfur must be seen in the context of Sudan as a whole.9
Summary The humanitarian consequences of the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan must not be dealt with separately from its political causes. Humanitarian and political solutions need to be sought in parallel. The APG believes the application of a simple “Arab” on “indigenous African” dichotomy is misleading and should not be used to overlook deep rooted and historical factors that have led to the fragmentation of interdependent communities. This is not to deny that ethnicity is subjectively relevant and that it has become politicised in the context of Darfur. The issue of land is integral to the conflict, the break down of traditional tribal mediation mechanisms, neglect and underdevelopment and national and regional political factors need to be taken in to account in any analysis of the causes of the conflict and search for comprehensive solutions. The humanitarian needs in Darfur including, food, water, shelter, sanitation, and health are enormous. The nature of the attack on civilians has meant the need for long-term humanitarian assistance in the region. There are now hundreds and thousands of people in displacement camps within Darfur and across the borders in Chad. There are also large sums of people beyond the reach of humanitarian assistance whose numbers cannot be quantified. Funding for the humanitarian response by the international community has clearly been inadequate. The UK Government has contributed substantially towards the humanitarian appeal for Darfur and the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) appeal for Darfur has managed to gain considerable exposure and resources for the humanitarian eVort. However, greater and long-term funding is needed to address humanitarian capacity and needs in Darfur. Access has improved and obstacles to humanitarian delivery have been largely lifted but ongoing insecurity, poor weather conditions and logistical problems continue to hamper eVorts to access those beyond reach. Although the presence of international agencies has increased the numbers and capacities of humanitarian agencies remains insuYcient compared to the scale of the crisis. The international community must continue to push all parties to the conflict to uphold the ceasefire and allow full, unimpeded access to conflict aVected populations. Conditions in the camps are dire. The rainy season has brought water borne diseases such as cholera and dysentery. Populations have found themselves confined to camps, their movements severely restricted. Protection remains a serious concern with gender-based violence against women rife, whilst beatings, looting and disappearances continue to take place. There are a small number of UN human rights monitors on the ground in Darfur. The APG calls on the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to assign a much greater number of human rights monitors in Darfur and asks member states to provide the funding for this to happen. Despite a Memorandum on Voluntary and Safe Return signed by the GoS, local authorities continue to apply “direct” and “indirect” pressure on people to move back to unsafe villages or other locations. Concern has been raised about “safe areas” agreed between the UN and GoS. Safe areas may end up looking like “peace villages” as used by the GoS in the Nuba Mountains and Central Sudan and could be used to consolidate displacement and secure major towns. It is vital that the international community objects to the “safe areas” policy and that all return takes place on a voluntary basis. The African Union (AU) has been tasked with monitoring the ceasefire in Darfur but has an inadequate number of troops on the ground and has requested an increased troop force of up to 5,000 as well as an expanded civilian protection mandate. Questions still remain about the inexperience and capacity of the AU to deal with a crisis of this magnitude. The international community must therefore give their full backing to the AU including providing funding, equipment, transportation, training and logistics to enable them to carry out their tasks eVectively. The APG believes the AU should be provided with the mandate to not only protect civilians but also to disarm the Janjaweed. Protection remains the overall priority. Reports suggest the GoS has absorbed Janjaweed militias in to the army and police forces now providing “protection” to populations in camps. The APG believes the international community needs to apply sustained pressure on the GoS to ensure that this policy is immediately stopped. This also points to the need for monitors to work along side the police forces in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur threatens to destabilise the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process and push the country back in to war. International diplomaticeVorts have so far focused predominantly on the humanitarian crisis. The APG believes the international community must now give full financial and diplomatic backing to finding a political solution to the Darfur conflict whilst at the same time sustaining pressure on the GoS and SPLM/A to swiftly conclude negotiations in Naivasha. It is also imperative that the Darfur and IGAD processes are co-ordinated in order to avoid ambiguities and
9 Not printed. Copy placed in the Library. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 105
confusions between the two processes and to create a global and inclusive agreement providing for democracy and the sharing of power and resources throughout Sudan. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations must begin planning now for security operations in Darfur. The UN Security Council has passed two resolutions on the Darfur crises in July 2004 and September 2004. The APG welcomes the establishment of an international inquiry in to human rights violations and war crimes in Darfur by all parties to the conflict as set out in the former resolution. The inquiry should be set up rapidly and adequately funded by donors. Human rights groups have also reported on human rights abuses committed by rebel forces, who need to be pressurised in to opening up territory under their control for human rights monitoring. Continued attacks on civilians and alleged links between the GoS and militias in Darfur makes imperative the application of a UN arms embargo against the GoS. The APG recommends that failure by the GoS to meet its obligations, as set out in the UN Security Council resolutions should result in targeted economic sanctions against members of the GoS. Achieving peace in Sudan will require a shift in thinking away from the North South paradigm, which has typically been used to portray the ongoing conflict to a focus on centre periphery issues. The tragedy in Darfur points to the urgent need for this shift to take place and there are also other multiple trouble spots on the verge of exploding if the needs in those areas are not immediately addressed. The international community must focus its energies and eVorts on inclusive programmes that address the economic and political marginalisation that is fuelling discontent and conflict in the peripheral regions in Sudan. It is of vital importance that the Darfur crisis does not take the focus away from Sudan wide issues. The APG believes that active participation in the post-conflict phases by the troika US, UK, Norway and IGAD partners will be crucial to secure peace in Sudan. The critical need for financial support is apparent, but this must be reinforced by sustained political commitment and ongoing multilateral diplomatic eVorts. Extraordinary eVorts are needed from national, local, regional and international actors if Sudan is able to achieve as envisaged in the Machakos Protocol a comprehensive solution that replaces war “not just with peace, but also with social, political and economic justice which respects the fundamental human and political rights of the Sudanese people”. November 2004
Joint memorandum submitted by Suliman Baldo, James Morton, Roland Marchal and Alex de Waal
DARFUR IN 2004: THE MANY FACES OF A CONFLICT
A Working Paper 1. Introduction This paper summarises discussions among four international specialists on Sudan and Darfur. The four bring together long experience in Darfur with up-to-date knowledge of the current political situation in Sudan, including the regime in Khartoum as well as wider issues such as the Naivasha process which is working towards peace in the south of the country. Section Two outlines the current situation and Section Three takes a closer look at the local roots of the conflict. Section Four then examines the national and regional dimensions. The last section looks at some proposed actions to address the situation. (Annex 1 summarises the four authors’ background and involvement in Darfur.)
2. Background The crisis in Darfur is immense and complex. The basic outlines of the disaster are well-known: it is widely recognised as the world’s worst humanitarian disaster today, while the name “Janjawiid” has become synonymous with atrocity. But this high profile has not, at all times, been matched by an adequate understanding of the deep and complex roots of this crisis. The large-scale humanitarian response and political engagement launched by the UN, African Union and international community at large have been largely ad hoc, in ways more influenced by experience of other disasters (Rwanda, Bosnia and Southern Sudan, for example) than a thorough understanding of Darfur itself.
3. Local Dynamics Darfur is a crisis with deep local roots. Five aspects are important. — Identity—Identities in Darfur have always been complex, subtle and fluid, with the possibility of individuals or groups changing identity in response to political and economic circumstance. These identities are in the process of being manipulated by both Darfurian and external political actors, to create simplified and radically polarised “Arab” versus “African” identities. Political Arabism in Darfur is a relatively recent creation, related to Darfurian Arabs’ linkages with Sudanese political parties and Libya. The mobilisation around “African” identity is even more recent, Ev 106 International Development Committee: Evidence
associated with links to the SPLA (the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army, the main southern rebel movement) and bargaining for influence with the international community. There are worrying signs that a discourse over “autochthony” (belonging) is emerging in Darfur and elsewhere. Much remains to be learned about how local identities are playing out in the conflict. For example, the extension of the war to southeastern Darfur raises important questions about the neutrality of the Rizeigat, the most powerful “Arab” tribe. There is a danger that external engagement may reinforce competitive identity formation. — Land and resources—The influence of land tenure and competition for resources is controversial; there is a conventional view that identifies these as central to the genesis of the conflict, while an alternative view is that land is suYciently available so that resource conflict is not a significant issue. According to the latter view, what is occurring now is not “ethnic cleansing” (an attempt to resettle areas formerly inhabited by one group by members of another) but the use of land as a political weapon. Moreover, the provision of transport infrastructure, markets and basic commodities could contribute importantly to conflict resolution and prevention. This is an area demanding further attention. — Governance and law and order—A major cause of the conflict, and its intractability, is the incapacity of the Sudanese government in Darfur. Local government simply does not function. The absence of an eVective civil police force and the dismantling of the Idara Ahlia (“native” or “civil administration”), which was at the heart of local dispute resolution, were both major contributors to the escalation of violence. Distorted forms of Idara Ahlia were established by the government in the mid 1990s, with the aim of undermining the influence of certain chiefs and rival political parties (ie the Umma Party), thereby contributing especially to conflict in Dar Masalit (the area of Western Darfur along the border with Chad which is home to the Masalit ethnic group). The government has recently proposed the reintroduction of this form of local administration. Though tribal authorities have been continuously weakening since the 1960s, this initiative should be seriously considered as a major part of the solution to the Darfur crisis. However, the Idara Ahlia can only function if there is a powerful and neutral sovereign force able to enforce decisions as ultimate arbiter. This is the role in which the Sudanese state has failed most utterly. — Militia mobilisation—The Sudan Government has used a militia strategy (specifically militarising rural communities) as a means of pursuing its war since the early 1980s. The use of the Janjawiid in Darfur is just the most recent example of this. While the government may have little capacity to provide services, it does have the capability to play a cynical game of divide and rule. Meanwhile, the exact identity of the Janjawiid remains unclear. Some are Chadians, some are sedentarised former nomads from Darfur’s own Arab tribes, others are drawn from tribal self- defence units, and the leadership appears to be an integral part of the Popular Defence Force (local militias organised as early at the 1990s by the Sudanese Government). While there is little doubt that Khartoum set up and unleashed the PDF/Janjawiid this does not imply that it can easily rein them in or disarm them. — Darfur opposition mobilisation—The leadership of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM—one of the two principal Darfur rebel movements) is young and inexperienced, resulting in part from the decapitation of Darfur’s radical leadership in the early 1990s following the failed SPLA incursion in 1990. (And possibly the fact that more experienced leaders are not willing to participate.) The SLM is an amalgam of pre-existing local militia and self-defence groups (mostly from the Zaghawa/Tuer, Masalit and Fur ethnic groups), emerging from a constellation of small conflicts, rather than a hierarchical and centralised army. Its political agenda is focused on Darfurian issues. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM—the other principal rebel movement) has a more sophisticated leadership, drawn from ethnic Zaghawa/Kobe members of the Islamist movement who split with the Sudanese Government in 1999. The JEM was planned in Khartoum, as part of an agenda for regaining state power by the Islamists or at least reframing the national political arena. It has a smaller and more localised presence on the ground. It seems clear that none of the major players in Darfur fully understood the combustible nature of the problems in the region when they mounted armed actions in 2003–04. The conflict has been more vicious and far-reaching than either side can have envisioned, and the parties are struggling to cope with the monster they have unleashed. The high level of cruelty reflects both the traditionally violent nature of Darfurian society, and the disregard for human life by the “security cabal” in Khartoum.
4. National and Regional Dynamics Beyond its local dynamics, the Darfur conflict has both national and regional dimensions, which need to be addressed in any attempted solution. The national and regional dimensions include the following: — Split in the ruling Islamist party—Before the 1999 split, the Congress Party included substantial membership from Darfur, and also an (ambiguous) embrace of “African” Islamism alongside its traditional roots in the Arab-Islamist tradition of the Nile Valley. The split helped create the conditions for the conflict, by (a) pushing many Darfurian Islamists out of government and the International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 107
Congress Party, (b) initiating a purge of local government oYcials and PDF leaders. Additional divisions within the government and party have arisen as a result of the Darfur war, which might jeopardise the position of Vice President Ali Osman Taha and the security clique around him. This is a group concerned solely with remaining in power, which has created a strong core Islamist party and security institutions, but a weak state. — Oil revenues as a new factor in reframing grievances—As the regime’s ideological ambitions have slowly been abandoned, the focus has shifted more and more to retaining control of power and revenue. Oil money, in particular, is reframing both the reasons to rule and the grievances to contest the State. After two decades of economic decay, many from the elites and counter-elites are determined to secure their share, feeling that Khartoum (alone) is enjoying a new prosperity. The revenue-sharing agreement with the SPLA risks providing a “demonstration eVect” of how resistance followed by negotiation may win a new share of State revenues. — Links to the other Sudanese peace processes—The talks between the Government and the Darfur rebels in Abuja, Nigeria (the “Abuja talks”) are making slow progress and are unlikely to come to a rapid successful conclusion. Reasons for the lack of progress include the political inexperience of the SLM and JEM, stonewalling by the Government (related both to a policy of obstructionism and to divisions in the leadership), and some missteps by the mediators, notably raising the issue of disarming the rebels in advance of a political settlement. The Darfur conflict erupted as the IGAD (“Naivasha”) peace process between the Sudan Government and the SPLA was approaching completion. This is not coincidental. One of the lessons from Naivasha for Sudanese parties is that those who carry a gun will win a place at the negotiating table. The SPLA appears to have welcomed and even abetted the insurrection, anticipating that it would strengthen its political hand—a position it is now reconsidering as the Darfur conflict threatens to jeopardise the gains it has achieved at Naivasha. The Sudanese Government believed that the imminence of an overall agreement gave it a free pass from the international community in Darfur. For a while, the Darfur war put the Naivasha process on ice, which did not unduly worry the Sudan Government. By October, however, the primacy of Naivasha in finding an end to Sudan’s conflicts had been reasserted. Meanwhile, in a separate track, Khartoum is negotiating with the National Democratic Alliance (the NDA, the main coalition of “Northern” Sudanese opposition groups and parties) in Cairo under Egyptian auspices. The agenda for these talks implies a complete rewriting of agreements emerging from Naivasha, in favour of greater powers for central government. The Cairo talks are also the only forum at which the Beja are represented (a north-eastern Sudanese “non-Arab”, Islamic nomadic ethnic group whose Beja Congress has been waging a ten year rebellion). There is considerable concern that the Beja may be the locus of Sudan’s next serious insurrection and humanitarian crisis, unless the underlying political issues are dealt with soon (similar fears pertain in South/West Kordofan, where a new insurgent group, al Shahama, has recently announced its existence). — Neighbouring countries—Chad’s position is complicated. Zaghawa elements amongst the rebel leadership have strong ties in the Chadian government, while Chad’s President Idris Deby has major worries about the ambitions of the Chadian Arabs, many of whom are represented in the Janjawiid. But Deby is also indebted to Khartoum, which helped bring him to power. He is striving to stay out of the conflict, and accommodate the demands of both Zaghawa and Arabs. Eritrea is hosting and supporting the Darfurian opposition fronts, working hard to create unity within and between them, and appears opposed to any peace settlements until its own problems with its neighbours are resolved. Egypt is hosting the Government-NDA talks and is supporting a settlement of all Sudan’s conflicts favourable to central government. Egypt continues to regard Sudan as an internal security issue, not a foreign policy matter. The African Union, including Nigeria—The AU was initially welcomed by Khartoum in anticipation that it would prove a “soft touch”. It has proved more energetic than expected, and Chairperson Alpha Konare has made Darfur the test case for the AU’s peace and security agenda. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has hosted the Abuja talks, has similarly sought to make Darfur a showcase for Africa’s capacity to resolve its own conflicts. Nigerian involvement must be seen in the context of Nigeria’s internal politics and the President’s need to play to his own Muslim majority. Meanwhile, the AU decision to hold its July 2005 Summit in Khartoum threatens to complicate matters. If Sudan’s conflicts are not resolved, the location of the summit could be a cause for serious dispute between the AU, the US and Europe, while the mobilisation of African countries along a polarised “Arab”-“African” axis could seriously divide the AU and undermine its peace and security agenda. Ev 108 International Development Committee: Evidence
The present AU role in Darfur includes both mediation and a cease-fire monitoring force, protected by an AU military force. Though modest and handicapped by weak logistics and administrative capacity, an upgrading of the AU force was recognised as potentially the most eVective response in the short term, and one which the Sudanese Government might be persuaded to see as its “least worst option”. — Engagement of the international community—There is a clear risk of collisions between actions undertaken by the international community, including the UN system. There appeared to be a disconnect between the strategies pursued by the Security Council on the one hand, and those of UN’s presence on the ground on the other. Humanitarian action plans were being drawn up in Khartoum without apparent consultation with the rebels. There is a further danger that the peace talks might produce agreements that require the UN to attempt impossible tasks. Until October, the humanitarian engagement in Darfur was very fortunate in that there have been no serious incidents involving international staV. The deaths of two aid workers, one expatriate and one Sudanese, in a landmine explosion may prefigure a serious deterioration of personal security in the region. — Western activist constituencies—Western constituencies portray Darfur in simple and comprehensible, but misleading, terms, and then demand dramatic action. The most pressing issue in this regard is the portrayal of the Darfur conflict as “genocide”, with the implication that this places the perpetrators beyond the political pale and obliges military intervention. Setting aside the question whether the Darfur atrocities count as “genocide”, the Genocide Convention does not specify particular actions to prevent and punish it. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his determination that Darfur was indeed genocide, made on 9 September, made it clear that this finding would not change US government policy. The key point is that local mechanisms such as tribal reconciliation conferences are likely to be more eVective than formal judicial processes in achieving workable and lasting solutions. For that reason, western military intervention is undesirable and likely to be ineVective.
5. Recommendations for Engagement Specialists inevitably wish to examine causes and dimensions of a conflict in considerable local detail. They may wish to oVer complex and sophisticated solutions to match. However, the current situation demands clear and actionable policies. Striking the right balance in dealing with Government of Sudan is a particular problem. The only way to keep the Naivasha process moving forward to win peace in southern Sudan, will be to continue to deal with government and with Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, in particular. ItisdiYcult to do this while putting pressure on the Vice-President and possibly indicting some of his colleagues (perhaps even himself) over Darfur. And pressure alone is unlikely to work. Some real positive inducements for the government to cooperate are also needed. For these reasons, there is a dilemma whether to treat Darfur as a conflict requiring impartial mediation, or as asymmetric violence in which one side needs protection against the other. On balance, the first course is both more positive and possibly also closer to the truth. There are a number of options for engagement. Some lean towards mediation and others to pressure and all of them need a lot of work to make them actionable. — Civil policing—The importance of basic law and order cannot be over-emphasised. Any part of a settlement in Darfur (and indeed also the South) must include provision for a neutral, respected, well-equipped civil police force. In the interim, a Darfur “gendarmerie”, using camels rather than vehicles for transport, might meet some success in facing down local militias. — Complementary track of a tribal conference—Many of Darfur’s issues are best settled by an all- inclusive conference of tribal chiefs rather than high-level political negotiations between government and rebels. This will not be easy as the tribal leadership has its own agendas and links to outside groups. It may be that such a conference would only be possible when there is a framework political agreement in place. Certainly, a basic agreement to ensure that all participants can attend in confidence will be essential. Alternatively, it may be that the conference will provide a forum for all parties to meet and establish working relationships before seeking to address larger issues. Either way, preparations for this second track should begin without delay. — Resident Magistrates—For local dispute resolution, returning to a system of “resident magistrates” might oVer interest. A possible model involves basing one such magistrate, with legal powers under the Sudanese legal system but resourced and trained by the international community, in each major population centre. Each magistrate would sit on a panel with the regular tribal leaders to mediate and arbitrate flashpoint issues. — Linkages between diVerent peace processes—There are three diVerent proposals for sequencing/ prioritising the peace processes. The Government wants to settle Darfur before moving back to Naivasha. Sadiq el Mahdi (leader of the Umma party, Sudan’s largest mainstream opposition party), in an opinion reflected by the NDA leadership, wants to settle everything in a comprehensive national process. The SPLA leadership prefers to complete Naivasha first. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 109
The consensus was to advise following this latter route: pursue Naivasha as a priority to bring the SPLA into government (while noting the huge challenges facing the implementation of peace in the south), meanwhile stabilising Darfur. — Sanctions and genocide—All of the authors are uncomfortable with the portrayal of the Darfur conflict as genocide and with the consequence that Sudan should be subject to punitive sanctions and military intervention. If sanctions are unavoidable, targeting the overseas financial assets of individual government leaders, of the security clique, and of corporations owned by the ruling party and security agencies would be most eVective. November 2004
Annex 1
NOTES ON THE AUTHORS
Suliman Baldo Serving as Africa Program director as the International Crisis Group, Suliman Baldo is experienced in human rights monitoring, conflict analysis, and international advocacy. Since 2002, he has worked as an independent expert, providing advice on conflict situations in Central and Eastern Africa. From 1995 to 2002, he was with Human Rights Watch as Senior Researcher for the DR Congo and the Horn of Africa. His work also includes community-based development and management of humanitarian/emergency assistance. From 1982 to 1995, he served as development consultant in his native Sudan, and from 1988 to 1992, as field representative to Oxfam America, managing its development and disaster relief programmes for the Horn of Africa region through grants to community and intermediary NGOs Suliman Baldo holds a PhD in comparative literature from the University of Dijon in France and obtained undergraduate degrees from the University of Khartoum.
James Morton James Morton is a development economist with seven years of field experience in the Darfur region of Sudan. He is presently managing director of HTSPE, a UK development consultancy which worked extensively in Darfur between 1958 and 1992. This work started with detailed soil, vegetation and water surveys and evolved into major development programmes and sociological and economic studies. James lived and worked in South Darfur from 1982 to 1985 and in West Darfur from 1987 to 1990. He has a BA in Arabic and a PhD in development economics. In Darfur, James Morton worked with national staV on major development programmes and led a series of socio-economic surveys and other studies. His publications on the region include his PhD dissertation on agricultural development and the resource balance in Darfur, and a book, The Poverty of Nations, The Aid Dilemma at the Heart of Africa, which takes Darfur as a case study in aid and development.
Roland Marchal Roland Marchal is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and Chief Editor of the academic quarterly Politique Africaine. He has conducted long-term research on the sociology of conflicts in Africa (and particularly in the Horn of Africa), with fieldwork in Somalia, Sudan and earlier in Eritrea. He holds degrees both in Mathematics and Social Sciences from the University of Strasbourg, the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and University Paris VI. He has written and published widely on war and peace in Africa, particularly concerning Somalia, Sudan, and relations between the region and the Arab Gulf. His many recent publications include Guerre et Socie´te´s: Etats et Violence apre`s la Guerre Froide, (with Pierre Hassner, ed.: Paris, Karthala, 2003); The Somalia: Human Development Report, (with Ken Menkhaus: Nairobi, UNDP, 1998); Les Chemins de la Guerre et de la Paix, (with Christine Messiant: Paris, Karthala, 1997); and Lower Shabelle: Study on Governance (Nairobi, United Nations Development OYce for Somalia, November 1997).
Alex de Waal After receiving his DPhil from Oxford University, Alex has worked as an activist and a writer of several books on famine, human rights and conflict in Africa especially in North Africa that include Famines Crimes; Politics and the Disaster relief Industry in Africa. His first major book, The Famine That Kills came out of his work with Save the Children Fund in Darfur. Ev 110 International Development Committee: Evidence
He is editor of the “African issues” series with James Currey Publishers, and served as Associate Director of Africa Watch before resigning in 1992 in protest over the US military intervention in Somalia. He was a founder and director of African Rights and Chairman of Mines Advisory Group 1983–88 (co-laureate of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize), and director of programmes for the International African Institute. He is currently one of directors of Justice Africa and a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative, Harvard.
Memorandum submitted by the Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre (DRDC)10
1. Summary This paper was prepared in response to the request of the International Development Committee of the UK House of Commons for information from non-governmental organisations and individuals to assist the Committee conduct its inquiry entitled Darfur, Sudan: Crisis, Response and Lessons. The purpose of this paper is twofold. On the one hand it gives some brief background information about the Darfur region and the origin of the current humanitarian crisis. In this regard, it provides analysis of the root causes that underpin the present situation as well as the new pattern of violence that devastated the region since the 1990s. The paper will place certain emphasis on some little known features of the Darfur crisis including the situation of people originating from the region especially members of the Fur, Massaleet, Zaggawa and other African tribes who live in other parts of the country as they are being systematically victimised and harassed because of their blood ties with the victims of the tragedy in Darfur. In addition it includes a chronology of some of the events that occurred in the few months that preceded the escalation of the conflict and ignited the present rebellion. On the other hand the paper intends to outline the important role being played by the international and regional communities in protecting the victims of the crisis in the region, meeting their necessary humanitarian needs and also in persuading the warring factions to sit at the negotiating table with a view to working out a negotiated political solution to the conflict. Finally the paper draws lessons and conclusions from the tragedy that engulfs the region with the view that decision-makers gain further knowledge of the extent of the crisis in order to help them make informed decisions. Tribal disputes among ethnic groups in Darfur especially those between the sedentary African tribes and Arab nomads are not new phenomena in the region. This is because of the tribal nature of the region and the diVerent living patterns between the settled farmers and the nomad herders. Yet in the past tribal disputes—both inter and intra-tribal disputes—were characterised by their sporadic, unmeditated and limited nature. No previous tribal conflicts in Darfur or Sudan were capable of displacing more than 1.5 million individuals or forcing more than two hundred thousands to cross the international borders into neighbouring countries. Tribal conflicts in Darfur were fought against many backgrounds but they have never acquired the form of an all-round assault based on collective ethnic or tribal aYliation. They have rarely devolved into the present conspicuously polarised racial stands that are increasingly being assumed by the two broad tribal groupings in the region ie Arab tribes and African tribes. Politicisation of tribal diVerences is the main force that drives the current conflict. In fact since 1989 the national government started relying heavily on militia groups from Darfur and other parts of Sudan to fight a proxy war in South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains and to crush rising dissent in Darfur, including an SPLA-inspired rebellion in 1992. This gave the nomads leverage with the government, which rewarded them with positions at the local and national administrative levels as well as at the federal sovereign level as cabinet ministers and other portfolio holders. Most importantly the governments accorded the nomad groups unlimited economic, financial and military backing at the expense of other communities. The present armed conflict and associated humanitarian tragedy in Darfur date back to the 1980s when low profile yet protracted violent tribal disputes started rearing their ugly heads in the region. These disputes and atrocities have continued unabated since then without being heeded nationally or noticed internationally. A number of reasons have contributed to the build up of the present tragedy. Darfur and its people have been ignored and marginalised both economically and politically by the successive national governments since Sudan’s independence in 1956. Natural disasters that have hit the country—in particular drought and desertification experienced by Darfur in the 1980s—caused famine in some areas of the region and consequently it was followed by massive migration of nomads into areas inhabited by sedentary African tribes. Local eVorts to end the growing crisis in Darfur were frustrated by the government’s overt support of nomad groups against indigenous Africans and its lack of interest and political will to work out a viable and just national solution to the problems of the region. Dismantling of the hitherto well-established traditional chieftains systems that organise the life of people and solve intra and inter-communal disputes in the region. The influx of large quantities of weapons into Darfur and the nomad groups’ encouragement of their kinsmen to emigrate from neighbouring countries into the region. This cross-border immigration,
10 Some parts of this Study were partially drawn from the DRDC’s Paper entitled Background Information and Area of Concern issued in July 2004. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 111
which continues unabated until now has been consolidated manifold by the ongoing conflict and the support the immigrants receive from the national and regional governments. Added to this burning situation was the irrational interference of national and regional governments in favour of the nomad groups. As of late the international community became increasingly involved in the crisis in Darfur. This involvement comes amidst accusation that the international community did too little and too late. After long months of atrocities, destruction, killings and protest the UN Security Council adopted two weak resolutions that even failed to authorise economic and military sanctions against the government in Khartoum, let alone deploying the much needed international military force to protect the defenceless civilian victims of the carnage in Darfur. Yet it should be stressed that it was only in response to pressure from the international community that the warring factions agreed to undertake some steps such as the signing of ceasefire arrangements, commitment to allow unrestricted humanitarian access to the needy and the overall political engagement for a negotiated settlement of the crisis. Regional and international eVorts are currently underway to persuade the warring parties to speed up political negotiations in order to end the conflict. As such there is a long way to go before durable stability and, eventually, peace can be regained in the region. In the meantime, protecting civilians will remain a priority for some years to come. Indeed, the daunting humanitarian and other life-saving needs of the displaced and refugee populations must be addressed before these needs further develop into massive silent killers. However there are serious diYculties facing relief operations mainly the lack of safety and security and little financial contributions. This is the present situation despite repeated calls from the UN Security Council, Secretary General and the African Union (AU) to the world community to extend possible help. However, the international community—in particular Western European governments, UN agencies and humanitarian relief organisations—has played a cardinal role in helping ease the humanitarian situation in Darfur since the beginning of the conflict. Thanks to the medical and relief service of groups like Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, MEDAIR, Save the Children, CARE, Oxfam, USAID, etc, which saved the lives of millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in Darfur and eastern Chad. The international community still encounters serious diYculties in its work, yet success was achieved in many respects. The role of the British government will be discussed in a separate section of this study. The paper will attempt to make some critical analysis of the eVectiveness of the response of the international community towards the crisis. Our objective is to shed some light on the potential benefit to the people of the region and the world community that could be achieved through a change in the current modus operandi. This is necessary as it helps to introduce a more suitable approach to promote eVective response especially in the post-conflict rehabilitation and rebuilding phase. Some ideas will be put forward on the importance of the involvement of independent national and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups in helping the ongoing process. The paper will touch on some of the aspects and role that indigenous civil society groups are expected to play in helping the regional and international eVorts to end the crisis in Darfur and regain peace and stability as well as their role in rebuilding the region during the post conflict period. The paper concludes by drawing attention to the fact that armed conflicts, displacement and humanitarian needs in Darfur are expected to continue for some years to come before peace and tranquillity are regained in the region. The political process that could help bring an end to the crisis is expected to be complicated, painstaking, time consuming and volatile. New rebel groups have recently emerged in Darfur, which are not represented at the Abuja talks and may well need to be considered in the future talks. Building the destroyed lives and livelihoods of the war-aVected people in the region requires vast mobilisation of human and material resources. Because of the tremendous damage done in Darfur there is an urgent need for critical strategic thinking of the whole approach so far used to address the situation. EVorts should also be invested to planning for the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation phase.
2. Background The Darfur region is one of the richest—in unexploited natural wealth—yet severely underdeveloped regions of Sudan. It is the second largest region of the country and stretches over a large area with a land mass estimated at about 160,000 sq miles between longitudes 22)E–27)E and latitudes 10)N–16)N. Darfur is a remote region located in the extreme west of the country adjacent to Sudan’s borders with Chad, Central African Republic and Libya. Darfur was an independent Muslim kingdom known as the Fur Sultanate for a period of about 448 years (1450–1916) with a short interval of alien rule during the Turko-Egyptian and Mahadist States. The Sultanate of Darfur was a well-established Kingdom with its own written laws, system of government and external diplomatic relationships with some of the major political capitals of the world of that time. Towards the end of 1916 the independent Sultanate of Darfur was finally annexed to present- day Sudan by the then British colonial rulers of the country. The British invasion of Darfur was partly in retaliation to the position of Sultan Ali Dinar, the last ruler of Darfur, when he decided to camp with the Turkish Islamic caliphate during World War I. Darfur is a promising land where large parts of the region, especially in Western and Southern Darfur States, are blessed with fertile soil, huge water sources and a rich fauna and flora. As such, the region is host to considerable domestic and wild livestock populations. Domestic livestock includes sheep, goats, cattle and camels estimated at over 25% of Sudan’s livestock population and accounts to about 30% of the country’s livestock trade. Darfur’s livestock wealth was the backbone of Sudan’s economy especially in its foreign export earnings in the period before the country started exporting crude oil and gold. Although the Ev 112 International Development Committee: Evidence
Darfur region has lost some of its forests and grazing land because of drought and desertification, it is still suitable for investment especially in the fields of agriculture, horticulture and livestock development with experienced and cheap labour force in these fields. The region’s prospective underground mineral wealth including crude oil reserves and other valuable minerals is yet to be exploited. The people of Darfur believe that the government is reluctant to embark on major mineral exploration projects in the region despite the fact that commercial quantities of crude oil are expected in the region. With eVective policy to preserve the environment, cultivate the land, revive the ecological system, introduce suitable development projects and rehabilitate basic infrastructure, future investments in Darfur in particular in the fields of mineral exploration, game sport, agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry would be a highly profitable enterprise. Darfur—which means homeland of the Fur people—is host to approximately six million or one fifth of Sudan’s population of about 30 million.11 The people of Darfur are divided into two main ethnic groups viz, (1). Indigenous, African sedentary groups; and (2). Migrants, nomadic groups of Arab mixed origin. Within these broad ethnic groupings the Fur people constitute the majority of the inhabitants of the region. Among the largest tribes of the region the Fur, Massaleet and Zaggawa are indigenous Africans while the Rezigat, Missiriya, Bani Halaba and Ta’aisha are nomad tribal people of Arab-mixed origin. Together with these main groups many other distinct tribal groups live in Darfur such as the Tama, Burti, Tunjour, Dajou, Bergou, Bergid etc which are considered as indigenous Africans and the Ma’alia, Bani Hussien, Mahariya, Mahameed, Um Jallool, Taisha, Salamat, Awlad Rashid etc which are considered as Arab nomads. Historically all migrant ethnic groups in Darfur have made valuable contribution to the State in all fields of life and accepted to live under the Fur rule. Accordingly, each one of these groups was accorded a piece of land known as “Dar” or homeland where they lived and organised their aVairs. The nomad camel herders in Darfur usually inhabit the northern parts of the region where the majority is African Zaggawa who live side by side with the African Medoub and other nomads of Arab-mixed origin. The western parts of Darfur including the fertile landscapes surrounding the Jabal Marra massive are the traditional home of the sedentary African groups such as Fur, Massaleet and other non-Arab tribes. In the southern parts of Darfur there is noticeable presence of the Rezigat, Missiriya and other tribal groups of cattle herders who trace their origin to the Arab peninsula. This mosaic of indigenous African tribes and the migrant tribes of Arab-mixed origin managed to co-exist in the region for many centuries. Although most of the indigenous African tribes of Darfur are farmers and the bulk of Arabs are herders, interactions between individuals and sub-groups of both ethnic groups were peaceful rather than hostile. In diVerent occasions complementary relationships developed between the herding and farming communities.12 The nature of the complementary relationships was based on the provisions of the African farming communities to the Arab herders and vice versa. The farmers provided herders with agricultural produce such as millet, sorghum, vegetables and fruits whereas the herding communities provided farmers with animal products such as meat, milk, hides and butter etc. More so, herders made their animals graze on the stalks of millet, sorghum and tomatoes after the harvest and the animals maintained the fertility of the farmlands with their manure.13 In addition farmers used to rely on herders who take some of their animals to distant pasturelands during the dry seasons and the latter leave their weak animals and heavy belongings with the farmers. This process created friendship between members of the two groups to the extent that in some cases they intermarried and borrowed from each other’s cultures. As the case of the relationship between the Fur and the Bani Halba in the south-western part of Darfur.14 As a result of this peaceful interaction between Arabs and indigenous Africans in the region, the indigenous languages of groups such as the Berti, Burno and Tunjur died and they now mainly speak Arabic. Many Arabs also speak languages of groups whose individuals closely interacted with them. However, Darfur society was not a conflict free society. Wars were fought between individuals and groups but most of the wars that were fought before mid 1980s were mainly between the sub-divisions within the Arab clans. For example the major wars between Rezigat and Ma’alia in 1960s in south-eastern Darfur, Mahariya and Bani Halba in the 1970s in south-western Darfur and the Gimir and Fallata in early 1980s in the southern corner of Darfur. All these conflicts involved groups of people that identify themselves as Arabs.15 The only major conflict in recent history, which involved a group of indigenous Africans and Arab nomads was in early 1960s between Zaggawa and Mahariya camel herders. However, these conflicts were fought in a limited scale mainly over access to pasture or economic privileges. Local authorities were able to contain them within a few months. These wars can largely be considered as common inter-clan conflicts in a tribal society rather than ethnic or racial wars. During these wars local and national governments
11 According to the United Nations Population Fund, Sudan’s population in 2003 is estimated at about 28,363,000. These figures exclude the war-torn regions of Southern Sudan. http://www.unsudanig.org/JAM/output/data/retreat/costings/unit-costs- population.doc. 12 It should be understood that some Zurga like Zagawa and Medoub were largely herders (camel herders) and many Fur mixed farming with herding (cattle). 13 Gunnar Haalan (1969), in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Fredrick Barth (ed), pp 53–73. 14 It was rare to find in this part of the region a Fur or a Bani Halba identifying her/himself as a Fur or Bani Halba only without adding that but one of my parents is Bani Halba or a Fur. 15 The Fallata and Gimir are black African tribes. Their classification as Arabs is based on the self-identification of these groups as Arabs in recent history and since the current Arab-centric regime took over control of the country in a coup d’etat in June 1989. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 113
successfully played the role of an impartial arbitrator. Traditional leaders eg Magdoum, Shartaye, Nazir and Omda) were powerful mediators to settle diVerences between the warring groups. The traditional administration regulated the movements of nomads between the areas of sedentary population. Conflicts that may arise between individual herders and farmers were eVectively and expeditiously resolved usually through eVorts of tribal leaders or the local authorities. Since 1988 Darfur has been experiencing overt politicisation of ethnic and tribal diVerence with the formation of the Arab Congregation16 and the increased reference to Zurga, which is a racist connotation that includes the non-Arab indigenous population of Darfur.17 After Sudan’s national reconciliation in 1977 between the then government of General GaVar Nimeiri and the exiled Sudanese political parties, Darfur became a fertile ground for clandestine activities mainly by the National Islamic Front and Umma Party. These two political parties were in a coalition aimed at the overthrow of Nimeiri’s regime. As both parties were supported by Libya and under the influence of its political discourse of Arab Nationalism, they successfully transmitted this idea to Arabs among their constituencies in the region. As a result of this doctrine the latter invented a term of diVerence, Zurga, in early 1980s as a label for the non-Arab population. The word Zurga is charged with stereotypes related to the legacy of slavery in Sudan (eg lower human species, or those who deserve to be enslaved, uncivilized, pagans, etc). The line was thus demarcated between Arab and African populations in the region. Since then, the Arab clans/tribes largely acted as a unified group whereas the indigenous African populations continued to act as individual ethnic groups. It was only in 1998 and after intensive attacks of the Arab militias, which were later accompanied by regular government forces, that the African tribes of Darfur were compelled to grasp the term Zurga and charge it with their own meanings (eg indigenous, original, African, owners of the land and so forth). At the time when the term Zurga was invented as a signifier of a particular category of the population in the region, the idea of Al-Hizam Al-Arabi (the Arab-Belt) was widespread among the Arab populations of western Sudan. Al-Hizam Al-Arabi aimed at transforming the area that lies between the Red Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, which includes African Sahelian countries like Chad, Niger and Mali into an Arab region. Following the overthrow of Nimeiri’s regime in 1985, the people of Darfur often noticed military vehicles loaded with diVerent types of weapons, military equipment and personnel penetrating into the region through the northern border and heading to the areas where Arab nomads camped. Since 1985 the Ministry of Defence in Khartoum started providing weapons to the nomad herders of western Sudan under the pretext that they needed the weapons to defend themselves from possible SPLA attacks. For more than a decade the Darfur region has been facing an organised campaign of destruction of life and livelihood as well as systematic plunder of property and wealth. An incredible state of lawlessness and armed robbery mainly against the Fur and other peaceful African populations of the region accompanied this campaign. The already burning situation has further worsened manifold under the rule of General Omar Al Bashier especially as he actively pursues implementation of aggressive and radical policies inside Sudan and abroad. From July 1989 to December 2002 it was estimated that more than 10,000 persons were summarily executed in the three States of the Greater Darfur Region (Western, Southern and Northern). An equal number of persons could have perished because of conflict-induced famine; disease, agony and lack of safety and security while many other thousands especially women and children have been traumatised, wounded or maimed for life. Attacks by militia groups collectively known as the “Janjaweed”—that are armed and supported by the government of Sudan—are at the origin of the current crisis. These attacks were so coordinated, organised and so widespread that they caused an unimaginable agony and suVering to the people of the region throughout the 1990s. The situation became so dramatic with the involvement of the army to the extent that it was characterised as crimes against humanity, war crimes or ethnic cleansing by highly authoritative reports by UN agencies. However, some circles such as the US Congress, Senate and the State Department18 in addition to some human rights organisations and experts considered the crimes committed in Darfur as genocide. To face the challenge posed by the destruction of life and livelihood in their region, and as a sign of their lost confidence in the willingness of national and local governments to protect them against attacks of the Janjaweed, the people of Darfur have developed their own militia groups for self-defence, resistance and
16 In 1988 the representatives of about 13 Arab tribes in Darfur met came together and formed what is known as the Arab Congregation. This is a racist organisation. Although their declaration issued in 1988 addressed some political demands but their hidden agenda aims at driving the original inhabitants of the region from their rich homelands and replacing them with nomads that are being aVected by drought and desertification. Members of this organisation advocated war against all the Blacks or non-Arab populations in the region. Since then the organisation has been actively lobbying for oYcial financial and political backing from the central government and political parties to support their cause in the region. So far they have been successful in both objectives. Two of the current governors of the three States of Darfur are from the Arab tribes. The Secretary General of this organisation Mr Abdalla Ali Masar is the Governor of the Nile Valley State or (Wilyat Nahar El Nil) in northern Sudan. Other prominent members of this organisation hold Ministerial Portfolios such as the Minister of External Trade, Mr Abdulhamid Musa Kasha, General Abdallah Safi Al Nour, Minister of State for Presidential AVairs etc. 17 Some but not all the indigenous African groups that live in the region are the Fur, Zaggawa, Bergid, Dajou, Bigo, Berti, Tunjur, Hawara, Bagirma, Hawssa, Burgo, Burno, Binga, Kara, Massaleet, Areigna and Abudareg. On 18 December 2003 the representatives of these tribes signed a document aYrming their rights in the region in response to the document that the Arab Alliance signed on 15 November of the same year. 18 On 22 July 2004 both Chambers of the US Congress adopted concurrent resolutions condemning the continuing atrocities in Darfur as “genocide” and asking the international community to join with the United States to help bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe that is under way there. The US House of Representatives passed its version (House Concurrent Resolution 467) in a vote of 422–0, with the US Senate approving its version (Senate Concurrent Resolution 133) by voice vote. Ev 114 International Development Committee: Evidence
recovery of stolen objects and livestock. The formation of small tribal groups for self-defence continued throughout the second half of the 1990s. It should be noted that rebellion against the government policies in Darfur started in reality in 1992 when the late Mr Daoud Yahya Bolad, a one time leading member of the ruling party of General El Bashier, became aware of the government complicity in the campaign of destruction that targets the African tribes of Darfur. Mr Bolad quietly broke ranks with the government, forged a link with the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M) and started organising members of his Fur clan in the Jabal Marra area. He was able to establish a western faction of the SPLA/M and get the support of some followers in the western parts of Darfur. Mr Bolad was speedily arrested and summarily executed by the security forces in 1992 and consequently his movement ceased to exist. Conflicts and disputes in Darfur witnessed a dramatic development in February 2003 when the desperate representatives of the indigenous African tribes came together and organised themselves in the Sudan Liberation Army and Movement (SLA/M) and declared war against the government authority in the region. The SLA/M achieved remarkable success in few months and rapidly developed into a famous movement that draws membership mainly from the indigenous African tribes of the Darfur region. The SLA/M was followed by the formation of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which established its own army and political wing in April 2003. The government’s immediate response to the insurgency in Darfur was violent and aggressive. It excluded all venues for a negotiated settlement of the conflict and instead used the army and further increased its dependency on the Janjaweed and other paramilitary formations to fight a proxy war on its behalf. To crush the rebels native base the government and its allies used scorched-earth tactics including aerial bombardment of civilian targets accompanied by joint ground assaults by the army and the Janjaweed. This policy is responsible for the large-scale and protracted displacement of people as it rendered 3.5 million people destitute as war-aVected people and their livelihoods (including homes, schools, places of worships, medical centres etc) were systematically destroyed in whole or in part. By June 2004 it is believed that at least 2,600 villages inhabited by the African tribes of Darfur were totally or partially destroyed or burned down.
3. The Janjaweed
The Janjaweed is a coined Arabic word used by the local people to refer to gangs of outlaws and robbers. These groups are usually composed of criminal elements from diVerent nomad Arab tribes of the region. The Janjaweed who are uneducated and barely civilized individuals were manipulated and politicised by the present government and by racist organisations in the region such as the Arab Congregation and Gouresh Group to the extent that it could be argued that all the Janjaweed are Arabs; while not all the Arabs are Janjaweed. They acquired international fame when the government commenced drafting the nomad tribes in Darfur to fight a proxy war on its behalf against the SLA/M and JEM. The government took advantage of the Janjaweed lusts for destruction, theft and the nomad’s need of rich pastureland and immediately started organising, arming and unleashing them on civilian areas inhabited by the Fur, Massaleet, Zaggawa and other African tribes of Darfur. The government reliance on the Janjaweed was a calculated attempt to break the backbone of the rebel movements in particular as the government lacks enough troops in Darfur. Another element that could have played a role on the government’s dependency on the Janjaweed was the fact that the rank and files of the Sudanese army is dominated by men from Southern Sudan, Darfur and Kordofan. Some of the forces that were deployed in Darfur reportedly refused to fight their kinsmen, threw their arms and ran away from services. Although some whole Arab tribes in Darfur—especially those landless recent immigrant nomad tribes of Chad—have joined their ranks, the Janjaweed do not necessarily represent all the Arab tribes of Darfur especially those tribes who refused to take part in the government military policy to end the armed conflict in Darfur. The major nomad tribes that are known to be active within the Janjaweed ranks are those belonging to the nomads of Northern Darfur or Rezigat al-Shamal who are camel herders. These groups include the Ziadiyah, Mahariya or Mahameed, Um Jalool, Eriqat, and the Aiteifat. They also include groups such as Bani Hussein, Awlad Taqo, and Awlad Halim. In Western and Southern Darfur groups that took active part within the Janjaweed formation include some elements of Rezigat al-Janoub or cow herders as well as the Tarjam, Saada, Salamat, Awlad Rashid, Um Shishi, Shiteyah. Some of the distinctively notorious Janajweed field commanders are (1) Musa Hilal, overall Janjaweed Commander from Mahameed nomads, (2) Abdallah Abu Shinebat, Mournay Area, (3) Omer Baboush, Habila and Furbranga area, (4) Omda Saif Ma’adi, Nirtiti area, (5) Ahmed Dikhairy, Mournay area and (6) Ahmed Abou Kamasha. Ranking oYcials in the government service that are believed to be part of the Janjaweed leadership are (1) Abdalla Ali Masar, Governor, River Nile State, (2) Abdulhamid Musa Kasha, Minister of Foreign Trade, (3) Gen Abdullah Ali Safi Al Noor, Minister of State for Presidential AVairs, (4) Gen Suliman Abdullah Adam, Governor of West Darfur State, (5) Gen Hussein Abdullah Gibril, Member of Parliament. See annex one for a list of persons suspected of supporting the Janjaweed.19
19 Ev 126 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 115
The irony of the Darfur crisis is that the people of the region both Africans and Arabs, have more common denominators than diVerences. With some few exceptions, all the tribal groups in Darfur developed complementary socio-cultural systems. All the people of the region practice Sunni Islam and many among them use Arabic as lingua franca. The Janjaweed are majority dark-skinned Arabised savannah Bedouins— whose immigrant ancestors intermarried with the indigenous African people of the region. In reality the Janjaweed share common idiosyncrasies and destiny with their victims more than with other Arabised tribes of the river Nile basin. In most occasions it could be diYcult—for external observers—to draw clear distinctions between the Arab and African tribes of Darfur based on their physical appearance. This is because the diVerences between Arab and non-Arab groups in Darfur—as the case in other parts of Sudan— are based more on cultural and linguistic heritage rather than genealogy or physical anthropology. Indeed the word Sudan derives from the Arabic Bilaad-ul-Sud, which means “the land of blacks.” However, the distinction between Arabs and Africans is real and very important to the Sudanese people. It has been used throughout Sudan’s history by the Arabised tribes that inherited the country’s colonial rulers as a means to maintain economic and political power in the hands of few elite tribes from the northern part of the country and exclude other groups from any benefits.
4. Origin of the Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur Four interrelated factors played a major role in the deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Darfur region. These factors that need to be thoroughly addressed are the following: First: natural disasters that have hit the country—in particular drought and desertification experienced by Darfur in the 1980s—caused famine in some areas of the region and consequently it was followed by massive migration of people from the arid and semi-arid northern parts southward to the rich wetlands in the western, southern and central parts of the region. These areas are inhabited in majority by African agriculturalist tribes. Those aVected by the famine and forced to move southward are nomad tribes. Movement of nomads and their settlement in areas occupied by sedentary groups brought new patterns of skirmishes and disputes over water sources and pasture. Second: Darfur has been neglected by successive national governments, which explains the lack of sound sustainable development projects to mitigate the negative eVects of natural calamites and to meet the growing needs of thriving human and animal populations in a zone of ecological decline. Persistent neglect of the region and denial of the demands of its people for development and equality left a deep sense of exclusion and economic and political marginalization among the people of Darfur. Third: the deliberate policy of government to dismantle the well-established and historically preserved traditional leadership structures in Darfur. Traditional chieftains have played a cardinal role in organising the life of people and in solving intra and inter-communal disputes. These structures are especially important in regions where tribal allegiance is deep-rooted in the social and economic set-ups. Of particular concern was the government’s decision in 1995 to embark on a geographic and administrative redemarcation programme in Darfur through which it replaced the historical chieftain system and its traditional title (Nazir) with a new system. They appointed pro-government elements as traditional leaders and gave them the title (Amir) to replace the old title. As a direct consequence of this policy the government delegated administrative powers and allocated land owned by the African tribes to the newly migrant nomad tribes in complete disregard to the traditional methods for the distribution of land or consideration for the serious protest of the original inhabitants of the land. Fourth: influx of large quantities of weapons in the region from neighbouring countries, the spread of racist doctrines such as the expansion of Al-Hizam Al-Arabi and the encouragement by the nomad groups of their kinsmen to emigrate from neighbouring Chad, Niger, Mauritania and other west African countries into Darfur. The cross-border immigration of nomads into the region still continues unabated and has been further consolidated by the ongoing conflict and the support and encouragement the immigrants receive from the national and regional governments. The combination of these four factors, in addition to the irrational interference of national and regional governments, led to the unprecedented culture of violence and ethnic hatred currently experienced by the region. The government policy has unequivocally fostered the present conspicuously polarised positions assumed by the two broad ethnic groupings that live in the region ie Arabs and Africans. Manipulation of ethnic diVerences as well as the biased behaviour of the national and regional governments against the indigenous African tribes of Darfur are the main reasons that the crisis reached the present stage where the conflict can no longer be considered as a tribal dispute generated by competition over a scarce natural resource base in a zone of ecological decline, but a coordinated strategy to do away with Darfur’s indigenous African inhabitants because of their ethnic or tribal aYliation and to confiscate their land and wealth. In short two criminal aspects underlie the human tragedy in Darfur: viz (1) The premeditated mass killing and physical destruction—in whole or in part—of the agriculturalist African tribes of Darfur because of their tribal backgrounds; and (2) The appropriation of their land, the confiscation of their livestock and other material wealth (in some cases for extortion of money for protection by the Janjaweed militia groups) in the presence of government authority. Ev 116 International Development Committee: Evidence
5. Events in the Immediate Build-up of the 2003 Darfur Rebellion In 2002 the conflict in Darfur reached new dimensions with a sharp increase in the number and intensity of the Janjaweed raids in diVerent parts of the region and consequently an increase in the number of casualties among the indigenous African people. In April–May 2002 concerted attacks by the nomad militiamen against the area of Kabkabiya and Jabal Marra Massive left 101 persons dead, more than 200 wounded and thousands of livestock rustled. The local people expressed fears that the escalation of attacks against their regions constitutes part of a concerted campaign to depopulate vast areas replacing the original inhabitants with the tribes of the invading militia groups. At least 38 villages in southern Darfur between Nyala and Jabal Marra have been forcefully evacuated of their original inhabitants during this period. For instance two villages known as Danga and Tambasi, situated at about 70km and 80km from Nyala respectively, inhabited by the Fur tribesmen for many centuries, are now being occupied by the invading nomad tribal groups. In a bid to conceal their real identity the two villages were renamed with Arabic names (Um Al-Gura and Um Dawan-Ban). On 11 September 2002, the Arabised tribes in southern Darfur held a Conference in Kass town under the auspices of the Commissioner of Kass Province Mr Gourashi Mohamed Abdalla. During the Conference the indigenous African tribes were especially singled out for abuse and accusation. They were labelled as pagans, disloyal and rebels to justify new and widespread aggressions against them. An unprecedented escalation of devastating attacks against areas inhabited by the indigenous African tribes followed the convening of this conference. Between 12 September 2002 and 30 September 2002 it was reported that many villages around Kass, Zalingei, Kabkabiya, Jabal Marra and Nyala were systematically attacked during this period. As a result of these attacks 30 persons were killed in the area surrounding Kass, an unknown number was injured and about 714 livestock were looted. In Zalingei province two persons were killed and about 600 livestock were looted. In Kabkabiya province 17 persons were killed, 12 were injured and five villages were burned to the ground. In Jabal Mara Massive 13 persons were killed including five soldiers. In Nyala 18 persons were killed including Police Major Bashier Frarah Khatam. The rampage in Darfur went hand in hand with a vicious campaign of intimidation, harassment, threat, vilification and accusation against the indigenous people by the local authorities, national media and even top government oYcials. Their strategy was to incriminate the African tribes in Darfur and label them as bandits, disloyal, pagans or potential SPLA/M elements in a bid to prepare the ground for a massive attack against them. On Saturday 2 November 2002 and during his oYcial visit to Al-Fashir, capital city of Northern Darfur State, the First Vice-president of Sudan Mr Ali Osman Mohamed Taha warned the African tribes of Darfur of total destruction and that their areas will be “pulled backward for many years” if they join the rebel SPLA/M. These insensitive remarks, which came at the peak of the destruction of African villages in Darfur added insult to injury and were used by extremist elements within the Arab Congregation as additional fuel to recruit new fighters and throw them into the already burning situation in the region. The Vice-president’s remarks provided a further cover for the massive attacks against the indigenous tribes witnessed by the region in November and December 2002. Information we gathered has indicated that in the period between 1 October 2002 and 31 January 2003 at least 160 indigenous African people in south-western Darfur have been killed, hundreds of villages were burnt and thousands of livestock, foodstuV and other material wealth were looted or destroyed. It should be underscored that the identified casualties were those of persons killed around the main towns of the region. This clearly indicates that many more persons killed in remote areas especially in north Darfur were not documented. Below is a brief description of the raids by government supported nomad militiamen during the last three months of 2002. These incidents, which were reported to human rights organisations in the year 2003, represent only a fraction of the number of incidents that were committed in the region during the same period and which were not accounted for. 1. On Tuesday, 31 December 2002 and again on 1, 2 and 3 January 2003, a number of armed Tarjam and Missiriya Jabal tribesmen attacked Sinkita village about 70 km to the west of Nyala town. In this massacre 25 persons were killed and more than 40 others were injured. Around 800 huts were burned to the ground in Sinkita and their inhabitants were rendered destitute without access to basic human needs such as food, shelter and medicine. Following theses attacks the security forces abducted four village leaders. 2. On Tuesday, 24 December 2002 militiamen attacked Dumma village to the north east of Nyala. They killed at least 12 persons and injured 20 others. 3. On Wednesday, 27 November 2002 militiamen attacked Tegueraiss village. They killed 11 persons and wounded eight others. 4. On Sunday, 24 November 2002 militiamen attacked the villages of Sabunogna, Turra and Mukgjar killing at least 20 persons and wounding 24 others and burned down more than 20 huts. 5. On Wednesday, 13 November 2002 a group of about 300 armed militiamen attacked a number of villages in Wadi Gounda to the north of Kass, including the villages of Elayba, Wastani and Shawa. In total they killed 15 persons including a pregnant woman from Elayaba (Ms Hanouna Abdalla Suliman). They injured 14 persons and burned down 33 houses. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 117
6. On Wednesday, 9 October 2002 militiamen attacked a civilian convoy between Golo village in Jabal Mara and Nyala. They killed two persons including Mr Mohamed Ibrahim Musa, a 40-year old lawyer, and injured five others. 7. On Tuesday, 1 and Saturday, 5 October 2002 militiamen attacked Kidingeer village, 71 km to the north-west of Nyala town. They killed six persons and injured 10 others including women. Unlike other parts of Sudan, systematic human rights violations were committed against the indigenous tribes of Darfur by the security forces throughout the 1990s. These violations were committed under the disguise of combating robbery, banditry and outlaw activity. In reality since the present military government ascended onto power on 30 June 1989, the Darfur region has virtually been under a state of emergency regulations, which invested the security forces with unlimited powers to commit all sorts of human rights violations against the people of the region with complete immunity let alone impunity. Based on the state of emergency regulations a number of Special Courts were also established in the region to try persons suspected of committing criminal oVenses and other activities including political opposition and pro- democracy activists. In 2001 alone eight such Special Courts were established in Darfur. Heavy sentences including death and cross-amputation were issued by these Special Courts within a matter of weeks and defendants were denied basic legal protection or assistance. According to the Minister of Justice Mr Ali M Osman Yassin, “the procedure adopted in Darfur was a hurried one” and that “cross-examination is lacking in these courts.”20 Early warning signals about the imminent military action from the indigenous African people to resist government complicity with the Janjaweed attempts to expel them from their land were made long before the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur. On 9 August 2002 and after a month of his arbitrary detention, a Sudanese lawyer from Darfur Mr Abdel-Wahid Mohamed Ahmed Nour issued an appeal from his detention cell in Zalingei, western Darfur, drawing the World’s attention to his plight and the tragedy of his Fur clan. In February 2003 Mr Ahmed Nour led the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and commenced the current armed rebellion against the government. For its revealing nature Mr Nour’s appeal is reproduced below.21 “I am making this appeal from my cell in Zalingei Security Forces detention centre. The cell is 16 sq meters and is overcrowded: there are 12 of us in this small room without ventilation or windows. Food is very scarce. I have only one lung and I am diabetic. When I was arrested I wassuVering from Malaria. The security forces refused to allow me to see a doctor. I would also like to highlight the suVering of my Fur people. The security forces act with virtual immunity, terrorising the Fur people, raiding randomly and arresting people including the elderly and children and detaining them without charge or trial. Many have been subjected to torture. Many Fur men have fled to the mountains to find a safe haven and have left their lands. The Arab tribes attack their land, looting their properties and stealing their livestock. Many Fur villages have been completely deserted. I call upon the international community and human rights organisations to intervene to free us and protect the people of Darfur from the government aggression.” The formation of the SLA/M was a desperate, uncalculated and unorganised attempt by the indigenous people who lost any confidence in the local and national governments to protect them. Although military action by the SLA/M started early in February 2003 it was only on 13 March 2003 that they were able to issue a political declaration that outlined its objectives. The declaration stated; “The brutal oppression, ethnic cleansing and genocide sponsored by the Khartoum Government left the people of Darfur with no other option but to resort to popular political and military resistance for purposes of survival.” It added “The objective of the SLA/M is to create a united democratic Sudan on a new basis of equality, complete restructuring and devolution of power, even development, cultural and political pluralism and moral and material prosperity for all Sudanese.” National response to the rebellion in Darfur can only be qualified as catastrophic. From the very beginning of the rebellion the government adopted a strategy of persistent denial of the grievances of the people of the region and considered their protest as a security threat to the government and the country. As such the government ruled out any possibility for a negotiated political solution of the conflict and decided to pursue a military campaign allowing the security forces carte blanche to commit all sorts of atrocities. It intensively used helicopters and Antonov warplanes to indiscriminately drop shrapnel-loaded barrel-bombs on civilian targets. Joint operations of the army and militiamen have wrecked havoc in Darfur. After aerial bombardments they cordon oV villages to kill survivors, burn houses, dynamite wells, ruin agricultural produce, destroy schools, medical centres and deport people. This policy reached its peak in the first quarter of 2004. The government also employed a tactic of deception and blackout of information flow about the actual situation in the region. The government instructed national media not to report about the situation
20 Declaration of the Minister of Justice in a meeting with Mr Gerhart Baum, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan held in Khartoum in March 2003. For more details see the Report of the Special Rapporteur to the 59th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/2003/42) dated 6 January 2003, page 17. This document can be consulted at the Webpage http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/100/60/PDF/ G0310060.pdf?OpenElement. 21 This transcript was a translation from Arabic of the appeal issued by attorney Abdel-Wahid Mohamed Ahmed Nour on 9 August 2002. Ev 118 International Development Committee: Evidence
in Darfur under any circumstances as of Saturday, 3 May 2003. The instructions were relayed by phone on Wednesday, 31 April 2003 and Thursday, 1 May 2003, to the Chief Editors of all national newspapers in Khartoum. As a result of this policy copies of some dailies including Al-Sahafa, Al-Shari’ Al-Siyasi and Khartoum Monitor were confiscated on diVerent occasions.
6. Area of Particular Concern The result of the human tragedy in Darfur since the insurgency was declared in February 2003 to date is that at least two million persons, in particular members of the Fur, Massaleet and Zaggawa tribes, have become IDPs or refugees. IDPs live in precarious conditions in diVerent locations in Darfur and also in other parts of Sudan mainly Khartoum, Gedaref and the Blue Nile States. The Fur people who constitute the majority of IDPs are the most aVected victims of the crisis as their traditional areas in the Jabal Marra massive were severely aVected by the fighting and blockades. The Fur areas are located away from Sudan’s international borders as such few relief organisations were able to establish themselves in the area, consequently little relief material was delivered to the aVected people in that part of Darfur. No one knows the exact figures of the innocent civilians who were killed since the destruction campaign started in the region or the number of those persons who are under imminent threat of death in the coming months. All the ingredients for a humanitarian disaster on a large scale are in place in the Darfur region. In addition to the growing refugee population in Chad other unaccounted for numbers of people from Darfur were forced to flee Sudan into other countries such as Libya, Central African Republic, Egypt, etc. Yet the ordeal of those persons forced to seek refuge abroad did not end by crossing international borders. There are documented incidents in which the army and Janjaweed militia groups have attacked refugees across the international borders in Chad territory killing some of them and looting their livestock and other belongings. Persons who seek refugee status and legal protection from the OYce of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Libya and Egypt are facing serious diYculties. Most of these people are not provided with the necessary shelter, food and medication, which they are entitled to whether by the UNHCR or other humanitarian agencies. It seems that Khartoum was successful in convincing the UNHCR in Tripoli and Cairo, indeed through the authorities of these two countries, not to provide refugees from Darfur with legal protection or resettlement in third countries despite the genuine risk to the safety and personal security of most of these persons. The victims of the crisis in Darfur are not only confined to the unfortunate individuals who currently live in the region as IDPs or the refugees in Chad. Growing numbers of persons originating from Darfur, especially members of the African tribes who live in other parts of Sudan areaVected by this conflict often for no reason other than their blood tie with the victims of the crisis in Darfur. Hundreds of people are summarily executed or held incommunicado in diVerent parts of Sudan on suspicion of supporting or acting as a Fifth Column for the rebels of Darfur. The government is especially targeting influential community leaders, intellectuals and educated persons from Darfur in a massive campaign of arrest and dismissal from public services. The list of such targeted persons is long. It includes politicians, businessmen, scholars, students, army and security oYcers, human rights and pro-democracy activists as well as presumed combatants and supporters of the rebellion in Darfur. The government’s dismissal and arrest campaigns did not even spare members of the ruling party and elected members of the National Assembly or Parliament who come from Darfur. All these people have had their lives shattered and the wellbeing of their families endangered. They need special material and psychological assistance. The government’s horrendous spate of human rights violations unleashed against the people of Darfur is taking the form of an all-round economic war against individuals from the region such as the merchant class in Khartoum and Omdurman. Aggressive administrative measures through excessive taxation and excise duties have impoverished thousands of these merchants. Since May 2003 the government is conducting a secret security operation targeting the main market places in the suburbs of Khartoum and its twin cities Omdurman and Khartoum North where there is high concentration of merchants from Darfur. On 29 May 2003 the government launched a 3,000 man-strong military operation targeting Souk Libya and Souk Abu Zaid, which are two market places in the suburbs of Omdurman the national capital twin city. The security forces arbitrarily closed down shops, confiscated merchandise and arrested merchants. Since June 2003 the security forces routinely confiscate private wagons and trucks owned by individuals from Darfur anywhere in the country. They especially target four-wheel driven vehicles, which are widely used as means of transportation and interstate trade.22 This ban is especially harmful to the people of the region due to unavailability of asphalted roads or railways network as well as the vast areas of desert or semi-desert that cannot be easily crossed with other types of vehicles. This measure was tremendously devastating on the lives of these merchants and their households, as most of them have lost their only property and means of existence. No compensation whatsoever has been paid to those individuals who have had their properties confiscated. Since the second half of 2003, the government is conducting a massive campaign of demolition of houses in the poor residential areas in the environs of Khartoum and Omdurman, which are inhabited by an overwhelming majority of people from Darfur, Southern and Western Sudan. These people were displaced
22 See Albayan Arabic Daily Newspaper dated 26 May 2003. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 119
from their original homes by the situation of insecurity prevailing in their war-devastated regions. Some of these people lived in the targeted areas for over 10 years. Demolition is conducted at short notice and without financial compensation or alternative accommodation. By the end of October 2004, thousands of families were left without shelter in El Salama and Soba al-Arradi squatter areas (South Khartoum) as well as El-Salaam and Wad el-Bashier IDPs camps in (North Omdurman) where massive demolition activities have started earlier in the year. More than 5,000 households in el-Saliheen and el-Sareeha squatter areas are also made homeless in October 2004. Some 300 IDPs in Soba Arradi have so far been arbitrarily denied allocation of plots of land. In addition, 17,500 households, who were entitled to plots in Wad el-Bashier and El Salaam camps and in El-Saliheen and El-Sareeha squatter areas, have been waiting without shelter since their houses were demolished during March–July 2004. This policy is expected to increase the number of homeless IDPs in Khartoum manifold. The winter season is approaching and most IDPs now live in precarious conditions without shelter, food or hope. Poverty and unemployment compounded with poor health services and sanitation continue to aggravate the living conditions of IDPs in these areas with serious threats to the health of vulnerable age groups like children and the elderly. The government claims that this measure is intended to redemarcate the area and provide legal titles to its dwellers. However, the amount of land fees asked from the IDPs is so extortionate and excessive that they can hardly aVord the required fees. It is reported that government’s agents are active in the area persuading IDPs to sell their land titles for small amounts of money and consequently relinquish their rights to own the land. Many IDPs were already forced to do so and moved elsewhere in the country. The aVected people believe that the whole plan is a security measure to expel them from Khartoum as they are considered potential supporters of the Darfur rebellion. The living conditions of people trapped in the rebels’ held territory is bleak. The rebels, both the SLA/M and JEM, are believed to be in control of a vast area in the three States that constitute the Greater Darfur Region. Because of the nature of the guerrilla military operations in the region geographic boundaries of the area under rebel control are mobile and consequently the number of people they cater for is subject to constant change. In the northern parts of Darfur most of the Zaggawa nomads have voluntarily moved for protection to areas controlled by the rebels. These groups seem to be self-suYcient as they depend for food on their cattle produce. In the Jabal Marra massive we find the largest concentration of people under rebel- held territory. These people who mainly belong to the Fur tribe are relatively secure as the high mountains represent a natural barrier against the Janjaweed attacks. Yet they are in dire need of relief assistance as they usually depend on fruit trees and other agricultural produce to supplement their food. The Jabal Marra massive is under tight siege both from the government and some rebel factions in the north and therefore the people in this area have very little access to relief material. In the rich southern parts of Darfur the situation is relatively better as the people there still have some of their old production systems intact. It should be noted that in all rebel-controlled areas there are no operational systems of civil administration, law enforcement, public order or accountability. Although military operations by the rebels are mainly against the army and the Janjaweed militia, it was recently reported that they have killed and abducted individuals from the nomad tribes, obstructed relief work and confiscated vehicles.
7. Intervention of the International Community After many wake-up calls the reluctance, indiVerence, inaction and lack of knowledge about the plight of the people of Darfur that characterised the world’s reaction throughout 2003 finally started to fade away since April 2004. At present the situation is increasingly becoming the focus of attention of political decision- makers in many parts of the world. Thanks to the influx of more than two hundred thousands of refugees across Sudan’s international borders. The plight of the people of Darfur was also made public by eVorts of UN agencies and other human rights and humanitarian organisations that documented the atrocities in the region and seized attention of the international community. The current vigilance was manifested by visits of heavyweight regional and international personalities to Sudan, Darfur and the eastern parts of Chad to oversee the situation of IDPs and Refugees and ask the government to do more to end the violence. Personalities that conducted such visits included Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Alpha Oumar Konare´, UK Premier Tony Blair, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the EU Foreign Policy Chief Mr Javier Solana as well as a host of other top politicians from Western Europe and other corners of the world. Darfur was also present during the first debate in the US presidential elections on 9th October 2004 when both President Bush and his challenger Senator Kerry agreed that it is a genocide that needs to be stopped. The dangerous nature of the crisis in Darfur provoked many world political leaders to voice their serious concerns about the situation on diVerent occasions. On 7 April 2004 the UN Secretary General expressed a deep sense of “foreboding” about the crisis in Darfur and called on the international community to prepare itself for intervention in Sudan—including military intervention—to save the lives of the people in the region. In a joint statement issued at the conclusion of their annual summit on 10 June 2004, leaders of the Group of Eight industrialised countries (G-8) expressed concern about the situation in Darfur. The statement, which was full of compassion and solidarity with the plight of the people of Darfur, underscored the “. . . continuing reports of gross violations of human rights, many with an ethnic dimension . . .” They appealed to the international community to help end the crisis in Darfur by stating that: “We look to the United Nations to lead the international eVort to avert a major disaster and will work together to achieve Ev 120 International Development Committee: Evidence
this end.” Furthermore, leaders of the G-8 pledged their “. . . countries’ assistance in ending the conflicts in Sudan and in providing humanitarian aid to those in need.” The statement rightly emphasised the importance of a negotiated solution that tackles the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in the region by calling on “. . . the conflict parties to address the roots of the Darfur conflict and to seek a political solution.” Once again, at the conclusion of their Summit on 18 June 2004, leaders of the 25 nation-strong European Union expressed deep concern about the crisis in Darfur.
7.1 Regional and International Intervention Regional and international intervention into the Darfur tragedy has assumed two interrelated tracks viz (i) provision of humanitarian assistance and ii) initiation of political dialogue between the government of Sudan and its opponents in Darfur. Both the humanitarian and political tracks did not generate the required results for a number of reasons. The world did not invest in eVorts to address the crisis in Darfur throughout 2003 for fear that confrontation with Sudan over Darfur will thwart the Naivasha process that promises to end Sudan’s 20-year old war in the South. Political negotiations did not start until heavy pressure from the world community forced the warring factions to sit at the negotiation table in Abuja (Nigeria) in August 2004. The provision of life-saving relief material to the needy people in Darfur still faces serious impediments. Lack of security and the government’s policy to hinder delivery of relief material especially during the first 15 months of the conflict were the main obstacles encountered. Another dimension was the reluctance of the donor community to provide the necessary financial means to the UN and its specialised agencies to enable them procure the necessary relief material and deliver it to the needy people in the region. As a direct result of these obstacles, the lack of food, medicine and other necessities have developed into silent wholesale killers in vast rural areas of the region especially in the Jabal Marra massive where the aVected Fur people have not received relief material until recently.
7.2 The UN Security Council Action of the UN Security Council represents the legal basis for the response and eventual intervention of the international community in the Darfur crisis. On 25 May 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2004/18) endorsing the report of the OYce of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Although such a Statement has no mandatory power in the same sense as a Security Council Resolution, it has set the tone for action to follow. Despite the pressing situation it was only in July 2004 that the UN Security Council moved forward with the adoption of Resolution 1556/2004 followed by Resolution 1564/2004, which was adopted in September 2004. Both the two mandatory Resolutions were adopted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter implying that the situation in Darfur is a threat to international peace and security and that the international community could adopt mandatory punitive measures against the government of Sudan if it failed to put an end to the ongoing violence. It is to be noted that both Resolutions 1556/2004 and 1564/2004 placed shared obligations on the warring parties to allow relief convoys unfettered access to the region, cooperate with the AU mediation eVorts and respect their ceasefire and other commitments. They also asked the government to ameliorate the security situation in the region by dismantling the Janjaweed and apprehending and bringing to justice the leaders. However, the Resolutions did not yield the required results within so far as both the warring parties especially the government of Sudan quietly refused to comply with their provisions. On Tuesday 26 October 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1569/2004 in which it decided to hold a series of special meetings on Sudan in Nairobi on 18 and 19 November 2004. The agenda for these meetings will include “The Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan” and discussions with AU and IGAD oYcials on diplomatic eVorts underway to bring peace to Sudan. The forthcoming Security Council’s meetings are the last chance for the region of Darfur to remain intact. Warning signals about imminent complete anarchy in Darfur, which were aired on Thursday 4 November 2004 by the Special Representative of UN Secretary General on Sudan Mr Jan Pronk, should be taken very seriously if the world community is to avert another Somalia from reproducing itself in Darfur. In Mr Pronk’s words “The government does not control its own forces fully.” “The border lines between the military, the paramilitary and the police are being blurred,” and that within the rebel SLA/M and JEM “There are splits. Some commanders provoke their adversaries by stealing, hijacking and killing, some seem to have begun acting for their own private gain.”23 At the UN Security Council, western European countries and other like-minded nations are assuming a clear position against Sudan’s handling of the crisis in Darfur and therefore all the hopes of the people of the region rest with their resolve and persuasion. The USA and the UK are taking the lead in urging the Council to adopt meaningful measures against Khartoum yet they have refrained from taking any concrete unilateral action to protect the people on the ground despite the declaration of the US Executive and Legislative that acts of genocide were committed in Darfur. Members of the Council from the Arab and Islamic Worlds as well as Russia and China are lagging behind to varying degrees in their support of Khartoum’s policies in Darfur.
23 Report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Sudan Mr Jan Pronk to the UN Security Council in a briefing held in New York on Thursday, 4 November 2004 on Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s monthly report to the Security Council on the situation in the war-torn region. Comments can be consulted at http://allafrica.com/stories/200411050001.html International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 121
China, which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has played an amoral role in escorting Sudan free from eVective international action. By and large, China bears the prime responsibility for the weak response of the international community to the crisis in Darfur by watering-down language in the draft US-sponsored Resolutions at the Security Council that envisaged punitive measures against Sudan if it failed to comply with its obligations and end the violence in the region. It has even threatened to wield its Veto power. China’s conscienceless stand is driven by its own political and economic interests in Sudan rather than the suVering of the people of Darfur. It is protecting its investment in Sudan especially its 40% stake in Sudan’s growing oil industry, including refineries, pipelines and import of crude oil. As such reference to Sudan’s oil industry at the Security Council was largely considered as a threat not only against Sudan but also against countries like China, France, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and others that have oil interests in Sudan. Chinese companies are complicit in the depopulation of vast areas in southern Sudan to clear the way for oil exploration activities. In addition China’s oil purchases have enabled Sudan to buy arms from Beijing and other sources thus fuelling the violence in Darfur.
7.3 The African Union (AU)
Actions of the 3rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as those of the Peace and Security Council are the basis for the AU political and military interventions in the Darfur crisis.24 In fact the newly created AU Peace and Security Council started its work in May 2004 with the adoption of a resolution on the situation in Darfur. The involvement of the AU in the political mediation eVorts as well as their pioneer role in the protection of civilians is especially important because of the dangerous nature of the crisis. Involvement of the AU in the Darfur conflict also better serves the geopolitical interests of the government of Sudan thus it is their preferred option. This explains why the government continues to hinder attempts of the international community to extend a helping hand to end this humanitarian crisis. Africa has its own fears since on numerous occasions the Janjaweed and the Sudanese army have conducted cross-border military operations inside Chad territory. It was reported that military tension in the eastern regions of Chad is on the increase and it is most likely that Chad rebels may start their own military operations in the region, which threatens the fragile socio-political system in that country. It is, therefore, of great concern that the conflict in Darfur is posing serious threat to peace and security in Chad and the whole region especially as the Janjaweed are increasingly forging military links with their kinsmen in Chad. In an interview with the UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), on Thursday 17 June 2004, Mr Ahmad Allami, Personal Advisor of President Idriss Deby and Chief Mediator in the Darfur peace talks, said that: “The Janjaweed are recruiting elements in Chad. These are exclusively Arabs. This situation risks degenerating into an inter-ethnic war between a coalition of Arabs and other ethnic groups in the region.”
After some hiccups the first round of meaningful political talks under the AU auspices commenced in Abuja (Nigeria) on 23 August 2004. However, pressure on the warring factions to agree on a negotiated solution of the conflict has not yielded the desired result so far. The government continues to consider the armed conflict in Darfur as an internal security threat and rejects the demands and grievances put forward by the rebel SLA/M and JEM. Notwithstanding its bilateral talks with the SLA/M and JEM, the government insists on the convening of an All Darfur Conference. This is an attempt to strip the rebel groups of political legitimacy to represent the people of Darfur and eventually maintain the status quo. As such there seems little prospect of progress despite the successful conclusion of the second round of talks in Abuja and the signing on Tuesday 9 November 2004 of a series of breakthrough agreements touching on security and humanitarian issues. There is hope that more eVorts will be done to ensure that these measures are respected and negotiations for a comprehensive political solution for a lasting end of the crisis will be achieved. We are persuaded to admit that only mounting pressure from the international community— placing more and more emphasis on the political nature of the crisis and the need for a negotiated solution of the conflict—could speed up the process for political negotiations to end the crisis.
On 19 October 1994 the AU agreed to upgrade its team of 150 ceasefire monitors in Darfur that are backed by a 300-strong protection force into a full-scale military force of about 3,320 men with an extended mandate to protect humanitarian operations and deter armed groups from attacking civilians. However, key questions about the expanded operation remain unanswered. One of the questions that need answer was the extension of the mandate of the AU force from providing security for observers to protecting civilians. Communique´ PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII) adopted by the Peace and Security Council on 20 October 2004 and which organises the deployment of additional AU troops dramatically, failed to make a clear and unambiguous language on this important subject. It speaks about “protecting civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, with resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS.”
24 Decision AU/Dec.54 (III) adopted by the 3rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa 6–8 July 2004 as well as Communique´ PSC/PR/Comm.(XIII) and PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII) adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council at its 13th Meeting on 17 July and its 17th meeting on 20 October 2004 respectively. Ev 122 International Development Committee: Evidence
On the other hand eVorts of the AU to send troops to Darfur are crippled partly by the lack of necessary financial means and logistical support25 but also because of Khartoum’s manoeuvring within the AU institutions especially the Peace and Security Council. Khartoum diplomacy was successful in slowing down the AU eVorts and could render them meaningless despite the international unanimity of opinion that the presence of AU peacekeepers will have salutary eVects on the victims of the conflict. This is due to the fact that the rebel SLA/M and JEM were not represented during meetings of the AU Peace and Security Council and also because interested civil society groups were not present to influence the process.26 It also seems that Western European countries including the UK are not investing enough energy for lobbying with members of the AU to ensure that the valid concerns of the international community as manifested in UN Security Council Resolutions 1556/2004 and 1564/2004 are fully and unambiguously taken into account by the AU Peace and Security Council during their consideration of the Darfur issue. What is urgently needed in the region is a resourceful and strong internationally supported force of at least 50,000 troops and support service in order to eVectively protect the more than two million IDPs and refugees and ensure their safe return to their original villages. Any other measures that fall short of providing sound security and restoring the rule of law in Darfur simply means that the IDPs and refuges are confined to living in their present camps indefinitely while their victimization and harassment continue.
7.4 Humanitarian Intervention The dramatic unfolding of the Darfur crisis has taken the international community especially the donor agencies with surprise. It seems that no government or international agency could have imagined the level of destruction and humanitarian need experienced by the region within the first nine-month period since the rebellion started in February 2004. This perhaps explains the inadequate response of the international community to the appeals for humanitarian assistance made by the UN and some of its specialized agencies to provide relief material to the needy people in Darfur. The Sudan Assistance Programme (ASAP) of the UN consolidated appeal for Sudan for 2004, which was estimated at about US$ 639 million has generated less than one third of the required funds. The UN Donor Conference on Darfur held in Geneva on Thursday, 3 June 2004 appealed for US$ 236 million to aid the more than two million people aVected by the conflict in Darfur. In response donor nations made pledges of only US$ 126 million. Another equally important aspect was the lack of knowledge and information about the level of destruction in the region and the needs of its people. This is due mainly to the policy of information blackout so maliciously imposed by the Khartoum regime on the news from Darfur throughout 2003. The involvement of development agencies in a coordinated eVort to meet the humanitarian needs of the internally displaced persons and refugees should be further consolidated not only by the provision of financial means but also by knowledge of the situation and other political and organisational measures. As the world is still under the shock of the level of destruction of live and livelihood in Darfur and its inability to put a halt to the ongoing carnage, it is all too natural that most available resources are mainly devoted to meeting the immediate humanitarian needs. As such very little attention was devoted to strategic thinking or critical investment in future plans to help the people rebuild their destroyed lives in the post- crisis phase. Strategic thinking and eventually the designing of practical policies and plans to rebuild the region and rehabilitate its people are very crucial at this stage in particular when such eVorts target to fill the existing gap of policy research and documentation. Strategic thinking and documentation are indispensable for informed decisions that are expected to play a cardinal role in generating the appropriate political solutions for the conflict. Such thinking should address, but not be limited to, the questions of the political, institutional, developmental, economic, social, ethnic, racial, religious and cultural dimensions of the crisis. It is also necessary to ensure a broad and eVective mobilisation of the region’s material and human resources to treat the eVects of the tragedy on the lives of people in the post-conflict phase and also to help mitigate the negative eVects of the damage done to the social fabric as well as to live and livelihood in the region. At present it is understandable that there is no sound advocacy campaigns to educate the victims of the conflict and the people of the region and Sudan in general about their rights and duties or the moral values of accountability, responsibility, tolerance, forgiveness and reconciliation. Yet it is time to undertake the spadework and erect appropriate organs. Such a project can be done more eVectively with the involvement of local people and their independent civil society organisations that are part and parcel of the culture and tradition of the region and its people. The present negotiations both on the political arena and those on the humanitarian and security issues are essentially conducted between the government of Sudan and the rebel groups to the exclusion of other equally important actors in the region. Some segments of the people of Darfur—those targeted by the campaign of destruction of life and livelihood—and their representative civil society structures and organisations are not fully accommodated in the ongoing process. Inability of these social actors to contribute their knowledge and expertise during the negotiations, indicate that they will, indeed, be absent or ineVective in shaping their role in the post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction phase. Perhaps the
25 To secure logistics, support services and other provisions the AU has to resort to the international donor community. By the beginning of November 2004 the AU sources indicated that out of the estimated US$ 221 million to meet the cost of deploying the AU troops in Darfur the international community pledged only US$ 114.9. 26 Unlike other similar institutions, the AU Peace and Security Council allows interested African civil society organisations and groups directly concerned to contribute during the proceeding of its meetings and provide unbinding ideas and proposals. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 123
most visible absentee victim group were women. This happens despite the fact that women are ubiquitously present as the first and foremost victims of the current conflict and will be present as pawns in the post- conflict phase yet they are conspicuously sidelined in the decision-making process. This is true as far as the negotiations for a settlement of the conflict are concerned, and by consequence during the post-conflict rebuilding phase. As far back as the UN Women’s Conference held in Nairobi in 1985, UN member State aYrmed that: “equality is important for development and peace because national and global inequities perpetuate themselves and increase tensions of all types.” While it is obvious that the conflicting parties will not prefer engaging some of the absentee stakeholders it could be helpful if the international community places some emphasis on the importance of a multi-disciplinary approach that engage and mobilise some key indigenous partners to help resolve the crisis in Darfur.
8. The Role of the UK Government The UK government was among the first external powers to gain a clear understanding of the real situation in Darfur. Since the end of 2003 the UK government became aware of the destruction that has been taking place in Darfur through its diplomatic mission in Khartoum. In fact a UK national (Mr Mukesh Kapila) was the first person that dared to break the taboo about the situation in Darfur when he publicly voiced his concern about the nature of the crisis and sent out a strong warning signal to the world community by describing the situation as ethnic cleansing, drawing a link with the early days of the 1994 Rwanda genocide. He described the situation in Darfur in clear words stating that: “This is ethnic cleansing, this is the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis, and Idon’t know why the world is n’t doing more about it.”27 As the former colonial power that annexed the independent Sultanate of Darfur to present-day Sudan in the beginning of the twentieth century, the UK government and its people must be in a unique position of moral responsibility towards the plight of the people of Darfur. This explains the UK’s candid engagement with the crisis in Darfur. The UK was the first world power to take the bold stand of threatening Khartoum with the deployment of British troops in Darfur when the head of the UK Army28 declared late in July 2004 that a brigade of 5,000 British soldiers could be sent to the violence-wracked Darfur region of Sudan at very short notice. The UK bold position was also translated into the fact that Britain was the only country that has dispatched two of its top political decision-makers to Sudan to raise their concerns about the situation in Darfur and ask the government of Sudan to do more to end the crisis and ameliorate the situation.29 These trips were successful in conveying a decisive message to Sudan from the international community that it must comply with its obligations as a State member of the United Nations and honour its commitments to the international community and put an end to the violence in the region. These visits were concrete steps that gave more weight to Britain’s involvement in the Darfur crisis and indirectly helped save innocent lives by making the government of Sudan honour its promise to allow more AU troops to deploy to Darfur, and most importantly persuading the government to accept the security and humanitarian protocols that were signed in Abuja (Nigeria) on Tuesday 9 November 2004. No doubt that such eVorts would eventually help regain peace in Darfur and should therefore continue. The UK diplomacy also played an important role in building up and maintaining the ongoing momentum about the crisis in Darfur within the EU and the UN institutions. The UK is part of the team of “international facilitators” that helps bridge diVerences during the political negotiations between the government and the rebel movements. Although the British government and legislatives declined to join the US Congress and Administration in accusing Sudan of committing acts of genocide in Darfur, it has backed the US-sponsored resolutions on Sudan that were adopted by the UN Security Council in July and September 2004. On the question of genocide it seems that the UK government has left confirmation of the commission of this crime to the UN investigators. However, it is time for the UK government to conduct its own appraisal of the situation and come to a conclusion on this issue. On the humanitarian field the British government ranks among the largest donors for relief operations in Darfur. Added to the oYcial government eVorts there is an army of UK-based charity organisations now active on the ground in Darfur and eastern Chad providing live-saving relief material to the aVected IDPs and refugees. Britain allocated £62.5 million or the equivalent of ($112 million) in aid to Sudan in the year 2004. The extraordinary eVorts of the UK government in helping the Sudanese people come out of their current impasse should not over look some important political and social aspects of the crisis that engulfs the country. These aspects are at the heart and origin of the current crisis, which the UK decision-makers should take on board if they are to leave a lasting imprint on the country’s future course. The Sudanese elite that inherited the rule of the country from its British colonial rulers in 1956 have built a structurally deformed system designed to serve their own vested interests and the interests of certain ethnic groups to whom they
27 Mr Mukesh Kapila, then Humanitarian Coordinator and UN Resident Representative in Sudan, BBC Interview on the situation in Darfur, 19 March 2004. 28 Comment by General Sir Michael Jackson, Head of the British Army, BBC News, 24’s Hardtalk Programme in which he said “If need be, we will be able to go to Sudan,” adding that: “I suspect we could put a brigade together very quickly indeed.” See the Guardian Unlimited (http://www.guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,14658,1268219,00.html). 29 On 6 October 2004 UK Premier Tony Blair paid a one-day visit to Khartoum on his way to Addis Ababa during which he met with President Omar El-Bashier and other top government oYcials. The visit of Mr Blair was preceded by a visit by Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs, Jack Straw, who went to Khartoum and Darfur in the period 23–24 August 2004. Ev 124 International Development Committee: Evidence
belong. This elite group, which represents less than 40% of the country’s population, has imposed a self- proclaimed totalitarian Arab-centric cultural vision in a multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi- religious country.30 Such an ideology that strips Sudan’s African population of their indigenous heritage and identity is the breeding ground for exploitation, discrimination, social injustice and unrest, destruction and instability with costly human, economic and financial implications. These hitherto taboo subjects in Sudan’s political discourse must be addressed with courage and determination for the sake of unity as well as peace and security not only in Sudan but also in neighbouring African countries that are likely to experience the same tragic fate in the future. Any other measures that fall short of looking at these realities and treat their root causes will remain an attempt to address the symptom while leaving the disease uncured. This is the only way to enable Sudan achieve—as envisaged in the Machakos Protocols—a comprehensive solution that replaces war not just with peace, but also with social, political and economic justice which respects the fundamental human and political rights of the Sudanese people.
9. Conclusion The human rights and humanitarian crisis in Darfur is an integral part of Sudan’s overall failed system of governance fostered by unwise State policy that manipulates ethnic and tribal diVerences to maintain political and economic power in the hands of the Arabised groups of the country. The crisis is not only the result of conflict between Africans and Arabs over the control of scare natural resources in a zone of ecological decline but the creation of the government which has manipulated the nomad tribes on racial and cultural grounds. The situation witnessed this tragic unfolding when the government chose to accord its full military, political, diplomatic and economic backing to the nomad tribes of the region. Such a discriminatory policy is dangerous as it represents a breeding ground for social unrest, hatred and mistrust among the diverse ethnic groups that have co-existed in the region for many centuries. The people of Darfur share common denominators such as the practice of Sunni Islam, a relatively homogenous social behaviour and the use of Arabic as lingua franca. The unprecedented mass killings, pillage of resources, destruction of livelihood as well as the abduction, gang rape of women and other crimes committed against the African tribes have left deep scars on the consciousness of their victims. In light of the complicated tribal nature of Darfur, the armed conflict and revenge in the region are expected to continue for some years to come. This painful fact should be addressed with determination, zeal and courage before it engulfs other parts of the country. This reality is especially imminent if there is no profound change in the declared policy and the actual practice of national and regional governments. Relentless pursuance of draconian religious and cultural policies in a volatile multi-ethnic and multi-cultural region has inevitably injected hitherto eVectively controlled violent dimensions into the current conflict. Potential manifestation of similar violence cannot be ruled out in Darfur in particular as the region still experiences a fragile ecology, ethnic manipulation, a quasi-absence of infrastructure and where the traditional chieftain structure has been virtually dismantled. The Janjaweed have the ability and potential to continue a long-term destruction campaign in the region for a number of reasons. They have developed a full-blown racist mentality, a sustained warrior culture, vast knowledge of the region and its people, abundant sophisticated weapons, suitable means of transport and communication and most importantly the full backing of the state security apparatus. They are motivated by their pathological desire to destroy life, looting and war-booty, which they easily conduct with complete impunity. As such it will be a real challenge to bring an end to the conflict in Darfur—a region the size of France—even if there is strong political will among the international community to do so. This should not be inferred as an invitation for the international community not to act. To the contrary, it should be an additional inducement for all of us to face the challenge and find additional means to do a lethal blow to this growing crisis. The current relief eVorts in Darfur have focused on getting life-saving and other emergency relief material to refugees in eastern Chad and also to the IDPs inside Darfur. Beside providing emergency relief material to the needy, the main objective of the international engagement with Darfur should be to get the political negotiations onto a speedy track that sets out measures conducive to the safe return of IDPs and refugees to their original homes where they can restart normal life, take care of their needs and end the growing external aid dependency syndrome. Only at home do these unfortunate victims have a better chance of survival. Protracted exposure of these victims to insalubrious, congested and to insecure conditions in IDP camps and refugee centres is a recipe for death, despair and hopelessness let alone meeting the exorbitant and painful international protection and relief operations. No eVorts were made to address the root causes of the crisis through political or intellectual exercise. While providing life-saving relief material to the needy is meritorious, yet what good it makes to concentrate on relieving the symptom rather than treating the disease. The multifaceted crisis faced by the people of Darfur is a chronic structural crisis that requires a combined pool of political and scientific solutions in order to address it eVectively. Political neglect, social injustice, uneven distribution of wealth and the associated underdevelopment, socio-economic exclusion as well as marginalisation are at the root of the current crisis. In this regard we can conclude that one of the
30 According to the Population of Sudan: Ethnic Census of 1956—which was the only ethnic census conducted in the country to date—“The population of Sudan consists of: 39% Arabs 30% Southerners 13% Westerners, 6% each for Nuba and Beja, 3% each for the Nubians and for Foreigners and Miscellaneous. These figures are not necessarily correct (http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2004/sudan0504/appendixa.pdf). International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 125
most eVective ways of resolving the problems faced by Africa’s war-devastated country was through political and economic empowerment of the underprivileged regions to be conducted through a sound aYrmative action programme protected by legal guarantees. It is to be emphasised that the end of the security dilemma in Darfur and the associated destruction of facilities signify the beginning of ardent work to rebuild the destroyed social-fabric and livelihood of the people of the region. Equally important are eVorts to restore the lost confidence and trust between the diVerent ethnic groups in the region. The return of peace and tranquillity should also signify the beginning of sincere and concerted eVorts to bring a fresh start to the destroyed socio-economic systems and to reorganise the relationships along the lines of the respect of democratic participation, good governance, prevalence of justice and the rule of law as well as advocacy of the concepts of tolerance and peaceful co- existence between the diVerent tribal groups that live in the country without prejudice or discrimination. To help realise these objectives civic and human rights education should be one of the major programmes to be embarked upon as a matter of priority. High moral values of non-violence, non-discrimination and the respect of diversity should be the centre of future initiatives. Such an educational programme cannot be eVectively implemented unless it is introduced in a long-term process that necessitates the involvement of diVerent partners including local, regional and national governments, UN agencies and NGOs in a spirit of partnership and cooperation. In this regard it is necessary that the framework for a comprehensive multi-disciplinary development plan for Darfur be initiated as a matter of priority. The plan should be incorporated into the final peace arrangement and that its implementation commences as soon as the situation returns to normality. Such initiative should be supported not only by the warring factions but also by the regional and international development partners. Timely preparations for such a policy stems from the unsatisfactory political and humanitarian response of the international community to the crisis in Darfur. It is obvious that the combination of lack of knowledge about the crisis and the region as well as the absence of genuine local structures or mechanisms to be integrated into the work of governments, relief organisations, agencies and other actors involved in the Darfur crisis clearly indicate that eVective intervention in the region needs solid future perspective to regain peace and prevent the recurrence of such a humanitarian crisis. The prevalence of peace and tranquillity in the region will eVectively alleviate or reduce the current need for costly military protection missions and the endless humanitarian relief operations in the region. However, it should be underscored that the people of Darfur, Africans and Arabs alike, have no other option but to live together in the region and to accommodate each other. They are the only real guarantee for lasting peace and tranquillity in the region. The warring factions need a kind but firm helping hand to assist them to come out of the current situation. Assistance from the international community, therefore, is much needed at this dangerous juncture of the region’s history. The high moral values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence between the diVerent groups of people inhabiting the region should be inculcated in the coming generations. These values were the rule and norm in the past and should be restored and preserved for the future generations. Under the circumstances the government of Sudan should work out a nation-rebuilding plan that advocates a culture of peace, tolerance and reconciliation as a matter of top priority in its national agenda. A nation-rebuilding plan should be supported by comprehensive sustainable development strategy and socio-economic projects in the region. This is the only way to ensure that the negative eVects of natural calamities in the region were mitigated without being used by warmongers to advocate violence. An important component in the rebuilding process would be the establishment of strong, independent and eVective native civil society organs to help the international community as well as national social actors— including the antagonistic parties—in their eVorts to end the crisis and assist the people of Darfur in restoring their shattered lives. The ultimate objective should be empowering the victims of atrocities in Darfur to further mobilise regional and international public opinions to help them in their plight. November 2004 Ev 126 International Development Committee: Evidence
Annex One
A. Government High Ranking Officials 1. Mr. Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, Vice-President. 2. Gen. Salah Abdullah Gosh, Head of Sudan General Intelligence. 3. Dr. Nafae Ali Nafae, Presidential Advisor,. 4. Dr. Majzoub Al Khaleefa, Minister of Agriculture. 5. Mr. Mohammed Haroon, Minister of State, Ministry of Interior, Responsible for Darfur AVairs in the Ministry of Interior. 6. Mr. Abdulbasit Sabdrat, Adviser to the President.
B. Government Officials in or with links to the Greater Darfur Region 1. Gen. Adam Hamid Musa, former Governor of South Darfur State. 2. Gen. Suliman Abdullah Adam, Governor of West Darfur State. 3. Gen. Abdullah Ali Safi Al Noor, Former Governor of North Darfur State, Minister of State, Presidential AVairs. 4. Gen. Al Hadi Adam Hamid 5. Gen. Hussein Abdullah Gibril, Parliament Member, former Head of the Parliamentary Security Committee. 6. Mr. Abdulhamid Musa Kasha, Federal Minister of Foreign Trade. 7. Mr. Abdalla Ali Masar, Governor, River Nile State 8. Mr. Osman Mohamed Yousif Kibir, Governor of North Darfur State. 9. Mr. Hamad Abdullah Gibril, former Deputy Governor of North Darfur State 10. Mr. Gibril Abdullah 11. Mr. Mohammed Ibrahim Izat 12. Mr. Abdulrahman Ahmed Salih, National Mobile Education Commissioner.
C. Janjaweed Field Commanders 1. Musa Hilal, General Commander.
D. Janjaweed Field Commanders,Junainah,Sani Dadi, and Ustani Areas 1. Hussein Ahmed Awad, General Field Commander. 2. Hiraikah Ahmed, Field Intelligence. 3. Ahmed Kaleel Sheed, Commander. 4. Giddo Mohammed Iddrees Sheed, Commander. 5. Balilah Adam , Commander. 6. Girsho Golo Golo, Commander
E. Janjaweed Field Commanders in Saraf Omrah and Seraif Bani Hussein Areas 7. Mohammed Hilal, Commander, Deputy of Musa Hilal and his personal representative: 8. Amir Yousif, Commander. 9. Issa Amrol, Commander. 10. Mohammed Salih Kiraima, Commander. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 127
F. Janjaweed Field Commanders in Malam and Eastern Jabal Marra Areas 11. Rabih Mohammed, Area General Commander.
G. Janjaweed Field Commanders in Kuttum,Kabkabiya,Jabal Marra,Taweelah 12. Saeed Sarkol, Deputy of Musa Hilal in North Darfur. 13. Siddiq Salim, Commander. 14. Ibrahim Ghaboush Issa, Commander. 15. Hijazi Abdullah Abu Gosh, Commander. 16. Fadal Al Syd, Commander. 17. Ali Adam Abdelbagi, Commander. 18. Abdulaziz Daoud Mohammed, Commander. 19. Adam Al Sheik Abdelbagi, Commander. 20. Eltigani Hassan Mohammed Hilal, Commander. 21. Yousif Doro Mohammed, Commander. 22. Mohammed Salih Qayom, Commander. 23. Salim Hassan Abdelbagi, Commander. 24. Mohammed Daoud Mohammed, Commander.
H. Janjaweed Field Commanders in Um Seiyalah and Inka Areas (Northeast of Kuttum) 25. Ibrahim Abdullah Gadallah, Area General Commander. 26. Jafar Ali Abbass, Commander. 27. Omar Ali Hadi, Commander. 28. Fadal Ali Abbass, Commander. 29. Musa Awadallah, Commander. 30. Ali Digaim, Commander. 31. Mohammed Salih Ibrahim, Commander. 32. Basheer Ali Digaiss, Commander. 33. Ali Noor, Commander. 34. Adam Hamdan Jamae, Commander. 35. Ali Hamid Ibrahim, Commander.
K. Janjaweed Field Commanders in Maleit,Darmidob,Um Kadadah Areas 36. Mohammed Suleiman Rabih, Area Commander. 37. Al Hajj Issa Gadallah, Commander. 38. Suleiman Jalab, Commander. 39. Ali Jummah Jadain, Commander. 40. Musa Abu Dilaik, Commander. 41. Mahjoob Salih Mahmood, Commander. 42. Al Hajj Dakam, Commander 43. Ibrahim Mohammed Mahmood, Commander. 44. Salih Radi, Commander. 45. Abdullah Musa Abdelrhaman, Commander. 46. Adam Eid, Commander. 47. Ambadah Abu Zaid Ambadah, Commander. 48. Musa Rabih, Commander. Ev 128 International Development Committee: Evidence
L. Janjaweed Filed Commander in Murla,Higer,Tabaldiat,Umsirir and Donki-Direisa Areas 49. Mohammed Ibrahim Yagoub, General Commander, Coordinating Al Firsan and the Popular Defense Forces.
Memorandum submitted by ECHO ECHO’s Mandate and Interest in this Inquiry 1. ECHO, the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid of the European Commission (EC), funds relief operations for victims of natural disasters and conflicts outside the European Union (EU). Aid is implemented neutrally and impartially, straight to victims, regardless of their race, religion and political beliefs. ECHO is one of the biggest donors of humanitarian aid in the world. In 2003, it provided Euro 600 million in funding. ECHO support went to projects in more than 60 countries. 2. Since 1994, ECHO has committed more than Euro 290 million for relief operations in Sudan.31 While its commitment has been focused on the Darfur region in 2004, ECHO continues to monitor and address humanitarian needs elsewhere in Sudan, particularly in the South where these needs are very important.
Overview of the Humanitarian Situation 3. The conflict in Darfur has led to what has been described by the UN as the largest current humanitarian crisis in the world. The appalling impact of the conflict on civilians can be summarised as follows: — The insecurity due to the conflict has aVected most of the inhabited areas; — The conflict-aVected population in Darfur is estimated now at least 2 million people dependent on humanitarian aid, including 1.6 million internally displaced (IDPs) and about 400,000 residents directly aVected; — About 200,000 Sudanese refugees have fled into Chad; — Hundreds of towns, villages and other settlements have been burnt, looted and depopulated; — An estimated 70,000 persons have died as a result of the conflict, and an unknown number as the result of direct violence; — Massive and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) have been committed against civilians (eg rapes, indiscriminate attacks, destruction of properties), which will often have long-term physical and psychological impact on the victims.
Current Humanitarian Needs 4. According to the most recent UN Humanitarian Profile32, the approximate gaps in the provision of essential humanitarian services are as follows33:
Sector Assisted in % Gap in % Food aid 70 30 Shelter/NFI52 48 Clean water 40 60 Sanitation 42 58 PHC 67 33 Basic drug supplies 58 42 Secondary health facilities 58 42
5. The above table underlines that important gaps in vital life-saving sectors remain, despite extensive relief eVorts in recent months. This trend can be explained by the fact that, in conjunction with the enhancement in response capacity, target population figures continued to grow steadily due to continued conflict-induced displacement, distress, onward population movements into the larger relief centres (“the pull factor”), and newly gained access to certain areas. 6. These figures underestimate the reality, as there are an unknown number of people living in dire needs in remote areas whose needs have not been assessed yet. 7. Even if the fighting stops and the security situation swiftly stabilises, the people aVected will stay dependent on humanitarian aid in the medium term. Their dependency will be maintained by the fact that they have lost most of their assets and that the next harvest will certainly be very poor. Then any rupture in the humanitarian aid, especially in the food aid pipeline, would have catastrophic consequences.
31 See Annex 1. 32 Darfur Humanitarian Profile Number 7, 1 October 2004. 33 These figures concern only the areas accessible and where needs could be assessed. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 129
Risk Assessment and Constraints 8. Risks and dangers for local communities and humanitarian factors will remain abundant in Darfur as long as there is no durable peace agreement: — Continued escalation in the conflict, resulting in new influx of IDPs; — Forced relocation/repatriation; — Aggravation of the insecurity for humanitarian workers, expanding the “no go” areas; — Resumption of bureaucratic impediments; — Development of a chaotic and anarchic situation in Darfur; — Disease outbreak or epidemics; — A new bad rainy season; — Decrease in the interest of media and international community for a lingering crisis. 9. For the time being, access to the neediest people is the biggest problem faced by the humanitarian agencies. This problem is mainly caused by three factors: (1) Since the establishment of a UN-Government of Sudan joint implementation mechanism (3 July 2004), administrative impediments to humanitarian assistance have decreased in areas controlled by the Government. However, impediments have not come to an end in the rebel-controlled areas in spite of a UN-SLM/A agreement (18 October 2004) establishing a travel notification system for humanitarian agencies. (2) There are severe logistical constraints, which become critical during rainy season. (3) The deteriorating security situation now represents by far the main and most serious obstacle to humanitarian access. The risk for agencies to be caught up in fighting has increased, and the number of incidents involving aid workers is on the rise (eg truck drivers shot, humanitarian items stolen, abductions, threats). On 10 October 2004, two aid workers were killed in North-Darfur when their vehicle was hit by a landmine. On 22 November, more than 30 aid workers were evacuated by African Union helicopters from Tawilla town where heavy fighting was raging. This highly volatile and worsening security environment has led several agencies to suspend operations and/or to withdraw from some areas. This has had serious detrimental eVects, delaying or preventing distribution of aid to people in desperate conditions.
The European Commission’s Humanitarian Response 10. The Darfur region is not new to the European Commission (EC). It has been supporting aid programmes for many years in this marginalised, drought prone region. Since the beginning of the crisis, the EC has steadily increased funding for protection and assistance to the victims. So far, the EC has mobilised Euro 92,4 million for humanitarian assistance, of which more than Euro 57 million have been channelled through ECHO, including Euro 14 million for Sudanese refugees in Chad. The European Commission has just earmarked an additional Euro 51 million to be managed by ECHO (decisions in preparation) for the people aVected by the conflict in Sudan. About Euro 10 million of this new allocation will contribute to the World Food Programme’s (WFP) massive food aid distribution in Darfur. 11. In response to the Darfur crisis, ECHO has stepped up its presence in the field opening an oYce in Nyala in addition to its oYces in Khartoum and Nairobi. One further oYce and an antenna were opened in Chad in Ndjamena and Abeche in order to monitor the situation of Sudanese refugees in Chad. The staYng was increased accordingly in Brussels and in the field. 12. ECHO’s strategy in Darfur is to assist not only IDPs and refugees, but also the local hosting communities as well as the villagers in need in remote areas. In addition to assisting IDPs and refugees directly triggered by the conflict, ECHO’s strategy takes into the account the needs of: — hosting communities;34 —aVected residents living in remote and so far underserved areas; — returnees; — the “old caseload” IDPs from Bahr Al Ghazal in Darfur, as they have also become aVected by the new conflict. — The principal objective of ECHO’s interventions is to provide life-saving assistance to the victims of the conflict. 13. ECHO is working with 32 partners in Darfur: UN humanitarian organisations (60% of funding), INGOs (35%) and the Red Cross Movement (including International Committee of the Red Cross: 5%).
34 In certain cases 20 families are hosted and supported by one host household. Ev 130 International Development Committee: Evidence
14. ECHO’s funding is covering all relevant components of this complex emergency/displacement setting. The specificities of this complex crisis (eg insecurity, limited access, delivery gaps in all humanitarian sectors) justify that many humanitarian agencies may follow an integrated “multisectorial” approach in their interventions. The components funded are:
Food aid and food security — Support to food distribution implementing partners; — Targeted emergency household food security inputs to selected communities.35
Protection, IHL and care for special groups — Dissemination/training on IHL and basic principles; — Field studies on basic protection issues (eg sexual violence, forced relocations); — Strengthening of local community protection mechanisms; — Tracing and family reunifications where feasible; — Interventions towards the parties to the conflict to remind them of their obligations with regard to IHL.
Shelter and non-food items (NFIs) — Provision of plastic sheeting and/or basic local building materials, as well as basic household non- food items such as clothing, kitchen sets, mosquito nets, blankets, cooking fuel; — Reinforcement of up-stream parts of the shelter/NFIsupply pipelines as well as down-stream distribution systems.
Water and environmental sanitation — In IDP settings, distribution of soap, water containers, hygiene promotion through outreach workers, construction of latrines, vector control, waste water drainage, clean up campaigns, burial of animal carcasses and human corpses; — In IDP settings, improved water supply through a wide array of options ranging from tinkering to the repair and improvement of existing sources such as hand pumps; — In remote locations, when possible and relevant, repair of existing water sources.
Health and nutrition — Further nutritional surveys where required; — Establishment or continuation of therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes (centre- based or community-based) in areas with highest malnutrition rates; — Mass measles vaccination in IDP settings not previously immunized, and support to ongoing EPI where possible; — Reducing risk of outbreaks and epidemics of communicable diseases (eg malaria); — Targeted inputs to restore or create a minimum level of basic preventive health outreach and awareness in areas with high number of IDPs; — Support for improved (secondary and tertiary) care for victims of various types of violence, evolving around issues such as sexual violence, HIV/AIDS, mental health care, surgery for the wounded and obstetric; — Mobile clinics to enhance outreach to scattered IDPs.
Common services — Bolster cross-cutting domains such as co-ordination, information, security, mine awareness, humanitarian flights and other forms of transport, logistics, aid flow management, site planning and camp management, so as to facilitate a co-ordinated, timely, appropriate and safe response in the above-mentioned sectors. 15. ECHO will continue putting emphasis on the eVectiveness and quality of aid, as well as the good co- ordination between the various agencies operating in the field. ECHO sees that there is room for improvement with regard to co-ordination, especially for protection activities.
35 Eg animal health, emergency seeds and tools. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 131
16. ECHO supports the establishment of a co-ordination mechanism which ensures a clear separation between humanitarian and non humanitarian actors. 17. Besides its support to humanitarian agencies, the EC has constantly urged the warring parties to abide by the IHL and to respect the concluded agreements (eg the two Abuja protocols on security and humanitarian situation signed on 9 November 2004). The EC has financially facilitated the talks between Government and rebels, and provided a significant support to the African Union’s observation mission (Euro 92 million).
Final Comments
18. At this present time; the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is primarily a protection crisis. 19. In order to alleviate the suVering of the people in Darfur, the most urgent priority is the end of violence and violations of IHL. 20. Although it has progressed since the beginning of the crisis, access of humanitarian agencies to the victims remains a major issue, mainly due to security reasons. The improvement of the security situation is of utmost importance with regard to eVectiveness of humanitarian aid. 21. At least two million people are fully dependent on humanitarian assistance for their basic needs. Regardless of any developments in the political and security situation, the needs will remain over the forthcoming months. Hence in the medium term, it will be necessary to continue the massive humanitarian response by the International Community. 22. ECHO will remain committed to playing a pivotal role in this collective, vital eVort as long as there are needs. 23. At the same time, ECHO will continue its support to the victims of the conflict in other regions of Sudan, where thousands of suVering people live out of the media spotlight. December 2004
Annex 1
ECHO CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUDAN
Year Channel of funding Amount (ƒ) 1994 26,107,000 1995 21,400,000 1996 17,375,000 1997 18,954,000 1998 33,960,000 1999 13,500,000 2000 11,000,000 2001 17,000,000 2002 Global Plan 17,000,000 Emergency decision 1,000,000 Total 18,000,000 2003 Global Plan 20,000,000 Emergency decision 2,000,000 Total 22,000,000 2004 Global Plan 20,000,000 Ad Hoc 10,000,000 Ad Hoc 10,000,000 Ad Hoc 15,000,000 Ad Hoc 5,000,000 Ad Hoc* 31,000,000 Total 91,000,000 Total ECHO funding 290,296,000 *Mostly implemented in 2005. Ev 132 International Development Committee: Evidence
Annex 2
FUNDS IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN DARFUR MANAGED BY THE EC IN 2004 (in million EURO)
Service Amount RELEX RRM support of the cease-fire talks in N’djamena and follow-up in Addis Ababa 0.4 AIDCO EDF-Humanitarian Plus Programme 1.5 Peace Facility for the AU-led cease-fire monitoring mission (EDF)* 92 Co-financing budget line 1.2 Food aid & food security: 32 — WFP in Sudan (ƒ19 million of which ƒ4 million from 2003 budget and ƒ15 million from 2004 budget) — WFP for refugees in Chad from Darfur (ƒ2 million) — ICRC (ƒ6 million) — NGOs (ex-Euronaid funds) (ƒ5 million) ECHO From the following sources: 57.7 — From 2003 budget (Emergency Decision and Global Plan) (ƒ3.7 million) — Ad hoc Decision, adopted on 06/2004 (ƒ10 million) — Ad hoc Decision, adopted 07/2004 (ƒ10 million) — Ad hoc Decision, adopted 09/2004 (ƒ15 million) — Ad hoc Decision (B-envelope of EDF) (ƒ5 million) — Humanitarian activities funded in Chad for refugees from Darfur (ƒ14 million) TOTAL 184.8
* Some of the ƒ80 million announced in support to AUMIS II will be coming on stream in 2005.
Annex 3
ECHO’S FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CRISIS (2003–04)
Total ƒ INGOs 17,945,794 UN 25,484,000 Red Cross 2,945,979 ECHO Antenna 255,000 Total committed 46,227,734 Allocated 11,494,349 Grand Total 57,722,083
Total DARFUR Crisis
6% 1% INGOs 38% UN Red Cross 55% ECHO Antenna International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 133
Annex 4
ECHO’S FUNDING OF PARTNERS IN RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CRISIS
Partner Amount ƒ Non-Governmental Organisations: AMI475,000 ADRA—DK 745,382 Danchurchaid 750,000 GOAL 500,000 INTERSOS 1,132,603 IRC 603,478 IRC—UK 274,137 MDM—F 650,000 MSF—B 2,102,030 MSF—CH 750,000 MSF—F 2,250,000 MSF—H 2,158,000 MSF—SP 750,000 OXFAM 1,774,122 Premiere Urgence 680,865 SC—UK 800,000 Solidarite´s 700,000 Triangle 194,056 World Vision International 656,121 International Organisations: FAO 434,000 UNHCR 2,400,000 UNICEF 2,900,000 UNOCHA 3,650,000 WFP 15,600,000 WHO 500,000 Red Cross Movement: ICRC 1,500,000 IFRC 800,000 RC/ES 645,979 ECHO Technical Assistance (ECHO Antenna in Nyala) 255,000 Total committed: 46,227,734
*Aide Medical Internationale; Adventist Development and Relief Agency; Associazione Umanitaria Per L’Emergenzia; International Rescue Committee; Medecins du Monde; Medical Emergency Relief International; Medecins Sans Frontiers; Save the Children; ECHO Technical Assistance; UN Food and Agriculture Organisation; UN High Commissioner for Refugees; UN Children’s Fund; UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs; World Food Programme; World Health Organisation; International Committee of the Red Cross; International Federation of the Red Cross; Red Cross— Spanish.
Memorandum submitted by the Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan (London)
Understanding the Darfur Conflict The name Darfur is from “dar fur” which in Arabic means “the land of the Fur”. Historically, it was an Islamic sultanate located in the western Sudan. The Fur were the ruling ethnic group in the Darfur region before 1916. The Fur began to be converted to Islam in the 1300s. In 1596, the Darfur Sultanate was established and Islam declared the state religion. The Darfur sultanate remained independent through various conflicts in the Sudan, including the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan in 1898, before finally being subjugated by the British in 1916 and made part of western Sudan. Darfur’s long history of independence, and its resistance to various other groups seeking control of all of Sudan, should be taken into consideration to properly understand the present situation. Darfur is home to some 80 tribes and ethnic groups divided between nomads and sedentary communities. The rebels seem to be drawn from within mainly three communities of the Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa tribes. The war has inevitably focused upon those areas of Darfur within which the insurgents chose to base themselves. As has been the case in countless wars, many civilians have chosen to flee and remove themselves Ev 134 International Development Committee: Evidence
from these war zones. Although the indigenous peoples of Darfur (the Fur, and several other ethnic groups) and the Arabs have always had relatively distinct identities, they generally got along well until resources became scarce, then ethnicity and race became a factor in the conflict. Darfur has historically been one of the most remote regions of Sudan. Even in normal circumstances, the region is hard to reach because it is so far from the capital, Khartoum. Tribal and ethnic conflicts are neither new nor uncommon. Incidents of both small and large scale conflicts are recorded as far back as 1939 and they generally arise from disputes over access to natural resources like range lands and water points as well as livestock trespassing (grazing on farm lands), closure of herd routes and cattle raiding. Larger conflicts normally emerge from tribal disputes, banditry and disputes with transnational migrating communities. The influx of modern small arms since the war in Chad has increased the loss of life during such conflicts and caused polarization on ethnic lines. Historically, North Darfur and parts of West and South Darfur have suVered recurrent droughts. Crop yields have remained low and unpredictable due to erratic rainfall, pest infestation and the lack of agricultural inputs. Livestock has also dwindled due to pasture and water scarcity. The local labor force has continued to migrate in search of employment leaving behind children, women and the elderly. A combination of these factors over several years has systematically eroded the coping capacities of communities. The pattern of conflict changed from low-intensity, small-scale outbreaks from the 1950s to the 1970s, to high-intensity, persistent and large-scale battles in the mid-1980s. These conflicts have included those between the Rezegat and Maaleya (1968), Salamat and Taayesha (1980), Binihelba and Meharya (1980), Zaghawa and Gamar (1989). The prolonged drought that began in 1983 drove nomadic Zaghawa and Arab groups southwards into the central Fur region of Jebel Marra. By the time of the 1989 peace conference, several thousand tribesmen had died, tens of thousands had been displaced and 40,000 homes destroyed. These conflicts have been between nomadic and sedentary communities, and amongst and within nomadic and pastoralists. There has also been an additional source of instability in Darfur. Although the ethnically diverse people of Darfur were all Muslims and have a very strong sense of belonging to the Sudan, a sizeable minority also feel aYnity with related groups in neighboring Chad. In early 2003, two armed groups have waged war in Darfur against the Government of Sudan. These groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began the war with attacks on towns, government facilities and civilians in Darfur. Several hundred policemen were murdered and more than 80 police stations were destroyed in attacks. This resulted in a security vacuum which further distorted civil society in Darfur with numerous communities responding in their own ways. The conflict subsequently spiraled out of control and has resulted in many deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Sudan. Many others have fled into neighboring Chad. A growing humanitarian crisis ensued. The rebel movements appear to have recruited from within certain tribes and clans in Darfur and the war has inevitably focused upon those areas of Darfur within which the insurgents chose to base themselves. Several hundred thousand civilians have chosen to flee and remove themselves from these war zones. The rebel movements in Darfur have claimed that they are fighting against underdevelopment and marginalisation. Every part of Sudan, north, south, east and west is underdeveloped and Darfur has been the focus of considerable government attention. These claims should be assessed against the information and figures given below. Political participation: Since coming to power in 1989, the Sudanese government has sought to introduce a federal model of government. Darfuris are very well represented within Sudan’s political structures. There are seven federal government ministers from Darfur and Darfuris also hold, amongst other positions, a cabinet-rank presidential adviser position. There are also four Darfuri state governors and Darfuris are also members of the supreme and constitutional court. Darfuri representation in the National Assembly is second only to the southern states. Education: There has been a continuous increase in education facilities in Darfur. For example, the number of primary schools in 1969 was 241, increasing to 353 schools in 1978. There were 637 schools in 1989 and this increased under the present government to 786 schools in 2001, in addition to 1,455 mixed schools. Secondary schools have increased from 2 schools in 1968 to 195 schools in 2001. The present government also established three universities in Darfur. Health: The number of hospitals in greater Darfur has increased under this government from 3 hospitals in 1988 to 23 hospitals by 2001; health centres have similarly increased from 20 to 24 and medical laboratories from 16 to 70. Water Supplies: Water production levels have risen from 6 million cubic metres in 1989 to 11 million cubic metres in 2003 in addition to increased in natural water reserves from 1,400,000 cubic metres in 1989 to 12,300,000 cubic metres in 2003. Water pump production in greater Darfur has also increased from 1,200,000 cubic metres in 1989 to 3,100,000 cubic metres in 2003. During 2000–03, the following water projects were implemented in greater Darfur: the installation of 110 deep ground wells, the rehabilitation of 133 ground wells, the building of 43 dykes and 30 dams, the drilling of 842 hand pumps and the rehabilitation of 839 hand pump wells. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 135
Power Supplies: The total power generation in greater Darfur has risen under this government from 2,300 kilowatts in 1989 to 4,500 kws by 2000. Southern Darfur’s power generation in particular grew in the same time from three to seven megawatts in Nyala. Transport infrastructure: Greater Darfur accounts for 40% of airport and aerodrome infrastructure outside of the national capital. There are three international airports in Al-Fasher, Nyala, and al-Gineina with smaller airports elsewhere. All these were built under this government. Prior to 1989 there was no real road infrastructure in Darfur. The government has initiated a number of road and bridge building programmes to assist with communications in greater Darfur. The conflict in Darfur presents a very complex situation with very complex problems, and understanding of which has already been made more diYcult by the propaganda, which invariably accompanies war. The region is home to some 80 tribes and ethnic groups divided between nomads and sedentary communities. The rebels appear to have been identified within two or three communities of the Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa tribes which straddle the Sudan-Chad border. There are many dimensions to the conflict, regional, national and international. But, environmental factors—such as encroaching desertification—have led to considerable tension between nomads and more established farming communities. The inter-tribal violence that has taken place in Darfur has, nevertheless, been portrayed by some anti-government activists and some international media and NGOs as “ethnic cleansing” and even “genocide”. The activities of nomadic Arab tribesmen known as the “Janjaweed” have come into sharp focus. It is claimed that they are sponsored by the Government, which is not true. It is unclear exactly how much control anyone has over the “Janjaweed” gunmen, except their tribal leaders. All wars lead to human rights violations. The conflict in Darfur has been no exception. And as is so often the case in war, the conflict has inevitably been caught up in the propaganda and misinformation that comes with it and that has certainly characterised previous coverage of Sudan. In its wake, eVorts at conflict resolution will be hampered and the palpable presence of ethnic hostility will indeed constitute a concrete and tangible cause of future violent confrontations.
Response of the International Community The international community has shown considerable attention to the Darfur crisis, especially given the humanitarian and security situation. Sudan has welcomed, hosted and facilitated a wide range of missions and delegations from western countries, and international and regional organisations. These have included visits from British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the United States Secretary of State, Mr Colin Powell and Ministers from, amongst other countries, Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Ireland and Canada. Sudan has accepted and facilitated United Nations involvement at all levels in addressing and resolving the Darfur crisis, from the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, downwards. Khartoum has also welcomed, for example, fact-finding missions from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in April 2004, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations World Food Programme Director as well as delegations from the African Union, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Conference. There have been continuing visits by the United Nations such as that in August 2004 by the UN special representative to Sudan, Jan Pronk, deputy special representative Manuel Aranda Da Silva and the UN deputy humanitarian coordinator Erick De Mul. The Sudanese Government has also facilitated international human rights missions by non-governmental organisations, including that of Amnesty International in September 2004, and the UN fact finding mission this month of November 2004. The international community has actively assisted in attempts to resolve the conflict. The role of the Chadian government has been very positive. In 2003, the government accepted Chadian government oVers to mediate between the government and rebels. Chad was instrumental in negotiating ceasefires in western Sudan in September 2003 and subsequently in April 2004. Sudan has both acknowledged and welcomed the active mediation role played by the African Union in attempting to resolve the conflict in Darfur. Khartoum has particularly welcomed AU involvement given the stipulation in the United Nations Charter that regional organisations be allowed first to resolve conflicts before these are addressed by the United Nations mechanisms. Sudan has also welcomed the role of the African Union in deploying several thousand troops from African countries for the monitoring of the cease-fire and protection of such monitors. The Sudanese armed forces, police and security organisations have been instructed to give assistance to these forces. The government engaged, with the help of the international community, on a comprehensive program for a lasting solution to the conflict, that restores the economic and social fabric of the region, renews cooperation between the diVerent tribal groups to open new vistas for economic and social development. On 9 April 2004 the Sudanese government and two rebel movements in Darfur agreed to a 45-day ceasefire to allow humanitarian assistance to reach several hundred thousand peopleaVected by the fighting. The agreement included the release of prisoners of war and other detainees arrested as a result of the conflict, to stop laying mines and committing acts of sabotage and had pledged allow the free movement of people and goods. Ev 136 International Development Committee: Evidence
Measures taken by the Government The government was duty bound to respond both to the rebellion and the subsequent break-down in law and order in parts of Darfur. The government has deployed several thousand policemen in Darfur to provide security to civilians, and especially those civilians currently living in IDP camps. There are now joint border patrols by Chadian and Sudanese security forces. These patrols are a major step towards ensuring security and protection of the population in the region. The government has brought before the courts persons involved in violations of human rights. Scores of such persons have already been arrested and tried; others are being apprehended pending trial. From the onset of the crisis, the Government has sought a political resolution to the conflict. Early in 2003, Khartoum initiated eVorts at reconciliation through inter-tribal conferences. It then welcomed outside mediation by the Chadian government—mediation which resulted in a ceasefire for parts of 2003. The President has also declared amnesties for those involved in the conflict and has repeatedly reiterated Sudan’s commitment to a political solution. The Government has also set up a commission of inquiry into alleged violations of human rights in Darfur. Members of the commission include prominent human rights activists and it is headed by a former Chief Justice of Sudan. To coordinate the government’s response to the Darfur crisis, the Sudanese President appointed as his Special Representative in the Darfur States, the Interior Minister. On 6 July 2004, 15 decrees were issued aimed at addressing and alleviating the crisis in Darfur. These addressed security issues, the easing of aid and relief access to Darfur, human rights monitoring and the presence and work of African Union observers. They were: (1) To strengthen the security measures and protect the citizens in Darfur state. (2) Opening of police centres in the displaced camps and to strengthen the security measures in Darfur state. (3) To extend the necessary help to the committees and the African surveillance force. (4) Deployment of the armed force, the participating force, and the security institutions in Darfur state to maintain security and protect the citizens and their properties in Darfur. (5) Exemption of all the humanitarian aid imports from any restrictions, customs tariV, or any charges. (6) Repeal of measures regarding the specifications on the humanitarian aid imports to Darfur state. (7) To facilitate the freedom of movement for those working for humanitarian aid organisations in Darfur. (8) To facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid to the displaced people in Darfur state. (9) Exemption of agricultural inputs, fodders, and seeds in Darfur state from any restrictions, customs tariV, or other charges. (10) Exemption of humanitarian aid imports to Darfur state from any imports restrictions. (11) To facilitate the work of the national fact finding committee concerning the allegations of human rights violations committed by armed groups in Darfur state. Aid Access to Darfur: Humanitarian aid access to communities aVected by an on-going war has always presented considerable diYculties and problems. Darfur has been no exception. The Government of Sudan has assisted whenever and wherever it can in facilitating relief eVorts in Darfur by international and national non-governmental organisations. There are now some 6,000 aid workers present in Darfur present in 155 locations in Darfur. The World Food Programme is present in 136 of these centres and is feeding a million displaced persons. Media Access to Darfur: Similarly, the government has allowed and facilitated media access to Darfur by several hundred journalists. To stop the spreading malaise of ethnic hostility, the Government of the Sudan, in fulfillment of its responsibilities and obligations toward its citizens and to ensure their well-being, is seriously involved, with the help of the international cmmunity, on a comprehensive programme for a lasting solution to the protracted conflict, that restores the economic and social fabric of the region, renews cooperation between the diVerent tribal groups to open new vistas for economic and social development. The priority must be to complete the Naivasha peace process. Second, whatever the level of civilian support enjoyed by militias, it would be a mistake to tarnish the communities with the sins of the particular militia they support. On the contrary, every eVort should be made to neutralise the militia and stabilise communities in Darfur through local initiatives. To build confidence among all parties, but particularly among those demonised as “Janjaweed,” we need to use the same standard for all. To make the point, let us first look at the Darfur as one family. Finally, to build on the Naivasha process by bringing in all those previously excluded. To do so will require creating the conditions for a reorganised civil administration in Darfur. November 2004 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 137
Memorandum submitted by The European Sudanese Public AVairs Council (ESPAC)
OBSTACLES TO PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN DARFUR
Summary This submission seeks to present perspectives on several of the above issues, examining some of the obstacles to peace and reconciliation in Darfur and focusing on two inter-related questions. The first is what was it that triggered the systematic outbreak of violence in Darfur in February 2003? This question is at the heart of understanding the dynamics of the conflict. The second question is the extent to which flawed interpretations and questionable projections of the crisis—some of them the sort of propaganda invariably associated with war and particularly civil war—hinders both reconciliation and peace-building while at the same time skewing and adversely influencing international opinion.
Introduction The inquiry by the International Development Committee has indicated interest in the following issues: “the nature, causes and chronology of the crisis in Darfur; the international community’s response, including that of the United Nations, the African Union, humanitarian agencies and the UK Government; conflict prevention and peace-building at national and local levels; the nature of the aid relationship with developing countries aVected by conflict.”
The Nature and Causes of the Crisis in Darfur The war in Darfur began in February 2003 when two armed groups, the “Justice and Equality Movement” (JEM) and the “Sudan Liberation Army” (SLA), launched attacks on policemen, government garrisons and civilians in the area. Darfur is an ecologically-fragile area and had already seen growing—and often armed— conflict over natural resources between some 80 tribes and ethnic groups loosely divided between nomads and sedentary communities. These conflicts, some between nomadic communities and farmers, and some within nomadic and farming communities themselves, inter-tribal and intra-tribal, scarred the 1970s and 1980s. Much of this violence also had cross-border implications, with communities often straddling the Sudan-Chad frontier. In perhaps the most objective reading of the present crisis in Darfur, the UN media service has made this analysis: “The conflict pits farming communities against nomads who have aligned themselves with the militia groups—for whom the raids are a way of life—in stiV competition for land and resources. The militias, known as the Janjaweed, attack in large numbers on horseback and camels and are driving the farmers from their land, often pushing them towards town centres.”36 The rebel groups appear to have been closely identified with two or three “African”, sedentary, communities such as the Fur and the Zaghawa tribes. The systematic murder by the rebels of several hundred policemen and the destruction of over 80 police stations created a security vacuum, which together with the rebel targeting of tribal leaders and tribesmen from several “Arab” tribes, led to an explosion of inter-communal violence.37 It is clear that a variety of armed groups have been active in Darfur over the past year or so, either as participants in the war or taking advantage of the turmoil the conflict has caused. This has clearly included heavily-armed criminal gangs from both sides of the Chad-Sudan border. The conflict has spiralled out of control and caused a growing humanitarian crisis.38 Over one million civilians have been displaced by the conflict. On 19 April 2004, the government and rebels signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement mediated by the Chadian government as a first step towards a lasting peace. In November 2004 African Union mediation resulted in the Government and rebel movements extending the ceasefire and aid access agreements.39 The African Union will be providing both a forum for continuing peace talks and ceasefire supervision. It is essential that agreements are honoured, monitored and followed through as the international community attempts both to address the humanitarian aid needs of those hundreds of thousands of civilians who have been displaced by the war and to facilitate a political solution to the conflict. While the ceasefire has been violated from time to time by all parties to the conflict the bulk of events now in focus happened before the April ceasefire.
36 “Widespread Insecurity in Darfur Despite Ceasefire”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 3 October 2003. 37 See, for example, “Khartoum Forces Free Tribal Leaders Held Hostage in Darfur: Press”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 March 2003. 38 See “Sudan: One Million At ‘Imminent Risk’ in Darfur, Says US Government”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 3 March 2004. 39 See “Sudan, Darfur Rebels Sign Pacts to End Hostilities, Aid Refugees”, USAToday, 9 November 2004; “Sudan Signs Pacts With Rebels in Darfur Region”, The New York Times, 9 November 2004. Ev 138 International Development Committee: Evidence
What has Caused the Unrest? The insurgents in Darfur claim to be acting because of Darfur’s marginalisation and underdevelopment. That Darfur is underdeveloped is self-evident. It is no more underdeveloped, however, than several other parts of Sudan. It is also clear that this historic underdevelopment, however it is measured, does not adequately explain the inter-communal violence in past decades. It is diYcult to accept that underdevelopment and marginalisation accounts for the level of focused and orchestrated violence aimed at the Government of Sudan since early 2003, and clearly planned for some considerable time beforehand. It is also diYcult to ignore Khartoum’s assertions with regard to development in Darfur since the present government came to power in 1989.40 What is becoming increasingly obvious is that whatever legitimate issues may have arisen out of concerns about underdevelopment they have been hijacked by various opportunistic forces to serve diVerent ends. The question that must be answered is what was it that turned a limited, low-intensity conflict between the pastoral and arable farming groups in Darfur into a well-organised, well-armed and well-resourced civil war? Rebel claims that the war is simply the inevitable result of marginalisation have been contradicted by reputable, independent observers. A particularly credible observer is Ghazi Suleiman, Sudan’s most prominent human rights activist. He has publicly stated that: “The conflict in Darfur has nothing to do with marginalisation or the inequitable distribution of wealth. Inherently it is a struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese Islamist movement, the (opposition) Popular Congress party and the ruling National Congress (party)”.41 Suleiman is referring to the conflict within the Sudanese Islamist movement following the government’s sidelining of the Islamist eminence grise Dr Hasan Turabi, a figure seen as having been an obstacle both to the normalisation of relations with the United States and a peace agreement with southern rebels. The ruling National Congress party split with hard-liners under Turabi, many of them from Darfur, forming the Popular Congress party in opposition to any engagement with Washington and the West and peace in southern Sudan. (Noted anti-government critic and Sudan analyst, Alex De Waal, has observed: “It is almost unbearably ironic that just as southern Sudan is on the brink of peace, Darfur-and with it the entire north-is convulsed by another war. The linkage is not accidental”42). The Justice and Equality Movement, led by Turabi prote´ge´ Khalil Ibrahim, and at the heart of the Darfur conflict, is widely recognised as being part and parcel of the Popular Congress. In November 2003, the Popular Congress admitted that some party members were involved in the Darfur conflict.43 In January 2004 Turabi admitted supporting the Darfur insurrection: “We support the cause, no doubt about it...wehave relations with some of the leadership.”44 In the same month, Turabi admitted that 30 members of his Popular Congress party had been arrested in connection with activities in Darfur.45 It is clear that Turabi and Popular Congress deliberately chose Darfur to be the cockpit of their war against Khartoum. They also cold-bloodedly projected a racial element to the issue. Popular Congress activists originated and distributed a publication known as “The Black Book” alleging Khartoum’s marginalisation and neglect of Darfur and claiming that Sudan’s political elite was dominated by a northern Arab clique—seemingly the same clique once led by Dr Turabi. The Financial Times confirmed that the “Black Book” had been written by Justice and Equality Movement activists. The newspaper also noted that “the appearance of the Black Book did coincide with a deep split in the regime, which has exacerbated tension in society.”46 Alex de Waal has also commented on the importance of the “Black Book” in subsequent events in Darfur: “The Islamist split quickly took on regional and ethnic dimensions. The west Africans and Darfurians who had come into the Islamist movement under Turabi’s leadership left with him...InMay2000, Darfurian Islamists produced the “Black Book” . . . The Black Book was a key step
40 The government has stated, for example, that before 1989, there were only 16 high schools in Darfur: there are presently some 250 schools. In 1989 there were 27,000 students in schools; in 2003 there were more than 440,000. In 1989 there was not a single university in Darfur; there are now three. The number of hospitals in greater Darfur has increased under this government from three hospitals in 1988 to 23 hospitals by 2001. Water pump production in greater Darfur has also increased from 1,200,000 cubic meters in 1989 to 3,100,000 cubic meters in 2003. During 2000–03, the following water projects were implemented in greater Darfur: the installation of 110 deep ground wells, the rehabilitation of 133 ground wells, the building of 43 dykes and 30 dams, the drilling of 842 hand pumps and the rehabilitation of 839 hand pump wells. The total power generation in greater Darfur has risen under this government from 2,300 kilowatts in 1989 to 4,500 kws by 2000. Before 1989 there was not a single airport in Darfur; there are now three. There has been a three-fold increase in paved roads since 1989. And, politically, Darfur is very well represented at all levels of Sudanese society. There are eight ministers from Darfur and four Darfurian state governors. Darfurians are also members of the supreme and constitutional court. Darfurian representation in the National Assembly is second only to the southern states. 41 “Sudan Islamists use Darfur as Battleground”, News Article by Reuters, 22 September 2004. 42 “Tragedy in Darfur: On Understanding and Ending the Horror”, Boston Review, October–November 2004. Alex de Waal is a director of the human rights group, Justice Africa and a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University. He is the author or editor or several books, including Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984–1985, Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa and Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa. De Waal was formerly a co-director of African Rights and has worked for the Inter-Africa Group. 43 “Sudanese Government Warns Opposition Party to Stop ‘Sedition’ in West”, News Article by Associated Press, 23 November 2003. 44 “Peace Still Some Way OV in Sudan”, Middle East International (London), 8 January 2004. 45 “Al-Turabi Denounces US Role in Peace Process”, News Article by Al-Hayat (London), 26 January 2004. 46 “The Black Book history or Darfur’s darkest chapter,” The Financial Times (London) 21 August 2004. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 139
in the polarization of the country along politically constructed “racial” rather than religious lines, and it laid the basis for a coalition between Darfur’s radicals, who formed the SLA, and its Islamists, who formed the other rebel organization, the Justice and Equality Movement.”47 The linkage between Darfur’s violence and the Popular Congress has an additional dimension. In February 2001, Turabi and the Popular Congress signed a joint memorandum with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the southern rebel movement led by Dr John Garang, which called for the “the escalation of popular resistance” against Khartoum. A secret codicil to the Popular Congress/SPLA memorandum was an agreement by the SPLA to train Darfur rebels. The International Crisis Group, an organisation very critical of the Sudanese government, has noted that “numerous sources link the SPLA to the beginning of the SLA rebellion by providing arms, training, and strategy . . . It allegedly trained as many as 1,500 Darfurians near Raja, in western Bahr el-Ghazal, in March 2002.”48 These trainees subsequently formed the basis of the Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement. It is worth further noting that in March 2004, military oYcers linked to the Popular Congress attempted a coup d’e´tat in Khartoum. The BBC noted that: “Those detained are also being linked to the uprising in the Darfur region.”49 In September 2004, the Khartoum authorities foiled another attempted coup by Popular Congress and Justice and Equality Movement activists. The government captured a large arms cache “with which the conspirators planned to kidnap and kill 38 government oYcials and destroy strategic targets in Khartoum.”50 If true, the intimate involvement of Islamist extremists such as Dr Turabi and his Popular Congress party in the Darfur insurgency has worrying implications for those eager to end and resolve the war. It is very diYcult, for example, to end a conflict said to be about marginalisation and underdevelopment when at least one of major participants would appear to have a hidden agenda of overthrowing the Government of Sudan and replacing it with a more hard-line Islamist regime. Building schools and roads and drilling more water wells in Darfur, while doubtlessly useful, is not going to satisfy hard-line Islamist rebels in Darfur any more than reconstruction projects in Iraq have satisfied Islamist insurgents in that country.
External Involvement in the Darfur Conflict It is additionally clear that the Darfur insurgents have had considerable external assistance. The Justice and Equality Movement for example, are now also said to be receiving assistance from al-Qaeda.51 The “Sudan Liberation Army” were reported by Agence France Presse to have “weapons, vehicles and modern satellite communications”.52 UN media sources have also noted claims by tribal leaders that the rebels have better weapons than the Sudanese army.53 The insurgents have also been receiving military supplies by air.54 And, in a disturbing resonance of the gunmen who have dominated parts of Somalia in four-wheel drive “technicals”, the rebels have also been operating in groups of up to 1,000 men in four-wheel drive vehicles.55 Eritrea has also militarily, logistically and politically assisted the Darfur gunmen in its continuing attempts to destabilise Sudan. Khartoum has lodged oYcial complaints with the United Nations and African Union.56 The Sudanese government has also pointed to the agreement signed in the Eritrean capital between Darfur gunmen and elements of the Beja Congress, an armed anti-government group based in Eritrea.57 The Sudanese government has had grounds to doubt the credibility of their counter-parts in the Naivasha process, Dr John Garang and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). While engaged in peace talks with Khartoum, the SPLA have both trained and armed the Darfur rebels. As noted above the International Crisis Group has noted SPLA involvement in training Darfur rebels. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, SPLA spokesmen were still claiming as recently as September 2004 that the SPLA “has nothing to do with the present rebellion in Darfur”.58
47 “Tragedy in Darfur: On Understanding and Ending the Horror”, Boston Review, October–November 2004 48 “Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis”, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No 76, Brussels, March 2004. 49 “Sudanese Islamist Leader Arrested”, News Article by BBC Online, 31 March 2004. 50 “Darfur Governor Links Khartoum Plot with Rebels”, News Article by Reuters, 26 September 2004. See, also, “Sudan arrests 14 Islamists for sabotage plot”, News Article by Reuters, 8 September 2004. 51 See, for example, “The New Afghanistan and the Next Battlefield?”, in Richard Miniter, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror, Regnery Publishing, Washington-DC, 2004. 52 “New Rebel Group Seizes West Sudan Town”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 26 February 2003. 53 “The Escalating Crisis in Darfur”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 31 December 2003. 54 See, for example, “Sudan Accuses Southern Separatists of Supplying Arms to Darfur Rebels”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 28 April 2003, and “Sudanese Armed Forces Attack an Unidentified Plane for Helping Western Rebels”, News Article by Associated Press, 28 August 2003. 55 “Dozens Reported Killed or Wounded in Attack in Western Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 October 2003. 56 See, for example, “Sudan Calls on U.N. to Take Action Against Eritrea”, News Article by Deutsche Press Agentur, 5 January 2004; and “AU to Consider Sudan Complaint Against Eritrea”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 January 2004. 57 See, for example, “Sudan Rebels Form Alliance Against Khartoum Government”, News Article by Africa Online, 28 January 2004. 58 “Sudan’s Southern Rebels deny Involvement in Crisis in Darfur Region”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 16 September 2004. Ev 140 International Development Committee: Evidence
Any study of the conflict in Darfur can now no longer ignore the involvement of al-Qaeda with some of the insurgents. Mr Tom Vraalsen, the UN secretary-general’s special envoy for humanitarian aVairs for Sudan, has pointed out the regional implications of the Darfur conflict: “A continuation of the problems in Darfur could have serious political repercussions in the sense that it could destabilize the area along the Chad-Sudan border and it could have repercussions also regionally if it continues. It has to be brought to an end.”59 This is precisely why groups such as al-Qaeda are interested in Darfur. American counter- terrorism expert, Richard Miniter, in his latest book, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror, has reported that the al-Qaeda network has for some time been establishing itself in the Sahel area, an area which is made up of Niger, Mali, Chad and Sudan. Dozens of al-Qaeda terrorists were killed in Chad in 2004. Miniter states that al-Qaeda instructors, including specialists in guerilla and urban warfare and logistics, have been involved in training Justice and Equality insurgents in Darfur. He further states that al-Qaeda involvement in Darfur “dovetails with other reports from North Africa. The desert wastes have become al-Qaeda’s latest battleground.”60 It is clear that any Western military intervention in Darfur would serve as a rallying point for Islamist extremists, both within and outside of Darfur and Sudan.
Propaganda and Sensationalism within the Darfur Crisis To address the Darfur crisis it is essential that events in Darfur are evaluated as objectively as possible. To do so observers must cut away the pressure group politics— especially within the United States—war- related propaganda and media sensationalism that has already distorted perceptions of the Darfur crisis and Sudan.61 The government has stated that: “Those with their own agendas are trying to give a very sad view of what is happening. The propaganda in the west is trying to exaggerate what is taking place in Darfur.”62 That the Darfur issue has been enmeshed at least in part in propaganda images and claims is clear. It would be naive not to factor such a dimension into any study of the crisis. There have been allegations of genocide, ethnic cleansing and the use of chemical weapons in Darfur. Recent claims, for example, of the use of chemical weapons in Darfur have unravelled. A prominent German newspaper alleged that the Syrian and Sudanese governments had used chemical weapons against civilians in Darfur.63 This claim, although exposed as misinformation, was widely repeated and serves as a further illustration of the propaganda war surrounding Darfur.64 Similarly sensationalistic claims, while serving any number of short-term political goals, complicate and distort an already complex issue. Any solution to the Darfur crisis has to cut through this propaganda wall and move on. It is useful therefore to assess some of the major allegations that have been made with regard to events in Darfur.
Allegations that Genocide is Taking Place in Darfur In September 2004, the American Secretary of State, Colin Powell, responding to domestic pressure from conservative and anti-Islamic constituencies, declared that events in Darfur constituted “genocide”. This was despite having previously stated two months before events in Darfur did not “meet the tests of the definition of genocide”.65 His September comment, in the lead-up to the US elections, was widely seen as an attempt to divert media attention away from the disastrous events in Iraq. The American record for crying wolf, in the wake of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction fiasco, is clear. The United Nations Secretary-General Mr Kofi Annan has contradicted American claims: “Icann ot call the killing a genocide even though there have been massive violations of international humanitarian law.”66 The African has also gone on record as stating: “Even though the crisis in Darfur is grave, with unacceptable levels of death, human suVering and destruction of homes and infrastructure, the situation cannot be defined as a genocide”.67 Washington’s genocide claims have been criticised by well-respected humanitarian groups such as Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF).68 MSF President Dr Jean-Herve´ Bradol subsequently described American claims of genocide in Darfur as “obvious political opportunism”.69 Dr Bradol had previously stated that the use of the term genocide was inappropriate: “Our teams have not seen evidence of the
59 “Situation in Sudan’s Dafour Region ‘Very Serious’, Says UN Envoy”, News Article by Africa Online, 16 January 2004. 60 Richard Miniter, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror, Regnery Publishing, Washington- DC, 2004, pp 98–99. 61 For an overview of propaganda within the Sudanese conflict see, David Hoile, Images of Sudan: Case Studies in Misinformation and Propaganda, European-Sudanese Public AVairs Council, London, 2003, available at www.espac.org 62 “The Escalating Crisis in Darfur”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 31 December 2003. 63 See, for example, “Syria Tested Chemical Arms on Civilians in Darfur Region: Press”, Agence France Presse, 14 September 2004. 64 “US Doubts Report on Syrian Chemical Weapons Testing in Darfur”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 15 September 2004. 65 For a full transcript of Powell’s comments see “Powell Says Talks With Sudan Government Yielded Agreement”, 1 July 2004 at http://allafrica.com/stories/200407010005.html. 66 “No Genocide in Sudan, Annan Says”, News Article by Deutsche Press Agentur, 17 June 2004. 67 “Africans Press Sudan to Quell Violence”, News Article by Associated Press, 6 July 2004. 68 See, for example, “Doctors Without Borders/Me´decins Sans Frontie`res Challenges US Darfur Genocide Claims”, Mediamonitors, 5 October 2004, available at www.mediamonitors.net. 69 “From One Genocide to Another”, Article by Dr Jean-Herve´ Bradol, 28 September 2004, available at Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (UAE) website, www.msfuae.ae. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 141
deliberate intention to kill people of a specific group. We have received reports of massacres, but not of attempts to specifically eliminate all the members of a group”.70 Dr Mercedes Taty, MSF’s deputy emergency director, who worked with 12 expatriate doctors and 300 Sudanese nationals in field hospitals throughout Darfur at the height of the emergency has also warned: “Idon’t t hink that we should be using the word ‘genocide’ to describe this conflict. Not at all. This can be a semantic discussion, but nevertheless, there is no systematic target—targeting one ethnic group or another one. It doesn’t mean either that the situation in Sudan isn’t extremely serious by itself.”71 Me´decins Sans Frontie`res is an exceptionally credible observer with regard to allegations of genocide for two reasons. Firstly, MSF was amongst the first humanitarian groups to establish a presence in Darfur as the conflict unfolded. MSF is very heavily involved in the provision of medical and emergency services in all three of the states that make up Darfur, deploying two thousand staV.72 It has been actively assisting 250,000 people displaced by fighting throughout the region. Secondly, MSF’s reputation is quite simply beyond reproach. Me´decins Sans Frontie`res was the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. It has also received numerous other awards recognising its outstanding humanitarian work throughout the world.
Allegations that the Darfur Conflict is Racial
One of the other sensationalist themes is that the conflict in Darfur has been a racial one in which light- skinned “Arab” tribes have been engaged in the “ethnic cleansing” of black “African” tribes.73 These sorts of claims are particularly inflammatory and very questionable. The simple fact is that there is very little, if any, racial diVerence between the many tribes of Darfur, “Arab” or “African”. Both communities are black. The London Observer newspaper has reported, for example, that “[c]enturies of intermarriage has rendered the two groups physically indistinguishable”.74 The UN media service noted: “In Darfur, where the vast majority of people are Muslim and Arabic-speaking, the distinction between ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ is more cultural than racial.”75 This reality has been confirmed by prominent anti-government critics such as John Ryle and Alex de Waal.76 Ryle has noted that Arabs and non-Arabs “are generally physically indistinguishable”.77 Alex de Waal has stated that “Characterising the Darfur war as ‘Arabs’ versus ‘Africans’ obscures the reality. Darfur’s Arabs are black, indigenous, African Muslims—just like Darfur’s non-Arabs.”78 The New York Times has exemplified contradictory reporting on this issue, with articles on one hand by their columnist Nicholas Kristof alleging, for example, that “black Africans have been driven from their homes by lighter-skinned Arabs in the Janjaweed”79 while also publishing subsequent articles such as “In Sudan, No Clear DiVerence Between Arab and African”.80 Even “African” Darfurian anti- government figures such as Dr Eltigani Ateem Seisi contradict the dangerously lazy shorthand of the New York Times. Speaking at a conference in Brussels he stated with reference to “Arabs” and “Africans” in Darfur that “we all look alike” and that one “can’t tell from the features if he is Arab or African”. He added that he, an “African”, had a lighter skin than many “Arabs”.81
70 “Thousands Die as World Defines Genocide”, The Financial Times (London), 6 July 2004. See also, Bradol’s views in “France Calls on Sudan to Forcibly Disarm Darfur Militias”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 July 2004. 71 “Violence in the Sudan Displaces Nearly 1 Million. An Aid Worker Describes the Gravity of the Humanitarian Crisis”, News Article by MSNBC, 16 April 2004. 72 See, for example, MSF’s own briefing: “Me´decins Sans Frontie`res has been working in Darfur since December 2003. Today, 90 international volunteers and nearly 2,000 Sudanese staV provide medical and nutritional care in areas with more than 400,000 displaced people. Medical teams conduct medical consultations and hospitalisation, treat victims of violence, care for severely and moderately malnourished children, and provide water, blankets, feeding and other essential items in Mornay, Zalingei, Nyertiti, Kerenik, El Genina, Garsila, Deleig, Mukjar, Bindisi, and Um Kher in West Darfur State; Kalma Camp near Nyala and Kass in South Darfur State; and Kebkabiya in North Darfur State. MSF also continues to assess areas throughout Darfur. Additional teams provide assistance to Sudanese who have sought refuge in Chad in Adre, Birak and Tine, Iriba and Guereda.” (“We are looking at a second catastrophe”, Darfur feature article on MSF Australia Website, http:// www.msf.org.au/tw-feature/045twf.html). 73 See, for example, “Arab Militias Destroying Schools in Sudan to Wipe Out Black Culture”, News Article by Knight Ridder Newspapers, 20 August 2004. 74 “Empty Villages Mark Trail of Sudan’s Hidden War”, The Observer (London), 30 May 2004. 75 “The Escalating Crisis in Darfur”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 31 December 2003. 76 John Ryle is Chair of the Rift Valley Institute and a Research Associate of the Centre of African Studies at the University of London. Alex de Waal is a director of the human rights group, Justice Africa and a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University. He is the author or editor or several books, including Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985, Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa and Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa. De Waal was formerly a co-director of African Rights and has worked for the Inter-Africa Group. 77 John Ryle, “Disaster in Darfur”, The New York Review of Books, Volume 51, Number 13, 12 August 2004. 78 “Darfur’s deep grievances Defy all Hopes for an Easy Solution”, The Observer (London), 25 July 2004. 79 Nicholas Kristof, “Cruel Choices”, The New York Times, 14 April 2004. 80 “In Sudan, No Clear DiVerence Between Arab and African”, The New York Times, 3 October 2004. 81 Comments made by Dr Eltigani Ateem Seisi at the seminar “Confronting the Crisis in Darfur: A Transatlantic Assessment”, Transatlantic Institute, Brussels, 12 May 2004. Dr Ateem is the head of Darfur UK, an anti-government group based in Britain. Ev 142 International Development Committee: Evidence
Allegations that there is a Policy of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur There has obviously been a vast displacement of civilians within Darfur. A sensationalist media and human rights industry has claimed that the government has pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.82 Me´decins Sans Frontie`res has noted that “there is no systematic target—targeting one ethnic group or another one”. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian AVairs, Mr Egeland, has also stated that the term “ethnic cleansing” did not fit events in Darfur: “Ithink we hav e more reports actually of a kind of scorched earth [policy]—and that nobody has taken over. ...It’scomplex, because some have said that it doesn’t fit the legal definition of ethnic cleansing. The same tribes are represented both among those who are cleansed and those who are cleansing.”83 Mr Egeland’s views have been echoed by key human rights experts. Asma Jehangir, the UN rapporteur on extra-judicial summary and arbitrary executions, for example, has said: “Iwouldn’t categorise as ethnic cleansing at the momen t because that is not the impression that Iam getting. Itcould be an unintended purpose but the numb ers are staggering, the situation is terrible.”84 Allegations of ethnic cleansing have also been clearly contradicted by Sudanese government actions. Far from wishing to see the displacement of “African” Darfurian communities, the government has self-evidently been very eager to see these communities returned to their homes. In October 2004, Khartoum reported to the UN that 70,000 displaced people had been returned to their places of origin.85 Jan Pronk, the UN Special Envoy to Sudan, was said to be concerned because neither the UN High Commissioner for Refugees nor the UN Organisation for Migration had been consulted prior to the repatriation. While there may well be some concern as to whether all the returns were voluntary Khartoum’s eagerness to return refugees to their place of origin is manifest.
Allegations that the Government Controls the “Janjaweed” Assertions that the government controls the “Janjaweed”, the gunmen and bandits that have been associated with much of the violence in Darfur, and can turn their activities oV and on like a tap have also distorted the reality of events. Part of the problem has been defining the term “Janjaweed”. A sensationalist media has lumped together as “Janjaweed” regular army forces, popular defence forces, police units, tribal militias, armed robbers through to any armed “Arab” tribesman. It is a bit like claiming that the British government controls all loyalist organisations, paramilitaries, gunmen and criminal rackets in Northern Ireland. The simple fact is that virtually all of Darfur’s 80 tribes will have members who are armed, some with members on both sides of the conflict. Some tribal militias will not disarm unless rival tribes also do so. A western diplomat in Khartoum has noted: “There are many gangs or groups that (the Sudanese government) doesn’t control or who may be partly under their control or controlled by the local authorities. So this is not a clear-cut picture. That makes you understand how diYcult (disarmament) is logistically.”86 According to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian AVairs Mr Jan Egeland “There are many armed groups and many armed criminal gangs in Darfur.” He referred to the Janjaweed as “a monster that nobody seems to be able to control”.87
Claims That All Militias in Darfur can be Disarmed in 30 Days Unrealistic expectations often based upon naive claims have not assisted with a resolution of the problem. One issue has been the problem of disarming the many armed groups and individuals in Darfur. In July 2004, for example, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution threatening action against Sudan if it did not disarm gunmen in Darfur within 30 days.88 Charles Snyder, a former acting assistant Secretary of State for African AVairs, and the State Department’s senior representative on Sudan, has stated, however, that there are no “30-day, 90-day quick fixes” to the problem. He also admitted: “This is going to take, in my view, 18 months to two years to conclude the first phase” of making the region safe for people to return to their homes.89 Clearly, every eVort must be made to both remove weapons and the motivation or need to carry weapons from the Darfur situation. Increasingly shrill demands for an immediate disarmament of armed forces within Darfur in the face of the reality outlined by Mr Snyder serve no purpose other than enflaming an already fraught situation.
82 See, as but two examples, “Sudan: Government Commits ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in Darfur”, Human Rights Watch, 7 May 2004 and “Ethnic Cleansing Blights Sudan”, News Article by BBC News Online, 27 May 2004. 83 “Interview with UN’s Jan Egeland on the Situation in Darfur”, News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Nairobi, 5 July 2004. 84 “Sudan ‘Neglecting’ Darfur Crisis”, News Article by BBC News Online, 8 June 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/ pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa 85 “Sudan: 70,000 Darfur IDPs Reportedly Taken Back to Their Homes”, News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 25 October 2004. 86 “Squabble Over Words Obscures Sudan Violence”, The Los Angeles Times, 6 November 2004. 87 “Sudan: Interview with UN’s Jan Egeland on the Situation in Darfur”, News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Nairobi, 5 July 2004. 88 See, for example, “Sudan Must Act on Darfur in 30 Days or Face Measures, Security Council Warns”, News Article by the United Nations News Center, New York, 30 July 2004. 89 “US Diplomat Says it May Take 2 Years to Disarm Militias in Sudan”, News Article by Associated Press, 24 September 2004. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 143
Claims About Humanitarian Aid Access There has been considerable sensationalism with regard to humanitarian aid access to Darfur. There have been attempts to claim that the Government has been systematically denying humanitarian access to Darfur. It is worth examining the aid issue in some depth. Humanitarian access to war-aVected communities in Darfur is essential in addressing the crisis. The international community must be aware of the extent to which emergency relief and food aid in such circumstances can and has been manipulated. In September 2003, the Government of Sudan and the SLA signed an agreement allowing “free and unimpeded” humanitarian access within Darfur.90 The international community must be aware of the extent to which humanitarian issues can be manipulated for political eVect.91 For rebels a humanitarian crisis is a no-lose situation. A humanitarian crisis always reflects badly on the government in the country aVected. And a humanitarian crisis is something which can be created and deepened. One of the goals of most insurgencies is to internationalise the conflict to which they are a party. One of the easiest means of doing so is to provoke a humanitarian crisis. This is precisely what the Darfur rebels succeeded in doing. Merely starting the war in Darfur initiated a humanitarian crisis in western Sudan. The escalating of the conflict and the government’s response to it led to a deepening crisis and considerable displacement of populations—a feature of most wars. The rebels, however, have deliberately sought to heighten the humanitarian crisis they created by starting the war by additionally seeking to escalate food insecurity knowing full well that this would be the focus of immediate international attention. The UN news service, for example, has reported rebel attempts to disrupt food security in the aVected areas: “SLA rebels regularly attacked and looted villages taking food and sometimes killing people...The attacks present a real threat to people’s food security and livelihoods, by preventing them from planting and accessing markets to buy food.”92 Quite simply put, insecurity means severely curtailed humanitarian aid access. The UN humanitarian relief spokesman has quite simply stated: “You can’t give aid when there are bullets flying.”93 In January 2004, for example, UN media sources reported that “about 85% of the 900,000 war-aVected people in Darfur...are inaccessible to humanitarian aid, according to the UN, mainly because of insecurity.”94 In December 2003, the UN quoted the Government as saying “The problem is in areas controlled by the SLM. Our experience has made us hesitant to send relief to areas under the SLM because of kidnapping and attacks on trucks.”95 On 11 February 2004 the Equality and Justice Movement declared its intention to close down every road within Darfur aware of the devastating consequences this would have on the ability of the Government and aid agencies (national and international) to provide emergency assistance to those communities suVering in Darfur. The rebels also further escalated humanitarian access diYculties by deliberately targeting aid workers. They murdered nine World Food Programme truck drivers, and wounded 14 others, in an attack on a relief convoy in October 2003.96 All this followed a set pattern by rebels in other parts of Sudan, tactics which succeeded in creating a humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan. The veteran American journalist, Robert Kaplan noted, for example: “On June 1, 1986, twelve Kenyan truck drivers bringing food into the south from the Ugandan border town of Nimule were ambushed...The drivers were bound by ropes to their steering wheels, and then grenades were lobbed at the trucks. This put a virtual halt to the World Food Program’s overland relief operation. Only 600 of the 90,000 tons had been delivered.”97 The then extent of the insecurity for humanitarian workers led to the United States government asking the Sudanese government for help with security and access.98 One month later, rebel gunmen killed two other relief workers and abducted three others.99 Rebels have also kidnapped other relief workers. In a further example of interference with humanitarian work, JEM gunmen admitted abducting five aid workers working for the Swiss humanitarian group Medair.100 Rebel harassment of aid workers and humanitarian relief has continued throughout the crisis. The Spanish branch of Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (Doctors
90 “Agreement Reached Allowing Humanitarian Access to Darfur Region of Sudan”, Press Release by United Nations OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, New York, 17 September 2003. 91 See, for example, “Sudanese Darfur Rebels Block Aid Pact”, News Article by Reuters, 26 October 2004 and “Darfur rebels threaten humanitarian aid workers”, News Article by UPI, 23 October 2004. 92 “Widespread Insecurity Reported in Darfur”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 30 July 2003. 93 “Aid Workers Unable to Reach Most War Zones in Darfur, Western Sudan”, News Article by Deutsche Presse Agentur, 13 January 2004. 94 “Authorities Forcibly Close IDP Camps in Southern Darfur”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 16 January 2004. 95 “Feature—Death and Destruction in Darfur”, News Article by Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs, 11 December 2003. 96 “Workers in Sudan Aid Convoy Killed”, News Article by BBC News, 28 October 2003. 97 Robert D. Kaplan, Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, Vintage Books, New York, 2003, p.190. 98 “USAID Seeks Security for Aid Convoys to War-Torn Area of Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 26 October 2003. 99 “Sudanese Government Accuses Rebels of Murdering its Relief Workers”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 November 2003. 100 “Rebel Faction Admits Abducting Relief Workers in Sudan”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 20 November 2003. Ev 144 International Development Committee: Evidence
Without Borders, MSF) and the Irish GOAL aid agency were forced to leave the Jebel Marra area of Darfur after “repeated” acts of aggression targeting humanitarian personnel and the relief supplies intended for people in need. Rebels had also attacked aid vehicles.101 The provision of humanitarian relief such as food aid and medical supplies have historically been a bonus to rebel movements. Firstly, international access impinges upon the national sovereignty of the country concerned. Secondly, international agencies with food and emergency supplies also help to sustain communities within rebel-controlled areas and can often be diverted by rebel forces. It was widely acknowledged that vast amounts of food aid were diverted during the war in southern Sudan. In July 1998, for example, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the starvation-aVected diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar Mazzolari, stated that the SPLA were stealing 65% of the food aid going into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. Agence France Presse also reported that: “Much of the relief food going to more than a million famine victims in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan is ending up in the hands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), relief workers said”.102 The Government of Sudan would appear to have acted responsibly with regard to humanitarian access to Darfur. The facts speak for themselves. In less than 12 months the Sudanese government has agreed and facilitated an increase in aid workers present in Darfur, from two foreigners and a few dozen nationals in September 2003 to just under six thousand aid workers—over seven hundred of them expatriates—by August 2004.103 The signing of the April 2004 ceasefire made it much safer and thus much easier for aid agencies to operate in Darfur. On 6 July 2004 the government issued 15 decrees which addressed, amongst other things, the easing of aid and relief access to Darfur. In total, there are now 155 locations assisting with internally displaced people in the three Darfur states, and the World Food Programme is present in 136 of these centres.104 There are now dozens of international and national non-governmental organisations working in Darfur.105 Speaking in June 2004, the outgoing UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Sudan, Mr Kevin Kennedy, confirmed that visas were generally being granted within 48 hours—as promised by the Government of Sudan—and that “people are experiencing very few visa diYculties”.106 That there have been propagandistic attempts to claim that the government was deliberately blocking access to Darfur by aid workers is clear. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian AVairs, Mr Jan Egeland, speaking in July 2004, commented on some of these claims, noting: “It is strange to see that there is still the notion in the world that nothing is happening and we’re completely blocked from accessing Darfur. We are reaching some 800,000 people at the moment with some sort of assistance and food.”107 By September 2004, the World Food Programme was feeding some 940,000 conflict-aVected people in Darfur.108 The presence of several thousand aid workers in Darfur provides clear evidence of the Khartoum government’s commitment to the provision of food and medical relief to Darfur’s war-aVected communities.
Conclusion The Darfur crisis is a very complex one. The international community has already played a vital role in both striving to reach a political solution to the conflict as well as addressing the immense humanitarian crisis the conflict has brought with it. The ceasefire must be extended, enforced and monitored. The mission of the African Union monitors must be supported and assisted. The ceasefire monitoring and verification
101 “MSF Spain Flees Rebel Attacks in Sudan’s Darfur”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 November 2004. 102 “Aid for Sudan Ending Up With SPLA: Relief Workers”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 July 1998. 103 Figures provided by the UN press oYce, Khartoum. 104 “Darfur: Humanitarian Emergency Fact Sheet Number 24”, US Agency for International Development, 1 October 2004. 105 These include the following. United Nations agencies: WFP (World Food Programme); WHO (World Health Organisation);UNFAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation); OCHA (UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs); OHCHR (UN High Commissioner for Humanitarian AVairs); UNDP (UN Development Programme); UNFPA (UN Population Fund); UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees); UNICEF (UN Children’s Fund); UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organisation); UNMAS (UN Emergency Mine Protection Programme Sudan). Non Government Organisations in Darfur: ACF (Administration for Children and Families): ACTED (Agency for technical cooperation and development): ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency): Action Against Hunger; AHA: Air Serve: AMDA: ARC: CAFOD (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development); CAM; CARE; CESVI( cooperazione e sviluppo/Cooperation and Development); CHF International; COOPI (Cooperazione Internazional); Concern; Cordaid; Memisa/Mensen in Nood en Vasten Aktie; COSV (Comitato di Coordinanemento Delle Organizazione per il Servizio Volontrario); Christian Aid; CRS (Catholic Relief Services); Danish Refugee Council; DED (Deutsche Entwicklungs Dienst); Die Johanniter; Emergency; EMDH (Enfants du Monde Droits de l’Homme, Droits de l’Enfant); Feed the Children; Food for the Hungry; GAA (German Agro Action); Global Hope Network International; GOAL; Help Age International; Humedica (Humanitarian medics); IDRB; IMC (International Medical Corps); International Aid Services; Intersos (Mine Action); IRC (international Rescue Committee); Islamic Relief Worldwide; ITDG (Intermediate Technology Development Group); Leprosy mission; MDM; Medair; MercyCorps; Mercy Malaysia; Merlin (International Relief Organisation for Medical Emergencies); Me´decins Sans Frontie`res—Belgium; Me´decins Sans Frontie`res—Switzerland; Me´decins Sans Frontie`res— France; Me´decins Sans Frontie`res—Holland; Me´decins Sans Frontie`res—Spain; NCA; NRC; One Earth; Oxfam; Plan Sudan; Relief International; Safe Harbour; Saudi Red Crescent; Save the Children—Sweden; Save the Children—UK; Save the Children—US; Spanish Red Cross; Solidarites; Samaritan’s Purse; Tearfund; Terres Des Hommes; THW (Technisches Hilfs Werk); Triangle; UMCOR (United Methodist Committee On Relief); World Concern; World Relief; World Vision. 106 “Interview with Kevin Kennedy, Outgoing Acting UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan”, News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Nairobi, 23 June 2004. 107 “Interview with UN’s Jan Egeland on the Situation in Darfur”, News Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Nairobi, 5 July 2004. 108 “Darfur: Humanitarian Emergency Fact Sheet Number 24”, US Agency for International Development, 1 October 2004. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 145
teams which have so eVectively policed the ceasefire in southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains mustbe introduced to Darfur. The Darfur peace talks must be encouraged and all parties to the conflict must be held to account by the international community. In addition to focusing on all parties to the conflict international pressure must also be brought to bear upon external forces—such as Eritrea—that have been fuelling the fighting. The humanitarian needs of those who have been displaced must be met until those aVected are able to return to their homes. Khartoum must address the criminality and armed banditry that has undermined law and order in Darfur. It is essential to evaluate, and where necessary discount, at least some of the sensationalism that has clouded the Darfur issue. The issue is far too important to leave to extremists, propagandists, flawed analysis and those who wish to see continued conflict in Sudan. The Sudanese government has spent several years successfully normalising its relations with the international community and is on the verge of signing a landmark peace agreement with southern rebels. The Naivasha peace process addressing Sudan’s decades long civil war in southern Sudan is the end result of a process of reform, liberalisation and engagement in Sudan that can be traced back to the 1999 ouster of the Islamist leader Dr Turabi. In April and in mid-May 2000, Khartoum indicated its readiness to enter into “an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire” and to restart negotiations for the achievement of a lasting peace. Throughout 2001, the Sudanese government repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution of the southern conflict. It called upon the SPLA to do the same.109 With the Bush Administration’s support, the ensuing peace process resulted in the 2002 Machakos protocols and 2004 Naivasha agreement which have brought southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains to the brink of peace. This process must be seen through to its conclusion.
Similarly, it is essential that Sudan remains committed to the course of normalisation of its relations with the international community that had preceded the Darfur crisis. In 1999, for example, the European Union entered into a political dialogue with Sudan, noting improvements within the Sudanese situation.110 There had also been a similar regional shift in attitudes towards Sudan and the Sudanese conflict.111 In 2001, for example, Sudan held the presidency of both the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, a body which brings together eleven north African states.112 The then newly elected Bush administration and Sudan entered into a new relationship, with extensive Sudanese support in counter-terrorism both before and after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks within the United States. It is also clear that from 1999 onwards the political situation within Sudan has changed significantly. The former Prime Minister, Umma party leader and key opposition figure, Sadiq al-Mahdi, declared in 1999, for example, that: “There are now circumstances and developments which could favour an agreement on a comprehensive political solution”.113
Criticism of the Sudanese government is legitimate and necessary but it must be measured and properly focused. Knee-jerk responses by the international community to sensationalist and often questionable claims about Darfur serve only to enflame an already tense situation, endanger the Naivasha peace process and slow Sudan’s re-engagement with the West. November 2004
Memorandum submitted by Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch appreciates the invitation to comment to the International Development Committee on the subject of “Darfur, Sudan: Crisis, Response and Lessons”.
It is probably now generally accepted—and is perhaps one of the starting points of the Committee’s inquiry—that, despite the depth of the crisis, the initial response to events in Darfur was inadequate. It must be hoped that lessons will indeed be learnt. The establishment of this inquiry is therefore welcome.
109 See, for example, “Sudan’s Government in Favour of Ceasefire in 18-year Civil War”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 22 April 2001 and “Government Ready for a Ceasefire”, News Article by United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network, 15 May 2001. 110 “EU and Sudan Agree to Mend Rifts Through Dialogue”, Middle East Times, 19 November 1999. See, also, “EU Seeks to Renew Dialogue with Sudan Broken OV in 1996”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 November 1999. In July 2000, the countries of Africa also selected Sudan to represent the continent as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The fifty-three African nations chose Sudan over Mauritius and Uganda to succeed Namibia as the African representative on the Security Council. 111 Sudan has over the past three years emerged as a leader of the region, developments which culminated in Sudan’s hosting of the Eighth Heads of State summit of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) body, as well as the February 2001 Heads of State summit of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. 112 Sudan is amongst the first nine of twenty Common Market of East and Southern Africa member states to implement the first stage of the envisaged Free Trade Area. This will be Africa’s first step towards full regional integration and a common currency by 2025. See “Sudan to Join African Free Trade Area”, News Article by Reuters, 30 October 2000. 113 “Developments in Sudan Favour National Reconciliation: Mahdi”, News Article by Agence France Presse, 25 December 1999. See, for example, “Opposition Leader Predicts Solution to Sudan’s Conflict”, News Article by PANA, 27 March 2000. Ev 146 International Development Committee: Evidence
The Media:Reacting Too Late Questions of how best to develop “early warning systems”, so that we are not taken by surprise by the outbreak of conflict, can be discussed at length. Such discussions can play a valuable role. It is the view of Human Rights Watch, however, that in the context of Darfur there is an even more pressing question: why the crisis was ignored not just before it began, but long after the crimes and the killing of civilians were already well under way. The violence began in 2003. There were only isolated reports in the UK media in 2003 and early 2004, even as human rights organisations and humanitarian agencies alike were eager to sound the alarm. The senior United Nations humanitarian oYcial, Jan Egeland, denounced the humanitarian crisis in Darfur in late 2003; the top UN oYcial in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, went public in March 2004 with the scale of the disaster, reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide—an unusual and controversial move. But, with few exceptions, Egeland’s and Kapila’s words, though carried by the international news agencies and therefore seen by news desks all over the world, went largely unreported, or reported only in the news-in-brief columns. The immensity of the disaster—Kapila had described Darfur as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis— was simultaneously highlighted, and relegated to a footnote. A small number of newspapers carried news stories on Darfur on the inside pages. But none shone a spotlight on the region, although the facts of what was happening were not seriously in dispute, even at that time. That pattern continued. Human Rights Watch has long experience in seeking to create impact through the publication of its reports, which are often prominently reported in the newspapers, on radio and TV. But the 50-page Human Rights Watch report Darfur in Flames, published on 2 April 2004 and filled with first-person testimonies, received less attention than many of the organisation’s other reports. Urgent action alerts and reports by Amnesty International on Darfur had equally little reaction. A newspaper or television channel may well choose to ignore a report by a human rights organisation if it merely overlaps with what the organisation’s own reporters have already documented, or even a story that the newspaper is already planning to publish. That was, however, clearly not the case on this occasion. There was almost complete silence on the Darfur issue at this time. Even the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide provoked little reflection about what was happening now in Darfur. Even when the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, used the occasion of his speech on the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, on 7 April 2004, to highlight the crisis in Darfur, there was little response. A reader’s letter, with signatures by the respected Africa Confidential, distinguished academics and others, was published in the Guardian in early April. The letter referred to the Darfur reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and pointed out: “‘Never again’, pledges a world which this week commemorates a million Rwandans who died in the 1994 genocide. Yet in western Sudan a similar catastrophe is unfolding amid a deafening silence.” The International Crisis Group talked of Darfur as “the potential horror story of 2004”. That, too, gained little reaction. Paradoxically, it took the suppression in late April of a report by a United Nations team on the horrors of Darfur—the team talked of government and militias causing a “reign of terror”—to begin to make the story bigger “news”. The first powerful front-page and inside-page coverage in the UK media came on 23 April, with a story under the headline: “Rape, torture, and one million forced to flee as Sudan’s crisis unfolds. Will we move to stop it?” That and related stories, quoting Human Rights Watch and others, ran across three pages. A column on the same day, headlined “Sudan is another Rwanda in the making” quoted Kofi Annan’s words, that “the risk of genocide is frighteningly real”. (The Independent, 23 April 2004) Through the following weeks, and especially through June and July, the importance of the story began to trickle through to all the main papers, and on the TV screens. During the summer months, there was powerful television coverage which had dramatic political impact. All of this was, however, very late: by then more than one million people had been forcibly displaced from their homes and were living in insecure and squalid conditions in overcrowded displaced persons camps. Six months before, the number was half that. The failure to pick up on a major story while it was already brewing was, of course, nothing new— especially in Africa. In 1984, the Ethiopian famine was under way for many months, and was not regarded as news, until Michael Buerk’s powerful reports for the BBC about “the closest thing to hell on earth” suddenly changed all that in October of that year. In 1994, during the Rwandan genocide, there was an equally strong tendency to ignore the unignorable. Thus, the media failures of Darfur can clearly be seen as part of a pattern. The author of this note is a former journalist. As noted in an article in the Financial Times magazine which partly addresses these issues (Steve Crawshaw, “Genocide, what Genocide”, Financial Times 21 August 2004, the innate small-c conservatism of media judgements mean that one cannot necessarily expect the media lessons to be quickly learned. Darfur showed us that the lessons were not learned after Rwanda. Why should one assume that they will be learned after Darfur? International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 147
In those circumstances, a strong case can be made for suggesting that the answers must lie with politicians and policy-makers themselves. The question of how to raise media profile—though crucially important in many regards, for media and NGOs alike—should for the purposes of this discussion and analysis, for and by elected parliamentarians, be put to one side.
Politicians Should Not Need Media in Order to Act News editors will always be reluctant to devote major resources to a news story until they are convinced, not least by the competition, that they have to. There will always be other priorities, and budgets will always be tight. This has been the case in Africa especially. That therefore places much responsibility on the shoulders of the policy-makers who are in possession of the necessary information—from NGOs, from UN oYcials, and from their own diplomats. In the spring of this year, human rights organisations and humanitarian agencies agreed on the scale of the Darfur crisis. Why, then, did so little happen? Politicians and policy-makers feel partly constrained from acting or speaking out unless the issue is already on the front pages or on the television news—as Darfur was, during the summer months of 2004. In the intervening months, many lives had unnecessarily been lost. We would urge strongly that policy- makers should not feel obliged to wait on the editorial-writers before responding promptly to the commission of crimes against humanity committed by governments or groups, like the Janjaweed militias, which are sponsored by and act in concert with government. Politicians in the UK rightly emphasise the importance of the constituency mailbag, in a parliamentary democracy. But the mailbag will not be full with letters on a given issue, unless voters are aware—via newspapers and TV coverage—of the issues. If, for the reasons laid out above, there is insuYcient media coverage, another yardstick is needed. Britain pressed for some accountability at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Overall, however, there was a woefully slow reaction to the unfolding nightmare. The strong comments, and visits to the region, by the Secretary of State for International Development, the Foreign Secretary and then the Prime Minister were welcome when they came. But the attention was late in the day. The United Nations Security Council was equally slow to react; nor did Britain seek to change this. Despite the issue of a press release as early as October 2003, the Security Council waited until July 2004 before a full discussion of Darfur. It is regrettable that the important report “Responsibility to Protect”, published by the Canadian government and submitted to the United Nations in 2001, with its emphasis on the need to respond earlier to emerging crises in order to prevent potential large-scale loss of life, has largely been ignored. The appointment this year of a special United Nations rapporteur on the prevention of genocide is to be welcomed. It will be important, however, that he is listened to in a way that the warnings of NGOs and others—in Darfur and elsewhere—have previously not been.
Wrong Signals None of the above failures can be put down to ignorance. The general public knew little about Darfur at this time, because of the lack of media coverage, as described above. But there was no shortage of knowledge, among oYcials and diplomats. British and other foreign diplomats in Khartoum were regularly briefed by the international aid agencies operating in Sudan who were worried at the failure to address the problems of Darfur. Experts from at least one leading aid agency flew to New York in January 2004 to brief members of the United Nations Security Council on the extent of the crisis. In this context, it is all the more remarkable to note the tone of a speech by the British ambassador to Khartoum on 27 April 2004. This was already several weeks after the dramatic comments by Mukesh Kapila, Kofi Annan and others, quoted above. The HRW report Darfur in Flames had been published three weeks earlier, and a follow-up HRW report, Darfur Destroyed, would be published the following week; other organisations had already spoken out. These reports documented many crimes against humanity, including widespread ethnic cleansing and civilian massacres. And yet, the ambassador felt able to talk optimistically of Sudan as standing “on the threshold of a new era”. Emphasising that “we are and wish to remain true friends of Sudan”, the ambassador boasted that British trade with Sudan was up by a quarter; and noted that British Airways had just reopened flights to Khartoum. The ambassador noted with satisfaction: “In June I expect to see the first British trade mission for a number of years”. Such speeches are always cleared in advance with the Foreign OYce in London, so that the views expressed should be taken as representing the views of the British government, not merely those of the ambassador. ItisdiYcult to reconcile these optimistic statements with the well-documented facts on the ground. The British government position later changed, to include support for the possible imposition of international sanctions against the abusive regime. The crimes against humanity committed by Sudan were, however, clear by April. It is regrettable that the British government, and other members of the UN Security Council, did not feel it appropriate to address the scale of these crimes at the time when they were first aware of them, but only once those crimes were on the front pages. Ev 148 International Development Committee: Evidence
AHuman Rights Crisis,Not Just a Humanitarian Crisis It was noticeable, too, that there was an apparent reluctance to call the crisis for what it was—a conflict which had human rights abuses at its very heart. The humanitarian crisis was not the result of natural disaster—flood, drought, or failed harvest—but the result of the ethnic cleansing and the pattern of killing which made it impossible for people to plant or harvest crops, or to return safely to their homes. There was nothing new about the tactics of the Sudanese government. The same tactics, including the use of proxy militias, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, were the same that had been used in the south for the past 20 years. When UK government ministers later began to take a strong stance, that had a clear positive eVect—the first Sudanese concessions came in response to such pressure, including fuller access for humanitarian agencies operating in Darfur, and the African Union force. The pressure from Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, during his August visit to Khartoum, for visas to be granted to HRW and Amnesty International was directly responsible for the issuing of such visas. (Sudanese oYcials had until then repeatedly claimed that HRW’s carefully documented reports on Darfur were “fiction”.) HRW hopes that the evidence gained during those visits to Sudan will, in turn, be valuable for the future prosecutions of the crimes committed in Darfur. Strong words from Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development, also played an important role when they finally came. It is regrettable that these strong words came so late.
The Need Not to “Compartmentalise”Human Rights Problems In spring 2004, there sometimes appeared to be an oYcial eagerness in London to put the problems of Darfur to one side, because of the fragility of the Naivasha talks on a possible end to the long-running, separate north-south war in Sudan. It was suggested that a tough stance on Darfur might endanger those talks. British oYcials used the word “sequential” to explain, in eVect, why the issue of Darfur should be left on one side until the Naivasha peace agreement was secured. It is important to see the problems of peace and stability in the round. The problems of Naivasha and the north-south conflict should not be ignored, because of Darfur. The converse is equally true, however. There has been a constant tendency to water down Security Council resolutions on Darfur, because of Naivasha. And yet, Kofi Annan was right to emphasise that a failure to address the problems of Darfur would be more likely, not less likely, to endanger the Naivasha agreement. The “we’re too busy now to think about that other problem” school of policy-making may seem sensible in the short term; in the long term, it is not. The pattern is in constant danger of repeating itself. Thus, at the time of writing, the problems in Coˆte d’Ivoire are receiving too little international attention. The dangers of continuing to turn a blind eye are diYcult to overstate.
Lasting Justice It is essential to press for real accountability at a high level. There has been caution in some quarters about proposals for an international commission of inquiry, which could “name names” for those responsible for the crimes against humanity that have taken place. That commission has now begun its work, and should be encouraged to be fearless in its judgements. “Command responsibility” is a key concept in international law for allocating responsibility for crimes committed. This allows senior politicians and commanders to be brought to justice both for crimes that they have ordered or encouraged, and for crimes which they were in a position to prevent. The international eVorts for accountability should not stop with the commission of inquiry. TheUN Security Council should refer the crimes to the International Criminal Court for prosecution, where appropriate. It is important that there should be no selectivity on this point. If blame deserves to be allocated to senior Sudanese politicians, then that finger must be clearly pointed. “Pragmatism” in allowing certain perpetrators oV the hook because of their perceived “usefulness” in another context (for example, peace talks or the possible formation of a new government) is short-sighted and counter-productive. It is unclear at the time of writing whether that lesson has been learnt. The north-south agreement contains no provision for accountability for the two million dead and four million internally displaced, mostly southerners, in that 21-year conflict. It does not set up a tribunal nor even a truth commission to punish those guilty of the massive human rights abuses during that conflict. This failure to address human rights abuses has led directly to the widespread abuses in Darfur: the government, not having had to pay any price for its atrocities in southern Sudan, has continued this pattern of abuse in Darfur. Stability can be achieved only through justice. Short cuts on justice are likely to be politically more expensive in the longer term. This is true in Darfur, just as it is true in regions of crisis all around the world. Steve Crawshaw London Director November 2004 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 149
Articles also submitted. Not printed: Darfur in Flames, Human Rights Watch, April 2004. Darfur Destroyed, Human Rights Watch, May 2004. Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support, Human Rights Watch, July 2004. “Genocide? What Genocide?”, Financial Times, 21 August 2004. If We Return, We Will Be Killed, Human Rights Watch, November 2004.
Memorandum submitted by The International Crisis Group (ICG)
ICG’s MISSION AND INVOLVEMENT IN DARFUR The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 staV members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. ICG has been at the forefront of those battling to bring the crisis in Darfur to the world’s attention and get action taken to address it, publishing field research results and putting forward detailed policy recommendations to prevent a worsening of the situation. Our earliest reporting on the emerging crisis could be found in “Sudan’s Other Wars,” 25 June 2003, “Sudan Endgame,” 7 July 2003, and “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 11 December 2003. Our latest reports are “Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis,” 25 March 2004, “Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur,” 23 May 2004, and “Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan,” 23 August 2004. The latest Sudan report “Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD,” published on 5 October 2004, also deals extensively with the Darfur crisis. All reports are available on our website (www.icg.org).
I.AWorsening Crisis Darfur became the latest chapter in Sudan’s civil wars when Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels—mostly members of African sedentary tribes, such as Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit—took arms against the Khartoum government in February 2003, in protest against years of political, economic and social marginalization of the region. After a string of rebel military victories in spring 2003, Khartoum responded to the insurgency by arming Arab “Janjaweed” militias to clear civilian population bases of African tribes thought to be supporting the rebellion. This policy led to the displacement of between 1.5 to 2 million civilians in Darfur, and the death of at least 100,000. A ceasefire agreement signed between the government and the Darfur rebels in April 2004 failed to stop the violence. Urgent action is required on several fronts if the conflict in Darfur is to be prevented from metamorphosing into a full fledged interethnic war. The situation in Darfur is deteriorating despite the eVorts of the international community to improve it. The ceasefire is collapsing; banditry and abductions are on the rise; and attacks against relief agencies have restricted humanitarian access. Negotiations mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) between the government and southern-based rebels of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA) to end Sudan’s major civil war inched closer to conclusion as the Darfur crisis escalated. If the elusive comprehensive peace agreement pursued under the IGAD process is not completed soon and the situation in Darfur does not begin to improve, the country could easily implode as nation-wide conflict erupts in the West, South, and East and unease spreads to the central region as well. This would set the cause of peace in the country back many years and would have a devastating impact on the region as a whole. Most importantly, the humanitarian implications would be staggering.
II. Inadequate Responses The international community refrained from intervening in the Darfur crisis during its crucial first phase when it was still possible to arrest the escalation and steer the parties to an early negotiated solution. Instead, the wrong-headed belief that more aggressive pressures would cause Khartoum to opt out of the IGAD negotiations prevailed. The government used that lack of resolve to slow the IGAD process, while its army, air force, and allied Janjaweed militia jointly bombed, raided, and burned to the ground hundreds of villages predominantly inhabited by groups of African ancestry, forcibly displacing their inhabitants and indiscriminately killing, maiming, and raping many in the process. The government and allied militias also systematically destroyed the economic and social assets of the targeted communities, by—among others— poisoning wells, destroying fruit tree orchards and burning schools and clinics, in an apparent bid to prevent the return of the IDPs to their home areas. By the first quarter of 2004, evidence of widespread war crimes Ev 150 International Development Committee: Evidence
and crimes against humanity being committed in Darfur became too embarrassing to ignore. Only then did the international community speak out to demand an end to atrocities; alas, it has yet to follow its rhetorical condemnations with meaningful action. Thus far, the UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564 on Sudan have not yet been backed up with an appropriate response, despite the failure of the parties to fulfil their obligations as specified in these documents. The Council must be prepared to take far stronger action in order to help stop the carnage in the Sudan, principally against the government of Sudan for continuing to sponsor and carry out attacks against its civilians, while failing to take any meaningful steps to neutralize the Janjaweed militias. The credibility of the Council is on the line. With each passing week that it does not follow up on its threats, the Council loses leverage and is taken less seriously by the parties.
III. The Current Situation in Darfur As the IGAD process continues, the government has also been conducting negotiations in Abuja with the two Darfur rebel movements, the SLA and JEM, under the auspices of the African Union (AU). Talks resumed in the Nigerian capital Abuja in late October, continuing from a first round which broke in mid- September. The mediators succeeded by 9 November in persuading the parties to sign two accords- the humanitarian and security protocols. The parties had agreed to the protocol on humanitarian issues in the August-September round, but the rebel movements refused to sign it without securing an agreement on security issues as well. The Protocol on Security Arrangements was made possible after the Khartoum government dropped its objection to a clause committing it to renounce oVensive military flights over Darfur. It is essentially a framework agreement designed to improve upon the existing cease-fire. It reiterates the government’s responsibility to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to identify those militias over whom it has control, to be verified by the AU-led Ceasefire Commission (CFC). It also calls on the parties to provide their respective areas of control to the CFC, which should enable it to better monitor the Ceasefire. If things were getting better in Darfur, the ongoing troop deployment of the African Union might have been suYcient. But the situation is in fact deteriorating rapidly. Yet, to date—more than a year and a half after the crisis began—less than 100 observers are on the ground in Darfur. The Security agreement will be boosted by the recent decision of the AU Peace and Security Council to expand the AU force in Darfur to roughly 3,320 troops, including more military observers, a larger protection force, and an 800 strong civilian police component. The AU force will eventually expand its presence from 6 sectors at present to 15 sites once the deployment is fully completed. Yet, it is far from clear that such a force will be suYcient or can be operational fast enough, as it will take months to deploy. What is needed is an even larger force, a more robust civilian protection mandate, and wider international participation that will provide the African troops with equipment, airlift, and command and control capabilities. Taking steps to improve the security situation in Darfur must be the top priority for the international community. What little progress had been made towards stabilizing the situation on the ground is now in danger of being reversed. Despite repeated commitments and promises, there is little evidence that the government has taken any consistent and meaningful action against the Janjaweed militias, beyond integrating them into the formal security services such as the army and the police. Pledges by the government to bring to justice those responsible for human rights abuses or crimes against the civilian population remain unfulfilled, fuelling the already existing culture of impunity and extending the cycle of violence. Twice in the last few weeks the government raided al-Geer displaced camp, as well as Otash camp, near the city of Nyala, capital of South Darfur, and forcibly removed camp dwellers using tear gas and physical violence. The incident, which directly contradicts the agreement on voluntary returns signed by the government and the International Organisation for Migration, occurred in full view of AU observers, UN humanitarian workers and the international media, and shortly before a planned visit by the SRSG in what amounted to a deliberate provocation. The recent rise in inter-communal tensions and the fact that Janjaweed militias still prey on civilians around the camps is of equal concern. Reports of resettlement (mostly in West Darfur State) by Arab tribes on land cleared of its original inhabitants indicate that more robust action is required to help improve the situation and allow the safe return of the IDPs to their original villages and home areas. Just as distressing is the attitude of most government oYcials towards the situation in Darfur. With few exceptions, there is a sense of complete denial, both oYcially and unoYcially, regarding the crisis. The government does not act with a sense of urgency, and doesn’t see itself as having any responsibility for the situation there. Over the past few months, government oYcials have oVered four explanations for the crisis in Darfur: (1) the SPLA is supporting the Darfur rebels to increase pressure on the government at the negotiating table; (2) the US government was exaggerating the situation there in order to use it for its domestic political agenda ahead of the elections; (3) it is part of a Western or Zionist conspiracy against the Muslim/Arab world; or (4) it is being supported by the traditional Sudanese opposition parties, in anger that the Khartoum regime has made peace with the South , while their own eVorts to gain political stature have failed. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 151
This reflects a general understanding inside government circles that Darfur is primarily an externally fuelled problem, that there are no “legitimate” root causes to the conflict that explain why the rebellion began, and, ultimately, that the government bares no responsibility for the crisis or for its resolution. The strategy of the government mediation team at the Abuja talks clearly exhibited this approach. Government delegates repeatedly pushed several points. First, the SLA and JEM are essentially tribal militias who are not representative of Darfur and are therefore not qualified to engage in substantive political negotiations. Second, since responsibility for individual actions in Darfur rests with one’s tribe, a solution can come only through a tribal conference/negotiation, in which the government need not be directly involved. By extension, the message being sent is that those militias used by the government to carry out the atrocities and displace 1.8 million Darfurians over the past year and a half are autonomous tribal militias, who can only be disarmed and reined in in parallel to the disarming of all the other armed groups in Darfur, including the rebel movements. This despite the recent admission by the head of Sudan’s security services, Salah Abdallah “Gosh”, that the government had armed tribal and other militias as a counter insurgency measure and had targeted civilian villages he claims were being used as rebel bases. The situation is becoming even more complicated due to the emergence of three new armed groups in Darfur and neighbouring Western Kordofan state. The National Movement for Reconstruction and Development (NMRD) is a faction of the JEM that broke oV in March 2004 over disagreements with the political leadership of the party. Allegedly receiving support from the government of Chad, the NMRD is intent on gaining a seat at the table at the AU sponsored peace talks. It sent a delegation to the August- September talks, but was refused entry after the JEM threatened to pull out if NMRD was recognized. Unless it is brought into the peace process, it has threatened to target members of the AU force and NGOs. NMRD has had several clashes with government forces, and at least one with JEM forces, and currently has a presence in the Jebel Moon area of West Darfur. It claims to disagree with the Islamist agenda of the JEM, and professes to have a secular political vision similar to that of the SLA. A second ground called Kharbaj (whip) has emerged in South Darfur; so far, little is known about this group and its intentions. A third group calling itself Al-Shahamah has recently emerged in neighbouring Western Kordofan State. The group is opposed to the government and is calling for the re-opening of the agreements reached between the government and the SPLA on Abyei and the Nuba Mountains.114
IV. Lessons Learned and Recommendations
Without international pressure the government would not have taken any serious steps to help the civilian population aVected by the conflict in Darfur and would have continued its military strategy to crush the rebellion irrespective of the enormous civilian death toll. The only actions taken by the government have come as a direct response to immense pressure from the international community. Yet, many of Khartoum’s promises have proven empty. The Security Council and the international community must take firmer action against the government in order to influence its calculations and must include the following concrete steps in order to help improve the situation:
1. The existing arms embargo against the rebels and government-backed Janjaweed militias should be extended to cover the regime and should be properly enforced.
Emerging evidence suggests that the government is not only continuing to attack rebel positions and civilian populations, but continues to arm and support the Janjaweed militias as well. A mechanism for monitoring the arms embargo must also be created by the Security Council.
2. Setting clear benchmarks and a timetable for the government-led disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, to be verified by the AU Ceasefire Commission, beginning with the immediate identification by the government of militias under its control, as promised in the August Plan of Action signed with the UN.
There is still great confusion over the exact definition of the Janjaweed and the specific armed groups and militias that are covered by that term. The government has not yet identified those militias under its control, despite agreeing to do so in the Plan of Action signed with the UN on 5 August. Establishing a clear definition of the Janjaweed will facilitate the monitoring of the government’s eVorts and the status and actions of those groups. The government should provide this information within five days of the next Security Council Resolution and the information should be cross-checked with the JEM and SLA, the AU CFC, and relevant international organisations and NGOs who have collected information on the topic.
114 The Nuba Mountains agreement dissolved Western Kordofan State, incorporating most of it into the Nuba Mountians (Southern Kordofan) State. The Abyei agreement granted a referendum to the people of Abyei to choose between remaining in the North or joining the South. Abyei is currently part of Western Kordofan State. Ev 152 International Development Committee: Evidence
3. Atravel ban and an asset freeze should be applied to ruling party senior o Ycials and businesses. It is time to implement punitive measures against the government of Sudan for its failure to fulfil its various security-related obligations under Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1664, such as imposing targeted travel bans on regime oYcials responsible for the government policies in Darfur and key Janjaweed leaders responsible for war crimes. Targeted measures to freeze all known assets of the same pool of oYcials, allied militia chiefs, and ruling party companies incorporated abroad should be adopted.
4. The no-fly zone the government has agreed to under the security protocol it signed with the Darfur rebels in Abuja should be closely monitored to ensure compliance. The parties agreed to no-fly zone over Darfur in the 9 November Abuja security protocol. Despite Security Council Resolution 1664, which urged the government to refrain from conducting military flights in and over Darfur, there have been continued allegations by both rebel movements that aerial bombardment and helicopter gunship attacks have continued over the past month. The Security Council should authorise the AU Ceasefire Commission to board any airplane or helicopter that takes oV anywhere in Darfur, without prior notification, as a means of monitoring the actions of the government air force.
5. Provide immediate support to the AU and its eVorts to expand its force in Darfur, and begin planning for further expansion of the force in the future. The expanded AU force oVers the best chance to significantly alter the dynamics on the ground in Darfur in the short-term, but its expected size (roughly 3300 troops), and limited mandate are unlikely to be suYcient to adequately stabilize the situation. The Security Council should also strongly consider granting a civilian protection mandate to an expanded AU force, as well as requisite political and logistical support.
6. Increase the number of UN Human Rights Observers in Darfur From the current eight observers to several dozen, so that there is at least one representative in each IDP camp, and one in each refugee camp in neighbouring Chad.
7. Increase pressure on the JEM and SLArebel groups to abide by the N’Djamena c easefire agreement This will be done in part by better monitoring of the arms embargo, but also by strengthening the political dialogue with both parties. A travel ban and asset freeze should be imposed on rebel commanders responsible for attacks on civilians, humanitarian personnel, and supplies.
8. Prioritise collection of evidence of genocide The current UN investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred and continue to occur in Darfur and whether these constitute genocide should prioritize the collection of evidence and the building of dossiers against culpable oYcials and militia leaders. Rape as a crime of war should thoroughly be investigated. The exact mechanism of accountability has not yet been envisioned, but it should be made clear to all the warring parties in Sudan, particularly regime oYcials, that culpability will some day be punished. November 2004
Memorandum submitted by Liberation Liberation is pleased to supply evidence about the current crisis in Darfur. Some context is required. Before independence there was an Anglo/Egyptian Condominium with respect to the Sudan. In development terms the South was treated separately from the rest of the country; it is now thought that the British left the South of the country, where the faiths were predominantly animist and Christian, vulnerable to the North. In Darfur the predominant religion is Islam. The victims believe that they have been targeted because they are black. Darfur means homeland of the Fur, the black people. There is an open border with Chad, therefore there is a good deal of border crossing, and many displaced people are in Chad. There is also some evidence of external intervention from inter alia the Lords Resistance Army. Since independence there has been an almost constant state of civil war. There is a consensus that the Arabised part of the country has sought to extend its influence over the Southern part of the country. Another perception is that development within the Sudan has been disproportionately of the central area. There are development grievances about all of the peripheral areas. The problems in Darfur stem partially International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 153
from a perception that within the current peace process its interests have been neglected. Peace negotiations have nearly finalised, with an agreement on revenue sharing; tactically the government, not wishing to lose income has no incentive to complete agreements. There are issues about assimilation. There has been a civil war for most of the time since independence, except between 1972 and 1982. At various times the ambition of the Southerners in exile in the UK has been: To seek complete independence. To participate in the government. To seek to replace the government. The current position is that six years after the peace agreement has been implemented there will be a referendum in the South about secession or unity. To outsiders, particularly perhaps the fundamentalist Christians in the USA, the struggle is perceived through an understanding based upon religion. As the perception of a proselysing Islamic interest is analysed the Christian Southerners are believed to be the persecuted. It is a rather more complicated matter. Recently the issue of genocide has come to the fore. It can be argued that there has been a policy of assimilation combined with genocide towards the South for many years. The current government argues that it is not involved. Others argue that the government uses various bandit forces as surrogates, currently the Janjaweed has been identified as a bete noir. The participants plunder resources and rape women making resettlement more diYcult. There is diVering evidence about the Janjaweed operating a scorched earth policy and elements of it making land grabs. Neither will contribute towards resettlement. One problem for anyone seeking to analyse the problem is that there are elements of truth in all of the explanations put forward. The present situation is of refugees in camps who are too frightened to return home in a situation in which informed opinion has formed the view that it is unlikely that suYcient food and other resources will be delivered to service those already in the camps. The British government seems reluctant to admit this to be the case. This obfuscates when clarity is required. The Sudanese government has attempted to explain problems in terms of a conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists. This is no longer the case when both have fled into refugee camps. Issues are raised about resettlement; the current government has a massive refugee problem, which it has tackled in part by arbitrarily bulldozing camps and resettling people with, apparently, no support infrastructure whatsoever. This may be a form of genocide. The government has also adopted a policy of assimilating Janjaweed within its army and police forces, which will not inspire confidence in the infrastructure! The government has also declared a number of, “Safe,” areas, again without appropriate support. One might think that the inhabitants are identified as potential victims. Once citizens have become refugees and International programmes to keep them alive are failing governments experience massive revenue deficits. At a time of power sharing one might hope that a focus of International aid might relate to rebuilding civic societies, able to work together. The UK government is a major supplier of International Aid to the Sudan. There have been indications of an allocation of the order of £63 million from October 2003 to July 2004. There are questions about where those funds are spent. The UK funds the ceasefire monitors of the African Union and human rights monitors. It is thought that there is a model of peacekeeping from the Juba Mountains If suggestions for recommendations for the future are required a tie into Development Aid should require: (1) Stop the killing. (2) Establish an appropriate maintenance regime for the camps. If adequate food supplies do not get through the contribution of International Aid is to delay deaths from malnutrition. (3) Establish support mechanisms for resettlement, which take account of the interests of both nomads and pastoralists. (4) Make the peace settlement operate appropriately. (5) OVer support for a civil society. (6) Build upon existing mechanisms for achieving advanced education together with programmes for both education and training in the Sudan. (7) The Sudan is in an hopeless position about International Debt. Once a peace settlement has been achieved the International Community might wish to consider write oVs. The report of the Associate Parliamentary Group on Sudan of October 2004 point towards a funding deficit for 2004 of the order of $190 million; note recommendation 2. November 2004 Ev 154 International Development Committee: Evidence
Memorandum submitted by Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF)
Drawn from the MSF Report: Persecution, Intimidation and Failure of Assistance in Darfur115 There is a war in the West of Sudan, with two rebel movements—the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) having launched an insurgency against the rule of Khartoum. After dramatic attacks in early 2003, the Government of Sudan countered with a decisive military response as well as arming and organising tribal militias to launch a campaign of violence and forced displacement against the civil population (presumed to support the rebel insurrection). Mass violence against civilians in Darfur began with a wave of attacks against villages in February 2003 and escalated in summer 2003. For over a year, the people of Darfur have endured a vicious campaign of violence and terror which has led to huge numbers of deaths and forced more than a million people to flee from their destroyed villages in search of safety. Over a year after their escape from their villages and after countless promises from the Government of Sudan and world leaders, safety has still not been found. The victims of violence were forced out of their homes; their homes were destroyed; they were pursued during their flight; harassed and violated during flight and they have continued to be persecuted and intimidated as they seek shelter in crowded and miserable displaced settlements. The pervasiveness of the violence against civilians in Darfur, as well as its duration over time represents a crime of enormous magnitude. The failure to stop the violence against civilians in Darfur was matched with an equally staggering failure to provide the necessary assistance for these devastated communities in the first year of the conflict. Patients in MSF clinics in Darfur and in neighbouring Chad have repeatedly recounted to us how armed militia attacked their villages, killing and raping the inhabitants. These people saw not only their homes destroyed, but also the militia purposefully destroyed their crops and water sources, ensuring that their way of life was torched along with their houses. Almost 1.8 million116 people were forced to flee their homes, including 200,000 who crossed the border to seek refuge in neighbouring Chad. Very few of them envisage how and when they can return and take up their lives. Humanitarianism is based on the notion that people have the right to find safety and succour amidst the violence of war. In Darfur the villagers fleeing violence and persecution have found little of either, as the violence and intimidation continued in their places of refuge. Rape and killings have been commonplace in the towns and camps where over a million displaced people now huddle. The scale and impact of violence has been documented in a series of nutritional and retrospective mortality studies, which MSF conducted through the spring and summer of 2004.117 The results of these surveys reflect the pervasiveness of the violence and appalling consequences of the atrocities committed against people in Darfur, but also the failure of the response to aid the victims of this violence. In all surveys conducted by MSF, the leading cause of death for those over the age of five years was violence rather than disease or malnutrition. In one study in Wade Saleh district in West Darfur, 60% of the deaths in people above five years of age were due to violence. Surveys completed by MSF in September 2004 showed that the leading cause of death (32.5%) suVered by displaced people living in Kalma camp over the previous seven months was violence and this figure was a staggering 78% of those aged 18–49 years. Among the displaced population in Muhajaria and Shariya, who had not been exposed to violence in the first part of the year, mortality was relatively low. But mortality recently surged due to new fighting and recent displacement—almost entirely in those over five years of age (95.5% of all deaths in those aged 18–49 years was due to violence in the previous 30 days prior to survey). While men seemed to be the primary target, women and children were also killed in large numbers. Studies in the large displaced camp of Murnei in West Darfur showed that 75% of the deaths of adult women resulted from violence. In the villages around Murnei, which had been torched in the campaign of terror, an average of 5% of the total population was killed. Those who survived told MSF staV of people being locked in houses as they were set afire. MSF staV saw clear signs of torture evident amongst some of the survivors. The camps of refuge have been turned into congregations of fear, in which people claim they live under the guard of some of the same armed men who burned their villages and killed their families. The displaced are too scared to go home and yet frightened to remain where they are. In several camps, people were too scared to transport wounded children to a hospital, fearing to be attacked on the road. Although the Government of Sudan has claimed that the violence has been brought under control, the displaced still face violence and intimidation. The massive violence against civil populations resulted in elevated mortality, destruction of livelihoods and flight. The terrified populations that crammed into towns and villages across Darfur, seeking relative safety then suVered a second calamity. These terrified populations faced suVering and death due to a massive
115 http://www.msf.org/source/countries/africa/sudan/2004/1101/darfur2004-11-01.doc 116 United Nations, Darfur Humanitarian Profile No 7, October 1, 2004, p 2, UNHCR Press Release of 27 October 2004. 117 Epicentre surveys in Kalma, Kass and Muhajaria, September 2004; Epicentre survey in Habilah, August 2004; Epicentre survey in Kebkabyia, August 2004; Epicentre survey in Murnei and Zalingei, June 2004; MSF-Holland food and nutritional survey in Wadi Saleh and Mukjar provinces, April 2004. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 155
public health crisis induced by deprivation during their ordeals and lack of shelter, water, food, an adequate sanitary environment and access to essential health care. The aid programme was one year late and remains inadequate. Even in the easily accessible Kalma camp, located 30 minutes from the major urban centre of Nyala, 3.2% of children still suVered from severe malnutrition in September 2004. For many months, the 75,000 people in Murnei camp were forced to survive on less then 1,000 kilo calories per day—less than half of what is minimally required to sustain a human being. Less than a third of the families in the large camps in Kass owned any soap—essential to avoiding diarrhoeal and skin diseases. The lack of assistance has forced people into desperate measures and dangerous survival mechanisms. In the displaced settlements, people are forced to search for firewood to exchange for food even though it means running the risk of rape for women, of execution for the men. Some told MSF that they were so desperate and so scared they would send the children out in the hours before dawn to search for wood—in the hope they would be less subject to attacks. In the full MSF report, MSF seeks to convey what has happened to the health of people in Darfur based on data emerging from our clinics and surveys. We do this in order to create some understanding of the magnitude and depth of the suVering and the failure to address these problems. We try to combine this with a human perspective gathered from the conversations and laments of the thousands who came to our clinics for assistance but who themselves were unable to remain silent about the atrocities committed against them and their families. While this picture of suVering, which has left hundreds of thousands of broken lives amidst the burned- out houses and villages of Darfur is a reflection of what has happened, we have to remind ourselves that this violence and suVering has still not ended. The people of Darfur continue to live in fear of violence and intimidation, even while an assistance eVort goes on around them.
Methodology The report is based on a series of cross-sectional nutrition and mortality surveys118 carried out in conjunction with Epicentre119 in six locations of Darfur—as well as face-to-face encounters with displaced people and patients, reported by the teams working in West, South and North Darfur since the beginning of the year 2004.
MSF Presence MSF currently has over 200 international aid workers and over 2,000 national staV working throughout the three States (West, North and South Darfur) and an additional 30 international staV and 160 national staV caring for Darfurian refugees in Chad. MSF medical teams in 26 locations in Darfur conduct medical consultations, treat victims of violence, care for severely and moderately malnourished children, improve water and sanitation conditions, and provide blanket feeding and other essential items for more than 700,000 displaced people in Darfur. Since the beginning of its operations, MSF has born witness to the extent and the nature of the violence against people in Darfur and its impact on the health and nutritional status of the population. November 2004
Memorandum submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
UNHCR’s Mandate and Interest in This Inquiry The United Nations OYce of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a non-political humanitarian organisation charged with leading international eVorts to protect and assist refugees. It seeks durable solutions for refugees, including voluntary repatriation, local integration in their country of asylum, and resettlement to third countries. The UN refugee agency currently looks after some 17.1 million people worldwide, including refugees, asylum seekers, recent returnees and other persons of concern.
118 Epicentre surveys in Kalma, Kass and Muhajaria, September 2004; Epicentre survey in Habilah, August 2004; Epicentre survey in Kebkabyia, August 2004; Epicentre survey in Murnei and Zalingei, June 2004; MSF-Holland food and nutritional survey in Wadi Saleh and Mukjar provinces, April 2004. 119 Epicentre is a non-profit organisation created in 1987 by Me´decins sans Frontie`res, which groups health professionals specialised in public health and epidemiology. In 1996, Epicentre became a World Health Organisation Collaborating Center for Research in Epidemiology and Response to Emerging Diseases. www.epicentre.msf.org Ev 156 International Development Committee: Evidence
The UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR) Interest in This Inquiry into the Ongoing Crisis in Darfur Stems from Two Major Concerns: 1. Chad is already struggling to cope with the influx of 200,000 refugees from Darfur and is facing the prospect of even more arrivals if the violence and related humanitarian crisis are not brought under control in western Sudan. 2. While eVective emergency response is essential for saving lives, the protracted maintenance of displaced populations inside Darfur and refugees in Chad will not be sustainable in the long term within the current political context. Sudan’s Darfur region must see the restoration of security and confidence in governmental structures as well as the removal of obstacles to access currently hampering the work of relief agencies before the some 1.6 million displaced persons and 200,000 refugees can return home. In this submission, the UN refugee agency wishes to address its experience with West Darfur’s refugees going back six years and their current protection needs to ensure the eventual voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.
Background The situation in Sudan’s western Darfur region is among the world’s worst humanitarian crises. More than 1.8 million people have been forced from their homes, with many brutally assaulted by militia groups. As early as May 1998 people have been fleeing insecurity and fighting in the Darfur region, when some 8,500 Sudanese left West Darfur’s El Geneina area and sought asylum around Adre´ in eastern Chad. The UN refugee agency gave the group emergency aid, as well as seeds and food to help them through the rainy season. In January 1999, UNHCR reported that 10,300 refugees had fled to Adre´ in eastern Chad and that a further estimated 120,000 people were displaced as a result of fighting in West Darfur. Over subsequent years civilians, mostly from sedentary agricultural groups like the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, were reportedly killed or wounded or saw their homes destroyed and their herds looted by nomadic groups. Sedentary groups complained that the Government forces were failing to protect them and suggested that the attacks were an attempt to drive them from their lands. The authorities reported that rebel groups were behind the conflict in the region. Despite this insecurity, there were no significant refugee movements between 1999 and April 2003 and relatively little information came out of the Darfur region. Meanwhile, peace talks in Sudan between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) started in June 2002. Darfur’s conflict was not covered by the peace negotiations and the killings and displacement were not investigated. According to the Government of Chad, the latest wave began in April 2003. By September 2003 more than 65,000 Sudanese refugees from Darfur were in eastern Chad, where UNHCR and its partner agencies mounted a major relief operation despite enormous obstacles in the remote region. Three months later the number of refugees had grown to 75,000 and an estimated 91,000 refugees were in Chad by the end of the year. Many refugees arriving in Chad alleged aerial bombardment of homes and “ethnic cleansing” by Sudanese Arab militia, UNHCR reported in December 2003. Agencies estimated that 600,000 people in Darfur were displaced by the conflict. Throughout early 2004, the number of refugees fleeing the Darfur region continued to increase, forcing UNHCR to construct additional refugee camps in Chad’s remote desert area. Following a June 2004 request from the UN Country Team in Sudan for UNHCR to share its expertise in protection, camp management and site planning, the UN refugee agency dispatched teams to the Darfur region and opened oYces in Nyala on 6 June and in El Geneina on 22 June.
Current Situation The current displacement crisis along the Sudan-Chad frontier is extremely complex and requires a coordinated approach on both sides of the border to stabilize the situation. In Sudan, there are currently an estimated 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in all three states that comprise the Darfur region. Many say they will flee to neighbouring Chad if they do not get the help and protection they require. Over recent weeks, renewed violence in Darfur has driven more people from their homes. On 16 October, the villages of Abu Surug and Bir Seiba, north of El Geneina, were attacked by Janjaweed militia, reportedly leaving 11 people dead. As a result, movements by international aid agencies in El Geneina and Abu Surug areas were suspended. IDP camps around the West Darfur city of El Geneina are threatened by possible rebel attacks. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 157
Access by relief agencies to Darfur’s civilian population is unsatisfactory. Continuing insecurity facing both aid workers and civilians alike has been highlighted by the deaths of two aid workers from Save the Children UK when their car was destroyed by an anti-tank mine in North Darfur in early October. UNHCR staV were recently forced at gunpoint by police to abort a mission to assist potential returnees from Chad in the village of Hasheba. Along with other international organizations, UNHCR field missions planned for early November have been cancelled following the recent kidnapping of 18 Sudanese from a local bus. The local authorities have blamed the SLA and SLM rebel movements for the kidnapping and say the rebels continue to violate the ceasefire and control and block roads used by humanitarian agencies. Most displaced people cannot envisage returning home because they do not trust the government to protect them. Those still residing in Darfur’s IDP settlements are often too terrified to venture beyond their encampments to seek food, firewood or fodder for their livestock for fear of attacks, including gang rape, robbery and murder.
Visit by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Following his visit to Sudan’s Darfur region and western Chad in late September, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers said aid agencies can only speak of voluntary and durable repatriation as an objective. He said that conditions do not yet permit widespread voluntary and durable return movements. Lubbers observed that while there is no longer massive, systematic violence, the ceasefire in Darfur is not being respected. Although hampered by continuing security incidents, UNHCR’s mobile protection teams are working in western Darfur near the border with Chad to monitor internal displacement and to assess the condition of abandoned and destroyed villages. This work is vital in trying to help a complicated mix of internally displaced Sudanese people, recent returnees from Chad and several thousand Chadian refugees. The latter have been living in Darfur for a number of years since fleeing droughts and border clashes between Chadian and Libyan forces in the 1980s. UNHCR’s teams, together with staV of other aid agencies, are working to protect internally displaced people in Darfur and to build trust and confidence among the traumatised victims of the conflict. High Commissioner Lubbers has noted that one key element of the humanitarian presence in Darfur is simply to be there with the displaced people who feel more secure given the presence of international humanitarian personnel. UNHCR currently has some 50 staV members working in its operation in Darfur, facing enormous logistical obstacles and security constraints. The High Commissioner announced on 21 October 2004 that UNHCR is to step up its operational activities in Sudan’s strife-torn West Darfur region as part of a collaborative United Nations eVort to provide protection and assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people and refugees. Acting on authorisation from Secretary-General Kofi Annan, High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers said UNHCR would work closely with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs (OCHA) in providing a more protective international presence in West Darfur and preparing for the eventual voluntary return of internally displaced people and refugees. UNHCR will work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross in this protection eVort. In West Darfur, UNHCR is planning in early 2005 to open seven satellite oYces (in Zalingi, Mukjar, Suleah, Masteri, Habila, Beida and Foro Baranga) and increase its staV presence with approximately another 18 international staV. The refugee agency has also requested WFP to position and dedicate a helicopter to facilitate movement and access to areas of displacement and villages of origin and potential return. Currently, UNHCR is in discussions with the Ministry of Humanitarian AVairs to conclude a Letter of Understanding on the voluntary return of internally displaced people to and within West Darfur which will allow for protection standards that are absent in GoS/IOM/UN agreement.
Chad Nearly 200,000 Sudanese refugees—mostly from West Darfur—have fled across the border to Chad, where they are housed in 11 newly built refugee camps run by UNHCR and its implementing partners. The massive influx of desperate refugees together with their livestock has placed enormous strains on Chad and led to growing animosity between the local population and the refugees. In and around the 11 camps a major problem is water. Some of the camps will shortly run out of water, leaving thousands of refugees in an extremely precarious situation. Eastern Chad is one of the driest places on earth and finding enough water has been a huge logistical challenge from the start of this operation. The total rainfall this year has been about one third of what was expected which means that eVorts are being increased to find and establish new sites. Ev 158 International Development Committee: Evidence
In eastern Chad’s Iridimi refugee camp, the water table is decreasing much faster than foreseen, with the current supply likely to last for only two more weeks. UNHCR plans to truck water into this site, but this is not a long term solution. Due to the influx of refugees and their livestock, there is a danger that the region’s water table may soon be exhausted. UNHCR is therefore looking into the possibility of moving some 7,000 refugees from Iridimi to Kounoungo where they have wells already supplying water to 12,000 refugees. Three other sites for camps have been suggested by local authorities but studies must be undertaken to determine their feasibility. In addition, problems have arisen due to other limited local resources such as firewood. There is tension between refugees and the local host population who feel that high levels of assistance are being provided to refugees, bypassing local communities. The UN system has become more active in addressing this problem and is investigating how better to provide help. A number of local Chadian host communities are now benefiting from wells and health care services initiated by UNHCR. Maintaining the civilian nature of Chad’s refugee camps whilst improving security is essential. This is being addressed through an agreement made by UNHCR with the Chadian government to deploy gendarmes. More eVorts are needed to register refugees to give a better picture of who is in the camps, an eVort that will also help to facilitate their eventual voluntary repatriation. In the absence of peace and security in western Sudan, Chad’s refugee camps may have to be maintained for years. The refugees are not unaware of this possibility, and subsequently, tensions are mounting in the camps. Eight refugees were arrested by Chadian gendarmes in late October after causing serious problems. Subsequently other refugees seeking information on the detainees threatened aid workers with knives. At the heart of the problem is a fear among refugees that the camps may become long-term settlements for many months or even years if a solution is not found inside Darfur. These sentiments has been exacerbated by the perception among refugees that aid agency eVorts to establish income generating activities within the camps are signs of complacency and an inability to help them return to Darfur.
Final Comments The vast majority of the 200,000 refugees who have arrived in Chad, mainly over the last year are now grouped in the 11 refugee camps constructed by UNHCR and its partner agencies. These people are arriving from appalling situations where they have been surviving in poor conditions. This has made it necessary to introduce a blanket feeding programme and special medical attention for the most needy. UNHCRs relief operation is underway but in one of the most challenging climatic environments; there are frequent dust storms and seasonal rains that disrupt transport in one of the most remote regions of Africa’s Sahel. Due to the fragile security situation in western Sudan, it is too early to consider assisting refugees to return to Darfur. It may even be too optimistic to hope they will be home by next year. This is a serious concern, if the refugees are not able to return home in time for the planting season, vital for their food security over the coming months, their repatriation will be even further postponed. High Commissioner Lubbers has suggested that in Sudan’s Darfur region, teams of female police oYcers or civilian specialists working in support of the police be fielded to help handle reports of violence against women and girls, stressing that these eVorts complement the work of other agencies, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and monitors from the African Union. The financial requirements of relief agencies operating in the refugee camps of neighbouring Chad and in western Sudan’s Darfur region are not yet fully met, despite the dramatic and well publicized needs. To care for the 200,000 refugees in Chad and to fund its protection and assistance operations in Darfur, UNHCR currently requires $115 million, of which $83 million has already been received; $5.48 million of this has come from the UK. The UN refugee agency is now drafting a revised operations plan and re- assessing its funding needs in view of its expanded role in West Darfur. Security in Sudan’s Darfur region is the most pressing issue and the main constraint to the delivery of protection and humanitarian assistance. UN Security Council resolutions have called on the Sudanese government to stop the violence so that humanitarian aid can reach those who need it. UNHCR welcomes this opportunity to submit written evidence to the International Development Committee’s inquiry into the ongoing crisis in Darfur, Sudan and remains available to provide further clarifications as required. Anne Dawson-Shepherd Representative to the United Kingdom November 2004 International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 159
Memorandum submitted by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 31 December,31 2003 1/12 appeal for $16.6 million for million $16.6 for appeal Sudaneserefugees Chad in 7 October - UNHCR launches UNHCR - October 7 1/11 and the lack the and humanitarian of access 9 December9 -SG issues first statement 1/10 crisesworld." the in 5 December5 -ERC says Darfur"has quickly become one of the worst the of one humanitarian on Darfur, expressesDarfur, on alarm over human rights violations $23 million $23 1/9 17 September17 -Greater Darfur Initiative announced, appealing for announced, appealing Initiative 1/8 4 September4 -SLA and the GoS the and reach a firstceasefire agreement Vraalsen,visits Darfur Mid-September-SG's 1/7 SpecialHumanitarian Envoy, 7 November - OCHA warns Darfur 1/6 isfacing its worst humanitarian crisis workersis non-existent some in areas sinceaccess that and 1988 humanitarianfor 1/5 1/4 1/3 September-Refugee numbers Chad in reach 65,000. At least 500,000 people in Darfur need humanitarianDarfurneed aid. in Atleastpeople 500,000 2003 1/2 Darfur Timeline Darfur Marchbreaks -Fighting Darfurregion the in out betweenGovernment forces Sudan the Liberation and 1 January,1 2003 Army(SLA) Justice the and Equalityand Movement (JEM). Ev 160 International Development Committee: Evidence 30 June,30 2004 appeal for outstandingfor appeal 320 internationals 320 1/6 deployed,including and negotiate a settlementa negotiate and requirementsmillion. $236 of meetingGeneva, in UN agencies 1 June - 2000 relief workers June1 relief -2000 3 June3 donoralert -At high-level a maintainceasefire, the improve access 13 May13 -SG writes President to AlBashir, urging him urging disarm to Janjaweed the militias, 1/5 SC after mission to Darfur. Late May - GoS lifts remaining estimatedabovebe to million. 1 7 May 7 Mr.- Morris (WFP) and Mr. Ramcharan (OHCHR) brief (OHCHR) Ramcharan Mr. access restrictions following intense following restrictions access UNadvocacy efforts; number IDPs of 1/4 releasedrequesting overUS$ million. 115 9 April -Revised April 9 appeal tragedyDarfur could in happen in N'Djamena 7 April -Marking April 7 anniversary 10th the of Sudan fill him with foreboding that a similarhima that with foreboding Sudan fill agreementsigned 8 April -Ceasefire April 8 Rwandangenocide,SG the says reports from 2 April - First briefing First - April 2 1/3 a coordinated,a scorched-earth to the UN the to SC by ERC who says 19 March19 -UN HC for to Rwandan to genocide. Sudancompares Darfur campaignethnic cleansingof is taking place. 1/2 January-June 2004 January-June Darfur Timeline Early January - SG's - January Early Team(UNDAC) team Darfur to Vraalsen,visits Chad SpecialHumanitarian Envoy, 1 January,1 2004 UNDisaster Assessmentand Coordination 18 February18 -ERC announces deployment of International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 161 31 December,31 2004 operations Abujatalks and 1/12 Government"road-clearing" Plan for the Sudan the Planfor launched in Genevalaunched in 30 November30 Work-2005 conditions. before the end of the year the of end the before deterioration of security of deterioration 1/11 pledge to sign to peace pledge agreement Mid-November-Continuing 18-19November -SC meets Nairobi; in adopting resolution 1574; GoS resolution1574; adopting SPLMand 9 Nov9 -GoS and and humanitarianand protocolsAbuja in SLA/JEM sign security sign SLA/JEM 1/10 20 Oct20 -AU missionmandate decidesexpand to measures 1/9 at 1.6 million. of Inquiry of consideringand additional 18 Sept18 -SC adopts resolution1564, of IDPs estimated October - Number requestingestablishment Commission of deployKhartoum. to 1 August1 -SRSG Pronk and DSRSG/HCAranda Silvada 1/8 of Janjaweed of to bringing and 30-daymechanism. reporting July-December 2004 July-December 29 July29 -SC Resolution 1556 justiceleaders, creatingtheir of adopted, demanding adopted, disarmament Darfur Timeline Darfur 1 July,1 2004 Mid-July - First meeting of the Joint by the first assessment joint mission. Implementation Mechanism, followed Mechanism(JIM) is established. 30 June-330 July -SG visits Darfur; signing of Joint signingof Communiqué with GoS rangeof a and commitments other issues;other Joint Implementation moratorium on all access restrictions access all on moratorium regarding disarmament, regarding impunity and Ev 162 International Development Committee: Evidence
Facts and Figures of the Humanitarian Response
Chart 1 Number of IDPs
1,000,000
900,000
800,000 710,084 West First SC resolution 700,000 (1556) adopted 600,000 Ceasefire signed 701,872 South 500,000
400,000
Number of IDPs Number of 431,135 North 300,000
200,000
100,000
0
Oct'03Nov'03Dec'03Jan'04Feb'04Mar'04Apr'04 Oct'04 Sept'03 May'04June'04July '04Aug '04Sept '04 Nov '04Dec '04Jan '05 North Darfur South Darfur West Darfur
Chart II: UN Humanitarian Access to Darfur (Sept 2003 to Jan 2005)
2,500,000 2,404,470
88% 2,000,000 84% 87% 79% Advocacy efforts lead 1,500,000 to progressive lifting of 88% restrictions 83%
1,000,000 90% 90%
Conflict Affected Population Affected Conflict 61% 77% 500,000 46% 13%
0% 0
JAN'04 OV'O4 SEPT'03 NOV'03 APR'04 MAY'04 JUNE'04 JULY'04 AUG'04 SEPT'04 OCT'04 N DEC'04 JAN '05
Conflict Affected Population Accessible by UN International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 163
Chart III: Total No. of Humanitarian Staff in Darfur (National and International) (April 2004 - January 2005)
10000 9,108Total 9000 8000 7000 Lifting of access 8,294 National restrictions 6000 5000 4000
Number of Staff Number 3000
2000 814 International 1000 0
April May June July August International October January September November December National Month Total
Chart IV: Estimated Sectoral Needs and Gaps in Darfur (January 2005)
3000000
2500000
2000000 38% 38% 37% 46% 51% 96% 27% 1500000 44%
Target Population 1000000 68% 63% 75% 56% 62% 63% 62% 73% 49% 54% 500000 37% 25% 32% 7%
0
PI E Food Shelter Nutrition Sanitation griculture Education Clean water are Facilities A C Gap Basic Drug Supplies Assisted Primary Health Care Facilities Secondary Health Ev 164 International Development Committee: Evidence
Chart V: Food Coverage as % of Conflict Affected Population
Food Coverage Sept'03 to Jan '05
2,500,000 2,404,470
2,000,000
1,500,000 70% 57% 61% 62%
1,000,000 62% 51% 52% Target Population Target 51% 500,000 39% 39% 7% 0% 17% 0
JAN'04 SEPT'03NOV'03 APR'04 MAY'04JUNE'04JULY'04 AUG'04SEPT'04 OCT'04 NOV'O4 DEC'04JAN '05
Conflict Affected Population Assisted Population
Chart VI: Sanitation Coverage as % of Conflict Affected Population
Sanitation Coverage Sept '03 to Jan '05
2,000,000 1,800,000 1,843,091 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 56% 52% 52% 800,000 42% 600,000 40%
Target Population Target 400,000 18% 200,000 13% 7% 0 0% 1% 3% 2% 4%
JAN'04 SEPT'03NOV'03 APR'04MAY'04JUNE'04JULY'04AUG'04SEPT'04OCT'04NOV'O4 DEC'04JAN '05
IDPs Assisted Population International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 165
Supplementary memorandum submitted by UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs (OCHA)
FORGOTTEN HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES Forgotten humanitarian emergencies are “forgotten” for any number of reasons, including: lack of strategic political importance to the international community; complexity of the crisis and a general inability/unwillingness to make progress; and duration and/or severity of the crisis. Regardless of the cause, forgotten humanitarian emergencies share similar symptoms or characteristics and require similar treatment, namely, the timely provision of adequate levels of aid proportionate to humanitarian need. As with all humanitarian action, aid for forgotten emergencies must be provided on the basis of need alone, not according to ideology, creed, nationality, or level of public exposure and media coverage. OCHA addresses forgotten crises through advocacy to raise public awareness, encourage political interest or attract resources. OCHA has Flash Appeals and Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) for a wide range of countries. However a number of these countries have received very little attention and fulfill the criteria for forgotten emergencies. Forgotten humanitarian emergencies often are characterized by: — Low levels of per capita aid, high levels of humanitarian need. — Poor or ineVective response to root causes of the crisis on the part of relevant political actors (governments, regional bodies, the UN). — High morbidity, mortality, malnutrition, and other humanitarian indicators. — Humanitarian presence (UN, NGOs, national and local groups) insuYcient to meet humanitarian needs. — Large number of displaced persons (internally, or externally as refugees) per host population. — Host communities for displaced persons are overwhelmed and unable to cope. — Extended duration and/or lack of improvement in the humanitarian situation over time. — Low levels of political, donor and/or media attention. Of course, not all forgotten emergencies contain all of the above characteristics; the criteria above are simply a guide to identifying forgotten emergencies. Based on these criteria, today’s forgotten humanitarian emergencies include: — Africa: Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Northern Uganda. — South America: Colombia.
Africa
Central Africa Republic (CAR) All of the conditions for a significant humanitarian crisis are in place in CAR. Infant mortality rate is now at 130 deaths per 1000 live births. Debilitating diseases such as polio, sleeping sickness and river blindness have reappeared. Two thirds of the population live on less than a dollar a day and do not have access to safe drinking water. 15% of the population is HIV positive. One million people—one third of the population— are in dire need of assistance. Basic social services such as health and education are virtually non-existent. CAR has been largely forgotten by the donor community. The 2004 CAP requested just $7.7 million but received only 38% support.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) More than 3.8 million people have died in DRC since 1998, primarily due to disease, malnutrition and displacement prompted by violent conflict. This staggering casualty figure represents the largest death toll of any global conflict since WWII. With an estimated 1,000 people dying in DRC every day, most due to easily preventable and treatable illnesses, a death toll of Tsunami proportions is reached about every 5-6 months.
Northern Uganda Ongoing peace eVorts provide the best opportunity in more than a decade to bring the conflict to an end. Since these eVorts started last fall, the level of violence in northern Uganda has declined. The number of internally displaced people has fallen from 1.6 million to 1.3 million people. The number of night commuters has fallen from more than 50,000 to 30,000. Humanitarian access has improved, although displaced persons living in camps still suVer from unacceptable conditions. Ev 166 International Development Committee: Evidence
Somalia Somalia is another long-standing humanitarian crisis where the international community has the best chance in years to make real progress. However, humanitarian indicators remain abysmal in many parts of Somalia. Several vulnerable coastal regions were badly aVected by the tsunami; the country also suVers from a fourth year of drought that has aVected some 700,000 people. Unfortunately, donors have been lukewarm in providing aid to Somalia. Of particular concern is low funding for education, health and agriculture.
South America
Colombia For several decades, Colombia has been aZicted by an unrelenting armed conflict, which has evolved into one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. The country is currently the battleground between guerrilla groups, paramilitary forces, military and police government forces and the criminal elements of organized narco-traYc—all of whom, at one time or another, have inflicted acts of violence against the civilian population. An estimated 3 million persons have been displaced since 1985. Child soldiers and the use of antipersonnel landmines are also key humanitarian concerns in Colombia. February 2005
Further supplementary memorandum submitted by UN OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs (OCHA)
Early Warning Systems
1. Introduction Timely and eVective early warning analysis plays a key role in helping the United Nations and the broader international community to detect and prevent complex humanitarian crises before they occur. For the UN’s OYce for the Coordination of Humanitarian AVairs (OCHA) and its humanitarian partners, early warning analysis is important not only to enable them to contribute to strategies to mitigate and prevent crises, but also to enable them to be better prepared to respond more eVectively to them. Ensuring that early warning triggers early action remains a key challenge. Despite the Secretary-General’s repeated pledges to move the organization from a “culture of reaction to a culture of prevention”, the UN has often failed to convert early warning into early action to prevent and mitigate conflict. Many Member States remain concerned that early warning and preventive action constitute an erosion of national sovereignty. The recent report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change120 reinforces this point. It flags an unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence as “the biggest source of ineYciency in our collective security system.” The report adds that failure to invest time and resources early in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of crises leads to much larger and deadlier emergencies that are much costlier to handle later.
2. Mechanisms for Alerting the International Commmunity to Emerging Crises
2.1. Security Council The Security Council has adopted several resolutions relating to early warning and conflict prevention. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1366 (2001)121 on the Prevention of Armed Conflict and General Assembly Resolution A/RES/57/337 (2003)122, emphasize the Secretary General’s role in bringing cases of “early warning or prevention” to the attention of the Council and “encourage the Security Council to continue to invite the oYce of the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator123 and other relevant UN agencies to brief its members on emergency situations which it deems to represent a threat to international peace and security.”
120 “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility,” Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, presented to the General Assembly on December 2, 2004, A/59/565. 121 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4360th meeting, 30 August 2001. 122 Adopted by the General Assembly on July 18, 2003. 123 The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator also acts as Under-Secretary (USG) for Humanitarian AVairs and is the head of OCHA. [Note by the editor.]. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 167
The need for early warning analysis is also stressed in Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1265 (1999)124 and S/RES/1296 (2000)125 on the Protection of Civilians, which invite the Secretary-General to bring to the Council’s attention matters which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, including deliberate attacks on civilians and systematic and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict. Despite these Resolutions, the ability of the Secretary-General or any of his senior oYcials to brief the Security Council on country-specific early warning situations has proved diYcult, due to Member States sensitivities. Briefings by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) have been limited largely to existing humanitarian emergencies or issues relating to the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
2.2. ERC Early Warning briefings for Member States (Humanitarian Diplomacy) In view of the diYculty of raising early warning issues in the Security Council, the ERC has taken the initiative to alert the international community to emerging crises through ad-hoc briefings to diVerent groupings of Member States.126 Most recently, on February 3, 2005, the ERC briefed ambassadors of the OCHA Donors Support Group on potentially emerging crises in Chad, Nepal, and Guinea. In each case, the ERC explained the underlying trends indicating why each country was at increased risk of humanitarian crisis, spelt out the potential consequences of inaction and provided concrete recommendations for follow- up action. The recommendations were varied and were targeted at mitigating possible causes of instability as well as declining humanitarian and socio-economic trends in these countries. As such, they included measures relating to political, human rights and humanitarian action.127
2.3. Framework Team (Prevention) The Inter-Departmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning and Preventive Action (“Framework Team”, FT), created in 1995, is an informal inter-departmental mechanism that today involves 24 entities128, including the Bretton Woods Institutions. OCHA reviews at risk countries with the Framework Team to ensure that the humanitarian perspective is reflected in strategies to mitigate and prevent conflict. While the Department of Political AVairs (DPA) continues to play a leading role in matters of conflict prevention, OCHA has a vested interest in the issue because of the resulting humanitarian consequences. A recent independent evaluation of the Framework Team129 concluded that while the Framework Team had done a commendable job in the area of UN coordination, its role and function needed to be more clearly diVerentiated from that of other committees that focus on crisis situations and member entities needed to be given the means to ensure more substantial and timely follow-up within the framework of strategies and approaches developed.
2.4. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Preparedness) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC),130 which formulates humanitarian policy to ensure coordinated and eVective humanitarian response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters, has established a Sub-Working Group dedicated to Early Warning and Contingency Planning. The IASC Sub- Working Group issues a quarterly Early Warning-Early Action report which aims to ensure that early warning triggers early action by linking specific minimum preparedness actions, such as contingency planning, to early warning alerts. The IASC has also developed an on-line Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWSweb) that seeks to provide early warning information on both natural hazards and complex emergencies.
124 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4046th meeting, 17 September 1999. 125 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4030th meeting, 19 April[nbsp]1999. 126 This function is mandated by Resolution A/RES/46/182 (1991), adopted by the General Assembly at its 78th plenary meeting, 19 December 1991, in which the General Assembly requests the ERC to provide “consolidated information, including early warning on emergencies, to all interested Governments and concerned authorities.” 127 Such briefings take place on a regular basis with the OCHA Donors Support Group (ODSG), but also with the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group (HLWG), the G77, and other groupings of Member States. 128 FT members are: DDA, DESA, DPA, DPKO, FAO, ILO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHABITAT, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNIFEM, WFP and WHO.[nbsp] The World Bank, the IMF, DPI, OSAA (OYce of the Special Adviser on Africa), UNEP, UNFPA, UNODC, and the SG’s Executive OYce participate on a case-by-case basis. 129 The External Evaluation was commissioned by the Framework Team and completed by Rajeev Pillay in August 2004 with funding from the Governments of Sweden and the United Kingdom. 130 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was established in June 1992 in response to GA Resolution 46/182 that called for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance. The IASC provides a forum that brings together a broad range of UN and non-UN humanitarian partners including UN humanitarian agencies, IOM, three consortia of major international NGOs and the Red Cross movement represented by ICRC and IFRC. Ev 168 International Development Committee: Evidence
2.5. OCHA’s Early Warning Unit To fulfill the tasks ranging from Security Council and Member State Briefings to inter-agency cooperation, as outlined above, OCHA has established a dedicated Early Warning Unit that aims to improve OCHA’s ability to identify potential complex emergencies. The Unit produces in-depth country reports, bi-weekly early warning reports, one page alerts in response to rapidly deteriorating situations, and a quarterly global risk analysis. These products are used by senior decision makers in OCHA and the broader UN community.
3. An Outstanding Challenge
3.1. Linking conflict Early Warning and Natural Disasters Early Warning OCHA’s eVorts in promoting preparedness and prevention to reduce future vulnerability, as stated in its Mission Statement, are relevant to both Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters. Yet, there are no common early warning mechanisms integrating both risks stemming from natural disasters and from complex emergencies. The Kobe Conference in January 2005, organised by OCHA’s Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), recognized the need to improve the link between the two areas. February 2005
Memorandum submitted by the UN World Food Programme (WFP)
Summary — The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is the largest humanitarian actor in the Darfur region of western Sudan. — WFP has a team of 65 international staV and 300 national staV currently working in an emergency operation that aims to deliver food aid to up to two million people a month by the end of this year. — WFP is working across all three states of North, South and West Darfur, coordinating the delivery of food aid by land, rail and air. — WFP Logistical support for the operation is provided by a fleet of more than 300 trucks, seven cargo aircraft, and an air passenger service which WFP runs for the humanitarian community working in Darfur.
The Crisis
Background Darfur has a long history of tribal conflict due to competition over scarce resources. In early 2003, clashes between African and Arab groups took on a political dimension, with the mainly African, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), fighting for greater autonomy from the Government of Sudan. The main reason given for the conflict is the widespread feeling among the resident population of Darfur of socio-economic marginalisation. In response to the uprising by African rebel groups, the Sudanese government is alleged to have armed and funded groups of Arab militia, known as Janjaweed, encouraging them to attack African communities in Darfur. As a result, hundreds of African villages across Darfur have been looted and burnt, water wells have been destroyed, and crops and livestock have been stolen, leaving approximately two million people in an extremely precarious position.
The Response WFP was working in the Darfur region long before the current crisis emerged. It responded to the crisis that begin in early 2003 with its first emergency operation in June 2003. As the scale of the humanitarian disaster escalated in early 2004 further measures were required and a new emergency operation was launched to cover the period April–December 2004. Month by month, from April onwards, WFP has increased its reach in the Darfur region, negotiating access to more areas, and providing food aid to increasing numbers of beneficiaries. By the end of 2004, WFP aims to be feeding up to two million people in the three states of North, South and West Darfur. Of this number, approximately 1.6 million are estimated to be internally displaced people who have fled their villages due to the recent conflict. The remaining 400,000 are those living in host International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 169
communities whose access to traditional food sources has been adversely aVected by the conflict. A further 200,000 refugees have fled the Darfur region of Sudan and are receiving food aid in camps in neighbouring Chad.
WFP Food aid Distribution in Darfur (April to September 2004)
Metric Number of Tonnage Beneficiaries
April 8,599 548,201 May 9,998 593,020 June 10,128 652,429 July 15,493 959,919 August 16,088 940,418 September 21,535 1,336,992
Constraints The Darfur crisis has presented a unique challenge to humanitarian agencies. It has combined logistical diYculties, with high levels of insecurity and environmental obstacles caused by the annual rainy season in August and September. Simply getting food aid to those in need is extremely diYcult. For example, Al Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, is the furthest town from any coastline on the African continent. Even under the best of circumstances it can take up to three weeks to move food aid by road from Port Sudan where it is delivered by cargo ships, to Al Geneina. During the rainy season, many internally displaced people outside Al Geneina could only be reached by airdrops. The main constraints can be divided into five categories: (i) Lack of access. (ii) Lack of capacity. (iii) Level of funding. (iv) Insecurity. (v) Weather.
1. Lack of access Humanitarian access to populations aVected by the conflict in the Darfur region was extremely limited until May 2004. Up until May, the Sudanese government had largely blocked relief operations in areas outside the state capitals of Al Geneina, El Fasher and Nyala. As a result of intense international pressure, the government lifted some of the travel restrictions in May, and announced a series of measures to facilitate humanitarian access to Darfur. As of October 2004, WFP had access to approximately 80% of the areas where populations in need of food assistance have been identified. Most of the remaining inaccessible locations are in areas under the control of the SLA and the JEM. WFP has reached agreement with these two rebel groups to allow free passage for humanitarian missions but in practice, access to rebel areas remains complex and unpredictable.
2. Lack of capacity The extent of the crisis in Darfur only become truly quantifiable once access to the whole region opened up. As with many emergencies, it took time to muster the logistical and human capacity necessary to deal with the problem. WFP had to negotiate the purchase of hundreds of trucks to ferry food aid by road to the needy. Extra cargo and passenger aircraft had to be chartered to provide air support. Contracts were signed with the Sudanese railway authorities to allow the transport of food aid by rail. Additional staV had to be swiftly deployed to Darfur to support the growing logistical operation.
WFP logistical capacity (October 2004) 6 X 6 All Terrain trucks 120 Long-haul trucks 200 Ilyushin 76 cargo aircraft 4 Antanov 12 cargo aircraft 3 Helicopters 4 Passenger aircraft 7 Ev 170 International Development Committee: Evidence
While every eVort was made to expedite the process of delivering food aid, the sheer scale of what was required meant that it has taken several months for WFP to approach what is a reasonable operating capacity in Darfur. Now that the capacity has been increased, additional problems such as a recurrent shortage of aviation fuel, a lack of apron space to park aircraft at the main airports, and insecurity along road routes and railway lines are playing havoc with attempts to increase the delivery of aid.
3. Funding The current WFP emergency operation for Darfur is now almost fully funded until the end of the year. However, as late as July this year, the operation had barely one third of the funds required.
WFP funding requirements for April—December 2004 Emergency Operation
Emergency food assistance: $203 million (£113 million) Special operations: $36 million (£20 million) Total: $239 million (£133 million) As of the 4th of November, 2004, WFP was facing a 15% shortfall on the budget for this emergency operation. While bridging loans and other mechanisms can be used during the course of an emergency to cover gaps in funding, planning is far easier if the budget is covered at the earliest possible date. Intense international interest and blanket coverage of the crisis by the media certainly played a role in ensuring that the necessary funds for the Darfur crisis were raised in August, September and October. There is, however, no guarantee that this level of interest will be sustained in the coming months, at a time when the humanitarian operation is moving into a critical stage.
4. Insecurity Perhaps more than any other factor, widespread insecurity has presented a huge constraint on the work of humanitarian agencies in Darfur. In the early months of 2004, conflict across large parts of the region, coupled with the Sudanese government’s refusal to grant access beyond the main towns of Darfur, blocked the provision of aid. Humanitarian agencies like the World Food Programme will not attempt to deliver food aid if this puts the well-being of our staV at risk. Although the area of military conflict in Darfur has decreased, pockets of intense fighting still exist. In recent weeks, there has been a dramatic deterioration in security across the Darfur region that can be broadly attributed to two factors. Firstly, the Sudan Liberation Army has undertaken increasingly bold action against Sudanese government forces in an attempt to expand the amount of territory under rebel control. Clashes have been occurring in all three states of Darfur, but they have been particularly intense in the Jebel Mara mountains and the northern sector of north Darfur. Secondly, October and November is the time of year when traditional tensions between pastoralists and farmers tend to peak as the herds start moving from south to north (cattle) and from north to south (camels). In addition, there has been a worrying increase in random incidents of banditry and criminality including armed ambushes and robbery across the Darfur region. These incidents have grown in frequency. Drivers ferrying food aid for WFP have been stopped, held at gunpoint, and had their personal belongings stolen. On several occasions, drivers have been shot and seriously injured. National and intenational staV from WFP have been robbed at gunpoint. Humanitarian workers have been forced to retreat from camps during food distributions due to disturbances involving armed men. Whenever an incident like this takes place roads or locations are closed oV to humanitarian workers until security clearance is received. The immediate eVect is a slow-down in the delivery of aid to the beneficiaries. In early October, a mine explosion in North Darfur killed two aid workers from Save the Children UK, and led to the temporary suspension of WFP activities in an area where approximately 50,000 people were about to receive food aid. Also in October, in South Darfur, a commercial truck carrying WFP food from Khartoum to Nyala was stopped by a group of unidentified men at Ishma (between Nyala and Muhajaria). Twenty Metric Tonnes, or 400 bags of sorghum were looted. Local leaders in SLA-controlled areas reportedly distributed the 400 bags to the community. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 171
As this paper was being finalised in the first week of November, heightened insecurity in West Darfur had led to the temporary withdrawal of humanitarian aid workers from the camps of Zalingei, Golo and Nertiti where approximately 160,000 internally displaced people are located. In addition, access to two camps on the edge of Nyala in South Darfur was severely restricted on 2 November when police surrounded the locations and moved around 250 families to a diVerent area further from the town. If the frequency of these incidents increases, it is likely to have a serious negative impact on the ability of agencies like WFP to reach the hungry.
5. Weather The onset of the annual rainy season in Darfur in August and September placed an additional strain on WFP’s eVorts to move food aid by road. Heavy rainfall also limited the use of some of the more rudimentary airstrips situated in the Darfur region. Infrastructure across Darfur is extremely undeveloped and the road network is rudimentary. Outside the state capitals of Nyala, El Fasher, and Al Geneina, most of the roads become mud or sand tracks that traverse open countryside, and dry river beds. When the rainy season begins, the rivers fill with fast-flowing muddy water. At the height of the rains, WFP truck convoys carrying food to Darfur could find themselves trapped on one side of a river bed waiting for several days before the waters dropped. At the height of the rainy season in August, WFP began airdrops of food in West Darfur. The airdrops were directed at 70,000 displaced people and local residents who had been cut oV due to heavy rains and insecurity. While dropping food by air is the most expensive last resort, it became necessary at the height of the rainy season. Even now that the rains have ended, land travel around the Darfur region is extremely demanding. Many of the mud roads have dried into rutted tracks which are punishing to the most robust of vehicles. Although the waters have now subsided, they have left behind dry sandy river beds where trucks carrying food can all too easily sink up to their axles and become stuck.
The Lessons The humanitarian situation in the Darfur region remains precarious. However, as with any major emergency operation, it is always important to step back and assess how the levels of assistance can be improved, and where the delivery of food aid can be streamlined. Two areas of major concern for WFP are the continuing unacceptable levels of insecurity that disrupt the flow of aid to Darfur, and the nutritional status of the beneficiaries.
Nutrititional Status of Beneficiaries in Darfur In an attempt to get a clearer picture of the nutritional status of beneficiaries in the Darfur region, WFP led a survey in all three states in August and September this year. WFP collected data on more than 5,000 people at 56 sites in collaboration with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, the UN Children’s Fund, the Atlanta-based Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States and United Kingdom branches of Save the Children and with the support of Sudan’s Ministries of Health and Agriculture, and its Humanitarian Aid Commission.
Main Findings of the Survey — Almost 22% of children under the age of five are malnourished. A figure of 15% malnutrition among children of this age is normally taken as indicating a serious situation. — Almost half of all families are not consuming enough food to sustain an active and healthy life. — Internally Displaced People are markedly worse oV than local residents, with just 6% of people in camps able to obtain suYcient food by their own means and not relying on food assistance, in contrast to 46% of local residents. — Food aid has played a critical role by reaching 70% of households among 1.45 million internally displaced people at the time the survey was carried out. — Only 18% of the malnourished children identified by the survey were receiving the supplementary feeding they required. — Health problems are widespread with more than 40% of children having diarrhoea and 18% acute respiratory infections. Both of these problems are a major cause of death among children in developing countries. Ev 172 International Development Committee: Evidence
— Large numbers of children, women and pregnant women in Darfur were found to be deficient in minerals and vitamins. More than half of the children and a quarter of the women are suVering from anaemia. The survey found a 25.8% prevelance of goiter—an enlargement of the thyroid caused by a lack of iodine—among non-pregnant mothers. — With a poor crop year ahead and the nutrition and livelihoods of the poorest residents of Darfur already at risk, targeted food assistance will be needed in 2005 for people living in conflict- aVected villages. — The survey put the crude mortality rate for February to August in Darfur at 0.72 deaths per 10,000 people per day. The under-five mortality rate was 1.03 deaths per 10,000 per day. Both rates are below the emergency threshold. However, the report noted that these figures are for mortality across a population of IDPs and residents over a seven month period. This survey is therefore not comparable with other surveys taken among diVerent population sub-groups or diVerent geographic areas where mortality rates may be higher.
Main Recommendations of the Survey — Given the low coverage of selective feeding programmes identified by the survey, WFP and UNICEF in conjunction with implementing partners should undertake a review of protocols and programmes for supplementary and therapeutic feeding. — Blanket supplementary feeding must be implemented on the ground for all children 6–59 months of age and pregnant and lactating women (in total, approximately 20% of the population). — The very high prevalence of diarrhoea (40%) among children needs to be addressed through improved access to health care, water and sanitation. — Step-up eVorts to ensure that the net (consumed) ration is 2100 kcal met through a complete food basket consisting of cereals, pulses, CSB, fortified oil and salt. — Ensure more regular delivery of the general ration. — To help address the problem of iodine deficiency among beneficiaries, increase the amount of iodized salt provided in the ration from 5–10 grams.
The Problem of Insecurity The continuing problem of insecurity can undermine all of the gains made so far in reaching the hungry of Darfur. Steps can be taken to avoid dangerous roads by using longer routes, but inevitably, this has a knock-on eVect, slowing down the delivery of food aid. WFP is considering with the relevant bodies of the United Nations, two options to address this problem: (i) Request the African Union (AU) to provide AU escorts for food aid relief convoys: This would become a viable option if the AU mandate is expanded to a size that would allow it to shoulder this additional task. However, at this moment in time, the AU does not have enough troops on the ground to provide this service. (ii) Implement a notification system: WFP could implement an advance notification system in which the Government of Sudan and rebel troops are notified of WFP convoy movements. A tentative schedule would be provided to the Government of Sudan and rebel troops, indicating that the convoy would be identified by two WFP vehicles, one in front and one at the back. UN security oYcers should have the means to contact the relevant field commanders along the key routes to notify them of any significant delays. It should be recognised, however, that this would be diYcult to implement given the loose and decentralised nature of the SLA hierarchy. This option would only be used as a “bridging arrangement” pending the deployment of additional AU troops that could be used as described above in option one. November 2004
Supplementary memorandum submitted by the UN World Food Programme (WFP)
WFP Food Aid The United Nations World Food Programme is often asked whether it is guilty of dumping surplus food from the developed world on countries in the developing world with the eVect of undermining local markets. While historically, there have been problems attributed to the delivery of food aid, much has been achieved over the past three decades to tailor the delivery of aid in such a way that it has a minimal disruptive eVect on the markets of the recipient country while simultaneously enhancing its positive impact in terms of assisting a population in need. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 173
Whenever possible, WFP will buy food in the very countries or regions where the hungry people live. This is currently the case in Sudan, where one region of the country has produced bumper harvests, allowing WFP to purchase food for beneficiaries in another region, Darfur where 1.6 million people are now dependent on food aid. Dumping of food aid may become an issue when food commodities are exchanged bilaterally on a government to government basis. There is evidence that this kind of food aid can cause market disruption when it is delivered as a resource transfer for balance of payment or budgetary support. This approach was particularly problematic in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the early 1990s when there were massive and misguided transfers of bilateral food aid. This “programme food aid”, as it is sometimes known, often finds itself being sold on the markets of the recipient country and leads to price falls that aVect local farmers. Such “programme food aid” is also not necessarily utilised in a manner that guarantees it will reach the most needy of beneficiaries as food delivered to the market is often going to be out of the financial reach of the poorest sections of the population. This negative scenario can be avoided if food aid is channeled through organizations like WFP. Our objective is to ensure that we reach the hungry without distorting local markets. To enhance our targeting of food aid, WFP has developed a sophisticated system of “Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping”, or VAM analysis.
VAM delivers the information which not only allows WFP to target the right people in the right place at the right time, but also to answer the key question for the world’s biggest food aid organization: how can food aid make a diVerence?
This is how WFP ensures that food aid is targeted extremely carefully at people who have little or no purchasing power and is therefore highly unlikely to distort markets.
Refugees, internally displaced people, AIDS orphans and hungry schoolchildren have very little purchasing power and are hardly likely to be at the front of the queue at markets and shops. They are not major actors in the commercial food market.
Targeted food aid, delivered through the World Food Programme has a way of reaching the neediest people like no other resource. When drought, floods, war, HIV, or economic crises strip people of their livelihoods, they are no longer consumers.
Food aid meets their absolute most basic needs, freeing what little income or savings they may have for other necessities like shelter, health care and education.
Broadly speaking, WFP would still argue that when there is an urgent need for food commodities to be provided to a targeted population in need, the origin of the commodities is secondary to their utilisation.
To put it more bluntly, it would be a tragedy if people were left to starve because WFP was prevented from using surplus food from a country willing to donate that commodity.
However, it would be wrong to assume that WFP is consequently being used as an instrument to dump unwanted food from the developed world on populations in Africa and beyond where people are suVering from chronic hunger.
Firstly, it is important to recognize that food surpluses around the world have diminished in recent years. Partly, this is due to strong demand from the expanding Chinese market which has driven up prices and led to a dramatic reduction in surpluses around the world. It is, therefore, far more profitable for suppliers in the big agricultural nations, like the United States, to sell their produce at high prices to willing buyers, than to dump it on the developing world.
Secondly, the World Food Programme does not set out to buy food surpluses. When WFP receives cash donations, we buy on commercial markets, although some donors require us to buy commodities in less competitive markets which does reduce the amount of food we can purchase.
Finally, and this is perhaps the most important point, it makes no economic sense for a major exporter to dump surpluses through food aid because the costs of delivery—especially with historically high ocean freight rates—and administration are so high. Why pay over £120.00 per metric tonne to “dump” a commodity valued at £80.00 a metric tonne? It is far cheaper to use export subsidies or credits to dispense with commodities that cannot be sold readily at commercial prices. November 2004 Ev 174 International Development Committee: Evidence
Memorandum submitted by Alex Vines, Head, Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International AVairs, Chatham House
UN SANCTIONS AND SUDAN
This submission focuses upon the history of UN Sanctions on Sudan and their possible use. It draws upon my experience as a UN sanctions weapons investigator on Liberia from May 2001 to May 2003 and subsequent research on sanctions conducted at Chatham House.
UN Sanctions and Sudan The threat of UN sanctions has hung over Sudan since July 2004. Security Council adopted a resolution on 30 July—although expressed in rather foggy language—that gave Sudan 30 days to disarm and arrest leaders of the Janjaweed or possibly face UN sanctions. China and Pakistan abstained from an otherwise unanimous vote for the measures; Algeria and Russia also lobbied for more time. This process was repeated in September 2004 when a second US-drafted resolution had to be significantly watered down to deal with opposition from China, Pakistan and Algeria. China even threatened to veto the resolution, which was passed on 18 September. Beijing has an interest in avoiding oil sanctions in particular because it has invested heavily in Sudan’s oil industry. Such measures could be easily achieved through a blockade of Port Sudan, but this is something that Khartoum also greatly fears. The US has consistently sought a strongly worded resolution, but because of a lack of consensus in the Security Council has worked with Britain on alternative approaches such as getting the Sudanese government to accept more African Union (AU) troops to protect civilians.
Not New The question of sanctions against the Sudanese government as a result of its failure to stop the violence, has become a prominent theme, but such measures are not a new issue for Sudan. UN diplomatic sanctions against Sudan were imposed in April 1996 in response to the country’s failure to extradite three suspects connected to a June 1995 assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. More far-reaching travel restrictions were provisionally approved by the Security Council but never implemented. This was due in part to a UN pre-assessment report on the likely humanitarian impact of such measures, as well as Egypt’s reluctance to support stronger sanctions. Egypt feared that it would suVer significantly from sanctions and was concerned that Sudan may retaliate by reducing the flow of water along the Nile and expelling hundreds of thousands of Egyptians working there. Cairo also opposed an arms embargo. Sudan never handed over anyone connected with the 1995 incident. However, the Sudanese government sent a letter to the Security Council in May 1996 indicating that it had asked Osama bin Laden, who was suspected of funding radical Islamist groups, to leave the country. Bin Laden subsequently moved from Sudan to Afghanistan. At that time sanctions may have also encouraged a split between the Islamic National Front of Sudan and the country’s military leaders, who wanted to avoid such measures after the experiences of Iraq and Libya. The UN lifted its diplomatic sanctions in September 2001. Because of the civil war between the north and south, the European Union had already imposed an arms embargo on Sudan in 1994 followed by US economic sanctions in 1997. In September 2004 it threatened to widen the sanctions package if Sudan failed to end the Darfur crisis. It said it would consider a travel ban on the Janjaweed militia leaders and even an oil embargo. Although there has been much discussion of sanctions there has been less reflection on what this would actually entail, what kind of instruments they would be and their likely impact. Since the early 1990s there has been a dramatic increase in the number of occasions when sanctions have been imposed by the Security Council. Before then they had only been imposed on two countries: Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. Since then the Council has imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990; the former Yugoslavia in 1991, 1992 and 1998; Libya in 1992; Liberia in 1992 and 2001; Somalia in 1992; Haiti in 1993; Angola’s UNITA movement in 1993, 1997 and 1998; Rwanda in 1994; Sudan in 1996; Sierra Leone in 1997; Afghanistan in 1999; Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000; and parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from July last year and and on Cote D’Ivoire in November 2004. The peace and security mechanisms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide the legal basis for the Council to impose sanctions. Such measures have provoked controversy, not least because of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq during the 1990s, which was related to, if not directly caused by, UN sanctions. International Development Committee: Evidence Ev 175
Bans,Controls,Embargoes The arms embargo is the most widespread sanction used in Africa. Such controls were imposed on Angola, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia and last year on parts of the Congo and on Cote D’Ivoire in November. There have also been commodity embargoes such as those on diamonds exports from Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia and timber from Liberia and these are threatened on Cote D’Ivoire for December 2004. Travel bans were applied on Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The sale of petroleum products to the Angolan rebel movement UNITA was prohibited. That group was also subject to financial sanctions as were Liberia’s ex-President Charles Taylor and some of his associates. The UN Security Council has threatened to implement an arms embargo that would cut oV weapons to both the militias and rebel groups in Sudan. There has also been discussion about a travel ban on Janjaweed leaders and informal exchanges in the corridors about asset embargoes, particularly petroleum. Freshly back from Sudan, the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw noted in his speech at Chatham House in August 2004 that financial sanctions may have worked on Libya, but they must always be used as a last resort. Generally until the late 1990s UN sanctions had little impact. The move towards greater eVectiveness was a result of increased eVorts at monitoring compliance, but despite the new enthusiasm, the record remains mixed. The UN diamond embargoes on Liberia and Sierra Leone and the timber embargo on Liberia are fairly successful. In contrast, arms embargoes have failed across the continent. Travel bans don’t have such a good record. Sudan is likely to follow the same pattern. Indeed the Sudan Government has its own defence industry, producing small arms and ammunition, with a ready supply of stockpiled raw materials, so an arms embargo would take significant time to bite.
Importance of Oil On the other hand an oil embargo, with a naval blockade of Port Sudan would have impact—as oil provides a major source of revenue for Khartoum this would quickly squeeze elite business and military interests. Before its first export of crude oil from Sudan in August 1999, Sudan’s economy was in dire straits. Government oil revenues rose from zero to almost 42% of total government revenue in 2001. Oil revenue has had an impact in projected military spending. The president of Sudan announced in 2000 that Sudan was using its oil wealth to build a domestic arms industry. Military spending in 2001 soaked up 60% of the 2001 oil revenue of US$580.2 million and continues to be high.
Wider Diplomatic Package Sanctions are more successful if they are part of a wider diplomatic package. There have been few independent studies of the eVectiveness of sanctions in Africa but the key to a successful embargo is political will both in the Security Council and amongst member states to implement and monitor the measures. In the 1990s the two countries where western political will for eVective sanctions was at its greatest were Iraq and Libya. Sanctions probably thwarted Saddam Hussein’s eVorts to procure weapons of mass destruction and in Libya they encouraged Tripoli’s rapprochement with the west. Sanctions on Liberia itself were less successful, but worked as a measure to loosen Taylor’s grip on the Revolutionary United Front rebels of Sierra Leone.
Sustaining Pressure It is wise not to rush into imposing UN sanctions. Their history in Africa demonstrates that they are blunt instruments that have limited impact on targets. The lack of Security Council consensus about Sudan is likely to continue and the start of sanctions is still far away. If UN sanctions fail, US and EU oil sanctions could be a possible option. If UN sanctions are imposed on Sudan, small, symbolic UN monitoring panels of a handful of consultants have limited impact. A large country like Sudan needs hundreds of well supported monitors on the ground, with a clear-cut reporting mandate. In Congo, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) is assisted by a UN investigative team in watching the arms embargo on the Ituri and north and south Kivu regions. This could be be a template for Sudan. African Union states could be mandated by the Security Council to play a major role in monitoring and reporting compliance, especially if also backed up by a naval patrol oV Port Sudan with a mandate to record and search for oil exports if UN sanctions were agreed. A credible threat of sanctions can be more productive than the hasty enforcement of symbolic measures that could undermine the credibility of the UN. The Sudanese government’s behaviour shows that the threat of sanctions in July, following the circulation of a strongly worded draft resolution threatening tough action, helped focus attention on the humanitarian crisis. A similar reaction occurred in the 1990s Ev 176 International Development Committee: Evidence
when Sudan downgraded its support for radical Islamist groups as a result of UN sanctions. Khartoum does fear sanctions and especially oil sanctions. The challenge is how to sustain this pressure and how to reach consensus in a divided Security Council or how to look at alternative avenues such as co- ordinated and extended EU and US sanctions on Sudan. November 2004
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