CVH/je cc: Mr. Narasimhan, Mr. Lemieux •/
10 January 1971
I aekaowledge receipt of your letter of 23 December era the subject of the appointment of Er. Glenn f . Seaborg as President of the Fourth International Conference on tihe Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* to be held to Septeaber 1971- Is tbls conaexiaa, I jaay recall tfeat so far, three conferences have been held on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy* The first, toeld ta Genera In Au^ist 1955j was presided over by lr. Horni J, Bhstbhs of Inclla, Tbe second, held in Geneva in September 1958, was prestded over by 8r» Fraiscis Perrin of Isaacs. The- thlrd# -beM in Geaeva from 51 August to 9 September 1S^» «s» presided over lay Be. V.S. Saelyanou of the USSR. Srora the above you will trndsrstand that there is a principle of geographical rotation in regard to the presideaejr of the international conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Eaergy* For the fourth said conference, the Scienti- fic Advisory Cofflmittee reeonaaended that an American should preside* Dr. CUeaa Seaborg VBE nosjioated for the position of President by the Government of the USA, and I had no alternative save to accept the ncaiination. X also aetocwledge vith thanks the book "Population Control throu^t Jfaelear P^Hution** stirij with your letter. I have read it with great tsterest* ¥ith sincerely,
U
Mrs* Bath Gage-Colby 0,2?. Sepresejstative Women*0 International League for Beace and freedom Penthouse Sis 307 Sast Mfrth Street Hew torkj B»Y. 10017 eaatte y- and ^w
FOUNDED IN 1915 /First President: JANE ADDAMS
UNITED STATES SECTION / JANE ADDAMS HOUSE / 2006 WALNUT STREET / PHILADELfm PA. 19«3/ferf?7l10 (»15) / CABLE: WILJS » 0 -/>
National President KATHERINE L CAMP
Executive Director GLENNA B. JOHNSON Hothouse Six Finance Director U ' JP" 30? East 44th JOAN BRUNSWICK c< New York City Legislative Secretary Dec 23>I97 PATRICIA A. SAMUEL 120 Maryland Avenue, N.E. Washington, D. C. 20002 " ° U.N. Representative RUTH GAGE-COLBY
Executive Director Emeritus My dear U That: MILDRED SCOTT OLMSTED .j. SPONSORS It may appear presumptuous that the ret>re- SADIE T. M. ALEXANDER MARIAN ANDERSON ROGER BALDWIN sentative of the Women's International League for Peace and RUSSELL W. BALLARD STRINGFELLOW BARR Freedom to the United nations should raise serious objection CARLETON BEALS 1 SAMUEL BELKIN to the appointnent of Glenn T. Seaborg as President of the DANIEL M. BERMAN DERK BODOE Fourth ^International Conference "on the~PeaceTul7""U'ses of HUGH BORTON KAY BOYLE "• A'tomlc Energy, ' to""be '"held"' in SSpt ember I"7XiTh"e '"f act that RALPH J. BUNCHE ALLEN M. BUTLER at tHat time he will have served' as" Chairman of the United HENRY J. CADBURY ALLAN KNIGHT CHALMERS States Atonic Energy Coranission for ten years totally dis- STUART CHASE HENRY HITT CRANE qualifies this man from such a United Notions role. JEROME DAVIS DOROTHY DAY MRS. JOHN DEWEY JAMES P. DIXON Lly organisation at its Annual l.'eeting; in June HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS W. H. FERRY 1970 called for "a moratorium. on the misuse of science which is WELTHY H. FISHER D. F. FLEMING poisoning earth's environment, eliminating chemical, biological JEROME FRANK ERICH FROMM and radiological poisons before Enrth is made wholly untenable, HARRY GOLDEN FRANK P. GRAHAM not only for l;?n but all living things. Since the Atomic Energy MRS. ERNEST GRUENING ALICE HAMILTON Commission holds the nowerto continue nuclear weapons develop- MARY DONOVAN HAPSOOD GEORGIA HARKNESS ment through unde?;round testing and the All' nnd Ivlirv systems, DONALD HARRINGTON HELEN M. HARRIS and to licence nuclear plants for "oericeful uses" of nto:.iic ANNETTE B. HOPKINS MORDECAI JOHNSON energy, now likexjise known to bo danr;erous to health and safety, MRS. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. FREDA KIRCHWEY the League also demanded a full Congressional review of the AEG." RALPH E. LAPP STAUGHTON LYND HELEN MERRELL LYND "We, the Peonle of the United Untions" , nuct take MARGARET MEAD ARTHUR MILLER a more imaginative and courageous part in savin;; the world from M. f. ASHLEY MONTAGU PHILIP S. MOORE disaster, liverythinr; for which the world Organisation Mid its VICTOR PASCHKIS MRS. MALCOLM E. PEABODY people dream and plan and work requires a world in which to G'et A. PHILIP RANDOLPH WILLIAM GORHAM RICE it done. The world is threatened. It is the UOilLD that must be BAYARD RUSTIN HARLOW SHAPLEY saved or else its PEOPLE will be lost. RUTH E. SMALLEY BENJAMIN SPOCK ROBERT STEIN Our League is preparing a background paper, ALBERT SZENT-GYORGYI assisted by the two scientists who have written ^c^pulati_on_ Cqivbrol. HAROLD TAYLOR HOWARD THURMAN LOUIS UNTERMEYER through Huclear Pollut i o^n . It is the nost frightening' book I've JERRY VOORHIS read" to de.te, and during the Ion.;; convalescence from my bad acci- JAMES P. WARBURG FREDRIC WERTHAM dent a year and a half a;;o I read r ood almost nothing; else but in JESSAMYN WEST GILBERT F. WHITE the field of the "peaceful afcon. " I am not a scientist, but one ROY WILKINS does not need a degree in nuclear physics to understand what we HONORARY SPONSORS are now up againt. I know you understand because I read your YEHUDI MENUHIN LORD BOYD ORR report on the Protection of the Human Environ .lent most carefully* VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT BERTRAND RUSSELL With deepest admiration and affection, \ M 'e-Colby Lli-i representative U N I T E D NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations., N,Y. (FOR USE OP INFOBMATION MEDIA -- HOT AN OFFICIAL RECCED)
Fress Release SG/A/98 DC/665 21 January 1971
SECRETARY-GENERAL DESIGNATES SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CONFERENCE OF COMMITTEE Off DISARMAMENT
The Secretary-General, U Thant, today announced the designation of Ambassador Ilkka Pastinen, at present Deputy Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations, as his Special Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Mr. Pastinen will take up his assignment with, the United Nations as of 1 February 1971.? when he will be released from his present post.
* *«# Mr. &»K. Kufcafeov, Si^ejf-S&e3»«fca3Ey-Gei«a?al 25 .January 1971 for Political aad Security Council Affairs
Seeretary-Cteaersl
on the of the tots Baee jM^jMj
X refer to your raesersndtaa Sated 18 Janttary. X enclose e copy of a jaeBor&ndum Sated 22 January addressed to Ja© OB the seme subject lay Mr. de S^faes* IB the eJLiwn^tffiBcea, I agree that tfee overall resireitslbillty for the iffipleaeirtatioa of resolution 266? (XXV}, laclmdisg tfee study, should devolve upsa tbe BspasetEeaaffc of Bslitieal «tod Seetiritgr Gouacil Affairs. As for your suggestion that Mr* de Seynes assign, at least one and aae eeeial esgpert frera tb© staff of Ms ffepartj^iit to wttH tit© offtcese-s assigned frisa the PSGA Department in whatever weark jaast "be taagertakea froat tltra Secretariat sicte, !4r. de SeyRes lass «Kplaised why it is not possible for kba in t&e ippe^ent eiret>mstsascea to assign one of Me staff stesibers for t^ wca»& envisaged, I as mire tlmt your Apartment will have no iiffieulty in eo-operstiag vith the Department of Sfeonfiaaie and Social Aff&irs in giviisg tliesm the opportunity to read and tqpoa the pa^esps prepared for the implementation of resolution 266?
ee: Mr. C.?* Ur. P. de Hr* UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR
22 TO: The Gecretary-Gencral DATE: January 1971 A:
REFERENCE:
THROUGH: Mr. C.V. Na:-asi.: FROM: Philippe dc Ge^he;:. Urider-Secretary-Genera 1 DE: for Economic end G /cial Affairs SUBJECT: Repoj['t_on th-j Ccono^iic and 3oc i.al Conce<•iuGr.ccs- OBJET: of LAP Ar:,'.. R. ce ajid jf riilic.ary E::nendi tures I o":i rci'crrJn : to ':he f:K?rn'.jrandiu:; of Mr. Ku;,akqv rclatin;: to che A;:..-e:.iijl.7 rosolutions on dir,cirnn::iont. Mr. Kutakov, in his ::i-3i.fi-jrarid-a-.:i. cee;-;:.;. oo overlook t,he fc.ct that the purpose of resolution '"''').r.< (X'CV) ic precisely the ''pocriij.Lo redirection towards ecv;y-)r.:i>:: and social pro^rariiinon of reriourcen nou dcvctcd to r.vilioarv purpoccc'' and thao it is co;:!pal::ory for us to present a report to EC030C and the General Assurl'i'ly on thi;.: very topic. In fact thi::; ic not a new topic in ECOSOC and in the Gecond Committee cince we have had resolutions to the -j,o.::\c or nii.-iilor effect ever since .b,'^-i- and we hcve already, ot the Le^innin;;: of the Decode, produced a report which ha;j now been repu;jli,ohcd in a ''triptych" on disarmament. Resolution ;...''o.,,'' (>X\r) on zhe "Economic and soci:;l conns"u.-vncGC of the ar;nr;;nonts race and it:: -Jxtrei.-.oly hari.iful effcctr: ';n world peace and security" ir: ony which requires e;:tre::\ely s:)phis tioatod economic r. ;•!.•; ]yL-i.'; ';:-GSCU on input-output tochni^uoo. Rod we been entrusted with i.!ie i.;iple:;ientation of thi:: rerolution, we woulO hove had to hire c hij;;h level con:-ultr-nt to dir^-CL the v;crl; r;ir.cc -.ur present other c :-rxiit::;ents would not P'jrui;; us „„.• deal with ohis matter with our owr. I'eso So it is not possible, in the present circur..stance;: . to assign one of our staff iuei-;l;ers to PGCA for th,o worl: envi.--aj:cd. The resources of the Department can. however, co-operate in reading and co^r-unuin..'. upon the papers prepared for ii;:pl.o:.ictitation of r'.'solution :":oo i' (XXVT). 13 January 1971 The Secretary-General L.N. Khtakov, tJnder-Secretary-neneral for Political and Security Council Affairs. Report on the Econoatic and Social Consequeitxees of the tons Race and of Military Expenditures I refer to the memorandum of 8 December 19TO addressed to Mr. Narastehan by Mr. Gustave Feisscl on behalf of Mr', de Seynes. The inclusion In the proposed report of material dealing with "the possible redirection towards economic and social progransaes of resources now devoted to military purposes" was linked froa the very beginning to the relaxation of tensions and the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security. Tfte origin of the idea of the study is to be found in the statement by the Secretary-General on 22 May 19JO to the Conference on "The Politics of Disarjnaraent: Proposals for the 1970s" vherein the Secretary- General first raised the question of such a study as something which would help to launch the Disarmament Decade and create a fuller understanding of the needs and the possibilities for reordering priorities in the Decode of the 1970s. In the Introduction to his Annual Report for the past year, the Secretary-General, in Section II dealing with Disarmament, again put forward ths idea of such a study and spoJoa of "reordering both national and international priorities in the decade ahead". Thus it is clear that the idea and the various aspects of the study were jaade in the context of disarmament* The Secretary-jSeneral' s proposal was considered by the First Ccearaittee under item 9^ of the agenda dealing vlth "economic and social coneec(!.i®nces of the artaasienta race and its extremely hanaful effects on world peace aisd security". The debate in the First Coaroiittee, BUS veil as the preamble of resolution 2667 (XXV)»both indicate that the matter was considered, aa primarily a political probless and that the economic and social aspects and goals were directly related to progress in disarmament, the tepanovezaent of international relations and the maintenance of wrld peace and secxarity. Consequently it would be nonaal that the overall responsibility for the iutpleeserrtatiori of resolution 2667 (XXV), including the study, should devolve ypan the Department of Political Security Council Affairs and the Disarmament Affaire Division. - 2 - nevertheless, I do recognise that the economic and social aspects ifill play a very lntportant role In the study and. tliat there should, therefore, be very doss cooperation between the 'Economic and Social Affairs Department and this I vould hope that Mr. de Geynes would be villing to at least one economic: ejcpert and one social expert from the staff of his Iteparteient to co-operate fiilly wltt) the officers assigned frrai f.\he PBCA Depart^iint in 't^tatever work must be under- frcs'-i the Secretariat side. cc: f-Sr. Harasimhan Mr. de Geynes UN IT ED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR DATE: g_ TO: Mr. C.Ve Naraslmhan 19?0 A: Chef de Cabinet' REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: Gusts ve Feiscel DE: Special Ms^i^tant to the Under—secretary -"General for SUBJECT: Economic and Social Affairs OBJET: Report on. the. Economic _. Arms Race Since time did not permit him to do r>o personally, Mr. de Seynes, before leaving for Paris, asked me to transmit to you his comments on Mr „ Kutakov's memorandum of 3 December to the Secretary-General outlining some ideas for the report called for in draft resolution A/C.1/1. 535/Rev. 1, and more specifically in its operative paragraph 3» Mr<, Kutakov's note is of a rather general nature and thus it is difficult to provide any specific comments. One precise point which could be mentioned pertains to the 4th point which according to Mr0 Kutakov could bs included in the report, i«c, "the possible redirection towards Economic and Social p-ogrammes of resources now devoted to military purposes. o .o" This point Mr. de Seynes feels should logically fall within the framework of the study on the Economic and Social Consequences of disarmament called for in the draft resolution a.donted by the 2nd Committee. Mr» de Seynes had yesterday an initial discussion with the Secretary- General concerning the implementation of operative pararrarh 3 of draft resolution A/C.l/L. 535/Rev« 1, which T understand will be pursued upon Mr. de Seynes' return early next week. (J / * 0JU Stavropouios 29 legal Counsel fiie of Gemral Aesmbly dtsaneat resolutic^s •fee X observe tMt I-tr. Kuts&mr Ms sent j-oa e eopy of to BIS dated 37 January on the 6b0r?« subject. I would be ssost geat^ful for yowr views %»€ satvie« sm tli« %«eetions fee has ee: Mr. UNITED NATIONS f|gj? NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM ^^' MEMORANDUM 1NTERIEUR TO-. The Secretary-General ^ Qf^u\ °*™'- 2? January 1971 REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: Leonid N. Kutakov, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs -** SUBJECT-. Transmission of General Assembly disarmament resolutions OBJET: to Governments 1. Among the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session there are resolutions 266l A, 2666, and 2663 B, on which a decision should be taken by the Secretary-General whether these resolutions are to be transmitted to the Governments concerned. 2- Besolution 266LA. This resolution urges "the Governments of the nuclear-weapon Powers" to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing as well as deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems. A decision should be made, as to whether a copy of resolution 266l A should be addressed by the Secretary- General to all the five nuclear-weapon Powers, including the People's Republic of China, and whether the transmittal should be made by letter or by aide memoire, and the method of transmitting it to the PEG. 3. In connexion with this matter, you will recall that in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2^6 B (XXIl) convening the Conference of Hon-Nuclear-Weapon States, you cabled an invitation to the People's Republic of China to attend the Conference together with the other nuclear-weapon States, but the cable was not accepted by the People's Republic of China. I should also like to refer to resolution 2030 (XX) by which the General Assembly endorsed the idea of convening a world disarmament conference "to which all countries would be invited". In that case, the People's Republic of China was approached by some African countries, but it declined the invitation to participate in the Conference. ^- Resolution 2666. This resolution concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco requested the Secretary-General to "arrange for transmittal of the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States" and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session of any measure adopted by them in order to implement it. Again, a decision should be made by the Secretary-General as to whether this resolution should be transmitted to all five nuclear-weapon States, including the People's Republic of China. In this case, since a reply is expected, a letter would be the normal means of communication. - 2 - 5. Resolution 266$ B. This resolution, inter alia, called upon "all nuclear-weapon States" to suspend, nuclear weapon tests in all environments. In the past, as a rule, resolutions calling for cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, or even in all environments, have not teen transmitted to Governments, mainly because the matter was being actively dealt with by the ENDC, but also in order to avoid any political complications that might arise in connexion with the testing by France and the People's Republic of China. The CCD, as you know, is actively engaged in trying to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The question is whether the past practice should be continued, or whether a new decision should now be taken to transmit resolution 2665 B to all nuclear-weapon States, including the People's Republic of China. 6. In view of the implications of the decisions on the above questions, perhaps you might wish to obtain the views also of the Chef de Cabinet and the Legal Counsel. 7- As soon as decisions in principle have been made concerning the queries in paragraphs 2-, h and 5 above, the letters or aide memoires, as the case may be, will be prepared for your approval and signature. cc: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan Mr. C.A. Stavropoulos CVN/je "MeS B.I. filler k Jfebruary 1971 Controller fhe Mr. Kutakov lias raised the question of representation allowance to be paid to Mr. Ilkka Pastinen, and he has suggested that he may be paid at tfce saa® irats as the normal rate for an Assistant Seeretary-General. I accept his recoimnendattoa, which I Mlieve teas been informally discussed with you. When Jmbassador Pastinea is disohargiug his responsibilities as ray Speeial Representative to the Committee of the Conference OH Bifiamasaaent, I would request that he be paid the representation allowance of 4^5^ per moath. Sir. CVV. ;lSp». li*H» Kutakov Mr. Lemieux UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR TO: The Secretary-General DATE, 1 February 1971 REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: Leonid N. Kutakov, Under-Secretary-General for ' 1 DE: Political and Security Council Affairs SUBJECT: Representation Allowance - Mr. Ilkka Pastinen OBJET: ' —— • In connexion with the appointment of Mr. Pastinen as your Special Representative to the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish to request that he be authorized a represen- tation allowance at the rate normally paid to an Assistant Secretary-General. CVH/je cc: Mr. Lemieux 5 February 1971 for Politieal and Security Couaeil Affairs "BraBsrnlsaion of Geaeral AaaeBibly diaannaiagnt resolutions tio Governmeuts X refer to yew? aemorandum dated 2? January cm the above subject. I belteve you ireeetTed a cow o£ *b® ^rtewe of the Legal Counsel expressed in Ms meaiorafcdttm to nse dated 1 February (copy attaebsd). I agree with tfce views exp-essed "by tfce I«gal Cotuisel. AecocfcUngly^ resolution 2666 (XXV) BffiQr fe transmitted to all tfee five nueleay-weapon Powers. So far as resoltitions 2661A aa4 2665B are concerned, I feel that it is best to follow tfee past ccs Mr. C.V* Uarastohan Mr. C.A. Stavropoulos UNITED NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM 1NTERIEUR V* TO: U Thant . DATE : 1 February 1971 A: The Secretary-General _* >X^ CV*. REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: C. A. otavropoulor DE: The Legal Counsel X SUBJECT: OBJET: Transniofjion or General As3ei.-:bly disarrnan-jyjnt. re-p.olutiona to Governn .nts 1. By memorandun o,' '!•;-,' January I'/fl, you have ask _d for my views and advice on Mr. Kutakov's memorandum to you of 27 January, regarding the; above subjecto Essentially, the- point r?t jcsue is wh-vthvjr '.jeneral Assembly resolutions rjt'.'xlA, ;;.:666 and ,:'66^>3, adoj/ttd at th'. last session, should, 'b.. transmitted to all the five nuclear-weapon Powers, Including the People's liepublic of China. Resolution ;--666 (XXV) ?. Of the three resolutions just mentioned, only resolution iobG (XXV) of 7 Oeceinbcr 1970 nvkes oxprcsn reference to its trriri.snvi:.:sJeri. Operative paragraph S reads as follows: "Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for transmittal of th . present resolution to th-~ nuclear—veexpon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty—six.th ses?: ton of ony measure adopted by them in order to implement it.'' Pursuant to this peragr&ph, th-.-: Secretary-General is under an obl:iCation to send the resolution to "the nuclear-weapon Sta.tes.' ^. The People's Republic of China certainly possesses nuclear weapons. Furthermore, resolution Pb66 (XXV) deals with the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Additional Protocol II does not list* the entities which may become parties to it, but the Treaty of Tlatelolco itself, to which the Protocol is an annex, refers in article ,--& to signature and ratification of the Protocol "by all powers possessing nuclear weapons." I am informed by a member of the Permanent Mission of Mexico - Mexico bein^ the depositary! of the Treaty of Tlatelolco - that there ic- no doubt that the formula just mentioned extends to the People's Republic of China, which has - 2 - previously been approached regarding becoming a party to the •Protocol; • • • - • " . k. In view of the foregoing, I believe that the Secretary- General is required to transmit resolution 2666 (XXV) to all five i nuclear weapons States, including the People's Republic of China. The appropriate means of transmission, in my view, would be a third person note (note verbale) from the Secretary-General to the respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Resolutions 2661A and P663B 5. Neither of the- other two resolutions mentioned, in Mr. Kutakov's memorandum (2661A (XXV) and 26658 (XXV) of 7 December 1970) contains any express request to the Secretary-General to transmit the resolutions to the nuclear-weapon States. It is therefore a question of policy whether those resolutions should be transmitted. I note, from paragraph 5 of Mr. Kutakov's memorandum, that previous resolutions similar in substance to resolution 2663B (XXV) have not as a rule been transmitted to Governments, and the same policy reasons may continue to, apply. 6. If, as a matter of policy, it is decided to transmit either or both of the resolutions in question to the nuclear-weapon Powers, I consider that the People's Republic of China should be one of the recipients. The issue here is not one of "statehood" or "independence", but of possession of nuclear weapons. The People's Republic of China is clearly identifiable as an entity having such weapons. As in the case of resolution ?666 (XXV), if transmission is decided upon, a third person note would appear to be the appropriate means. ••'* !- v UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM JNTER1EUR TO: The Secretary-General DATE: 5 February 1971 A: REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE! FROM: L.N. Kutakov, Under-Secretary-General > DE: for Political and Security Council Affairs SUBJECT: Transmission of General Assembly disarmament OBJET: resolutions to Governments In my memorandum of 27 January 1971, I raised the question of transmission of General Assembly resolutions 2661 A (XXV), 2666 (XXV) and 2663 B (XXV) which were addressed to Nuclear-Weapon States. The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your instructions con- cerning the transmission of the other disarmament resolutions of the twenty-fifth session which contain paragraphs addressed to "all States", "all Governments" or "Member States". As a rule, in the past, it has been the practice to transmit dis- armament resolutions, as a matter of routine, to disarmament bodies • (the Disarmament Commission, the EMDC, the CCD, etc.,) either for action or for information. On the other hand, contrary to the practice followed in the case of resolutions on other subjects, the disarmament resolutions have not as a rule been transmitted to Member Governments. The reasons for this were: the political sensitivity of the subject, which involved mainly the Great Powers; and the fact that the disarmament resolutions, which were usually general in'their terms, were to be the subject of detailed negotiations in subsidiary bodies. In this connexion, the question was raised within the Department of PSCA as to whether the past practice mentioned above should be con- tinued or whether it should be changed and all resolutions on disarma- ment should also be transmitted like those dealing with other questions relating to the political field. t In view of the importance of the matter, I discussed this at a meeting of senior officers of the Department. The Director of the Disarmament Affairs Division expressed the opinion that, in'view of the repeated recommendations of the General Assembly to curtail the volume and expense of documentation of the United Nations, it is considered that the above traditional practice should be maintained. He felt that any change in this practice might raise questions. 1 • • • / i On the other hand other officers felt that they saw no reason for treating disarmament resolutions on a different basis from those relating to international peace and security, apartheid -or decoloniza- tion and 'that the matter should be brought to the attention of the Secretary-General. In this Connexion they also drew attention to the Circular Letter No.OR 4^1 dated 15 November 1966 (Section XVI - Transmission of'resolutions) from the Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs on the Procedure to be followed in matter's relating to the General Assembly. I am inclined to support the view that, except in cases when, for valid considerations, the Secretary-General decides not to transmit a particular resolution, all resolutions which contain any paragraph addressed to States should be formally transmitted with a covering note. I should be grateful for your guidance regarding the procedure to be followed in this matter. ETHIOPIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 866 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA, NEW YORK, N. Y. JOO17 February 8, 1971 N 120/11 Excellency, - <* With reference to Your Excellency's letter PO 131/2(1) dated January 21, 1971 in connection with the appointment of a qualified Consultant Expert to assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of a report on the economic and social conse- quences of the. arms race and of military expenditures, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Mr. Kifle Wodajo has been nominated by my Government to participate in the first „ session to be held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from February 16 to 19, 1971. Accordingly Mr. .Wodajo will be arriving around the 15th of the current month, and it will be highly appreciated if the necessary arrangements could be made in order to have the air ticket transferred to him to Addis Abeba through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. 1 .Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to tljie^Uni-ted Nations H.E. U Tharit ..,,.'' Secretary-General of the United Nations New York, New York 10017 yO' REPUBLICA SOCIALISTA ROMANIA SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA MISIUNEA PERMANENTA PE LINGA NATIUNILE UNITE PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 6O EAST S3RD STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. IOO28 N°* 15^ -" . ' - ' New Yoric, le 9 fevrier 1971 Monsieur le Secretaire general, J'ai 1'honneur de me referer & votre lettre no. PO 131/2 (1), du 21 Janvier 1971, et de vous communiquer que le Gouvernement de la Kepublique Socisliste de Koumanie propose la candidature de l,i. Gheor^he.DOLGU, maitre de conferences ,3 1'Universite de Bucarest, redacteur.en chef de la revue "Viat?a econoiaica", pour §tre nouime en tant qu1expert consultant afin de participer 3 1'elaboration du rapport sur les consequences econouiiques et sociales de la course aux ariuements et des depenses rnilitair'es. Veuillea agreer, monsieur le Secretaire general, les assurances de a-? haute consideration. Duma , M Qha rgl ^'affaires a.i. Son Excellence U THANT, , ,• . i t .i' ' Secretaire g^nera.l.de, - ; •» »- 1« organisetj.au des Nations Unies ' , ' NEW YORK t'O, jj-t1 lj POLSKA RZECZPOSPOL1TA LLJDOWA POLISH PEOPLE'S..REPUBLIC STAtE PRZEDSTAWICIELSTWO PRZY NARODACH ZJEDNOCZONYCH PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 9 EAST 66™ STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. IOO2I ' TEL: 744-2506 16 February 1971 Excellency,' In reply to your letter dated 21 January 1971, I have the honour to inform you that the Polish Government has nominated Maciej PERCZYNSKI, Associated Professor of Economy as a, candidate for appointment as consultant expert to Assist in the preparation of a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures. • Professor Maciej Perczynski is Head of the Departament of Economic Relations and Member of .Scientific Council of the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs,Warsaw. At the same time he is Associated Professor of Economy in the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw. During the years 1966/69 Professor M.Perczyn- ski in the framework of UNDP activities was a lecturer in economic planning at the University of Damascus. Professor M.Perczynski has knowledge of English, French and Russian languages. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. H.E. U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations United Nations Headquarters New York,N.Y. 1001? UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations, N.Y. (FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD) Press Release DC/669 22 February 1971 CONFERENCE OF COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO RECTONVENE IH GENEVA ON^L FEBRUARY. 1971 The 26-member Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will reconvene in Geneva on 25 February 1971. The Secretary-General will be represented at the Conference by Ambassador Ilka Pastinen of Finland as his Special Representa- tive to the Conference and by William Epstein, Director of the Disarmament Affairs Division, as his Alternate Representative to the Conference. They will be assisted by officers from the Disarmament Affairs Division. Technical services will be provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva. The twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions on disarmament* Several of these called on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to deal urgently with questions of general and complete disarmament (resolution 266l C), chemical &nd;'bacteriological (biological) methods-of-v^fare-(resolution £662), banning underground nuclear weapon tests and achieving a comprehensive test ban (resolution 2663 A and B), and putting and end to the arms ro.ce, particularly in the nuclear field (resolution 2667). In accordance with the usual practice, the Sacretary-Aeneral will transmit all resolutions on disarmament to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference, * *** * >JL- £LvVo»~-*.J &. 0_JL e*Co I, vUs^ \J /!/• 19 March 1971 Note for the Record On the basis of Hr. Kutakov's memorandum to me dated 17 March 1971 .» I discussed with the Legal Counsel, Mr. Stavropoulos, who said that he had no strong views on the subject of interpreting the term "all governments" which is mentioned in operative paragraph k of Resolution 2667 (XXV) . According to him, if the sponsor or sponsors of that particular resolution have in mind all governments, both members and non- members of the United Nations, then I should act accordingly. Today I sent for the Permanent Representative of Romania who sponsored that particular item and /Che main sponsor of the Draft Resolution which was later adopted, and asked him to explain his intention regarding the phrase "all governments". He said that he made it very clear in his statement introducing the resolution that "all governments", whether members of the United Nations or of Specialized Agencies, or non-members of this Organization, are meant to be contacted with the request to extend their full cooperation to the Secretary- General. When I asked him to spell out the governments he had in mind, he said he had in mind governments such as: People's Republic of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Viet-Ham and the German Democratic Republic. On the basis of this explanation, I have decided to accept *&p. Kutakov's recommendation. U Thant UNITED NATIONS |||p NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM ^"^ MEMORANDUM 1NTERIEUR T0. U Thant DATE: 19 March 1971 A: The Secretary-General REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM-. C. A. Stavropoulos DE: The Legal Counsel SUBJECT: OBJET: Report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures: request to Governments for co-operation,in carrying out the study 1. I have received a copy of the memorandum of 17 March 1971? which Mr. Kutakov addressed to you on the above subject, and on which you have orally requested my views, 2. In his memorandum Mr. Kutakov refers to operative paragraph k of General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV), whereby the Assembly "calls upon all Governments to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General," and he recommends that the Secretariat should interpret "all Governments" to include the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the German Democratic Republic. As you are aware, my Office had already advised that "all Governments" should be equated with "all States", and accordingly, in line with established practice, only States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies should be invited to co-operate in the study in question. 3. There are difficulties in the way of interpreting "all Governments" in a manner different from "all States". If it is assumed that there is a difference, how is that difference to be defined? The fifty States which comprise the United States of America all have Governments. Southern Rhodesia has an "illegal regime", but is it a Government in the present sense? A similar problem arises with respect to other entities, such as Oman. To avoid problems of this nature, it is necessary to argue that "all Governments" means all sovereign Governments. This, however, is merely the "all States" formula with a different name. k. I personally believe that a decision to interpret "all Governments" in a more flexible manner than "all States" could only be based on a firm indication cc: Mr. Kutakov — 2 — that this was the wish of the General Assembly. There is absolutely nothing in the record leading up to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) which indicates this to be the case. In fact, quite the contrary appears to be true. The draft resolution, containing in its original form the reference to "all Governments", was introduced in the First Committee at its 1765th meeting, on behalf of some twenty-four sponsors from all regional groups, by the representative of Romania. Speaking to the very paragraph in question he said that: "The Governments of Member States, non- governmental and international institutions and organizations are also being called upon to make their contributions to the report.... / Underlining added_/. He, therefore, gave the most restrictive interpretation to "all Governments" as being the Governments of only Members of the United Nations. While he may not have intended so strict an interpretation, it is certainly clear that he did not have in mind that "all Governments" was meant to be a new formula, pursuant to which at least the entities mentioned in paragraph 2 of the present memorandum would be invited by the Secretary-General to submit comments for inclusion in the study in question. Furthermore, I have found nothing in the record of the First Committee indicating that any other speaker held this latter view. I therefore see no reason, in this instance, to depart from the usual practice. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM 1NTERIEUR TO: DATE: 1? March 1971 A: The Secretary-General REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: L.N. Kutakov, Under-Secretary-General for DE: Political and Security Council Affairs SUBJECT: Report on the economic and social consequences of the OBJET: arms race and of military expenditures; request to Governments for co-operation in carrying out the study 1. A copy of the note verbale dated 1 March 1971 from the Secretary- General which was sent to all States Members of the United Nations is attached. In this connexion attention is drawn to operative paragraph 4 of resolution 266? (XXV) which "calls upon all Governments to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General to ensure that the study is carried out in the most effective way". 2. A decision has to be taken as to whether the note verbale referred to in paragraph 1 should also be addressed to States other than Members of the United Nations. 3. The Legal Counsel who was consulted in the matter is of the opinion that "all Governments" should be interpreted as Governments of all States and accordingly the note verbale should be addressed to all Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies. 4. This would leave out Governments such as the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the German Democratic Republic, whose contri- butions would certainly be important in the preparation of the study. 5. Having regard to the substance of the study, the importance of seeking the co-operation of all Governments concerned and the fact that the Secretary-General is responsible for the preparation of the study with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, I would recommend that in this case the note verbale should be addressed to all Governments without distinction, including the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Wam and the German Democratic Republic. 6. In making this recommendation I should like to recall the recent decision of the Secretary-General to transmit to the People's Republic of China the text of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) relating to Disarmament. cc: Mr.Stavropoulos <• , UNITED NATIONS WW NATIONS UNIES NE^W ^YORK The Secretary-General of the United Eations presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of and has the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, to be transmitted to the General Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-sixth session. In accordance with the terms of this resolution, the Secretary-General appointed the following group of consultant experts to assist him in the preparation of the report: Mr. Gheorghe Dolgu Professor of Economics, University of Bucharest; Member of the Romanian Academy of Social and Political Sciences Mr. Willem F. Duisenberg Professor of Macro-Economics, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands Mr. Vasily S. Emelyanov Corresponding member-of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Mr. Pla'cido Garcia Reynoso Professor of Law, School of Economics, University of Mexico Mr. Vojin Guzina President of the Federal Commission of Nuclear Energy, Yugoslavia; Professor of Economics, University of Belgrade Mr. Douglas Le Pan Professor at the University of Toronto; former Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Department of External Affairs of Canada UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES - 2 - Mr. Ladislav Matejka Deputy Director of Research Institute for Planning and Management of National Economy, Czechoslovakia Mr. Akira Matsui Ambassador, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan Mr. Jacques Mayer Directeur des syntheses e'conomiques & 1'Institut national de la Statistique et des etudes e'conomiques, France Mr. Maciej Perczynski Professor of Economics, Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw Mr. Mullath A. Vellodi Joint Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India Mr. Henry Wallich Professor of Economics, Yale University United States of America Mr. Kifle Wodajo Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia Sir Solly Zuckerman Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government of the United Kingdom The Group of Consultant Experts, which held its first session at United Nations Headquarters from l6 to 19 February 1971> to organize its work, considered that it would be greatly assisted in its task if Governments could supply information, both quantitative and qualitative, on the matters listed below: 1. The level and trend of military expenditure over the past decade, and the near-term and long-term prospects for such expenditure. Data on expenditure should be broken down, if possible, in terms of procurement (commodities), personnel, research and development, capital investment. 2. The effect, if any, of military expenditure on the rate of growth of the economy. 3. The effect of military expenditure on the use of resources. (a) The level and trend of employment of manpower in (i) the armed forces; (ii) defence-related activities (b) The level and trend of manpower and financial resources devoted to all research and development activities, and the proportion of these totals allocated to (i) military purposes; and (ii) defence- related industry (c) The level and trend of public and private social expenditure (education, health, cultural activities, social security, housing, etc.) UNITED NATIONS WmS NATIONS UNIES -3 - k-. The effects, if any, on the volume and structure of imports and exports resulting from (a) domestic and (b) foreign military expenditure. The proportion of imports and exports that is defence-related. 5. The effects, if any, on the balance of payments resulting from (a) domestic and (b) foreign military expenditure. 6. The level and trend of economic aid, provided or received, and the relationship, if any, of defence considerations. 7- The influence of military expenditure on the level of economic activity and on foreign trade. 8. Possibilities of environmental damage. Tendencies towards the premature exhaustion of raw material resources or the over-exploitation of such resources. 9- Effects on social stability and on social attitudes, tensions, frictions. 10. The effects, if any, of defence considerations on over-all production and foreign trade policies. 11. The effects, if any, of .defence considerations at home or abroad on the transfer of technology (a) internally (b) to foreign countries. 12. Other information or observations which may be relevant to the work of the expert group, particularly in connexion with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) which calls upon all States to take effective steps for the cessation and reversal of the arms race and for the achievement of steady progress in the field of disarmament. Having regard to paragraph k of resolution 266? (XXV) which "calls upon all Governments to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary- General to ensure that the study is carried out in the most effective way", Governments are invited to supply any data, information or studies-that would throw light on the items listed. It should be emphasized that all data supplied by Governments to the United Nations or specialized agencies under existing standard reporting procedures' will be made available by the Statistical Office of the United Nations to the Group, and there is, therefore, no need for Governments to furnish such data in connexion with the present request, except in so far as it may be possible to bring previously supplied information up-to-date, or to provide additional detail. Since the Group wishes to examine trends over the past decade, as well as the current situation and outlook, it is requested that, wherever possible, data should be supplied for the years UNITED NATIONS tHi NATIONS UNIES 1961 to 1970. Value data should be reported in national currencies in current prices, and wherever possible, in constant prices. If estimates are also available in terms of current and constant dollars, these too should be reported. Since the report called for by resolution 266? (XXV) is required to be transmitted to the General Assembly in time for consideration at the next session, it is requested that Governments forward their replies to the Secretary-General not later than 1 May 1971• 1 March 1971 ITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL A/RES/2667 (XXV) ASSEMBLY Twenty-fifth session Agenda item 9^ RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY _/on the report of the First Committee (A/8l8U_)/ 2667 (XXV). Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security The General Assembly, Conscious of the threat to mankind posed by the ever-spiralling arms race, especially in view of the existing large stockpiles of and impending new qualitative advances in nuclear armaments, Aware that world military expenditures have been continuously increasing, in spite of the achievements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament during the 196«s, Convinced that unless vigorous measures are taken without delay to stop the arms race and to maKe concrete progress towards disarmament, giving the highest priority to nuclear disarmament, military expenditure is liKely to increase at an even greater rate during the 1970s, Deeply concerned that the arms race, nuclear and conventional, constitutes one of the heaviest burdens which peoples everywhere nave to bear and that it absorbs immense material wealth, human energy and intellectual resources, Deeply 'convinced that the elimination of the enormous waste of wealth and talent on the arms race, which is detrimental to the economic and social life of all States, would have a positive impact, especially on the developing countries, where the need for skilled personnel and the lack of material and financial resources are most keenly felt, 71-00112 A/RES/2667 (XXV) Page 2 Convinced that a halt in the arms race, a reduction of military expenditures and concrete progress towards disarmament would greatly facilitate the achievement by nations of their economic and social goals and would contribute effectively to the improvement of international relations and the maintenance of world peace and security, Conscious that it is the fundamental task of the United Nations to promote, in accordance with the Charter, the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Determined to take appropriate steps to bring the arms race to a halt and to make progress towards general and complete disarmament, which is the most important question facing the world today, Wishing to promote the elaboration and implementation of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, which would also facilitate the United Nations development programmes during the 1970s, Believing that thorough consideration of tne main aspects of the arms race would facilitate a better understanding and evaluation of its negative consequences and of the great dangers with which it is fraught, 1. Calls upon all States to take effective steps for the cessation and reversal of the arms race and for the achievement of steady progress in the field of disarmament; 2. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue to pay urgent attention to all questions meant to put an end to the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field; 3. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures; 4. Calls upon all Governments to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General to ensure that the study is carried out in the most effective way; 5. Calls upon non-governmental organizations and international institutions and organizations to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report; 6. Requests that the report be transmitted to the General Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-sixth session. 1919th plenary meeting, 7 December. 1970. 30 March 1971 (^0 p.m.) S-Cf: Dr. Bunche called from home to say that he did not have the opportunity this morning to mention to you what follows regarding Breznev's speech suggesting an international world conference on nuclear disarmament including Peking. Dr. Bunche submits the idea if you would like to consider the possible of issuing a statement to endorse Breznev's idea concerning the international conference. Dr. Bunche did not have the opportunity to read the full text of Breznev's speech. CVN/je cc: Jfe%Le 7 May 1971 Assiatanti Secretary-fifenersl ' -6f'- ©be .faetinen I have diseuaised the ^u&atjton &£' ttoiB eoniinuanee of Mbaesador ae wy Speciai Representative to the Conference of the Committee on BisSKBpment >?lth AmbaSisador Pastinen himself during nsy recent visit ths CCB may rseess in the mamner, Ambassador Pastinen has tefeen leavQ of absence from his own Government and cannot go back to Helsinki during the recess. He will alto be needed as soon as the CCD resumes its work, end also when the first Odosaittee, as veil as the sessions, of the General Mseaibly discuss the report of the CCD» In the circumstances > I have decided that Ambassador Pastinen 'a present contract should be extended up to the end of November 1971. 3E shall be grateful if yew would take the necessary administrative action in. the matter. W. I..B* Mr-, ?'/; Mr. C.1T* Narasimhan '•'". ' i.}'.^'".: ' ,„.,* i(i. : ' ," ' -•"- '^. •••"' ^f -' CEMEBAL AGREEMENT • ACCORD 6£MdRAL TRADB SUR LES TARiFS SQUAWiERS ET LE COMMEflCE '. , *'-'J'.J»." l *, TELSGRAMSJES : OATT, GENEVE •—; :.' TELBPHON3 : 848011 834000 332000 881000 Villa !• ,0o»to . Palati d«> Matlont 1211 CENfeVE 10 REFERENCE : 00/101 ^^c;^is. , ;$.' ..**r- 4?- MS Dear Mr. Secretary-General, Thank you for your letter of 8 March 1971, referring to General Assembly Resolution 266? (XXV) and requesting contributions for the report you will make on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military *V '.•'. ,-, expenditures. ^•^•••.'«1 ' •*. ' • v' ^ ^.v/^'- : I wish to inform you that the OATT has made no studies Wf concerning the part the arms race plays in inhibiting international trade, and we do not therefore have any material which could contribute to your report. Yours sincerely. Olivier Long Director-Genera tJ Thant, , Secretary-General, United Nations, Hsw York •v™..-. OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE Mii^CPfl^ UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA Telegrammes: UNATIONS, GENEVE Palais des Nations Telex : 22.212 ou 22.344 CH - 1211 GENEVE 10 Telephone : 346011 334000 332000 331000 REF.NO: O, / 30 April 1971 (a rappeler dans la reponse) Personal and Confidential My dear U Thant, It was very good to see you in Geneva and to find you looking so well. I enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum which Mr. Kutakov asked me to prepare for him which deals with the prospects for the approval of a BW Convention by the General Assembly at its next session. The CCD will go into recess after its meeting on May 13 next. I intend to return to New York on Sunday, May 16, and will have to leave on Wednesday, May 19, for Canada to get an honorary degree and (I hope) to take a few days leave. If it is possible to see you for a few minutes on either Monday, May 17, or Tuesday, May 18, I should be very grateful as there is a matter I would like to discuss with you. With best wishes and personal regards. Tours sincerely, William Epstein His Excellency U Thant Se cretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 29 April 1971 . the- ffor a BH 1. The: reactions to the new draft convention .submitted by the. socialist States -are as;' folows-; •• . ,- '•• -• .-,.•'". • • •.. '. :.- •• '(a) ^.er!3hiied Ki&gdoHtj Italy 'and, to a lesser extent* Japan, Have welcomed • • the draft eoii*entioii« Tfee ITnited Kingdom and Italy have given their preliiisinary but fairly deta^ed- comments;. The United States lias not yet spoken and teay not speak tpatjti the last day of the session, on Fay 13* and it is- not yet inowa Aether it will eoffiment la detail than. It is • quite possible j however., that it may be discussing, informally or in •private, some of its detail ed eosmients witk the Soviet Haioii and other delegations before thiat date* It is not yet clear whether Canada or the Setherlaads td-11 gitre their re^ctiona during; the current session. (b) Is regards the: 'noE«ialigaed eoiiniries, the sew draft W convention has been welcomed by Argentina^ "Braail, Morocco and the UM, Of these, oaly Braail and Argentina have ffiadedetaile d coiraneiits. !There is a possibility 1tist Moroeeo and UAH say give their detailed cosments during- the current Cession, but this is not yet definite. Sweden, in a very preliminary statement, in effect eriticiaed th© separation of B weapons from C weapons and indicated its dissatisfaction with this procedTire. Yugoslavia did; likewise, 'but' used lesss strong language, Hexieo is expected to speak next week and is also" ;e±peeted to voice its dissatisfaction over the severance of B weapons f row C • weapoas. lone of the other non-aligned cotiatries has1 iadieated any intention to speek at this session. If they do, it is expected that at least a few of the® Kay also express dissatiisfaetioa ^tb the Mo-step approach. 2. As 1 see the situation at the 'zassaeBt, the raain probleia coneerps. the time factor. If t&e text of a Bft eonventios can "be agreed by the Soviet Union, the United States 8&d -the United Kingdom by the end of August, I would think that there irould ber little doubt btit that it would be approved by the General Assembly. However^ if the COD resiaias in session until late October, or even «ntil -the end of September,' and doss not report to the General Assembly until after the. Assembly has begun its /work, I "would consider that the chances' of an agreed text being approved by the General Asaeiably at this session could be eGHsiderably disdnisJied, ami that there sight be a real possibility of the draft cowentioa being sient back foi* further consideration. There appears to be seise feeling of resentment amongst : some members of the GCD, .particularly the non-aligned, in view of tHeir strong support for dealing ^ith C and B weapons together, at what they regard as having w>yae rug pulled oat from, under their feet" on the question of GBIJ (as it -feras in 1969 on the sea-bed draft treaty}. If, in addition, the CCD does not report to the General Assembly until soae time after ••'.2.. it has begua i€s "wr£» It is possible that there 'Mght be additional feelings of Teseatmeiit nipt oal y by some of the noa-aligaed Members of the CCB but by other Bejabers of 'the -Baitec! Ifetio&s (as there was in 1969 in regard' to the sea-bed draft treaty) at the delay ia report&ag to the Assembly. Foreign 'Miiisters; of lumbers'- of the lotted Uatioas like to have the report of the GCD submitted .in ] time -for " them to take it into aeeomt in their statements in the general debate. : It is trtae that the sea^bed draft treaty involved important interests :of'e0a§tal Stated aad that. there -was insufficient time to give. fall eonsMeratioa to the® at the I^&j Assembly, while a B¥ convention does not have the saEje^important'eleffieiStg.'-' ' Ho^ever;^ 'the. reverse argoiaeat ha.s' been rsade by some. delegations' ia Geneva^ to the effiet that the BW draft convention ig not very Important IEC itself^ that ta'e>r£ Is fao urgency in approving it at this sessldfl of th© : Isseffibljr aad that, it eould therefor© be deferred for another year while -aorfe ;pr&ee<|e^ && G: ;• 3. All of the'abov'e f&'^tors WDSHld1 ssem to indicate that there sight be sotae risks that the draft 'Bltf eoaveati'Qa VioaLd ^ot receive the approval of the A$seM)ly at -tMg ;se^si-©B if its subsiis&qn i.s delayed beyond the ©ad of Imgu-st or begjtfflaing. of ^epteiabe^, la aay eaS©> it" is clear that the chances for Its approval tj&t&d be Each ;eah;aaced if it ^rere submitted in time for it to be tsiken -a^eoiaitt' ^Hr^a^. th^ .gen^r^l &ei?at:e* ,. ..'."'.... • .. :' 'la ca^e- it '-f.s siisplj- rjot pesssibl© to ' reaoh. agreement on.' a dyaft BW b'etweeu the maia ' partieis by the end of August, it Mght "be worth con- ether-it iBight aot M a good' idea for the CGD to adjotijm i^s session here a33,ow th© issia parties ^Jd other Eeiibers of the GCD to continue iafonaal private aegotlatlons at OT headquarters dijriag the cotirse of thd geaeraL debate at the Gene-rial •Mserably» - -IM-le' :^tieh a eotir^e of action Eight in some ways be more difficult 'than ' eoatiauiag the disciigsioas ia the CGD at Geneva^ it ^uould^ on. the other hand, give the eielegattioiss at the General Isserobly in lew lEbrk a feeling that thiesy \?ere act belag igfaoral by the' ^Gp and might give then some sense of satisfaction td.th> the ample ppport^aalties afforded them to make their vie^s toxoua to the" -EeSiber.s1" o'f' tle: GGD ^liie the inforpal discussioiis aad aegotiations were piKse'seding, aiad; that" they; ire:r® not iserely expected to *rubDer~staapn the test vorkM oat at ioe^vs-i (it td.ll be reeaiied that suoh a. cotarse of action proved -to be siieesfesftjl ^hen the Comprehensive:- PrograEsae for Msarmapient was considered . at the. last session* fthea: the HPT :was e6'nsicfs.rsd: by the Genersil Assembly .from. Apri! to J\m0' IfS^ aa^ -Erliefi-the'-Otater Space Treaty was negotiated in 1966.) If 4dnsidered reia3;iy. iiefeessary, th^re eotjld also be a iseetirsg; of the CCD ia Hew Yorfe^ as-has- in fact happigBed im "Khe; past^ biit I really do not think such a procedure" is neeesaary siac© all inei^ers of the CCD are ia any case members of the Aeseiabiy. "FolloT-jiag the procedure outliaed; in this paragraph woiiLd certaialy aot provM-e aay: 'gtiaratttee of a-'sftoc©sfe?ul outeomej, but it Mght have some value, .and the ;p^ss;5Ml!ti&^ should at -least b0:earcfiadLly weighed* '....-'. $--..' ;:iBoHe 0f Mese"' !prdbXe'ES seM'"arise if 'the Bain parties can speed up their tsegotiatidas so that aa agreed text ean'b© prepared by the end of August.. One way ia Tsfcieii this eonl(i. be doae woald. be for the USSP^ the USA aad ttie UK to eontian© to earchange their views aad coaduet negotiations thro^h diplosiatie chamlels or otherwise daring the recess of the CCD in aa effort to produce an agreed text by the tMe the CCP resumes towards the end of Jiaae. OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE ffiSlffl! UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA TSISgrammes: UNATIONS, GENEVE Palais des Nations Tilex : 22.212 ou 22.344 CH - 1211 GENEVE 10 Telephone : 346011 334000 332000 331000 May 12th, 1971 (a rappeler dans la reponse) Personal and Confidential Dear Mr. Secretary-General, After a 12-week session, the CCD is about to adjourn and will reconvene at the end of June after the customary recess. The usual end term report will contain a summary of the positions of the parties arid an assessment on the work of the CCD. It may be of some interest if I were to try to supplement these with some observations of a more personal character. From the point of view of atmosphere, this session of the CCD has been lively and hardworking with an unabated interest in subjects discussed. The relations between delegations both official and informal have been harmonious and the co-operation between the two Co-Chairmen without friction. The general sense of frustration characteristic of the beginning of the session has subsided with the discussion of specific issues and the Socialist draft on B¥ and toxins. The tangible results of the work of the CCD at this session can be summed up succinctly: a breakthrough in the deadlock on the approach to chemical and biological weapons in the form of the new draft convention of the Socialist countries on B¥ and some new ideas on the comprehensive test ban treaty or transitional measures which their proponents hope might ultimately lead to it. In assessing the prospects for the CTB, its link with the SALT is, however, a political and military reality despite the growing insistence by the nonaligned and some other members that this should not be so. By agreement of the Co-Chairmen, the session was prolonged by two weeks. This was done primarily in order to give the US time to receive instructions and also in the hope of prompting delegations to come forward with their reactions to the new negotiating situation in the aftermath of the Socialist draft on BW. In the latter respect the results were slightly disappointing. Besides the sponsors of the draft, only half of the members have so far given their views. Those who have not officially expressed His Excellency U Thant Se cretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. p Office des Nations Unies a Geneve - 'United Nations Office at Geneva Page themselves include the US. At the end of the session, the US and the UK did, however, informally and privately convey their comments in writing on the Socialist draft to the delegation of the USSR. This should expedite the negotiating process, but even so it is doubtful whether sufficient progress can be made during the recess to allow the presentation of a joint or identical draft convention at the start of the summer session. It would be desirable, of course, for the CCD to produce an agreed draft agreement on BW and toxins based on the widest possible consensus in good time for submission to the 26th General Assembly. In view of the delay in reactions to the Socialist draft and also the fact that substantial differences in texts remain to be negotiated, the time factor may, even in the best circumstances, prove difficult. There has already been some talk about the necessity of an extension of the session in the fall. Another unknown is the strength of the opposition of some non- aligned against the concept of a separate BW treaty as such, and their continued insistence on a comprehensive solution of the whole CBW complex. So far this opposition is limited to Mexico, Sx-reden snd Yugoslavia (approximately in that order of insistence), but they may be joined by Ethiopia (because of their experience of the horror of the C¥ during the Italo-Ethiopian war) and one or two others. In any case, there will not be a unified non-aligned position, Argentina, Brazil, UAR and Morocco having already taken a favourable attitude to a B¥ convention, Morocco though with some reservation. Regardless of its size, this opposition may, however, prove a further complicating factor in the negotiations either by trying to work out and by generating discussion of a parallel document on CW or, as a minimum, by insisting in a BW convention on so strong a link to the CW that this will in effect jeopardize the whole concept of a separate BW treaty. Those delegations, which strongly oppose a separate treaty on BW only, already project that opposition in terms of the situation in the next Assembly. They visualize, in fact, difficulties in obtaining an Assembly approval for a B¥ only treaty. Leaving aside the tactical aspects of the situation, it seems to me that such a hypothesis is at least premature at this stage. In my view, much will depend on the more general political context at that time and to a lesser extent on the timing of the submission of the CCD report. Much will also depend on the progress or lack of it on other disarmament topics primarily SALTy The Secretary- General's study on the effects of the arms race/will also have a great impact on the mood in which the Assembly will approach the Disarmament debate. To- Special Representative for Disarmament / OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ft. TQ . His Excellency REF : U Thant Se cretary-General DE - FROM : Ilkka Pastinen GENEVE, 14 May 1971 Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament OBJET - SUBJECT : Situation Report No. 4.3 I forward herewith for your information "Situation Report No. 4.3" covering the Conference from 23 February to 13 May 1971. The Situation Report includes an Assessment of the entire session and Annex I containing the "Positions of CCD Members with Regard to Various Disarmament Measures" from 26 March to 13 May 1971, which covers only the period since the last situation report. SEC/CONFIDEKTIAL Geneva 13 May 1971 CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE OH DISARMAMENT Situation Report No. 43 (23 February - 13 May 1971) Page ASSESSMENT General 1 Chemical and biological weapons 2 Attitude towards the SALT 4 Comprehensive test ban 4 Conclusions 5 ANNEX I Positions of GCD Members with regard to Various Disarmament Measures CCD (a) General 1 (b) Procedure 2 CBW (a) General 3 (b. ). Geneva Protocol of 1925 5 (c) UK draft treaty 5 (d) 9-Power draft convention on biological weapons and toxins 6 (e) Prohibition of CW 21 (f) Other proposals 22 (g) Verification 23 (h) Unilateral renunciations 24 Underground test ban 25 (a) General 25 (b) Verification 30 (c) Threshold Treaty and other solutions 31 (d) Verification by challenge 33 Halting the nuclear arms race 34 (a) General 34. (b) The bilateral strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) 34 General and complete disarmament 35 World military Expenditures 35 Report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures (GA Res.2667 (XXV)} 36 Non-Proliferation Treaty 36 The Sea-Bed Treaty 36 Prohibition of use of nuclear weapons 37 Cut-off of production of fissile materials for weapons purposes 37 Nuclear-free zones (a) General 33 (b) Treaty of Tlatelolco 38 Elimination of foreign military bases 38 Measures of regional disarmament 39 'European security 39 France and the PRC ^0 World disarmament conference 40 Miscellaneous /O Geneva 13 May 1971 CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT Situation Report No. L% (23 February - 13 May 1971) Assessment General The first session of the 1971 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was businesslike. Extensive discussions on the questions of CBW and a com- prehensive test ban (CTB) contributed substantially to clarifying these problems. The general statements at the beginning of the session were marked by widespread dissatisfaction with the slow progress of disarmament and by con- cern about the future course of the Committee. There was a general tacit consensus that the question of CBW should be given priority during the 1971 sessions. Many members in all groups maintained that consideration of a CTB by the CCD need not be delayed because of the SALT talks and that the CCD was under obligation to make a substantial progress report on the subject to the General Assembly at its next session. There was much criticism of the existing deadlock on both CBW and CTB, which many members believed resulted from unwarranted military considerations on the part of the big Powers. The major event of the session was the presentation of a nine-Power Socialist draft convention on BW and toxins. Most Western and some non- aligned members welcomed this as a constructive step to break the deadlock on CBW. Several influential non-aligned members continued, however, to oppose the division of CBW by a separate agreement on B weapons, and to insist that the Committee continue during 1971 to work towards agreement on a total CBW ban. - 2 - On CTB, several members at first advocated a "threshold" ban, or at least some limitation on the number and magnitude of underground tests, if the comprehensive ban proved unattainable at this stage. Subsequent dis- cussion revealed that most members consider a threshold ban impractical to implement and thus prefer to aim for a comprehensive ban, with perhaps a short phasing-out period and some transitional measures pending a complete ban. Despite the clarification of views, however, and the references to recent statements of American authorities to the effect that on-site inspections are no longer necessary for adequate CTB verification, the United States stated that its position had not changed and that it still regarded on-site inspection as necessary. Although virtually all delegations continued to recognize GOD as the ultimate aim, with priority for the reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, there was little substantive discussion at this session of matters other than CBM or CTB. Nor was there much discussion of the disarmament proposals in the statement by Mr. Brezhnev to the 24-th Congress of the CPSU on 30 March 1971. Chemical and biological weapons The question of the prohibition of CBW attracted main attention and the urgency of its solution was universally stressed during this session of the CCD. At the beginning, the efforts were aimed at a comprehensive solution, supported by the great majority of members of the CCD. On 30 March, a new development of importance took place when the Socialist States submitted a draft convention on the complete prohibition of B weapons and toxins. This draft was presented as a compromise to overcome the impasse created by the refusal of the Western Powers to agree to ban C weapons, and as a first step to achieving the complete prohibition of all C and B weapons. In presenting their draft the Socialist States stressed that this did not signify a change in their position of principle in favour of a complete prohibition of C and B weapons and urged negotia- tions in parallel on C weapons. They also stated that a BW convention would represent first real disarmament measure since it ensured the complete prohibition of these weapons and the destruction of their stocks. - 3 - A number of Western Powers, including the United States, welcomed the new draft, but only the UK and Italy made detailed comments. They, together with the US, regarded the draft as a positive step and hoped that the acceptance by the Socialist States of the principle of a gradual approach to the prohibi- tion of CBW created, together with the UK draft convention, a basis for the achievement of a consensus, and for the preparation of a single draft con- vention to be submitted to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Although the United States made no detailed comments on the record, it did provide the USSR and other members of the Committee with a written memorandum setting out its specific and detailed views on the new draft. These were apparently regarded as providing a hopeful basis for successful negotiations with the USSR. Japan continued to prefer a comprehensive solution but expressed its readiness to consider a partial approach, if acceptable to the majority of CCD members. Canada and the Fatherlands made no direct comments on the new draft. The positions of the non-aligned States differed substantially. Argentina, Brazil and the UAR, while stressing their preference for the com- prehensive prohibition of CB¥, were willing to accept a partial solution banning only B weapons, with an undertaking by all parties to the convention to continue negotiations with a view to achieving an agreement on the prohi- bition of C weapons. Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia took a clearly negative position towards an agreement limited only to B weapons and toxins, which they considered to be only a marginal measure of minimal significance, since there was almost no likelihood of B weapons ever being used, and insisted on immediate negotiations for a comprehensive ban on both C and B weapons. Morocco took an intermediate position, urging a formal commitment in principle in the draft convention to a ban on C weapons and the possibility of a mora- torium on their production pending the elaboration of the treaty provisions for a ban. The other five non-aligned States did not comment on the 9-Power draft during this session of the CCD. The preliminary discussion on the new draft convention indicated dif- ferences on several specific questions: whether to restate the ban on use of these weapons in the draft convention; the references in the new draft to the scope of the Geneva Protocol and the implied reference to resolution 2603 of the General Assembly; the legal formulation of the provisions concerning the international responsibility of parties for implementation of the convention,- the formulation of the undertaking to continue negotia- tions on the prohibition of C weapons; and a possible role for the Secretary- General in the complaints procedure in case of suspicion or violation of the convention. Attitude towards the SALT In the general discussion at the beginning of the session, many of the non-aligned countries, as well as Japan, made openly critical remarks about the SALT for the lack of any apparent progress, and expressed fears that it might merely turn the quantitative nuclear arms race into a qualitative one. They also regretted the fact that they were not kept informed by the Co- Chairmen on the progress of the talks, and some stated that, if the SALT did not make substantial progress soon, the CCD could not refrain from dis- cussing the issues of nuclear disarmament. Direct criticism of the talks subsided as the members addressed themselves to specific issues, but it still formed the primary background of the CTB discussion. The Co-Chairmen made no direct reply to this criticism. Comprehensive Test Ban Virtually all members stressed the importance of a CTB. The Soviet Union referred to the recent statements of Mr. Brezhnev at the 2^.th Congress of the CPSU, calling for a CTB based on national inspection and accepted "by everyone and everywhere". Almost all non-aligned members stressed the need for a full ban to fulfil the pledge of the nuclear Powers in the MPT to halt the arms race. They also deplored the increased testing since the conclusion of the partial test ban, as a means of continuing the qualitative nuclear arms race and which resulted in radioactive pollution of earth and sea. Canada, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands urged agreement this year on some limitation of underground testing, if a CTB could not be achieved immediately. The Western members and most of the non-aligned stressed the importance of improving the international exchange of seismic data in connection with a further test ban of any type. On the other hand, most - 5 - non-aligned members agreed "with the Soviet view that an underground test ban was now possible without on-site inspection. Members in all groups referred to the recent statements, particularly those of Mr. William Foster, to the effect that on-site inspections were no longer necessary for adequate verification of a CTB. The United States made no reference to any limitation of underground testing, but repeated its insistence that adequate verification of a CTB required on-site inspection. The USSR stated clearly that any ban involving the possibility of on-site inspections, a threshold ban and the UK proposal for a phasing-out by quota, would be unacceptable to it. The UAR also failed to mention its previous proposal for a threshold ban with an accompanying moratorium on all tests, and opposed a partial ban. During the latter part of-the session, Sweden and the Netherlands both stated that they had come to the conclusion that the implementation of a threshold treaty would be impractical, primarily because of identification difficulties. They urged the CCD to continue its efforts to achieve a full underground test ban, possibly with a brief agreed phasing-out period. Canada, with some support from Sweden, Japan and the Netherlands, suggested a number of transitional measures to fill the gap between a limited underground test ban and a CTB, including advance detailed reporting of their testing programmes by nuclear- weapon signatories of the NPT, the progressive phasing-out of tests and the commitment of the nuclear Powers to the improvement of seismological verifi- cation methods. Mexico, supported by Japan and Sweden, revived the idea of the use of "black boxes" as a means of solving the verification problem. Conclusions Despite the opposition expressed by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia to a separate convention on B weapons and toxins and the reluctance of many others in this regard, it would appear likely that a large majority of the CCD will ultimately support a BW agreement as a first step towards a total CBW ban. Present evidence indicates that the Co-Chairmen may try to work out during the recess an agreed text, either as a joint or separate-but-identical draft, for presentation to the Committee at the summer session, in the hope that general agreement on a draft text can be reached in time for submission to the 26th General Assembly. While the difficulties of achieving a generally agreed draft text at the next session should not be insuperable, they may - 6 - well lead to protracted and difficult negotiations. There may also be discussions on a possible text for a complete ban on C weapons, if some of the non-aligned countries succeed in working out either a declaration or draft treaty provisions in this regard, as suggested by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia. With regard to the CTB, Canada, Sweden and Mexico, supported by some other non-aligned countries and by Japan and the Netherlands, will undoubtedly continue their efforts to achieve agreement on the text of an underground test ban. Extensive discussion on this subject, including the question of possible transitional measures, will undoubtedly occupy considerable time of the CCD atiite coming session. However, unless the United States agrees to alter its present position on the need for some on-site inspections, it is difficult to see how the CCD can make any concrete progress on a CTB during 1971. The most that seems possible at the moment is progress in widening support for some aspects of transitional measures. At the coining session, the main discussions are likely to concentrate on a BW convention, a supplementary CW ban and a CTB. Assuming that there will be a continuation of the present spirit of compromise by the main parties and of their desire to have some generally acceptable draft treaty to present to the General Assembly, there are grounds for hoping for a broad consensus on a draft BW convention. There are perhaps also hopes for some progress towards a CW ban and towards a CTB. AfflEX I Position of CCD Members with regard to Various Disarmament Measures (26 March - 13 May 1971) CCD (a) General During the second part of this session, several additional members associated themselves with the general view that CCD progress towards disarmament had been slow and unsatisfactory. Poland noted that, in the light of the heavy armaments burden, public opinion was impatient with the work of the CCD, which was undeniably slow and the results of which were short of expectations despite the best efforts of many delegations, the conclusion of a number of significant treaties and the promise of additional agreements in the near future. Poland blamed the lack of more concrete results on the lack of response and understanding of certain members,parti- cularly the United States (see "Halting of nuclear arms race - SALT" , below). The UAR noted the waning expectations of public opinion and the General Assembly's growing weariness with the CCD's rate of productivity and with the results achieved. It shared the feeling of despair in the face of the many obstacles which had arisen. Even though a complete deadlock had not been reached, disarmament negotiations were undergoing a "credibility crisis". The crisis had been latent in the CCD for some time while the Committee occupied itself with peripheral matters, and it had not "erupted" this year because of the new draft convention on BW of the Socialist States. However, the threat of crisis still persisted as long .as the CCD was not enabled to come to grips with the real disarmament issues by fulfilling the commitments of existing treaties, such as the NPT, and achieving other treaties, such as a CTB. The credibility crisis was not due to the methods of work or to the composition of the CCD but, in particular, to a prevailing inter- national situation conducive to deep mistrust. There could be no confidence while the norms of international law and UN resolutions were being flouted by some - as was now being done in the Middle East - without serious criticism or efforts of dissuasion, and a threat to peace was a threat - 2 - to disarmament. All must work towards the establishment of confidence if the CCD was to be expected to achieve substantial results. Yugoslavia commented that the CCD discussion had shown anxiety and impatience with the unsatisfactory results achieved so far, noting that the Lusaka Declaration on the arms race and disarmament demonstrated the deep interest of the non- aligned countries in the problem. Interest in disarmament was so great that it was untenable that political and military-technical conditions should be posed. Sweden stressed the view that the expectations of UN would be unsatisfied if the CCD again reported only marginal measures such as the Sea-Bed Treaty andthe ban on B weapons now suggested by the nuclear Powers. Even though positive, such measures were not significant steps towards the reduction of armaments, and the CCD should pursue far-reaching agreements, with priority to a CTB and a comprehensive CBW ban. The effect of partial treaties, such as the partial test ban, NPT and Sea-Bed, had not been satisfactory, and the lack of a full prohibition in the former two treaties had seemed to legitimize the continued arms build-up by the nuclear Powers. The PRC was expected to take its place in the United Nations soon, and the CCD should study ways to adapt its work in a way to solicit the PRC's active co-operation. Sweden was not yet ready to subscribe to suggestions such as those of Mr. Brezhnev for a 5-Power nuclear conference or a world disarmament conference, since it continued to hope that the CCD could prove to the General Assembly its effectiveness in handling disarmament. (b) Procedure Japan supported the holding of additional informal meetings during the 1971 summer session, with the participation of experts, including those from the Socialist States, to consider such questions as the scope of CW ban, the available verification measures for such a ban, and the possible checkpoints of verification. The UK welcomed this suggestion, and Poland said it would consider it. The UK also suggested it might be helpful to hold an informal meeting, either at this session or the next, to work on the final drafting of a BW convention. At the request of Canada, Italy. Japan and Yugoslavia, the Co-Chairmenrecommended and the CCD approved the convening of an informal meeting on 7 July to discuss CBW. The US and the UAR welcomed this decision, and the US indicated it would participate. - 3 - Canada thought it would be useful to convene, during "the summer session, an informal meeting with the participation of seismological experts, including experts from the two major testing Powers, to consider the implementation of resolution 2663 A (XXV), calling on the CCD to assist in studying the question of improving the international exchange of seismic data. The UK and Sweden supported this request. At the request of Canada and 11 other members, including J+ Western and 7 non-aligned, the Co-Chairmen recommended and the CCD approved the convening on 30 June of such a meeting. CEW (Comments on this subject took place mainly in the context of the 9-Power draft on BW.) (a) General Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia continued to criticize a partial approach to CB¥ (see "CCD-General", above). Sweden noted that the nuclear Powers were not the only ones involved in the CBW field, and that the rest of the world wanted complete elimination of all CBW and was not ready to legitimize the proliferation of C weapons, from nerve gas to herbicides. The Geneva Protocol banned the use of all CBW, and the production of all should nov be outlawed. Since a consensus on a BW ban had been secured, the CCD must con- tinue to give priority to a comprehensive CBW treaty so that the prohibition of the "more relevant" C weapons would not be indefinitely postponed (see also "Section d", below). Mexico reiterated its opposition to a. partial approach to the question of CBW, such as the 9-Power draft convention, as well as in the draft of the UK. It was not easy to oppose an agreement reached by the two big Powers but Mexico did so because it felt the function of the non-aligned members of the CCD was not to support automatically all proposals of the- great Powers but to examine them critically in the interest of the international community. The proposed measure on B weapons had little sub- stance. The majority of States preferred an agreement on a comprehensive ban of CBW. Mexico could not agree that it was impossible to achieve such broader agreement. The proposal to split a single entity and treat B weapons in iso- lation would have unfavourable consequences, undermine the Geneva Protocol and jeopardise prospects for the ban on the production of C weapons. This view was supported by SIPRI. The USSR itself had stated in working paper CCD/303 that the separate treatment of B weapons was -unacceptable because it would reinforce and legalize C weapons, annul an accepted rule of international law established by the Geneva Protocol and increase the danger of augmenting the arsenals, as well as the use of C weapons. It was not possible, therefore, to accept such a step now as a positive contribution to the solution of the problem of C weapons. Perhaps, the real explanation of this step was that the big Powers were not prepared to ban the production of C weapons because of verification difficulties or for other reasons. Accordingly, the 9-Power draft convention could be considered as an agreement not to ban C weapons. The ban on B weapons alone had little importance, as they were virtually unusable in a war and had already been unilaterally renounced by the USA and some other states. To avoid the alleged danger of a breakthrough,making B weapons usable.without risk to the user, it would be sufficient if the USSR also unilaterally renounced these weapons. Such an undertaking would have the same effect as the proposed treaty, which was without real control, and would be quite adequate while the agreement on CB¥ was being negotiated. Mexico recognized the value of a commitment to continue disarmament negotiations under the NPT. It saw, however, less value in its inclusion in the limited Sea-Bed Treaty and saw no reason to accept such a commitment, and the resulting postponement of the prohibition of C weapons, in a convention on B weapons. Experience showed that partial agreements tended to increase obstacles to full agreements, as in the case of partial test ban. The artificial division of C and B weapons in the 9-Power draft was contrary to the General Assembly resolution approving the memorandum of the non-aligned states. Although the big Powers maintained that verification of the ban on C weapons was highly difficult, the non-aligned states should not resign themselves but redouble the efforts for negotiations on C weapons now. To concentrate on the ban on B weapons to the detriment of other more urgent measures, such as the complete test ban, would be deplorable. Yugoslavia also expressed the belief that further progress towards a comprehensive solution of the CBW question was possible this year, and opposed postponement of a OT ban. It stressed the view that Resolution 2662 (XXV) was a sound basis for constructive negotiations and that several possibilities for a widely acceptable over-all solution were available, including the suggestion - 5 - of Morocco. Noting that the provisions in other treaties for further negotiations in good faith on •unresolved issues had proved to be of limited value, it maintained that any partial GBW ban must be clearly presented and formulated as part of this complex problem. Finally, it presented rather detailed suggestions on elements required in a CW ban (see "Prohibition of CW", below). The USSR and its allies also stressed the urgency of solving the CW question (see "Section |f$ below)* (b) Geneva Protocol of 1925 The USSR _and its allies, plus Brazil. Sweden and Yugoslavia, expressed the view that the question of use of CBW had been resolved by the Geneva Protocol (see "section $", below). Romania noted that this opinion was widely shared and embodied in important documents, in resolutions of the General Assembly, and in the Secretary-General's expert report on CBW. It added that the BW convention should in no way undermine the Protocol's validity but should confirm its universal application. The USSR and its alliest plus Yugoslavia, said that repetition in a convention of the Protocol's ban on use might weaken the Protocol. Poland noted that one positive result of efforts to achieve a CBW ban was the US intention to ratify the Protocol and hoped such ratification, without reservation with regard to certain C weapons, would take place soon. Mongolia also criticized the US failure to ratify the Protocol, and G ze cho s lo vakia . Mongolia and Poland referred to continued US use of C weapons in Vietnam. Poland also mentioned use of such weapons by Portugal in Africa and possible use by Israel. Japan welcomed the increased number of ratifications of the Protocol, including the intention of the US to ratify, as evidence of substantial progress in the field of disarmament. Yugoslavia also welcomed the many new accessions to the Protocol as evidence of a growing acceptance of the ban by a vast majority of States as a constant component of international relations and a generally recognized rule of international law. (c) UK draft treaty (See "9-Power draft on BW", below) - 6 - (d) 9-Power draft convention on biological weapons and toxins On 30 March Bulgaria, ggechoslavakia. Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of l^Pferiological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction (CCD/325), co-sponsored also by the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR. The USSR at the presentation of the draft noted that it was also supported by the GDR. and its allies In submitting the new draft convention, the USSR/stressed that they continued to favour the joint prohibition of C and B weapons. The USSR noted that the Socialist States believed that complete prohibition and elimination of CBW was possible and considered their revised draft convention (A/8136) as an acceptable basis for an agreement. Bulgaria. CzechoSlovakia, Poland and the USSR said that the conviction that the C and B weapons could be banned together had been shared by many States. The USSR observed that this fact was reflected in several documents, such as the memorandum of the non-aligned States of 1970, proposals submitted by Morocco and Sweden, as well as in resolution 2662 (XXV) of the General Assembly. C ze cho slovakia appreciated the position of the non-aligned States, supporting the joint approach to the prohibition of C and B weapons. Bulgaria noted that the great majority of CCD members was sympathetic to the 9~ Power approach to the joint prohibition of C and B weapons and a number of ideas had been advanced in search of a solution in conformity with the resolution of the General Assembly. The USSR an'd its allies said, however, that the position of the Western Powers, which refused the joint prohibition of C and B weapons and were willing to agree to the ban on B weapons only, had caused a deadlock in the negotiations on CBW and created the situation where an agreement on the entire problem was unlikely. Czechoslovakia said that the Western Powers opposed banning of C weapons, because these weapons played an important role in their strategic plans, as shown by the use of C agents by the US in Vietnam. The USSR said that the arguments of the Western Powers on the difficulties of control of the prohibition - 7 - of C weapons were only invalid attempts to justify their unwillingness to ban C weapons, while Bulgaria observed that the Western countries ignored appeals, such as that of Mexico, for reasonable control without seeking impossible perfection, but did not make any concrete proposals on verification they would consider appropriate and limited themselves to vague promises of technical studies. In order to break the impasse, the Socialist States had submitted a new draft convention on banning B weapons and toxins only. GzechoSlovakia and the USSR noted that a moratorium on, or unilateral renunciation of B weapons pending the negotiations on C weapons, suggested by some delegations, particularly Mexico, was not'a proper substitute for treaty obligations. In explaining the contents of the new draft convention, the USSR and Mongolia noted that its basic purpose was to ban completely biological weapons and toxins and thus to exclude the possibility of their use in war. The USSR observed that this was reflected particularly in articles I and II, prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling or other aequisition of B weapons and toxins and providing for their destructions within three months after the entry into force of the convention. Auxiliary equipment and means of delivery designed to facilitate the use of such agents and toxins for hostile purposes would also be prohibited. In reply to the UK, Mongolia and the USSR stressed that the 9-Power draft convention envisaged the destruction of biological "agents" as well, and that "weapons" in article II stood for what was prohibited in article I and, consequently, included also agents produced above needs for peaceful purposes. Hungary felt that slight terminology differences in articles I, II and V of the draft could be overcome easily. Mongolia and the USSR noted that article X of the draft convention ensured that the prohibitions of the convention would not hinder the economic and technological development of bacteriological activities for peaceful purposes of States parties, or international co-operation in this field. In reply to the UK, the USSR and its allies explained that the 9-Power draft convention omitted the prohibition of use of B weapons since this had already been codified by the Geneva Protocol. The USSR observed that the inclusion in a convention - 8 - of the prohibition of the use of biological -weapons, might be used as a pretext to claim that there was no prohibition of this kind so far, and that the question of the prohibition of use of chemical weapons was still open. Similarly, Poland and Hungary maintained that the repetition of the prohibition of use of B weapons in a convention might weaken the Geneva Protocol and added that after the destruction of all B weapons provided for in a convention, there would be no possibility to use them. Hungary considered remarks by some delegations concerning reservations to the Geneva Protocol as a misunderstanding, because these reservations would become superfluous after the conclusion of a complete GBW convention. The USSR, Mongolia and Poland dealt with the provisions of the draft convention on control and verification. Mongolia said that the verification provisions of the 9-Power draft convention were based on a combination of national and international means and provided for effective control. The USSR said that articles IV, V, VI and VII provided for a system of guarantees intended to make the agreement a viable and effective instrument, by combining both national and international verification procedures. Articles IV and V provided for international responsibility of States parties for the compliance with the provisions of the convention and for taking necessary legislative and administrative measures to ensure the implementation of assumed undertakings. The implementation of this obligation rested fully within the competence of States parties to the convention in accordance with their existing constitutional procedures. Provisions for a similar type of control were included also into other international agreements, as in article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Concerning the provision that the parties were responsible for the compliance with the convention by their citizens, Hungary said that the Commission of International Law supported the view that states were responsible for acts of their citizens. The aim should be that the parties enforce compliance with the convention within their territories, or anywhere under their control, as provided for also in the HPT. As to international means of verification the USSR said that under article VI, States parties would consult and co-operate in solving problems which might arise in the implementation of a convention, while article VII stipulated that any State party which found that any other State party breached its obligations under a convention might lodge a complaint with the Security Council and would - 9 - co-operate in carrying out investigations decided upon by the Security Council. The Security Council itself, in accordance with its powers, would determine how the decisions adopted under article VII of the proposed convention were to be implemented. This complaints procedure was an important international guarantee concerning the implementation of a convention and was similar to relevant provisions of the Sea-Bed Treaty. In reply to comments by the United Kingdom, the USSR, Hungary and Poland said that the procedure proposed in the 9-Power draft convention concerning complaints to the Security Council was appropriate, practicable and in accordance with the Charter. The USSR noted that its position regarding the proposal in the UK draft concerning the good offices of the Secretary-General in case of possible complaints on violation of a convention, was already stated in connexion with the negotiations of the Sea-Bed Treaty. Poland stated that it could not accept the proposal, contained in the draft convention submitted by the UK (CCD/255/Rev.2) that the Secretary-General should take part in control operations. In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter, the Security Council was the main instrument for prescribing peace. In reply to Mexico, the USSR also noted that its criticism of the UK draft as undermining the generally accepted norms of international law in the Geneva Protocol and not helping to achieve progress in the elimination of C weapons were still valid. The USSR and its allies pointed out that the 9-Power draft convention contained important provisions concerning the ban on C weapons. Particularly article IX obliged parties to conduct negotiations on effective measures for the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of C weapons and for their destruction, as well as for the prohibition of the equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the use of C agents as means of warfare. Reference was also made to the preamble of the draft, stating that agreement on B weapons would facilitate progress towards the complete prohibition of C weapons, as well as to the fact that the obligations of a convention were reinforced by the provision of article XII, providing for the convening of a conference to review that the provisions of the convention were being implemented. - 10 - The review conference would consider also the implementation of the provisions of article IX. Negotiations on the prohibition of C weapons should not await the entry into force of a convention banning B weapons, because the prohibition of C weapons was an urgent matter. The development and stockpiling of C weapons continued and the toxic chessi&al agents were used by the United States. Therefore, the consideration of a convention on biological weapons and of the prohibition of C weapons should proceed in parallel. The USSR stressed that the Socialist countries adhered to the principle that it was necessary to seek the prohibition and elimination of both C and B weapons and had twice submitted draft conventions in this regard for consideration of the General Assembly. It felt also that the prohibition of B weapons would enable the concentration of the negotiations on the prohibition of C weapons and observed that after banning B weapons no State would be able to evade the question whether it was prepared to agree to the prohibition of C weapons. Czechoslovakia said that the complete prohibition of C weapons should be agreed upon as soon as possible and that the question should remain on the CGD's agenda. It said that the need for a complete ban on G weapons was stressed also by the fact that psycho-active agents and ne:eve gas, considered by some people to be the weapons of the future, were being perfected and stockpiled by some NATO Powers. It noted that the Sea-Bed Treaty could give some guidance in solving this problem. Poland observed that an agreement on the prohibition of C weapons was an urgent matter because these weapons were still used in Vietnam and in Angola and might be used by Israel against Arab States. It suggested that the CCD should consider establishing a time limit for the conclusion of the negotiations on C weapons and that these negotiations should be concluded at the latest before the first review conference under a convention on biological weapons. Bulgaria said that while the 9-Power draft convention stipulated the undertaking to conduct negotiations on an effective ban on G weapons, the UK draft convention treated the question of biological weapons in isolation from other disarmament measures and did not make an unequivocal commitment to the total prohibition of chemical weapons. - 11 - Similarly, Mongolia observed that the undertaking to continue negotiations on the ban on chemical weapons in the 9-Power draft convention was stronger than in the UK draft. Romania maintained that a convention on B weapons must include a formal commitment to undertake negotiations concerning the prohibition without delay of C weapons. Considerable attention was paid by the USSR and its allies to the fact that the new biological convention must not linit or detract from the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol. They stressed that the 9-Power draft convention relied on and fortified the Protocol. (See also'Section d?above). The Socialist States maintained that their draft convention offered the possibility of an early agreement on the prohibition of B weapons and was a solid basis for the elaboration of the final text of a convention. Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and the USSR observed that a convention banning B weapons would be the first real disarmament measure providing for the elimination of one type of weapons of mass destruction. Czechoslovakia said that in dealing with the problem of B weapons the CCD should not forget the necessary timetable in order to avoid criticism in the General Assembly for a belated presentation of a draft convention, and noted that the negotiations of the CCD would be expedited if the members gave their preliminary views while awaiting final official positions of their Governments. Hungary agreed with the UK that the CCD had a basis for working out an agreed draft convention on B weapons which could be submitted to the Twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. The USSR expected that the entry into force of the convention would facilitate agreement on other disarmament measures and on GCD, while Bulgaria and Romania considered a convention as a link in a chain of measures aimed at the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. - 12 - In reply to comments of some delegations, In particular those of Sweden, the TJgSR and Czechoslovakia restated their support of partial disarmament measures. The USSR noted that partial disarmament measures were important both from the practical and political points of view. As an example, it recalled the Moscow partial test-ban treaty, which was important as a measure preventing radioactive contamination of the environment and at the same time played a positive role ia. world affairs. Convention on B weapons did not represent a partial measure but aimed at the complete prohibition of these weapons,, which would be of a positive value. Czechoslovakia said that partial agreement on the prohibition of B weapons would not legalize 0 weapons but, on the contrary, would foous the attention on the prohibition of these weapons and help to persuade those who were blocking an agreement to take the required political decision to open the way towards the solution of this problem. On the part of the Western Powers, the UK and Italy welcomed the fact that the Socialist States had accepted the principle of gradual approach to the solution of the problem of CBW, Italy confirmed its support of the convention on B weapons as the first step towards the complete prohibition of C and B weapons. The UK welcomed the 9-Power draft convention as a positive step in the field of B weapons. It felt that, together with the UK draft convention, the GCD had the material to achieve consensus and to present an agreed draft convention to the XJflTIth session of the General Assembly, thus proving again the value of the COD as a negotiating forum. Italy also felt that the CCD could achieve an agreement on a single test in time, so as to submit it to the next session of the General Assembly, since the differences between the two drafts were not great. The UK observed that some of the provisions of the 9-Power draft were very similar to those of the UK draft. Dealing with particular questions, it said that the Geneva Protocol was one of the most effective instruments and a convention involving the destruction of B weapons and agents would effectively strengthen the ban on the use provided for in the Protocol. It felt that the references to the Protocol in the UK draft convention were more comprehensive and effective than in the 9-Power draft, -. 13 - but noted that the latter had some useful additional points and thought that it should be possible to arrange a satisfactory amalgam of the two. Concerning the prohibition of the use of B weapons, the UK reconfirmed its position that it did not wish to detract from the Geneva Protocol. It observed, however, that a number of States parties to the Protocol had reserved the right to use B weapons in certain cire.umstances. It felt that it would be logical to make it clear in any future biological warfare agreement that this option on use, preserved by some parties to the Protocol., was completely ruled out by the provisions banning production and possession of B weapons. The UK noted, however, that it would examine the argument that the ban on the use of B weapons was unnecessary since the comprehensive ban including the destruction of all B weapons would make the use of these weapons impossible. Italy observed that the 9-Power draft convention did not ban the use of B weapons, as did the UK draft. The artument that this problem had been already settled by the Geneva Protocol was understandable and attractive but the ban on the use in the Protocol was limited by reservations of many States, particularly concerning possible reprisals. Therefore it considered preferable the UK draft, providing for the complete ban on the use of B weapons and underlining that this prohibition is valid even in the ease of conflict. The UK considered the complaints procedure set out in its draft as the most important deterrent against non-observance of a convention. However, recalling the CCD's negotiations on the Sea-Bed Treaty, it said that it would not wish to make the role of the Secretary-General an issue of principle. It maintained, nevertheless, that a convention should not omit the UK provisions for investigation of complaints, because under a procedure such as that in the UK draft there would be virtually automatic, impartial and quick investigation of complaints of the use of B weapons, which would be a major deterrent against any violation of a convention. Italy said that the complaint procedure set out in the two draft conventions differed greatly. _ The 9-Power draft provided only for complaints to the Security Council, which Italy considered insufficient in the light of the veto. It preferred the UK draft providing for prior complaints to the Secretary-General. The UK felt that a commitment provided for in the UK draft, to provide assistance to any party against which B weapons were used, would also be a real deterrent. Italy also supported the view that the final text of the convention should include an obligation, provided for in the UK draft, to assist States parties attacked with B weapons. Concerning the 9-fower draft convention, it observed that the provisions of its article II did not provide for. the destruction of B agents. It said that explanations by the USSR and Mongolia concerning the destruction of biological agents did not eliminate some confusion in articles I, II and V of the 9-Power draft convention. Clarification of this question, however, should not be difficult. Concerning definitions, it felt that formulations in the report of the Secretary-General on CBW and in the study of the WHO could be used. The UK noted, furthermore, that references to the Geneva Protocol as an instrument embodying generally recognised rules of international law, as well as indirect references to General Assembly resolution 2603 A concerning the Geneva Protocol, would need careful examination since many UN Members abstained on that resolution both on procedural and substantial grounds; similarly, the commitment concerning further negotiations on C weapons prohibition should be phrased carefully to make it realistic and widely acceptable. Italy noted that the 9-Power draft reaffirmed the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol as banning all CB¥ and representing a norm of international law. This problem was very complex and the interpretation embodied in resolution 2603 A of the General Assembly was controversial. Its insertion into the text of the draft convention would neither strengthen the Protocol nor facilitate an agreement en a draft which should have the broadest possible support. In reply to the USSR, the UK noted that it had not refused to outlaw C weapons and would - 15 - honour repeated promises to pursue the task, though difficult and long. It hoped that other members of the CCD would soon express their views so that a generally acceptable text of a convention could be tabled and finishing touches completed before fie next session of the General Assembly. Italy welcomed article X of the 9-Power draft convention designed to safeguard peaceful scientific development, and the provision in its article II concerning the destruction of stocks of B weapons within three months. The US were pleased with the submission of the 9-Power draft convention, which was largely modelled on the UK draft and had made the negotiations on the BW convention an imminent prospect. While -'»"•:.'•. much work still remained to be done the CCD should be able to develop a generally acceptable text by the end of the summer session. Concerning the prohibition of GBW, the US was determined to continue to seek a solution of the difficult problem of verification. This should not, however, delay the negotiations on the BW convention. The findings of US. research in the field of CW verification were not encouraging but the CCD must face up to all of the results whatever they might be. It welcomed the meeting of experts on CBW which would be held on 7 July in which US experts would participate. (See also section "CCD-Procedure" above). Japan said that the 9-Power draft convention on B weapons, as well as the UK draft convention, were based on the presumption that negotiations on the ban of C weapons should continue after an agreement on the prohibition of B weapons. The fact that the two Co-Chairmen of the CCD had taken a similar position on this question should have an important influence on future negotiations on the prohibition of C and B weapons. It stressed also the fact that the USSR, when introducing the new draft convention, stated that discussion on the prohibition of B waapons should proceed in parallel with that on the prohibition of C weapons. While stating that it was prepared to respect the opinion of the members of the CCD on the basic lines of negotiations on the prohibition of C and B weapons, Japan recalled resolution 2662 (XXV) of the UN General Assembly, which recommended that C and B weapons should continue to be dealt with together. -16 - Among the non-aligned members of the CCD only Argentina, Brazil, Morocco and the UAR so far presented their detailed comments on the two draft conventions on B weapons, while Mexico and Yugoslavia made general remarks against a partial approach adopted in the two draft conventions. Argentina considered the 9-Power draft as a positive step to break a deadlock in the negotiation on CBW. It did not share the view that this approach would mean the abandonment of the efforts to reach the joint ban on both B and C weapons because the USSR gave categorical assurances that the negotiation on the prohibition of C weapons would continue. This commitment was reflected also in article IS of the 9-Power draft convention. Brazil welcomed the 9-Power draft convention, which would probably lead to overcoming of the threatening deadlock. Similarly, the UAR noted that the submission of the important draft of the Socialist countries postponed the eruption of the crisis of credibility in the work of the CCD. Morocco said that while the 9-Power draft convention did not seem to fully meet the wishes of the international community, or the concept of a full prohibition of B weapons shared by Morocco, it should serve as a basis for serious discussion-and would help to move the negotiations of the CCD forward. Sweden stressed that the UN Members would not be satisfied ifthe CCD again reported only marginal measures, such as the Sea-Bed Treaty or the restricted ban on B weapons, which was suggested by the nuclear-weapon Powers, and presented arguments why marginal partial measures were insufficient. (See also section 'CCD-GeneraHi,'above. For views of Mexico and Yugoslavia see section (a) above and (e) below respectively). Argentina considered the provision of the 9-Power draft that each party to the convention should be responsible for the compliance with its provisions by its physical and legal persons even outside its territory as an unwarranted return to the concept of "personal jurisdiction", which was now superseded in commercial relations. The concept of "territorial jurisdiction" of the UK draft was much more logical. This could be rectified by the adoption of language which would eliminate the first concept and cover not only the activities of the nationals of a party but also of foreign persons within its territorial jurisdiction. Despite the explanation of the USSR, Argentina considered an undertaking to take legislative measures to enforce the convention unnecessary, since the basic prohibition of the production and the undertaking to destroy B weapons were total obligations, encompassing the duty to take internal legal measures by parties to implement them. The provision of the.9-Power draft to - 17 - consult and co-operate in the case of a conflict was insufficient in the absence of an adequate verification procedure. Argentina promised to give its views on this complex subject later. Concerning the complaints procedure, Argentina preferred the approach of the UK draft convention, although it understood the difficulties which the procedure providing for prior complaints to the Secretary-General might present to some States. It also felt that the provision of the UK draft to assist parties attacked with B weapons should be included in the draft convention. Brazil, commenting on particular provision of the 9-Power draft convention, said that it always supported the broadest possible coverage of CBW and preferred global treatment of both kinds of these weapons, but was willing to support concrete results even if short of the desirable comprehensive prohibition. It shared the view that the prohibition of the use of B weapons was fully settled by the Geneva Protocol but was not opposed to reiteration of this prohibition, although not necessarily in the new draft convention. The convention on B weapons should merely refer to and emphasize previous instruments prohibiting the use of CBW. The complaints procedure of the UK draft convention on the use of B weapons would complement the Geneva Protocol. Contio 1 provisions in the 9-Power draft convention were reduced in practice almost solely to the complaints procedure. In case of violation, complaints should be channeled through the Security Council, but the recourse need not lead to immediate discussion in the Council. ¥ithin the framework of the Security Council there should exist a "preliminary fact-finding informal negotiating group"which would prepare the consideration of the matter by the Council. This preliminary instance could be foreseen by the convention or could be left for the Security Council to decide, Brazil felt that the Council should consider the establishment of such mechanisms as part of the general reappraisal of its activities. A biological weapons convention was a good opportunity to start such a procedure which would have undeniable value in defusing potential controversies deriving from a violation of the B weapons - 18 - convention. This matter deserved the attention of the GCD. It welcomed' an article in the 9-Power draft dealing with the exchange of scientific information and safeguarding the economic and technological development of States parties in this field which was an indispensable principle of any disarmament agreement. It expected delicate negotiations on the B weapons convention but considered that the most difficult task was the prohibition of C weapons. The efforts to achieve full prohibition of CBW should not be abandoned. In this context it supported a "normative provision" for a commitment to pursue negotiations on a complete ban on C weapons, and observed that the CCD should not feel satisfied by the prospect of achieving the B weapons convention. Even this limited result, however, was worth the CCD's efforts. Morocco noted that the 9-Power draft was fairly similar to that of the UK, but on the other hand there were some significant differences that it was not possible to ignore. The 9-Power draft was based on the principle that the prohibition of use of B weapons was covered by the Geneva Protocol which constituted a generally recognized .standard of international law. The extensive attention given to the prohibition of use of B weapons in the UK draft was likely to create confusion as to the true aim of'the ban on B weapons and to increase the effect of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol made by various states. While the reservations to the Protocol-made it in effect a non-first-use ban, the UK draft convention aimed at the total prohibition of use of B weapons. There was no guarantee, however, that the convention on B weapons would not be subject to reservations also. In any case the prohibition of the production of B weapons would make the reservations to the Protocol purposeless concerning the use of B weapons. As regards the article banning the production of B weapons, Morocco preferred the 9-Power draft. However, the texts of both drafts, permitting the production of biological agents for peaceful purposes, were too vague. As regards the provision of the UK draft concerning the destruction of all B weapons within three months after the convention entered into force "for that Party," Morocco considered the words "for that Party" superfluous. Regarding the complaints procedure, Moroccan opposition to inclusion of the ban on use of B weapons covered also the complaints on their use. It maintained that the complaints on use would have no practical value - 19 - after the use occurred and that use should IDS prevented by the prohibition of production of B weapons. The provision of the UK draft to "furnish appropriate assistance" was important. However, it should not be tied to the use of B weapons but to the violation of the convention. Articles IV to VII of the 9-Power draft covered the requirement for a combination of national and international means of verification and were appropriately strengthened by the provision for co-operation in the scientific field, but the suggestions by Argentina concerning the responsibility of parties for acts of their citizens and foreigners on their territory, deserved attention. Morocco supported the complete ban on CB¥ and considered the commitment to further negotiations on the prohibition of C weapons in both drafts unsatisfactory. It suggested that such an article should include: (l) an undertaking to accept the principle of the prohibition of C weapons$ (2) a commitment to pursue negotiations on effective measures to that end, including appropriate verification, in the shortest possible time; and (3) the possibility of reaching a moratorium on C weapons pending an agreement on their elimination. It stressed that the question of the prohibition of C weapons must be pursued unceasingly as a measure more significant than the ban on B weapons. The TJAR said that the 9-Power draft convention on B weapons was received by a majority of CCD members with realism and the expectation that it would help to overcome existing obstacles and to achieve positive, though modest, results soon. The 9-Power and the UK drafts had much in common. But it particularly approved the provision of the 9-Power draft that the Geneva Protocol embodied generally recognized rules of international law, and its approach that the prohibition of use of B weapons was already solved by the Protocol. The arguments of the UK on the prohibition of use of B weapons in the convention had not removed the UAR's apprehensions that the existence of two instruments dealing with the same objective in a different way could create difficulties. The nev convention might be subject to reservations similar to the Geneva Protocol. In any case, it would invalidate reservations to the Protocol by making use of BW impossible. In both drafts the legal obligation for parties - 20 - to pursue negotiations on the prohibition of G¥ was general and vague and insufficient without a corresponding legal sanction. The precedents of the partial test ban treaty and the NPT had proved that such obligations were ineffective. The aim was to achieve an agreement and not only to negotiate. It supported the view of Morocco that the relevant provision should be more specific including the following points: (l) the principle of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of CV and their vectors, as well as their destruction} (a) an obligation to negotiate on the implementation of this principlej and (3) an element of urgency and importance in achieving a. C¥ convention. A time limit for achieving an agreement on a convention on C¥, as suggested by Poland, was not conducive to expediting its conclusion, which depended first of all on the political will to get rid of CW. The UAR preferred the wording of articles I and II of the 9-Power draft, but suggested the inclusion of the prohibition of "research", proposed in the UK draft, as well as the clause "never in any circumstances" which would make impossible any reservations to the. convention. For the sake of uniformity of used terms, it suggested adding "and agents" to articles II and V of the 9-P°wer draft. The UAR would welcome some explanation concerning the implementation of the provision of the destruction of B weapons and considered the working paper of Sweden (CCD/324.) on this subject was timely and helpful. Article III should prohibit not only the giving but also the receiving of assistance in the production of B¥. Furthermore, it welcomed an article in the 9-Power draft providing for the responsibility of parties for the observance of the convention by their nationals, including both physical and legal persons. As regards co-operation and consultations provided for in article VI, it noted that relations between some states prevented normal implementation of this obligation, which should be reflected in the convention. Furthermore, it doubted whether such a provision should apply to all parties of the convention. The control procedure should rest with the Security Council alone, but were not steps possible other than the investigation of complaints and the submitting of information to States concerning the results of its investigation? The provision on peaceful uses of B agents was important but some clarification concerning its implementation would be welcomed. It favoured also the withdrawal clause proposed by the UK due to its deterrent value. The UAR welcomed the decision to convene an informal meeting on GB¥ (see "CCD - Procedure" above). - 21 - (e) Prohibition of CW Yugoslavia presented the following views on elements to be included in a CW prohibition. Any ban on C¥ should (l) cover the development, production and stockpiling of all C weapons, agents, equipment and vectors, and include an undertaking not to assist others in prohibited activities; (2) include an obligation to destroy or convert to peaceful use all CW stocks, equipment and facilities and to disband CW military forces and ban further training; (3) contain precise definitions of C weapons, as in the Secretary-General's CBW Report and in the 1954 Brussels Treaty on the renunciation of these weapons by the FRG; and (4) clearly state all exceptions for research, etc. The verification provision of the ban should include both national and international measures, as-"explained in Yugoslavia's working paper CCD/302 of 6 August 1970 and in its previous statement at this session. National measures, to be enforced by national legislation, should include obligation (l) to place all CU installations under civilian control in order to remove CW production, from military secrecy and thus, in a sense, establish control by the people; (2) to make public agreed relevant data, without unnecessary details, on all items to be destroyed or converted, on proving grounds, and on all installations on the national territory of a Party used or of potential use for CW research, development or stockpiling; (3) for a governmental agency to report periodically to an international organ data on C agents not banned because of civilian use but which must be controlled, including export-import figures on such agents; and (^) to abolish restrictions on the publication and international exchange of scientific information in fields of chemistry relative to the ban. With regard to the obligation under (3) above, no formula had yet been found for deciding which agents should be controlled, but the problem would not be an insoluble task with the help of a few experts. The Depository States should be informed of the national laws or decisions taken, so that any State would be able to ascertain the facts, thus building confidence. The national measures had a certain international character, but international measures of verification should include (l) an obligation that all destruction or conversion be carried out under the supervision of a small international commission, which would not verify details but rely on official data supplied by the host country; (2) the establishment of an international organ, technical rather than political, to receive and disseminate statistical data; (3) an obligation to enter into consultation with other Parties to remove doubts of implementation of the treaty, as in the Sea-Bed Treaty; and (4.) the possibility of on-site inspection by invitation, but not necessarily as a formal obligation since failure to provide explanations would weigh heavily on a suspected State. The use of fact-finding pro- cedures through an international organ would also be desirable to avoid the political implication of recourse to the Security Council. Suspecting Parties could also inform other Parties in order to increase the pressure on a suspected Party before making a complaint to the Security Council. Finally, the convention should contain a separate provision on a complaints procedure to the Security Council. Mexico invited the non-aligned States to join it in elaborating a draft CW convention during the 1971 recess or at the beginning of the 1971 summer session. It added that Yugoslavia had provided an example of how to proceed. (For views of Japan and Sweden on CW verification see section (g),below.) The USSR stated that the discussion of technical aspects of C¥ control would only divert the attention from the essence of the problem and might serve as a screen for retaining CW. The 9-Power draft convention on CBW dealt extensively with the problem of control. (For views of the USSR and other Socialist States on the prohibition of CW see also section (d), above.) (f) Other proposals Mexico stressed its preference for a joint CBW ban for reasons most recently advanced in a SIPRI study on the subject, but considered a true compromise essential. Speaking before it had seen the new 9-Power draft convention on BW, Mexico stated that such a compromise could be based on the Moroccan suggestions contained in CCD/295, with the improvements indicated by Morocco in its statement at this session. It reaffirmed that the Mexican position was based on the non-aligned Memorandum that had been recommended by the General Assembly and that a "reasonable" system of veri- fication was all that could be required. On this basis, it maintained, the supplementary agreement on CW verification suggested by Morocco would - 23 - not take as long to achieve as some feared, as there were many useful proposals on the subject before the CCD. (For comments of Mexico after presentation of the draft see sections (a) and (e), above.) Yugoslavia also referred to the possibilities for solutions available, including the Moroccan suggestion (see section (a), above). (g) Verification Sweden submitted a working paper, CCD/324., dated 30 March, containing a summary description of the various methods available for the destruction of existing CBW stocks. The conclusion of the paper was that while veri- fication of destruction was technicallyfeasible it presupposed the presence of inspectors on the spot. In presenting the paper, it noted that, although destruction was called for in both draft conventions then before the Committee, neither contained provisions for verification of such destruction by inter- national means, which was essential. Sweden noted that stocks marked for elimination might also be diverted to peaceful purposes, such as for research or for health protection, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. Japan, referring to the impasse in negotiations over the issue of verifi- cation of C weapons, noted that only fragmentary information was available to outsiders with regard to the character, amount of stockpiles, or the production capabilities of C weapons, particularly in the militarily important States. Under these circumstances, Japan had doubts whether the CCD could conduct a meaningful discussion of a CW ban and in particular the verification of such a ban. It was therefore necessary to promote "international communication" on the subject. International information exchange networks had become a trend despite differing social systems in various States, mainly as a result of interest in environmental pollution; Japan was conducting a" survey of the chemical industry in the context of pollution, and this might provide useful data with regard to verification of a CW ban. Recalling the General Assembly resolution calling for verification through a combination of national and international means, Japan expressed the view that "self-controlled abeyance" was insufficient unless safeguarded by effective international means, such as those applied by the IAEA in the context of the KPT. However, although a CW ban should theoretically have the same degree of safeguards as other mass destruction weapons, it was not practicable that these safeguards should be of the same severity as for nuclear weapons. Japan therefore took the position that, although a CW ban would require an international inspection team entitled, if it was felt necessary, to free access at all times to all plants having a C-weapon production capacity, actual inspection would have to be ad hoc, based on a complaint procedure. International verification should start with a system ofobligatory reporting to an international agency; followed by an obligation to consult and co-operate; then through a fact-finding survey by the Secretary-General of the United Nations assisted by a panel of experts; and ultimately, when no other means was available for removing doubts of a violation, to on-site inspection. This procedure should not be hampered by a Security Council veto. (For comments of Yugoslavia see section (e), above.) Japan also called for additional informal meetings of the CCD at the summer session to consider the verifi- cation problem (see "CCD-Procedures", above). (h) Unilateral renunciations Japan welcomed the decision of some States, including the US, to take unilateral steps in renunciation or restraint of CBW as evidence of sub- stantial progress in the disarmament field. Yugoslavia also called such renunciation, as in its own case, one of the important elements of the last year's work on CBW. Mexico said that to avoid the alleged danger of a break-through in the field of B weapons, it would be sufficient if the USSR also unilaterally renounced these weapons pending the conclusion of a com- prehensive CW convention. The USSR stated that unilateral renunciation was not an appropriate substitute for a binding treaty obligation (see section (d), above). Underground Test Ban (a) General The USSR quoted Mr. Brezhnev's call, at the 24-th Congress of the CPSU, for a comprehensive test ban "by everyone, everywhere", adding the USSR's belief that an agreement based on national inspection, without on-site inspection, was possible. The real obstacles lay in the political, and not the technical, field. The possibility of detecting violations through national means was so high that nobody could test underground secretly. Poland supported all the Brezhnev disarmament proposals. Romania called for priority negotiations on nuclear disarmament, including CTB. Canada noted that a number of members, including Ethiopia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands and Pakistan, had supported its view that the CCD should explore all possibilities for halting or further limiting nuclear testing. A CTB was an urgent objective of the CCD and the General Assembly, and support for such a ban had recently been repeated by Mr. Brezhnev. A CTB would curb the arms race and buttress the NPT. Canada would continue to press for fulfilment of the Moscow Treaty obligations to end all tests. Delay in achieving a CTB undermined that treaty, since underground tests continued in increased numbers and magnitude, while unrestrained testing by the PRG and France also increased. This situation could even undermine support for the MPT among the non-nuclear-weapon States, unless the nuclear-weapon States demonstrated their willingness to pursue a CTB seriously. It was also essential to halt the pollution of the atmosphere through venting, and pollution of the sea through seepage. Mr. Brezhnev had again evoked the relevant problem of those nuclear Powers that had not signed the Moscow Treaty by calling for a conference of the five nuclear Powers to achieve nuclear disarmament; but this should not mean that nothing was to be done to stop or lojait testing except with the participation of all five Powers. Canada favoured the participation of all nuclear States, but the CCD should not be immobilized while the present restraints on testing were gradually being eroded. Canada suggested a number of transitional measures which could be taken to bridge the gap between the partial test ban and a CTB (summarized under "Section c", below). The UK. - 26 - confirming that GTB was a'major aim of its policy, stated that the CCD's work towards this goal should not cease because of SALT but that, on the contrary, the GGD should be ready to take advantage of the SALT outcome. Work on a CTB should not be postponed on the grounds that not all nuclear Powers were participating in the CCD. The CGD must undertake hard, realistic negotiations on the subject, based on a genuine willingness on all sides to see the end result achieved. The Netherlands favoured a CTB, because such a ban would prevent the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, demonstrate a willingness to end the technological arms race and balance the commitments of the NNWS under the NPT. With regard to veri- fication, the Netherlands thought national means alone would be a considerable deterrent to a violator, but did not want to exclude the possibility of on-site inspections, despite their shortcomings (see "Section b", below, for details). With or without on-site inspections, however, one hundred per cent certainty was unattainable. It was necessary to decide whether it was more important to ban all tests with the risk that some small explosions would be undetectable or to continue unrestricted underground testing with the risks that involved. The crucial point was whether clandestine tests could affect the strategic balance, and whether explosions of a few kilotons could affect that balance more than the continued testing of all kinds of weapons. If a CTB proved unobtainable, the CCD would have to concentrate on restricting underground tests and not accept an all-or-nothing attitude. However, after considering various threshold proposals, the Netherlands believed the CCD should seek a complete solution to the testing problem rather than a partial one. (See "Section e", below, for specific comments on threshold proposals and other suggestions). The US said it would participate in the discussions on CTB to be held during the summer session, although its position on the need for on-site inspection had not changed (see "Section b", below). Sweden, in a first statement, again stressed the view that the first task of the GCD was to work out a CTB treaty (together with a comprehensive CBW ban, see above), which should become a reality this year. It noted that there had been no positive developments in fulfilment of the KPT commitment to further measures to halt the nuclear arms race. In a later - 27 - detailed statement, Sweden noted that the non-aligned members had tried from the beginning to achieve a CTB, and that their memorandum of April 1962 had been accepted as one of the bases of negotiation and remained so today. The Moscow Treaty had cut off negotiations on a full CTB, and these had until recently remained at the point reached in 1963. Meanwhile, the Moscow Treaty had not functioned as a disarmament measure, although Sweden recognized its political significance and importance as a health measure against radioactive contamination. Recently, however, a new phase of GTB negotiations had begun, marked by a number of concrete suggestions. In 1969, Sweden had submitted a suggested draft underground test ban (ENDC/24-2) and it hoped to achieve a commonly accepted text. Verification of the ban was based on exchange of information, includiag seismic data, and verification-by-challenge, with the possibility of recourse to the Security Council and withdrawal from the Treaty. This year, changes had been suggested with regard to the scope, form and verification of such an agreement. With regard to the scope, the UK, Canada, Japan and the Netherlands had suggested partial or transitional measures, such as a threshold treaty, or a phasing out period or quota of permitted tests. The USSR, the UAR, Ethiopia and the Netherlands had expressed doubts on the desirability of a threshold treaty, and Sweden opposed such a solution for political and technical reasons. Politically, a threshold treaty was another half-measure allowing the further improvement of nuclear weapons and, unless the threshold was placed very low, it would also permit proliferation. Technically, the difficulties of determining an effective threshold, either in terms of magnitude or yield, with accurate seismic monitoring would be so great that much controversy would result unless on-site observations were possible. The technical problems could be avoided entirely by a ban on all tests. However, Sweden would be glad to continue to discuss these problems and strongly supported the Canadian proposal to hold technical discussions with experts this summer, including experts from the more knowledgeable nuclear-weapon members of the CCD. Sweden saw indisputable merits in a phasing out of testing, based on the quota proposal of the UK. Such an arrangement could be combined with peaceful explosions during a transitional period, provided the date for the complete ban was not too distant and was firmly settled. It could also - 28 - help in testing verification capabilities, particularly if agreed calibration explosions were part of the quota. With respect to the form of the treaty, Sweden considered it unwise to try to achieve the desired CTB by renegotiating the Moscow Treaty, as that might open questions now settled by a treaty binding on more than one hundred parties; it preferred an independent treaty, or possibly a protocol adding to the Moscow Treaty but not affecting its provisions. The CCD should urgently consider and decide the question of the legal format before elaborating a detailed text. Among the transitional measures supported by Canada, Sweden supported the advance announcement of all tests with indication of time, yield and magnitude of each, which would help solve the verification problem. It also supported the suggestion of Canada, the UK, Japan and the Netherlands for international co-operation and improvement of test verification by seismic means and welcomed the support of these countries and others for a seismic data exchange. It joined Mexico and Japan in supporting the use of "black boxes" to help identify weak events, although it thought standardised seismograph stations with agreed operational norms would be more effective; it asked the US and the USSR to explain their present attitude towards black boxes. Sweden was convinced that obligatory on-site inspections were no longer necessary and that inspection by invitation would be sufficient, although it did not oppose on-site inspections if they were acceptable to the nuclear Powers. The importance of on-site inspections had diminished, as evidenced in the statements of Mr. William Foster, while the effectiveness of other means of surveillance, particularly that of satellites, had increased. The problem of verification was a lesser obstacle than in 1963, and theecontrol problem would disappear when the nuclear Powers were politically ready to stop tests. In the meantime, the increasing frequency of radioactive leakages from - 29 - underground testing weakened the integrity of the Moscow treaty, and it was the duty of governments to react to this. To facilitate progress towards a CTB, Sweden asked the following six questions: (l) could any delegation give specific political reasons for a threshold treaty despite the general political and technical objections to itj (2) were there reasons for another partial agreement, such as a phasing out of underground tests; (3) did delegations prefer an independent underground test ban, an addition to the Moscow Treaty in the form of a protocol, or a renegotiation of the Moscow Treaty despite the risks involved; (4-) did they wish to work simultaneously on a comprehensive treaty and on a series of transitional measures leading up to itj (5) could the nuclear-weapon Powers state their position on co-operating in a seismic data exchange as a transitional measure; and (6) could the nuclear-weapon Powers state their present position towards obligatory on-site inspections and to inspection by challenge or by invitation? Mexico said it would be deplorable to concentrate on a BW ban to the detriment of an urgent measure such as a CTB. The recent CCD activity with regard to CTB, new control proposals and technological advances had opened up new prospects for a CTB, and its consideration deserved and required the highest priority. The non-aligned members had a greater function than simply stressing the necessity for a big Power agreement, and perhaps the time was ripe for them to elaborate a CTB treaty draft. Mexico invited other non-aligned countries to join it in this task during the CCD recess or at the summer session. The UAR said that a CTB was long overdue, since the partial test ban was not restraining the nuclear Powers from full-capacity underground testing. Some non-nuclear-weapon States were reaching the stage where only a political decision was required to permit them to go nuclear. In view of the non-adherence to NPT and the aggressive conduct of certain threshold countries in the region of the UAR, there was an urgent need to overcome the obstacles to a CTB, which, together with the NPT, would establish a true non-proliferation regime. Some relationship existed between a - 30 - CTB and the SALT, but there was no need to delay consideration of CTB by the GCD until success was achieved at the SALT. A positive achievement either in the CCD or at the SALT would generate a reciprocally beneficial influence. Due to the extensive preparatory work, the technical progress on verification and the many proposals already tabled, realization of a CTB should not be difficult. (See also "Section b", below). (b) Verification The US said its position had not changed, and it continued to believe adequate verification required on-site inspections The field of seismology deserved continued study and development, and the US was engaged in a large programme of research in the area. At a recent briefing in Geneva attended by many members, the Director of the US Advanced Research Projects Agency had made clear that new promising developments in verification techniques were still at an early stage and that differentiation between natural and nuclear seismic events was still unsolved. The effect of future improvements was difficult to foresee, but the US hoped common understanding of the verification issue could be advanced. It intended to participate in the CCD's examination of the current state of the art (see "International Exchange of Seismic Data", below). Canada noted that the two major Powers were further apart on the critical verification issue than in the early 1960's, when a compromise had seemed possible on the basis of "black boxes" and a limited number of on-site inspections. It was not clear whether subsequent discussions of this problem had been postponed because the problem was intractable or whether the problem seemed intractable because serious dis- cussions had been suspended. (See also "International exchange of seismic data", below.) The Netherlands believed that the use of all national means of verification of a CTB would constitute a considerable deterrent, with many risks for a possible violator, except for tests of a few kilotons or less. As shown in the Netherlands working paper CCD/323, existing seismic stations could identify 50 kiloton explosions in hard rock; it would soon be possible to identify those of 10 to 20 kilotons; and the use of special long-period instruments would permit a reduction to 5 - 10 kilotons.-Explosions in dry soil were considerably more difficult to identify but were not practical because of cratering. On-site inspections would be an additional assurance but this was no panacea, since an on-site inspection could, in practice, not be requested unless the test was detected, which would not always be possible. The Netherlands favoured adequate verification for any disarmament measure, however, and did not want to exclude the possibility of on-site inspections. - 31 - The UAR. referred to press reports that on-site inspections were superfluous (see "Section c", below). It maintained that any agreement on the verification issue must meet two essential conditions: (1) it must recognize the principle of exchange of data so that all countries could obtain information of political concern to them easily and quickly^ and (2) in case the data raised suspicion, the treaty must provide for a procedure of verification by challenge, recourse to the Security Council, a review conference and a withdrawal clause. (For the views of Sweden on verification, see "Section a", above). (For the view of the USSR, see Section (a), above, and Section (c), below.) (c) Threshold Treaty and other solutions Canada suggested the following transitional restraints to strengthen the partial test ban pending conclusion of a CTB, which it thought should be carefully studied by the CCD: (l) The nuclear signatories of the Moscow Treaty could report details of their annual testing programmes in advance, thus providing a basis for checking present and future verification techniques and for judging actual adherence to agreed restraints to protect the environmentj (2) the same Powers could undertake to phase out progressively tests above agreed magnitudesj (3) such phasing out could proceed parallel with improvements in seismological verification capabilities; (4.) the Moscow Treaty provisions against venting could be strengthened and others added against other environmental hazards such as ..earth disturbances or seismic sea waves; (5) the major testing States could make commitments to promote international co-operation in the improvement of seismological verification, in accordance with Resolution 2663A (XXV), including the provision of advance information on annual testing programmes. Canada noted that the nuclear Powers could institute any or all of these proposals and undertake further restraints by unilateral declarations, although binding international agreements would be preferable, in the form of a new treaty or treaties negotiated by the CCD. Perhaps the most suitable alternative, considering that any new agreement would in any case have to refer back to the Moscow Treaty, would be the negotiation of a protocol to that Treaty. Progressively extendable partial measures could be steps towards a CTB, a fact which should be carefully weighed by those insisting on an "all-or-nothing" approach to the problem. In light of the urgency, the Co-Chairmen should consult on taking at least one, or more, of these transitional measures pending a full CTB, so that the CGD could make a positive special report under Resolution 2663 B (XXV). The Netherlands called the following measures suggested by Canada attractive: (l) advance notice of underground testing programmes by the nuclear Powers3 (a) improvement of seismolo.gical identification capabilities| (3) international co-operation against the radiological hazards of nuclear explosions} and (4) a diminishing scale of annual testing and phasing out tests. The Netherlands also recalled the UAR threshold proposal for a ban on tests above a magnitude of 4.75, coupled with a voluntary moratorium pending further progress in detection capability, and the similar Japanese proposal for a ban on tests above the same magnitude without a moratorium but committing parties to co-operate in improving the verification system so that all tests could be banned. The Netherlands saw difficulty in establishing a threshold based on a certain1:seismic magnitude, because a magnitude of 4.5 to 4.8 represented explosions of 5 to 10 kilotons in hard rock, while the same magnitude represented explosions of 50 to 100 kilotons in alluvium. Similarly, large decoupled explosions in cavities would not exceed this magnitude. Different geological and geographical possibilities could create problems of interpretation of seismological recordings, which ecu. Id lead to unwarranted accusations. With specific regard to the UAR proposal, the Netherlands doubted its usefulness because of the difficult relationship it would create between the binding treaty obligations and the voluntary moratorium and the problem of what would result if the moratorium were broken. In any case, the UAR had recently indicated that its proposal was no longer valid. Japan reiterated its position that tests above a certain magnitude should be banned, and praised the Canadian efforts to achieve an important positive step towards CTB. Such steps, it said, could not upset the existing military balance between the super-Powers, which had an overwhelming nuclear superiority over all other States. Therefore, Japan hoped the US and the USSR would give serious consideration to steps that would have an impact on the nuclear-weapon States still conducting tests in the atmosphere and that might lead those States to reappraise their present position. - 33 - The USSR stated that the UK idea ef a thresheld ban, supported by Canada and Japan, was based ©n the assumption that seme tests were net identi- fiable by national means, a view which was not acceptable to the USSR. Underground tests below the threshold would be legalized by such a measure, which would not facilitate a CTB. It added that it was net reasonable to ban underground tests above a threshold, and that the USSR shared the view ©f Ethi^ia that the threshold approach might permit for a long time the perfection of smaller tactical nuclear weapons. The UAR expressed the view that a "partial solution" of the underground testing problem involved a risk of indefinite postponement ©f the final step, the possible undermining of the HPT and an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, it said, recent technical developments made a partial solution unnecessary, as the international press had quoted Soviet and particularly US sources to the effect that on-site inspections were now superfluous, since seismological means of verification were sufficient. (For Sweden's opposition to a threshold ban, and support of a phasing out and certain transitional measures, see "Section a", above.) (d) Verification by challenge The UAR supported this concept as an essential part of a CTB veri- fication (see "Section b", above), Sweden noted that its draft convention on a CTB had based verification on a procedure including verification by challenge. International exchange of seismic data Canada noted that improvement of the international system of data exchange was one means of facilitating a solution of the verification problem for a CTB (see also "Underground test ban", "Section e", above). It urged that, during the summer session, informal meetings be convened in this connection. (!Che UK and Sweden supported this suggestion - see "CCD-Proeedure" above). Late in the session, Canada and 11 other members (see "CCD-Procedure") requested, and the CCD approved, the convening of an informal meeting on 30 June to discuss the improvement of seismic data capabilities in the framework of a CTB, in accordance with resolution 2663 (XXV). In presenting the request, Canada urged all member States, particularly the nuclear testing Powers, to send experts to the meeting. Canada also included a commitment to improvement of seismic data exchange -34- amongst its suggested transitional measures (see "Underground test ban", "Section c",above, and an expression of Sweden's interest under the same item, "Section a"). The Netherlands stated that it supported a "detection club" or other seismic co-operation, and regretted that the Soviet Union's willingness to participate in an international seismic data exchange was conditioned on the conclusion of a CTB with national verification. Japan praised Canada's efforts to achieve a positive step towards a CTB. The PAR called for recognition of the principle of"exchange of data in any agreement on CTB verification (see "Underground test ban - Section b", above). Sweden welcomed the support of seismic data exchange by the UK, Japan, Nigeria, Canada and the Netherlands. It also noted that the UAH had stressed the significance of access of all countries to seismic data and that the USSR had made its support of a full exchange conditional on the conclusion of a CTB. Halting the nuclear arms race (a) General Romania urged the immediate negotiation and adoption of a set of measures to ban all weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological. Priority should be given to nuclear measures, including a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of additional nuclear- free zones, a CTB, and cessation of production of nuclear weapons and their vehicles. Such a set of measures would put an end to the gravest danger ever threatening mankind and fulfil the obligation in the NET. (See also "Non-Proliferation Treaty", below). The USSR referred to Brezhnev's recent speech stressing the halting of the nuclear arms race and to his proposals for various nuclear measures (see detailed views under various items), while Poland welcomed all Brezhnev's proposals.The USSR also noted that, in nuclear disarmament, equal security for all States required the participation of all nuclear (b) The bilateral strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) /Powers. The USSR quoted Brezhnev to the effect that a positive outcome to the SALT would make it possible to avoid a new round in the nuclear arms race and would also release funds; and that, where delicate military and technical aspects were involved in disarmament negotiations, the security interests of the parties should be respected and no one should seek uni- lateral advantages. Poland quoted US Senator Muskie to the effect that the US, at the SALT, demanded restraint on the part of others in the deployment of nuclear weapons while showing no willingness to reciprocate; Poland added the view that this comment would apply to the US attitude in all disarmament negotiations, including those of the CCD, and that - 35 - more trust in the good will of others and a more constructive approach were essentail conditions for success. Yugoslavia expressed concern over the slow progress at. the SALT and said it was not prepared to make overall disarmament progress condi- tional on these talks. A serious shift in the power balance as a result of the SALT was unlikely, and such fears should not be exaggerated. The UK and the UAR also stated that the CCD's work on a CTB should not be delayed while the results of SALT were being awaited (see "Underground test ban - General", above). General and complete disarmament The USSR quoted Brezhnev to the effect that halting the nuclear arms race and achieving GCD would remain a major aim of the USSR's foreign policy. It added that it was deciding its priorities on measures of nuclear disarmament according to their contribution to achieving GCD. Consideration of GCD by the GGD was important, and it should be con- sidered in parallel with partial disarmament measures. The 25th General Assembly had reflected the concern of many over the lack of progress towards GGD. The USSR draft Treaty on GCD of 1962 was a basis for consideration of the subject, as were a number of other documents before the CGD. It was gratifying that many delegations were ready to consider the problem, but a solution required the efforts of all CCD members and of all nuclear Powers. The CCD could work out a draft treaty to be submitted for the consideration of all States. A world disarmament conference could consider general disarmament. Poland welcomed the USSR's proposal that the CCD should start drafting a GCD agreement, which Poland had suggested two years before. It also said implementation of the NPT would contribute to GCD. World military expenditures The USSR quoted Brezhnev's recent call for a reduction of military expenditures, particularly by the major Powers. The US, in distributing a US report on world military expenditures for 1970, noted its conclusion that such expenditures had reached a record peak of 204 billion dollars in 1970, but that this increase was the smallest in recent years and relatively less than the price rise. It also noted that the poorer countries had increased their expenditures faster than the wealthier ones. (See also "Conventional disarmament", below.) -36- Report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures (GA Res. 2667 The US welcomed the Secretary-General's study on the subject, and said it would co-operate fully in replying to the questionnaire which had been sent to UN Members, and hoped other Governments would co-operate. The US looked forward to the results of the study which should help the COD in its work. Non-Proliferation Treaty The USSR quoted Brezhnev to the effect that the NPT reduced the threat of nuclear war by the FRG, Japan and Italy and that other States should ratify it. Poland stressed that the NPT strengthened peace and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, thus contributing to economic development. It urged ratification by the maximum number of States, parti- cularly by those with a nuclear potential, and the early conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA. It thought the safeguards principles recently approved by the IAEA would facilitate ratification of the Treaty and safeguards negotiations by several States, particularly those in Euratoia. Poland was undertaking negotiations with the IAEA, it said, and was preparing a national system of regulation and control of nuclear materials. Finland's recent agreement with the IAEA proved that such an agreement was not so complex as asserted by - some Euratom countries. Poland appealed to all signatories, especially European countries, to ratify the HPT and declare their readiness to initiate IAEA negotiations. Romania said the CCD should keep constantly in mind the legal commitment to further negotiations contained in the NPT, which must be respected if the number of Treaty ratifications was to expand and the viability of the Treaty was to be enhanced. Such negotiations had not taken place since the Treaty entered into force and CCD members also parties to the NPT should not lose sight of their special responsibility in this regard. The US also welcomed the progress made by the IAEA in elaborating the safeguards procedures for the HPT, noting that safeguards agreements called for by the Treaty had been negotiated already with Finland and Austria and that negotiations with thirty other countries were underway. The US hoped for many more agreements and further NPT ratifications. The Sea-Bed Treaty The USSR quoted Brezhnev to the effect that the Outer Space and Sea-Bed Treaties were only initial steps towards the goal that nuclear -37 - power should serve peaceful purposes only» Sweden referred to the Treaty as a "marginal measure", which did not satisfy the expectations of UN Members (see "COD - General"). Prohibition of use of nuclear weapons The USSR reiterated the view that nuclear weapons should be outlawed, with renunciation of their use as an important step to demonstrate a readiness to take concrete steps towards their elimination. It noted that General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI), in the elaboration of which the USSR had actively participated, stated that the use of nuclear weapons was a violation of the UN Charter and contrary to international law. A draft convention of the Socialist States prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons had been submitted to the 22nd General Assembly. The Geneva Protocol had proved its worth with regard to CBW, and a similar ban on nuclear weapons would strengthen international security. C z echo Slovakia said that only a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons, followed by their destruction, could eliminate the nuclear danger. The ban on use had been supported by all peace-loving mankind practically from the beginning, as evidenced by the adoption of the 1961 declaration on the subject, on the initiative of African and Asian countries. All should be critical of the dilatory approach to this problem during the last ten years. Czechoslovakia supported the USSRTs draft convention on the subject, which would in no way affect the so-called power balance often invoked by Western countries and which presented no control difficulties. A ban on use would also suitably supplement the NET and demonstrate the readiness of the nuclear Powers to embark on the way leading to elimination of the threat of nuclear war. If a full non-use treaty proved impossible, the nuclear Powers could at least agree to a non-first-use treaty in order to diminish the danger of nuclear attack or blackmail and to enhance the security of all countries, particularly the NNWS. Romania said such a ban stemmed from the basic principle of international law against the use of force, and noted that only political will was required to make it a reality and a security guarantee to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Cut-off of production of fissile materials for weapons purposes The USSR said that, since a cut-off would not reduce existing weapons by a single bomb, it was without significance either as a measure of nuclear disarmament or as a reduction of the threat of nuclear war and - 38 - would simply create an illusion without factual substance. ¥ith regard to proposals that a part of the weapons-grade enriched uranium be diverted to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful activities, the USSR stated that it was already actively participating in such arrangements, both within the framework of the IAEA, and on a bilateral basis. The US welcomed the support for a cut-off agreement expressed by members. A cut-off would not be an illusory measure, as had been argued, but could become truly significant over the long run, if not immediately, as a brake on the nuclear arms race. Adoption of IAEA inspection for the cut-off would also be a step towards a more universal system of safeguards on fissionable material production. Nucle_ar-free zones (a) General The USSR quoted Brezhnev's support for the establishment of such zones. Poland welcomed this support and referred to Poland's prior initiative for the creation of such a zone in Europe. Romania listed the creation of such zones as one of the priority measures for nuclear disarmament (see "Halting the nuclear arms race", above). The US also noted its continued support for nuclear-free zones, where appropriate. (b) Treaty of Tlatelolco Mexico welcomed the US Senate's recent approval of Protocol II of the Treaty and took the occasion to recall the Treaty's unique nature and to urge ratification of Protocol II by all nuclear Powers. Subsequently, the US announced its deposit, on 12 May 1971, of instruments of ratifi- cation of the Protocol, noting that the Treaty of Tlatelolco was a major regional arms control initiative. Mexico welcomed the final US ratification of Protocol II. Elimination of foreign military bases The USSR cited Brezhnev's support for this measure. The US said that, for progress towards GOD, conventional arms limitations must be tackled as well as nuclear limitations. Restraints on conventional arms should apply to major military States as well as to developing countries. The problem of restraining the spread of conventional arms was becoming more - 39 - difficult, and the US was disappointed that the CCD had shown so little interest in the subject. With regard to the comments on heavy arms expenditures, restraints on conventional weapons would also release much-needed resources for non-military purposes. Measures of Regional Disarmament All statements on this subject were closely related to the European security problem (see following section). European Security The USSR quoted Breahnev's recent call for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in the European area, particularly in Central Europe. Poland welcomed, inter alia. Brezhnev's proposals for the convening of a European conference, the conclusion of regional agreements on the renunciation of force and the reduction of the danger of a military confrontation in Europe. It recalled previous Polish proposals for a European conference with the participation of the USSR and the US. Poland was ready to discuss any proposals which might be concluded by such a conference or chain of conferences, as the establishment of European security would have a salutary effect on world security. Poland regretted that some countries in the West hampered even the preparatory work for creating a system of European security, and it feared that the opportunity for creating a collective security system in Europe might be lost. •The US repeated its support for mutual force reductions in Europe, noting that it was making intensive studies of the issues involved. It also indicated interest in other regional arms limitations agreements. Yugoslavia said regional disarmament should take place first in Europe, because the continent was deeply divided and overburdened with arms and armed forces, often foreign. Success in this field in Europe would have a positive impact on international relations and on the progress of disarmament in general. Recent positive trends in Europe opened new avenues for co-operation, but major results were unlikely without concrete disarmament measures and military disengagement. Such a development would be possible only if all countries concerned observed the principles of the UN Charter and refrained from force, pressure and interference in the internal affairs of others. Yugoslavia was engaged in a constant search for European security based on the recognition of the existing territorial status quo, the elaboration of rules of conduct, and free co-operation and regional disarmament without disturbing the present European and global stability. France and the PRC The USSR quoted Brezhnev's call in his recent speech for the convo- cation of a conference of the five nuclear Powers. Canada and Sweden referred to such a conference without taking a definite position towards it (see "Underground test ban - General" and "CCD - General", respectively). Sweden also referred to the possibility of the PRC soon taking its place in the UN and to the need for the CCD to adapt its work in a way to splicit the PRC's co-operation. Canada, in discussing the need for a CTB, referred to unrestrained testing by France and the PRC. The UAR noted that a CTB should ultimately bear the signatures of all nuclear Powers, including the PRC and France, and that their adherence to the partial test ban was also highly important. The participation of these two Powers in disarmament work would provide a new impetus, but in the meantime the CCD should not slacken or postpone its efforts. World disarmament conference The USSR quoted Brezhnev's recent call for such a conference. Sweden mentioned the proposal, commenting that it was not yet prepared to subscribe to it (see "CCD - General".) Miscellaneous The USSR submitted a document (ENDC/326) containing a declaration of the GDR on the subject of disarmament. STATEMENT OF TttE USSR GOVERNMENT tr. For more than a quarter of a century mankind has been saved from a world war. However> peace remains unstable. Military conflicts and seats of war tension appear in one or another area of the world, the danger of a global military confrontation continues to persist. The arms race is one of the factors which have a particularly advene effect on the entire international life. It gives rise to an increased danger to peace, let alone the fact that it consumes tremendous material and intellectual resourses which otherwise could be used for accelerating economic and social progress, for the benefit of mankind. The nuclear race, obviously, is fraught with a particular danger* It is this race which, above all, is so alarm- ing to the peoples who feel Concerned aboart their future. The Government of the USSR, addressing this statement to the go- vernments of the powers in the possession of the nuclear weapons does not see a necessity of stressing its particular destructive power, the disastrous conse- quences of its application, the sufferings and calamities which would be brought upon the peoples of the world had this war broken out. At the same time it feels it expedient to draw the attention of the governments of all nuclear powers to the fact that although the struggle for the reduction of the arms race has resulted in some positive measures, so far it has not been possible to reverse the process of stockpiling more destructive weapons of mass annihilation in the arsenals of the nuclear powers. Consequ- ently, more persistent efforts are required toward the effective measures aimed at nuclear disarmament. It is the opinion of the Soviet Government that this is the duty and responsibility of all nuclear powers. It is they and they alone who can and must work out and impliment a practicable program of nuclear disarmament. This task, undoubtedly, cannot be accomplished if the efforts to solve this problem would be made only by one or some of the nuclear powers. - 2 * Joint efforts of all the nuclear states are required, so that these weapons could be banned and destroyed. 1 ! It is generally known that the nuclear powers, so far, do not have a common approach t6 the solution of the nuclear disarmament problems and there is much difference in their views on these problems. However, this should '. » , ' • not prevent the nuclear powers from taking joint steps toward narrowing the gap between their points of view, toward paving the way to nuclear dlsarmanent through cooperative efforts. This is called for by the interests of the peoples, the interests of all nations, the nuclear powers included, because their secu- rity, too, will be more reliably guaranteed by way of the elimination of the nu- clear weapons rather than through continued nuclear arms race. Taking into account all these considerations the Soviet Govern- ment suggests that a conference of five nuclear weapon powers - the Soviet Union, the United States, the Chinese People's Republic, France and Great Britain, be convened in the nearest future. Problems of nuclear disarmament as a whole should be discussed at such a meeting. As far as an agreement result- ing from these talks is concerned, it could cover both the whole complex of nuclear disarmament measures and separate measures gradually serving this purpose. There is no doubt that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would promote the solution of the general and complete disarmament problem, have a wholesome effect upon the entire international situation helping to strengthen confidence in the relations 'among states. The Soviet Government suggests that an exchange of views be started through the diplomatic channels on the question concerning the date of the conference, the place, its agenda and schedule. As far as the Government of the USSR is concerned, it believes that the sooner the five nuclear powers conference is called, the better. Its position concerning the place of the conference remains open. It would agree to - 3 - ^ ; , i , t . • . ; . any place acceptable ib ail the participants. Should there be general agreement, the Soviet Government would welcome ah idea of establishing a Preparatory Committee for the Conference. The Government of the USSR will be interested in having the views which may be expressed by each nuclear power on all these questions* li expresses hope that this statement will be considered with due attention called for by the nuclear disarmament problem and that progress will be made through the joint effort of the nuclear powers in the solution of this problem. 3AHBJIEHKE FIPABHTEJItCTBA CCCP Qojiee qexsepTM setca qejioseqecxBo nsdaBjieno ox BOMHH. Bnecxe c xeMj imp ocxaexcs Henpo^HBiM. To B xo B apyroM pawoHe seMHoro mapa BosHMKa^ox soeHHBie KOHI|)JIHKXBI f H oqarw BoeHHOM HanpsaceHHocxHj coxpaHHexca onacHOCTB soeHHoro .1 GTOJiKHOBeHMa rjiodajiBHoro Macfflxada. 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B pemenMH DXOW npoQjieMH. ^ - OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA MEMORANDUM Private and Confidential A - TO : His Excellency REF : U Thant The Secretary-Ge Ilkka Pastinen DE - FROM : Special Representative of the Secretary-General GENEVE. 2 July 1971 for Disarmament OBJET - SUBJECT • Unofficial Summary of Informal Meeting held on 30 June and 1 July 1971 I forward herewith a copy of the Unofficial Summary of the Informal Meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held on 30 June and 1 July 1971. ll): GOMillMiQL 1 July 1971 SfCiS OF SHE COIlCESfBE 01 DISARMED tlnpffieia l Suromary of the Itoj&mal Meeting held ,at the, Palais des Hations on 30;, June ..and,!. July. 1971 . • ghalmans Mr. Jorge Gastafteda and later Mr. 'Miguel Maria (Mexico) Hr. Ignatieff (Canada) said that a group of delegations had asked for an informal meeting,, idth experts present, to pursue GA Resolution 2663 .Canadian fcfor&ingpape r CCD/327 illustrated what could be done in seisraological EsinatiQa In the Eorasiaji land mass. He introduced Dr. Hbitbam. ., lM,t|iaifl (CanadiaK; expert) consider-ed the negotiating of a test ban to be esseiitially a political prolblem nhere could only assist by clailfying the possible risks involved in aa gg^eeiaent, Th© tecimical report, distributed by Canada at tlie Geae^al Asso^xLj ia 1970 eonelna^i tlaat in tlie northern heiai sphere 6D-Mlotpa underground explosions could be Identified using the seism e described in the replies from Goverjmeats to the Secretary-General to Resolution 2604 (XXIf) , The estimates in the Canadian paper eoJiservati'7'e. Studies using tile Canadian standard seismic nettrorfc aloae demoastrated that identificatioa capabilities for a major Ilorth imerican test site were in the 10 to 20 kiloton yield range in hard rock. "She -working paper CCD/327 contained the results of a case study of 123 underground esplpsioaa in Eurasia. 1 now scale to measure the size of events using the surface traves was detrised, using signals most easily iQioasared on standard instruments, x-Mch enabled the coi^arison of data obtained on another continent id.th data obtained on the same continent as the event of interest. The study resulted in aa identification threshold of surface wave magnitude 3.2, which corresponds to explosion yields of about 20 kiloton in environments other than dry alluviton. The study used data from 42 standard seismograph stations in Asia, Europe and Middle East, TsfeiGh, T^ere repprted in the returns to Resolution 2604. (2XI¥) , and which proved the value of the present'' level of international data exchange. The . experience 'with the new scale made it probable" that td.th all the useful data, employed,, the corresponding forth Meriean lower lisiit for identification eould be reduced to 5 to 10 miotons in Biost natural environment s? except dry alluvium and possibly valley tuff. In the absence of guaranteed .2 .- selssaie data In much of Eurasia^ tiro comparatively simple steps reduce the loiaer lissit. to 5 to 10 kllotons in most of tMs region's current test- sites, namely the deployment of a limited number of improved '' I6a%~period seismograph stations? and the merging of currently available •:"4ata to achieve the detection and location ability calculated in the Canadian technical report of Deee&ber 1970. Regarding the Canadian prognosis•of a capability at 1 to 2 kilotons in most natural environments, ' such target would require massive investment in arrays situated on the saja'e continent as the events of interest. Prior esapination of data ia the 5 to lQ"Jdtloton raiage and" the corresponding weak earthquakes would provide the basis for a more certain extrapolation of the possibilities. Br, Ihithaia -urged the delegates to start thinking about explosion yields in1 terjas of the refiaed surface *ja.ve scale proposed and f-el.tl 'that parti ei&arly delegations of the nuclear testing powers could probably improve On it. Increased yield precision was obtained because the available evidence stiggested' that the refined surface t-jsve magnitude for an esqxLosion xjas not seBsitlTre to 'ti>e detonation jEediu% id-th the exception of dry and possibly valley tuff. The Canadian irorking paper had used only dae of -the saany tools for discriminating underground explosions fron earth,&aakes. Other criteria -when properly used and in combination could be' effective for yields less than 10 Kt in hard rock. It was necessary in techMeal papers to discuss events in terms of a defined threshold. He sta'ted that diserifaination was statistically possible belou the threshold figiires Canada had quoted and some deterrence existed, therefore^ below those fbrzaa! threshblds. This concept of threshold should not be confused •with, the political concept of a treaty prohibition threshold, which had been discussed by different delegations in the COD, Dr. Ijhitharn drew 'the follcsdug conclusions from warding paper CCD/327: (l) The lack of information on the precise location and yields of underground esplosions, and on the deployment of seisaographic stations and their capabilities in mich ;of the Eurasian land mass jaade the situation below about 20 kiloton aard rock yields asysmetrie between Eurasia and I'Torth jtoeriea. (2) In view of the results of the Canadian stud/, -which was a small scale 'international experiment in co-operation.9 he considered fully justified Canadian insistence on the need for guaranteed availability of seismic • 'cfeta, (5) Certain delegations claimed that all underground explosions could be identified by-national EieanSy which lias not the Canadian e:sperience. • Gana'dl i-ioul'd, therefore, welcome publication of the techniques and data .. •used) to .achieve'tho'se.results* (Sweden) welcomed the informal meeting to consider verification of a.'CTB by seissaic means, bat also hoped later in the session the'd'GD would consider other tectoleal verification possibilities, such . as satellite su^eillanceV 'The CCB also seeded more information on the ^peets :df on-site inspection, Art Intensive and realistic dis~ of both technical and political problems during thlis session was t&: ftS.fi! the denial Assembly mandate on this subject. Sweden ' ' had distributed six scientific reports, which were mifflittarised ia CCD/329. Di?»;;'I3gicsson (%edish es:pe^t) said the six repbf ts x^ere rather technical, Js^p^3?'l deisoiifeed a 'mathematical tool; for preeise measumaeat of epicentres. '••" The''®' had demised aa 'efeij- b^tes*: jaethod, but the fall value of these ex- .''-' " p^r&sental methods ebtild be obtained only then calibratioa events could be put b the calotiiatipa. In this case, the Bisthods b@eam© a useful tool for fjiBg STMleaa?feveaatS |th e selection of areas for on-site inspections, "Paper1 2 described a method of finding a proper balsneoj, avoiding alsraas id.th regard to test violations, and deciding whether the c&l reqiiirements :of a solution could be met. Many questions remain ich, he' hoped,, wotald be taken up and solved la subsequent woi?k. The working of Dr. Ritseeraa of the Ketherlands contained ves^y timely data on eiig'tO'for'b th£ ba'sis of e'aleulations of the number of false alaa^as, i* 3 tias a raihet* "technical stiidy of" the properties of station bttt 'he was happy that its coiiciusions were similar to those of his Canadian :Briti'sh colleagues, 'fh& majoj? point was the large differescft between . ">3asgniitades obtained from the' same explosions at different stations « 'Everyone was aeoastomed to speaking of ntagiiitudes as they were goffie thing defiiStej which was iiot the case. Arrangements for a threshold test ban /would •;"' fi^uire calibrated stations and calibrated test sites. Paper 4 showed that yi'ela 'estimates from 'surface waves" tjere preferable to egtisoates frpn body Wave" 'stations, "But 'here, toos calibration was required, and care must bs •' exerctaed in using the study. Paper 5 was an account of esperiaaoe wit"h small aa&ays la Sweden. The iffiporfcanc© of such arrays would increase. 'The Swedes had used, "Canadian and Scandinavian, and:, &ore recently^ Japanese and '; - lloroeeaii data. Study of weak events by such methods would form an important •item f'or fattire iMernationai co-operation. At Swedish stations? the P^waves • gave better detection for Eurasia than for North toerica. Paper 6 deaj-t with the methods of'Identification by complexity and by short-period spectral rkMos. The former was poor, but the latter much better down to 5 Kt. The study mast be used carefully, however, as the data was incomplete. Body and surface wave magnitudes were better, but still too weak for digtant events. In addition to these six studies9 there was much unreported work in the UK, India/ Australia and the Netherlands,, which generally agreed that identi- fication was possible down to 5 Kt, using Canadian data on North American events, whieh fit in with what Dr. ¥itham had said. Identification by P-S-wave ratios was extremely effective but measurements varied greatly at different sitesj so one should treat the results with care. Ambassador Garacciolo (Italy) said the problem of external monitoring was linked to the problem of efficient collaboration and organisation of data exchange, to the establishment of an adequate, homogeneous network of monitoring stations9 and to the need for a reasonable threshold for such monitoring, which should hot be below 4-75 for explosions in hard rock, Italy doubted that lower thresholds could be attained, because the geographical distribution of the seismic observatories had been designed for different purposes than for monitoring on test bans. Also., in the Mediterranean Basin, short-period seismographs could not be amplified beyond certain limits because of intensive miorbseismic activity in the area, the possibility of decoupling made threshold definition even more difficult. Since the threshold would be expressed in magnitudes, magnitude-yield ratios must be determined between error limits of a quarter of a unit of magnitude, as in the case of earthquakes. His remarks represented a purely technical contribution to tae problem of defining a threshold and left the door open for other measures for a gradual restriction of tests, such as those suggested by Canada. With regard to improvement of detection and identification techniques, e programme should be adopted including (a) the establishment of an inter- national centre for coordination of research and data dissemination and storagej (b) the subdivision of each continent into sones, with their own data^gathering arid processing centres! (a) the standardisation of observa- tories fiafid1} (d) the commitment of governments to bear costs and to lend assistance to improve the world network along the lines of Res. 2663. In tight of the difficulty of identifying explosions in alluvium, Italy was interested in the statement of the Netherlands delegation concerning the possibility of Identifying such explosions by other means. Careful consideration should be given to the proposals to make at least partialjprogress towards a full test ban pending a CTB, Italy favoured the temporary separation of peaceful explosions from military explosions and prior notification to the IA1& ofpeaceful underground explosions. f* 5 *• (IK) noted that the UK had assisted in improvement of world-wide seissiologleal capabilities by Baking a& esqpert available to the Canadian Govermeat for three i-to^ths early this year. Scientific progress could help moutd the political td.ll necessary for achieving a GTB. Real' progress had bse'n made in past years. A CTB could be effective only if participating' States were sure that other states were not gaining a military advantage by breaches of the treaty. Detection and identification of tests would play a large part in the achievement of a CTB, and an over-optimistic technical assessment of capabilities should be avoided, fhe IK had tabled a working paper last years CCD/296, aimed at determining present capabilities. Today's meeting would permit members to take stod: tig progress siaee the last meeting in August 1970, (tfe ©jqpert) said the Canadian paper (CCD/327) was one of the most careful and comprehensive studies made on the seisnological aspects of a GTS. It could be easily verified and extended as it was based only oa published data. It provided new and better limits to the capacity of the existing seisraie network^ improving on the 1968 SIPRI conclusions. fho study shoxred that the identification bthreshold for trndergromd e^plosfons in the northern hemisphere was approximately 20 Kt tjfaea: f3^ed aaywhere bM in dry alluvium. 1?he improvement on the SIPRI study was due to the fact that recent peaceful nuclear explosions, such as dasb'uggy 'and Bulisoi} in the US, had provided a better sample of explosion data than was available to SIPRI. Ho such information had corae from the tlSSB, but some interesting articles on the results of e^qseriments 'there had appeared in the past year. . In this connection, the HIE Working Group of the IAEA had urged the release of PHE source data in all eoua tries. Hso, a practical method for correcting for path differences had resulted in more precise Ms magnitude estimates {in this connection, he agreed with Dr. "MithaB that the tise of Ms magnitudes vas an enormous advance over Kb); and records had become available from additional stations, including Kabul 'aad Spitabergeii. Contrary to the SPIRI study? however, the Canadian report had omitted data from the Horthwest Pacific, as consideration of such data 'would have been too tisae-consuffiing. There were scientific reasons for completing a study of thig and other areass such as the fact {a) that recording "stations in Eurasia were less uniform; (b) that the complications of transmission paths are likely to be extreme in the areas and C'e) that the surface wave amplitudes my be two or three times less for similar ' distances in such an area of combined land and ocean. Other matters requiring further study in the. coatejct of using national means for test monitoring^ were? (a) the degree of Eii&d signals for nearly similtaneQns events,, (b) improvement of' reliability of national seismic systems so that data would be complete and timely,, a&& (c) tlie problem of creating an esqperieneed cadre of analysts for national monitoring systems through training programmes,, etc. The assisting network could tmdoubtedly be improved fey a "moderate® expenditure, as the Canadian paper suggested, "but the term "moderate-" should be clarified. Certain isproveiffients cbt&cl be laads with present expenditures,,, such as the use of magnetic tape to reduce bacdsgroimd noise. The Canadian paper stated that, by such xaethods.^ the identification threshold could be powered to 5 to 10 Kt, as coapafed to the. 3 to 6 Kt estimated, for the specially deployed networks described ia CC33/296,, ineltidiBg large arrays of the modest UK siss* Ilhile tlie restsltg of the Canadian study sight sake a lower estimate possible, it seemed doTi>tfal that long-period arrays eould "be dispeassd -with entirely because (a) magnifieatiort of standard 'seismometers resiilted in increased baekgrotmclimoise., while the UK proposal uas to taTce advantage of new seismometers and array processing to reduce the amount of noise relative to. sisals; (b) the arrays could, reduce the danger of interference of signals. Since last Aiagust's meeting,, a long period array had been established in India, aad the 13K \ms recersriag' dat£ froia a .Swedish long-period array and espected data from a similar array jla Atsstralia, ¥Ith this data the I3K Eight be able, aest year to take a more definite position on these feo points, as veil as .OB the basis and reliability of the method of calculating surface WTe. Es^ftituctess %5iich -was a feature of th«? inprov©Bents presented ia the Canadian paper. The use of tape recording and array stations made the ideBtifieatioB process less sl^les and the UiC had suggested use of small eoiapstters by each station? recent experiments had;-shorn that such computers laighi cost ..paly half as Baich as previously estimated. If the less conservative Canadian estimates on the detection of surface waves *rere also confirmed, the 15 million potaid estimated east of the monitoring systems propose~ d in the U&|$apey$&': r could be substantially redtieecU In the context of the UK research progrssue, much progress mad been roade ia developing asa instrument for ubroad»basd reeording", -abiGh sho-old be a big improvement for detectioMi and identification purposes^ oyer the separate instiraaents ased for recordiKg only pair&s of the full speetruti of grotind vibrations - 7 from a gtpea seismic etent, namely, the 3hort«-period (P-uave) and the long-period (S.-waTre) . The principal regaining uaknom vias whether or not "broad band seismographs" could be equally good surface ^raire detectors as "narrow band losg-period seismographs". The Canadian stwJy confirmed the position uitb regard to the ^deeoiapiiiag*' of seismic signals by dry allnvitfflu If firings could be so arranged as to escape detection, ' there was Tery little point in issking- tremendous improvements in seisalc aet-tjorks. At the isoisent, detection and identification techniques appeared to be %i the limt of sefisaee-". • '. l^«r faaiaka (Japsm) introduced a Japanese esrpert, Dr. S. Stag^ehiro. (Japanese ospert) skid he serald distmssi (a) the use of* ocean-bottoia seiamo^»aphs to imprmhs the present detection capability for seismic events am possibly to increase the capability of distinguishing esplosions from aatural eveatst smd (b) the establisJm.ent of a •oniversaily acceptable means of determining the migaitede of seismic ©rents* Oa the first poiatj, he »oted the eonstaat p2*6gr©ss in receat jears toiasrds identifying esplosioias in ]bard roelt of less th&n 1 kiloton, assigning such esplosions GOtild be detected and sufficient data obtained from theEi for the appropriate criteria to be applied. In addition to the P-S ratio, other criteria depeadiag solely oa JMifasres •were now being developed, Japan was studying the frequeacy ratios ±n P~traves to see if they could be tised as a discriminant, t-Meh eoiild well lowr the present threshold at teleseismc distances, since detecting S-tjaves tms at present more difficult than detecting P-mires oialy. Reeeat studies indicated that better d-i techniques were 'being aeqiaired, if support data were available. Sach improved capability -rfotild contribute to the aehieTTCTieia.t of a GTB. detection teehrdq.ues must be improved to Eatch identification techniques, Despite progress in deteetisg surface xmves, deteeijion capability would resjaia limited if Gonfined to land observations, and these liiaits should be lowered by placing stations OB the ocean floor, laliere Japanese experiments showed soise levels Ies0 than half th&se of the quietest land-site, and unaffected by Weather and seasons, Under such conditions, a one ton explosion ahotald be recor&Me at a distance of 3,000 Ma. Oceans-bottom seismographs could be employed at depths of sete^al thousand meters and operated for 2 to 5 months without mainteaaace. Infoisiation stored on aag&etic tape could be qtiickiy processed, la recording sigaal-to«»noise ratio,, a single ocean-bottom station would prolsably detect selssdc events equivalent to a fairly large array, oa land, Hth a tripartite array o-tt the ocean-bottom, a certain independent location capability could be obtained, and it eould also provide data useful for identification, onee identification criteria using only P-waves uere developed. Buck arrangements would not intrude on sovereign territory, Although, data could "tot easily be obtained from such emplacements on a real time basis, the records eould be brought to the surface and examined only when necessary. Ocean-bottom seismographs should not be excluded from consideration in making changes and improvements in the global seismic networks, ¥ith regard to a universally accepted means;' of determining laagnitudes, it had been shorn that recorded aagiiitiides differed tddely from station to dation. Consequently, one had to employ the Etean jaagnitude of a number of stations or accept the reading of a certain nmber of feey stations, la order to get an acceptable mean magnitude, S5 stations were inquired. An examination of the StPSI report and the Canadian report of 1970 showed that a sufficient ntaaber of stations had been used. The detection threshold for earthquakes at stations at a distance of 90 degrees from the event could be conservatively estimated at 5,25. The Canadian report gave a similar value for the identification threshold, bmt this 'was normally 0,8 higher than the detection threshold. There ijere high hopes for lowering the detection threshold for S-tiaves to that of P-waves as a result of recent developments in long-period instrumentation, and this would also lower the identification threshold. However, the number of stations naist be reduced and, accordingly, there 'iNfould be differing sets of data on different events is tiidely separated areas. The question then arose as to what should b© done •with magaitades with comparatively low statistical Value (i.e., too few stations) from two such different sets of stations* They could be accepted as a first approsdiaation, but for higher accuracy, they must "be adjusted to compen'sate for the geophysical peculiarities of the earth, 'which would be a tremendous task. On the other hand, it should not be too difficult if the study were liadted to a combination of stations of highest sensitivity and to possible source regions of underground explosions. In any case, a comprehensive study achieved througga inter- national co-operation would provide the academic eomjmmity xd.th valuable Mr,. Bos (Uetherlahda) noted the statements he had already made to the COD on the subject of a" GTB and interim partial measures, and welcomed the infojSssl meeting. He presented Dr. Eitseiaa of the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute^ who had authored a paper on the seisiaieity of the WSA, tJS£>R and China which had been privately circulated to delegations. (letherlands ©spert) said his paper had been prepared because of the uncertainty prevailing concerning the feasibility of detection and identification for siaall jnagnitud© events. The paper showed that? while the misaber of earthquakes are very smalla the number of smaller magnitude shocks of M, 4»5 or less ¥as appreciable. At the same time, it might "be noted that aany explosions had been identified below that of 90 per cent identification level in the Canadian paper of tJhithem and Basharn, that is, under favourable conditions, actual identification vt&s sometimes better than that theoretically predicted. The conclusions of the earlier Netherlands working paper (CCD/323) were nearly identical •with those reached by the Canadian and Swedish experts, namely, that the present ' system x/as "stiffi cleat for yields of 10 to 20 Kt, and thatf vjith gemiaaLPg stations at appropriate places9 eventually 5 to 10 Kt cottld be reached, COD/3S3 was giraply a resume of data taken from open literature and contained no ba^ic data of Uetherlands origin. The estreaely low threshold values had not been pursued, since the Netherlands recognised that they were only of 'academic interest at the present time. Identification . doi«Hi to a few Kt only in h'ard rock, as described by the UK experts, could be achieved only after heavy investment in sophisticated seissiic equipment; and a CTB could jalwaye be violated by firing yields of 10 Kt or less ia dry soil at an appropriate depth. At the present stage, the yield threshold, to be significant, taust be lowered by a factor of ,;10 to 20 because of thifs possibility. It i*juld take sorae time to put new equipment in operation and, therefore, from the seismic:' point of view, the Ketherlands had concluded that the present conditions for a CTB would not be essentially five y^ars from jSpi. LeomM (W&.) istrt^oed Mr. CB$fi--8Spejirt)' aotsS tfeat aotwlthstsBding the success sight Be' achieved in asiside; reseaffdi* th©i?@ «ere iali©r©at liigdt&tlbn& to teeHa&jase for t&© >@M|le&iioia "of & • eoapfftheasiv® test baa* teait of Mr, tisafeasio*s P®aark0 are Contained' Jr* cleemajaat 'oil X $&$ 1^71) " ' asked Bs?» l,uka@io (a) if he eotald indicate i lats fKsflS ths-laffg® arfej stations feaulS bsoome a roilabi@? ssd (b) if feosld add et^rthiagj, and pes-feap© issms 'ft'voyldng pap0^? teith ?©jpjpfi to IB Ms atatsatot G0ad©rKiag tsaid@ati?Iable high-yield US ^ofi^ sda*ess itself to oae a£ th@ tlsat data from all tba-es largs US arras's 'ItPA i»' Alaska" sail WOES4S la ^.'jrwsy) had bg©a fox* t^sbaical1 ^©asoBSj but tfest tfassr sfecnsM be ' saM H© h®.^ gaiasi th® irapreesios from th© discussion t it ^as aot'pdseibi© to detset or identify all ertaia tbsashoidj and 'tfeat, be^nS tfe&t. It toot&d *s® Sif^ioult- to from the thteshdX^ to »^feasis0 thats while sstpeHts etic«5 and sould not vstit a ;^rf^cti m©thdd .of of a C'JFS. Sfes aaksd vhethar it was thsrs would always ba a ia|s©a0i'ble. If for $srk©otioa ' (S»sd£sii espai't) aot©3#' with regard ts th® first taa£ tfeai9 -silth th& l^tsps^t^sioa of ss^r© i^ser thfejp© iioidd fe® graat difficulty fa siorfei^g otst. tbs of s '-^'fi^M for fwrfehe* iiiirestiigjitiea is that area end the ( to fiua s?#X&tl«a®9 fh.®^@ sag' also th® «$Kl©m 'of selecting mo^© eonvmtional stations to Bpgyade and how this should fee done. lr. Ihirlaway (UK expert), replying to Mr. Ixnru* s question, noted that no research group had ever been given a directive as to a desired threshold and that the magnitude of 4»75 had besn the first generally referred to some ten years ago. Slowly, the everts had brought the threshold down and the "magic figure" was now 4«p». probably because it was a nice round figure. In his opinion, event & above 4-»0 could be detected and located, but many were extremely difficult. to identify, and it would be extremely expensive to arrange to do so. A magnitude of 4-*5 was put forward as a threshold in 'the US' working paper. OHe of the reasons for setting the figure arbitrarily at that safe level was that firing in dry soil was possible which gave lower seismic signals, From the purely technical point of view, there were limitations to putting the threshold lower, such as background noise, which could not be stopped. Hi was not referring to a threshold for a test ban but only to the limitation on the effectiveness of instruments. In large arrays, the limits of detection were beginning to be seen, probably below ,4,0' 'but above 2.0, perhaps around 3.0* important events could go on below that level and it had been noted that, as the threshold of detection lowered, store small events were registered which could not be identified. IS then became a political "question rather than a technical one. ¥ith respeet to Mrs. Myrdal|is Question, it was true that there would always be a residuum of unidentified events, no matter what instruments were used, as there were an infinite number of earth shocks at lower magnitudes. As far as he knew, there was no non-seismic method for detecting small events at .long distances. Mrn...Leonard' (C$) said that Ml, Lukasie had made remrks pertinent to 'Mr. IBTU'S question at'yesterday''s Meeting and these remarks, concerning the limitations on future identificatioa capabilities, would be issued as "•'a working'paper. ... :;... / .• ': "' • Mr., _lhitfaam (Canada) said that, with regard to Mr, Snru's question, he agreed with Mr, TMrlaway, except that it should be made clear that we were talking about a realistic world where we have to identify from distance. As you came nearer to a seisMc event the" levels of identification got lower and lower. Operating'at a distance of 3,000 km or more froja the events^ as we are now doiiig, the threshold could probably not go below P-wave Eaghitude '4- even with the arrayst although there had not yet been sufficient data to determine this 'and the Canadian paper simply isade as estimate. The problem therefore became'a political one of risk assessiaent. With regard to non- seissnic means of verification, 'he did not agree entirely with Dr. Thirlaway Me iiiterp^eted I'Jrs. MyarfalTs question sore broadly. In general, seismic waves Were the most important Hearts of verification, but,, in the context of a GTB, there were other methods such as satellites for ascertaining the activity associated -with an undez'ground test which would fr 35nru (Ethiopia) asked why the previous active consideration of bQxes1ir -ha& been abandoned. Mri. Ihirlaimy (tf& expert) said he could answer the question^ but would li&e' t The G6B should examine the possibilities of combination of measuresf. including seismic detection, satellite surveillance and on-site inspection. On© possible transitional measure to build confidence would be the advance notification of appropriate data concerning projected explosions. fhe Canadian' delegation would consult with other delegations about the best way to ensure that the various suggestions for confidence-building §s a necessary fbundtion for a CTB treaty might best fee reflected in the special report the COD was requested to submit to the next General Assembly session. Deferring to the Question of how much value should be attached to measures to reduce further the technical threshold of detection, Mr. Ignatieff maintained that the <3GD discussion on verification techniques would be considerably enhanced, if it were better informed by the nuclear testing Powers whether such an improved detection and verification capability would facilitate a political decision to ha^t or curb underground,testing, and also how important if; was to their security to continue testing, restricted to very low; yield devices. Mr. Ericsson (Swedish expert) noted that in the discussion the concept :-6f "threshold" was used in two different sensesj (l) in denoting the ultimate technical limitf (3) in defining a threshold level of permitted explosions for the purpose of a test ban treaty. Sweden regarded the latter as too difficul- :' vv.V.t. '"...' and not of muc• h use'. - . Mr. Bos (Netherlands) raised the question of possible co-operation of different national systems in detection and verification. He noted that in WO co-operation existed in certain co-ordination of national weather systems and asked if such co-operation existed also in the exchange of seismic - data* • • • ; . •: •••'•"' . • " Mr, liukasio (IS expert) observed that concerning such a co-operation there existed certain technical problems in dissemination of data from the arrays. Those data were registered on magnetic tapes comprising large number of sensors (from 100 to |$& seismometers). !Phe recipient of such a tape must have data processing facilities. Some problems were also created by using data of one computer ia another one. It might therefore be useful to create some centre for uniformity for those data. The Iteited States had such a centrej however„ if there was large demand for informatioti, it might prove difficult to provide responsive service. The ftSA Would provide such information -within the capability of its centre, and he mentioned the possibility of establishing a central international institution, in which the US would foe prepared to participate. Mr.. ^Leonard (US) observed that the United States facilities concerned were totally unclassified and the limits of possible exchange of data • were posed by purely technical problems. Mr*. .Ericsson (Swedish ©spert) noted that in conventional seismology the international exchange of data was organised by a number of organizations and had steadily improved. Efforts continued to establish a conventional seismic data bulletin with the use of communication satellites. Such co-operation was not technically or financially very difficult but its realisation was delayed by consMeration in too many cosmdttees. (Italy) said that the exchange of views and the interventions of the experts did not give a complete reply to the question of a wrld-^dde system of data exchange also using local systems, Italy woiild grabiait a working paper dealing with this subject, which could be discussed at a latea? stage. OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA Private and Confidential MEMORANDUM A - TO : His Excellency REF : U Thant Secretary-General DE - FROM Illcka Pastinen GENEVE, 8 July 1971 Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament OBJET - SUBJECT : Unofficial Summary of Informal Meeting held on 7 July 1971 I forward herewith a copy of the Unofficial Summary of the Informal Meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held on 7 July 1971. AMS jmjimiiL . g July 1971 OF THE COMMITTEE 01 DISflElfflKBNT Informal. Eeeting held at t&e_Falai-s des Ifa.tio.ns .on ,7, July 1971 Chairaan? Mr. 0. Khosbayar' (Mongolia) Mr. Taiialga (Japan) welcomed the convening of the informal meeting on the prohibition of CBE. The meeting would be useful even If it could not reach any conclusions and every delegation would Bake Its own evaluation of the discussion and the views stressed by the experts. He had circulated to delegations a paper containing information on the annual production of the Japanese cheraieal Industry of hazardous compounds, particularly phosgene^ hydrogen cyaside and phosphorus compounds (Japanese espert) said that Japan had concentrated on the verification problems specifically related to the production of nerve agents, which were organophosphorus compounds. These corapoundss however^ were widely used for peaceful purposes in the production of pesticides. The difference between nerve agents and pesticides in chenieal' structure was that nerve agents "contained sacthyl-phosphorris bondsf which were absent in pesticides. A sensitive method for detecting a nethyl-phbsphorus bond would greatly facilitate the detection of nerve agents, Japaaess working paper (CdD/301) submitted last years noted that by using the liethod of gasehrosatography it would be possible to detect and identify some nerve agents in liquid wastes from cheiaical plants, in the soil and dust In and around the producing plants or on the production equipment and worker's clothes. This method would also enable verification of the presence of methyl-phosphorus bonds which cannot be used for purposes other than tha production of nerve agents. If a method of sieroanalysis of chemical compounds with a Bethyl-phosphcrus bond could be established, It would be possible to verify whether nerve agents were Ming produced by checking liquid wastes from the suspected plant. Japan had no data based on this method so far? but believed that it could be a possible method of verification,, particularly If visits could be arranged to facilities where nerve agents were actually handled. had a!0c stEggesi^, the establishment of a system of reporting by 'States on tfe statistics for cert&tn pl»sp!iorus coarpotrnds., giving the ts'-' produced s idqaorfescT fei imported aii-d figures for consumption for •'•' -. purposes^ as a ®es£as to present the use of those substances for the prodttetioii oif nesnre ageats, Cheeking tlie production and consumption of jfgfllov pisosphoras • aid other iKpoarfcant intermediates in the prod-action of nerve aforits libtild enable" ascertaining whether such agents trere produced. IB Japaas statistics &bout the production aM eonsusption of inorganic iSs t?&re eade pablics. but no sufficient statistics on j^as eo£Sj other tfean agricultural oaojyiir:alSj were availalile. "If coaatsdes publidiied reliable statistics Bore Esgrstesjatically, it could to baild aoafidence ss&ag* atateSj although tJioffe were weaknesses in sygtes "becsase of tfe®' possiMlity of other methods of ' maniifacturlag agests aM of possible BtaitiS-'&ieal errors. Japss. also reltei-ated its suggestion last year concerning the prenrsntion of t&e aeorerfc diswlopmsnt of or research on new tjrpes of highly tosie Cl' la thS' futors. It proposed •Siat the esistir^g ehcsmical co^potrnds vlth a iettel Ssse sqts&l' to or above the. level of 0.5 rdlligran por kilogran of bo4y "sfeigfet by fiiypoaermic isjeetion sfeoiild bo listed as i terns to be reported upon, S&fer eh.SEn.ba3L substances' would "bo 'iiested by an appropriate iatsniational imsti'tate,' asS if their toxic effects reached the envisaged level , be aanousbed. Japsm aoted tliat there trord scfi'a tloan ten kinds o^ conpottfida vith tome effects equal to or e;cceedin^ the suggested fjiore ¥as" the qtiastioa 'whether the lethal dose shcaD.d be based on injectidas or OK inhalation er pei'ciitanecras absorption o.s in the of a GIT. It would also l>e desirable to discuss an appropriate inter- body to car^T1 out ^BuShoirrtiatiV^ "tests' i'ri::that regard. introtteoe^' fe. 'Ho^Sman Cuttigr f i"on the TTS Arras Control -said that US research had, focused on the problem of containing- 'the G warefar® nerve agents suid devoted pai*ti ci-lar attention to the proautttlon stags. A study oa possit)!© proced-ares for- inspection of ' was tanaez1 'way. tha inspectors would co trained aat VQ-&M 'tts'e proasss siEasardea EJIC! flowsheets ^ eharfea, data on espiment sad inspectable iteias? iaspecMon ami check lists, grid other technical data arid gi'ddelines to ioa of organophosphGrua aerrc agents, Sgpcriraentg wsre ooncfoctec is' thres eoE^erelal e&srrfeal plants, particularly iflth a ietr' to fiJiS out the relationship "between the degree of intrusion and the oftliat 'sort of ia^pec^ioa. It was found that the answers to questions 1m" t&5 tjaestlpssaird sight reveal contaercial secrets and 1 tl*0' ^e^tiGim&f s ©^ tlie2^fom5 ms beisg rewissd. •!£he ITS -^igs nefertoofe in 1971 a stn% of phdsphosros pro ceasing In oilier ftotastsd^s,. &s {feSeriifced in t^clirdeal foirmals^ because the production %ffiat ''iEffce^snadSatas and preciirso3?s in other coimtries sight be frraa US Ki&tlio€s* In. that case the ".inspoc table51 features d'iffei*. P^ailraiaar^ rissaTts indicated that (l) at present to be no significant dU^ej'anG©- between US technology and that ''of othes* doimtx'i&s^ £a»2 (2) new' and different methods ..for prodticiaig-i ofg^noptespBdrw^ cBjarpoand'Sy as viell as elemental phosphoroiiss appeared to "foe fet sctejffi^cF ^cfe^lopseiit IB a n'om&e? of csxintries su.;.d sdglit become ifeX^' ^itfels a ctecacb. Ife1. Matter H»ted tliat, tjhilc prsatiction \-rns porteps the nosi prosiising £b? Vte'Ifi'C^tlos , collateral research I-KLQ n-ocessarj in tho related fields of trsiaspor-fetioRj stoirage sad field testi.ng of C ag^r,ts ss* ' TJS ^asearcjji e;ffos?tS' woijld continue. hoped the new Kscting iroiilc!. contribute to ^uestioss i^ft •ffiian0t?i5ffi'ed by pi-c-vions jneetings. oho ^eidowad the af .tlid Swedish sontrlbuti.ar.3 to tho probler^ ontliiiod In CCD/322 or 18 -I'Sansh, CCi)/334"of 30 Karcti" asd CCD,^333 of 6 July 1971, "S© latter paper stS'sssed tlie need ife ary troatj* for tmasMguons definition of what" was ss&nt 157 tn-slns ancl linjferlin.ecl the "bc.-'mdary position" of 'to^dns as ciieEricsl sufcstsaces of1 biological crl/jbij wMcli eo-o3..cl cost logically be disalt mth is a obEprehe^sivs CBT'f ban x?h0re their ejsct dslinitation would not fee a matter of" doacera. If a United trestjr txas first to be ho^rever •, tojdfts imzst lio indlttdts3^ but tJte woblei- of appz'opriats ; arose. !!crsov@r5 if ioslnss vere IiieliKled in a 3W bssij as v«=.s foreseen^ an Jiaportcuit sfc&p In tfee- direction of 'iaclisJiag C-agesits in sucii a basi would "be tafc<5iSj te^ Sweden still" coaiiia&rea tlis addition of other C weapons la a. paHisl. treaty ta Se aaa open questicsn.- ^&.JsSislaa C'S^sdisJi 'ssport) kiicl the StMisb rar^? CGD/333j sought to tfee VBrlous gjfomitiss dn wBicli a definition, of tosdsa i-ljjlit "be tli© 'mte?al os?igin o? occrarsnce; (iv the degree of to!si:(54% anS (c)' tlxo clieMcal nature cf the toxins. Hsall^f the the •po^obllitTT of clior?ical synthesis of Ijiological tosins os" 'Sresn yelsti^^iy lfeia!.ssd sul^stasces of biologi-oal origin, Slie eoucspt of tba&ns smsi be bl&aKLy aM -unasfelgaously defined ir. a treaty and a dafxaitlCB slight be s&LectecI fit® the various critea^Ia given in the - ?;byMfig paper, iltli refe^encs to the US' vrarMng paper,, CGD/3325 eoae&rf'iiBg,' Ct? verification^ !de posott several, questions j, (a) with regard to tfee suggested BealiTig-o.ff of Mased production plants pGKdin£ a decision OB dlssisatllng bi* reconverting, vfe,t possible other uses right lie tho-dght of fo2? a jfostser'nsnr^' gas plant? (b) Witii regard to the reference to the uncertain trelue of available iaethods of laboratory anaj,jrrds In viBrrf I cat-ion of "a C¥ ban? "WES It correct to assune tliat the rethods feeiasal'ySs t?ere not put in' question but rather that tlio 2-etIiodEt of usiug them in tlie verification process ires-e not yet established? (c) On the latter polat? how long ^foulcl It take to work out such r-eliaMc rou.tines''' Arad fd/'iias tn@E>e aay roaaoa to belio^re that SOEIO of theso methods, e.§, y '•Use of laa^r-'Sota'c© Is^ared spectrcscopj' for lovig-cll stance six^ ^e- to -b^ of ^pe rsr^iewed the vie^s already esprosscd in the GGO OK 'tbs "tfefee 5^3 ing a reliable and accc"tal;],c nothod c^Af d-jriii '^1® 5.st s:b: , had studied" seaoie atmospheric sen'sinl; of field testing of CW_, which had proved to-; be;. Ineffective .without sose degree of intrusion and national c6-operation la' eschSSigiilg iBfonaation on air sanples. ! Mr.L,fHa^s worth (US) noted that any control measures or. C weapons to be devised should take into.aceoiiat the. existing effective restraints on use and. avoid leading to a less' stable- situation, Tins C'GD should approach triLth great circiMspectiba'faeasufees -described as international but whose effectiveness, depended ba national'data. Hational means of verification 'could play no rao??e thai a sub'Qidigjry par"u in providing the required assurance, since it coiild' not. be envisaged: tha'it a national edniro3. authority trouLd proyid'e an objective,cheek ;oa Aether aiiother branch1 of the aaaie government was producing T^eapon's. Ee\releoi;ied the continnihg effort of all delegations to discover neir ideas^ ho.th of a political' and iseientific nature. He introducet d .]!%• : . R. Holmes* ' *i. iJho '..,.'i^osaid addres. s himself to . a nroble"" ' s not hitherto discussed^ that of'verifying Whether troops engaged In legititnate training ia defence against C weaportfe jvaght be concealing 'preparation foz- offensive-use.,,v -'.-. .,':" •;•..-..'.' .'.':-; ' •. • lijxJlolxigg' (^K- 'expert) said softe S'tates jfligiit consider the Geneva Protocol deterrent against Gl'J to "be the ultimate "deterrent,, while others sight prefer as a deterrent the development of: the best possible defence. Both approaches required" the laaintenan'ee' of ehemcal defence eqiiipnent and training, in 'its'" use.'• ' States cotild not he expected to. rsrlincjuish their' defence etjoipaent t-dfent- the -most far-reaching verification of a G!T ban; and smaller States-ssight "be Just as vulnerable to less toidc agents as larger Ststtes Eight "be to riore tasic agents,"'-'such as nerve gas. Since.C •defence training .night involve the'iis,e of sisnilant gases, stispiei'ons coiild arise which cotild fee most effectively Eet by acceptance of inspection of the training ^and testing areas, US'defeace research had provided information on such verification'and'its difficulties. To identify the' l? agent use&j' • . •-sample s•''•.. of eart• h and plan• . t life' Eigh;. '• t•'"-• be take' n• froi.' , n the site for analysing. Tests with one of the nerve gases, Sojaan, showed fhat while it cotsld not be detected in plants 24. hoiars after exposure, a first eonpo-und > ..'-•'-• '._ -> . ' f •• of metabolisa fe.the plant was identifiable for a natter of ifreeiks. However, one diffielilty ^Tas the possibility thai a'sinilar coEpound co-old be produced in the plant as a re'sult of -pesticides,. Tests sight a3.so be carried out on tihe local fa'iaia,,', particii3,ariy blood tests, to show the effect of nerve agents in certain body, enayrass tiMc-h'.lasted' for nore. than eight weeks. "4 Bins,, tliara w&s® prospects "of "y edification procechi^op •^miah night provide •feiiS s-egmired i^Orsaasfeio^.cLf'/eai>i£ie^ cmV within a feu uoeksu This research M.glit S'eqtdr'e ^or^e renyrI@iQ£ of siaienerits In the SIITi! Deport or* CB'I to the effeetJtKat ;t%5 tacfsnical diffleult&ss of detecting use of GW agents vrere not /peat if the 'right experts vrc^o- quiek".j? sent to tlio seen© an5 tfc?jt &&£& e:c?f?2?ts l-saye 'likely to be found ready in tlic <2sfea;ce forces of the advanced ''coiritries. 1 2acli tee!E'i5.cal wdrk ror*ai.iGcl to be d0n^j ntft only 'wi-tb aenr-ef'' agen.ts -bfit' ';i,tli other i;;.lacjsoc of agoirfes- •" .although eid-Bting teeb:,dqm0.o did- slidt? ^o^ase as. a basis for agreed . *&<$ g^o^lng •iKE;2>er of pollution studies sight wall s- In that there i?an a ;;reat d5.f.foresee bst sSsivtirsg that it ttas no* feasible to establish international controls c- emilre chord r;£l i3%0tH,&£? and eente-ndf^g' tliat any lilnd of ccnt-rsl v&atsio-eYei* *K?;S <^tit of question. His delegation agreed ^'iltli the view ef t'ie £eyrr'eserd:«iiiire of Oasads. that ihs. central IGS^IO .was to "delineate torlfieatfon proc^dus'es'fo? an agreement on agents -v? oh ?%*. Bos hoped that the fteforaal n&3"binr T/oii\d -'crit/rlbii-ts to the -aaidsx-^i: of the soor?e of the m^oMM'Bloa jaid of the verification aspcets, iteli esj)63rt} desalt udth tli© prob-lan cf distir^uishing bate rjMdll- bad an Gsclti&iva applicatio:i as CU aj'^i cozipomicl feBat were "being used' lbjv l^acefixl purposes but- right also be v-ssd as'CU. JB hM cirexilsted a tsntetivcr li:st of eoi5r:r'-aiiuG taat co-old bo uaoa T>j.r>oh5.bated j ifTliicb.' iiadj howsv^s^j a nsss&^r cf drru/^r^ccSo ".riie Jiapansce .g pe.par (CGD/301) irrcroduc^, a togd-city level of 0.5 rilligi'si.^ per gi*aK of bodji' t©irjht as ""fche cr-itea^itjri .for isicond:ltlc.na.l prohibition of C dojnpo^jads, In tte SBtedi^t ^oi&ng pj^es1 (CCI3/322} of 16 HSPC& 1971 do:3-3 oi* 1-jag/kg iscscjy tfoiglS't'.wa-g -suggeGted. Urtfortmiatelyj 1 f^ospowKls as cief5Jied in -She S^redish tRniting paper ? and chesalca! agent•w*- s did to a• great,,' _ t £sfe& "^' ^^ --i s3 -^iilo ^ot bein^t/ identical^ • Fo:r eKampl'^j tte drug aeostigciimj fed a tosiGitgr of 0.4. -^/''kg and shoxzld 'thus £&1T in the Glass o? -supertOKiiiS9 but it was coi^ainly not : potential .C -raarfar:e3; agorit» Q& tlie otljsp haaid, niataM gas k& no cl1ri3;lfen apoLicStlon ^iia'tsoew'er aii^' Sad' a to:d.city of 3 r;g/kg asxl ims t.liixa the class of 'superiosdn agents* Tc circumvent those diffi cutties,, the Ke;tlierlar-cis in Its wosking jpapsr COD/320 of FarcA 1971 sagr-eateS? (!') to Xinit the prohibition for the tine being t~ nerve agents an tho raxin (2) to adopt' tlie Japortes© criterion for toad, city of '\5 rg which tras negotiable;' and (3) tc sei:ple that sriteri-ur to a ^enorol fo ng a rsrrbrjK. number of :i3rv!G a^ojits and a rdnirr-r. nrjurer :". considered the r/sethocl if ckronatographjj coupled *;ith t^er-r.ic-^io dot©ctors# ig '^o:;er CIOD/2T. to T;e srti- and feasible. It had dtarted a progrorore for 'idientif^l'ng" product- s- in . mste 'i-atoi* by using tlie gascltrosatograpMc and ricro-spooti'ophotoroti-ic te.chai5jD.03 'mentioned la the US tjorfdng; paper CCr)/33^a "Tr. Oct^s suggeoted as & mssibl;© r.ethod also tite study of s^ocia-1 r.etabolir patter-r. changes in E.icro-orgaii:lsfi.B and vegetatioa "in the vrlcinity of suspect cd factories. It tms not possible to say whether the Terf.fi cation p«?dblem coulcl fee solved or not. Progress cexild onTly "be ruids with the help of sll .-xran tries. v US), ir* ?ep"y to ?^: . Caracciclo'e statc3s;-j©:-it that the difficultis;3' of Verifying diversion of corsercial phosphates to pS.^.i'L'.ary piirno&'es rrigrht not be as great in coxtntries uiib. Ions product:. on than the ITS,, noted ttetj' in the US s'budjTj a very aigh fimr^; hc«l 3clil>orately "boon cbo-sen as an esaEple., and tloat- $. smaller ajsoiint "light be s^.Q-ificeiit for ssaller obiia. tries* Iii regard to the sase delegate's ataterrtcnt tfe,t a violation tfc-ald be nore visible if one paraisetex* r-f the li^ntliotlcal solution > varied j he asked xfiiether, as a 'cfmseqiionce of g^ich TE ,ria.ti.oBJ, other ^oit/'d not also var^,, thus risking the v^.. '."•"' a. ti en again loss visible. '«.. . <•*• Ite.^Gttttsr (ITS export},, in reply to the fonr questions posed by Kr, LimcliK (Si^reslea) said tfeai (a) Kith regaixl to the possible V.DC of plEsts for other• purposes _j SOKG equipnant coriel bo used.fcr the tdtion o'f: tiie Sfeao chesnieals for peacefu" p-irpescs: (b; ho thought faasMsn, trlth regard to tlio ITS paper DP partiattlar techrdeal s, bad boon answered lyj :-!r. Gons (n^blierlanis).: (c) on the tij^e Becesisasy'to wo'rS'out a verification synton, he ecu" d r:sl:c nc predictlcii., ";as it coird not s^ren be predletcd 'Khethor an acceptcMe syctcr^ coix^.d be > as noted; oy '*lr. Oonia; It doperxied on hcv ruoli research v-as the Initial tast vas to' consider, ao a joint effort3 all possible a processes in areas v/Mah night be fn -i.ti\i"0 stzch as the iiov •'•'.'" :0rs®B assationed 13*-Hr." Oosa aad Mr. lariat (d) !lr, Ifolses (Ull) had on tao stib-jset ofk in^'ared 'ueeliniqueB of sc:iSiag; -with tlie tre^ondous 3-»i.de istorest in the pollution psxiblen., it rd^ht be that iissfu"! ?S" *foiild "be ToTHsd by those vrrkinrj in tliat fioldj ir-clitdir:£ private CVK/je cc: vf$r, Lemieux 1971 Bill* . • . . ••; - '• The Seeretary-Gane^al Me asked me to acknowledge yaw personal and corifldential letter to Irks dated 9 July. Both he and I hav* t%en not& $f its contents. So far as the Introduction to ttoe Annual fiepprt is concerned, you Will "be requested as usTaal to prepare the first draft, fhs Seer4taiy«6eneral has asked me, however, to r^ipest you to send me personally your views on the important points to be stressed in the '.'• "'"!•' Introduction this year. As you are aware, the Secretary*Qeneral would wish to take advantage of this occasion to review the progress or lack of .|ccc>gjpeiae in the last ten years. tou will be glad to knotf that the brief holiday in Bermuda has done U SJfaani a lot of good and he is doing much better. With kind regards, Yours sincerely, C.V. NarasItalian Chef de tei Williara Epstein Alternate BepeesentalJivf of the ^oretary-Ceneral to the Conference of the Ooffimittee on Disariiiament • United Uations QSfi^jt; at .Geneva Palais^ ' '" ' DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA w \^ ~~ cP relegrammes: UNATIONS, GENEVE Palais des Nations Telex : 22.212 ou 22.344 CH - 1211 GENEVE 10 HIephone: 346011 334000 332000 331000 9 July 1971 REF. No : (S rappeler dans la reponsa) Personal and Confidential Dear U Thant, I was delighted to learn that you had fully recovered from your temporary malaise. Your short holiday and rest in Bermuda I am su£re did you a world of good and I hope that you will continue to benefit from it and stay well. The CCD started out with rather more activity than usual because of an informal meeting with experts on CTB on 30 June and another on CBW on 7 July. Experts attended from all six Western countries and from Sweden. The experts went into highly technical details, but had very good exchanges both at the informal meetings and privately so that the meetings can be regarded as the most successful of this sort ever held. CTB It became clear from the evidence of the experts that it was now possible to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions down to very low yields and that the main obstacles now were of a political rather than technical nature. Alva Myrdal is engaged in making some revisions to the Swedish draft treaty for a CTB and hopes to table it perhaps during the present session of the CCD. George Ignatieff and Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, who also are eager to promote a CTB, will probably proceed in what they regard as the parallel task of proposing transitional measures pending agreement on a full CTB. They are working quite closely together and it is possible they may table some working paper or draft proposals at this session for a number of transitional measures. CBW Although the outlook for progress on a BW Convention is quite promising, the work goes rather slowly. The Soviet Union and its allies are working on a revision of their draft convention taking into account the American views which have been communicated to the Soviet Union privately and also the views of the non-aligned. After a revision of the 9-Power draft is presented, hopefully within the near future, it will still be necessary to go through the process of producing a joint or common draft convention. His Excellency U Thant Se eretary-General United Nations Hew York, N.Y. Office des Nations Unies fi Geneve - United Nations Office at Geneva Page ^ The non-aligned delegations are still very much unenthusiastic about a BW Convention, but it looks as though their position will be to go along with such a convention as a first stage, but to insist on a number of amendments that will strengthen the draft, in particular, the commitment to achieve agreement on a CW Convention with the possible fixing of a time limit for the latter. It is not yet clear whether the non-aligned will try to produce the text of a draft CW Convention themselves. Alva Myrdal told me that she was very much interested in doing so, but that it seemed practically impossible to get agreement amongst the twelve on any such draft and hence she was not sure whether a few non- aligned countries would try to present such a draft convention or whether they would try to get all twelve to agree to some less precisely worded working paper. SALT There seems to be considerable hopefulness amongst the CCD delegates that some agreement will emerge this year, probably some form of quantitative limitation on ABMs. There is the continuing desire, which has thus far been expressed only by Japan, for some qualitative limits as well and progress also towards the reduction of nuclear missiles. Five Nuclear Power Conference Ambassador Leonard at the opening meeting of the CCD on 29 June made some mildly favourable but equivocal comments regarding the Soviet proposal for a Conference of the five nuclear Powers. I gather from him that the idea is to keep the door open to acceptance by the United States in case the PRC should accept. However, the US is not in favour of such a five Power conference and in any case feels quite certain that the PRC will not accept the proposal. I gather the impression from some members of the Soviet delegation here that they, too, have doubts as to whether the PRC will accept the proposal. The general feeling here is that the PRC will either reject the proposal or make some non- committal reply or perhaps wait until after it takes its seat ! in the United Nations, ti A number of the CCD members,including a number of the non- aligned as well as some of the Western powers, fear that if there is a five power conference, it will tend to reduce both the importance and the scope of the work of the CCD even more than the SALT has done. ' Force reductions in Europe : Ambassador Roth, the head of the Disarmament Commission of the - ' FRO, is in Geneva at the present time. He told me that his staff ' , are spending almost full time working on the NATO proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). He expected that NATO would appoint a representative or negotiator in October to ! explore the Soviet proposals and to attempt to reach some general understanding on the nature, date, time, place, agenda and procedure of a conference. If everything goes smoothly and quickly ' in the initial exchanges, then the NATO Council could probably take ' a decision at its meeting in December so that a conference on • ; •reduction of arms and forces in Europe could take place early • " ' it next year. • •<••;••, ' • *'- Office des Nations Unles a Geneve United Nations Office at Geneva Page 3 Experts Report on Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race I saw Lord Zuckerman in London and conveyed your greetings to him. He seems to feel much better about the Report now that he has been given more or less a free hand in the preparation of a draft. Introduction to the Annual Report While I am sorry that it will not be possible to have any further personal discussion with you regarding the contents of the Introduction, I shall proceed along the lines we discussed when I saw you in New York. While the draft will go forward at whatever date is mentioned in the usual request for preparation of the draft, I am hopeful, as mentioned by you, that it might be possible to make some final revisions in the text after discussing the matter when you come to Geneva around 5 September. Once again may I express my great pleasure at your full recovery and send you my best wishes and warmest personal regards. Yours sincerely, Epstein CVH/je cc: /Mrs Mira ao July 1971 Personal and Confidential Bear &U, ..' ' ' This is a gvdck aoloiowled^aent of jraaa? latter Sated 15 July with which you sent Horns? Jack's article on SAO?. I shall skew it to the Seeretaiy-Gsneral as ffequested. 2 too hope to see you ia Geneva in tbs cota?ee of the one* fw dcora. With MM regssr&s, Yc«u?a siacer^ly, C.V. Chef % Cabinet Rep-eseatativffi of the teae«Bl to tlw of the CoaEHittsse on 0«itsd Wstioue Office at Geneva dee Rations O.FFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA Folegrammes : UNAIIONS. GENEVE Palais des Nalions Telex : 22.212 on 22.34* CH - 1211 GENEVE 10 I I ( Trlephone : 346011 334000 332000 3J1000 REF No : 15 July 1971 ( a rappeler dans la reponse) Personal and Confidential Dear C.V., I had hoped to have a word with you when you were here earlier this month, but you got away before I managed to do so. Homer Jack, who used to be Executive Director of SANE, and is now Secretary-General of the World Conference of Religion for Peace, has just returned from spending a few days at the resumed session of SALT in Helsinki. He has written a little article on the SALT discussions which he hopes to have published in several American publications including perhaps the Saturday Review. He has asked me to bring it to the attention of the Secretary- General. Since some of his views, including his comments on the secrecy and shortcomings of SALT are quite interesting, I thought the Secretary-General and you might like to have a look at the article. It is entitled "Five Grains of Salt" and a copy is enclosed herewith. Since I understand you are due back in Geneva around the 22nd of July, perhaps I can arrange to see you for a few minutes then. With best wishes and warm regards. Yours, pstein Mr. C. V. Narasimhan Chef de Cabinet United Nations New York, N.Y. *•'''»•' '.• VV-.--M ggi4£S PTV3350 KS BRCY 8Y.ISBV !29 AY IfS SS 2060 I8D1A SdVT Itr SEVEBTEESTB ^ES&tMftS 0KA1BW O'F SEVERAL E£ SE8EMA SOiFEf?E§CE StOP f)¥ '?1EFE!?£1CE WtttD BE TO CHAIS SESSION 6S ON THE * IMPACT OF KUCLEAR t£CH80tO(5Y IK DEVELOP 186 CCUKtR'IEJ ft, SUBJECT VERY CLOSE TO KY KEAHT STOP- 700 HAVE HEFEHREB TO K¥ ' II 3*9 f# ti'#H ^, ' --^> nJJfiAf*>S*hi 'H'IrilfiVK:f F** - •sftV%-^r T£. CffEftTE A- PRO&L£K £V FEASIBLE TO REQUEST IE OF" tfii:"'OTHER ^/!SE P8ES1CESTS 1C CKA1E 1 Af? MY f^FEB AS. DAS SO^iE At THE THIRD CGtfFEREBCE c&t s*& SESEM ^s*s STOP THIS 'SKe-ii^ BDT CFEATE A PR08L£f3 E^ES If i' «£??£ TC CKA1R FEASIBLi TO 08E OF ' THE' OTHEI? VISE i A-K pR£SE«rrse IPES AS WAS DOME BH BMAfBjl -PRESIS t-*§ • § HE. STOP WffltE EXP»£SSr»5 Sff A86VE PREFEBKflJCE I SHALL MATURAULY TEE WAfTEH'T© TfOU F©S riH^l D£G1S!0^ STOP R ig4g Distr. GENERAL S/10275* 23 July 1971 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: SPANISH LETTER DATED 22 JULY 1571 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICj TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL With reference to the letters reproduced in documents A/8336 and S/10250 of 6 July 1971, I have the honour to send you herewith a memorandum summarizing some basic facts concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and Additional Protocol II thereof. I should be grateful if you would arrange to circulate the text of this memorandum as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council. (Signed) Alfonso GARCIA ROBLES Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations * Also issued" under the symbol A/83^6. *$* -2- Some basic facts concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and Additional Protocol II thereof 1. At the request of the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, the text of the reply, dated h January 1971, from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Senate of the United Mexican States, "regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", has been reproduced inter alia in document A/8336 (also issued under the symbol S/10250) of 6 July 1971. The document in question was distributed in connexion with an item for the twenty-sixth session entitled "Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Hue1ear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". 2. Analysis of this document leads to the conclusion that in order to form a correct view of the question as a whole account must be taken of some basic facts concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Additional Protocol II thereof. The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize the most important of those basic facts. 1. Position of the Mexican Senate 3. The reasons which led the Mexican Senate to address an appeal to the legislative bodies of all States for whose signature and ratification the Treaty of Tlatelolco or one of the additional protocols thereof are open are set out in the last paragraph of the appeal in the following words: "From the foregoing it may be seen that the lofty purposes inspiring the Treaty of Tlatelolco have the fervent and total support of the countries of the world and that its provisions have'become the expression not of mere aspirations but of a will which is asserting itself at an accelerating pace and with which,we are convinced., no qountry on earth can fail to associate itself. The ratification and implementation of this instrument by all the countries of Latin America, and of its additional protocols by all nuclear-*- weapon States or States having territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible - whether or not they are Members of the United Nations - constitute at this time in the world's history, we firmly, believe, a moral imperative which mankind insists must be fulfilled in the -3- interests of a creative peace which will be conducive to further achievements on the path of progress and happiness for all peoples." 2. Extent of obligations assumed under the Treaty of Tlatelolco lj. The extent of the obligations assumed under the Treaty of Tlatelolco with a view to implementing the regime of total absence of nuclear weapons established in the Treaty is exactly the same for Mexico as for all other States Parties to the instrument. 5. Article 1 of the Treaty, in which these obligations are specified, reads as follows: "1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: "(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and "(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. "2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon." 3. Extent of obligations assumed under Additional Protocol II 6. Wuclear-weapon States which, by signing and ratifying Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco become Parties to it, assume the following obligations: (a) To respect, "in all its express aims and provisions" the "statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in" the Treaty of Tlatelolco; (b) "Hot to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies"; and (c) "Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty". -2- .MEMOEATTOUM Some basic facts concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and Additional Protocol II thereof 1. At the request of the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, the text of the reply, dated h January 1971, from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Senate of the United Mexican States , "regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.", has been reproduced inter alia in document A/8336 (also issued under the symbol S/10250) of 6 July 1971. The document in question was distributed in connexion with an item for the twenty-sixth session entitled "Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". 2. Analysis of this document leads to the conclusion that in order to form a correct view of the question as a whole account must be taken of some basic facts concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Additional Protocol II thereof. The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize the most important of those basic facts. 1. Position of the Mexican Senate 3° The reasons which led the Mexican Senate to address an appeal to the legislative bodies of all States for whose signature and ratification the Treaty of Tlatelolco or one of the additional protocols thereof are open are set out in the last paragraph of the appeal in the following words: "From the foregoing it may be seen that the lofty purposes inspiring the Treaty of Tlatelolco have the fervent and total support of the countries of the world and that its provisions have become the expression not of mere aspirations but of a will which is asserting itself at an accelerating pace and with which,we are convinced, no country on earth can fail to associate itself. The ratification and implementation of this instrument by all the countries of Latin America, and of its additional protocols by all nuclear- weapon States or States having territories for which, de Jure or de facto.,' they are internationally responsible - whether or not they are Members of the United Nations - constitute at this time in the world's history, we firmly believe, a moral imperative which mankind insists must be fulfilled in the -3- interests of a creative peace which will be conducive to further achievements on the path of progress and happiness for all peoples." 2. Extent of obligations assumed under the Treaty of Tlatelolco k. The extent of the obligations assumed under the Treaty of Tlatelolco with a view to implementing the regime of total absence of nuclear weapons established in the Treaty is exactly the same for Mexico as for all other States Parties to the instrument. 5. Article 1 of the Treaty, in which these obligations are specified, reads as follows: "1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: "(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and "(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. "2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon." -;• 3. Extent of obligations assumed under Additional Protocol II 6. Nuclear-weapon States which, by signing and ratifying Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco become Parties to it3 assume the following obligations: (a) To respect, "in all its express aims and provisions" the "statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in" the Treaty of Tlatelolco; (b) "Hot to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies"; and (c) "Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty". -k- T. After expressly mentioning these obligations, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2666 (XXV), adopted on 7 December 1970 by 10 H votes to none, affirmed its conviction that they "are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations , which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter". k. Some responsible opinions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco 8. (a) In its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, the United Nations General Assembly stated that it: "Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples." (b) In its resolution B of 27 September 1968, the Conference of Non-Nuclear- Weapon States observed that: "the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has already established a nuclear-weapon- free zone comprising territories densely populated by man". (c) In his address delivered at the opening meeting of the first session of the General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), the Secretary-General of the United Nations said, inter alia, the following: "In a world that all too often seems dark and foreboding, the Treaty of Tlatelolco will shine as a beacon light. It is a practical demonstration to all mankind of what can be achieved if sufficient dedication and the requisite political will exist. "The Treaty of Tlatelolco is unique in several respects.... The Treaty of Tlatelolco is unique in that it applies to an important inhabited area of the earth. It is also unique in that the Agency which is being established at this session will have the . -' ' advantage of a permanent and effective system of control with a number of novel features. In addition to applying the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the regime under the Treaty also makes provision for special reports and inquiries . '/' • -5- and, in cases of suspicion, for special inspections. There is embodied in your Treaty a number of aspects of the system known as 'verification-by- challenge', which is one of the more hopeful new concepts introduced into the complicated question of verification and control. "The Treaty of Tlatelolco preceded the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by more than a year and exceeds it in the scope of its prohibitions and its control features. Both Treaties have a similar goal, but the former Treaty goes beyond the latter in also prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the area of the nuclear-free zone.... "Under the safeguards and guarantees provided by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and by the operations of the Agency, nuclear energy will be used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the countries within the zone and its benefits will be devoted solely towards the economic development and social progress of your people. Thus, the States members of OPANAL will take the lead in demonstrating to the world that nuclear energy will be, as it should be, a great boon to mankind and not the instrument of its doom. \ "The States of Latin America, which also include the States of the Caribbean Sea, have laboured hard and built well in erecting the edifice of the Agency for the Prohibition .of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Perhaps history will record that they, too, 'builded better than they knew1. And now OPANAL has come to life. I am confident that it has the good wishes of the Members of the United Nations. As the Agency proceeds with its work for security, for peace and for progress, I feel sure it will continue to have the encouragement and support of the United Nations. Under the Agency's charter - the Treaty of Tlatelolco - you have provided for close links with the United Nations. It is my hope that in the years to come these links will be forged ever stronger for the mutual benefit of both organizations in their common cause." (d) On the same occasion, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency said the following: "I am honoured to be invited to be present on this important occasion, when for the first time an international body has been created specifically to ensure compliance with a Treaty under which parties to the Treaty solemnly pledge to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to keep an entire sub-continent free from nuclear weapons. "It is also the first meeting of a regional grouping that has accepted the application of safeguards by another organization on their nuclear • activities. v , "Although the concept of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone is not new, the creation of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is the first tangible realization of such an ideal. With it the aspirations of the people of Latin America for security and the prospect of wider and more productive applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has come nearer to fulfilment.... -6- "The Treaty of Tlatelolco might be regarded, as the first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament which provides for the application of an institutionalized and international control system and as such represents a decisive step forward in the recognition and acceptance of international s afeguards." 5. Attitude of the United Nations and the Conference of .Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to signature and ratification of Additional- Protocol II 9° The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted three consecutive resolutions, and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States one, urging the nuclear Powers to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 10. The relevant provisions of these resolutions, which were adopted without a single opposing vote, are: (a) Operative paragraph k of resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 19673 in which the General Assembly: "Invites Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible"; (b) Paragraphs 1 and 2 of section II of resolution B of 27 September 1968, in which the Conference of BFon-Nuclear-Weapon States: "1. Eegrets the fact that not all the nuclear-weapon States have yet signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; "2. Urges the nuclear-weapon Powers to comply fully with paragraph h of resolution 2286 (XXIl), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 5 December 1967"; (c) The operative paragraph of resolution 21*56 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, in which the General Assembly: "Reiterates the recommendation contained in resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon- free zones, and especially the, urgent appeal for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers with paragraph h of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, in which the Assembly invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America"; . ' (d) Operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which the General Assembly: -7- "1. Reaffirms the appeals it has addressed to the nuclear-weapon States, in its resolutions 2286 (XXII) and 2^56 B (XXIIl), to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) as soon as possible and urges them to avoid further delay in the fulfilment of such appeals; "2. Notes with satisfaction that one of those States has already signed and ratified the Protocol and that another has signed it and is now actively engaged in the ratification process; "3. Deplores that not all nuclear-weapon States have as yet signed the Protocol". 6. Need for Additional Protocol II 11. With reference to the question whether the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon Powers in respect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco should take the form of formal acceptance of the commitments specified in Additional Protocol II or merely of unilateral declarations, the General Assembly's appeals mentioned in the previous section of this memorandum show clearly that the Assembly is categorically in favour of the first alternative. 12,, To this should be added the fact that, as the General Assembly noted in its resolution 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, after expressing the conviction in its resolution B that "for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary", emphasized, in 1968, that "such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol". 13. It is also pertinent in connexion with this point to quote the very recent statement, of 6 May 1971, made at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the representative of the Soviet Union who, referring to the draft treaties which the Committee is considering in connexion with the item on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, said at the Committee's 51^th meeting: "On numerous occasions the Soviet delegation lias stated that unilateral declarations cannot achieve the same purpose as international agreements. In this respect we fully support the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Hyrdal, to the effect that — 9... unilateral decisions can be no substitute for internationally-binding agreements. ... And it is, of course, preferable to arrive at a state of affairs in which we shall have an international treaty so that all renunciations will have the same and, we hold, maximum coverage1," T. Importance of the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II lU. The importance which the United Nations attaches to compliance with the repeated appeals by the General Assembly that the nuclear Powers should sign and ratify Additional Protocol II "as soon as possible" is demonstrated both by the fact that in its latest resolution - resolution 2666 (XXV) - the Assembly, in words used in exceptional cases only, urged them "to avoid further delay in the fulfilment of such appeals" and, in particular, by the fact that the resolution itself contains two decisions, those in operative paragraphs k and 5, the texts of which read as follows: "t. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-sixth session an item entitled 'Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)' ; "5. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange for transmittal of the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session of any measure adopted by them in order to implement it." • • Hew York, 22 July 1971. ':': ' OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENEVE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA MEMORANDUM CONFIDENTIAL A - TO : His Excellency U Thant Secretary-General DE - FROM : Ilkka Pastinen Special Representative of the Secretary-General GENEVE, 10 AugUSt 1971 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament OBJET - SUBJECT : Situation Report No. I forward herewith for your information "Situation Report No. 44" covering the Conference from 29 June to 5 August 1971. The Situation Report includes an Assessment and Annex I containing the "Positions of CCD Members with Regard to Various Disarmament Measures." SEC/CONFIDENTIAL Geneva 10 August 1971 CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT Situation Report No. 44 (29 June to 5 August) ASSESSMENT General 1 Chemical and biological weapons 1 Comprehensive test ban 2 Conclusion 3 ANNEX I Position of CCD Members with regard to Various Disarmament Measures CCD (a) General 1 (b) Priorities 1 (c) Procedures 2 CBW (a) General 2 (b) Prohibition of biological weapons 3 (i) General 3 (ii) 9-Power draft convention 3 (iii) UK draft convention 7 (iv) Identical draft conventions 7 (c) Prohibition of chemical weapons 10 (d) Verification 10 Underground Test Ban (a) General 12 (b) Transitional measures 13 (c) Threshold Treaty 13 (d) Swedish draft treaty on CTB 14. (e) Verification 15 International Exchange of Seismic Data 15 Halting the Nuclear Arms Race 16 (a) Bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 16 (b) Conference of five nuclear-weapon Powers 17 The Non-Proliferation Treaty 17 Prevention of an Arms Race on the Sea-Bed 18 Prohibition of use of nuclear weapons 18 Cut-off of production of fissile materials for weapons purposes 18 Nuclear-free zones 18 General and complete disarmament 19 Report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures (General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV)} 19 Conventional disarmament and the arms trade 19 European security 19 Reduction of military forces in Europe 19 Prohibition of the use of force 20 France and the PRC 20 World Disarmament Conference 20 Other items 20 Miscellaneous 21 CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT Situation Report No. 44- (29 June to 5 August) Assessment General The resumed (summer) session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continued to be devoted almost exclusively to the two subjects of CBW and a CTB. The session began with two informal meetings with experts present, one on CTB on 30 June and the other on CBW on 7 July. It was generally felt that the experts, from all six Western members and from Sweden, had made a useful contribution to understanding the problems and limits of veri- fication of an underground test ban and of a complete CW ban. On CBW, delegations continued to make general statements and detailed comments on the Socialist draft BW convention and, to a lesser degree, on the UK draft. In the expectation of a new or revised text, the discussions proceeded at a rather slow pace. However, by 5 August all delegations had spoken on the subject, either at the winter-spring session or at the resumed session, except Burma, Canada and Ethiopia. A number of members still expressed disatisfaction with a convention limited to BW and toxins, and all, including the Co-Chairmen, stressed the importance of maintaining a close link between such a convention and a CW ban. With the submission on 5 August of separate but identical texts of a new draft BW convention by the Socialist countries and by the United States, the discussion is expected to receive a new impetus. Efforts will of course continue, particularly by the non-aligned delegations, to obtain further changes in the new text. During this period, increased attention was devoted to the subject of a CTB, led by Canada and Sweden. Although little progress was evident in the way of concrete results, the discussions not only served to re-emphasize the desire for serious efforts to obtain a CTB, but also developed some new approaches to the problem. CBW During the period covered by this report, the attention of the CCD was focused mainly on the question of the prohibition of CBW. Because of the private USSR-US negotiations on the text of a new draft convention on BW and toxins, - 2 - - there was relatively little formal discussion by these delegations and their allies. On the other hand, some of the delegations of the non-aligned States, in commenting on the 9-Power draft convention of 30 March, stressed their continuing preference for the simultaneous prohibition of biological and chemical weapons. They repeatedly urged that, if a separate convention on biological weapons was to be worked out, the link between a ban on biological and chemical weapons had to be safeguarded and strengthened. They called for more than a simple undertaking to conduct negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and proposed a commitment to the principle of a C¥ ban and an actual treaty obligation to achieve an agreement on this subject, possibly within a specified time-limit. Some also urged a moratorium or renunciation of chemical weapons pending the conclusion of a CW convention, and also the submission of a document which would contain the main elements of a future CW convention and thus become a basis for negotiations on their prohibition. Identical drafts of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, submitted on 5 August, took into consideration practically all of the proposals of the United States which were contained in a private memorandum circulated to the members of the CCD after the submission of the Socialist draft BW convention on 30 March. This memorandum had accepted the Socialist draft as the basis for negotiations and agreed to its main elements. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, in introducing the new texts, expressed the hope that they would serve as a basis for the elaboration of a final agreed text for submission to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. Few of the suggestions made by some of the Western and non-aligned countries were incorporated in the new text. The remainder of the session will probably be devoted to a discussion of these in an attempt to work out a generally acceptable text. The group of twelve non-aligned States are in fact endeavouring to work out a joint position on the identical drafts, and to propose amendments to it, designed primarily to strengthen the link between a BW and a CW ban; they hope to submit these at an early date. CTB The discussion at the informal meeting on CTB verification showed that capabilities for the identification of nuclear explosions have been signi- ficantly increased in the last few years so that all but the lowest tests - 3— of a few kilotons can potentially be detected and identified by seismic means alone. A number of delegations, led by Canada and Sweden, and supported by Japan, urged that present capabilities permitted a "political" decision in favour of a CTB based on "relative risk", i. e., the greater risk to the testing Powers and to the world of an unrestricted continuation of testing, as compared to the lesser risk of failure to identify a few low-yield explosions. There was, however, no evidence during the period of any change in the long-standing opposing positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on the subject. Continued initiatives by Canada and Sweden, looking towards at least some interim action in the form of immediate transitional measures pending a full test ban, were intended to maintain and enhance the pressure for change. Both members, supported by others, stressed the need for some signi- ficant progress, particularly in the light of the General Assembly's request for a special report on the subject. Canada stressed the urgent need for interim measures to improve identification techniques and to reduce underground testing, beginning with high-yield tests, perhaps in the form of simple announcements of reciprocal undertakings by the testing Powers. Sweden, while also supporting the idea of transitional measures, urged early and serious attention to a CTB treaty based on Sweden's draft text, which would be amended to include a phasing-out period and a procedure for peaceful explosions. The details of these and improvements in international seismic data exchange would be included in three separate protocols to be worked out later. Conclusion In view of the apparent flexibility of the Soviet Union and the United States on the text of a draft BW Convention, and their evident desire to obtain a broadly acceptable text to submit to the General Assembly, there is considerable optimism in the CCD that such progress can be made. Areas of doubt remain, however, concerning the amendments desired by the non-aligned delegations, which will necessitate further negotiations. The allies of the United States are apparently awaiting the outcome of the expected non-aligned amendments before deciding on co-sponsoring a final joint text. It is expected that during the remainder of this session there will be considerable further discussion on both a CTB and on interim transitional measures to reduce or phase out underground nuclear tests. These discussions may be directed towards preparing the substantive contents of the special report on CTB called for by the General Assembly in order to lay the groundwork for action by the Assembly. ANNEX I Position of COD Members with regard to Various Disarmament Measures (29 June to 5 August) GCD (a) General The USSR said that the measures proposed by Mr. Brezhnev at the 2£th Congress of the Communist Party fell within the CCD's competence, particularly treaties banning nuclear weapons and CBW weapons, CTB, the creation of demilitarized zones, the dismantling of foreign bases and the reduction of military expenditures, primarily by the major States. It added that, in proposing a Conference of the five nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union had envisaged talks on nuclear disarmament continuing in other bodies, particularly in the CCD. It also said that the CCD could play an important part in seeing that already agreed measures become fully operative and effective, adding that participation of all CCD members in concluded agreements would assist CCD aims. The US. noting the 10th anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, said that agreements worked out in the CCD would also contribute to co-operation and confidence among States. (b) Priorities The USSR said priority should be given to a complete ban on CBW, a CTB, the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed, and broad measures of nuclear and general disarmament, with top priority to nuclear disarmament. Romania also urged top priority for nuclear disarmament, within the framework of "GCD, and mentioned a ban on the use of nuclear weapons; a cut-off of nuclear weapons, including a cut-off of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and their transfer to peaceful purposes; nuclear-free zones and a CTB. The US said that, in addition to work on CBW and on CTB, the CCD could do useful work during the session on a cut-off of production of fissile materials, on nuclear-free zones and on possible restraints on conventional weapons. Japan said the CCD should intensify its efforts to solve nuclear disarmament problems, giving highest priority to an underground test ban, for which conditions were ripe. - 2 - (c) Procedures Romania recommended greater flexibility in COD procedures, with no limitation to a single theme but simultaneous discussion of other important matters. It added that all States desiring to do so should be permitted to present their views before the COD. Chemical and biological weapons (a) General The discussion focused mostly on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons based on the 9-Power draft convention of 30 March (CCD/325/Rev.l)# on this subject. Considerable attention, however, was paid also to the question of banning chemical weapons and on the necessity to preserve the link between the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons. As regards the link between the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, the USSR and Czechoslovakia reviewed the evolution of previous negotiations on CBW and repeated the reasons for the submission of a draft convention prohibiting bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins only. The USSR recalled the 9-Power draft convention on CBW and restated the position of principle of the Socialist States favouring the complete prohibition of both C and B weapons; they considered the banning of B weapons as creating the best conditions for the complete prohibition of C weapons. The draft convention on B weapons envisaged certain obligations in this regard. Romania noted that partial agreement on B weapons should be integrated in the framework of efforts leading to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, particularly of nuclear arms, A specific provision to this effect should be included in a convention. The US recognized the .desire for a ban on C weapons and supported an unambiguous commitment to further negotiations to this end to be included in a B weapons convention. Japan was prepared to support a convention on the prohibition of B weapons as a first step, but maintained that efforts towards a ban on C weapons should continue in parallel. The Netherlands also stressed that negotiations on the banning of C weapons must be vigorously continued. A number of non-aligned States paid particular attention to this aspect. India maintained that in the new stage of the negotiations, the integral link between C and B weapons must be preserved and that negotiations on the prohibition of C weapons must actively continue. It was essential that the CCD, at its present session, reach an agreement on at least the principal elements of a draft convention on C weapons. Nigeria observed that it had - 3 - always favoured simultaneous negotiations on the prohibition of C and B weapons, as endorsed by the General Assembly, and deplored a separate ban on biological weapons with the resulting postponement of a CW ban. It believed that previously concluded partial measures had failed to live up to expectations. Pakistan welcomed the 9-Power draft convention as a positive step forward, but noted it would prefer a joint treaty on C and B weapons. A separate BW convention would not be satisfactory, as it would create an impression that a convention on C¥ was not within reach in the foreseeable future and would also tend to weaken the Geneva Protocol. However, if the CCD should decide that the only possibility of progress now was a separate convention, Pakistan offered its participation in the preparation of the text. Yugoslavia repeated its preference for a joint solution and stressed the necessity of preserving a link between the prohibition of C and B weapons, whether dealt with in a single instrument or separately. It considered preservation of the continuity of the negotiations on C weapons as a primary task. As the CCD now concentrated on the draft convention on B weapons, negotiations on the prohibition of C weapons were not proportionate to the urgency of this question. No instrument on the ban of C weapons had been accepted as a basis for negotiations. The problem of C weapons was discussed mostly from the technical aspect of control, while the political determination to negotiate a ban on such weapons was lacking. The CCD should at least formulate a paper containing the principal elements of a C¥ convention. (b) Prohibition of biological weapons (i) General Czechoslovakia urged the CCD to complete its work on an acceptable draft to be submitted to the General Assembly this year. Romania said that if an effective instrument with a broad support was to be achieved all legitimate views and interests had to be taken into account. The USSR hoped that the debates would enable the CCD to move ahead towards reaching agreement on the draft convention on B weapons. The US looked forward to intensive negotiations on the convention on B weapons and hoped that an agreement with broad support could be achieved during the present session of the CCD, with the active participation of all its members, so that an agreed draft could be submitted to the 26th session of the General Assembly. (ii) 9-Power draft convention India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan and the UAR welcomed the 9-Power draft convention as a positive step forward in negotiations on the prohibition of B weapons. India said that, in the CCD, a consensus had already emerged - I). — that the 9-Power draft should serve as the main basis for negotiations on a BW convention. Nigeria recognized the 9-Power draft as a child of circumstances and welcomed it as a positive step. It also agreed with the UK that the two draft conventions on B weapons (the 9-Power draft and the DK draft), could be satisfactorily amalgamated. Several delegations made comments on the 9-Power draft convention and the TJAR submitted formal amendments to it (CCD/32&). Nigeria. Pakistan, Sweden and the Netherlands dealt with the question of terminology and definitions of the terms used in the convention. Nigeria . and Pakistan recommended the use of a uniform terminology and the elimination of a confusion between "weapons" and "agents". Sweden maintained that the question of definitions must be solved before a decision could be reached on any agreement on biological weapons. A working paper on the definitions of toxins submitted by Sweden (CCD/333) sought to define toxins, which were chemical means of warfare but as a rule of biological origin. A definition should cover all toxins of potential use as warfare agents, both those of biological and of synthetic origin. If synthetic toxins were not explicitly covered in the convention, a loophole jeopardizing its very purpose would exist and it would further decrease the political value of the proposed convention. Sweden suggested an amendment to the draft convention adding the words "whatever their origin or mode of preparation" after the word "toxins". Sweden also said that if the prohibition was restricted to toxins of biological origin, several governments might then have to reconsider the text. Inclusion of toxins which were chemical agents into the convention on biological weapons would mean that an important step towards the prohibition of chemical weapons had been taken. In view of this Sweden considered it as an open question how far into the field of chemical weapons the convention on biological weapons should go. The Netherlands also favoured a definition of biological agents in the convention, to make clear that they included all agents causing death or disease to plants, as well as to men and animals. Pakistan supported the scope of the prohibition on B weapons as proposed in the first three articles of the 9-Power draft but suggested that the undertaking to prevent research in this field, contained in article two of the DK draft, should be included. A similar suggestion was contained in amendments submitted by the UAR. The Netherlands also supported this point and suggested the elimination of the provision excepting the production for "peaceful" purposes in article I of the 9-Power draft, since this ordinarily meant non-military purposes, while the Netherlands felt that some production - 5 - far passive defence sh®uld be permitted. If the wsrd "peaceful1* was retained, it should have n© impact ©n the interpretati©n of the same word in the IAEA Statute, in the NPT and in other treaties. Nigeria suggested that the time limit f©r the destruction of B weapons stockpiles sh©uld be reconsidered and the destruction method clarified. Concerning the prehibition of use ©f B weapons in the convention, while Pakistan considered the relevant previsions of the preamble and of article 8 of the 9-Power draft sufficient, Nigeria suggested that the final draft should contain a simple reaffirmation of the ban on use t© reinforce, rather than to weaken the Geneva Protocol. The Netherlands also favoured the inclusion in the 9-Power draft ©f a clear reference to ban any use of B weapons for hostile purposes under any circumstances. It considered such a clause important particularly in the light of various reservations to the Geneva Protocol. Nigeria• Pakistan and the UAR observed that the provisions of article VI of the 9-Power draft, dealing with consultations and co-operation of parties in the application of the convention, should take into account the fact that there were instances when relations between some States would not allow its normal implementation. Nigeria, the Netherlands and Pakistan dealt with the question of a complaints procedure. The Netherlands confirmed its support of a complaints procedure of two stages, involving factual investigation by an expert body or some international organ prior to consideration by the Security Council. Such a separation of the functions of investigation and of political judgment would eliminate the possibility of political recriminations in early stages of the complaints procedure. Together with Nigeria% it felt that the complaints procedure suggested by the UK would better ensure an automatic impartial investigation without the Security Council veto. Pakistan said that the complaints procedure should ensure credible and effective measures by the Security Council. India. Pakistan and Yugoslavia stressed the necessity of strengthening the Geneva Protocol. Pakistan considered sufficient the relevant provisions in the preamble of the 9-Power draft, including the reference to the General - 6 - Assembly resolutions. Yugoslavia said that the Geneva Protocol should be safeguarded from any direct or indirect violation. This was the aim of the 9-Power draft, though a disclaimer clause might not be sufficient. The elements consolidating the validity of the Protocol as an instrument of inter- national law,as in resolution 2603 A of the General Assembly, should be retained in the convention o n B weapons. On the other hand, Nigeria suggested that the reference in the preamble of the 9-Power draft to the Geneva Protocol should be eliminated in the light of the controversy concerning General Assembly resolution 2603 A. India, Nigeria, Pakistan and Yugoslavia dealt with the provision of the draft convention concerning further negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. India said that in the light of the clear and unambiguous mandate given by the General Assembly, a mere treaty undertaking to continue negotiations on C weapons was not satisfactory. It suggested that the preamble and article IX of the 9-Power draft should be improved to reflect fully the link between C and B weapons and to strengthen the commitment to continue negotiations on the ban on C weapons. It was essential that the CCD also reach an agreement at this session at least on the principal elements of a draft convention on C weapons. Nigeria noted that the link between B and C weapons 'j should be substantial and evident, with general agreement that a convention on C weapons would follow closely. This could be ensured by a firm treaty commitment to further negotiations. Serious consideration should be given to a moratorium on C weapons pending the final agreement, and the CCD should appeal to governments to recognise the important role that political will could and should play in the final solution. Pakistan maintained that an undertaking for early conclusion of the convention on G weapons would be the most important element of the convention on B weapons. It supported the previous proposal of Poland that a time-limit should be set for the conclusion of a C¥ convention and suggested that this should be three years after the entry into force of the B¥ convention. Yugoslavia felt that an undertaking in principle to conduct negotiations on C weapons was not sufficient. An obligation to achieve an agreement on their prohibition should be included in the convention, accompanied by suitable political action to renounce C weapons as a. means of warfare and by the submission of an appropriate negotiating instrument without delay. Yugoslavia considered that the formulation in the preamble of the 9-Power draft mentioning only B weapons and toxins and not C weapons should be adequately amended. It also considered unacceptable the idea of holding a conference reviewing progress on C weapons after five years and - 7 - suggested that it take place two or three years after the agreement on B weapons. In order to ensure continuity of the work on a CW convention, it also emphasised its readiness to co-operate during the present CCD session in elaborating the elements of such a convention, simultaneously with efforts to improve the draft convention on B weapons. While Pakistan welcomed the provision of the 9-Power draft on the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of biological agents and toxins, the Netherlands felt that this article was superfluous, because in the chemical and biological field there were no "haves" and "have-nots", as in the case of the NPT. Pakistan supported the article on amendments to the convention contained in the 9-Power draft and suggested that a withdrawal clause should be included in the convention. Yugoslavia and Nigeria suggested that the biological weapons convention, as the first instrument of real disarmament, should reaffirm the principle that the savings from disarmament should be channeled to development, primarily of the developing countries. The Netherlands and Nigeria also suggested that the provision of the UK draft, concerning appropriate assistance to the Party against which biological methods of warfare were used, should be retained in the convention. Nigeria noted that the word "appropriate" should be clarified. (iii) UK draft convention (For comments on the UK draft convention see sub-section (ii) of (b) above.) (iv) Identical draft conventions On 5 August 1971, two separate but identical drafts of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction were submitted. The USSR introduced the revised 9-Power draft, supported by the German Democratic Republic (CCD/337). The US introduced its own draft (CCD/338). - 8 - In outlining the provisions of the revised 9-Power draft, the USSR re-emphasized that its co-sponsors strove for the prohibition of both C and B weapons, but this was not feasible because certain Western Powers were unwilling to give up C weapons now. The Socialist States considered the prohibition of B weapons as a first step to the solution of the whole problem of CBW. The purpose of the B weapons convention was the complete prohibition and elimination of B weapons and toxins, with the broadest definition of the latter. The convention would be a real disarmament measure strengthening universal security, and it would exclude waging war with the use of B weapons and toxins. The revised draft reflected the opinions expressed during the spring and the current session of the CCD by a number of delegations. The USSR hoped that the Committee would prepare a final agreed text on the basis of the revised draft. The revised draft recognized the significance of the Geneva Protocol, reaffirmed the adherence to its purposes and principles and called for strict compliance with the Protocol by all States. Hbthing in the convention limited or detracted from the obligations under the Protocol. Due to different views as to whether the Protocol established a universally recognized rule of international law or whether it was obligatory only to its parties, no provisions were included in the draft reaffirming or refuting any of the above concepts. The Socialist States, however, continued to consider the prohibition of the use of all CBW as a universally recognized rule of international law. The prohibition of the use of B weapons was not included in the draft convention because it was already prohibited by the Protocol. Reiteration of the prohibition in the convention would weaken the Protocol and admit different approaches to the prohibition of B and C weapons. The incorporation in the preamble of an intention to exclude completely the possibility of using B weapons was a natural result of the convention. An important objective of the convention was to ensure the complete prohibition and elimination of C weapons. The draft obliged States to conduct negotiations to this end and it would facilitate an agreement on the prohibition of C weapons. The article on the review conference in the draft provided for the examination and reviewing of provisions relating to the prohibition of C weapons. Such a conference might be convened before the expiration of the five-year term, if requested by a majority of parties. Obligations assumed under the convention, combined with the review conference, increased the prospects for banning C weapons. The draft was based on a combination of international and national safeguards against possible infringements. Parties to the convention were obliged to adopt necessary measures for the implementation of its prohibitions within - 9 - their respective territories or -under their jurisdiction or control anywhere. Parties would also undertake to consult and co-operate in solving problems arising from the implementation of the convention. In the case of a breach of obligations by another party, the State might complain to the Security Council. The complaints procedure ensured an objective investigation and the adoption of effective measures to suppress possible violations of the convention. These safeguards were strengthened by the provision of the review conference. The combination of those provisions would guarantee the effectiveness and viability of the convention. The new draft also included a withdrawal clause similar to those in previous treaties. The terra for the destruction of B weapons should be fixed later and the convention would oblige all parties to take necessary precautions during the destruction. An obligation not to preserve stockpiles of B weapons was added. The inter- relationship of the prohibition of B weapons and of general and complete disarmament was mentioned in the preamble. GCD would include the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and the draft convention provided for the elimination of one type of such weapons. The USSR hoped that the revised draft would facilitate agreement on the final text of the convention and expedite its elaboration. After its conclusion, efforts could concentrate on the prohibition of C weapons. The US said that the new parallel draft conventions on B weapons were •» based primarily on the earlier draft of Socialist countries (CCD/325/Rev.l), but owed much also to the original UK draft. The CCD was indebted to the UK for its constructive approach and craftsmanship demonstrated in the pursuit of the aim to ban B weapons. While the convention banning B and toxin weapons xjould not represent a complete solution of the CBW problem, it would control the deadliest and most indiscriminate weapons. Although B weapons had never been used in hostilities, their possible use caused widespread concern since a potential existed for developing B weapons against which there was no effective defence. The development of a widely acceptable draft by the CCD for its submission to the next General Assembly would be a major accomplishment and would represent the first real disarmament measure. The draft convention would in no waj detract from continued efforts to develop a ban on C weapons. It would also support and strengthen the Geneva Protocol by article VII and by the second and ninth preambular paragraphs. The inclusion of a ban on the chemical substances, toxins, would significantly broaden the scope of this first CBW agreement. The time-limit for the destruction of B weapons would be fixed in a way taking into account practical considerations. A clear - 10 - requirement was included providing for necessary safety precautions. In a way similar to the NPT, Article III -was designed to prevent the proliferation of B weapons. Article VIII fulfilled the earlier statement of President Nixon in favour of an unambiguous commitment to further negotiations on C weapons. The US was determined to find solutions to the difficult problems of verifying the ban on C weapons. It was not prepared, however, to support any formulation disregarding the problems of effective control in the field of C weapons. The elaboration of measures on co-operation among States in the development of peaceful uses of B agents and toxins must be left to other bodies, but all parties to the convention would be committed to facilitate such co-operation. The provision for a possible review conference before the expiration of the normal five-year period met suggestions on this point by a number of CCD members. The number of ratifications required for the entry into force of the convention should be relatively small. Efforts should now be concentrated on specific Improvements In the parallel texts in order to complete a widely acceptable convention so that it might be submitted to the next General Assembly. (c) Prohibition of chemical weapons Sweden observed that the prohibition of C weapons cannot be contingent upon the improvement of control. The ban on the production of C weapons would be predominantly a political-military decision, as was the decision to prohibit B weapons and toxins without verification. It was urgent to agree on a comprehensive ban on the production, etc., of C weapons similar to the ban on the use of both weapons in .the Geneva Protocol. Sweden maintained that the Members of the United Nations should be informed about the effectiveness of the proposed measure on the prohibition of B weapons, as well as about the outlook for the complete elimination of C and B weapons. (For further comments on the prohibition of C weapons see section (a) "General" and sub-section (ii) of section (b) "Prohibition of biological weapons" above.) (d) Verification (The CCD held an informal meeting on CB¥ with experts present on 7 July.) The US welcomed the Informal meeting to pursue efforts to find an acceptable solution of the difficult problem of verification of the prohibition of C weapons. The CCD was at the beginning of a long process of research and explorations concerning new approaches to effective verification. It had increased to technical knowledge on that subject last year through a number - 11 - of working papers and informal meetings. Further exchange of expert views was essential. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was effectively pursuing the study of the problem of verification in the field of C weapons and the US wished to share the relevant information as it became available. It informally distributed copies of an "inspection questionnaire" designed for the use by inspectors engaged in an on-the-spot survey of a nerve gas facility. The US also submitted a working paper (CCD/332) dealing with three aspects of verification of C weapons: (l) whether the safety features at a nerve gas production plant were sufficiently unique so as to distinguish such plants from ordinary commercial operations; (2) the possible role of physical controls in ensuring the inactivity of a shut-down plant; and (3) the possibility to use sampling techniques to determine whether a facility was producing nerve agents. Japan proposed the convening of an informal meeting on C weapons with the participation of experts from the largest number of countries, including the Socialist States, at such meetings. Sweden said that a significant improvement in the remote verification of C and B weapons was probably unrealistic. On-site control was technically promising but politically unacceptable. On the other hand, the possibility of some access would! .lower apprehension and hence the requirements for the level of control, as was the case in the field of nuclear energy with the increasing access of the IAEA. If access was not allowed, the production of all C and B weapons was nearly unverifiable and the separate treatment of the two types of weapons was therefore not warranted by any difference concerning their verification. The similarity of imperfection concerning the verification of all C and B weapons was reflected in the memorandum of the twelve non- aligned States (CCD/310), which requested a combination of appropriate national and international control measures. It was possibly also reflected in the consultation and co-operation formulae in the two draft conventions on biological weapons. Sweden noted that clarity was desired in verification provisions of the convention, which could be achieved by spelling out the principle of verification by challenge and by including the words "appropriate international procedures • within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter", as contained in the Sea-Bed Treaty. The effectiveness of such a control system, applicable to the whole field of B and C weapons, would be gradually increased through national legislation, open documentation and international reporting to some appropriate body. Since toxins, which were C weapons, were included in the proposed draft B¥ convention, Sweden considered it an openc. question as to how far into the chemical warfare field the biological convention should go as regards verification. - 12 - Underground Test Ban (a) General The USSR reiterated briefly its position in favour of the prohibition of underground tests and recalled statements by Mr. William Foster, former Director of ACDA, by Senator Case and by various US scientists to the general effect that on-site inspections were unnecessary for adequate verification of a complete test ban. Romania also urged early action on a CTB, noting that recent evidence had shown that the verification problem could be appropriately solved and stressing the political nature of a final decision in the matter. The US hoped that the CCD would, at the present session, gain a better understanding of the relationship between current seismic technology and a verification of CTB. It welcomed the 30 June informal meeting on the subject. Japan recalled previous suggestions on solving the verification problem, such as an agreed annual number of on-site inspections, an agreed annual quota of tests to be reduced to zero over a certain period of time, the establishment of a special committee to consider conflicts and decide on the need for on-site inspections, and inspection-by-challenge. It noted that, in the past, the positions of the US and the USSR had been closer on the question of "black boxes", the number of on-site inspections and a moratorium on all tests. It hoped a CTB could be achieved in the near future on the basis of a combination of, or variations of, these proposals. If this proved too difficult, tests above the present detectable and identifiable level should be prohibited as a temporary measure, taking into account the seismological approach suggested by Japan in March 1971 and the proposals of other countries. The improved climate resulting from a US-USSR ban on all tests would influence States that were continuing to test in the atmosphere. Canada stressed that the CCD had devoted too little time to CTB at its present session, particularly in light of the special report required by UN General Assembly resolution 2663 (XXV). It recalled Canada's previous call to the major testing Powers to facilitate progress towards a CTB, in addition to adopting certain transitional measures (outlined below). Hopes for an early treaty depended on the reaction of the major testing Powers to the previous Swedish queries with regard to their present attitudes towards co-operation in seismic data exchange and on-site inspections. With regard to the type of international instrument to be used for a ban on underground - 13 - tests, Canada favoured a treaty independent from the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 or perhaps a protocol to that Treaty. Finally, Canada stressed that the technical aspects of the verification problem must be explored in order to expedite the necessary political decisions under conditions of "relative risk", i.e., the risk of -undetected tests as compared to the political risks of an unrestricted continuation of testing. Sweden also reminded the CCD of the special report on CTB requested by the General Assembly (see also "Swedish draft treaty" below). (b) Transitional measures Canada recalled its earlier suggestion that, to facilitate progress towards a CTB, the major testing Powers should begin to reduce testing and thereby re-enforce the Partial Test Ban. Advance notification of projected tests with appropriate detailed data would be one valuable transitional step. The publication of similar data on past tests would also be valuable. In reply to various questions posed earlier by Sweden, Canada said the CCD should work simultaneously on a treaty and on transitional, or interim measures; pending the conclusion of a treaty, all testing should be reduced and environmental precautions improved. Agreement on interim partial measures might take the form of a protocol to the Moscow Treaty of 1963 or, preferably, simple announcements of reciprocal undertakings by the testing Powers. In a working paper which it subsequently introduced (CCD/336), Canada outlined the following transitional measures it had suggested, which it stressed were neither comprehensive nor exclusive: (l) measures to help develop seismologies! identification techniques through (a) advance notification of the details of planned underground explosions and (b) undertakings to co-operate in the use, development and improvement of monitoring facilities; (2) measures to reduce testing and its harmful effects through (a) undertakings to reduce testing, beginning with large explosions, and (b) the consideration of measures against environmental risk. Sweden, in suggesting modifications to improve its draft CTB treaty text, also supported the transitional measures to a CTB suggested by Canada. (c) Threshold Treaty (For the views of Japan, see (a) "General", above). Canada said it accepted the Swedish view on the considerable difficulty of implementing a threshold treaty and had not intended to suggest such a treaty, but only transitional measures which might not require a treaty at all. - u - (d) Swedish draft treaty on GTB Sweden suggested various modifications to its 1969 suggestions for a draft treaty on CTB (ENDC/2/42). Besides certain minor changes in the preamble and procedural articles, it proposed: (l) inclusion of the idea of a phasing- out period in Article I, because an abrupt discontinuance of testing might create practical difficulties,' the length of the phase-out period should be stated, with details for its implementation to be included in a separate Protocol I annexed to the Treaty; (2) peaceful explosions should be dealt with in Article II, with details in an annexed Protocol II; to facilitate such explosions for peaceful purposes, the rules of the Moscow Treaty against "venting" could be somewhat eased in the same Protocol; (3) the article on verification, with its undertaking on seismological data exchange, should remain, with details concerning the data exchange, covered in a separate Protocol III: (4.) a new article should be included providing for a review conference. The concept of three additional protocols, Sweden maintained, might facilitate the political decision "in principle" required for conclusion of the treaty proper; and these protocols could be worked out later, with the assistance of experts. The definitive form of Protocol III could best be worked out after the treaty entered into force and after some experience had been gained from the phasing-out period. All parties need not participate in all the protocols. For example, Protocol I on phasing out tests would concern mainly the nuclear-weapon Powers, while Protocol II on peaceful explosions would cover all members of the IAEA and parties to the Moscow Treaty. The verification procedure in the draft text should remain unchanged, since verification by challenge, based primarily on national measures resulting from the seismic data exchange and strengthened by the complaints procedure, would give sufficient assurance. The viability of this procedure, based on the use of seismological methods, was dependent on the technical capability to achieve a sufficiently high identification probability to deter violations, to reduce false alarms from earthquakes to a negligible point and to cover the entire range of events requiring identification. (See also section on "Verification" below). The procedure was also dependent on the use of existing or easily improvable monitoring facilities; the recent informal meetings had shown that science could meet far-reaching requirements in this regard. Finally, Sweden invited all CCD members to co-operate in preparing a revised version of the draft treaty text. Romania said the Swedish draft treaty, as recently modified, could permit the initiation of real negotiations for a CTB treaty. — 15 - (e) Verification In suggesting modifications to improve its draft CTB treaty text, Sweden not only defended the validity of the verification-by-challenge concept included in that draft (see above), but also noted that Canada had mobilized international action on data exchange to improve verification capabilities and that the US offered the hope of improved capabilities when its three large array stations became fully operative in the near future. While capabilities for discriminating between explosions and earthquakes still differed in various areas, a recently employed method permitted the gauging of the reliability, or "confidence", of a particular monitoring system to within a one percent risk of error. A Swedish working paper (CCD/329) showed that certain areas in Asia and North America had such a confidence probability of 78 to 99 per cent for events greater than 100 kilotons. Other Worth American areas showed only 12 per cent assured probability, but that was still above the 10 per cent probability deemed sufficient by Sweden for political purposes and to deter violations; and it even included events down to 5 kilotons, which was a considerable improvement over the lower limit of 20 to 60 kilotons quoted three years ago. Regrettably, the experts had concluded that identification at lower levels would become increasingly difficult with decreasing yields and had speculated that, while a 5 kiloton level would be attainable, a 1 kiloton level could not be achieved. In any case, Sweden maintained, political decisions must be made which would require compromise between the desirable and the possible. For the purpose of discussion of political requirements, Sweden had reached the conclusion that the deterrence level for explosions of a yield of 30 kilotons in hard rock would be 90 per cent identification; 10 kilotons, 50 per cent; and 3 kilotons, 10 per cent. These levels were near what was technically possible today, with an expected rate of earthquake false alarms of only one in ten years. These levels were based only on a single explosion and would be higher for a series of explosions. They were also based solely on seismological capabilities and did not take into account other useful verification methods, which would raise the level of deterrence, such as monitoring by satellite. International Exchange of Seismic Data Canada noted its long-standing interest in improving CTB verification capabilities through an approved international seismic data exchange and - 16 - welcomed the informal meeting on the subject as an effective way of dealing with the crucial scientific aspects of this problem. It introduced a working paper (CCD/327 and Add.l) summarising a Canadian study which supplemented an earlier assessment of worldwide verification capabilities based on UN resolution 2604.. Canada also supported Sweden's question to the testing Powers with regard to their present attitude towards co-operation on seismic data exchange. The US submitted a working paper (CCD/330) containing its statement at the informal meeting reviewing its efforts to improve detection and identification capabilities by seismic methods. Italy also submitted a working paper (CCD/331) summarising the views it had expressed at the informal meeting on detection and identification techniques and possible ways of improving international seismic data exchange. Halting the Nuclear Arms Race (See also "General and complete disarmament" and "Other items", below), (a) Bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks In the opening statements, the USSR and the US quoted the joint US-USSR announcement of 20 May 1971 with regard to the SALT. The US noted that it .and had been widely welcomed/added that it was intensively preparing for the early resumption of the talks. The USSR noted that the importance of the talks was increasing in the present international situation. Japan said that the US-USSR announcement was encouraging, though limited, Japan hoped for agreement on both defensive and offensive nuclear weapons and thought any agreement should proceed from limiting numbers to limiting qualitative weapons development and scaling down nuclear arsenals. The nuclear Powers should agree not only on strengthening measures to prevent accidental war but also on measures to avoid nuclear war. A US-USSR agreement to limit strategic nuclear weapons would be significant, both for disarmament and for increasing security. Even a partial success at the SALT would favourably affect negotiation in the CCD and in the United Nations. - 17 - Yugoslavia noted encouraging signs of a US-USSR agreement at the SALT, (b) Conference of five nuclear-weapon Powers The USSR outlined its proposal for a conference of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, which could embrace either the entire complex of nuclear disarmament or separate measures leading to it. This would not prevent continued discussions on nuclear disarmament in other bodies, particularly in the COD. The US stated that the USSR proposal for a conference of the five nuclear- weapon Powers was one possible approach to the desired goal of participation of all nuclear-weapon States in disarmament negotiations, but that the US would bear in mind that certain issues were appropriate for discussion among nuclear-weapon States and others among both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear- weapon States. The US would accordingly welcome the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control and disarmament efforts in a manner satis- factory to all these States and in a manner reflecting the interests and concerns as well of non-nuclear-weapon States. Czechoslovakia welcomed the call for a five-Power conference, which it believed would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament, and relaxing tension, enhancing confidence, promoting peaceful co-operation and contributing towards the achievement of positive results in other disarmament negotiations currently underway. It thought the COD should support the convocation of such a conference. .The Mon-Proliferation Treaty CzechoSlovakia maintained that, despite general satisfaction with the NPT, the Treaty was far from achieving its objectives and the status of its acceptance was unsatisfactory; the CCD should therefore review the status of the Treaty and the implementation of its obligations. Japan, without specifically mentioning the NPT, suggested that the CCD should urgently consider the establishment of a control system of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States to prevent such weapons from falling under the control of other States, organisations or individuals. Due to the diversification and miniaturisation of nuclear weapons, there was a danger of proliferation by unpredictable incident or by accident. In connection with their support of a CTB, several States referred to the commitments in the NPT on further effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. - 18 - Prevention of an Arms Race on the Sea-Bed The USSR, recalling the Sea-Bed Treaty's commitment to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed, urged the CCD to negotiate mutually acceptable steps for demilitaization of the area. These negotiations, it said, could be based on the Soviet draft submitted in March 1969. The USSR also announced that it had ratified the Treaty and urged others to do so. Japan also announced that it had deposited its instruments of ratification, while Czechoslovakia stated it would soon ratify. Prohibition of use of nuclear weapons Czechoslovakia said that, as in the case of CBW, nuclear weapons should first be banned and then completely eliminated; at least, a. non-first-use ban should be achieved. Romania listed a ban on use among the nuclear measures for priority action, maintaining that such a ban would reduce international tensions and the danger of war, while paving the way for further effective measures. Cut-off of production of fissile materials for weapons purposes The US said the CCD could also do useful work at this session on a cut-off. Japan envisaged urgent action on this item. Romania. in recommending early action on the cessation of production of nuclear weapons, said this should include the cessation of the production of fissile materials and the transfer of their stocks to peaceful purposes. Nuclear-free zones The US said that the CCD could do useful work at the session on this question. The USSR outlined the Brezhnev proposals which included nuclear-free zones. Romania included the creation of additional nuclear-free zones among nuclear matters to be given absolute priority. It was essential that the COD follow up the proposals of various States and groups of States, the recommendations of the General Assembly and the important precedent of the Tlatelolco Treaty by helping to create such new zones. Although the ultimate responsibility for such actions rested with the States in the various regions, discussion of the matter in the CCD would stimulate progress. Romania desired a zone of peace in the Balkans, which should be nuclear-free. Mexico announced that the Netherlands had ratified Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Panama had become the seventeenth party to the Treaty by ratifying it and waiving the conditions for its entry into force. - 19 - General and complete disarmament The USSR outlined Mr. Brezhnev's disarmament programme, which it said was aimed at the adoption of partial disarmament measures and the creation of a basis for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union intended to make efforts to ensure progress towards GCD. Romania also stressed the need for action in the general disarmament field, recalling its previous proposals in this regard. The GCD, it said, should give GCD the priority it merited, not as an abstract theme but as a concrete objective, with the initiation of formal negotiations on a GCD draft treaty. Report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures (General Assembly resolution 2667 (XX\T)) Japan welcomed the expert study on the subject and hoped it would provide clarification of actual arms conditions throughout the world and their domestic and international consequences. Romania said the Secretary-General's study should provide the basis for early CCD consideration of a freeze and reduction of military budgets, as well as for other measures to halt the arms race. Conventional disarmament and the arms trade The US said the CCD could do useful work at this session on possible restrictions on conventional weapons. Japan stated that the co-operation of militarily important States and the self-restraint of weapon-producing countries would facilitate the reduction of conventional arms in conflict areas; Japan was not permitting experts of arms to such areas, it added. European security Czechoslovakia said the CCD should support the convocation of all conferences aimed at strengthening international security, such as a European Security Conference. Reduction of military forces in Europe The US noted that the NATO Foreign Ministers had welcomed the Soviet response to the NATO proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, and had expressed their intention to work towards negotiations. Work on this subject was proceeding vigorously within NATO governments and at Brussels, The USSR recalled that it had proposed the initiation of negotiations leading towards a reduction of forces in Ear-ope, and that it was ready to - 20 - discuss both national and foreign troops. It expressed satisfaction that many Western countries were interested in the Soviet proposal. Czechoslovakia welcomed all steps towards mutual force reductions in Central Europe, which it felt should not be made dependent on the results of negotiations in other fields. Yugoslavia said it saw a readiness on the part of the Powers to begin talks in the near future on mutual balanced force reductions. Prohibition of the use of force Japan stated that the problem of divided States was one cause of the arms race and that renunciation of the use of force for the solution of this problem would create a climate favourable to a cessation of the arms race. Romania called for firm measures to ban the use of force and intervention in the internal affairs of other States. France and the PEG The US recalled the Secretary-General's suggestions for associating France and the PRO in disarmament negotiations, and noted that President Nixon had stated in his 1971 report on foreign policy that all nations had a stake in peace. The US would welcome the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the disarmament efforts in a manner satisfactory to all those States and reflecting the interests of non-nuclear States as well. Japan said that PEG participation in disarmament negotiations was particularly desirable, but that the essential participation of the PRC and France should not be made a prerequisite for such negotiations, as that might delay the adoption of concrete nuclear measures. In view of the over- riding superiority of the US and the USSR, all CCD members should pursue nuclear disarmament without such a precondition. The PRC and France should participate in the partial test ban treaty to strengthen world security and reduce en- vironmental pollution. Romania said that all nuclear States should participate in disarmament negotiations. World Disarmament Conference Romania said the convening of a World Disarmament Conference had taken on increased importance in the context of the Disarmament Decade. Other Items Romania listed, among other priority measures of nuclear disarmament, the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and the ultimate destruction of - 21 - all such, weapons and their carriers. It also recommended action on a number of partial measures to foster confidence, such as a ban on new military bases and the siting of nuclear arms and foreign territory, the elimination of existing bases on foreign territory, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the liquidation of military blocs, the renunciation of military manoeuvres on foreign territory and abstention from all demonstrations of force and actions which would engender tension, stimulate arms production and hamper progress towards disarmament. Mi s e ellaneous The US, noting that the development of restraints on weapons had been included in President Nixon's 1971 Report as one of the aims of US foreign policy, stated that the security of all nations was interdependent and that creative diplomacy was required, particularly with regard to disarmament. The USSR stressed the importance of fully implementing agreed treaties and noted that the non-participation of militarily important States in disarmament agreements reduced the effectiveness of disarmament efforts in general. Czechoslovakia expressed the view that the practice of linking the holding of one negotiation to the prior success of another negotiation was an undesirable practice that should be abandoned in all disarmament and security negotiations. Japan said that, despite the achievement of the NPT and the Sea-Bed Treaty, many CGD members were frustrated with the results of disarmament negotiations. It also stated that some States were slandering other States for alleged militarism, which should in reality be judged only on the basis of the percentage of economic power alloted by a given State for military purposes and by the degree to which a State's functions were dictated by a small number of men for those purposes. Japan also recalled its previous suggestions for the regulation of nuclear testing on the high seas and hoped the testing States would avoid hindering navigation and threatening the security of other States. 17 August SGr Mr. Chacko is leaving over the weekend to attend the meetings in Geneva. He would like to call on you at your convenience this Thursday to discuss the attached report. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: The Secretary-General A: FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION XX POUR INFORMATION Date: FROM: 17 August 1971 DE: M.E. "tKacko, PSCA CR. 13 (11-64) \ f HEFORP ON AMD SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS BACE AND OF MXLSEAHT EXPENDITURES for Dis^isei^B ia ij- Ssptesib*;? 1971 LosA Zaajfeesrassac, QM0 KCBj, FES Bis discussions and negotiations -ealch the United Nations Organisation has pursued la order to achieve its basic purpose of maintaining peace end eliminating war have led to some useful steps in the field of asms limitation and disaaBamsnto Nonetheless they have not succeeded in halting® leave alone reversing:, an axsns nee which has grown ever more perilous over the years? and ever more wasteful of human and other resources,, Hhe fact ftoat world military expenditures have been continuously increasing was fozaally underlined in Hie resolution of the General Assembly %&ich called for the present Report „ In 1962s, when the report of the Seeretazy General on -fcfee economic and social consequences of disasmemsnt was being prepared;) tito available data indicated that the world •was th@n spending roughly $120 billion «roinmlily for military purposes,, $sn years later we find the figure standing at about $200 biUioaD She trend to produce and accumulate ever more sophisticated and ever greater numbers of costly and deadly veapons continues uninterruptedly0 Almost every state in th® worlds including a graving number of smaller or developing countries vhich desperately need to use such resources as they can command for productive social endSj, have found themselves Impelled along this patho 1 See Appendix I p Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament (United Nations Publication,Sales No0: 62,XXa) Implementing General Assembly Resolution 1516 (XV) BjST far the largest pork of the total of military which 10 devoted to equipment is eonssased In the production end purchase of conventions! weapons such as aircraft,? tanks and gunso Ibis generalisation. applies as much to the nuclear powers as to non-amelesr stateso Bte was® uhieh have marred this past decade have beea waged almost entirely by meajas of this eategoxy of veapoaSo Chemieal and itaeterlologieal (btologieal) weapon* have eomraned only an inslgnlfieaacfe part of total exgsa^ifemss on orma0 'but the oalnou shadov -fiiey cast over the vorld i» totalSy dispx Hie third and most fearful category of axraaaeat to \ftieh military expenditureB are devoted are nuclear weapcmao Ihese pose tfee greatest threat vhlch M^lrfT^ now faceso "The threat of the immeasurable disaster vhich. could befall manfeflBfl were nuclear «ar ever to erupt? whether by miscalculation, or by mad intent^ is so real that informed people tfee world over understandably become impatient for measures Bacteriol^cical iani the Efff eete of -Bieir Possible Ifae (Waited Ifateiona Sales K6«,: Eo69ol02^)$ para, 371 3 of disaasaaaaat additional to the few aeasM3?®® of asm limitation that w hare already been agesed to e The 1962 Report of the Secretary Cene$al on the Economic and Social Consequences of IHtMMmmst& considered the scale of the resources then being devoted to military purposes,? an& th« peaceful ages to i&icb thoy mi^it otbefftfisa be puto It dealt tritii «be cowe3?sioa problems that could ari«e0 aed Urn 2spaet of disaxaosBKmt on intaraaticoal eeonoraie relatiozts aad on aid for seoaosie developEsato It eoneludad that all the problems an& difficulties of tr^aoition eoaaocted with disanaaaent could be met l^r aHpropsdate national and 2ntexnatioEt&l meamres^ aaA that tiie divessiai to peaceful jmrpss©® of t&e reoourees now in nilitasy we could benefit all through the iisgE-orestent of voelA econoaic and social conditioaoo W» have been aaked to apparemfiii «ie aame general problem from the point of view of the social end eeo&oxoie consequences of the asaus race and of ailitaay e^pandituTefto Tfe do so vi^a a oense of tizsenejr^ in the recognition that until a halt is put to the xaee^ there can be no assurance of laatiag intesmtioaal peaee^ OF little likelihood teat resources could be found to help achieve the goals of the Second United Nations Development decadeo Effects of the Possible Use of Mucleag Waasone and Security and Economic Itoplicationa fog States of the of these (United Nations publication Sales K60: Eo6S0IXol)5 para0 & CHAESERJI Qualitative aspects of the Ajsns Race 2he decade of tiie nlneteen-eixtiesg, essentially the period •luce the Secretary-GeneralRs 19*>2 Report;, may veil go down in history a* having been marked by a greater spread;, end a more spectacular technological elaboration of axnaaents than any by which it was preceded,, Ifcaa this point of view it stands out not because of &e application of any totally new piece of scientific knowledge in &e devising of a new class of offensive or defensive weapons or of veapon systems0 Ihere -ware no developments comparable to the emergence of radio or radarg jet engines or rockets? nuclear weapons or electronic eomputeztto Bie decade vill be remembered simply because over the ten years which it encompassed^ supersonic flight became a commonplaces not only in -@ie military forces of -@ie highly industrialised nations& but also in tiiose countries in rela- tively early stages of economic development; because of the enormous multiplication of nuclear weapons in the amouries of the super» pguaggg because the pile^up of nuclear weapons over tiie period meant that more destructive power was being stored than was necessary to eliminate life on earth several tines over! because the development of ballistic missiles* and -Sue sophistication of their guidance and control systems? made any point on earth open to precise attack by nuclear warheads; and because space technology added a nev dimension to 'Sie field of military ccta&unications and surveillance 0 The decade will be remembered simply because these® as well as other developments too numerous to mention? characterised the axas race of the period0 5ra She mates-up of militaxy budgets varies from country to country0 but in the nine which together now account for 85 per cent of -ftie world5® expenditures on military forces and anaaments,? it can safely be said that something lilte half goes to personnel costs (pay^ pensions*, clothing^ housings, ete0) and the rest to a combination of research and development,, purehase of equipments, construction® and operationse Total world expenditure on weapons over 1&« sixties may have amounted to as much as 500 billion dollars at current prices0 As already noted? by far 1&e larger proportion of tills sum was devoted to Hie purchase of conventional an&s - of guns and ammunitionj, transport vehicles and tanksp eomnmieations and surveillance equipnentp aircraft and ships, It is one of the paradoxical faete of our times that &e far snaller total outlays on nuclear anas which the nuclear powers have made over the yearS0 has resulted in the stockpiling of weapons vitfa a potential destructive power infinitely greater than that of all other armaments put together,, The qualitative changes in axaautents which occurred over slxbies are too well~known to need spelling out in detailc In category of strategic or long»«ange nuclear weapons tbere was a rapid change in •&$ means of delivery,? starting vi&i the switch from manned bombers to liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles*, first of intermediate and then of inter-continental rangOo The deployment of solid-fuelled missiles in concrete silos rapidly followed,, as also did the development of submarine° Not only did the variety® technical complexity9 and cost of the means of delivery of strategic nuclear weapons increase during the of asatism wil^i a jmslsar eapabili^ by -ftie addition of B4®ae@ and t&e People's Republic of China0 W1& tiie loteoduetion of ev&mog* sophisticated and less vul- nerable mesas for -aie long-yange delivery of nuclear varheadSg nations turned t&eir efforts in military research and development to the problem of detecting and intercepting ballistic missiles0 Special radar networks were set up to give early waning of missile firings^ and towards the end of toe decade® anti-ballistic missiles ware being developed and even deployed,, Simul taneouslye efforts were directed to the devising of missiles vita multiple warheads (MXRVs) capable of being aimed at a number of targets from & single and soe theoa?etically0 of orendaelming anti-ballistic missiles defences0 Biis apparently logical sequence of steps In the effort to improve a weapon system or to def«od «®almt it,-, neither usuaUy nor necessarily occurs in a rational tine sequence<> Dhe people vho design improvements in weapons are themselves the ones who as a role envisage the further steps they feel should be takea0 Iney do not wait for a potential enemy to react before they react against their own ereationso Bie research and development effort which has been devoted to strategic armaments over the sixties has been enormousa It has involved far more than the traditional techniques of tiie aerospace and electronic industries,, It has also penetrated the marine sciences,, and proved a powerful spur to studies of space technology <, Military satellite commonicationsc, supplementing more conventional me^tods of ecnmunicationg have also been deployed^ as have also space surveillance systsfflSo Vast technological developments have also occurred in weapons and weapou~*y8tem8 designed for air^ land and sea. varfaffeo The develop^ ment and deployment of supersonic aircraft^ equipped 7 weapons® Joss greatly Increased the cost and complexity of what are •till regarded as conventional flatter aircraft,, Ifce vulnerability of such expensive weapon* to attack when deployed on airfield*;, as veil as that of their fixed basesj, have in torn encouraged the production of vertical take*off aircraft and of the anted helicopter0 These developments have widened 1&e range of aircraft in «er?ceE> and the scale of the aeroaautieal research viiieh has been called upon to support their development o The familiar chain of new weapon? eounte3?=%reapan and counter<=eoiinter» veapon has also characterised the sphere of land varfare0 The dependence of armies on araoured •Tehides has Intensif ied^ with a consequent increase in their "depth of capitalisation" 0 Ihe response to this change was Sie continued elaboration of sophisticated anti-tank veaponso In areas vhere surface coDmomieations are poorp guerilla war has &t some countries given rise to a much greater use of the helicopter^, withj, again^ an increase in 'Oie depth of capitalisation of ^ie armed foreeso But here9 toop a countearateasure has appeared ia the shape of toe 'cfiftewnan anti-aircraft miffi®ile"o Intiti enava l sphere nuclear and gas turbine propulsion have added new dimensions to -ttie design of ships7 machinery & at the same time as the axnanent systems of a ship here become a much oore Important element in its eosto 2he increasing vulnerability of surface vessels to air attack has been countered by Ifte development and installation of antiaircraft missiles „ Oounter^aeasures have followed^ such as the stand«off bombj> uhieh can be launched from beyond the range of 8 &hip»b0rae missile,, and the s&ip«=to-e&ip gulden! rais@il©0 A uhol® new sang® of technologies has been fcm^ht into m® tn nawml warfare in the past deeade0 B&ese various qualitative changes can be briefly illustrated by the following figures0 At the outset of the decade® hardly any inter°° continental ballistic missiles (XCBKs) had yet been deployed,, 3y the end of tiie deeade 1he estimated numbers were 29150<> In I960 1&e depl«y« aent of submarine-asuRsaied ballistic missiles was negligibl«o ^r tbe end of the deeade some 55 nueleas^aissile eistesaa?laes were opeyationalp eosipxlsing about 800 launch vehicles^ niaose a&Ltiple vazbeads enabled tliem to deliver about 19800 Hie world atoek of fitting vessel® is estimated to have increased, from ^550 to ^,,900 fxm I960 to 19680 2hi» relatively small increase in numbers aasice the Much larger increase in iSie value of tikis stock (at 1968 frlcesg, «ae value of the stock in I960 vsa about &b billion^, as eostpairad vim $59 billion in 19680 a 75 p«r cent rise )0 At -Qifi outset of the deeade^ -^is w>rld stock of supersonie filters vas estimated to be 6g,000o "By tiie egad of the decade it had doubledo In I960 there were 15 production programmes for super-* sonic aiseraftl by 1970 these too had doubled . examples of t&e qualitative changes nhieh have marked asms race of Hie past decade as Sources John Ho Hoagland; World Coabat Aircraft and III The Arms Race in terms of Resources The seale of the economic burden which the peiture so sketehily drawn in the preceding chapter reflects is only too easily realised, however imprecise some of the figures*-/ First, military expenditures for the world as a whole are now running at the level of $200 billion a year. This represents something between 6 and 6.5 per cent of the total of World Gross National Product, roughly equal to what the world spends on all health and education services, and very much more than all official economic aid granted by developed to developing countries. In a period in which no major nations have been at all-out war with each other, it is a new departure for the world to devote so large a proportion of its resources to military uses. Compared with previous periods in which the more highly industrialised countries were not at war with each other, such as the years of the arms race before the First World War of 1914-13, or the early nineteen thirties before the Second World War, there have been two major changes « First, the world's standing armies are much larger than they used to be. Second and more important, the qualitative I/ The sources used in this chapter are given in the footnotes to the chart So The statistical study of world military expenditure is still in its infancy and comparatively li'.'htle research into the question has been encouraged. This is mainly because of the issue of secrecy. Even allowing for this, a good deal could be done to Improve the international comparability of national figures. The world estimate given in this Chapter probably has a 15 per cent margin of error either way, which means that the true figure lies between $170 and $230 billion. However there is a much smaller margin of error in the calculation of trends. In trend calculations, the main point is that the definition of military expenditure in the main countries should be consistent from year to year. *» 2 «- changes in weaponry described in the previous chapter mean that the weapons with which these amies are equipped have grown immensely in cost and complexitye Up to now the 'seeoad industrial revolution' •» for examples the commercial and technological exploitation of computers and electronics «• has probably had a mush more powerful impact on the military than on the civil sector» Isi consequence, the relative share of world output devoted to military uses in the years sine® 1949 has been at least double what it was in 19139 when there had already been three years of competitive re-arming between the great powers, It then stood some- where between 3 and 3/2 per eeato From 1950 to 1970, in the whole periood following, the Second Worlworld Warwar, tnthe snarshare cof.worl d output gpi At the end ofthe period in 1970S the figure was to military uses has been about ? per centoZ 3a short, if we compare the period after the Second World War with that before the First, world military expenditure has risen about twice as fast as world output. This means that the world has increased the voliume of resources which it is devoting to military uses at least twenty-fold since the beginning of the centuryo Over the past twenty years, the rise, though rapid, has not been steady (See Chart 1 A)» It has tended to go up sharply in periods of crisis or war, and then level off for a number of years, but without returning to the pre-crisis figure» Thus in the short space of the three years between 1949 and 1952, world adHtary expenditure doubled in real terms „ It then remained approximately level for nine years „ It rose a little in the early sixties,, and very substantially between 1965 and 1968. It then levelled off in 1969, and fen in 1970, With so irregular a mewcsiaent., the calculation of any trend depends greatly on the 'base-year' chosen for the calculation,, If one takes the whole period for which estimates are available - that is, from 1949 to 1970 - the long-term average rate of rise ia world military expenditure, at 5-5/2 per cent a year in real terms, lias been roughly in line with the rate of growth of the world national product „ Proportionately more of the increase came ia the first than the second half of the whole period „ In the nineteen fifties, the rise in real terns was 6-6 '2 per cent a year. In the nineteen sixties, it was 3-4 per cent. In consequence the share of military spending in the world's national product is now less than it was ia I960. It is customary j and obviously convenient, to use the share of the national product as a common measure for almost all kinds of expenditure9 for example, expenditures on health and education. Military expenditures are no exception On the other hand, they can hardly be regarded politi- cally in the same category as expenditure on health and education, as a 'collective good* which should necessarily be accorded a given share of the national output - a claim which is often deployed by the military in discussions about the sis© of defence budgets. There is another reason why it is misleading to treat military expenditures in this way. People might suppose that ware the calculated percentage of the national product vofc d ito military expenditure by rival states to remain steady, they would not be engaged in an arms race. Equally, a falling percentage of national product could be takes to imply that an asms race was 'going into reverse' „ Neither of these inferences would be necessarily true, Indeed, a steady percentage of a constantly rising world output would imply an uaewlisig sms race9 at the same tisae as a fallisg pes-eea&age co&ld e@si§?eal an absolve increase In BdHtary expeBditweSo Significant developments of new weapons eaa oee«r svea •whsn absolute expenditures remain at a constant level, as happened in the period between 1952 astd 1961, when world militazy expenditure, both in absolute teras and at constant prices 5 reaisiBad. fairly steady &at •sstiesa very coasiderabla techsio- logical de^elopiaeiits isi weapomy oee-oxredL QrOy a coafciauoua aad rapid fall in the absolute total of world military exp@aditvre over & number of years could be taken as reliable ereide&es of a really significant slowing of the world anas race. World military 6Kpe&ditur$ is highly eoasesfc^ated in a handful of countries „ A m@re nine eoimtries out of 120^ aesounted for seme $5 per cent of the wo^ld total in 19?0o These e0satri©s » maialy th© major industrial countries of the w»rM » dosdnate^ arei iadeed almost entirely detersainaf, th© ^orld trendo ^ot on3^ do they aeeomt for the bulk of milita^ @Kp@ndit%3r@a fn&y also ce^ot© to adlitasy spsaidtog a larger proportion of their reso«SE*c®sp aboisfc 6 per eent of their than do other count2d©30 Developing coraatries-^plsy a lesser s?ole ia th© global BOTS ^Lth aearly half of the KccriUPs popislatlon,, the^r ae@ount for only aboufc 6 per cent of wrld adlitarj speadiag9 astd their isfluenee oa the world trend is expenditure is eoaseqas^Ij ssainiiaalo Farther^ thoj devote a smaller share of their r©s0i3re I/ I3ie 120 countries eor@r all th@ cotmtri©@ in the world with any sigsaifieant Bilitarj <^penditw®c Ura nin© major cotmbries are: 5 USA, USSR., People s R@p%ibli@ of China, Francep F@l®r&l of Gesfflassy, U£, Poland^ Xtal^r 2/ $ne People's Repniblic of China? whieh has b®sa S&elsided azrasg the nine jisajor milltasy powers,, is ^telnded fr-iss th® total for developing countries„ industrialised eoasEferieSo Overall oaly about 3 /2 per cant of their total ssatioaal output goes to their amed forces0 Averages for th© group of dwelopiag eeantries as & ^hole a?ss hoHSverp misleading,, At the top @nd of the seale^ sosa© aia© developing countries devote more than 10 per e@st of their output to sdlltary purposes,, At th® lowe? ssds the?® are eleven coimt^ies for ^lioh the fig&na is less than 1 per Although militaKgr @p@adittg in d@r^©loping cotsKt^ies is relatively low in relation to that of the advan@ed countries, it is sigalfi= esnt that in the decade of the sixties its rate of growth was appreciably faster in the&veloping emas&rias than th® world average <=> in ©oatrast to what has happened in the aia® major sdlitary powers0 Against a world rise of about 3 per cent a year, ailitasf spending in the developing countries has been increasing at a rate of some 7o2 per e©nt a year0 When the needs of ©eorassle dev&Lopaenb &r@ so pressiasg9 it is a disturbing thought that these countries should have found it necessary to increase their military spending so speedily, particularly when their per capita income is so lo^0 The $110 |>®r eagita devoted to adlltary expenditure by the nine largest speMers ms,y appear a sdnor sacrifice in relation to & £§£ gjggita *^P of $1A37» but to the eitisea of a developing ©ountry^ •uith a ger capita in@«m@ of oslj $20?9 sws®. the diversion of $7 a year for oilitary purposes eaay rob Mm of one of th© "necessities of his life9* This rapid rate of increase shoulds howevers be interpreted with some caution,, Hie srass r&e@ in th® "third world * can b® directly related to the wars in table-h it has been @og%gsd<, ^afc as is fuHy reeogzds@dt, such ©onfliets have not been eo&dueted isdepeadssstlj of the great powers» who have provided [email protected] supplies of weapons and of fiaaae@0 In other regions military ©xpenditiape has b©@a rising from a very low bas©o A zaaaiber of new states have beaa building up their amed forces virtually from nothing. When stated isa terns of percentages, the rates of increase in these countries will obviously appear very higho The arms race has been discussed so far in terms of expenditure,, This is the right basic measure for a study which is designed to ask what the resources new absorbed for military purposes imply in terns of the sacrifice of other opportunities0 There arep however9 other measures which nay have some contribution to make to the analysis0 Theoretically it should be possible to measure the number of men involved in the arms race - i»e0 the 'manpower absorption of military expenditure',, Unfortunately these calculations are difficult in practice „ The number of men in the armed forces is knoim for most countries^ but it is all but impossible to calculate precisely the numbers engaged in the production of goods used by the military =• particularly in countries where weapons are only one product of multi-purpose firms „ Overhead labour has to be allocated between the firm's civil aad military production before any useful calculation can be undertakeno Where estimates have been made, it would seem that the percentage of the country's total manpower employed directly or indirectly in defence has corresponded fairly closely to the percentage of military expenditure in its gross national product» On the other hands when a country relies heavily on conscription for manning its armed forces, and when it pays its conscripts a relatively low wage, estimates of its military expenditure will give a spuriously low indication I/ There are, however, problems of comparability and coverage in estimating world totals0 Some countries have para«Bdlitary forces, which could either be classified as part of the armed forces, or as part of a pa&l&e £$?€©« 0&h@r countries, such as S&eden or Switzerland, rely heavily on reservists who serve for a small part of the year0 of its ssdlitas^ cra&isyss siaee the Mbsw esHfcssit of that has foeasa nadewalm&do Xnth&t ease saasapos?©? is a bsttsr of the eoira&ry's sdlitas-y sfferto Ga the other hand,, ^foere there Is so eoaseriptioHfr it la the Eaaspsterss" astlsasts which probably gives too lew a figure,feeeaiss ei t does aot silo? fos- the fact that the akill of the topical persoa It has b$@n ostifflatsd that abossfe 50 sdlHsn p@opl@ are engaged or is^irest3je fo2> ssllitaEy pOTp©ses ttoe^^i^ the «orld. available iEformatloa do®s not peraiii a menm preeiso fi@£r©9 nor ®m, it b@ said hew th@ n^absra hav@ vas-ied &VST- the yearso Fairly aeewrat© figurss for fehs a^msd foress alone ar® available^ bust th«gr a?® not a good eiabstittit® for It is worth sotiogp h0yw©rD that the fig^r® for th© world's forces as @ ^feole reached a total of 23«»24 million by 1970P aad that it had bam rising at a rato of about 2 p@r e©Effc a y@ar dml^g th@ dacad© of the sixties o ?ery little of this rise ©ee«rrad ia th© uiae saajor militay pcftrers,, ^ose increase in sdHtar^ spesdiag eaa be asseoaassfeed for maialj by the elaboration of the weapons the^ prcKiweed or bought 0 firt-aslS^ all of the increase la adlitsr^- wssp-zfrmj? occwrod IB the dw@lopi®g cornitrtsss •whose sher© of the overall total for the world's armed for@@s Is now about 37 percent9 in contrast to a 6 per cent share in military «oq3onditur@o Over the past deead© the sasaibers ia their araed for@es have been rising by 4 per cent & yea?o Iwo other possible measures of the arms raee may be briefly mentioned,, It would be of scans interest if a measure could be provided of changes in the world's stock of weapons - a 'depreciated capital stock" estimate0 Tliis iSj, however „ more & theoretical than a practical possibility0 There is only fragmentary information about esdsting stocks9 aad about the proportions of military ssqpenditure tM@h are devoted to weapons procure^ rnent* Counts of weapons would be quite inadequate9 because of the trend to product ioprovement whieh isakes for ®x8ssspl&g a new combat fighter a very different weapons-system from one built ten years ago=( The deseriptionof the arms race in terais of stocks of weapons has to be largely qualitative,, Another conceivable measure would be an estimate of the world stock of lethal power <= which of course went up astronomically when nuclear weapons came into being*, The figure is now so enormous » seme years ago it was equivalent to some 15 tons of INT per head of the world »s populatim ° that it is hardly meaningful^ la any event „ estimates of this kind have a greater relevance to a military than to an economic and social analysis of the arms race* For the purpose of this report9 measures of expenditures An estimate baa been sate of th* &orM etodc of fitfttia* ahiv* ougKests tha-c o?er the peslcd 2£*2~™££ ±t rccc i year. (Sm SI&BZ There ia little ^c^^fc tbsfc the v^rH stsck. of ha* boaa ziatog rasddlaro F^eslBefeaQSi hae ff«s^aad hi£&« and saaurt. weapons have a very long lif®9 so that @om® produced at the turn of the ee&tttBy are still in laseo But these are only fragmentary contributions towards a calculation whi6h» with the present restricted flow of information^ is not possible0 =. 9 =" therefor© remaia primary,, It is ®a tfa© basis of th@a that ealeuiaticsss east be sasd© of th© ?@al cost of military spendings that is to sa^p of the <@rmiiy® uses to ^hleti tb® had thegr beea Bats - Ctets 1A. ggtd IB 1A IB &miioas 1970 Prices T«a 1961 155-0 157.4. nd 6.8 1962 l£Tc6 12o7 7.8 1963 175.9 15 »0 &5 196k 150,0 9oO 1965 150.2 15 «>0 9.8 I88o5 10.0 1967 -i 10.8 1968 n.7 1969 206.5 179.7 16.6 12.2 19TO 172 06 12.6 #» pas-iaa feeffare 1961 ia the 3sfole 2 (1961=100) lOOoO 100.0 100,0 1962 1963 U7oO 126»1 196V 109^ 1965 122.2 1966 11*8,6 196? 159o7 1968 149,0 180.9 1970 t G? W8S «f of mlft^ioasagg*.^^^ .-(*•' ' - "Whiles ear terae «f ysteesee do na& a©& tss t» ©aqoire iacfco the Assss Kae®9 -ftfe® erats&a&mtitiffi of &&© ©sfesufe to affect <3ftfe®r finite csf pttMia espa&Sitara Is trade Essare realistic by first nsfee to ia it, cap to f the of ff It netton esfeS. xtfiefcloa iriltl^ ^s^®e^eela@® tSfe® SEOS la aogbistietttefi vaeQpcra»e ®s©ag ^^t seeaE-ity ie asMsessopily Satonnssdl nare is speafc on WMsaastt*s0 SsSs®& Sn ^te field sf aeeiear veapomy rtveante Ag^efare to fee <&te €®s@o Ssefe m? st^p in the slabawitSjaa of wuinar tua^ens ia 3 K^« s.-m'iJjmss stage «? imeeptfiiii^r «n& in tiwn iafe«nsifi^ ^&@ «s^e to &£v@zt ever of and aoa*® ©ff@as of t«^©9i«6ys acd fey -2 «, resources foe basic fields &P scieaee tthieh night bear upon the development of sophisticated ^sapenss the sras space ale© inevitably affects the direction aM teapo of a country's scientific flbort of powerful political decision in a contrary direction, the asms race, particularly in sophisticated saodem weapons,, could go on indefinitely, Out basic reason for its mcstea-tosa is very simple. It is laid bare in the brief account -which was given in Chapter 2 of some developments that haw occurred over the peat decade. Every country * or group of countries, believing -^mt it aS^tt be attacked by another , usually tries to inipro^s its milltaar forces and its arsenal of weapons o She soldier does not wieSi -to be out manbered or "owt=«uasaefin by a potential enemy,, or potentially out^aanoeavred because of his greater nobility, or neutralised by his better defences „ This applies as much to the developing eotmtz-ies <^ilch Isport tfceir «eapaos9 as it does to the most powerful iB&ustrial notions ^Stich develop and nanufacture It is the latter *» not the fotmer « wteo are the pace««etters of the aras race., *Bu& too are the ones i&o,, partly as a result of the development of technologsr for militazy porposea0 have also had an us impact on the development of seieRee=based industries in the civil fieldo Hie spe^ of development of tiie ecrapater and automation industries, of «i« eleetmsies issdustry generally9 and above aH. of aerospace industry, eves eaoxsnouely to -ate relentless urge of the oilitary technologist to work at tii® frontiers of applied scientific teaowledge, and to incorporate in t&e design of ESW weapons @r weapon systeas the nost ad^oieed engineering teehniqiues. The amis race of 13i@ swper^gwers is now a competition to achieve an advantage not in quantity but la quality = in the speed of -3 - t&e s-aage ©sal acese-asr sf fcs&Xistie ssleslXee, in the of tsn&@, in the e&iGiesey of ffsfisr syataBSf, ssad oa0 'Bie osffls asaee Ssas to faefc fceges© a «a it itiself mig&t to^e aa^i is OBIS as&eefc of -3i@ £&PS® Bsftes-e % asw wssa^cea i© a^i^&eSe tSi© isilit^y Sesigaer i as a s^de olreafiy aesignl^; a sm^s e£ t setiw? sMel wM^s <» be laopes wili aet «aSy bs sEea?e e^^eti^e in p^^em^acet, Imt ®ls© less to aeffeaees «bic9i 1^8 ©Shes1 siS® sig^t ists^^ce la s-espease to & new t&p^t. Oba Isy ssei^,8 ©eatsosale to anfi tsdsaic®! Sssewie^g© am fe& !sofeilla®d essal pesSsM$ aM in ps&etiee by the eastesat to %Me& nations era willing to dlwrt jpssoureea frm other social and political esds. the period of tfee "sixties", tits &@grea of dtv®?si»a was * net only, sad state s&rsfftsis&Zy? in those S$at«8 which at one tlas oa* astothor t$es early «iKtiess it still ^moieffl $s®s?&ta%VQ \ibile ailfttesy capeMi-^aw vas 601 per east of SUP ia 19689 the $&&&eetioa of aiiitaay etpi^ent ©eta^ict gtma 1O per cent of" fores of tfco eagiaeairiag inftoatE^s at t&e aaae tios as it id pas? eent of ail ijueiifled se£®atists an& eagiaeera on R •' , , 2a gMitgen to -Sis eeew dm-las ill© pssiod of fiertslciissjat of &ev tiaapons qualitative cfcaugee ia aroazasats also geaerats ^saatitetive ea& ctaaaaes ia asansiossp trithin the «rae& s«9roieee,> Ae haw 'been said® the K»sfl»es?8 of sMUefi tetSiadciaRs recio&E^ Star of «vemmf«» B^fiiisticatca ei^eat ham to •aft hi^besr atanterite «f skill asS -tesiaiaag os* tbe psrt of poraannsQL eltso becoEs ese@st&2lo An ca&$&ex effl^jgesta itegna to to 1ba dttv^Ui^itog coxmtoles fiiafiEg tito past d«Be£e» tSwy too SK»?« of t£teix> eeese© te^mi^ aaqpewer to nilitary fem to be ts^aiiaea alxrtm&p CSP eoplegrlas foreign » all to t&e Setriiraist sf a imsse fs?aitftaa use ef St veudift l» an eae^gemtiim to daira *6ia,t ailltaxy R end D9 and the 8eeondacs?y tacdtaeilQgieal «^ eSxtstiitiea de^aafis vbicb it geaaswte&s, still «ttraets itoffl "^sot tes^iaa" to be fctmfl ia tbs pocOL of stelesrtific; «a& engiaeeriiq; mngpotver ©f tli« ©s^sr insSssatei^, pa^EPBo Bat ainee tfea Mb«att> srd eltra^B searee, l&sra am be little doabt that aaa D can have aa ianatiosssry «f£teet ia tilts eeissfeific market r9 in so ef ccicjice=feifi«ii liaSusfey,, it feas also put its Sspriat oa the growth of 0oi«art>ifieteJ8w3L©ag0 9b y stisiudLetis^ & dessaM fea? certain of eyeeialistf «M of eesta&s MMs of sj^tselaHssfi iaftoacsatiOBf, out tAdd& doair«a sdlitssy inpe^ects earaM not be a£M,a«sd« xeeovA of aivffisoet wsspsm gr^s«asE®e in the "airties** aaagr illly®tssati^ ef -K&© s&aa®snsseaffe ef cestly pyojeets 'before tfteSr ooaii>l«tioiap asd sftep feaMy^s of gaOliens of dollars a testes-legies! or seleatifie it «aas to @a esfl. fcsused <&sss$& fesesas© the eseat®^ of ^ais is easily tanas ia th® geetssp of s&maee a single ®asgias figs9 & asfetoe 60 ssatss1 4@t airlia It i® act esilsr tlsat aei? tedasKdj^^ el.^e^@ "stafe© of tfee srfe" ^ieSi it s@ee@$Ssp CK" thatip eejKfepzar to ©f e^s^aie t^m^m^o a gesssmtiea is d«eigo®ft ts» a?e$3£g© ^ffi^^f aagnjits^ly ttag-mi @«s& to of -^saa froa s&v&t t® tsa SEP ^at @o^ to BffiO.it®iT ®3^©sslltees g^saias e^tsastf, -Kbis s^aas ttefe at tesgffe Qst ESS© ttea tfe© ®sa© ^sr^^^im ®f & S®f esc® liMget voi&A lue B aM D east® it <^nswt be SISTO of adiievijtg gs^stor sssusti®' fer ^©^®tlsg to th« z%ee f its ffes&sresso A2s^a«§y 1^© siac© Iras &esult@& la £t CHAPTER V. The national consequences of the ©gas race^and^military eapeadituye The resources which USF& allocated for military purposes 32*6 a Measure of what Is denied other avenues of public and private expenditure. If countries had not felt themselves driven to embark on large programmes of military spend- ing» the resources so consumed could obviously have been put to many other uses. There is no way of saying what these would have been, any more than it could be claimed that the total volume of national resources would have been the same if countries had not built up the industries concerned in the manufacture of modern armaments. While the main social and economic factors « capital, labour„ technology «• which as?e responsible for growthe and their interact ion» are not fully understood9 the central economic objective of Host countries is a fast rate of economic expansion. In orthodox economic theory the determinant of growth which is accorded greatest smprasis is the increase in the stocl of capital» and relation- ships arc postulated between the rise in that stock end the rise in output to which it is likely to give rise. The social factors are usually treated under the heeding "investment in man5 - investment in order to increase the healths well-being* education and potentialities of a countryBs citizens. Clearly this social Irsvestraent should not be considered simply as a means to faster economic growth. It i» also an end in itself. And clearly^ too,, military expenditures absorb resources which are substantial enough to make a considerable difference both in the level of fisced investsaent - that is6 to the addition to capital stock to provide new production facilities9 as well as new processes in existing enter* prises — and to the volume of resources which can be devoted to improving man's lot through social and other services. ^i@re is no lack of investment opportunities in the world. Most countries have waiting lists of investment projects, tieularly in ths public sector^ During the past deeade0 vorld military ootls^s (converted to 1970 prices) hav® totalled some $1,850 billion. Probably a'bout one»thi?d of thisp say $60O billion, vas devoted to the procurement of products of the engineering and build- ing industries,, In theorys and using the same approximate c&pital/output ratioe if there had been no military expenditures at all, and if $600 billion had been I/ The aiiaple use of a marginal capital/output ratio of y vould suggest that such a transfer would accelerate the growth rate by 1 per cent. This is clearly an overstatement,; since there are few esaasplss of relatively sudden increases in the level of investment of this magnitude. But even tf the effect on the growth rate were only half as big as that suggested by the nor» raal capital/output ratio,, it vould still yield a v@ry considerable increase ia output over time. used instead to sssarafaetape capital goods for civil 0&fcpats these capital goods could have resulted in an annual output worth about $200 billion a y®are This is the equivalent of the national incomes of France and Italy combined. This purely illustrative* but admittedly •anrealistlee calculation simply assvaaes the transfer of the building and engineering components of world military expenditure,, not the transfer of all military outlays. The illustration is provided merely to give some economic perspective to the stain issiae vith -Bhieh v© are dealing. fhe problem of inadequate investaaent is particularly acute for developing countries. At their present levels of investment the gap between &ieir standard of living end that of the Industrialised countries is almost certain to "besoms fas* wider than it is today. One of the basic issues of the process of social and economic developssent in the developing countries is that net? productive sectors East be created which are now more or less entirely lacking. Their in- vestment needs are heavy because a great deal of their economic infra«8trueturee for eJEeoaple* transportation? has to b@ built up more or less from nothing. Hits huge unsatisfied requireient for capital was recognised in formulating an inter*- national strategy for the Second United Rations Development Decade. Resolution 2626 (XXV) of the United Rations General Assembly stated that in order to attain a 6 per cent growth rate in developing countries « eosTesponding to a 3.5 per cent growth rate per head -> the ratio of gross deszestie savings had to rise by 0»5 per cent a year* until it attained the level of about 20 per cent by 1980. For this to be done? as the resolution points out,, the developing countries must ^keep the increase In their current public expenditure under close scrutiny with a vietr to releasing the msSwm resources for investment.* Yet one of the largest items in current public expenditure in most countries is military expenditure. It is clearly unlikely that the developing countries will be able to achieve a a&gsive increase in their i&vest&ent; from the resources they themselves eomaand. were vorld military ©sgjsndito-es tofo ® s'dbstsatieliy reduceds the of the benefit wcrald obviously aeerts.® to -She developed eoantriesp sine® they ©re the ones friio a?® responsible for a&owfe nifie»tenth@ of world ssilitary spending. If sons of the released resources were to fee issed for accelerating economic growth rates where the need is greatest,? theses would therefore hawe to be a transfer froa the developed to the developing countries fey -nay of increased aid. This point is discussed later la this Report. The perfcieular "social f@st«xs>* -wSiieh directly esaee2?siw economic growth is the lerel of education. Fay more is Jjwolved here thsn just the scientific and «ngiaoe?iag ksiswledg® ^xich goes into g'oseasreh @st9. dewelotpaent assfi. \ifeieh lends to new techniques and new teshnologsr. %e saansgeffial ability and ©^®?ieae® aecessssy to organiae end eoixteol psio&ueti(m processes» and the skill and sd&pts&ilitjr of the vo£>Ic$x>8 011 the shop^lees^ ars (grresy felt as Important,, if oot laoTd so. ^Reaearcih end Develo|ffitent7 hacrs "b&sn institisfcloasaliaea In ®od«sm indtsstsdsd societies so that innovation is no longer the haphsam-a ps^seess that it was in the period of the isolated fswento?. In eonsequenee^ j?«3«Ereh and development's sh®r© in the S national product of SMra3tJ?i©l eowitries has ?is@n fast. For ©mapleB R end D% consuned only an esttmted 0.3 per ceirfc of the national p^odiaet of the tfoS.A. before the Second World W@s?, 2he figure was ©feo^& 1 per cent at the start of the 1950s. In 2$69 it was 3 P&? eent. There has "been a sSailar tiptrnffd trend in the Soviet tfaion,, vith the share of research and development espsadit^r® in national income rising frm 1 per eent in 19^0 to 3=7 per cent in 1966.^ Other highly indus- trialised societies ha&e not lagged far behind. There is also little doubt that there has tern a eonsidesufele increase in formal education for management. Modem sasnagaasnt t@ehniqtses ar@ being increasingly tat^htp racier than acquired by s&oiple practice mid ©sperisnees, both of ^hieh» of coras® 9 still have a powerful part to play in the paroeesso Correspondinglys, there Source to come froa M. Meyer. has been & considerable increase too in the foraal training of skilled w©s*k@s?sfi where again it has been f0un& insufficient simply to r«ly on the aeepisition of techniques on the shop-floor. Xhese new requirements have led to the intensive development of educational systems $ end in virtually all eou&tries the share of national output which goes to education has risen (in the United States $ for ©samples from 3| per cent in 1959 to about 6| pa? cent in 19$9)« In most developed countries expenditure on education now consu&ed W> pe? cent of total resoa?e@s. T3ie percentage is lover - between 2 wid 5 per cent °» in developing countries, but he?® also the educational ehare has been rising. In Btoet countriess hOTJ€^er9 more is still devoted to military purposes than is spent on education generally B, and far more than goes to research end d€ftelop*» ment for the civil sector of the eeono^fo Obviously the sittzation voild be different if a siseable part of the financial resources no^ demoted to uses ve?e directed to isaprwring the facilities for edue&tiam sad for civil research and development,, But as has aXrsedy l»®@n pointed outg at least as important is the fact that the snaed forces ia indiastrialised countries absorb a disproportionately lerg® share of the ®waila!>le teehnicaUy s&illed personnel^ Modem aosniee are equipped with hi^l^ sophisticated amaaaents ^iose dewelopeents maintenance and operation demands the TSBG of highly skilled Rganpever all aloag the line, fhe 'opportimity costs9 ef military expenditures have therefore to be thought of not Jost in terms of a f in®aeial njeasws1©. fne s^talitati^a aspect of the personnel concerned is critical. In shorfep a gted«©ti®a in military espenditnre could today contribute greatly to && Deceleration of ^orld economic grov^is however fflweh the latter nay have been spvered by th@ tsdiaologis&L edvenees which the resources allocated to military K & D made possible. Bub economic grouth» Tshich alw@y@ demands aiore f issd investment and more resources for education, is only one aspect of the matter., Apart from education, there is ttie need to build «p efficient health seyv&ces, «feieh even in the wealthier to asset tiiaes the feed total ef gubXie£$- la lih© THQ&&& ©s while the wcsr-M spspMs ©a E83Bt« EQ^si'&jg itK^ateaat s^^sssaats ©^f e^out 5®^ ISB tan® woslS ©s a «ltole fas- it dwtng ^i® sfetii®s th^s to th® l&PGTOa ffiffisHsjesimsiitalhass^& o Kiessi it islghfc Is© saifi^ si©jsgpss^Bt the pesl&i'wa sM@ of th@ the past 9 '^[J^.AWCS c ta ssll oasfe the T is1© to 1m dsalt applied to the psfdblssa of using the earth's phg^iml jf©8esi$?e©is to % isagr does aofc ©afisisgsr th@ li&ely needs of fu'oss1© gSRamttoa. Processes to g iaelssdisig the s-ea-eyeling of i?a&t$» ®s?e howler asss no* lilsely to IMS med© freely availed.® to -feaekl© the ^e f®s» the ^oteetio^ of th© eoafliet with oth@s> fields of 5h® '&&S&&R of hotasing aM -to!anspaeft©ti©nj, as well ©s th® eve «&<2aa?ly Sn Si^eet 1sisflg«ta2y empa^itiosi Is is a SSSIRS f the m^-ld in -to £©Hy it ia sc^se-j if sot all this ®&ront^@ of a sssftefeim to ist ©rd®? that sil th® j?®Q®m th® fatw©s os» for the p^evS.sioa of sff of is Mghe ee ^i@s?@ it stoss do sot -.easily aeeesmsodat© to ^iaug®s ia th@ ®€@QQ@I@ sitissti^a ©f 8 in -with Military1 @2d©enel®S0 ©ad with th© tlaj®"8yel® of milltaxy ®his eossidemtioa beesaes oTb^ieias ufaea., fop some jpsesons, 02° othes?e tli© OBthoiffitiea deeid© that military ®sjp8nditTH>8 Suss to te shelly incpeassdj as has 1 happened oa jaes?e thaa one oeession in the pQat^ras psriod (Chart 1A)0 In developed nexfcst ceonssaiesj, th© authorities ©£•© fsesfi 'tflth a nssa'feer of raspalatefel© in imislng th« neceae^y ajMitlonal r@e Shis has am1® thsst %QT va^ of stadt&eed social «s^enaitas?«e ead so alter ®s£®ss dassend t© forse ^> prices and @ee^.«jaa.t® th@ pass of ia?latlcm0 Ac iaflatisn®^ p£&s@ss9 oaea genesutedj, is diffi«lt sad eostly to step,, Ss^slsnce shows that a ©hasp awing la military esp^aiitts?® can hav® affeets vhich v In eentraA2y planned e^neadsss acy psloslty gives to ailit^j sets consts^aints «m the flexibili^r with tiMdi the esot^sa^ eaa 1>@ plan&@d raoata hat® to fall ©atis^ly oa the civil see&oBv esafl th@ p^ei&lea of the prepes? e^ailitei^m l?gtwis@n arapply mid dosmrai fos? t^^iciss ind3&tri@s and Beetors beeeeaes appreciably mc®« diff icwlto In d@w>l9piag ecfantelesff the tas^feasci is limited, ffc® p©y ^ eivil and th« eost ®f militasy forces often tak© ^p ssost @f a Fsssthesrs, sine® in Eaany sis^h eo^Eata?i®s mseh of th© f issaasee fo? meat eomes t&m the burden on the fealaaee of pjajTagnts fo? th@ psm^hase of szm fs= effect cm highly eoae@a&mte& in a limit©! @acl to ©o?s@ eomitari@B it is sdso hi^ly coassn-teatsd in aoteeft ses-liee oa^ the also f cap -ai@ a&aadosuasat of iss i^iieih t@£® of of man ctgy "be di?eeti«m h®^@ to ^i@ past led to s?jM©nly f inA that what vith m> alteximtive l®ft th«to! Mfe to « A ®osas of th© pesras-ftal S3sSsasts»ialis«& esaal3?iiss0 If tJaesrefog'® v4sh«s -to ©ecgfflis£® sophisticated wea$oas» end if em of th© eotsats'ios them has no wish to pwifl© th©a T?y way of saaiitag^ aM8 th© dwelapiag could ineasf a eoosiitefflM.© Tfealsaes ®f jsgwsffla&s cost in wsapoas to a tgrpieesi patt^a-n ©f civil d€«ffiSc. eeleralatloas hav@ feesa m$&® of the in d^sand fos? & seleatsd g?o«^ of L®OTiti®ff "s ta^es t@ ^ insert®! h®$>@}. F©p s^ ©ffifflwas^j £@ th© as naeh as C@) 1®^ esest. FOTtltss^ this e@lei2lg,ti«m tstes acs aees^at of possibility ttot th@ ^®asf of p^jassits festfc"s®sa th® aajos? e@isateies0 In maSntaining tstx^s and feasss in fopsiga emmts'leg. Bisrisg smse p@^t a«p asssad ia ospte? to pro^ids,, S9^e & pool «? fo&e®,, or deal ^i-^i eatesgensieB siseh ®s of tfee assis s®c© 1® the ia weapm^. 13ie Sae&ad HM. 'che^® Ijsesi sxo •sr&s'j, the^@ is little s^asoa to that the aatitms of tli@ trorld umaia. haT© de^o-fced to eivil than d@f?otsd to of ©eaipjfeespsp of ate ts?@mporfc tJie Seeoad World War to ^fcie d«wlfi^se8st efif ^ms designed to ig%&w&8& p"®ei3@ steps left its EJKBk on all is still ss& th® pase at ^ifaieh aetraad that th© designed te solve t&@ w»rldg@ present soelsl ©nd ©esmcsjiffi pffdfetessg, arad the isap^^mmt of is^Sly t&e weld's uiest passing th© to th© She gpias^off fj?caa milit®^ R & 35 -win b®lp littl© ia soiTiag the into th h@@ il<^,piSd to SE'SatiS ®. p@^hol^g&€^X ea^a£&jgi&-%>ouiu(. t^i «aw«*as-&ia.ij(a«.^p | of fear and ®3S3letye ©i? ^.t®gziatlKily ecf s©«i®l ^©jsstloa ©a? dislll^asies,, •» all states dif raind -ahidi eaaaot tefe %® ^^€t@£L te» ^w ©sp ®sad if { ©f ^J©£> a gsssemttea feat the wa^ltii. is ©a to all -E&st is -aiaieh ia aoss lialief to Bssa"s in th© s^post,, A3J. that n@$a Is© said is tSmt f ps&pi@ did in -Hi© asmsi still do. also is Is f@lt in oros^ this ia t© th© otfe®? sids^ sad la gsisis?®! @®fe t© 5, Zudcerman CHAPTER VI The, economic asad social eomaieguenees of military expenditure from the international point of view However considerable the impast & eountry's military expenditures have oa the attitudes of its people and on the implmentation of national policies im the civil field, the purposes these ©xpenditures are meant t© ®@rv® ar® by definition imteraatioaal ia ©haraeter, Firom time immemorial owatrie® have armed in order to defsaad their 'national issfc ©rests ' = whatever they may be taken to be =• and ia order to assure their security against possible aggr©s<= sion, The seale of military expenditures has always been a r©fleetioa of the degre© of international tension whi@h eadsts in different regions ©f the world Isa the world as a whole „ If maeskiaid were at p©ae The amount that assy one of the industrialised countries contributes as 'aid1 to the developing world is elearly decided in the light of all the ©alls mad® on the resources at its disposal, aimd so has to take it© place in a list of natiomal priorities. As already noted, total world military expenditures are @om© thirty times the amount, officially doaated as aid, although the met figure for official a@sistaa@e of $60? billion = whi@h is the basis of the ratio estimate of 1 : 30 - almost certainly understates th© total volume of 'aid4 whi@h ©learly should also ijselud© investment ©apital from private as well as governmental sources. On any reekoning the difference between the two kinds of estpenditure is, however, ©normou^o At the same time it i® not neee^sarily the e^se that the two ar© inversely correlated, that aid would tegreag© were military expenditures to deeliaae. It is a paradoxical faet that official figures indi@at@ that the developing ©ousatrie® whiefe re@@iv© most aid as°© usually those •whieh spend most, per capita, im the btailding«up of their mili°=> tary forees. Moreover, it is not obvious? how all ©ountrie® diff©r©aiiate military and ©@onomi© aid0 Faets about the seale of tann& trade or sjrffig aid normally held seeret, aad there ar@ no official figures for the direct tary aid some aras~exporting ©ountries provide. Unofficial sources present a gloomy pi@ture of some producing ©ousstries trying to lower their unit ©©sis for armament by eneouragisrag the sales to developing ©ountries not oraly of obsolescent but even of modem equipment; and of others giving weapons md weapoa^systems away for pr@mimably purely political r@as®a@0 A tna® picture of the relation of the volume of aid for eeonomi© and @o@ial purposes to that represented by transfers of arm© might repeal some very startling features, especially when it is remembered that many, if not most, of the recipient ©oumtries aeeos-d at least as high, if not a higher, pzloflty t© military as do t® e©®n®mi© aid. In the long-tssm = and parti@tnlarly T^@SJ one takes int0 a@©ovt the problems whi@h ai°@ g^gaerated by rapidly multiplying population \sho^® @xp@©tation@ of higher standards of liviag go ©n rising - tter© ©an b® littl® doubt that e@@snomi© aid is the mor@ important from the point of view of a stable condition of p©a®i© in the world* Thia point is? generally a«s<3©pt®d, y@t official figures do not suggest that the g@nero^iity of donor @ounirie@ be®n propofftiossat® to their meanja (se@ Chart 2)s ®p that their generosity ±m P2°oid.disig @@onomi@ r@sow@©@, their h©lp in tru® t®©Smi@al aid, has always that ik military aid0 In s»hort «= as has already been suggested = ther© is no- elear yet that the volume of aid would automatically imnsreae© if military lo Were the latter to happen, th© bulk of the r@@our@®@ whi@h be released, and which are sometimes referred to as the 'disarmament dit»ld©nd», would almost ©ertainly b© under pressure to be used by the ©ountrie^ who are today's main military spender® in the @atisfa@tioas of ^fulfilled domestic d@maads for the strengthenisag of their finaa©ial position generally, for investment, for the improvement of the social @er^i@©e, or for personal mfflsumption,, It would ©ertaialy be eoonomieally possible to divert resources released from militei^r budg@t@ for additional etsonoadLc aid to the developing countries,, But this -would depend on th® statesmanship ©f th® ©ountsies ©osieeimed and on major polities! It is unfortunate, th@i?©fop@9 that pjfevious experi It would take only a % per ©eat phift of asms KKpeaditw® to derolopawt to make it possible to appreaefe th© offi@isl d©^el©pm®iai assigtaa©© tairg©io The Pr@sid®at of the World Bsusk has suggested that s^©& & ndfflor sihdffc ©onild b® a©hi«v©d sn@r@ly by ©artailiag the Bta^gisa of imasfe® iss ©adstissg pro grannies* o Obviously a HKsr© substantial airtailmssit of th® asros raee K^ske popisibl© for th© first tiara the kisid of massif© trausfes0 of fell ia the donor ©ouastriss aa°@ highly ©pe@ialia®d isa th® skill© they hav© been us^iiag, asad ar® not noeessasdly th© peopl© who eould help in raiding the yield© of os-ops, or ija developing wates0 supplies., It will tak© time befog1® the resource® whi©h war© devoted to their tfaiaisag and prodtt©® a geaeratioia of men ©OTpeteat to haadl© what ar® ©ailed t&e 'R asd D problems of development'. Equally it does not follow that the multiplieati@8i of the financial reiourees whi@h go t© agidoiltural r@s@ar©h will se© a eom=> mesa&urate iaereasie in dis@overies of the kind that hav© p?ovid©d Isidia, the Philippines, and other developing ©ountries •with vastly better strains of and oth@r graiffl@ than were at theis0 disposal b©for©; or that a t®i-times to th© farnd© •««hi@fe go t© resnareh into the physiology of haanan r®pi°odu@tioa would ad<9an@e the day wfaeaa the growth of population ©aaj be regulated by a@@eptabl@ asad reliable meaaso Advan@©@ @u@h as these depend far mor© osa genius ttea on ae>neyt far more on the i^^pired r@@&ar©h •weirker ths® on batallions of a@olyte@o On the other ha$d, there ©an b@ no doubt that a @on@©rt@d .aad @®ntiwo@© @@i@ntifi@ atta@k on problems of development by ©itlzens of the @ountri@@ ©oneeimed, aided ^dier® appropriate by scientists from the more ad^aneed @ouaitrie@ of the world, would inevitably have a major and @riti@al influence on the way development programmes are formulated and th ol^o i'ie • rt US |j \>n, Curre.'-f yri'cu. 100 1 SO 2.OO '_ ^m^M^z/^mmMj. «l»*ra IOO, 'vjr.j . -Tv\c o.Cel P»'^Vts or o -.*.» '* * t liine wafi«^ its tteea>t9 v® are held b*ek @f @f tte© lo fell It fej It tfe® f&'igt'fej @ss fefe© P&isMM'fe&^s