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AIR rcvicwU N I VERSI TY THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL Of THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

U.S. M il it a r y Stratecy: P aradoxes in Per spect ive...... 2 Maj. Edd D. Wheeler, US.AF Mish a p Analysis: An Impr o ved Appr o a c h to Air c r a f t Accident Prevention . . . 13 Col. David L. Nichols, US.AF T he Many Faces of the Spa c e Shuttle...... 23 Williani G. Holder T he Lea d-Time Problem: T heory .and Appl ic a t io n s ...... 36 Lt. Kenneth C. Stoehrmann, US.AF Lvtel l igence and Information Pr o c essin g in Co un t er insur c en c y...... 46 Dr. Charles A. Russell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, US.AF T he Middle East, 1973: C old W.ar Chances and Amer ic a n Interests...... 57 Capt. Bard E. O Neill, US.AF Air Force Review Modern Communications, a Wise Investment...... 63 Maj. Gen. Paul R. Stonev, US.AF ln My Opinion O rcaniz.atio.nal Devel o pmen t : C an It Be Effective in the Armed Forces? ... 68 Lt. Col. Peter E. LaSota, US.AF Capt. Robert A. Zawacki, USAF Syst ema t ic Reso l ut ion of Social Problems within the Mil it .ary...... 73 Capt. Jon M. Samuels, US.AF Books and Ideas A chtunc! Fuecer th vppex! ...... 80 Dr. Alfred Goldberg A C o mmun t t y within “A Nation of Strangers" ...... 89 Col. Andrew J. Dougherty, US.AF Marjorie M. Dougherty T he C ontributors...... 95

Addra* rrunuMnpts to Editor. Air Lm vm itv the cover Brvirw Drvidon. Bldg. 1211. Maxwdl AFB. AL 36112. Printed b> Covrmmenl Printing Office. In "The Many Faces of the Space Shuttle." Williain Addreit lubtcnpíiom to Supcrintrndent of G Holder savs that the shuttle is on its way Doou menti CPO. Washington DC 20402: yearly hnt onlv after many years and many viciv- $6.00 domruic. $10.00 foreign; single copy $1.50. \itudes Tl»e Air Force lias been a prime mover in research and development of the shuttle tech- nology and will play ari important role in iLs launching and subsetpunt operation. The shuttle is lieuig dcveloped by National Aeronautics and Space Administratíon (NASA). Our cover VoL XXIV No. 5 J ix r - A t a i T 1073 depicts a shuttle engiric configuraiion mockup. U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY Paradoxes in Perspective

M ajor Edd D. W h eel er T IS difficult for the modem student of strategy to point to a cogent defi- nition that rings with clarity and truth. Perhaps he will have to settle for a prosaic one even if somewhat less than profoimd. ITerminologists tell us, in langnage often not easily understandable, that strategy deals with the “development and employment of national power, including military power in peace and war, to secure national aims against antagonists in the international environment.” 1 Although this statement may be true, it is hardly clear, for we are caught almost immediately in the

ambiguities of precisely what constitutes most difficult conditions.” 2 Yet one might national power and even more so in its question why strategy should be considered elusive “development and employment.” experimental as opposed to systematic, or The rest of the definition does little to crys- why more practical than impractical. After tallize its meaning. all, successful strategy is not necessarily ex- A common definition which is clearer, perimentally practical; it might well be because shorter, but which does not seem systematically impractical, especially if it entirely true, States that strategy is “the art is to achieve surprise. of the general. ” One might reasonably argue, Moltke was correct, however, in one im- and many have, that strategy is both “art portant respect, for he seemed to sense that and Science,” thus implying that there is a strategy is characterized by indefiniteness good measure of method as well as imagi- and difficulty. These two wrinkles, which nation in strategy. Furthermore, it can be actually might be considered one in that reasoned that, in order to transmit substan- they nin across the same seam, must be tial meaning, the definition of strategy pressed upon and a working definition of cannot be too generalized. Specifics are strategy ironed out before we can turn needed; indeed, most of history’s great specifically to the subject of U.S. military strategists were quite specific in addressing strategy. the subject. Napoleon, for example, formu- As with most endeavors, strategy has be- lated no less than 115 concrete maxims come progressively more complex with the related to the realm of strategy. passage of time. Twenty-two hundred years Unfortunately, some definitions seem ago, Scipio’s strategy involved only breaking lacking in both clarity and truth. “Strategy,” through Hannibal s front line of war ele- according to Prussian Field Marshal Count phants in order to win a complete victory Helmuth von Moltke, “is a system of ad hoc at Zama. Two thousand years later, strategy experiments; it is more than knowledge, it had become more scientifically and math- is the application of knowledge to practical ematically oriented, as evidenced in detailed life, the development of an original idea in preoccupation with such matters as the accordance with continually changing cir- geometry of marching formations and battle cumstances. It is under the pressure of the alignments. Even so, as late as the first

3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW decade of this century it was possible for shadow of Armageddon cast by unsound the dying Field Marshal von Schlieffen to Soviet decisions to base missiles in Cuba. capsulize what was to be the German grand Nonetheless, because war—or perhaps the strategy at the beginning of the World War absence of war—is the ultimate test of the with his direct dictum to “make the right success of military strategy, it is appro- wing strong.” priate to address briefly the nature of war- Those relatively simple days now seem fare, especially modem warfare. as dead as Schlieffen. The contemporary War is nasty business and exacts a dear strategist must pick his difficult way through price. The only question is how much one the sometimes opaque rhetoric of counter- is willing to pay. force, controlled response, graduated deter- Lest this approach seem oversimplified, rence, and the rest. Half the battle is in- another perspective might be added. Thomas volved in learning the new langnage of C. Schelling, who has the talent for ordering battle. The path is winding and too often complex issues into simple form without windv.J being simplistic, says that “war has always, Through the frequent heat and infre- or almost always, been a bargaining process; quent light, what then can be said? For and limited wur in particular is a bargain­ my purposes, I offer that military strategy ing process. Today’s kind of limited war is a plan o f action for pursuing those ob- involves two kinds of bargaining: bargain­ jectives established by the government as ing about the outcome and bargaining being necessary to its best interests. To about how the war itself (‘the bargaining’) ampíify this definition, three caveats might is going to be conducted.” 3 In light of both be added: approaches, mine and Schelling's, what • Military strategy is essentially a then can be said of limited war? program for action, as opposed to inaction and commitment to the status quo. a bargaining contest • Military strategy takes into account First, limited war is a bargaining contest. not only military factors but all those which Bargaining involves give and take; price is figure importantly in the nation’s power, not absolute. The parties are willing to e.g., political stability, economic strength, negotiate in light of reason—never mind and national resolve. whose—and come to terms that are accept- • In pursuit of national objectives able, though perhaps not equally so, to through strength, it is imperative to eon- both. Yet it is important to remember that sider the objectives and strengths of others, war, limited or otherwise, is a contest. It especially those of antagonists. involves contestants who want somehow to win. The parties in conflict may not wish The Nature of War to throw away the mie book or to be pe- nalized excessively, but each is looking for Military strategy does not cause war. In gain, almost always at the opponent's fact, a lesson of history seems to be that expense. war is more likely to ensue from a void in This lesson may glint cold to our eyes, strategy or from the absence of sound but we should not fail to read it. In the strategy. Witness the results of the lack of cushioned and sometimes eushy language of British and French military preparedness in international relations, we tend to overlook the face of Munich, or the threatening a hard fact: winners and losers still exist. V.s. MILITARY STRATEGY: PARADOXES IN PERSPECTIVE 5

Another fact which should not be forgotten In contrast to Clausewitz, who believed is that the winner achieves dominance (the that nothing short of “great and general word victory currently being somewhat engagements will produce great results,” 5 passé) through superior force or threat of Mao would choose initially to hit and run, force. to avoid decisive confrontation. Indeed, Thus, limited war is a contest in which this decision is more the product of pru- one forcibly drives the hardest possible dence than doctrine, for insurgency begins bargain for gain which he believes the other as a frail flower (or weed, depending upon side will find acceptable. Because the ob- the individual perspective). Time is needed jective sought in all likelihood has definite for it to put down roots and nourish itself in limits, so does the injurv one is willing to the fertile soil of discontent and unfulfilled inflict—and the price one is willing to pay expectations. Care must be taken to avoid in doing so. Lest the whole business appear the gardener’s pruning before the stalks are entirelv callous and disgusting, it should be numerous and full grown. Yet in all this, added that the objective sought might be Mao is merely biding his time, waiting for something as selfless as assisting one’s friends the moment when the insurgency can blos- in time of honest need or peril. som forth and assert itself through open and Many friends of the U.S. have problems superior strength. At that moment, when the with insurgency, that form of active op- weeds are deep-matted and the lilies fester- position by a group against the recognized ing, the gardener will be subverted. govemment. Although it stops short of open rebellion, for such practical reasons as lack Giap’s dream of adequate support or ripeness in timing, insurgency is generallv armed, violent in General Giap has also pitted his insurgent nature, and entirelv serious in its intention talents, with varying degrees of success, to achieve overthrow. It is difficult to de­ against the green thumb of the establish- fine and probably all the more dangerous ment. Of his successful campaign against because of its absence of sharp definition. the French, he writes: “There was no clearly- defined front in this war. It was there where the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it the gardener will be subverted was everywhere.” 6 This is a memorable To understand insurgency, it is helpful to statement and doubtless true of the early investigate the writings of insurgents. Two stages of guerrilla operations; yet Giaps notable experts are Mao Tse-tung and Vo most spectacular success was not “every­ Nguyen Giap. Their mastery of the art of where’’ but at one plaee in particular. It insurgency or guerrilla warfare has been was at Dien Bien Phu, where he was able greatly influential in changing—and rav- to pin down and overrun with brute power aging—the face of modern Asia. And they the flower of French forces in Indochina. have caused us no small grief in the process. Giap has been much less successful against Mao, undeniably one of the great military the Americans in Vietnam, largely because strategists of this centurv, writes: “There of their refusal to be pinned down. In fact, is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a one of the key features of that war is the decisive battle. . . . In guerrilla warfare, fact that Giap has been thwarted by power- small units acting independently play the ful and highly mobile forces continually principal role, and there must be no ex- pushing him into defensive actions. The cessive interference with their activities.” 4 would-be hunter found himself hunted. 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

When Giap chose to violate his avowed • Plan for high costs. (This is advice belief in the diffuse front and launched which, seen in the light of the war in Viet­ large-scale offensives, as in early 1968 and nam, needs no footnote.) the spring of 1972, the results were disas- • Escalate deliberately, and if pos­ trous. In these two instances, Giap lost sible rapidly, and talk peace from a position hundreds of thousands of men in an attempt of strength only when the sincerity of the to relive his glory at Dien Bien Phu. He opposition is unquestioned. Actions which got only nightmares for his trouble. There fali short of this approach will probably is every reason that Giap s sleep should be be interpreted as weakness or lack of resolve. haunted by Phantoms, both the type that strike from the air and those that waver up the shark’s mouth from graves dug by his insistente that his version of history repeat itself. Although awesome in its dimensions and fearsome to contemplate, general war is simpler to describe than limited war. It coun terinsurgency has the clean yet jagged, open, and terribly The American experience in Vietnam has final simplicity of a shark’s mouth. As for certainly not been an unqualified success. general war with nuclear weapons, Dr. Nor should it stand as a model of how best Schelling points out that it is identified with to conduct counterinsurgency operations, if language which speaks of destroying a nation for no other reason, insofar as the United as a viable society and that “for shorthand States is concerned, than that the future this is often taken to mean wiping out half will not soon permit corresponding outlays the people or more.” 8 of blood and treasure when our vital in- The objective of general war is to destroy terests are not immediately at stake. But the enemy’s ability and will to continue with nations which hope to mount successful whatever resourees and weaponry are avail- counterinsurgency operations, that is, oper­ able. It is difficult to envisage the price a ations aimed at defeating guerrilla actions, nation would consider too high to pay for would do well to remember the following success when the price of defeat is total precepts, all of which are substantiated by destruction and loss of national existence. what South Vietnam and the United States The example in World War II of Germany’s either did or failed to do: choice not to use her stockpile of chemical and biologieal agents is not whollv con- • Keep the “weeds” cut: encourage vincing to the contrary, since that decision social reform and programs aimed at re- was eonditioned by questions as to the effi- ducing popular discontentment; failing that, ciency and decisiveness of those weapons begin vigorous pmning operations against and by the specter of a more massive re- insurgents as early as possible. taliation in kind. It is a fairly safe assumption, • Stay mobile and engage the insur­ therefore, that general war between two gents only under conditions that are most major powers possessing nuclear weapons favorable to your strengths.7 will involve the use of those weapons. Only • Do not promise the boys “home by when one nation possesses a decided nuclear Christmas” or, for that matter, by the Lunar advantage over another might the smaller New Year—long duration is one of the few power decide not to use nuclear weapons, common characteristics of all counterin- even in a general war, for fear of swift surgent actions. and utter destruction. For example, China U.S. MILITARY STRATECY: PARADOXES IN PERSPECTIVE 7 might not be anxious to introduce nuclear fundamental importance in shaping U.S. weapons in a general war with the Soviet strategy. In fact, in its commitment to re- Union. She probably would have little trenchment and lowering the U.S. military choice, however, for the Soviets would be profile abroad, the Nixon Doctrine has be- likelv to capitalize on their nuclear supe- come the governmental policy most in­ fluential on U.S. military strategy during the rioritv.J Obviously, then, to speak of general war, last several years. In the magnitude of its especiallv with nuclear weapons, is to speak impact, it ranks with sueh past policies as in terms of absolutes or near absolutes. So Trumans containment of Communism, terrible are the consequences of general Eisenhower’s massive retaliation, Kennedy’s war between major powers that, in looking flexible response, and Johnson’s thrust into down into the abvss of nuclear possibilities, Southeast Asia. The Nixon Doctrine is one might recall the heavy finalitv of Ham- paraphrased in the 1972 Republican party let’s last words, “The rest is silence.” platform, which affirms “that America will remain fully involved in world affairs, and Factors Influencing yet do this in wavs that will elicit greater Military Strategy effort by other nations and the sustaining support of our people.’’ Sí The President It is impossible to speak of military apparently intends to keep this approach strategy in isolation. Since military strategy as his rnain theme in foreign affairs during is but a means of accomplishing national his second terin of office. Barring some radi­ policy, that policy is, of course, the most cal shift,f it is likelvj that this doctrine will influential factor in determining strategy. continue to be determinative of our mili­ Thus, in a verv real sense, strategy is in- tary strategy through the mid-seventies. fluenced by all those elements that go into Other eoncerns are also important, how­ the making of national policy. Some of ever. Governmental programs aimed at these, to list onlv the more obvious ones, correcting domestic ills along with stabilizing are governmental doctrine and programs, the economy at home and abroad will re­ public opinion, the slant of the media, pres- main high in priority and will obviously sure groups, individual genius, and, of course, compete strongív for the budget dollar. We what the other side does. will be only as strong as we can afford to Yet to look at these several broad factors be, and in military appropriations Congress at one sweep leads to a rather amorphous will probably be increasingly tightfísted. view. I will, therefore, touch upon each Not without reason, the nation may decide separately, combining the second and third that a new transportation system is equally because of the contemporary—and disturb- as important as a new generation of ic bm s. ing—tendency of public opinion to be largelv Whether talking guns and butter or missiles molded by the media. and margarine, the way to the national treasury may get slippery. doctrine and programs public opinion and the media What a govemment sees as its ideological commitments and the programs undertaken Also on unsure footing are recent relations to meet those commitments obviously lie between the military and the media. Not at the heart of military strategy. Most re- that relations have ever been particularly cently, the Nixon Doctrine has been of close. The early Civil War press, for in- 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW stance, ran a smear campaign in which & Company has been entirely aboveboard General Sherman’s sanity was called into in its dealings; in fact, its tactics have question. Onlv slightly more dignified have sometimes approached shameless exhibi- been some of the charges leveled at sênior tionism. The point, then, is not that the military figures in the wake of the “Lavelle group has been correct but that it has been incident.” American media have demon- effective. strated an astonishing proclivity for hopping The military is subject to the same kinds aboard anv bandwagon that makes it a of pressure. Groups that have recently stung practice to throw eggs at passing generais. the military into varving degrees of action Such practice accomplishes two things: it or attentiveness include those advocating may prevent the appearance of “the man on equal opportunity and environmental con- horseback," bnt it also makes it difficult for servation. Future military strategists who even the most skilled and deserving military fail to account for, say, minority group leader to find a stable mount in times which representation in the sênior officer ranks or call for bold and decisive action. for keeping the oceans clean, however sound The American military has its roots among their conceptions otherwise, can expect the people and the tradition of the citizen- to be subjected to questioning in a manner soldier. Most of its greatest leaders have most rigorous. Whether one calls this phe- come from middle-class, often humble, nomenon fairness or fad, he must, indeed, origins, not from illustrious martial dynasties. call it fact. The military is a popularly based institution, which needs popular support. Yet that sup- port has been severely eroded, chiefly of individual genius late by the media, which have been less It was G. Wilson Knight who said that we than kind and possibly less than objective. must “interpret an age in the light of its . . . No matter. This is not the time for charge men of visionarv genius, not the men of and countercharge. For eurrent antimili- genius in the light of their age." 10 He was tarism to be dampened and for the healthy speaking of the world of literature, but his growth of an all-volunteer military Service words ring true for the world of military that can attract its full share of capable strategy as well. Men mold events as much (and noble) people, the military must find as being molded by them. Without the ways to re-establish salutary contact with advent of Napoleon’s strategic genius, mod- the wellspring of power in a democracy, ern Europe would look vastlv different the people themselves. today. Without the overlapping of Napo- leon s career with that of a young Prussian staff officer bv the naine of Karl von pressure groups J Clausewitz, the development of strategy Citizen Ralph Nader and a relatively small also would have been vastlv different. coterie of students and intellectnals have Napoleon was bv far the more successful demonstrated the potency of a well-orga- military leader, yet Clausewitz has prob- nized pressure group. They have taken on ably exerted a greater influence on ensuing two of América s most powerful institutions, military strategy. This is so because Clause­ General Motors and the U.S. Congress, and witz, although presently more quoted than have gained either major concessions or understood, was still gifted in writing down uncomfortable squeamishness that portends for posterity the full range of his under- concessions. This is not to say that Nader stancling of strategy. Thus, with strategy as U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: PARADOXES IN PERSPECTIVE 9 with all other pursuits, not onlv is it im- us that enemy aetions are likely to be im- portant who gets bom; it is also important bued with guile and surprise. who is successful in getting the deep im- Although it seems somewhat hollow, the pression of his thought recorded—through current enemv offer of peace in Indochina deed or word. is probably not a wooden horse which they In this last sense. the example of American hope we will pull in through the gate. militarv strategy poses an interesting case. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that the It is senerallv conceded that. with the approach used to pursue their objective, possible exception of Alfred Thayer Mahan, namely, overt force, has failed—at least .America has produced no tmlv great mili­ temporarily. They admit to an error in tarv strategists. Whv? Possibly because our method, not intention. The future almost brilliant militarv leaders—and thev have inevitably will see the North Vietnamese been numerous—have been more concerned pursue their self-interests in this area through with action than with introspection. Thev other means. .And those means, like the essentially have been doers rather than present gesture of peace, will conform not thinkers. .And few of the thinkers were in- onlv to the strategv of Giap but also to clined to record their most seminal thoughts that of either the Soviet Union or China, or on strategv in language that following gen- both. erations have found compelling. The tradi- To confirm that the peace is not a wooden tion of American militarv strategv' has not horse, we need not attempt, as Cassandra entirely lacked great thinkers; it has lacked advised the Trojans, to burn it upon the great writers. plain. But neither should we in guileless confidence hurry to bring it within the citadel of our trust. We need to watch this the opposition “horse" for a while, to see if it is reallv It vvould be fatal to forget a major reason capable of carrying us to where we want whv we have militarv strategv: because we to be. have enemies. The fact that there is an opposing ideology with powerful armed Current Military Strategy forces capable of destroying our civilization within minutes deinands our closest atten- Our current military strategy rests not tion and vigilance. Without succumbing to onlv upon the Nixon Doctrine but also national paranóia, we must remember that upon the Presidents announced policy that there are many thousands of talented op- the United States is moving from “an era of ponents who receive great satisfaction. confrontation to an era of negotiation.” 11 reward. and prestige in return for thinking In this context, no longer is it considered up ingenious ways to insure that their wav desirable that the other side blink first in of life survives and, hopefullv, prevails over an eyeball-to-eyeball encounter. Now we ours. Necessity dictates that we consider know that such a confrontation must not their intentions in forming our own. In occur, especially when the eost of flinch- doing so, we should not fail to attribute ing or miscalculating is so prohibitively to enemy strategists two important quali- high. ties: they are intelligent, and they are in- the peace imperative terested in and capable of doing the un- expected. The history of militarv strategv The President s policy actually voices a at least as far back as the Trojan War telís rather eommon sentiment: we want peace 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

with honor. Peace has become a bewilder- continent’s distance from Moscow. ingly difficult terni to define, but what the Modem military strategy has seen dis- President seeins to be saying is that we tances diminish. Continents have been con- want to avoid confrontation that might lead densed, and national concerns have become to a massive nuclear exchange. It is not international. “Strategy today,” commented so much an act of diplomacy as of necessity. one writer a generation ago, “is world This element of necessity is clearly recog- strategy and it is no more possible to shape nized in Morton H. Halperin s observation: it merely to suit the limited interest of one particular country than to confine a typhoon Whatever we may choose to call it, we are to a potato patch.” 13 In the years since, doomed to peaceful coexistence with our enemies because we live in a world in which the storm has grown larger, the patch small- war cannot be abolished, because there is er, and the possibility of pursuing solely no other means to settle issues that men feel national interests more improbable. are worth fighting for. But war—at least war in the sense of general nuclear war—can only intentional stalemate lead to such complete destruction that in the final analysis, the war could not have been It is also improbable that either the United worth fighting. It is this central paradox which States or the Soviet Union can achieve a provides the challenge and the setting for dis- dramatic shift in the balance of military cussion of the role of military strategy in the power within the near future. Since World current era.12 War II, both sides together have spent more Peace, or at least absence of general nuclear than $2 trillion, with the result only “that war, has become an imperative. with any conceivable or current or future deployment of nuclear weapons, neither side can expect to attack the other without i n ternationalism receiving a retaliatory strike that would Another necessary feature—and paradox— destroy the attaeker as a modern nation- of our national military strategy is that it state.' 14 For this reason, we have seen fit cannot be truly national. It must mesh with to begin the Strategic Arms Limitation the military eapabilities and doctrines of Talks (sa l t ). our allies. Despite recent tendencies toward The key aspect of sa l t , as it affects scaling down abroad, the flavor of our mili­ U.S. military strategy, is that it limits the tary strategy, especially in Europe, is highly number of our land- and sea-based missiles international. for up to five years. Under sa l t , the United Even where a formal alliance does not States will freeze the number of its ic bm s exist, as with Israel in the Nliddle East, our at 1054 and sl bm’s at something less than strategic commitments are clear enough to 700; the Soviet Union will freeze its ic bm s discourage attempts that might threaten the at 1618 but possibly build the sl bm force national survival of our friends. In Israels to 950.The United States will continue case, there should be little doubt in anvone s to possess more warheads but less total mind that the United States would not nuclear megatonnage than the Soviet Union. stand aside and watch that nation destroyed. In the language of the strategist, these In the same vein, we realize that the Soviets, numbers translate into intentional stalemate. despite their recent involuntary retrench- We have decided to seek détente with the ment there, would not permit a similar Soviets as an alternative to the possible fate to befall Egypt, although Cairo is a destruction that would arise from head-on U.S. MILITARY STRATECY: P.\RADOXES IN PERSPECTIVE 11

confrontation. One voice that denounces upon an American city or naked aggression the West’s policy, hence strategy, of ac- against an area where our interests are commodation and stalemate is that of the clear and declared (Berlin, for example) great Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn: would probably ignite the nuclear spark. “The timid civilized world has found nothing The fire from that spark must be prevented vvith which to oppose the onslaught of a if at all possible, for even if it did not rage sudden revival of barbarity, except con- initially, it would make future and larger cessions and smiles. 16 Should his criticism nuclear fires more likely, and civilization contain but a syllable of the “word of itself might well be the tinder. After the truth” which he seeks to express, it would first eonflagration, the rest would follow indeed be no smiling matter. much easier. In facing this possible prece- dent, we may be reminded of a line from the poetry of Dvlan Thomas: “After the Future Alternatives first death, there is no other.” Where we are going will be deterinined in large part bv where we have been. Our action and responsibility near-term military strategy probably will not change overnight. Nor should it neces- Let me hasten to add that it is far from my sarilv, for recent strategy has been some- intention to call for the incorporation of thing more than the chain of farcical errors alarmist or pacifist tendencies in our stra­ which frenzied detractors might claim. As tegic plans. On the contrary, the necessity a nation, we have refused to allow ourselves for courage and even boldness will be or our allies to be manhandled. We have greater than ever. The spirit of Munich is pursued our objectives and protected our more apt to precipitate than to avert war. interests vigorously—some would sav too There is need now for perpetuating an vigorously at times—without touching off opposite kind of spirit, one which clarifies World War III. We have managed to for all to see that there are certain princi­ muddle through fairly well. pies and objectives which are the foundation Yet we cannot afford smugness. One can for national greatness and which are worth protecting at any cost. hardlvJ claim success merelvJ because he has not yet blown himself into oblivion. The United States must dedicate itself to a course of action that ensures its posi- tion on the plus side of any equation in- “After the first death, there ia no other." tended to compute strategic power. New Studied avoidance of that oblivion must policies, doctrine, weapon systems, and, continue at the forefront of our strategic indeed, ways of thinking will be needed. thought as we plot the future course. Nuclear Except in time warps, one does not move war must be avoided. It would be extremelvy ahead bv standing still. And we cannot difficult to justify under almost any circum- depend on Science fiction to save us. stances that did not imrninentlv threaten a Some things, though—all eminently large part of our population or a vital human—are never outdated and must never national interest. We cannot identifv pre- be discarded, namely, imagination, courage, cisely, nor should we try, what will or will and resolve. These are not mere worcls or not serve as adequate provocation for a abstractions. At their best, they can serve nuclear response. Suffíce it to say that prov­ as program guides for action: we (the U.S., ocation in the form of a concerted attack “us,” the military) must have the imagina- 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tion to determine what ought to be done, less or more would be immoral: anything the courage to begin, and the resolve to less, immoral to those generations who have see it through to favorable completion. sacrifíced much or all to establish our great- We must move forward, yet with care, ness; anything more, immoral to those gen­ playing always to our strengths, yet not erations yet to be bom. with provocative abandon. To do either Udorn RTAFB, Thailand

Notes

1. Urs Sehwarz and Laszlo Hadik, Strategic Terminology (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1965). pp. 203-4. Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). p. 94 8. Schelling. op. cit. 2. Quoted in Fred R. Brown, ed., Management: Concepts and Praetice 9. Quoted in “Issues in the Campaign: Foreign Policy,” Bangkok Post (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 1967), p. 88. (Special Report), Noveinber 5. 1972, p. 14. 3. Thomas C. Schelling, "Concepts of Limited Warfare." in Military 10. G. Wilson Knight. Shakespeare and Religion (New York: Simon and Strategy for Limited War (Maxwell AFB. Alabama: Air War College Associate Schuster. 1968). p. 294. Program, 1971), Ch. 11. p. 3. 11 Quoted in Bangkok Post. 4. Mão Tse-tung on Cucrrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Criffith (New York: 12. Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy ^Boston: Little, Frederick A. Praeger. 1061), p. 52. Brown. and Co.. 1967), p. 12. 5. Karl von Clausewitz. On War (New York: Modern Library. 1943). p. 208. 13. John C. Slessor. Strategy for the West (New York: William Morrow and 6. Vo Nguyen Ciap, Peopte s War, Peoples Anny (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Co., 1954), p. 47. House. 1961), p. 21. 14. "Peace. National Security. and the SALT Agreements." Current Xcws, 7. Machiavelli is relevant here with his axiom: “Good cominanders never September 13. 1972. Part 2. p. 7-F. come to an engagement unless they are compelled to by absolute necessity, 15. Ihid. or occasion calls for it.” The Art o f War, trans. Ellis Farneworth ílndianapolis: 16 Quoted in " One Word of Truth,’ " Time, September 4. 1972. p. 13. MISHAP ANALYSIS An Improved Approach to Aircraft Accident Prevention

C olonel Davi d L. Nic h o l s

Commanders are responsible for using all Air Force resources effectively and judiciously to suecessfully complete assigned missions, and so contribute to the progressive achievement of overall Air Force objectives. —U S A F M a n a g e m e n t P r o c e s s 1

NE of the best manifestations of effective and judieious use of Air Force resources is reflected through the Safety Program. The goal O of this program is . . to conserve the combat capability of the United States .Air Force through the preservation of its personnel and materiel resources.” 2 Each commander is directed to take action within means available (1) to prevent accidents, (2) to eliminate or minimize the effects of design deficiencies, and (3) to eliminate unsafe acts and errors that represent accident potential.3 To date, the Air Force has been most successful in aircraft accident prevention, as a brief look at history clearly illustrates. In 1947 the major

13 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW aircraft accident rate was 44 accidents per the things that are easy to do have already 100,(XX) flying hours. By 1953-54 the rate been done by our predecessors.” 5 had been halved, and by 1959 the rate was What he said has proven to be true, and below ten. The improvement gradually eon- the challenge will be even more difficult tinued over the next twelve years to a low in the next decade. The Air Force cannot rate of 2.5 achieved in 1971.4 relax but must continue to explore and de- The ,\ir Force is justifiably proud of this velop improved methods of preventing acci­ record, but an inevitable question arises: Can dents. Old methods need not be discarded, but new methods must be innovated to meet the increased challenge effectively. This article reports on such an innovation: Mishap Analysis. Mishap analysis is basically a trend analy­ sis program that looks in detail at potential sources of accidents. Many flying units al­ ready have some form of trend analysis program, but in most cases they lack depth, timeliness, and credibility. The inadequacies of such programs will not meet future re- quirements. To be effective, a safety trend analysis program must incorporate three essential characteristics: (1) it must provide a realistic data base for analysis; (2) it must provide timely identification of accident po­ tential; and (3) it must highlight problems arisingfrom the materiel/maintenance com- plex—the primary souree of today’s acci­ dents.6 This article shows how these es­ sential characteristics relate to mishap analysis. realistic data base Several years ago a waterfront community was threatened by an epidemic from un­ known causes. More than a thousand resi- dents became ill within a week, and one the accident rate be further reduced? How person died. An autopsy was performed and far can we go? An answer to this question revealed that death resulted from uremia, is unknown, but it is obvious that the Air probably aggravated by impure food. The Force has reached a point where continued circumstances indicated that shellfish were improvement is increasingly difficult. Major the cause. Armed with this information, the General John D. Stevenson addressed this local authorities acted promptly to correct problem in 1960 when he stated, “. . . the the shellfish problem. But unfortunatelv, accidents ahead of us are going to be the several other persons became seriouslv ill most difficult to prevent in our history, for before it was discovered that the first fatality MISHAP ANALYSIS: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION 15

was not indicative of the real cause of the He emphasizes that the importance of an epidemic. The basic cause was not the shell- individual mishap lies in its potential for fish but was, in fact, water pollution.' creating injury and not in the fact that it This storv brings to light several fallacies actually does or does not. Therefore, any from which it is important to leam the fol- analysis as to cause and remedial action is lowing lessons. The first lesson is that iso- limited and misleading if based on one major lated and/or spectacular cases do not provide accident out of a total of 330 similar acci­ the best guide for corrective actions. A sec- dents, all of which are capable of causing ond lesson is that a wrong diagnosis of cause factors usually results in the wrong remedial actions. And finally, the true source of a majority of ills is the best foundation upon which to base analysis.8 Thus, while attack- ing the shellfish, one should not overlook the possibility of water pollution. Today’s Air Force is subject to three fal­ lacies, too, and they impose limitations on the safety program. Fallacy I. Today, relatively few problem areas are identifíed through accident inves- tigation. One reason for this is that most causes do not reach the “accident ” stage, be- cause someone—usually the pilot—saves the aircraft. Airbome emergencies that are safely recovered belong in this category; they are events that could have been acci- dents. In reality, they should be considered as accidents, accidents that did not result in injury or damage. .And it is here that a fallacy becomes apparent: these “accidents” will not be analyzed for accident potential because there was no injury or damage. They are ignored in much the same way as the polluted water. The seriousness of this shortcoming was identifíed by H. VV. Heinrich, a noted pio- neer in the scientific approach to accident injuries or damage. In other words, those prevention, when he observed that “. . . for who limit their study to isolated, spectacular every mishap resulting in an injury [or dam­ cases—major aircraft accidents—are looking age] there are many other similar accidents only at the tip of an ominous iceberg. that cause no injuries [or damage] what- Fallacy II. Another reason many “causes” ever. 9 He reached the conclusion that, in go undetected is that accidents are extremely a group of similar mishaps, 300 will produce difficult to investigate and analyze accu- no injury whatever, 29 will result in minor rately. Often investigation boards have little injury, and one will result in major injury. more than a “smoking hole” for evidence; 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW consequently, it is easy to arrive at erroneous A more recent twenty-month study in a conclusions in spite of the most commendable different wing revealed 975 mishaps (acci­ efforts. A more criticai observer reports dents, reportable incidents, and nonreport­ that . . accident boards, forced by ex- able incidents). Pilot error was the cause of pediency, sometimes find it easier to assume approximately five percent of the total.12 pilot error than to prove materiel deficiency This should indicate that pilots cause less or maintenance error.” 10 He supported his than ten percent of the accidents. Yet dur- case with the following logic: ing this same general period, Air Force-wide statistics reflect that pilots cause over 40 percent of the accidents.13 Do accident investigation boards fail to uneover true cause factors? If so, numerous problems have been neglected and hence will contribute to other accidents. Fallacy III. Accidents do not occur fre- quently enough to establish trends, particu- larly at lower echelons of command. Unless a trend is established, commanders may be forced to treat the effect rather than the cause of accidents. L Air Force directives require reports on those incidents that are “almost accidents,” and this is particularly useful information because the aircrew and equipment are in- tact for a logical and thorough investigation. Thus reportable incidents provide more ac- curate cause factors and a better data base for analysis and remedial actions than actual accidents. So those who analyze reportable incidents as well as accidents are on somewhat firmer ground, but this also is only looking at the tip of a large iceberg. The tip, in this in- stance, allows study of both accidents and “almost accidents,” but it ignores data from “could have been accidents.” Moreover, this Over a nine-month period a fighter wing’s tip is still too small for trend analysis at mishap experience included 204 reportable wing levei. and nonreportable incidents. In the same pe­ The most reliable source of information is riod the wing had six accidents. Analysis of the incidents revealed 9 percent were caused that which includes all problems that could by pilot error, while 90 percent resulted from result in an accident. These problems will materiel failure and/or maintenance malprac- be found bv studying the mishap rate, which tice. However, pilot error was assessed as the measures accidents, “almost accidents, and primary cause in 83 percent of the accidents. “could have been accidents." A truer defini- Materiel failure was proven in onlv one case.11 tion of the mishap rate might be the record- MISHAP ANALYSIS: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION 17

jng o f all unexpected events, occurring in analysis rather than Computer techniques. flight, that did result or could have resulted For a program of this scale, manual tech­ in an airbome emergency. niques are more desirable for many reasons: the inputs/outputs are more timely; the timeliness manager develops complete familiarity with the data; they are more responsive to the For raany years, . . . safety organizations unprogrammed needs of accident preven- have been doing a thorough job of investigat- tion; they tend to be simpler and provide ing, analvzing, reporting, and taking correetive action ãfter an accident, and in analvzing trends from records that are weeks, months, or vears old. Important as this is to a safety program it is “after-the-fact"—too late to pro- vide effective Controls to prevent these acci- dents. It is apparent that \ve need the facts on our safety situation as of the moment. There- fore, we need a method to pinpoint the accident-producing, unsafe acts before the ac­ cident happens.14 What couldbe more useless to a command- er than a thorough in-depth analysis of how to prevent an accident after it has already occurred? Anv hint of increased accident exposure before-the-fact is without doubt more use fui. The central objective of mishap analysis is to get early identification of potential problems so that prompt correetive actions can resolve same before an accident occurs. To accomplish this, a properly managed accident-prevention program will have docu- mentation that is accurate, timely, and up- to-date. YVhen analvzed, it will provide trends or spotlight areas requiring attention. The program must not degenerate into history. It must be an active day-to-day program which points out problems that exist now. This day-to-day program is therefore based outputs that are not burdened by irrelevant at wing levei. The mishap data are collected data; they are less expensive; and they are and reviewed dailv, and a formal analysis is available to all. This souncLs like heresy in completed monthlv. Hovvever, the dailv re- todav s computer-oriented world, but this views will bring to light potential problem program is more produetive when given the areas; therefore, supplementary analyses personal attention that is associated with are frequently required during interim peri- manual operation. Possibly some future ods to iasure timeliness. evolution of mishap analysis will fruitfully Also the program uses manual inputs and incorporate computers. 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW man versus machines In the same period, ten accidents were at- Mishap analysis concentrates more on the tributed to pilot error. This means that machine than the pilot because aircrews are pilots saved 66 aircraft for every accident the strongest element in preventing acci- they caused.16 dents.15 Therefore, emphasis is placed on Recently, a more detailed study was increasing aircraft reliability. completed in a large taetical fighter wing The safety philosophy has too often leaned equipped with several different types of air­ upon the pilot by giving him the responsi- craft. During a twenty-month period, 299 in-flight emergencies occurred due to main­ tenance or materiel factors. Four of these led to aircraft accidents, one of them at- tributed to pilot error. In this case study, pilots saved 299 aircraft compared with their one failure.17 Thus pilots do an exceptional job of cop- ing with emergencies. But the fact remains that if aircrews did not have to cope with serious malfunctions, or at least such a large number of them, the accident rate would be greatly reduced. Therefore, a most fruit- ful area for increased attention relates to the machine—the product of the materiel/ maintenance effort.

some general guidelines The first step in a mishap analysis program is to establish priorities. Ideally, a command- er would give each tvpe of aircraft equal attention to prevent accidents; however, since resources are limited, priorities must be established. In other words, if one tvpe of aircraft is well protected bv the existing pro- cedures, then additional effort should not be wasted. But if accident exposure is high, then normal procedures should be augmented with mishap analysis. bility to cope with malfunctions rather than Next, the data base must be established providing better equipment. Aircrews have for the type(s) of aircraft to be influenced done an exceptional job in accepting this by mishap analysis. The amount and tvpe challenge. A survey completed in 1960 il- of information collected are criticai; there­ lustrates this point. It showed that during a fore, the first step is the eollection of com­ six-month period Air Defense Command had plete, factual data, without regard to severitv 681 in-flight emergencies due to maintenance or cause. This concept permits investigation or materiel deficiencies. Extraordinary air- of the entire iceberg rather than just the tip. crew performance overcame 659 of these. The data eollection process could begin SIISHAP ANALVS/S A1RC.RAFT ACC1DENT PREVENTION 19

in many ways; however, for ease of control officer. The information can be set forth in and to insure complete coverage, the best various types of graphs, tables, and charts starting point is the aircrew/maintenance to identify trends not only by subsystem but debriefing that follows each sortie. At de- also by type of aircraft, by individual air- briefing, a “description of occurrence” is craft tail number, by squadrons, by main­ completed on a mishap report work sheet tenance sections, etc. whenever an unexpected event occurred Detailed discussion of various graphs, that did result or could have resulted in an tables, and charts is not within the scope of airbome emergency. If an emergency ac- tuallv occurred, the work sheet description shouíd be augmented by personal contact between the safety officer and the aircrew to be sure that all details are clear. One eopy of the work sheet is tumed over to safety personnel during a daily pickup, and another is sent to Vlaintenance Qualitv Control for investigation. Quality control determines what system component failed and, if possible, how it failed. The completed report is then forwarded to the safety office, where it is evaluated against criteria in Air Force Regulation 127-4 for a reportable or nonreportable incident. Reportable inci- dents receive further investigation and are submitted to higher headquarters in ac- cordance with directives. For nonreportable incidents, a cause factor is assessed based on the investigation by quality control. The wing then has available for analysis the causes of all accidents, “almost accidents,” and “could have been accidents.’’ The next step is to record the data by methods that will provide early detection of problems. The information is shredded out by subsystems and cause factors. The sub- systems are those in which a malfunction could lead to an accident: landing gear, en- gine, drag chute, flight Controls, hydraulics, this article. Most methods in common use autopilot, fuel system, instruments, electri- are quite simple. However, one technique cal, weapons, etc. The cause factors include that merits comment, because seldom used aircrew, maintenance, materiel, and unde- by the safety officer, is the control limit termined sources. When tabulated, this in­ chart. It has unique value in that it gives a formation provides the basis for trends in quick and simple summary of the mishap numbers and tvpes of subsystem failures and data. The chart can be constructed for many causes of failures. The use of these data is things, such as failure rates of subsystems, limited only by the imagination of the safety mishap rates for each type of aircraft, or an 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW overall mishap rate of all aireraft influenced fore, mishap analysis capitalizes on positive by the program. The accompanying control as well as negative experiences to provide limit chart, an actual chart used by one before-the-fact accident prevention clues. wing, represents the overall rate. (Figure 1) The chart shows when mishap rates are Is it valid? normal (the grey area) and when rates devi- ate from normal. Normal experience is de- Has mishap analysis been tested? Is it fíned by the area within the “control limits.” worth the extra effort? The program has This area is derived by setting limits that are been used in two large fighter wings, but it one standard deviation either side of the is difficult to measure the degree of success.

upper limit *"

lower limit *

Figure I. A control limit chart derived from one tactical fighter wings mishap experience, the rate hased on the numher o f mishaps per 100 sorties

mean rate. Thus 68 percent of all mishap One seldom knows how many accidents rates will fali within the control limits. Mis­ were prevented in any situation. But the hap rates that exceed one standard deviation author, having managed both programs, are out of the control limits and require feels that the degree of success was signifi- special attention. When mishap rates exceed cant. The programs were also inspected and the upper limit, accident exposure is exces- studied by many safety experts in all eche- sive. The problem(s) should be ferreted out lons of command from the Directorate of by analysis of mishap data presented in Aerospaee Safety down through air divisions. other graphs, charts, and tables. Conversely, In each instance, the program was praised when mishap rates fali below the lower as a strong deterrent to aireraft accidents. limit, this must also be analyzed to deter­ There is another, less subjective wav to mine what is right. With this approach, evaluate mishap analysis through the use of commanders can exploit those assets that Heinrich s theory. The theory States that are good and enhance safe operations. There- investigation of any random sampling of 330 MISHAP ANAL YS/S AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION 21

mishaps shows that the sanie set of circum- nothing that relates to the base of Heinrich’s stances will usuallv result. In this group, pyramid; therefore, we overlook the most there will be 29 which produce onlv minor promising source for trend analysis. injury/damage and one which will produce In contrast, the mishap analysis program major injury/damage. Heinrich’s theory can appears to relate to all segments of the pyra­ be summarized in a pyramid, or as an ice­ mid. The twenty months of data collected berg structure. in one wing revealed three major accidents, The top blocks of the pyramid—the tip of 87 reportable incidents, and 885 nonreport- the iceberg—directlv relate to the Air Force able.20 This is a relationship of 295 accidents reporting system of accidents and incidents. with no damage or injury and 29 accidents

29 29 29

300 300 295

Heinrich's theory mishap analysis

Figure 2. Heinrich s theory Figure 3. A comparison o f Hein- rich s theory with mishup experience

For example, in 1970 Pacific .\ir Forces with little damage for each major accident. Command suffered 60 major accidents and Admittedly, the sample is small, but the 1739 minor accidents and reportable inci­ correlation is so close as to indicate that dents. Thus for every major accident there mishap analysis does fill in the gap and pro- were 28.9 accidents of lesser damage. Hein­ vide the needed data base for analysis. If this rich says there should be 29.18 Also in 1970, is true, the proposal is valid and worth the the Air Force experienced 200 major acci­ extra effort. dents and 5800 minor accidents and report­ able incidents.19 This represents exactly 29 accidents of lesser degree for every major M ish a p analysis does not by any pretext es- accident. In other words, the findings of tablish the ultimate, but it does open a new Heinrich and the Air Force are compatible avenue to accident prevention. It is an under- as far as the top blocks of the pyramid are developed approach that is begging for ad- concemed. But the Air Force presently has ditional attention.21 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Such a program takes on increased impor- with these factors in mind, but it does impose tance during periods of austere funding and an additional workload. However, when the personnel cuts. Equipment is getting older cost of this effort is compared against the and will be more prone to materiel failure; multimillion-dollar cost of most accidents, also manpower cuts increase the possibility the expense is insignificant. It certainly rep- of rising personnel factors in accidents. These resents an effective and judicious use of Air must be countered with improved super- Force resources. vision, increased surveillance, and improved Air War College management tools. Mishap analysis is offered

Notes

1 USAF Management Process, Air Force Manual 25-1. Department of the that all 70 of these were caused by pilot factor. the percentage for pilot factor Air Force, 15 October 1964. p. 1. increases to about 8.5 percent. Therefore. the actual pilot factor mishaps in this 2. Respotisilnlities for the USAF Aerospace Safety Program, Air Force Regu- study fell somewhere between 1.5 and 8.5 percent of the total.—Extracted lation 127-1. Department of the Air Force. 11 June 1971, p. I from XX Tactical Fighter W ings Safety System .Analysis data (a PACAF sub- 3. Ibid., pp. 1-2. ordinate unit), September 1970-April 1971. Hereafter cited as Safety Analysis. 4. USAF Aircraft Accident Summary 1971. Directorate of Aerospace Safety. XX TFW. Norton AF Base. Califórnia. 1972. p. 2. 13. US Air Force Accident Bulletin 1967-1970. Directorate of Aerospace Safety, 5. Major General John D. Stevenson. Commander. Western Air Defense Com- Norton AF Base. Califórnia. 1969-1971. p. 1. inand. ADC. “Ideais and Realities," lecture presented to the First Annual 14. Lieutenant Colonel Jack E. Bailey, "Safety Sampling Program." Profes­ USAF Safety Congress, Riverside, Califórnia, 12 September 1960. sional Studies Paper. Institute of Aerospace Safety and Management. University 6. USAF Aircraft Accident Summary 1971. p. iii. of Southern Califórnia. Los Angeles. Califórnia, December 1966. 7. H. W. Heinrich. Industrial Accident Prevention. A Scientific Approach 15. Stevenson. op. cit. (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1941). p. 29. 16. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 17. Safety Analysis. XX TFW. 9. Ibid.. pp. 26-27. 18. "Unit Safety Officers Cuide to Statistical Analysis,” Headquarters PACAF. 10. Major John C. Fair. "Caleulating the Risk,“ Professional Studies Paper. Safety Analysis DiVision. Hickam .AF Base. Hawaii, 1971. pp. 5-6. Institute of Aerospace Safety and Management. University of Southern Cali­ 19. US Air Force Accident Bulletin 1970, Directorate of Aerospace Safety, fórnia, Los Angeles, Califórnia. 16 December 1968, p. 4. Norton .AF Base. Califórnia, 1971. p. 1. 11. Ibid. 20. Safety Analysis. XX TFW. 12. Analysis revealed cause factors assessed to materiel factor, 599 (61%); 21. Within the past two years, Air Training Command has expanded its air­ maintenance factor. 173 (18%); pilot factor. 14 (1.5%); and 189 (19.5%) were craft safety trend analysis program; however, that program is fundamentallv undetermined. A further analysis of the undetermined causes revealed at ditferent from the concepts set forth in this article. The author feels the most least 119 of these could not have involved pilot factor, whereas the other 70 important differences are related to concepts of ,1) appropriate data base. <2* could have derived froin pilot. materiel. or maintenance factors. Assuming timeliness. and (3) levei of rnanageinent. HE IDEA was not new. Engineers for the last two decades had realized the tremendous economic potential of a reusable space transportation system. Even from the beginning of the space Tprogram some fífteen years ago, the thought of dropping millions of dollars’ worth of aerospace hardware into the drink after only a couple of minutes’ use seemed utterly ridiculous. At last, the day of a reusable launch vehicle may not be too far in the future. The first hurdle has been passed and the space shuttle is on its way. The shuttle, to be constructed by the North American Rockwell Corporation, will be a two-stage vehicle with the booster consisting of two large

23 24 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

solid-fueled rocket motors. The payload- carrying orbiter will be the second stage and will carry up to 65,000 pounds of varied cargo into earth orbit. The shut- tle blends the best of aircraft technologies and spacecraft know-how that American aerospace industry has acquired over the years from working on projects for the mili- tary and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (nasa). It also relies on technology and ideas generated during the ’50s and ’60s. Many of these ideas were developed under Air Force sponsorship and helped provide much of the technical back- ground for today’s shuttle.

early Air Force developments Following World War II, the real spur to rocket development was the German V-2 rocket. The Army Air Forces shipped a number of the V-2 rocket engines from Ger- many to North American Aviation, and this event precipitated that company’s start in the rocket business. The first project that evolved with the new technology was an air-breathing cruise missile known as the Navaho. The vehicle had a piggyback con- fíguration, which has reappeared in recent shuttle configuration studies. Some of the configurations resembled it so elosely that one would have sworn the long-defunct Navaho missile had been reborn. The Air Force s X-20 Dvna-Soar project also laid important groiuidwork for devel­ opment of the shuttle. The X-20, which was canceled during the earlv sixties, was a manned winged space vehicle that was to be placed in orbit atop a Titan booster. The vehicle was designed to accomplish a high- angle-of-attack re-entrv for an unpowered landing on the desert. The X-20 in-orbit vehicle differed from the current shuttle orbiter, although its con­ The Navaho air-hreathing cruise missile, hased on Ger- man technology guined from V-2 rockets, was developed figuration was quite similar, in that the X-20 hy North American Aviation for lhe Arnuj Air Forces. did not contribute any energv during the THE MANY FACES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE 25

boost period. Its other technologies, how- ever, did not materially differ from those of the current configuration. During the late fifties and early sixties the .\ir Force did several studies on a so- called aerospace plane. Its technology con- stituted some of the first thinking about re- usable spacecraft, which were not to become a reality for some twentv years. When nasa was thinking about its selec- tion for the shuttle, every conceivable con­ figuration and propulsion system was con- sidered and then reconsidered. .And once again an earlier .Air Force program provided much of the data for one of the alternative possibilities. During the late sixties the Air Force carried out a program using a large pressure-fed engine in an application known as the Big Dumb Booster (bd b). Simplicity was the kevnote of the concept, which used thick welded-steel tanks capable of with- standing extreme pressures. Boeing did a majoritv of the bd b work for the Air Force. Even though the pressure-fed engine con­ cept failed to make the present shuttle con­ figuration, its attributes received consider- able attention in the deliberations. As is now well known, the shuttle will use solid-fueled motors for its first stage. As of this writing, the exact size of the solids to be used has not been firmly decided, but apparently it will be in the neighborhood of 142 inches in diameter. It should be noted that motors of this size have never been used on a flight vehicle. It should also be noted that no manned spacecraft has ever been launched on a solid-fueled vehicle. But the usaf Titan III, which sports two 120- inchers, was designed initially to boost both the X-20 and the Manned Orbiting Lab- oratory (mo l ) manned payloads. A 156-inch motor was developed and tested imder USAF's X-20 Dyna-Soar was to bc boosted into orbit hy a Space and Missile Systems Organization Titan rocket anil re-enter for an unpowered landing on (sa mso ) supervision, with the idea of its the desert. . . . A prototype Manned Orbiting Labora- tonj (MOL) was developed and tested under SAMSO, but possible application as the motor to uprate the program was canceled for economtj reasons. The MOL the Titan III. Another possible application is fixed between a Cemini capsule and a Titan IIIC. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW considered at the time was use as a boost and certification, no matter which size of engine in the three-million-pounds-thrust solid is fínally selected. The Air Force has class. Lockheed and Thiokol have been in- been launching the Titan IIIC from Cape volved in the testing of a 156-inch solid Kennedy for a number of years, not to motor. In addition the Air Force and nasa mention the solid-fueled Minuteman ic bm . have sponsored a small amount of work with This vast solid experience must not be over- a 260-inch motor. looked. Although no large nasa launch vehicle has ever used large solids for the prime boost propulsion (several Delta vehicles initial shuttle development have used small solids for thrust augmenta- During the late sixties, the basic shuttle tion), the Air Force experience with large ground rules were drawn, and the aerospace solids is extensive and will be quite impor- industry began analyzing every possible tant during the shuttle booster development confíguration. Clearly, with the scarcity of

fu

«42311 Bi jfB|

B

The Titan IIIC solid 1'20-inch boosters and other large solid booster programs have given the Air Force valuable experience with solid motors similar to those that will be used to propcl the space shuttle. THE MANY FACES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE 27 space funds. it was imperative that the right would be employed in different numbers in configuration be selected. There just was both stages. The upper-stage engine, how- not enough money to reverse direction in ever, would be equipped with an extendable mid-stream. But one point was clear from nozzle, to increase the expansion ratio for the start: the shuttle should be designed to vacuum operation. replace all existing launch vehicles. Air Force influence in the design of this The initial ground rules stipulated that engine was also very signifieant. The Air the shuttle’s two stages would both be com- Force during the mid-sixties had sponsored pletelv reusable. This would later be changed the Pratt and Whitney development of the to a partially reusable system, but the initial XLR-129 reusable rocket engine. The engine configurations had both stages fullv reusable. used a closed combustion cycle that pro- The propulsion system ground rules re- duced vacuum specific impulses of 444 mained rather stringent during this period. seconds. The same Lox/hvdrogen propulsion system The XLR-129 contributed substantially to 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the staged combustion technology, which was provided to nasa and made available SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION to all potential engine eontractors. Rocket- CONCEPT dyne’s closed-cycle engine emerged the win- ner of the engine competition. ORBITAL The completely reusable confígurations OPERATIONS studied were many and varied. General

Dynamics studied a so-called “Triamese” LAUNCH concept. The advantage given for such a CONFIGURATION configuration was that its center of gravity remained on the center line of the vehicle at all times. Also, the aerodynamic shape BOOSTER RETURN of both stages was to be kept the same in ORBITER RETURN order to reduce development costs. The Martin Company suggested a fixed- wing, semi-ogee platform for the orbiter, which would provide an estimated hyper- sonic lift-drag ratio of 2.5 and a subsonic lift-drag ratio of about 8. The booster would be flown back by a crew located in the nose of the left-hand rocket stage, maintaining a point, but the price tags made nasa stand high angle of attack until reaching subsonic back and take a long look. The cost was speed, to minimize heating. just too high to permit developing both the North American visualized a vehicle with booster and the orbiter concurrently. In outer wing paneis that would fold downward June 1971 nasa extended the study con- from a vertical fin position to provide suf- cepts to include a phased levei of booster ficient lift for the landing approach. Both and orbiter development, with an expend- the booster and the piggybaek-mounted or­ able launch vehicle used to postpone the biter would have had the same shape. cost of developing a manned reusable Through the abundance of study con- booster. cepts, nasa even looked at an air-breathing The Air Force supported the extension of fírst stage for the shuttle. Advantages of such the study efforts because the phased-devel- a system were that the vehicle could land opment approach offered the means to re­ at high speeds with a full fuel load follow- duce early development risks and costs. The ing an aborted take-off, and it offered the reusable orbiter could later serve as the sec- ability to transfer to orbit planes not di- ond stage on a fully recoverable shuttle, but rectly above the launch site. It is not at all for its first years of operation it would be inconceivable that a second-generation shut­ boosted to Mach 10 or more by a throw- tle could be produced with an air-breathing away first stage powered by a large solid- booster before the end of the century. fueled motor or inexpensive liquid-fueled rocket. nasa asked the eontractors to reposition the propellants of the orbiter in drop tanks the expendahle booster returns located outside the orbiter. This redesigning The reusable confígurations did not appear in effect made the orbiter much smaller, to be unreasonable from a technical stand- since it no longer had to contain all the In the launch and recovery profile of the initial space shuttle concept, booster arul orbiter would return and be reusable. . . . Mamj different shuttle configurations were considered in the final deliberations.

propellants for boost purposes. The compo- The Grumman/Boeing team also looked sition of the ultimate booster became a at a very interesting application of the Sat­ whole new bali game as the many expend- ura V’s first stage (S-IC). It was felt that able concepts were examined. the S-IC could be modified for water re- Both liquid pressure-fed and pump-fed covery at about half the cost of developing propulsion systems were examined for the the pressure-fed boosters. possible booster application. The pressure The S-IC would have been staged in se­ engines were given a good possibility of ries with the orbiter propellant tank. But winning the competition. They were con­ the lower weight of the S-IC would have sidered in both parallel and series burn made it possible to add a retrorocket to the configurations. In the parallel configuration, recovery system, thereby reducing the im- the boosters would have been attached to pact velocity below that possible with para- the orbiter s propellant tank. In the series chutes alone. It was also felt that the S-IC, configuration, the boosters were clustered which would have been equipped with below the now only single orbiter fuel tank, wings, would sustain less damage and face with the orbiter riding piggyback on the less danger of sinking than some of the oth- propellant tank. nasa felt that it would er concepts. have been economically feasible to recover these pressure-fed boosters. To make them final configuration—the solids win recoverable would have necessitated that they be heavy welded structures not unlike In March of 1972 the parallel-burn solid- the Big Dumb Booster. propellant configuration was selected. In

29 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A ctitaway view o f the space orbiter as it rests on the propellant tank

this design the two solids that constituted as propellant storage space. As a result, the booster would burn in combination with there is a large hole in the back of the the orbiter s propulsion system to provide motor through which seawater can enter the propulsive force for the initial portion freely. Thus, the possibility exists that the of the flight. The orbiter propellant tank booster might sink. nasa, however, has been will be jettisoned just prior to orbit injec- looking into designs that would allow the tion but will not be recovered. The solids, burned-out case to take only a limited however, will be recovered. amount of water. There are problems when solid motor re- Several different concepts for recovering covery is considered. By their very nature, the solids have been considered. Goodyear solid motors use their combustion chambers Aerospace has proposed another possible THE MANY FACES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE 31

Orbiter in flight atop its fu el tank, Orbiter opens cargo cloors atui sends a Sorth American Rockwell conception to orbit an unmanned satellite.

technique using hot-air balloons. The bal- boosters of the shuttle. Each is estimated to loons would be deploved after the booster weigh about 100 tons. As each booster sep- was brought under control bv a cluster of arates following the upward thrust phase, parachutes. Altitude of the hot-air ejection it will start the plunge back to the earth’s and inflation could be preset, radio deter- surface and reach predicted speeds of more inined, or controlled bv an altimeter. Once than 990 miles per hour before the para­ stabilized and free Hoating, the booster chutes check the descent. The booster will would be lovvered into the ocean with lit- hit the water at about 45 feet per second. tle or no damage. The most likely recovery technique will the Air Force and launching the shuttle use parachutes alone, probablv ganged in threesomes. The chutes would deploy after The initial shuttle launch and landing site booster separation and lower the booster to will be at the Kennedy Space Center, Flor­ the water surface. The booster could be ida. This site will be used for research and tilted to an upright position, the same tech­ development launches expected to begin nique that is employed in righting the re- in the late 1970s and for all operational turned Apollo command modules. Other flights launched into easterly orbits. Facil- concepts have considered retarding the rate ities for all shuttle users at the Kennedy of descent with retrorockets. Space Center will be provided by nasa, The booster recovery problem with the largely through modifications of existing shuttle is not going to be an easy one to facilities that were built for the Apollo and solve. While parachutes have been used to other programs. lower the Apollo crews safely into the ocean At a later time, it is planned that a sec­ after each mission, nasa has not dealt ond operational site will be phased in at with parachute loads as heavy as the solid Vandenberg Air Force Base, Califórnia, for 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

shuttle flights requiring polar inclinations. shuttle were typified in recent Congressional The basic shuttle facilities required at Van- testimony by Secretary of the Air Force denberg are to be provided by Air Force. Robert C. Seamans: These decisions, which have been con- . . . the Air Force has been launehing dod curred in by the Department of Defense, satellites into orbit since 1959. Through these were reached bv the Administrator of nas a eíforts we are now able to provide our forces after nearly a vear of study by a site review with better Communications, improvednaviga- board. During the evaluation, the board re- tion, more precise maps, and better early viewed data at all available alternatives, warning. including 150 potential launch sites, and We are continuously assessing our military personnel associated with the evaluation mission requirements against available tech- visited more than 40 sites. Consideration nology and fiscal considerations. When space was given to booster recovery, launch azi- Systems can best help us accomplish our mili­ tary tasks, and are competitive in terms of muth limitations, latitude and altitude ef- cost and performance, we would expect to fects on launch and landing performance, pirrsue their development. In the future, I abort considerations, relative cost, environ- anticipate that space systems will allow even mental effects, and impact on present and further improvements in our defense posture. future programs. nasa Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher I believe that the priority given to our stated that the boarcTs studies shovved that space efíorts should reflect the fact that our the Kennedy-Vandenberg combination has national security could be seriously jeopard- cost, operational, and safety advantages over ized if another nation should move very far any possible single site or any pair of sites ahead of us in space technology. in the United States. To make better ase of space systems, we Preliminary cost estimates for establish- must find ways to reduce the cost of operating ment of the devei opment and operational in space and to improve our operational flexi- facilities at Kennedy Space Center are about bility. Toward this goal, both nasa and the Air Force have conducted studies which show $150 inillion. This amount is a part of the that cost reductions could be realized if total ol about $300 million estimated by boosters and spacecraft were reused, rather nasa for facilities required for the develop- thaji discarded after a single use. From these ment, production, test, and initial operation studies we have also concluded that a proper- of the space shuttle. Iv designed Space Shuttle could permit the The operational facilities and equipment dod and nasa to pursue promising space ap- required at Vandenberg afb are expected to plications which are presently not feasible. cost about $200 million. This amount is I would like to enumerate some of the wavs compatible with the allowance for facilities a Shuttle could enhance our defense space in the estimates of future investment costs operations. The Shuttle could be used as an on-orbit for shuttle operations included in the nasa test-bed to conduct development and qualifi- and usaf studies, which concluded that the cation testing of new space systems and sub- space shuttle will produce a substantial net systems. On-orbit tests could allow our engi- savings in future civil and militarv space neers to define potential technical problems program costs. and improve designs while in the prototvpe stage by testing under realistic operating Air Force stake in the shuttle conditions rather than in ground facilities built to simulate the space environment. 1 his The Air Force s important stakes in the could offer significant savings bv allowing us THE MANY FACES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE 33

The tpace shuttle orbiter delivers a sutellite putjloud Io earth orhil. The satellite is pulled au aij from lhe shuttle hy a command-controlled space lug.

to prove the capability of a proposed system turned to earth for diagnosis and repair, and prior to undertaking the expense of developing operationally redeployed in a minimum of an entire satellite. time with better confidence that the problem Retneval of payloads from orhit also offers was resolved. the potential for refurbishment and rease Also, by being able to better diagnose the which could lead to more effective use of causes of malfunctions that occur in space, our space hardware. we shonld be able to improve the design of Similarly, operational rLsks associated with future spacecraft. the development of complex new space Sys­ From an operational standpoint, the Shut­ tems could be reduced. If a satellite shonld tle will be designed to significantly reduce fail, it could be recovered by the Shuttle, re- prelaunch checkout time with improved reli- 34 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

• r. _ ~L|tF,::ii !hl B l .« £ ' TT1 ...... __ 3 L* j^ 3 É B E Í^ £

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,' i i m A test pilot "flies" a space shuttle simulatorat North Ameri- can Rockwell. . . . Lockheed engineers in a mockup of a space cockpit (far left) studi/ fihn of airplane landing, to foresee problems shuttle pilots may meet.

ability and less dependence on ground sup- an important part in launching it. Those in port. This would allow a rapid response the .\ir Force interested in being a part of capability which could be invaluable during future U.S. space programs had best learn certain crisis situations. all they ean ahout this one because it’s go- So, ready or not—the space shuttle is ing to be shuttling between earth and space eoming! The Air Force has plaved an im- for a very long time! portant part in developing it and will play Integrated Systems Division, Foreign Technology Division, AFSC THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM Theory and Applications

L ieu t en a n t Kenn et h C. Stoehbmann

1 FTER years of hard work, a man decides to build his dream house X It is to be the most modem house imaginable, with all the latest % innovations. After the design is approved, the contract is let, and ten months later his home is ready. Then a peculiar situation develops. All the innovations incorporated in the house have been either upgraded or superseded by newer, teclino- j logically superior innovations that have been developed /, during the ten-month building period. In short, the /// k house is outdated because it took time to build it. /// / \\ The man vows that next time he will plan ahead /// / \ \\ to anticipate innovations not yet on the mar- /% / / \X '\ \ ket. But how can anyone plan for innova- /

36 tions or inventions that do not exist at the And finally, can ic bm’s be further hardened time of planning? How can anyone build to withstand future overpressures from as something “modem’ if it is planned for yet unknown-sized hydrogen bombs? months or years in advance? This is the lead- The problem focuses around planning, time problem. both present and future, yet it is much more Be it a new house, a modem submarine, than that. The problem can be broken down or a new generation of aireraft, the lead- into distinct parts, each of which is fraught time problem is alwavs present. In the de- with assumptions, probabilities, and possi- fense seetor, the lead-time problem is es- bilities. This is not to say that the problem is sentially one of how to plan a weapon system unsolvable if handled with care but rather to today to be built tomorrow and to be effec- suggest that it is similar to trying to erect tive against enemy threats, present and a building on a sand base; a shaky founda- anticipated, the day after tomorrow. For tion does not give one much to start with. example, the new Air Force B-l bomber can Nevertheless, the parts of the problem can handle most air defense missions to counter be isolated into 1) planning, 2) speculation, threats present today, but can it handle as 3) time eonstraints, and 4) research, develop- yet undiscovered future threats? The new ment, testing, and evaluation (rdt&e ). Of trident can be a well-nigh invulnerable the four, speculation is by far the most cru­ launch platform today, but what about in the cial and least scientific, while time con- future if new antisubmarine warfare (asw) straints are sometimes determined by rdt&e , techniques are developed by our enemies? and planning sets the stage for the entire

37 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW process. Analysis of each of these parts elearly quite defensible as it concerns the two super- shows the complexity and difficulty of the powers.2 It would come into question, how- overall lead-time problem. ever, if a nation such as China, with inferior Speculation, or assessment of the future technology, assessed a potential enemy, say vis-à-vis the system under consideration, is the Soviet Union, in this manner. the “sand foundation.” Without going too This instance aside, the paradox is still deeply into the discipline of futurology (Her- present. With the United States making its man Kahn’s Hudson Institute, the Club of assessment of Soviet air defenses based on Rome, etc.), suffice it to say that this aspect América s air defense future, the paradox of the problem is eoming under increasing emerges. An American counterpart to the scientific rigor. Probabilities are traded for aircraft planner in air defense is trying to certainties as trends are analyzed to predict analyze the future of the Soviet aircraft in future postures. As pertaining to the lead- the same manner, i.e., based on American time problem, though, assessment of the fu­ r &d in aircraft survivability. In other words, ture presents a curious paradox, mainly be- as the aircraft planner assesses American air cause such assessment involves predicting defense of the future, he designs an aircraft the future of a potential enemy. The uncer- to counter these defenses. The air defense tainties involved are not hard to handle sinee counterpart sees this new American aircraft and tries to design a new air defense to . . . there are simple techniques for dealing counter it (a counter to a counter, if you with uncertainties which make it possible to will). The chain grows ad infinitum. Thus, point out the major ones for the decision in assessing a potential enemy, one must maker and indicate their signifieance. In fact, consider the possibility that the new system rather than conceal uncertainties, a good will be outdated before it is even built. Proof analysis will bring them out and clarify them. of this is evident in the appropriations by A best guess, of course, is not the same as certain knowledge. It is desirable to examine dod where an increase in spending on offen- the available evidence and determine the sive weapon systems is often coupled with bounds of uncertainty.1 an increase in spending on the speeific de- fensive system concerned with negating the The area of concern is with the enemy. offensive system. Assume the United States is developing a The problem is further compounded by new aircraft to counter Soviet air defenses. the same paradox on the Soviet side, so the Obviously, American scientists and planners task of ever designing an aircraft to pene- do not have access to the Soviet files on air trate future Soviet defenses is even harder. defense r &d , future deployments or develop- Yet somewhere in this circular maze a deci­ ments. Therefore, the United States can only sion must be made to go ahead with rdt&e predict what the Soviets will have as a de­ on a system that the planners and analysts fense against a new aircraft by analyzing the feel is worthwhile. From here on, the die is only air defense r &d files available: its own. cast and a commitment has been made.3 In This means that U.S. assessment of future actuality, the problem now becomes one of Soviet air defense is done by making an as­ cost-effectiveness. When is it cost-eífective? sessment of the future American air defense When is it cost-effective to proceed with system. This line of reasoning is based on one rdt&e instead of holding out and trying to crucial assumption: that Soviet r &d and speculate on future threats? This is the hard- American r &d are proceeding at approxi- est decision that must be made. The effects mately the same rate. This assumption is of these decisions are numerous and bear THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 39 directly on the overall arms race spiral.4 future technology (e.g., whether the new sys­ With speculation proving to be a very tem can be modified in the future as was the tricky area of concern, the time constraint F-104G for West Germany). So now, besides factor is another that requires assessment, maldng assumptions about future Soviet namely, how far into the future a planner technology (and hence its potential as a should try to assess the threats to the new threat) based on American technology, the system. This becomes a function of, among planner must question American technology other things, the time needed from the draw- itself as it applies to the rdt&e and life- ing board to operational readiness (the rdt&e expectancy aspects of the new system. split into r &d time and t &e time) and the The time constraint contains the seeds of life expectancy of the new system. Using the a paradox in the circular nature of the as­ new aireraft example onee again, a planner sumptions conceming technology. In using must decide the limits of these two factors technology to assess both Soviet threats and and add their sum to the date at which the American capabilities, the temptation is to decision to begin rdt&e is made. In other use a double standard in trying to measure words, if the rdt&e time of the system is 8 this technology. Here the problem arises. A years5 and its life expectancy is 20 years, planner might want to be more liberal in his the assessment period should be for at least assessment of technology vis-à-vis the threat 28 vears. A problem arises with this in that (i.e., it is probably better to assess a threat the time between the beginning and end of that does not materialize than fail to assess the assessment period is lost. Obviously, since one that does). Such liberal tendencies should this lost time must be taken from either the be avoided when assessing American tech­ rdt&e or life-expectancy portions of the svs- nology in building and maintaining the new tem’s life, the shorter the assessment period, system (i.e., if technology cannot produce the better chance the new aireraft has of the new system, the planner has wasted time, countering future air defense threats. The money, and security). Here is the paradox: problem can be overeome somewhat by add- to be liberal in one area while being con- ing the assessment period to the rdt&e peri­ servative in another in assessing the same od, but this now requires another assumption thing (in this case technology) is logically conceming the length of the assessment pe­ impossible while maintaining a single stan­ riod. The whole lead-time problem is now dard.6 compounded further by another speculation The third part of the lead-time problem factor. is that of rdt&e . Even though an estimate The time constraint part of the problem is can be made on the time allowed for rdt&e , not one that cannot be overeome, and it is this estimate issubject to numerous pressures crucial to the entire lead-time problem. How that can force its alteration. If alteration does long is rdt&e ? That could easilv be a func­ occur, the extra time needed for rdt&e would tion of how different (both quantitatively have to come out of the only phase of the and qualitatively) the new system is from the system s time constraints not yet utilized, the previous one. Existing technology as well life expectancy of the system, possibly caus- as new advancements also plays a major ing the entire project tobe non-cost-effective. role. How long should life expectancy be set A classic example of this is the F-lll (or at? Again, it is a function of many things, TFX as it was originally designated). After not least of which is the State of the tech­ being designed as a Navy fighter, it was nology being used to build the new system modified numerous times to fit a variety of and the assumptions (again!) made about neecLs against an expanded number of threats. 40 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

The aircraft was built along the accepted line tem is justified solely on “technological re­ of thinking in the early 1960s that sponse” grounds. As one opponent of the B-l has stated in stressing this point, projects were approveJ on tlie basis of a given technology. Then new technologies The United States is now almost committed to evolved. These were swiftly perceived as new a new strategic B-l bomber, justified in large opportunities for greater “performance” and part in response to projected Soviet air defense as making the preexisting techniques obsolete. improvements it is now very plausible to ex- Changes were approved, and with them higher pect will never arise—and which makes little costs, delays and unforeseen technical problems difference in any case.10 as the new techniques were merged with the rest of the system.7 Thus planning, the final area of considera- tion, is a somewhat catch-all phase that re­ The result was a simple case of trying to quires a special characteristic absent in many make one system do too much (hence the present-day decision-making apparatuses, Navy’s cancellation), which resulted in the common sense. In planning, the overall lead- increased costs and delays. Even though the time problem is most apparent. The time FB-111 is now operational, itslife expectancy periods of all other facets of the program are has been shortened to the extent that it will summed up to produce the overall “time become technologically obsolete in the near line” of the new system. The immense space futine. It is not that the FB-111 is a bad between the beginning of the idea and the aircraft. Rather, by trying to make it suit operational readiness date is the lead time too many tasks, rdt&e was stretched out to even though the assessments made must take such an extent that that period almost coin- into account the life expectancy of the new cided with the life expectancy of the air­ system. If a planner can’t see the forest for craft.8 the trees in this overall planning facet, it is The rdt&e aspect is further eomplieated easy for him to jeopardize the entire system by the paradox discussed under time eon- by centering on one particular facet, harden- straints. The use of technology for two pur- ing parochial views and dooming the system poses (to build a system and evaluate the to failure. Each facet must be viewed in the future enemy threat) means that rot&e in context of the entire lead-time problem. The one area feetls on the rot&e (mostly r &o ) of planners who can do this are probably the the “opposing” section.9 Breaking out of it most worthwhile assets to the entire system. to build a system requires more rdt&e (now Even though common sense overshadows mainly t &e ), the lessons learned here sup- the entire problem, there are specific as- posedly being applied to the next-generation pects of planning that must be coordinated system in that particular category under and applied to the overall political/eco- rot e & as well as to the opposing system. Thus, nomic/militarv/ situation that the nation if a new aircraft is T&E'd and something new finds itself in. Furthermore, planning must is found to counter it, air defense planners be closelvj in time with that most crucial will immediately begin their own rot&e to area, financing. Simply stated, it is hard to exploit this new weakness in the aircraft, hop- convince anyone, much less a Congress skep- ing that the Soviet counterpart aircraft has tical regarding defense matters, that system this weakness too. Only careful planning, the X is needed to counter future threats A, B, final area under analysis in this study, can C, and D when A, B, C, and D do not exist. prevent planners from becoming trapped in This of course involves the political/eco- this circle to such an extent that a new sys­ nomic/military aspects of those systems as THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 41

well as their effects on future political/eco- ing other parts of the time scale to l>e shifted nomic/military situations. Arguing that a downwards along the line. Since the final new aircraft is needed against as yet undis- point on the scale (the end of the system’s covered and possibly nonexistent threats is life expectancy) is fixed during the initial easily eountered with the argument that assessment period, the lengthening of the these future threats will not be developed R&D time necessarily shortens other areas, by the enemy if we do not develop an air­ usually the life expectancy of the system, craft that can counter present threats. Leav- unless growth considerations are a part of ing aside for the moment the idealistic and the planning and design. As mentioned previ- moralistic assumptions implicit in that ously, the entire system might now not even counterargument, one can easily see that be cost-effective. A similar argument can neither side has a solid case. Ultimately the be made for each section of the time spec­ problem rests on the issue of trust: if “we” trum. As will be seen in the following analy- do not build something to counter present sis of two weapon systems, even the l)est threats, “they” will not build new threats. planning cannot make up for fluctuations This means that our force is vulnerable to in funding and shifts along the time line. present threats, i.e., we are at a strategic This analysis of the theoretical issues in- disadvantage. To be at an advantage, we volved with the lead-time problem does not must build the systems needed, thus putting attempt to offer Solutions to the problems them at the disadvantage. Without delving raised. Rather, it is to serve as a basis for into philosophy (Why do we need the ad­ the following study of two current advanced vantage anyway?), suffice it to say that the strategic systems, the B-l bomber and the entire idea of a “zero-sum” game is extremely trident, and the attempts to cope with the complex and crucial to the entire planning problems. Because of their ongoing nature, facet of the problem. Most officials in both the 20/20 hindsight analysis often found in the military and the govemment are not assessing such systems is not currently avail- willing to accept being on the “short end” able. What can lie analyzed is the daily of the advantage-disadvantage spectrum. complexity of these problems and the steps Much can be said, however, for the cooling taken so far to combat the many issues men­ effect if both sides should adopt the idea tioned in this theoretical overview. of “strategic sufficiency.” If a planner can convinee the Congres- Practical sional powers who control dod appropria- Applications tions for defense projects to allocate money for a particular system, a new question The four areas previously discussed as arises: How do the planners disburse it? In comprising the lead-time problem are all the overall plan for a new system, the fac- present in the specific instances of trident tors of speculation, time constraints, and and the B-l. While different methods have rdt&e have been integrated to produce a been used to treat these problems, it is ob- linear scale of time. The money given to vious at this time in their respective develop- each factor can greatlv affect the pace at ment stages that the handling of these sys­ which the system moves along this scale. tems is radically different from the handling For instance, small amounts of money al- of previous defense contracts.11 Conse- loted for r &d would slow the process of quently, optimistic predictions concerning developing the svstem from the drawing costs and performance are being proliferated boards to the metal-cutting phase, thus forc- throughout the defense establishment. The 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW reasons for such statements lie in the treat- We propose to continue with that activity, a ment given to the lead-time problem. developmental activity; more wind tunnel In the area of speeulation, planners of testing, much more structural testing, and much more engine testing leading to the con- both trident and the B-l have been careful to stress general enemy defense characteris- struetion of three prototype aircraft. We an- ticipate the first flight in April 1974, following tics rather than specific threats. Therefore which we plan to flight test these aircraft for the development of each of these systems is a years time, before making a produetion de- geared towards a variety of improvements cision, if one is made.16 over its predecessor, the Polaris and B-52 bomber respectively,12 to incorporate tech- Such schedules are not inherently bad, but nological advances that have also been used they do add a sense of rigidity to the overall to increase the enemy s ability to counter time speetrum and could force Congressional the older systems. These assessments of tech- appropriations to waver if the schedules are nology are being made on the assnmption of not adhered to. While no statements have equality in technologieal advances between been made as to the life expectancy of either the United States and the Soviet Union. This system, it still remains a truism that increased seems to be a safe assumption, as Dr. John S. rdt&e times will necessarily cut into life Foster, Jr., realized when he remarked, “The expectancy of each system. Undoubtedly, United States ean no longer feel assured that former Deputy Secretary of Defense David it has unquestioned technologieal superiority Packard’s “fly-before-buy” idea is indeed an over the Soviet Union.”13 Finally, the para- improvement in system acquisition, but care­ dox mentioned previously concerning the ful planning is needed to assure that t &e is use of American technology to assess Soviet not stretched out to such an extent that the threats is indeed present, but, as explained, new system is effectively outdated when the it offers the only basis for study. Uneertainty decision concerning procurement is finally still exists, but careful analysis has reduced it made. as much as possible. This, of course, cuts into the third area of The second area of concern is time eon- the lead-time problem, that of rdt&e . Unfor- straints. In the B-l and trident examples, tunately, neither system is in the t &e stage these restraints are already present although of development yet, and r &d is continuing no prototypes have yet been built or tested. under a great deal of secrecy. Thus, not much The double-standard problem is present (as concrete specific evidence can be added to one writer has maintained, the entire lead- the overall Packard dictum.17 One facet has time problem is a problem of using two sets emerged in the B-l program that might serve of assumptions about one’s technology in to set the pace for future endeavors in rdt&e . order to make different cases14) although, as Contrary to the rdt&e of the F-lll, the B-l already mentioned, the use of general threat is attempting to use proven equipment as analysis rather than specifics has decreased part of the total system, thus cutting down use of the double standard. What is some- rdt&e quite significantly.18 This means that what disturbing is the contention that Ameri­ dependence on new technology to produce can technology can build these new systems the new systems as well as test and evalu- without any trouble.10 This, of eourse, means ate them is not as strong as in previous that specific time tables for rdt&e have been systems. This is occurring without sacri- set up, such as the following one put forward fieing the needed improvements that the by Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Sea- systems will incorporate. Finally, rdt&e con­ mans, Jr., for the B-l: tinues to feed the “counter” forces in the THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 43

defense of such systems as disciissed previ- Department asks for increased monies to ouslv.19 In sum, it would seem that trident spend on trident and the B -l. The issue of and B-l development is taking a new ap- trust has become central to the entire dis- proach to rdt&e , one th at can n o t b e o b je c- cussion, as many Congressmen feel that tively evaluated until the systems becom e “the concept of strategic mix, like so many operational. other doctrines, seemed to evolve after the The final area in the lead-time problem is technology was developed rather than be- planning. In both trident and the B-l, plan- fore.” 21 Conflicts arise between military ning has been very thorough and detailed leaders and Congressmen as to whether the so as not to incur the wrath of Congress United States needs to have the advantage through cost overnms, delays in procure- in the “zero-sum” game. These debates con-

Prior to FY70 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 \ j$1000 - sub + missiles TRIDENT $105 $TÕ *$44** $1 10*** $942 / | $750 - sub only

’ $20m w as originally asked for. "* Actual funding was 545m. * * * Thís has since been updated to $140m.

remarks • FY73 costs include S400m for construction and procurement. • Accelerated TRIDENT program adds S1.0 billlon a year in costs. • Total System cost is estimoted at $15.0b for 20 boats. • Funding beyond FY73 is opproxim ately $ 13.8b. • Ten-year operating cost is estimated to be $2.3b.

Figure I. Funding o f TRIDENT strategic system in mitlions of dollars

ment, and legal battles.20 It is in this stage tinue even though money is appropriated that the greatest improvements in combat- by Congress for the systems. ting the lead-time problem can be seen. The present status of trident and B-l Planners with common sense seem to lie in financing continues the trend of increased control, as both systems now reflect eon- funding over the years, but many less well- cerned and deliberate planning in order to known facets of such financing are impor- ensure continued Congressional support and tant. Both systems have incorporated infla- introduction of these systems into Service tion factors into their cost estimates.22 Both on schedule. systems continually revise cost estimates At present, the overriding problem in the (and in the case of the B-l, rdt&e estimates planning of both systems is Congressional too) to keep unit costs as near to the original funding. The political/economic/military estimates as possible. Finally, both systems issues are being hotly debated in Congres­ have already set out monetary allocations sional committees every day as the Defense for each stage of the time spectrum so as to 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW be able to keep each facet of the spectrum in theory, and 2) it is being handled by pres­ to its original length. These allocations are ent planners and analysts in various ways, of a specific nature.23 all designed to bring about a cost-effective One particular aspect of the trident pro- weapon system. The two examples have gram points out quite graphically the power- shown how the problem is being handled, ful effect that finances have on systems being but one should not forget that developed. There has been talk of accelerat- a decision by the Secretary of Defense to de- ing the trident program to put the first velop, procure, or operate a weapon system systems into operation in 1978 instead of affects not only the current defense budget 1981. This switch was approved by Secre- but future budgets as well, the latter far more tary Laird and reflects a decision taken after than the former as a rule. When he decides to careful overall planning.24 This accelerated begin the engineering development of a new

Prior to $30-35 bought in 1 FY70 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 \ * excess of 200 a/c ------4 umt cost $144 $100 $100* $370 ( $30-60 otherwise

* Actual funding was $75m.

remarks • Avionics amount *o $4.8m per aircraft. • Operating cost is $10m per year including tanker support. • Total system cost is estimated at $11.3 billion. • Funding beyond FY73 is approxim ately $ 10.0b. • Ten-year operating cost is estimated to be $8.0b.

Figure 2. Funding of B-l strategic system in millions of dollars

program cuts off three years in the rdt&e system, with procurement presumablv to fol- and assessment stages and, at an average low, he initiates a stream of expenditures which cost of $1 billion per year, puts the system can eventually include development, procure­ into Service.25 Obviously it is wrong to equate ment, and operating costs and maintenance the time decrease to the money spent, but costs of the completed system.26 the relationship between the two does exist to some degree and should not be lightly VVith world and national resources becom- disregarded. ing scarcer, the United States must order its priorities. This obviously will involve the defense establishment and its problems and F rom this analysis it is clear that 1) the lead- policies. Successful understanding and cop- time problem is present in actuality, not just ing with the lead-time problem, inherent THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 45

in development and acquisition of every all bureaueratic maze that American govern- dod svstem, can only serve to fortifv dod’s ment has become. case and increase its strength in the over- Fletcher School of Luw mui Diplomacy

Notes

1. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Sinith. How Much Is Encnigh? (New York: 14. Enthoven and Srnith. pp. 232-33. Harper and Row, 1971). p. 70. 15. Laird's comment concerning thident: "W c luve not built one of these 2. See State ment by Dr John S. Foster. Jr . conceming this issue in U.S. submarines. but 1 can assure you . . . that we have the technology and the Congress. Senate. Subcommittee of the Committee oo Appropriations, Depart- capability to do it.” Subcoiuinittee of the Committee on Appropriations. DOD ment o f Defense Appropriations. FY73, Department o f the Navy. 92d Cong.. 2d Appropriations. FY73, DOD, p. 413. sess. (Washington. 1972), pp 693-94. 16. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. DOD Appn/priatiuns. 3. See Dr. Fosters critique of the B-l in this regard in U.S. Congress, Senate. FY73. Air Force, p. 69. Subcommittee of the Committee an Appropriations, Department of Defense 17. Murphy. "Era of Austerity,” p. 144. Appropriations. FY73. Department of Defense. 92d Cong.. 2d sess. (Washington. 18. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. DOD Appropriations. 1972), p. 690 FY73, Air Force, p. 75. 4. See comments on this by General Otto Glasser. DCS/R&D, Hq US.AF, in 19. Funding for ULMS increase d from $140in in FY72 to $942m in FY73 U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, svhile ASW fnnds increased also. The B-l funding went from $370m in FY72 Department of Defense Appropriations, FY73, Department of the Air Force, to $445m in FY73 while air defense funding rose from $348m in FY72 to 92d Cong.. 2d sess. (Washington. 1972), p. 686. $695m ui FY73. See Laird, Defense Budget aiul Program, FY73, p. 68. 5. See Andrew Pierre. "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britau». France and America." 20. Such a legal battle is developing over the Navys F-14 and Grumman. Foreign Affatrs, voL XLIX. January 1971, p. 289. See "Grumman v. lhe Navy," Time, December 25. 1972, p. 68. 6. Not aD agree that a^essment of an eneray should be liberal. “Over- 21. Economics o f Defense, p. 101. estimates do not necessarily lead to Insurance and safety; they may lead to the 22. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. DOD Appropriations. pricing of important capabüities out of the market and to strategies of despair." FY73. Navy. p. 106. and DOD Appropriations. FY73, Air Force. p. 73. Enthoven and Smith, p. 70. 23. See Admirai Zumwalt*s discussion of ULMS in Subcommittee of the 7. Ibid., p. 26. Committee on Appropriations. DOD Apffropriations. FY73. Navy. p. 106. 8. F - l l l costs have risen 280% from $2 8m to SS.Oin per unit. Members of 24. Ibid., p. 1439 gives the history of ULMS. Congress for Peace Through Law. The Economics of Defense (New York Praeger. 25. Charles Schultze et al.. Setiing National Priorities. The 1973 Budget 1971). p. 79. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972). p. 98. 9. See Melvm R. Laird. Defense Program and Budget for FY73 (Washington: 26. Enthoven and Srnith. How Much Is Enougfi? p. 48. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 68. 10. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. DOD Appropriations. FY73, DOD. p 1154. This articie has been adapted for Air University Review by 11. See Charles Murphy, “The Pentagon Enters Its Era of Austerity," For- Lieutenant Stoehrmann from a paper prepared as part of his tune, December 1972, pp. 144-50. academic work while assigned under the Air Force Institute 12. Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. DOD Ajrpnrpriations, FY73, DOD, pp 420-21 of Technology program to the Fletcher School of Law and 13. Ibid.. p. 688. Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts. U 9.St?l04t NOS I TA’ minn isoia

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2S = g liAMn A fflTull CA*D AliAMn fflTullCA*D v Hkonvu OI vlM HROUGHOUT the history of warfare, against the Viet Minh in Indochina.4 By from Biblical times to the present, contrast, a much-improved French intelli­ accurate and timely intelligence has gence effort in Algeria was an important beenT of singular importance in the conduct element in successful French operations of militarv operations. Most successful mili- against the Algerian National Liberation tars leaders have clearly acknowledged the Front (fln).5 contribution intelligence can and does make Thus, in many of the popular writings on to the achievement of victory. counterinsurgency that have emerged in re- In the years follovving World War II, in- cent years, intelligence is regarded as the telügence assumed added importance with sine qua non of success. Sir Robert Thomp­ the outbreak of insurgency in many areas son, a leading exponent of the value of in­ of the world, either as a result of the ex- telligence in counterinsurgency, perhaps ex- ploitation (frequently by Communists) of pressed it best: political, economic, and social injustice or be- If subversion is the main threat, starting as it cause of the rise of nationalism and the con- does well before an open insurgency and comitant disintegration of prewar colonial continuing through it and even afterwards, it empires.1 Faced with the task of combating follows that within the government the in­ an elusive and often shadowy enemy deeply telligence organization is of paramount im­ submerged in the indigenous population, portance. In fact I would go so far as to say govemments and their military/internai that no government can hope to defeat a com- security forces quiekly realized that if they munist insurgent movement unless it gives top were to identify, locate, and destroy the in- priority to and is successful in building such surgents, an efficient and effective intelli­ an organization.6 gence Service was essential. All too often, Although intelligence is recognized as an however, the government and its internai integral and indispensable element of coun­ security forces had neither an intelligence terinsurgency, the major focus of its appli- system nor the basic framework upon which cation has been against rural-based guerrilla one could be built. By the time an effective movements. This is a natural consequence intelligence network was created and op- of the modem experience in counterinsur­ erating, the guerrilla movement was firmly gency, which has been derived primarily established, and the task of isolating and from combating insurgency centered in the neutralizing it was not only extremely dif- countryside rather than the cities. Yet there ficult but time-consuming and costlv as is increasing evidence, particularly in Latin well.2 America, to indicate that the focus of in­ Those govemments that were able to surgency may be shifting from a rural to an create effective intelligence organizations urban environment.' Should this shift con­ and use them effíciently were normally suc­ tinue, it will not only have a marked impact cessful in their counterinsurgency efforts. on eurrent counterinsurgency strategy and This was particularly true of the British tactics, virtually all of which have been campaign in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 and formulated in response to rural insurgency, the Philippine operations against the Huks but also will place unprecedented demands from 1946 to 1954.3 In both instances, ac­ on intelligence.8 curate and timely intelligence was a crucial The increased demands on a govemments factor in defeating the insurgents. On the intelligence/internal security apparatus other hand, inadequate intelligence was a stem from the very nature of urban insur­ significant weakness in the French campaign gency itself. Lacking the need for the rural 47 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEXV

guerrilla’s conventionally organized military gent movement. A large number of pene­ forces, the urban guerrilla instead depends, tration agents is essential because of the at least initially, on much smaller core groups security practices, particularly compart- of dedicated and well-trained “political rev- mentation, employed by most guerrilla or- olutionaries.” Maintaining no fixed base and ganizations. Without extensive penetration, operating relatively independently of any it is extremely difficult to obtain a com- centralized command structure, the urban prehensive picture of the insurgent’s or­ guerrilla surfaces more briefly, strikes more ganization, capabilities, plans, and objec- swiftly, and disappears more quickly than tives and to identify its leadership core. does his rural counterpart.9 Effective intelligence, however, requires Using readily available commercial and far more than the mere acquisition of in- public facilities to satisfy his basic survival forination. As Nathan Leites and Charles and operational need for food, clothing, Wolf, Jr., point out: shelter, transportation, and Communications, the urban insurgent relies on the anonymity The ingredients of effective intelligence organi­ inherent in the urban environment, coupled zation and operations are numerous and com- plex. An effective system requires not just with tight security and rigid compartmenta- collection of information from multiple sources tion, to protect him and his organization. (some degree of redundancy is essential) but Under such conditions, unless the urban also processing, classifying, evaluating, storing, guerrilla is engaged in some form of overt and retrieving information. Indeed, modem activity clearly and directly in support of technological progress in information process­ his revolutionary goal, such as robbery, kid- ing and handling is probably more important napping, or assassination, he is invisible to for counterinsurgency than are changes in both the police and the intelligence/internal weapons technology.11 security apparatus, and his organization is virtually impenetrable. Thus, the speed, accuracy, effieiency, and Despite these advantages, the urban guer­ effectiveness of information processing, par­ rilla knows fiill well that a small group, no ticularly the collating and retrieval aspects, matter how dedicated, is unlikely to succeed are of criticai importance not only to the in overthrowing the government. In order success of the intelligence effort but also to to succeed, he must expand his organization, the overall success of the counterinsurgency not only in numbers but also throughout program itself. The reasons for this impor­ various segments of the society. At this point tance are threefold. the urban insurgent movement becomes • First, historical experience has vulnerable to penetration by the govern- shown clearly that the longer it takes to ment’s intelligence Service, To achieve detect the existence of an insurgencv, the penetration, however, requires a massive larger the forces required to combat it and intelligence network extending throughout the lower the probability of success in de- every segment of the society or at least those feating it.12 Conversely, the earlier an in- segments likely to prove fertile ground for surgency is detected, the less costly and recruiting by the insurgents.10 A massive more effective will be the effort to control intelligence network is needed not only to or defeat it. The information processing insure that the intelligence Service knows system can make a significant contribution when the recruiting begins but also to insure to the earlv detection of insurgencv bv its that a sufficient number of the intelligence ability to highlight “indicators.” Since the service’s agents are recruited into the insur­ insurgent leaders, because of their organiza- INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY 49

tions small size, cannot achieve their goals “arranging” that information in various pat­ single-handedlv, thev must engage in some terns for study and evaluation. Unless the form of overt activity that will prove to the intelligence Service has in operation an in­ popnlace that the insurgents are capable of formation system that makes this retrieval effectivelv ehallenging the government, and “arranging” feasible in terms of time thereby attracting the support and new and eost, it may never obtain a truly ac­ members thev require. This overt activity curate and coinprehensive picture of the may take the form of propaganda, limited guerrilla movement. Without this accurate work stoppages, raids on isolated police and comprehensive picture, counterinsur- posts, bank robberies, assassinations, and the gency programs and resources cannot be like, which may appear relativelv common- developed or focused to achieve maximum place, but their frequency and intensitv may results. well be indicative of the beginnings of in­ surgency.13 If these incidents are reported • Third, in addition to facilitating and the information processing system is both the early detection of insurgency and capable of retrieving the individual reports the compilation of an accurate and com­ on the basis of the tvpe of incident, frequen­ prehensive picture of the movement itself, cy, location, etc., and if the system can com­ the information processing system can be pare the information to that of previous of singular value in the identifieation and periods, it can assist in identifying not only subsequent neutralization of the insurgent the beginnings of insurgency but also the infrastructure, that is, the underground or- areas where possible insurgent activity is ganization which embodies both the central concentrated. An inordinate and unexpected leadership core and those elements that increase in certain tvpes of incidents, oc- support and sustain the entire insurgency. curring in a particular geographic area or It is the infrastructure which constitutes the within a particular segment of society, insurgent moveinent’s heart and lifeblood. should, at a minimum, increase the govern- It provides the ideological underpinning and ment s vigilance and dictate an intensified political direction of the insurgency, deter­ intelligence effort to ascertain if an insur­ mines strategy, Controls the employment of gency is beginning. • the armed forces, and furnishes the men, money, supplies, Communications network, • Second, no matter how extensive and intelligence that are necessary if the the intelligence network may be, informa­ insurgency is to remain viable. Unless this tion about an insurgent movement, partic- infrastructure is attacked successfully, it is ularlv an urban one, usually is acquired in unlikely the insurgents can be defeated.14 small bits and pieces like those of a jigsaw As long as the underground organization re- puzzle. To obtain a clear and accurate pic- mains intact, the insurgency remains alive ture of the insurgency, the various pieces of and is a continuing threat to the govern­ information must be fitted together in a ment, regardless of the number of military number of patterns, which are adjusted or successes achieved by the counterinsurgent rearranged (collated) on the basis of con- armed forces. Normally the insurgent will tinuous inputs of new information. In order find it much easier to replace his armed to do this, the intelligence Service must forces if his underground structure continues possess an information processing system to survive. The one thing he cannot replace capable of retrieving information according easilv is the structure itself.15 to differing criteria or characteristies and To attack the infrastructure successfully t J B êá.} ip. :

L-P f JBH m'T

microfilm camera

high-speed collator

key punch and verifier While the information processing system can be of material assistance in providing reader-printer these two requirements, it is particularly valuable in documenting the identity and function of underground members, thus enabling the counterinsurgency persoimel to identifv key personnel within the infrastruc- ture so that they may be targeted for ap- prehension. This is achieved through what and cripple the insurgency effeetively, the is known as a “dossier-building” capability, counterinsurgent forces, particularly the that is, the capability to link and retrieve intelligence Service, must possess both an fragmentary or nonsubstantive information accurate picture of the undergrounds or- concerning an individual which, in the ag- ganizational structure and a thorough under- gregate, can constitute unmistakable evi- standing of the interrelationships of the dence of membership in the insurgent in- component elements within that structure. frastructure.

51 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This documentation of membership in the manner in which modern information pro­ underground structure is extremely valuable cessing can be used for intelligence and and important. Unless the coimterinsnrgent counterinsurgency purposes. Few of the of­ is certain that those individuais arrested or ficers with whom we talked had any real otherwise detained as part of the under- appreciation of the improvement it can ground structure are, in fact, members, he make in operational effectiveness. Many can never be certain of the true progress he viewed it, at least initially, as “gadgetry” is making in his attempt to root out and de- that might be nice to have for prestige stroy the infrastructure. Furthermore, ap- reasons but not really necessary for mission prehension of only those individuais whose accomplishment. A second reason is the membership or involvement with the insur- very strict financial constraints placed on gent underground is extremely well docu- the operations of the agencies involved. mented guards against indiscriminate arrest Forced to compete for limited budgetary of civilians, which is likely to be counter- resources with other agencies and with productive to the governments efforts to existing programs, there is very little money win or hold popular support. In addition, available for an information processing Sys­ neutralization of bona fide infrastmcture tem. Even if sufficient fimds were available members provides excellent propaganda for the purchase of a system, many agencies material to illustrate the government s effec- believe they do not have personnel with suf­ tiveness against the insurgency; helps to ficient technical knowledge or aptitude to deter those contemplating either joining or operate or maintain it. When it was sug- otherwise supporting the insurgents; and gested that perhaps the system in use by provides a basis for proceeding against the another government department or agency apprehended undergroiuid member accord- could be adapted for intelligence or internai ing to existing law, thus contributing to the security use on a time-sharing basis, there legitimaey of the governmenfs entire coun- was almost imanimous objection on the terinsurgency campaign. grounds that such use would entail an un- In spite of the contribution that modem acceptable risk of compromising ongoing information processing technology can make operations, sources of information, oper­ toward strengthening the ability of less- ational techniques, and overall capabilities. developed countries to resist internai sub- In view of the very nature and mission of version and insurgency, very little use has intelligence and internai security agencies, been made of it by intelligence and internai this point is well taken. Intelligence and security agencies in those countries. As a internai security agencies can perform rea- result of diseussions with police and intelli­ sonably effectively in the face of many ob- gence and counterintelligence officers in stacles or handicaps, but there is a very real Latin America, sub-Saharan África, and question as to whether thev can perform Southeast Asia, we believe modern informa­ with any degree of effectiveness at all if tion processing is probably the least under- their own security has been compromised. stood and one of the most neglected areas A risk of compromise of this nature is one of intelligence and internai security oper- which no such agency is willing to accept ations. or can afford to take. There seem to be several reasons under- lying the failure to adapt this technology to internai security and counterinsurgency uses. C onsidering, then, the prob- First, a basic ignorance exists regarding the lems and objections associated with the in- INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING IN COUNTER1NSURGENCY 53

troduction and use of modem information afosi by other intelligence and counter­ processing technologv by those intelligence intelligence agencies. and internai security agencies faced with Prior to development of the afosi system, the task of combating an actual or potential all such collection reports were filed and subversive insurgency, it would appear that retrieved manually, a process that was not two basic steps should be taken. First, a only time-consuming but made recall ability maximum effort should be made to educate and response time erratic and unsatisfac- the leadership in both the application of tory.16 In adclition, the space available for this technology to normal operations and the storage of these reports soon would be ex- benefits in terms of increased eífectiveness hausted. It was evident that a more efficient that can be derived from such application. information processing system was needed, This education could be achieved, at least and needed quickly, if the a &a Division was in part, by affording greater emphasis to the to continue meeting its responsibilities. use of information processing systems in The current afosi system emerged follow- those U.S.-sponsored or -conducted training ing an extensive study of the a &a Division’s programs for foreign police officials and requirements and the capabilities of existing militarv personnel assigned to intelligence commercially available information process­ and internai security agencies or units in ing systems. Its major purpose is to provide their respective countries. a single integrated system capable of re- A second step would be the design and trieving individual reports as well as facili- development of a low-cost, relatively un- tating the detection and analysis of patterns sophisticated, highly efficient, secure, and and trends through the rapid collation of dependable information processing system reported information aecording to variable for use by these agencies. This is essential, criteria. since it would be rather pointless to con- The basic principie underlying the system vince one he needs to improve his informa­ is the elassification of reported information tion processing capabilitv and then be un- aecording to preselected criteria or char- able to provide a realistic means whereby acteristics, such as geographic location of that capability can be improved. incidence, group or organization involved One information system which may be (if known), type of activity or incident, ideally suited for counterinsurgency is that souree, date/time, etc., the assignment of currently being used by the Air Force Office simple numerical codes to each preselected of Special Investigations (afosi). It was de- characteristic, and then the use of these signed and developed in 1964 for the Ac- numerical codes, either individually or in quisitions and Analysis (a &a ) Division of combination, as the basis for storage and afosis Directorate of Special Operations. retrieval. The information or individual re- The a &a Division, among other things, ex- port itself is microfilmed on an aperture ercises staff supervision of afosi s worldwide card identical in size to the standard ibm counterintelligence collections program; card. Each aperture card will have a micro­ prepares analyses, estimates, and special filmed copy of as many as four 8- by 10- studies on organizations and activities of inch pages. By means of a key punch, the counterintelligence and security significance numerical codes are transferred to the to the Air Force; and acts as the central aperture card, and retrieval is effected repository for all collection reports gen- through the use of a collator programmed erated by afosi field elements throughout to sort out those cards bearing one or more the world as well as those reports furnished assigned code numbers. Under this system, 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

then, it is possible to retrieve not only a niques, security practices, and the like. This specific report dealing with a particular capability is particularly valuable in dealing incident, organization, or activity but also with a known insurgent group when periodic all the reports regarding any specific or­ reviews of available information are neces- ganization, type of incident, or form of sary for either analysis or targeting of in- activity in any particular location or loca- telligence resources. tions during any designated time frame. For Another feature of the afosi system is its example, the system is capable of sorting capability to store and retrieve biographic out within minutes all the reports dealing or “dossier” data on individuais through the

The aperture rard of AFOSI's intelligence system, çontaining microfilmeil copy of up to fonr pages, enables electronic processing, storage, collation, and retriccal of data collected worldwide.

with antigovernment propaganda country- use of combined alphabetical and numerical wide by month as a means of determining coding. With this feature, it is possible to trends or patterns of activity. Similarly, any retrieve all reports in the system concerning individual report dealing with a particular a particular individual or the names of all propaganda incident eould also be retrieved individuais known or suspected of involve- in minutes. As another example, the system ment in a particular tvpe of activity. For can be programmed to retrieve all the re­ example, within the counterinsurgencv con- ports dealing with some aspect of a partic­ text, the svstem can be used to retrieve the ular organization or its activities such as biographic data cards on all persons either organizational structure, membership, fi- known or suspected to be part of some ele- nances, Communications, recruitment tech- ment of the insurgent infrastructure. Thus INTELL1CENCE PROCESSING IN COUNTERINSVRGENCY 55 it would be a simple matter to retrieve the Two other aspects of the system are also names and accompanying biographic data worth mentioning. First, because it is a of persons suspected of being couriers or self-contained unit and no outside facilities intelligence agents or financial supporters are used for any of its functions, such as of an insurgent movement. microfilm processing, security is particularly The information system now in use by good. Second, although the afosi system is afosi uses off-the-shelf equipment readilv designed and used primarily for intelligence available through commercial sources. The and counterintelligence information, it can basic components are a microfilm carnera readily be adapted for storage and retrieval that produces the microfilm aperture card, of criminal incidents and investigative in­ a reader-printer for either viewing the aper­ formation as well. This feature would be ture card or printing a readable paper copy particularly useful to an urban police de- of the microfilmed report should one be partment or other internai security agency needed, a standard kev punch, a key-punch responsible for both counterinsurgency and verifier that cross-checks the kevpunched the exercise of the police function, since a coding on the aperture card, a high-speed single system would be able to handle all collator, and a 315,000-card-capacity storage its information processing needs. bank. In the more than eight years the afosi One of the major attractions of this par­ system has been in operation, it has proven ticular system is its low cost, both in terms to be remarkably efficient, dependable, and of equipment outlay and operating costs. trouble-free. The number of analyses, esti- Total equipment costs are approximately mates, and special studies prepared by the $19,000, which can be reduced even further a &a Division has increased more than 50 if some of the components are rented rather percent, research time required for prepara- than purchased. Based on an annual input tion has been reduced by more than 60 of 15,000 aperture cards into the system, percent, and response time has been cut by yearly operating costs, exclusive of man- approximately 70 percent. In terms of stor­ power and overhead, are about $1.500. age space, the improvement was even more Manpower requirements for system op- significant, with a net reduction of nearly eration will vary according to the individual 84 percent in the number of square feet re­ user’s needs, such as the number of hours quired for file storage. In addition, downtime the system is operated and the number of because of component mechanical failure inputs fed into it. With the annual input of has averaged less than 30 minutes per 15,000 aperture cards and operation of the month. system on a six-day, 48-hour week, four There are, of course, a number of com- people are required on a full-time basis. mercially available information systems that No special technical or educational quali- can be adapted for use by intelligence and fications are required for operating the internai security agencies. Our purpose here system other than an ability to learn key- has not been to advocate the system in use punching. Training time is also minimal. by afosi but rather to illustrate that a rela- Experience has shown that to become fully tively simple yet efficient and dependable qualified, the average person will need system can be developed at reasonable cost about 16 hours of classroom instruction and to enhance significantly the effectiveness of 24 hours of supervised on-the-job training, intelligence and internai security agencies exclusive of key-punch instruction and in coping with internai subversion and in- training. surgency. It is not important which particu­ 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

lar system is used; it is important that those “. . . effective counterrebellion requires that agencies recognize the very real contribu- [the counterinsurgent force] improve its tion that modem information processing capacity to collect, store, collate, evaluate, can make to mission effectiveness and that retrieve, and use information.” 17 serious consideration be given to its adop- //

Notes

1. For a broader discussion of the origins and types of insurgeney. see P 8. Ibid.. pp. 59-60. Kecskemeti, Insurgeney as a Strategic Prohlem iRAND Corporation Memo 9. A detailed description of the t ac ti cs and techniques of the urban guerrilla RM-1560-Pr, February 1967). pp. 15-19. For a more detailed treatment of is contained in Carlos Nlarigliella. "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla.” the root factors generating insurgeney and the influence of Communist ideol- Written in June 1969. the Mini-Manual received widespread attention when it ogy, see also Charles A. Russell and Major Robert E. Hildner. "The Role of was published in the January-February 1970 edition of Tricontinental. the of* Communist Ideology in Insurgeney." Air University Review, XXII. 2 (Junuary- ficial organ of the Havana-based Organization of Solidarity of the People of February 1971.'. 42-48. África, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL). Nlarighella had broken with the 2. Major Edgar OBallance. "Thoughts on Countering Communist Insurgent Brazilian Communist Party and established the National Liberating Action War." The Army Quarterly and Defence Review. Octobcr 1966-January 1967, (ALN), an urban-based terrorist group. He was assassinated in São Paulo. p. 73. Brazil, in November 1969. 3. I) M. Condit et a i, ChnUenge. and Response in Internai Conflict, Vol I. 10. Andrew R. Moinar. Vndergraunds in Insurgent. Revolutionary. and Re- The Experience in Asia (Washington: American University. Center for Research sistancc Warfare (Washington: American University. Special Operations Re­ in Social Systems. February 1968), p. 464. An in-depth account of the role search Office. November 1963), p. 10. played by intelligence in the anti-Huk campaign is related in Napoieon D. 11. Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Anu- Valeriano and Charles T R. Bohannon. Counter-Cuerrilla Operations. The lytic Essay on Insurgent Confliet.s RAND Corporation. Report R.-462-ARPA. Philippine Experience New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1962). pp. 44-64. See February 1970), pp. 135. 140. also Uldarico S. Baclagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines 12. Dr. Michael C. Conley and Joann L. Schrock. Preliminary Survey o f In- i.Manila: M. Colcol & Co.. 1960). p. 17. surgem y in Urban Arcas (Washington: American Universitv. Special Oper­ 4 John J. MeCuen, The Art o f Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg: ations Office. 5 February 1965). p. 11. Stackpole Books. 1966), p. 115. See also Oito Heilbrunn, "Counter-Insurgency 13. Ibid.. p. 8. Targets: A Question of Prioritics." The Army Quarterly and Defence Review. 14 Sir Robert Thompson. .Vo F.xit from Vietnam (New York: David McKay. October 1966-January 1967. p. 204. 1970). p. 166. 5. Major Edgar O Ballance. The Algerian Insurrection 1954-62 (Hamden: 15. Leites and Wolf. pp. 78. 8*1. Archon Books. 1967). pp. 65. 68-69. 76. 80-81. and Constantin Melnik, The 16. The ability to retrieve relevant documents is referred to as "recall abil- French Campaign against the FLX (RAND Corporation. Memo RM-5449-ISA. ity." "Response time" is the period of time between initiution of a search for September 1967). pp. 70-72. a particular document or documents and the retrieval of that document and 6. Sir Robert Thompson, Dcfeating Communist Insurgeney: The Lessons of its deli very to the requestor. See F Wilfrid Lancaster. Information Retrieval Mulaya and Vietnam New York. Frederick A. Praeger. 1966). p. 84. Systems, Chararteristies, Testing, and Evaluation New York: John Wiley & 7. Charles A. Russell and Major Robert E. Hildner, "Urban Insurgeney in Sons. lf>68), p. 55. Latin America. Its Implications for the Future," Air University Review, XXII. 17. Leites and Wolf. p. 135. 6 (September-October 1971). 55. MIDDLE EAST, 1973

Cold War Changes and American Interests

C aptain Bar d E. 0 ’Neill

HE vear 1972 was, without doubt, one of the most active in American foreign policy. Happily, most of the major de- Tvelopments—President Nixon s trips to Moscow and Peking and especiallv the sa l t agreements—were oriented towards the creation of a more pacific and stable international atmosphere. In the midst of snch encouraging trends, however, one area re- mained turbulent and pregnant with the possibility of future conflict—the Middle East. Unfortunately, with both the United States and the Soviet Union involved in the region, the poten- tial for superpower confrontation was an ever present reality that precluded a posture of “benign neglect” by either side. Even the expulsion of most of the Russian military advisers by 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Egypt’s President Sadat in July 1972 did had new and important implications for not completely alter this picture, for Mos- American foreign policy.1 cow retained a substantiál investment in As Sino-Soviet differences escalated and Egypt, only later adopting a policy of cool- eventually produced a general military build- ing relations with Cairo. In fact, Moscow up along their common border, the as- sought to further solidify its position in the sumption that the Communist system was area by increasing its military and economic monolithic and directed solely by the Krem­ assistance to Iraq and Syria. lin became untenable.2 This was all the Given the potentially explosive nature of more true in light of the intensified rivalry the Middle Eastern milieu, it would seem between Peking and Moscow throughout that a review of American interests in the the world, which led the United States, in area might be a worthwhile exercise. Not some situations, to side with one Communist only do the ending of a calendar year and power or the other (e.g., the American and of a four-year presidential term provide a Chinese condemnation of the 1968 Soviet convenient time for such an undertaking, invasion of Czechoslovakia). but the anticipated close scrutiny of the The other assumption of American foreign Defense Department budget and American policy, that the Soviet Union was an ex­ commitments abroad make it especially ap- pansionist power primarily motivated by propriate at this point. As might be ex- ideological imperatives, also carne under pected, a reassessment of United States in­ attack. It became increasingly evident that terests in the Middle East must briefly take Moscow would sacrifice ideology for the into account the Soviet and Chinese involve- sake of State interests. Nowhere was the lat- ment in the area. ter more evident than in the Middle East. Perhaps the most significant aspect of Although Rússia had been involved in the United States policy since World War II Middle East for centuries, its interests were has been the cold war rivalrvJ between the largely focused on the northern tier States, U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- Turkey and Iran, where the interests of sev- publics (U.S.S.R.). Indeed, it was the per- eral major powers—Britain, Franee, Ger- ceived Soviet threat to Greece, Turkey, and many, and Rússia—converged and often Iran in the aftermath of World War II that clashed. When in 1955 Premier Khrushchev inspired the Truman Doctrine, reinforced bypassed the northern tier and involved the the general policy of containing Com- U.S.S.R. in Egypt, by supplying arms (via munism, and set the stage for the American Czechoslovakia) and assistance in construct- backing of the Baghdad Pact of 1955, the ing the Aswan Dam, there were fears that Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, and the in- the Kremlin was making a bid to establish tervention in Lebanon in 1958. Such an its ideological hegemony in the area. With American stance was not unusual in light of the passage of time, however, the Soviet the general consensus, which persisted un- Union found that the strong nationalist ori- til the early 1960s, that the Communist Sys­ entations of Arab leaders, especially Gamai tem was monolithic and the Soviet Union Abdel Nasser, militated against the Sovieti- was an expansionist power whose actions zation of the Arab world. On several oc- were largely informed by ideological moti- casions Nasser made it trenchantly plain that vations. With the increased visibility of the he opposed Communism and then proceeded Sino-Soviet dispute in the 1960s, however, to incarcerate members of the Egyptian a number of these assumptions were sharply Communist party.3 questioned, and the answers that were given The situation was not much better in re- MIDDLE EAST CHANCES AND AMERICAN COMMITMENTS 59

gard to Moscow’s left-wing friends in Syria States will have a continuing interest in and Iraq. While welcoming Soviet aid and the maintenance of air and transit rights, military assistance, the Ba’thist leaders in given the geopolitical significanee of the Damascus and Baghdad took a fiercely in- Middle East as a crossroads between Eu- dependent stance, asserting their national rope, Asia, and África. aspirations and periodieally purging their Of course the overriding interest of the domestic rivais, the local Communist par- United States in the Middle East is peace ties. Although the Soviet leaders showed between Israel and the Arab States. Hence, their chagrin over such developments, in the the United States has aimed for a military end they always swallowed their pride and balance of power between the two sides overlooked the assaults on proletarian in- and has worked with other nations and the ternationalism, no doubt concluding that United Nations and on its own initiative to their investinents and newlv won positions of secure a permanent peace. Although these influence were more important than sup- efforts have thus far been not entirely suc- port from the fledgling Commimist parties cessful, the risks of escalation involving the in Egvpt, Syria, and Iraq. superpowers, which are inherent in any new Given the Soviet decision to sacrifice round of violence, make it imperative that ideologv on the altar of state interests, there the search for peace continue. A major con- seemed to be two implications or possibil- sideration in this regard is, of course, Ameri­ ities for the United States: to scale dovvn its ca^ interest in the continued existence and involvement in the Middle East or to main- viability of Israel. Besides being an impor­ tain an active role. It is the purpose of this tant factor in domestic polities in the United article to explore this choice with reference States, Israel is significant because the to the situation in 1973. United States has, through its previous pol­ icies, assumed a moral commitment to that country’s survival.6 The last major interest of the United W hat, then, are Américas States in the Middle East is a less direct interests in the Middle East at present? one. Since the area is part of nato s South­ First of all, it seems clear that earlier sug- ern flank, the United States has tried since gestions that Middle East oil would gradu- World War II to maintain an effective mili­ ally lose its importance have proven to be tary presence there. Whether the United misleading.4 Recent calculations, in fact, States should continue to view the region reveal an increased rate of oil eonsumption in this light is, however, linked to the ques- by the United States (by West European in­ tion concerning the changing nature of the dustrial States and Japan as well), the pro- Communist world and whether or not such jection being that by the end of the decade change should drastically alter American the United States will purchase abroad 12 policy. It is my contention that the new per- million barreis of oil (50 percent of total ception does not leave the United States eonsumption), 8 million of which might be without adversaries. What has happened is needed from North África and the Middle that the old cold war confrontation, along East.0 In short, it seems that Middle East with its heavy ideological overtones, has oil will become more rather than less im­ been transformed into a more traditional portant as the needs of both the United competition between nation-states. While States and its allies increase. this is clearly a more stable situation be­ In addition to the oil issue, the United cause the States involved tend to calculate 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

more conservatively and take fewer risks, versely affected if the U.S.S.R. were to gain the competition continues as the major a position of clear ascendancy in the Mid­ powers jealously guard and sometimes seek dle East. As John C. Campbell has sug- to expand their influence inerementally. gested, the whole uneommitted world would If there are any doubts about the Soviet see the handwriting on the wall.8 In other inclination to pursue a policy of power words, it involves a phenomenon that politics, surely they are dispelled by the Charles Wolf has called “psychological- increased Soviet naval presence in both the political interdependency.” 9 That is to say, Mediterranean Sea and, more recently, the other nations, if they should see the Middle Indian Ocean, plus the acquisition of port East fali under dominant Soviet influence, privileges at such points as Port Said, Alex­ might perceive the winds of change as andria, and Latakia.' Because of this evi- blowing in an eastward direction and thus dent Kremlin decision to increase its capa- seek the best deal they can obtain while bilities and influence in the area, it would they still have some bargaining leverage. A seem that the United States should seek to study of the diplomatic ability of Thailand maintain the present balance of power to tack with the political winds is instruc- while at the same time supporting nonvio- tive in this regard, witness its accommoda- lent resolution of the conflicts that plague tion with the Japanese in World War II, its the region. In a more specific sense, what alliance with the United States in the 1950s, does this mean conceming American inter- and its present renewal of contacts with ests in the Middle East? Hanoi and Peking in the wake of the Nixon First of all, the United States cannot af- Doctrine. It is shifts such as this which could ford to abdicate its presence in the area be replicated in the Middle East should because, in a context of eontinuing nation- Soviet influence greatly increase in that state competition, allianees such as nato region. As a consequence of such develop- remain important. Since the Middle East ments, the Soviets would be in a position to does oeeupy nato s Southern flank, a sub- align a greater number of States on their stantial improvement of the Soviet position side respecting issues in other parts of the in the area, coupled with a weakened world. Going one step further, one could American role, could further erode natos envisage the Kremlin using its position of strength, something that would hardly be influence in the Middle East for bargaining wise on the eve of very important negotia- leverage in negotiations and conflicts else- tions with the U.S.S.R. over mutual and where. The Cuba-Berlin linkage in 1962 balanced force reductions (mbfr ) i n E u r o p e . bears remembering in this regard. Indeed, a retrenchment of the American The American capability to pursue its military presence in the area at a time when interests vis-à-vis the oil and Israeli ques- the Soviets are increasing their naval de- tions could also be severelv undereut if the ployments would not seem eonducive to Soviet Union were allowed to become the buttressing the confídence of the United predominant power in the Middle East. If, States’s alliance partners. Moreover, it would for example, Rússia should be able to create remove an important bargaining chip before a network of Arab States that were de- negotiations even eommence and thus could pendent on her for economic and military make efforts to further stabilize East-West assistance, she might be able to use her relations more difficult. position to extract oil concessions that, in nato aside, the more general strategic turn, would substantially increase the cost balance between the two blocs could be ad- of oil or perhaps even deny part of this MIDDLE EA ST CHANCES AND AMERICAN COMMITMENTS 61 valuable resource to the United States, revolution, it is not inconceivable that China Western Europe, and Japan.10 would step up its revolutionary involve­ The Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli dis­ ment in response to an American withdrawal pute is familiar to evervone. Suffice it to and a concurrent Soviet re-emphasis of its say that a precipitous withdrawal of the revolutionary commitments.11 Seen in this United States from the area might encour- light, such a move by China would be a re- age the Kremlin to modifv its present re- action to both the partial power vacuum straint in favor of giving more active sup- created by the United States and a Soviet port to the Arab effort to “liberate” the attempt to assert itself as the leader of in- occupied areas. In other words, without the ternational Communist interests. United States to consider, the Soviet Union could decide to change its present relatively unaggressive posture in the Middle East to To sum up, although the nature of Ameri- a more aggressive one in the hope of in- can-Soviet-Chinese interaction has become creasing its influence in the Arab world by less ideologieal and more similar to tradi- sharing in any success the .Arab States might tional nation-state competition, the rivalry achieve. among the three powers continues, especial­ The reverberations of a decreased .Ameri­ ly in the already turbulent Middle East. can involvement in the Middle East could Given the continuing and projected Ameri­ also be felt in the northern tier, where the can interests vis-à-vis oil, transit rights, Soviet Union might seize the opportunity to peace, and defense of nato's Southern flank, realize age-old ambitions bv pressuring the a lessened American involvement in the Turks to renegotiate the 1936 Montreux Middle East could become a destabilizing Straits Convention, which specifíes, among force, which might result in a return to a other things, what kinds of warships can less desirable past. Conversely, by main- transit the Dardanelles. Essentiallv, what taining its present involvement in the re­ the Soviets would seek to do is restrict the gion, the United States can hopefully con­ entry of American ships carrying nuclear tinue to pursue its interests in an atmosphere weapons into the Black Sea. that is more pragmatic. Yet another danger associated with an As for the military implications of this American disengagement would be the pos- analysis, the United States must maintain a sibilitv that the Soviets would decide to re- capability to deploy its forces, especially emphasize their ideologieal mission and be- air forces, as adjuncts to diplomacy when come more involved in the revolutionary crises arise. The symbolic movement of movements in the area. Such a development forces, in particular the Seventh Fleet and would serve Soviet interests and increase Air Force units, during the September 1970 Moscow’s influence if its protégés were suc- Jordanian civil war was instruetive in this cessful, especially in the oil-producing States. regard. In that instance the movement of It is in regard to the last-mentioned point military forces underscored and made more that the United States must consider China s credible the American warning to Syria to posture in the region. Although Peking does desist in its invasion of Jordan. In fact, as not have the capability to be a major actor the record shows, the Soviet Union was in the Middle East in the foreseeable fu­ greatly concerned about the movement of ture, it has sponsored and assisted various American military forces, and this no doubt revolutionarv groups. While this tendency influenced the Soviets to bring pressure to has decreased since the end of the cultural bear on Damascas to withdraw.12 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Put simply, the point is that if the United war is dead, it is by no means clear that States perceives that it has important in- nation-state competition is dead. Recog- terests in the Middle East and if it wishes nizing this reality is the beginning of wisdom to maintain and protect those interests in when one is assessing American interests a stabilized environment, it mast have ade- throughout the world in general and in the quate capability to do so. While it may be Middle East in particular. true, as some seholars suggest, that the cold United States Air Force Academy

Notes

1. On Soviet-American relations since World War II and the alterations of 6. On United States-Israeli relations, see Nadav Safran. From War to War the American perceptions oí the Soviet threat, see Adam B. Ulam. The Ri- (New York: Pegasus. 1969). especially chapter UI and pp. 409-20. vais: America and Rússia since World War II (New York. The Viking Press, 7. See T. B. Millar, ' The Indian Ocean—A Soviet Sea?" New York Times. 1971i and Ulam. Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1968). pp. 13 November 1970. p. 35M. 378-752. For an account of Soviet-American relations in the Middle East see 8. John C. Campbell. Defense o f the Middle East (New York: Harper and Walter Laqueur, The Struggfe for the Middle East (New York: The Macmillan Row. 1958). p. 131. Company, 1969). 9. Charles Wolf, Jr.. United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and 2. An excellent work that summarizes the numerous factors underlying the Analysis (Boston: Little. Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 17-20. Sino-Soviet dispute is Klaus Mehnert Peking and Moscou• (New York: Mentor 10. Campbell, pp. 131-32. Books. 1963). 11. Ulam, in The Rivais (p. 389), notes that the absence of a clear .American 3. For a concise account of the soinetimes turhulent relatioaship between foreign policv might "offer an irresistible temptation even for the usually Nasser and Khrushchev see Peter Mansfield. Nassers Egypf, rev. ed. (Balti- prudent Soviet leadership to indulge in adventurism. to initiate or exacerbate more: Penguin Books, 1969), chapter 5. small and local crises, one of which might sooner or later ignite a major and 4. See. for example. William R. Polk. The United States and the Arab World world-wide conflict." (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1965). p. 289. 12. For an account of the U.S. role during the jordanian civil war. see Ben- 5. R. M. Burrell. "Producers and Coasumers of the World Unite!” New Mid- jainin Welles*s article in the New York Times of 8 October 1970. On the Soviet dle East, September 1972, pp. 32-33. ThLs projection of American needs takes Union s concem with possible U.S. involvement and its attempt to persuade into account the Alaskan, Canadian, and North Sea discoveries. oil shale pos- Syria to terminate hostilities, see Pravda, 29 September 1970, as cited in sibilities in Utah and Wyoming. and other sources of energy, such as nuclear Mizan, Supplement A, No. 5. September-October 1970. p. 5. and New Middle power. all of which entail high costs of extraction and/or produetion. East. November 1970, p. 45. Air Force Review

HE importance of the close Trelationship between com- mand and control and its support- ing Communications has been recognized in Air Force doctrine for so long that it has become axiomatic. So long, in fact, that in our decision-making process we MODERN COMMUNICATIONS, automatically assume that re- A WI S E I NVESTMENT sponsive, reliable Communications will be available whenever and M ajor Gen er a l Paul R. Stoney wherever needed. Until now, this has been a reasonable assumption because as long as even the most stringent command and control needs could be met with a dedi- cated teletype or telephone Cir­ cuit or single-sideband radio there was no real problem. This type of support was economical and technologically simple. But the heretofore reasonable assumption that our communication Services will be adequate to meet tomorrow’s requirements may no longer be so reasonable. High-frequency radio and teletype already fali far short of answering present demands, not just for command and con­ trol but for evervday management as well. And our customers are in- creasing their use of our Services at a truly alarming rate. We will find ourselves in serious trouble unless we recognize the staggering impli- cations of these demands and move quickly to accommodate to them. Although I am only one of four military Service communicators, I feel

63 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the rising impact of this problem more One major fact that accounts for the in- acutely than my eounterparts because the creasing demand for our Services is that Air Force Communications Service (hence Communications and automatic data pro- the Air Force) provides well over half the cessing equipment are replacing people and Defense Communications System Services. even entire intermediate management leveis I am unable to foresee how the Air Force and headquarters. It is easy to understand will produce the additional resources called that considerable savings accrue to the com­ for in current defense planning. The impli- mand which eliminates a whole manage­ cations are of such significance that a gen­ ment levei within its organization by auto- eral awareness of the problem by Air Force mating; what is not so easily seen is the sênior officers is essential. opposite effect: the increase in the Com­ Our Communications resources might be munications budget necessary to finance illustrated bv a candle burning at both ends. this new capability. Inflation and the dollar squeeze are melt- No one would deny that the advent of ing away our resources at one end while in- computeis and the development of jet air creasing customer demands are using up our transport contributed markedly to the elimi- capabilities at the other. Command and con- nation of our overseas supply depots over trol is no longer a relatively simple matter of a decade ago. Unfortunately, it is less easily hf radio and teletype; today it requires com- seen that the Automatic Digital NetWork puters, high-speed data transmission, and (autodin) and high-speed data circuits secure voice networks. We are bombarded play an equally important role. It is my vvith urgent demands for such expensive purpose here to demonstrate that savings Services that we can no longer afford to elsewhere in a command s budget are nec- provide commanders with exclusive systems, essarily countered to some extent by an however desirable they might be. These increase in Communications costs. persistent demands are consuming our pres- Upon examination of pertinent trend re- ent capability faster than we can expand lationships, it is apparent that the demands to meet them. And while our resources being placed on our Communications Ser­ candle is fast burning away, Air Force Com­ vices are not proportional to changes in the munications Service is being ordered to total Air Force population. The usaf reduce manpower, to trim operations and strength has declined about 30 percent in maintenance costs, to curtail technical the last nine vears, but data traffic in the training, and to withdraw from our isolated autodin system, for example, is five times mountaintop radio stations all over the world. greater today than in 1967. There are many This is not new to us; the appropriations more transoceanic circuits operating todav laws for the past several years have been than four years ago. It is important to real­ consistently criticai of rising Communications ize that afcs reacts more to demands placed expenditures. Although we have managed upon the total Communications environ- to cope to some degree with tightening ment than it does to organizational trends budgetary limitations, we have been laboring in the Air Force itself. The overwhelming under a strain that is fast approaching the fact is that the militarv machine todav is breaking point. The time is now upon us almost totally dependent upon Communica­ when afcs will no longer be able to carry tions for command and control as well as the load being placed upon our resources day-to-day management. A verv high price by the insistent, multiplying customer must be paid for tightly centralized con­ demands. trol of a global militarv force, and the time AIR FORCE REVIEW 65

has come for us to nnderstand this. drag formula, missilemen by thrust/weight. An important point: jnst talking about A communicatoFs first law is signal/noise. more Communications does not tell the My problem, in a word, is noise, ordinary whole story. Far more criticai to the even­ (and sometimes not so ordinary) sound. A tual solution of this problem is recognition crashing thunderbolt is the most dramatic of a need for a new kind of Communica­ example of noise. But noise coipes from tions, digital systems. many sources, from solar fiares to auto- Man has always lived in an analog world, mobile ignition. Much of the noise I must a world of sight and sound through the contend with is generated right in oiu own médium of sine waves. But we have now radio and electronic equipment. In many emerged into the space age, in which we respects my problem is more diffieult to must communicate with digital expressions. overcome than the aviator s or the mis- As is well known, digital Communications sileman s becaase their elements remain is not a new concept or a revolutionary com parati vely constant whereas the elec­ technique. Earlier militar)' Communications tronic noise levei in our society is steadily systems—telegraph, Morse code, heliograph, rising. Thus my problem is ever changing. teletype—were digital. These are all forms The best way to describe the effects of of electronic transmission whereby infor- noise on the digital world is to show how it mation is sent by an “on” or “off” signal affects our present analog systems. Every impulse, or, as in the case of the digital day each of us encounters and overcomes Computer, a “one” or a “zero.” We com­ noise, or static, on our telephone (analog municate digitally today over our worldwide system). We shout, or repeat ourselves, or analog structure bv inefficient conversion use the marvelous Computer between our techniques. ears to sort the message from the noise. The Nluch of the basic management structure error rejection ability of the human brain of our modem Air Force is dependent upon is fundamental to the success of analog computers and automated Communications Communications. There are, of course, cer- (our personnel, finance, and supply systems, tain electronic techniques for correcting or to riame a few). Certainly there is no turning eompensating for some kinds of noise-in- back now. For obvious military reasons duced errors, but they are not nearly so we must secure our Communications. Be- efficient as the human brain, and far more cause digits are the language of computers, expensive. because they are easier to encrypt, and As long as the human brain remains an because they are simpler to package, sort, integral part of the system, we will be able and switch, digital techniques are the most to detect and correct error. We can con­ practical means available to meet the grow- tinue trying to keep garbled teletype mes- ing Communications demand. For reasons sages out of everybody’s reading files, but too technical to explain here, greater vol­ we cannot catch them all; the recipient umes of Communications traffic can be han- must perform the simple if annoying task dled best if everything is converted to digital of sifting “signal” out of “noise.” As long form. But it is at this point that laws of as the transmission speed is slow and the physics come to bear: digital systems are human being is a link in the chain, we can vulnerable; they will not tolerate noise. live with the errors induced by noise in our There are immutable mies of Science systems. that govem men in nearly every field of However, it will not be that easy when we endeavor. Aviators are bound by the lift/ increase the speed of digital transmission, 66 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

which we must do in the future. A teletype inadequate. We are being forced to rewrite carries data at a rate of 75 bits, or separate the book. We are revising maintenance impulses, per second. A seeure voice net- procedures and conducting our own train­ work pulses at 2400 bits of data per second, ing to develop the specialists this unique job and the human being is no longer in the requires. In 1972, aflc bought us millions chain. Since noise is totally disruptive of of dollars’ worth of special test equipment digital systems, a noise-induced pulse is heretofore not needed outside of the depot. transmitted and recorded as a valid mes- And all this was necessary just to keep our sage by the Computer. Sometimes this can present equipment running at the peak be more than a mere error. Last year an performance demanded for digital traffic. automobile struck a power line pole several It is a very difficult and expensive job that miles from one of our switching centers, and requires top professional talent. Already, the resulting electrical “spike” shot so 25 percent of the 1600 communications- much noise into the Computer that the electronics officers in afcs are electrical entire memory bank had to be reloaded. engineers. All of this is barely keeping our That switch being out of Service for several heads above water. We are going to need hours cost both us and our customers plenty. considerably more in the future than just VVhen an Air Force commander outlines more test equipment and more engineers. a general automation requirement, usually The increasing reliance of the Air Force he has little idea of the specific impact it on vital automated Communications life- will have on Communications. For example, lines is forcing us to set very high goals. one stated requirement for general voice Our assignment is clear: we must be able to Communications stipulated: establish all send one million bits of data over a 12,000- calls in five seconds or less; encrypt all voice mile Circuit and misplace no more than one traffic; guarantee full audio imderstanding, bit. During the Vietnam war we learned to include recognition of the individual how to send recon photos halfway around voices; be able to conference up to 30 par- the world in near real time; now we are ties at a time. The only way we can provide being asked to do it even faster, with better these Services will be to speed up the data resolution, and in living color. The technol- bit rate to the absolute maximum capability ogy is available, but, again, it will cost. of the present system. Just how much it is going to cost can be Of course our autovon Service today projected. A recent DOD-wide forecast of falis far short of these goals, but we are demands for voice Communications suggests working hard to achieve them—and many there will be a relatively moderate increase others—bv seeking new and better ways to through 1985. However, it is not the need extend the limits of our system capabilities for more voice Communications but the while at the same time improving the quality monumental task of handling high-speed of our Communications. It is going to re- data that is giving us our biggest headache. quire a great deal of money, because the This is predicted to multiply to over fifty vast majoritv of the present equipment times todays volume, i.e., to three trillion inventory was designed to operate in the bits per day. analog world, and it cannot do the digital There are three approaches toward meet- job we are demanding of it without ex- ing this goal. One is to get the maximum traordinary effort and expenditure. performance from our present equipment and Our training programs, our tech data, manpower resources. We have already been our test equipment—all are proving grossly doing this, and we are now beginning to AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

lose ground with the demands. The second Will these additional funds materialize? way is to lease more hardware and Services I certainly hope so, because, as a result of from commercial companies. However, that the influence of many economic factors, we vvould mean a direct, out-of-pocket, rising, have decided to put most of our eggs in one and continuing o &m cost, and we have al- basket. We in the Air Force have committed ready been ordered to reduce our commer­ ourselves to centralized control of globally cial leases by ten percent this fiscal year. dispersed forces through automation and Such specific restrictions against leased high-speed data Communications. By making Communications demonstrate that there this commitment, we have also grossly over- needs to be a better understanding of the taxed our present resources and necessitated Air Force s verv great dependence on com­ the projection of an investment program mercial Communications for command of far beyond our present Communications our forces. It is difficult to see how we can spending leveis. approve millions of dollars for sophisticated Where our Communications needs fali in automated command and control and man- order of importance compared to new Air agement svstems and then argue about the Force weapon systems I will not speculate. Communications necessarv to hook them However, I do argue that whatever weapon up. Certainly the next generation of comput- systems emerge in the coming years, they ers will be nearlv ineffeetual imless they cannot operate without appropriate and are connected into high-speed Communica­ adequate Communications systems to pro- tions networks. vide their command and control. I have mentioned two approaches that We have reached a major milestone in the we might take toward preparing for the evolution of Communications in the Air future. But since we alreadv are getting the Force. We have more demands than we have most out of what we have now, and since capability. A monumental decision is before there will be continuing pressure to hold us, which is actually more a question of leased costs at present or lower leveis, when than if. There is no choice; the Air there is only one alternative left: we must Force must aecommodate to the pressure of operate under a carefully designed long- the growing criticai needs for high-speed range plan to replace much of our present digital Communications. We must only decide analog Communications equipment with when we will begin and how we will go specifically designed digital hardware. about doing it. In research and development, this will The picture is not so bleak if viewed from cost just about double the amount we spend the right perspective: we can and should today. Worse, communications-electronics regard much of the inereasing Communica­ procurement costs only five years from now tions costs as a wise investment. However, must be five times greater than the current if we fail to perceive the extent to which levei. But this does not tell the whole story the Air Force depends on Communications because it is onlv for strategic Communica­ to do its job, and if Air Force Communica­ tions. Tactical Communications are convert- tions Service fails to continue to provide ing to all-digital, too. Office of the Secretary those Communications, then our command of Defense has established the Tri-Service and control capability will be sorely limited. Tactical Communications Office to plan our We cannot afford not to afford the best joint tactical Communications systems for possible Communications. the future, and those costs have yet to be projected. Hq Air Force Communications Service In My Opinion

ORCANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT New times demand new measures and new men; the world advances, and in time outgrows the Can It Be Effective laws that in our fathers’ day were best; and in the Armed Forces? doubtless after us, some purer scheme will be shaped out by wiser men than we, made wiser by the steady growth o f truth. ie ü t e n a n t olonel et er a ota L C P E. L S —J ames Russel l Lowell C aptain Robert A. Z awacki

HE United States Air Force is indeed What is organizational development? Tin new times, and a new measure for There are many definitions, but perhaps the new times is organizational develop- Wendell Frenchs definition is best: ment. Organizational development ( od) is Organization development is a long-range a little-known management tool that has effort to improve an organization’s problem been utilized in complex organizations solving and renewal processes, particularlv since 1957, when the late Douglas McGregor through a more effective and collaborative implemented a program to deal with Cre­ management of organization culture—with ative change at Union Carbide.1 Although special emphasis on the culture of formal limited. od has begun to raise its head in work teams—with the assistance of a change military circles during the past two years. agent or catalyst and the use of the theory The United States Navy now has a Human and technology of applied behavioral Science, Resources Development Command, which ineluding action research.2 is tasked with evaluating this technique In short, od is a way of looking at the called command development for command- whole human side of organizational life. wide usage. The iNaval Academy and Air This human technology . . accepts as Force Academy have more limited research inevitable the conflicts among the needs of programs in their respective commandant individuais, work groups, and the organiza­ areas. tion, but advocates openly confronting these

68 IN MY OPINION 69

troais using problem solving strategies. Its e. To increase the sense of ownership of goal is to maximize the use of organization organizational objectives throughout the resources in solving work problems through work team. the optimal use of human potential.” 1 f. To increase the levei of self and group Organizational development has many responsibility in planning and implementa- focuses. Two that are of significance to tion. managers todav are managing change and g. To create an open problem-solving directing human energy toward specific climate throughout the organization that goals. What do we mean by this? Have finds synergistic Solutions to problems with you ever heard such complaints as, “Supply greater frequency.4 doesn’t know its ass from first base,” “Per- Underlying the above objectives are the sonnel never keeps us manned, “Intelli- values and beliefs of behavioral Science gence is out to lunch”? The target of these change agents. The primary value which complaints could be the system or its man- od represents is the humane and nonex- ager. Where is the breakdovvn in com- ploitative treatment of people in organiza- munication between the complainer and tions.5 All other values relate to this basic his target? Is there anv communicative value. They include: hnk between the two parties involved? a. Trust and openness—An open and non- Can the problem be solved through im- manipulative sharing of data is required proved communication? The complaining for effective problem-solving. is a complete waste of energy. In fact, it b. Leveling—All team members should can hurt the organization even more by tell it like it is! tuming other people off. The problem is c. Feedback—Feedback is a communica­ how to get the complainer to direct his tion skill for checking out the accuracy energy toward something constmctive rather of assumptions and data. Feedback must be than expending it to do further harm in shared in a helpful and nonaccusatory the organization. The practical application manner. of one or more organizational development d. Confronting conflict—Conflict is a concepts can focus on problem-solving, natural oeeurrenee between people on work improved communication, or building a teams and it should not be “placed under staff into a team—maybe all three. the rug.” Although the objective of od will vary e. Risk-taking—The ability to take an according to each specific diagnosis of unpopular stand on an important issue.6 organizational problems, some typical With this background of od objectives objectives are the following: and values, let us next discuss some com- a. To increase the levei of trust and sup- ponents of an od package. port among organizational members. recognizing a need b. To increase the incidence of confronta- tion of organizational problems, both with- How does any organizational development in groups and among groups, in contrast to program get its start? Are there signals to sweeping problems under the rug. indicate that od is necessary? Naturally, c. To supplement the authority associated there is no one answer to these types of with role or status with the authority of questions; the answer will vary according to knowledge and competence. the organizational setting and management d. To increase openness of communica­ styles. However, there is normally one tion. element that is present in originating od 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW programs, and that is pressure for change. collects information by interviewing, by The pressure for change normally will questionnaire, or both. show up as a felt need on the part of man- 3. The team-building meeting—can last agement. The felt need in civilian institu- one to three days, third party reports on tions can vary from a cry for increased information collected, an agenda is formed, profits to problems with excessive personnel issues are diseussed, and, hopefully, action turnover. In the military, it can be any- items are identified. thing from problems in productivity and 4. Follow-up—review agreements, report sortie rates to low re-enlistment or high progress on action items, and insure that drug-usage problems. These are but a few openness continues. examples of identifiable (tangible) types of 5. Renegotiation—follow-on team build­ problems that are often mere indicators of ing of a shorter duration." internai disorder or people problems which Perhaps the issues and plans have taken on have been festering within an organization new perspectives and need to be redis- for imdetermined time periods. cussed. As increased technology causes more problems with job satisfaction of subor- third party dinates, the supervisor needs to become In the foregoing discussion, we have used more aware of how his people feel about the terrns “change agent" and “third party.” their jobs—their levei of job satisfaction. If one is not concerned about this facet of Who are these people and what are their his management job, he may soon find him- functions? Perhaps this aspect should have self confronted with problems and publicity been diseussed sooner, but certainly we such as the U.S. Navy recently had in the cannot proceed beyond this point without race relations aboard some of its frontline a few details on this subject. The third warships. party, to be effective, is not the Inspector What can od do to help solve the types General; it is a behavioral scientist. Basi- of problems or improve the situations just cally, three major change agents or third described? We feel the one technique that parties have been identified: is most applicable to Air Force problem- a. The change agent who is completely outside the organization. solving and improved communication is team building. The form that will be out- b. The change agent who is internai to lined is commonly called the family group, the organization and serves functional areas i.e., a manager and those directly under other than the functional area to which he him. Team building is a super staff meeting or she is assigned. in some senses, but it diífers in that it is c. The change agent who is internai to longer, the atmosphere promotes open com­ the organization and serves various imits munication, a third party (change agent) of the system of which he or she is a part. is often present, and the agenda is jointly All three types must be trained in the formulated. behavioral Sciences, organizational psvchol- Although the design for team building ogy, organizational theorv, and/or man­ varies, a typical outline is as follows: agement. Change theorv, process, and 1. Formulate meeting objectives—nor­ strategies must be part of “his bag. mally done by the manager, group repre- An internai change agent has advantages sentatives, and the third party. over the externai change agent, such as: 2. Information collection—the third party (1) familiaritv with local jargon and proce- IN MY OPINION 71

dures, (2) the fact that his expenses are less at the Naval Station, Newport Beach, than an externai agents, and (3) knowledge Rhode Island. This is the first of four such of some of the “blocks” to organizational centers to be located on both seacoasts of effectiveness. However, there is no Santa the United States and in Havvaii. Claus, and the disadvantages of an internai The hrdc is responsible for command change agent are that (1) he may be part development (cd), interracial education, of the problem; (2) he may not see the and drug and alcohol rehabilitation. In forest for the trees; (3) regardless of his fiscal year 1972, approximately $410,(XX) courage and independence to hold to a was invested in an operational and con- position, he is still rewarded or punished by sultation budget. In fy 73, approximately the organizational unit he is trving to $217,000 is earmarked for consultation and change; and (4) his fellow team members may training contracts. The Navy runs its own perceive him as a spy or the tool of the cd workshops at Newport Beach. Destroyer boss. Therefore, he may never gain the Flotilla 2 is currently the target group for support or trust of the od participants. research on the applicability of cd tech- We recommend that the initial od effort niques in the operational environment. be managed by a change agent who is The U.S. Naval Academy has been work- externai to the organization. Fordyce and ing on a program for improved com- Weil State it this way: “The Third Party in munication and human relations skills Organizational Development is often called development for its brigade officers and in by a group to help it explore its every- personnel within the brigade. The program day conduct and to assist it in defíning how is under the direction of Conunander War- it wishes to change and how it will go ren Newman, and the National Training about making the change.” A second pur- Labs (a nonprofit organization that conducts pose “is to guide the parties toward more od workshops) of Washington, D.C., are self-sufficient behavior in solving their the consultants. problems, not to make them dependent on With funding assistance from the Air him for decisions.” 8 As the program de- Force Human Resources Laboratory, the velops, then an internai change agent may Air Force Academy is conducting research on be appointed to coorclinate the program. In the application of od in the commandanFs industrv, the internai agent is typically area. Their basic approach is improved under the supervision of the director of communieation and team building at the personnel or may even be the director air officer commanding and cadet wing of personnel. leveis. Although the od experience in the Given this background and theory, just armed Services is limited, what does the what are the militarv applications of organi­ future hold? zational development? the future military applications It appears the military Services are begin- There is no doubt in the authors’ minds ning to investigate the applicability of that the Navy is the armed forces front- organizational development to management runner in applving behavioral Sciences to techniques and problem-solving at various the management of personnel resources. leveis. Except for the Navy effort, however, Under the direction of Admirai Elmo Zum- all attempts at od have been very limited walt, the Navy has formulated its Human and somewhat token or halfhearted at­ Resources Development Command (hrdc) tempts. If one believes that survivability 72 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW in the seventies is predicated on manage- cation, Human Resources Development ment of technological and personnel (hiunan) Field Command, U.S. Forest Service, and resources, then he must investigate new G. D. Searle and Company are among the methods of dealing with his subordinates. organizations represented at one recent Na­ What can the Air Force do to improve tional Training Laboratory Workshop. personnel management techniques? The The successful manager or commander problem must be attacked from two direc- of the future must insure that the maximum tions: The first is to orient and train existing of human energy expended is focused on leaders in this area. This can be done at speeifie goals. The higher the mutual trust the sênior Service sehools and nco acad- and openness in his organization, the more emies. At the same time, the management free a manager is to act without being of personnel resources should become a misunderstood and the more ready he will subject for the leaders of tomorrow at the be to manage crisis situations. Air Force Academy, Reserve Olficer Train- Each Air Force officer, nco, and civilian ing Corps, and School of Military Science supervisor, regardless of his levei of super- (Officers). vision, should have some knowledge of organizational development skills. od is

In conclusion, organizational develop- here to stay in the Air Force of today and ment is a tool that can assist a commander the future! and his staff in sorting out the interper- sonal conflicts that reduce the productivity of his organization. Despite the misconcep- We have not succeeded in answering all our tion that a tough-minded manager can be­ questions. Indeed, we sotnetimes feel we have not eompletely answered any of them. come soft and that the responsibility and The answers we have found onltj serve to force of the manager are reduced with the raise a whole new set of questions. In some advent of group consensus, od has pro- ways we feel we are as confused as ever. gressed in many of our large corporations But we think we are confused on a higher and institutions today. The Maytag Com- levei and about more important things. pany, Honeywell, Inc., Jones and Laughlin —Anonvmous Steel Corporation, Charmin Paper Products, Universitv of New México, Western Elec­ United States Air Force Academy tric, Ontario, Canada Department of Edu-

Notes

1. D ou gl as M c C r e g o r , The Professional Manager (New York: McGraw-Hill 5. W. Warner Burke, "A Comparison of Management Development and 1967). pp 106-10. Organization Development.” The Journal o f Applied Behavioral Science, vol. 2. Wendell French and C. H. Bell. Organization Development: Behavioral 7 (1971). p. 576. Scienre tnterventions for Organizatümal Improvement (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 6. Tliese values are a modification from Randall, pp. 47-48. Prentice-Hall, 1973). 7. For a detailed discussion of the strategy in OD, *'e the Aetion Research 3. Lyman K. Randall. "Cominon Questions and Tentative Answers Rcgarding Model in French. "Organization Development Objectivey .Assumptions, and Organization Development,” Califórnia Management Review» vol. 13 (Sprint! Strategies,” p. 26. 1971), p. 45. 8. Jack K. Fordyce and Ravmond Weil, Managing with People (Reading. 4. Wendell French. "Organization Development Objective*. Assumptions. Massachusetts: Addison-Weslev Publishing Co.. 1971). p. 20. and Strategies.” Califórnia Management Review. vol. 12 (Winter 1969), p. 23. SYSTEMATIC RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE MILITARY

C aptain J on M. Samuels

ONTEMPORARY headlines dramatize must eulturally sensitize himself and his C the military’s painful quest for internai subordinates. Each must realize that he can- social harmony. Millions ponder the national not be color-blind, sex-blind, or any other security implications of this or that incident. blind. People living and working in large Congressional committees investigate and groups must be capable of identifying and pundits speculate. Buffeted by these pres- empathizing with different life styles and sures, the Service professional must contend the value systems associated with them. simultaneouslv with angrv minorities, an The modera manager, for example, learns inveterate institutionalized resistance to to approach a black ghetto youth differently change, and pious demands by “above-the- from a white middle-American. He does not battle” superiors for the immediate resolu- mistake the former s superficial preoccupa- tion of those “embarrassing” confrontations. tion with the gratification of present needs Threatened, confused, and apprehensive, as an indication of faulty motivation or lack this normallv pragmatic individual has cho- of intelligence. Today’s sophisticated leader sen increasingly to abandon systematic understands that the black’s attitude is as problem-solving technique in favor of an much future-directed as that of his white emotion-dominated approach to social con- counterpart. If he has read, as he should, Elliot Liebow’s classic study Talley’s Cor- troversv.J He often has drawn broad social conclusions from a few highly publicized ner, he realizes that but possiblv unrelated events. Frequently the difference between the two men lies not his faulty inductions have obscured local so much in their different orientations to time issues, confusing fact, fancy, policy, and as in their different orientations to . . . their prejudice. different futures. The future orientation of the This pattem need not be accepted as middle class person presumes, among other things, a surplus of resources to be invested in preordained. Human relations questions are the future and a belief that the future will be not unique. The inclusion of nonquantitative sufficiently stable both to justify the invest- variables such as race, sex, age, guilt, fear, ment (money in the bank, time and effort in and anger does not place this class of prob- a job . . .) and to permit its consumption at lem outside the normal management spec- a time, place and manner of his own choosing trum. Often, in fact, leaders who have ig- and to his greater satisfaction. But, the ghetto- nored basic managerial doctrine in favor of dweller grows up and lives in a sea of want. intuitive Solutions have found that the heat He does not, as a rule, have a surplus of re­ generated in these incidents can stampede sources either economic or psychological. them into economically and psychologically Gratification of hunger and the simple creature disastrous courses of action. comforts cannot be long deferred. Neither can support for one’s fiaggingself-esteem. [Empha- If the supervisor is to avoid this unfortu- sis added.] Living on the edge of both eco­ nate fate, he must consciously prepare him- nomic and psychological subsistence, the poor self and his organization for the tension that man is obliged to expend all his resources on inevitably accompanies social unrest. He maintaining himself from moment to moment.1

73 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Our supervisor understands that, despite tudinal and behavioral changes provide the the service’s vaunted “equal opportunity,” most difficult challenge of all. Alfred Zan- the habits developed by young men raised in der, in his article “Resistance to Change— extreme poverty can leave them incapable Its Analysis and Prevention,” outlined sev- of capitalizing on any opportunity. Thus, eral reasons why people are reluctant to the supervisor will employ a personalized alter either their schedule or their mental management approach that recognizes in- Outlook: herent individual differences. The key word 1. Resistance can be expected if the nature in this equation is individual. Our supervisor o f the change is not clear to the people who does not, for example, automatically equate are going to be influenced by the change. . . . the behavior patterns of the disadvantaged There is some evidence to support the hy- with all nonwhites. He thinks of people as pothesis that those persons who dislike their individuais, not groups. jobs will mostly dislike ambiguity in a pro- This sensitizing process is continuous. posed change. They want to know exactly Military personnel often experience difficulty what they must do in order to be sure to in objectively evaluating new ideas. This is avoid the unpleasant aspect of their job. . . . a failure of command, for it is commanders 2. Different people will see different mean- who are responsible for providing the at- ings in the proposed change. . . . We tend to see in our world the things that we expect to mosphere, referenees, and group experi- see. Complete information can just as readily ences that encourage the open exchange of be distorted as incomplete information, espe- information. People at all leveis must be cially so if the workers have found discom- taught to winnow common goals from ap- fort and threats in their past work situations. parently contradictory points of view. Care- 3. Resistance can be expected when those fully planned “rap sessions,” fílms, and influenced are caught in a jam between strong speakers with well-defined messages, eon- forces pushing them to make the change and trolled immersion in culturally alien situa- strong forces deterring them against making tions, and role playing are but a few of the the change. . . . many tools available to the supervisor who 4. Resistance can be expected to the degree is determined to create a change-oriented that the persons influenced by the change have pressure put upon them to make it, and will organization that profits from the different be decreased to the degree that these same tastes and outlooks of its membership. persons are able to have some “say ” in the One cannot overestimate the importante nature or direction o f the change. . . . of this basic step—the establishment of an 5. Resistance may be expected if the change environment that fosters a factual scientific is made on personal grounds rather than im- approach to human relations—in the eventual personal rcquirements or sanctions. . . . Many resolution of social conflict within the orga­ administrators can expect trouble in establish- nization. If this step is left incomplete, it ing a change if it is requested in terms of will hamstring any further efforts, leaving what "I think is necessary" rather than mak­ the organization resembling a group of ing the request in light of “our objective. . . . Americans told to play cricket without being 6. Resistance may be expected if change ig- nores the already established institutions in instructed in the rules of the game. the group. Every work situation develops cer- If they are to succeed, supervisors must tain customs in doing the work or in the rela­ realize that cultural sensitivity represents tions among the workers. The administrator a threatening concept for some individuais who ignores institutionalized patterns of work and certainly a change for many. Attempts and abruptly attempts to create a new state of to effect any change are difficult, but atti- affairs which demands that these customs be IN MY OPINION 75

abolished without further consideration will covery of the facts is not sufficient. What surely run into resistance.2 the partieipants think and feel must also play an important role in deciding what Managements task will be infinitely more course of action to pursue. difficult if these observations are ignored. Fourth, the supervisor should list and ex­ Once the commander is satisfíed that he and plore all possible alternative Solutions. The his subordinates are involved in a meaning- strengths and weaknesses of each must be ful sensitivity program, he ean expect that carefully examined. The circumstances asystematic problem-solving rnechanism will under which each possibility would operate function. All members of the organization most effectively should be outlined. will have confídence in the system’s objee- Fifth, the commander must determine tivity and will expect justice as its natural which alternative will best resolve the prob­ product. These two assumptions are vital if lem. He must also select a method of eom- this scientific approach is to compete with municating his decision that will not alienate the emotions aroused when social contro- any faction. If corrective action is required, versv is present. it should be couched, as far as possible, in The problem resolution systein itself is positive terms. Public recrimination must simplv designed. be limited. Unless disciplinary action is a First, rules must be established and ob- pivotal point in resolution of the conflict, it served. The supervisor must be certain that should be handled privately. The operative equal opportunitv and fair treatment pro- principie in this area coincides with Zan- grams flourish in his department. His sub­ der’s observations concerning the greater ordinates must have clear human relations effectiveness of change predicated on “im- guidelines to follow, and the manager must personal requirements or sanctions” than insure that these directives are strictly ob- change based on personalities. served. Paper programs are more destructive Sixth, individuais at every levei should be than no program at all; they involve the assigned personal responsibility for actions organization in a revolution of rising expec- in support of the commander’s decision. They tations. Unfulfilled promises and dashed must translate the directive into terms ap- hopes are the parents of group disintegra- plicable to their operation. For example, if tion. a base were ascertained to have been remiss Next, when problems do arise, the man­ in the employment and training of Mexican- ager must gather all the facts available. He Americans and a decision made to correct might begin by taking official statements the situation, its commander would set cer­ from the people involved and then initiate tain goals. An example might be “the hir- an inquiry just as he would for an accident ing, training, and placement of 75 Mexican- or other unusual event. At this stage, it is Americans by 1 July, 10 percent of whom essential that value judgments be totally are to be placed in supervisory positions.” suppressed. No one is lying, at fault, or a Each subordinaie manager would then be troublemaker. Evervone is a source of in- responsible for identifying a given number formation. of positions to be made available, develop- Third, the facts must be tested for validity ing a training program, and selecting the and relevance. The supervisor wants the an- people needed to fill these jobs. swers to two basic questions: VVhat really Finally, the manager must follow up his happened? VVhat do people believe hap- directives to determine the efficiency of the pened? He must deal with both. Mere dis- corrective action taken. It is vitally impor- 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tant that he ase measurements that accu- The first task facing the commander was rately reflect the real situation. If, for exam- to gather the available facts. Step one in ple, he merely counts supervisory positions this process was the taking of official state- filled by the Mexican-Americans hired dur- ments. Such a course had no negative im- ing the stated time, he might fail to note plications, as statements were required for that these individuais had been assigned to the ground accident report that had to be supervise only Mexican-Americans. While submitted regardless of whether a nomina- the numbers might be correct, the spirit tion for a decoration was made. During this of his equal opportunity directive would phase of his inquiry the commander discov- have been subverted. ered these “facts”: The following factual case—not a theoreti- 1. The witnesses had been unaware of the cal exercise—demonstrates perceptive hu- incident until they heard a muffled explo- man-relations management in the daily job sion. Up to that point they were looking down environment. range and firing at their own targets. When A squadron training nco asked his com- their attention was drawn to Jones and mander to nominate Sergeant Jones, a white, Smith, they observed Jones on the ground, for the Airman’s Medal. Jones was credited hands covering his face, the weapon lying by this nco with pushing A1C Smith, a a few feet away, and Smith standing slightly black, to safety when a weapon malfunc- to the rear of Jones and reaching toward the tioned and exploded. Jones received super­ injured nco. ficial injuries in the incident. Smith was un- 2. The training nco had not witnessed the hurt. Smith then went to the commander event but had interviewed all the partici- and alleged that the accident did not hap- pants. Based upon that and his knowledge pen as the nco said it had. “The weapon of weapons and range procedures in use the jammed, I called Jones, he took it, and while day of the incident, he had reconstructed he was exainining it, it exploded. He didn't the event. Jones, he pointed out, had an save me, I don’t need any man taking care excellent record and no reason to lie. Smith of me, and I don’t like being made a fool and the other blacks were medíocre airmen of by him saying so." The commander asked and known to be close friends. “They all the training nco about the incident and he stick together you know!” said, “It’s just those blacks, Sir. They don’t 3. Jones could remember little of the event. want a white to get credit for anything. If “It all happened so fast.” He had seen Smith Jones were black, they d want him nomi- raise his hand, indicating a weapon mal- nated for the Medal of Honor." In the past, function. He had moved down the firing line individuais in the squadron had received and was told by Smith that the weapon had the Airman s Medal for íncidents as ques- misfired. He took the weapon to examine tionable as this one. The three witnesses to it. “Here things are a bit fuzzy,” he said. the event are black and support Smith. “I realized the problem and the danger, For purposes of analvsis, it is assumed shielded Smith with my body. and pointed that equal opportunity programs were alive the weapon down range. The next thing I and well in the unit and that the problem knew I was on the ground covered with represented a momentary failure. Again, if blood.” this is a false assumption, any problem- 4. The medicai report showed Jones s in­ solving method employed will do little in juries to be eoncentrated in the facial and relieving the tension aroused by incidents upper chest areas. such as the one described. 5. The armaments section indicated that IN MY OPINION 77

the accident was caused by a "cook-off (a cedure, specifically, waiting ten seconds or round fíred by the heat of the weapon rather more before clearing the weapon. He was than by operating the trigger). This report also asked if he expected a cook-off. He further stated that at the time of the cook- answered that he could not remember open­ off the breach was open. ing the breach, and while he wasn t expect- 6. At the time, proper proeedure in mis- ing a cook-off, he did realize something was fire incidents involving the M-16 rifle re- wrong. “Knowing that, did you push Smith quired the instructor to remove the maga­ to safety?” zine and point the weapon down range for “Maybe not push,” he replied, “I stepped at least 10 seconds before opening the breach in front of him, though.” to clear the weapon. Cook-offs during nor­ Smith was then called in and asked about mal fíring rarely occurred. the open breach and the “push to safety.” 7. The squadron policy on decorations He could not remember whether the breach was unclear. Supervisors interpreted the was open because Jones was between him manuais in their own way, and generally and the weapon. Had Jones stepped in front the commander had approved their recom- of him? mendations without comment. “I can t remember, but I know I wasn t 8. To earn the Airman's Medal, one must pushed.” consciouslv risk his life to save that of an- Based on this investigation, the command­ other. er produced his own reconstruction. Smith’s The commander’s next step was to evalu- weapon had malfunctioned, he raised his ate these “facts.” hand, and Jones carne over to determine It was obvious that while the three wit- what was wrong. Realizing something was nesses could accurately describe events just amiss, Jones took routine precautions. He after the explosion, they had no real knowl- took the weapon and pointed it down range. edge of what happened prior to that time. After a time, he opened the breach. The The fact that they were black and also round inside cooked off. The blowback in- friends of Smith was irrelevant. The com­ jured Jones. Whether he waited 10 seconds mander did note the implications of the or not was irrelevant; cook-offs under this training nco’s statements about blacks. As circumstance are rare and ean occur after soon as this inquirv was completed, he ex- the ten-second waiting period. In the mind amined the possibility of prejudice being of the instructor, he honestly thought he had introduced into the squadron’s training pro- pushed or shielded the student. Confused by grams consciouslv or unconsciously by this the rapid chain of events, Smith did not re­ nco. In view of real evidence provided by alize that this was Jones’s intention when he the armory and the medicai reports, the took the weapon. training nco’s reconstruction of the event The commander now had to consider his was discounted. alternatives. The injuries sustained by Jones and the 1. He could follow the previous awarcls armory report seemed to confirm that the policy and nominate Jones for the Airman s breach of the weapon had been opened and Medal. If forwarded in the same form it an exploding round had blown back powder was originally reported, the nomination and shell fragments into the instructor’s would probably be approved. This alterna- face. tive would improve the career potential of Jones was interviewed again and asked if Sergeant Jones, an exeellent young prospect, he had complied with proper range pro- and reassure the squadron’s career nco s 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW about their commander’s faith in their judg- three and four immediately. Firing the train­ ment. Without further clarification, how- ing nco in the middle of a controversy would ever, it would alienate all or some of the eompletely obscure the questions posed by squadrorTs minority members, who would the original problem. The commander would probably see it as the word of one white also lose the opportunity to show that his man taken over that of four blacks. This im- equal opportunity program was capable of pression possibly could be mitigated by ex- objeetively resolving problems. Doing noth- plaining that while he realized the real ing at all risked adding a misunderstanding circumstances, he was taking this action to what might become multiple misunder- beeause in the past people had received this standings sueh as had previously provided medal for like incidents. This policy would the fuel that ignited major confrontations. continue in the future and would benefit After some thought concerning the reali- both black and white careers. ties of promotion competition in the Air 2. He could reject the nomination. The Force, he also rejected the hypocrisy of al­ hard feelings engendered by alternative num- ternative number one. ber one would be reversed: this time it He now had to determine what was the would be the white faction that would feel best method of eommunicating his decision their word was worth less than that of a to reject the nomination. He felt he had to minority airman. “The old man won t stand center his message around clarification of up to a black” would probably be a popular the original misunderstanding that led Smith refrain. He could help his cause by calling to protest the nomination. The theme would in his nco’s and explaining his findings and be “no villains, just people with part of the the bad psychological impact the nomination pieture.” He also felt that reformation of would have had on Smith, hoping they were the squadron awards program was an im- knowledgeable enough to accept the situa- perative and that this act had to be linked tion. to the problem solution. After all, simply 3. He could take no action on the award stated, Jones had not earned the medal for but reassign the training nco beeause of his which he had been nominated. conscious or unconscious prejucliee. While The commander prepared a written re- in the long term this nco might have to be port of his findings, which he discussed with removed, to do so at this time would com- his airmen at the monthly commander’s plicate the present matter. It might also be call. Here he again emphasized his theme. interpreted incorrectly by other supervisors He also called a special meeting with all as a warning not to oppose minority airmen supervisorv personnel, at which he explored on any issue. This course, however, would in depth all the human relations ramifica- solve the immechate problem, leaving the tions of the incident. At both these meetings commander time to deal with the unpleasant the actual incident was used onlv as a start- aftereffects. ing point for a discussion of communication 4. He could take no action at all presently. problems. The commander also announeed This is a judgment call based on the premise that the operations officer had been tasked that the incident is a minor one of little in- with the responsibility of preparing clear terest outside the immediate circle of those guidelines on the new awards and deeora- involved. In time, when tensions had eased, tions program. he could approve or disapprove as he saw After initiation of the new program, the fit. commander made spot checks to insure that The commander discarded alternatives nominees had fulfilled the requirements for IN MY ÜPINION 79

the decoration for whieh they had been unwarranted emotion. Initially he branded nominated. He also charged the superin- no one a liar. He refused to be inHuenced tendent (the sênior nco in the squadron) with by remarks about “those blacks” or the the responsibilitv of insuring that deserving anger displayed by Smith. He looked for the airmen were being nominated. He revised facts and then made a decision based upon the squadron’s human relations training his findings. This subjective decision was curriculum, introducing additional hours made only after he had factually recon- devoted to interpersonal Communications. structed the incident. After about a month, he interviewed the training nco in depth and discovered the man had been unable to shed the prejudices W hen deal ing with social problems, one he had learned earlv in life. He was reas- may not always have enough time to make signed to a nonsupervisory position. The a full investigation before making a deci­ sion. But one can always ask, “How do you commander then directed the operations officer to review carefully all training rec- know that’s true?” One should always strive to distinguish fact from opinion. Finally, one ords to determine where this prejudice might should engrave on his mind the words of have restricted the progress of any squadron Lieutenant General William McBride, Com­ member. In all cases, the benefít of the doubt mander of Air Training Command: “Equal was given to the airman involved, and re- treatment is not always fair treatment.” medial programs were developed to enable Anyone who is a supervisor must work him to catch up with his peers. Obviously, one cannot present all the de- with people. He must view them as indi­ tails in this illustrative example. Hopefully, viduais and develop management systems however, the reader can follow the problem- that respect their differences. When conflicts solving technique as the commander sys- occur, he cannot abandon these systems. If tematically worked through the case. Most he does, only the most powerful or the most raucous voices will prevail. In such eireum- important, it should be noted that at no stances, justice will seldom be satisfíed. point did he allow himself to be swayed by Lackland AFB, Texas

Notes

1. Elliot Liebow. Tulleys Comer (Boston; Little, Brown and Co.. 1967). quoted in Ceorge Henderson. To Live in Fréedom (Norinan, Oklahoma: Univer- 2. Alfred Zunder. “Resistance to Change—Its Analvsis and Prevention." sity of Oklalioma Press. 1972).

Recommended Readings Blake. Robert R., and Jane S. Monton. Corporation Excellcnce through Crid Kerner, Otto. Heport o f tlu National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorden. Organization Development A Systems Apprvach. Reading, Massachusetts: New York: Crosset and Dunlap. 1968. Addbson-Wesley Publishing Co.. 1969. Toffler. Alvin. Future Shock. New York Random House, 1970. CarmichaeL Stokely. and Charles V Hamilton. Black Power: The Polities o f United States Commission on Civil Rights. Racism in America and How to Com- Liberation. New York: Randorn House, 1967. bat It. Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1970. Books and Ideas

ACHTUNG! FLIEGERTRUPPEN!

Dr. Alfred Goldberg HüOKS AMD IDEAS 81

O THE countless Belgians and Hol- tion of the enormous Anglo-American en- T landers who watched with awe and deavor to master a new way of warfare. It anticipation that morning of 17 September was the best planned and most skillfully 1944, the skies must have seemed fílled with executed large-scale airborne operation of an endless stream of airplanes and gliders the war up to that point. Moreover, in many flowing steadily and majestically eastward. ways it was a “remarkable and spectacular First came a thousand B-17 and B-24 bomb- success, but not an unqualified one. The ers and escort fíghters of the U.S. Eighth Air failure to secure the main objective of the Force from Britain, to clear a corridor for mission, the vital bridges over the Lower the troop carrier aircraft through the thicket Rhine at Arnhem, may well have prevented of German antiaircraft defenses in the Low General Eisenhower from ending the war Countries. Hundreds of British and Ameri­ in Europe in 1944. Still, ma r ket remains can fighter planes followed immediately the historical high-water mark of airborne afterwards to sweep the areas selected for operations involving masses ol paratroops dropping the Allied paratroopers and land- and glider-landed forces. ing the gliders filled with more troops and During the course of World War II there equipment. Finally came the troop carriers were many other spectacular airborne as- and gliders, escorted by hundreds of fighter saults. All the major combatants mounted planes, flving in splendid V-formations to- operations emploving troops landed by para- wards their destinations. In all, nearly 4700 chute, glider, and transport airplane. Al- transports, gliders, fíghters, and bombers though the Russians had been the first to passed overhead within the space of a few develop regimental- and division-size air­ hours. And beginning shortlv after 1300 borne units during the 1930s, they did not hours, some 20,000 American and British achieve any important successes in airborne soldiers parachuted or landed bv glider warfare between 1941 and 1945. The piece- within one hour and twenty minutes in good meal eommitment of forces in their major order behind enemy lines. “In those first landings in the Vyazma and Kiev areas, the minutes it looked as if the down-coming consequence of insufficient transport air­ masses would suffocate every single life on craft, minimized their contribution to the the ground,’’ wrote a German repórter who big battles. was there.f The Germans achieved spectacular air­ Operation ma r ket , the airborne invasion borne successes during 1940 and 1941 in of Holland in September 1944, was the great- Norway, Belgium, Holland, and finally Crete est airborne operation ever mounted. It is —by far their greatest airborne assault of likely to remain unsurpassed in our time and the war. It cannot help surprising us today, maybe longer. Over a period of six days, especially in the light of the enormous Al­ almost 35,000 Allied soldiers—they consti- lied airborne operations in 1943-45, how tuted most of the First Allied Airborne small were the airborne forces employedby Army—dropped or landed in the battle areas the Germans to gain such remarkable suc­ along a corridor linking Eindhoven, Nijme- cesses. At least in part, the successes may gen, and Amhem in Southern Holland. ma r - be attributed to the exploitation of a high ket was the climactic airborne operation degree of surprise in most of the operations of World War II, representing the culmina- that seemed to shock and numb Norwegians, f James A. Huston, Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1972, $ 10.00), xi and 327 pages. 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Belgians, and Dutch so much that they were this single most important anchor in the incapable of effective response. A single Belgian defense line. More than three years parachute regiment in Norway in April later—in September 1943—the Nazi adven- 1940 provided the key to German success. turer Otto Skorzeny used gliders to put a A inere 40(X) German parachutists jumped few dozen men down on a mountaintop at in Holland in May 1940 and gained control Monte Corno in Italy to snateh Benito Mus- of vital points that helped open the way for solini from his Italian captors. the ground armor and infantry divisions that The largest and most speetacular German overwhelmed the Dutch defenses. A hand- airborne assault of the war, the conquest ful of gliderbome troops—fewer than a hun- of Crete in 1941, was also the turning point dred in all—landed on top of the mighty for the Germans: thereafter they never Belgian border fortress of Eben Emael early mounted a tactical paratroop attack of more in the moming of 10 May 1940 and seized than battalion size. The loss of 4000 men

Strafed bij U.S. figliters at a desert landing ground in North Á frica, a German troop-carrier glider hecomes a casualty. BOOKS AA'D IDEAS 83

killed, most of thern paratroopers, dampened James A. Huston, in his forthright presen- German ardor for such assaults. Without tation of the U.S. airborne effort in World the element of surprise and against good War II, has atteinpted to strike a balance British, Australian, and New Zealand troops, between combat airborne operations and the Germans could not win their usual quick the “rather more pedestrian matters of con- and cheap victory. Hitler later told his para- ception, organization, and training” which troop commander. General Student: “Crete exercise such a vital and deterministic influ- proves that the davs of the paratroops are ence on the battle payoff. The book is, as he over.” Hitler seems to have believed at the puts it in the Preface, “perhaps . . . more of time that the Allies also would draw the a historv text book for airborne operations sanie conclusion from the costly attack on than a sweeping narrative.” But if he has Crete and would not attempt the use of not presented a “sweeping narrative” (and airbome forces on a large scale. He was the accounts of the airborne assaults are wrong, for the Anglo-Americans regarded coneise and well done), he has produced a Crete as a remarkable demonstration of study comprising the broadest eontextual successfui employment of airbome forces. presentation on the creation of U.S. airborne Crete seemed to reinforce rather than forces in World War II. diminish arguments within the U.S. Army The debates within the U.S. military es- and the British Army in favor of creating a tablishment over the concepts, doctrines, large bodv of parachute and glider troops. organization, training, research, manage- Eventually, the United States formed and ment, and plans for the employment of U.S. deployed fíve airbome divisions, each with airborne forces, as presented by Huston, a strength of approximately 8.500 men, and reveal the enormous complexities and diffi- the British formed two airbome divisions. culties encountered in giving birth to a new In addition to the MARKEToperation, Anglo- mode of warfare. It is important that we American airbome forces mounted major understand and appreciate what lies behind, assaults in Sicily in July 1943, Normandy in or, perhaps more appropriate, what precedes, June 1944, and across the Rhine in March the actual employment of troops in combat. 1945. Smaller airbome landings occurred in The mistakes and lack of vision of the orga- North África in 1942 and in the Pacific: the nizers, trainers, and planners are inevitably Nadzab (New Guinea) operation in 1943, visited on the troops who go into combat. the dramatic long-range operations in Burma The uncertainties, eonflicting views and atti- bv \Vingate’s Raiders in 1943 and 1944, and tudes, thorny issues, and agonizing reap- the highly successfui parachute drop on Cor- praisals which throughout the war beset the regidor in February 1945. U.S. Army leaders and planners concerned

It is onlvJ in recent Jvears that we have with airborne troops—such men as Leslie been getting military historv that shows us J. McNair, Matthew B. Ridgway, Maxwell what lies behind the big battles and cam- D. Taylor, Joseph M. Swing, James M. Gavin, paigns that are the payoffs. Combat is, of William D. Old, William C. Lee—emerge course, the culmination of the whole mili­ from Huston’s account, lending it a tone of tary process and is by far the most dramatic down-to-earth reality and a depth of per- and compelling element in that process. But ception that greatly enhance it. it is also the tip of an enormous iceberg, Today’s practitioners of modeling and most of which is rarely exposed to the pub- gaming in the national security community lic eye because it lacks the sweep and the engage in analyses of current and future excitement of violent conflict. problems, seeking to establish a measure of 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

merit by which their outcomes may be as- tions men to troop carrier units; it did not sessed. Such ineasures of merit have always provide self-sealing tanks for the troop car- been applied to the great events of history riers; it failed to coordinate training ade- but often with little more success than the quately with the airborne divisions; it diverted modelers of the future aehieve. Still, we con­ troop carrier aircraft to other missions, such tinue to analyze and speculate about what as hauling cargo for the ground units and happened and what might have happened the combat air units; it sent troop carrier if______Thus, we are inevitably confronted units to some theaters where no airborne with such questions as whether a particular units were present. Huston concedes that effort was successful or justified. The air- priorities obviously had a great deal to do borne effort of World War II is no excep- with who got what and when, but he flirts tion to this tantalizing game. with the question of whether the priorities What contribution did U.S. airborne were right. And his quarrel seems to be not troops make to the overall victory in World so mueh with priorities within the ground War II? Might the resources devoted to the forces as with priorities within the Army Air airborne forces have been used more effec- Forces and between the aaf and the agf. tively in other ways—e.g., for more ground Huston says that General Henry H. Ar- or armored divisions or more bombers and nold, the commander of the aaf, was “an fighters? Or should some of the resources airborne enthusiast” but that of greater im- that went into groimd divisions and strategic portance “he was more of a strategic bom- bomber forces have gone into airborne divi­ bardment enthusiast." (p. 254) This is un- sions and troop carrier units? Such ques­ deniably true. Huston suggests that a higher tions are, of course, unanswerable, since we priority for the troop carriers might have can never be sure about what might have been been. Nevertheless, they hold an eternal just as effective as a policy which massed im- fascination for military professionals and pressive totais in bomber sorties, hours flown, amateurs alike, and many, including this and tonnages of bombs dropped but which, reviewer, are not deterred by the need to though carrying the appearance of violent resort to subjective arguments to support activity, had relatively little effect on enemy their opinions and judgments. war-making capacity until the last months of Although there was often contention and the war. In addition to contributing a con- poor coordination within the Army in plan- sequential strategic threat, a policy of holding ning, organizing, training, and equipping out troop carriers might have permitted a per- the airborne forces, Huston seems to feel fection in airborne training and technique that the most important problem grew out which would have rendered airborne opera­ of differences between the Army Ground tions considerablv more effective in breaking the enemy will to resist than were manv heavy Forces and the Army Air Forces; that the bomber missions in achieving that result. (p. heart of the differences lay in the consis- 254) tently low priorities accorded the troop carrier units, which were indispensable to Huston is aware that the troop carriers the airborne effort in every phase and in- were often hurried overseas to provide badly deed served as a major limiting factor on the needed airlift of cargo and men within the­ size and scope of the overall airborne force aters and that when they were diverted from and its operations. The aaf developed no airborne operations it was usually to serve specialized aircraft for the mission; it did the needs of ground units rather than air not assign its best pilots and Communica­ units. The thmst of his thesis seems to be BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 that there should have been more transport argument on behalf of the airborne forces aircraft to meet both troop carrier and cargo that was previously made by such distin- airlift requirements and that the resources guished writers as Walter Mil lis and J. F. C. for the additional transport planes could Fuller in behalf of the tactical air forces have been gotten by reducing the programs and the ground forces in general at the ex- for the strategic bomber forces. This is an pense of the strategic bombers. They too

Clider parts are assembled for the inoasion of France. 86 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW found the results of the strategic bombard- The contribution of strategic bombard- ment of Gerrnany not to have justified the ment to the defeat of Gerrnany in World expenditure of men and treasure. It is an War II has been a bone of contention ever issue that is obviously not suseeptible to de- since the war, but rarely, if ever, has the finitive resolution, but this makes it all the bomber been looked at in the context of more appealing. a trade-off with the troop carrier. And yet BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

it is in this context that the bomber prob- campaign inade a major and indispensable ably looks best, contrarv to Hustons view. contribution to the success of the Allied Even among those who regard the strategic armies in Western Europe, including the bombardment campaign against Germany’s Normandy landings and all that followed, industrv and urban areas as a waste of and therefore to the defeat of Germany. resources, there is recognition that the The strategic bombers and their escort

A Douglas C-47 tows a paratroop glider from an airfteld in the United Kingdom. . . . Allied paratroops prepare to hoard C-47 transports in England for airbome landings in Nazi-occupied Holland. Strong forces o f the First Allied Airbome Army, under command of Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, landed in Holland on a Sunday afternoon, 17 September W44. More than a thousand tow planes and gliders took part in the operation, escorted by swartns o f fighters, including a Dutch Spitfire squadron, to knock out flak hatteries and keep the Luftwaffe out of the skies. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

fighters smashed the Luftwaffe and destroyed many itself could induce them to commit its fíghter arm as a major opponent in the everything they had to the air battle before great air battles over Germany in the win- the invasion itself. It was Eisenhower’s ter and spring of 1944, the four months opinion that “ overlord was going in with preceding D-Day in Norinandy. It was the a very slim margin of ground superiority deliberate interim objective of the Combined and that only the Allied supremacy in the Bomber Offensive to neutralize or destroy air made it a sound operation of war.” 2 the German Air Force, this as an indis- The history of overlord, then, might well pensable prerequisite to the invasion of have been very different had a powerful Western Europe and the strategic bombing German fíghter force been present in the of Germany. The official U.S. Army his- skies over Normandy on 6 June 1944. And torian of the Normandy invasion has stated: the history of U.S. and Allied airborne op- “The German Air Force had been defeated erations in Europe would most certainly by the Combined Bomber Offensive in the have been very different. early months of 1944. This victory the Allies In current terminology, was the airborne were sure of. This knowledge was the most effort cost-effective? The nub of the matter important ingredient in the final decision is whether the results of the use of airborne to go ahead with overlord.’’ 1 forces compensated for the much higher The absence of the Luftwaffe in any sig- cost of creating and maintaining them. An nificant strength from the skies over the airborne division cost as much to equip as beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944 was an infantry division, which had about 75 the surest indication of the success of the percent more manpower. To this must be Allied air forces, particularly of the U.S. added the cost of the “airplanes and gliders Eighth Air Force. Moreover, when the required [together with their trained man­ thousands of troop carriers and gliders in power], the extra resources and time for Operation ma r ket flew over the Low Coun- training, and the extra shipping space tries to Arnhem and Nijmegen in Septem- needed for overseas movement of airborne ber 1944, they were little molested by troop carrier units.” (p. 255) In all, an air­ German fighters because the Luftwaffe borne division might well have cost two to was too weak to attempt an effective re­ three times as much per man as an infan­ sponse. And in subsequent airborne opera- try division. Huston concludes: “Whether tions over Europe the Allied airborne forces or not the effect of airborne troops in spe- could count on friendly skies. Most of the cific operations and their effect on enemy aircraft losses in European airborne opera- dispositions as a force in being was worth tions in 1944-45 carne from antiaircraft the cost is a matter of judgment.” (pp. 255- fire and crashes. 56) His omission of a final opinion or judg­ It is doubtful, probably unlikely, that the ment on the question, after his thorough Luftwaffe could have been so severely and detailed studv of the airborne forces, is diminished as a fighting force (the loss of perhaps the best indication of what a stump- its best pilots had the greatest effect) by er it is. any other means than the daylight strategic There were, of course, differing opinions bombing campaign. The Germans had as to whether the airborne forces had been every reason and every intention to hus- worth the cost. Many of the severest critics band their fíghter aircraft resources for use and most persistent doubters were to be against the Allied invaders of Western Eu­ found in the Army. But the U.S. Army s rope. Only the massive attacks on Ger­ judgment after the war was that the effort BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

had paid off, and the Army retained sub- highly specialized long-range strategic op- stantial airbome forces in its structure erations. For the shorter-range tactical thereafter. assault operations, the Army appears to Two U.S. regimental-size airbome drops have committed itself to the helicopter. occurred during the Korean War. In the When the history of airmobile operations 1960s the Army adopted the airmobile in Vietnam is written, definitive answers concept, in which helicopters carne to be for these difficult questions will likely be as substituted for troop carrier planes and para- hard to come by as for World War II air- chutes in assault landings. The helicopter borne operations. carne to be the distinctive and important Arlington, Virgínia feature of the war in Vietnam, to the total exclusion of parachute troops. It seems pos- Notes sible that such paratroop forces as the Army 1. Cordon Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, United State* Army in World War ll (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1951). p 180. retains in the future may be reserved for 2. Ihid.. p. 272.

A COMMUN1TY WITHIN "A NATION OF STRANGERS"

COLONEL ANDREW J. D o UCHERTY M arjorie M. D ougherty

URING the past year over 700,000 Until fairlv recently, the military was the U.S. Air Force individuais or fami- group most often identified as the gypsies liesD enjoyed, suffered, or otherwise went or nomads of society. Many who have spent through a permanent change of station. a tour in the civilian community have had For many it was a time of excitement and a sneaking suspicion that our civilian coun- anticipation; for others, sadness and frus- terparts were starting to enjoy—or suffer— tration. But for the majority, it was prob- the kind of transience that had previously ably a mixture of all these emotions. typified inainly the military. 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

suspicion confinned tion of the methodology leaves little doubt as to the fidelity and interpretations of the Vance Packard, in his recent hook, A Na- data. tion o f Strangers, t has explored for the first In the descriptive treatment, Mr. Packard time the true breadth and depth of the re- pulls together a massive array of data from cently evolved mobility pattems and frag- some of the most thoughtful and serious mentation that have become a new way of writers on the subject of mobility. He life in American soeiety. simultaneously explores such diverse but While many have suspected that move- related aspects as the impact of the change ment had increased, the phenomenal amount on towns and cities, on retired people and of the increase and, more important, the their life styles, and on the way people far-ranging impacts are cause for concern. behave. Finally, the book treats methods of Mobility in the civilian community is rap- reducing the fragmentation that usually idly approaching that in the military in results from the changes occurring. It is terms of frequency. Packard estimates that toward this final prescriptive portion of more than 25 percent of the population the book that the rest of this discussion moves annually. Given the continuation of will mainly be directed. technological and societal changes now in play, there is reason to believe that this previously solved Air Force problems become trend in the civilian community will not new problems for soeiety only continue but, in the short term, ac- celerate. Forces are simultaneously at play The Air Force has been forced to come to within the military to decrease the number grips in the past with the kinds of prob­ lems that are just beginning to concern the of permanent changes of station (pc s). Air rest of soeiety. The doctrinal charter of the Force permanent changes of station are programmed to decrease in each of the Air Force demands a eapability and flexi- next four years. It is altogether possible bility, coupled with a certainty peculiar to that in the near future the military will an armed force. Fighting or preparing to become one of the more stable and less fight in a global context has caused Air transient groups in societv. Force members to be historically a highly mobile group. Personnel planners are charged with the a descriptive and prescriptive study responsibility of providing a technologically Mr. Packard has done a truly impressive intensive array of human resources. The job, first, in defining the dimensions of the men and women of the Air Force are the new mobility; second, in assessing the so­ produet of long lead-time proeurement and cietal impacts; and, third and more impor­ training cycles prior to produetive utiliza- tant, in suggesting methods by which the tion. The selective retention of the appro- undesirable impacts of the phenomena of priate numbers and skills is as essential as mobility and fragmentation may be mini- recruitment to force vitality and abilitv to mized. Mr. Packard employed unique deliver. The mobility and fragmentation approaches to ferret out the facts about problems described by Mr. Packard are pre- mobility, a primary method being the num­ cisely those addressed bv Air Force planners ber of telephone disconnects. The explana- over the past twenty-five years with a high

f Vance Packard, A Nation o f Strangers (New York: David McKay Co., 1972, $6.95), 368 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

degree of success. Success can be measured therefore represent an excellent point of in onlv one substantive wav; we possess departure for diseussing the means and the numbers and skills required. We have methods bv which Air Force members have fought well in the most unpopular war in managed through the years to maintain an history, and, above all, the total fibre ot identity, a sense of continuity, and a sense our force is intact, vital, and reliable. of communitv while undergoing the severest Given, then, that the Air Force has previ- of stresses. Such an examination must be ously encountered to a significant degree the preceded by a selective look at those who problems now confronting the greater so- comprise the Air Force. ciety, and further given that the Air Force has addressed these problems with some degree of success, it inight be well to ex­ W hat is an Air Force? amine Mr. Packards thesis in terms of The nature of the .Air Force population and where the Air Force has been, where it is, the relationships which emerge are central and future implications. to any examination of the Air Force com- munity. An initial parameter is established in the recruitment of Air Force people. inside "Life on the Nuclear Frontier” While there are occasional overtones of “Life on the Nuclear Frontier’’ is the title draft motivation, it would be fair to State of the chapter in which Mr. Packard ex­ that the majority of Air Force members are amines the role of the federal government true volunteers. They purposefully sought in the changes confronting societv, with out and joined the Air Force. They compete particular attention given to Department of to remain members. They are people will- Defense and space activities. The chapter ing to accept a commitment in what they examines a variety of towns where the must perceive as a team effort. various Services and defense-related activi­ The myriad of available attitudinal sur- ties have a large impact. The studv focused vevsJ tells us much more about our Air Force onlv on the civilian-militarv interface and in terms of how we think and feel. Of par­ attendant trauma, with occasional personal ticular interest are the elements of the job “horror stories.” The point largely missed and life style that are perceived as most was the existence of a true militarv com- important in making career decisions. munity, a communitv which has been forced A recent survey focused on factors re- by the necessity of physical and emotional lated to the military job that are of pri- survival into a series of intricate and unique mary and secondarv importance. When mutually supportive relationships. The kinds presented with such an array and asked, of activities and programs which Mr. Pack­ “Which one is of the greatest importance ard would have found in these militarv to you?" and an equally searching second communities largely address the developing question, “Which is tlie second most im­ societal problems which he identifies. portant?” the percentages selecting each The final portion of the book, entitled factor are shown in the accompanying ta- “Toward Reducing the Fragmentation,” ble. These data paint an interesting picture pursues two central themes: the first, “re- of our Air Force. Note particularly the covering a sense of continuity,” and the preponderante of responses addressing the second, “approaches to a sense of com- first three factors plus that of “opportunity munity.’ These two themes represent the to learn” and the relatively minor interest distillate of the rest of the book. They displayed in geographical location, physi- 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

cal conditions, and other “hygienic” con- military job, we must consider a wider con- ditions of work. textual application. The job in the Air Force Two points need to be made. First, there does not exist as and cannot be portrayed is little concern with the transiency of life. as an independent variable separate and Our men and women are concerned with distinct from life style. We are, therefore, what is going on rather than where. These reasonably safe in assuming that the re­ interesting implications suggest two forces sponses largely reflect a cluster of attitudes at work: people are selecting the Air Force responding to Air Force life in a general life style and work while the Air Force is way. selecting them; and simultaneously the Air Other surveys characterize Air Force Force is being shaped by its members as members as wanting to travei and having the Air Force community shapes its mem­ a deep concern for other people as well as bers. Above all, these responses and the their nation. Given their even normal sta- responses to subsequent questions indicate tistical variations, those who comprise the a reasonable degree of satisfaction. An Air Force are not a true cross section of example of the ongoing mutual shaping the population. Rather, they represent a and fitting relationship within the Air Force more fínite universe of competent, task- is the cited survey, which is carefully studied oriented, ambitious, and concerned indi­ by personnel planners. Survey resultsbecome viduais. the basis for future programs and actions. The results speak cogently of men and The second point to be made concerning women who seek and are largely finding a the data is the probable universality of the sense of community and continuity in a life responses. While the question stipulated style typified by transience. Air Force mem-

Airmen Officers

Gr cate st Second Most Greatest Second Most Importance lmportant Importance lmportant Kind of people with whom I work 23.9 23.8 17.9 24.8 Challenging work 22.7 14.3 50.2 17.6 Recognition for my work 11.3 14.2 8.8 15.5 Pay 13.3 14.5 7.8 12.6 Geographical location of my work 7.2 8.8 5.7 8.5 Physical conditions under which I work 4.1 6.3 1.7 4.0 Hours of work 4.3 8.3 1.4 2.4 Opportunity to learn 13.1 9.7 6.5 9.8

Other — 4.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Significant sources o f career satisfaction in the Air Force BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

bers vote with their feet: if they don t find the family will be assigned to an area where what they want, they leave. Yet they are the child can get the special education he or staying. she needs in order to be part of the aca- demic mainstream. To those with extraordi- continuity and community—Air Force style nary or even ordinary medicai problems, it perhaps means champus (Civilian Health Mr. Packard tells a frightening story of and Medicai Program of the Uniformed what is happening in society. After stating Services). To the tens of thousands of fami­ that “rootlessness seems clearly to be asso- lies who have had personal tragedies and ciated with a decline in companionship, a requested and received preferential assign- decline in satisfving group activities, a ments, it means humanitarian transfers. To decline in mutual trust and a decline in a minority group member, it means equal psychological security,” he proceeds to opportunity. To each individual who re- State: ceives pc s orders and a letter from his Man needs a coramunity; he needs continuity. commander and sponsor with a package Being a full-fledged eard-carrying member of a of base, housing, and community informa- community is not incompatible—as some assume tion, it means the Sponsor Program. To the —with being a free full-fledged individual. It can be, since community functions through coopera- same family on arrival at a new station, tion, consensus, and regulations, but it need not using the lending cabinet, indoctrination, be. The community by encouraging interaction and other arrival Services, it means Family between people can contribute greatlv to the Services. To all members of the Air Force individuai s sense of self-respect and can provide community, there are certain common opportunities for self-fulfillment. Both contribute to an individual sense of identity. meanings. In a majority of cases there is a certainty of a wide array of base facilities, This, we submit, is a summary treatment of which we tend, often, to take for granted the community, Air Force style. Each of us but for which our civilian counterparts views the Air Force from a separate van- would give their eyeteeth. tage point of personal identity. To each of Most important is the process of com­ us, like the blind men describing the ele- munity, which is the true fabric of con­ phant, the .Air Force community represents tinuity. In the process of participating, something different. sharing, creating, and using the facilities, Most Air Force members, on reflection, programs, and Services, a series of intricate would probablv concede that they are in interrelationships is created that is the Air fact members of the Air Force community. Force community. The single element that has created and Mr. Packard draws on a study by Dr. now perpetuates this community is need. Robert S. VVeiss, who worked extensively The single statement that best represents in a research project at the Harvard Medi­ the philosophical underpinning of the Air cai School. Weiss focused on the lives of Force community is “The Air Force takes people who had been uprooted by broken care of its own.” marriages, by retirement, or by moving The meaning of this statement is indi­ considerable distances. He concluded that vidual and personal. To those thousands of people do indeed have needs that can only families who have a child with a learning be met within relationships with other peo­ disability or physical or psychological im- ple. He then identified five relationships pairment, it means Children Have A Po- most generally required in order to have a tential (chap). It means a guarantee that sense of well-being: the opportunity of 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW parents to nurture children, knowing people munity. What Mr. Packard seems to be who share our concerns, knowing people we talking about mostly is the quality of life can depend upon in a pinch, having one or in society. Upon examination, it appears more really close friends, and knowing that the quality of life within the Air Force people who respect our competence. has much to recommend it, especially in Perceptions of the Air Force community terms of the problems steadily mounting in are individual and personal. It would serve the greater society. no purpose to editorialize further on Weiss’s Read Mr. Packard’s book. He has a findings and what they should or should not powerful message concerning a society in mean to the individual reader. Perhaps flux. The Air Force community is not, nor many members of the Air Force community should it ever be, separate from the greater will find on reflection that Dr. Weiss’s society. We eannot and should not be in- listed relationships are fully or substan- sulated. The impacts Mr. Packard describes tially satisfied through the Air Force com­ will reach us. We need to be aware of them. Washington, D.C.

AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AWARDS PROGRAM

Dr. Ralph E. Strauch, a sênior mathematician with The RAND Corporation, has been seleeted by the Air University Review Awards Committee to receive the annual award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the Review during fiscal year 1973. His article, “Winners and Losers: A Conceptual Barrier in Our Strategic Thinking,” was previously designated the outstanding article in the July-August 1972 issue. The awards program provides payment to eligible authors, a $50 award for the out­ standing article in each issue, and a $200 savings bond for the annual outstanding article. The award winners also receive a plaque. The bimonthly winners for the past year were Dr. Ralph E. Strauch, “Winners and Losers: A Conceptual Barrier in Our Strategic Thinking,” July-August 1972; Lieutenant Colonel Edward Stellini, USAF, “Defense Dollars for Deterrence: A Matter of Priorities, ’ September-October 1972; Major Michael A. Nelson, USAF, “Soviet Policy in Latin America, November-December 1972; Major Richard Zock, USAF, “Resource Manage­ ment, Economic Analysis, and Diseounting in the Department of Defense, January- February 1973; Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Besley, USAF, “The Need for Military Officers as Strategic Thinkers,” March-April 1973; Captain Raymond S. Blunt, USAF, and Captain Thomas O. Cason, USAF, “Realistic Doctrine: Basic Thinking Today,’ May- June 1973. The Contributors

Integruted Systems Division, Foreigit Tech­ mander. AFOSI Dctachmeut, Du Nang AB. nology DiVision, Air Force Systems Command, Republíc of Vietnam. Major Hildner b a Wright-Patfcerson AFB, Ohio. lie has worked 1973 graduate of Air Command and Staff with the Boeing Company on the Bomarc H College and with Dr Russell has cuauthofcd and the Satum V. As a licutenant in the U.S. several articles on insurgency. Army, he served three yeurs as an air defense guided missile instructor. Mr Holder is lhe uuthor of a number ol technical articles and u book, Satum V—The Moon Rovket (1969).

M ajor Edo D. W h eel er (USAFà ; Ph D.. Emory Universily) has recently completed Anned Forces Staíf College. following duty L ieu t en a n t Kennet h C. Stoéhhmann in SEA as Special Assistant to Commanding (USAFA; M.A., Tufts University» is a student C apta in Bard E. ONeil l (Ph D.. Graduate General. Deputv Chief, JUSMAGTHAl. at tlie USAF Intelligence School, Lowry AFB. School of International Studies. Denver Uni­ Other assignments have been as a Titan II Colorado. Under AFIT/CI, he recently com- versity) is Assistant Professor of Political missile crew commander; missile programmer. plete

D r . C harles A. Russell (J.D.. Georgetown University; Ph.D.. American University) is Chief. Acquisitions and Analysis Division. C olonel David L Nic h o l s • B.S.. Oklahoma Directorate of Special Operations, Hq State University) is assigned to the Office of AFOSI. From 1951 to 1971 he served in the the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Atoinic Directorate of Special Investigations, Hq Energy i His expenence has been phrnarily USAF With Major Hildner. he has leetured in tactical fighters. including a tour in SEA at Air Command and Staif College and USAF flying the F-105. He has served as Chief of Special Operations School on insurgency in the Safety for the 23d TFVV. McConnell AFB. underdeveloped world and the role of counter- Kansas and the 18th TFW . Kadena AB. intelligence in counterinsurgency and co- Okinawa. Prior to coming to Air University. authored several related articles. M ajor Gener al Paul R. Stoney (B.A., he was commander of the L2th TFS. Colonel Emory University) is Commander, Air Force Nichols is a Distinguished Craduate of Air Communications Service, Richards-Gebaur Command and Staff College and a 1973 AFB, Missouri. Commissioned from pilot graduate of Air War College. training in 1942. he attended Communica­ tions Officer School in 1944-45 and was as­ signed to a training center for Airways and Air Communications Service. He has directed Communications and related activities in Japan, Hawaii. Hq AACS. Hq USAF. Hq SAC. OSD Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering. and as Vice Commander of AFCS from 1966, Commander since 1969. General Stoney is a graduate of Air Command and Staff School and Army War College. M ajor Rorert E. H il o n er (M.S., Univer­ sity of Colorado) is currently Chief. Opera­ tions Division. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Rome. Italy. Previous assign- ments have been in the Directorate of W il u aj u C. Holder iB.S.A.E., Purdue Uni­ Special Operations. Hq .AFOSI; as a counter- versity) is an aerospace engineer with the intelligence officer. OSI, Japan; and as Com-

95 Captain Zawacki is a graduate of Squadron Officer School. a member of the Acadcmy of Management, and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Washington.

C ulonel Andrew J. Doucherty (M.B.A*. L íeü t en ant Colonel Pet er E. L aSota Bradlev University) is Assistant Director. tM.Ed., University of Arizona) is Director. Professional Militarv Education. Office of Cadet Counseling Conter, USAFA. Commis- the Deputy Assistant Secretarv of Defense sioned and rated m 1954, he has served in (Education). Most of his assigninents have 55th Weather Recon Squadron, 3d Bomb been in tactical fighter. inclnding combat tours in Korea and Vietnam. and he was VVing, and 11 th Tae Recon Squadron and USAF adviser to the Royal Thai Air Force. has flown 106 combat mivdons in SEA, KK) C aptain Jon M. Samuels M.A., University He recently served as Professor of Aerospace of thein over North Victnain. I lis manage- of Oklahomai is Deputy Director, Department Studies. University of Pittsburgh. ment training íncludes the Kepner-Tregoe of Seeurity Police Training, USAF School of workshop on svstematk decision inaking and Applied Aerospace Sciences. Lackland AFB, two National Training Laboratory workshops Texas. He has served as a liaison olficer on organi/.at tonal developrnent. with the Republic of Korea Anmy and as exchange officer with the Roval .Air Force. While in England Captain Samuels was a visiting lec turer on militarv affairs at the Um- versity of Leeds. He has l>eeri selected for proinotion to major.

D r . Ai-fred Coldberg «Ph.D.. Johns Hop- kms University) is a sênior stalf meinber of the RAND Corporation, Washington. D.C. He was formerly Chief of the Current Historv Branch of tiie USAF Histórica! Divísion Mrs. M arjorie M. D oucherts M.S.W., Uni- C aptajn Robert A. Zawaí ki (M.S., l *ni- He has lectured at the Universities of Mary* versitv of Southern Califórnia > ls a social versitv of Wvoming’ is Chief. Research 1 iml, Southern Califórnia and UCLA. He was worker and the mother of two gyls. In addi- Divísion. USAFA. As an enlisted inan , 195*1 editor of A Histonj of the U.S. Air Force. tion to private practice, she has done ex- and since coinmissioning (1963), he has 1907-1957 and u coauthor of Ttu Army Air tensive casework in psychiatric clinira. served in personnel inanageinent and or- Forces in World War II and has contributed hospitais, and State dependent childrens ganizational l»ehavior in Labrador and else- to militarv and professional joumals. In 1962- Services. Mame d in England the Doughertvs where. He is a ftillv qualifíed sênior parachut- 63 he was a Visiting Fellow at Kings College, have experienced a varietv of ovenea and ist and jumpmaster with over 100 freefalls. London. stateside assignments.

Tlie Air University Review AwarcLs Committee has selected "Realistie Doctrine: Basic Thinking Today” hy Captain Ravmond S. Blunt, USAF, and Captain Thomas O. Cason. USAF. as the outstanding artiele in the May-June 1973 issue of Air University Review. ED IT O R IA L STAFF C olonel Eldon W. D ow.ns, USAF Editor J ack H. Mooney Managing Editor L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Philip M. F l a mmeh , USAF Associate Editor M ajor Ric h a bd B. C omyns, USAF Associate Editor E dmund O. Bahker Financial and Administrativo Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t , J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor. Spanish Language Edition L ia Mid o si May Patterson Associate Editor. Portuguese Language Edition WlLLlAM J. D e PaoLA A ií Editor and IIlustrator

ADVISERS C olonel Arthur G. L yn n //(/ Air Force Logistics Commútul

D r . H arold M. Hel fma n Hy Air Force Systems Çonimanil

C olonel H. J. D alton, J r . Hy Air Training Commtmd F rancis VV. J ennincs SAF Office o f Information C olonel John VV. \Valton Hy Strategic Air Command

C olonel Boo.ve Rose, |r . Hy Tactical Air Command

C olonel Arthur S. R acen Hy United States Air Force Academy

ATTENTION Air UniPersily Revirw is puMished to stimulate pro- fessional thought conceming aerospaee doutrines, strategy. tactics, and related tecliniques. Its contents reHect the opinions of its authors or the investiga- iioris and conclusions of its editors and are not to fie eonstnied as carrving any offieial sauction of the Department of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW