11 AIR rcvicwU N I VERSI TY THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL Of THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE U.S. M il it a r y Stratecy: P aradoxes in Per spect ive...................................................................... 2 Maj. Edd D. Wheeler, US.AF Mish a p Analysis: An Impr o ved Appr o a c h to Air c r a f t Accident Prevention . 13 Col. David L. Nichols, US.AF T he Many Faces of the Spa c e Shuttle........................................................................................23 Williani G. Holder T he Lea d-Time Problem: T heory .and Appl ic a t io n s ................................................................ 36 Lt. Kenneth C. Stoehrmann, US.AF Lvtel l igence and Information Pr o c essin g in Co un t er insur c en c y................................... 46 Dr. Charles A. Russell Maj. Robert E. Hildner, US.AF T he Middle East, 1973: C old W.ar Chances and Amer ic a n Interests........................ 57 Capt. Bard E. O Neill, US.AF Air Force Review Modern Communications, a Wise Investment......................................................................... 63 Maj. Gen. Paul R. Stonev, US.AF ln My Opinion O rcaniz.atio.nal Devel o pmen t : C an It Be Effective in the Armed Forces? ... 68 Lt. Col. Peter E. LaSota, US.AF Capt. Robert A. Zawacki, USAF Syst ema t ic Reso l ut ion of Social Problems within the Mil it .ary............................. 73 Capt. Jon M. Samuels, US.AF Books and Ideas A chtunc! Fuecer th vppex! ...................................................................................................................80 Dr. Alfred Goldberg A C o mmun t t y within “A Nation of Strangers" .......................................................................89 Col. Andrew J. Dougherty, US.AF Marjorie M. Dougherty T he C ontributors..........................................................................................................................................95 Addra* rrunuMnpts to Editor. Air Lm vm itv the cover Brvirw Drvidon. Bldg. 1211. Maxwdl AFB. AL 36112. Printed b> Covrmmenl Printing Office. In "The Many Faces of the Space Shuttle." Williain Addreit lubtcnpíiom to Supcrintrndent of G Holder savs that the shuttle is on its way Doou menti CPO. Washington DC 20402: yearly hnt onlv after many years and many viciv- $6.00 domruic. $10.00 foreign; single copy $1.50. \itudes Tl»e Air Force lias been a prime mover in research and development of the shuttle tech- nology and will play ari important role in iLs launching and subsetpunt operation. The shuttle is lieuig dcveloped by National Aeronautics and Space Administratíon (NASA). Our cover VoL XXIV No. 5 J ix r - A t a i T 1073 depicts a shuttle engiric configuraiion mockup. U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY Paradoxes in Perspective M ajor Edd D. W h eel er T IS difficult for the modem student of strategy to point to a cogent defi- nition that rings with clarity and truth. Perhaps he will have to settle for a prosaic one even if somewhat less than profoimd. ITerminologists tell us, in langnage often not easily understandable, that strategy deals with the “development and employment of national power, including military power in peace and war, to secure national aims against antagonists in the international environment.” 1 Although this statement may be true, it is hardly clear, for we are caught almost immediately in the ambiguities of precisely what constitutes most difficult conditions.” 2 Yet one might national power and even more so in its question why strategy should be considered elusive “development and employment.” experimental as opposed to systematic, or The rest of the definition does little to crys- why more practical than impractical. After tallize its meaning. all, successful strategy is not necessarily ex- A common definition which is clearer, perimentally practical; it might well be because shorter, but which does not seem systematically impractical, especially if it entirely true, States that strategy is “the art is to achieve surprise. of the general. ” One might reasonably argue, Moltke was correct, however, in one im- and many have, that strategy is both “art portant respect, for he seemed to sense that and Science,” thus implying that there is a strategy is characterized by indefiniteness good measure of method as well as imagi- and difficulty. These two wrinkles, which nation in strategy. Furthermore, it can be actually might be considered one in that reasoned that, in order to transmit substan- they nin across the same seam, must be tial meaning, the definition of strategy pressed upon and a working definition of cannot be too generalized. Specifics are strategy ironed out before we can turn needed; indeed, most of history’s great specifically to the subject of U.S. military strategists were quite specific in addressing strategy. the subject. Napoleon, for example, formu- As with most endeavors, strategy has be- lated no less than 115 concrete maxims come progressively more complex with the related to the realm of strategy. passage of time. Twenty-two hundred years Unfortunately, some definitions seem ago, Scipio’s strategy involved only breaking lacking in both clarity and truth. “Strategy,” through Hannibal s front line of war ele- according to Prussian Field Marshal Count phants in order to win a complete victory Helmuth von Moltke, “is a system of ad hoc at Zama. Two thousand years later, strategy experiments; it is more than knowledge, it had become more scientifically and math- is the application of knowledge to practical ematically oriented, as evidenced in detailed life, the development of an original idea in preoccupation with such matters as the accordance with continually changing cir- geometry of marching formations and battle cumstances. It is under the pressure of the alignments. Even so, as late as the first 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW decade of this century it was possible for shadow of Armageddon cast by unsound the dying Field Marshal von Schlieffen to Soviet decisions to base missiles in Cuba. capsulize what was to be the German grand Nonetheless, because war—or perhaps the strategy at the beginning of the World War absence of war—is the ultimate test of the with his direct dictum to “make the right success of military strategy, it is appro- wing strong.” priate to address briefly the nature of war- Those relatively simple days now seem fare, especially modem warfare. as dead as Schlieffen. The contemporary War is nasty business and exacts a dear strategist must pick his difficult way through price. The only question is how much one the sometimes opaque rhetoric of counter- is willing to pay. force, controlled response, graduated deter- Lest this approach seem oversimplified, rence, and the rest. Half the battle is in- another perspective might be added. Thomas volved in learning the new langnage of C. Schelling, who has the talent for ordering battle. The path is winding and too often complex issues into simple form without windv.J being simplistic, says that “war has always, Through the frequent heat and infre- or almost always, been a bargaining process; quent light, what then can be said? For and limited wur in particular is a bargain­ my purposes, I offer that military strategy ing process. Today’s kind of limited war is a plan o f action for pursuing those ob- involves two kinds of bargaining: bargain­ jectives established by the government as ing about the outcome and bargaining being necessary to its best interests. To about how the war itself (‘the bargaining’) ampíify this definition, three caveats might is going to be conducted.” 3 In light of both be added: approaches, mine and Schelling's, what • Military strategy is essentially a then can be said of limited war? program for action, as opposed to inaction and commitment to the status quo. a bargaining contest • Military strategy takes into account First, limited war is a bargaining contest. not only military factors but all those which Bargaining involves give and take; price is figure importantly in the nation’s power, not absolute. The parties are willing to e.g., political stability, economic strength, negotiate in light of reason—never mind and national resolve. whose—and come to terms that are accept- • In pursuit of national objectives able, though perhaps not equally so, to through strength, it is imperative to eon- both. Yet it is important to remember that sider the objectives and strengths of others, war, limited or otherwise, is a contest. It especially those of antagonists. involves contestants who want somehow to win. The parties in conflict may not wish The Nature of War to throw away the mie book or to be pe- nalized excessively, but each is looking for Military strategy does not cause war. In gain, almost always at the opponent's fact, a lesson of history seems to be that expense. war is more likely to ensue from a void in This lesson may glint cold to our eyes, strategy or from the absence of sound but we should not fail to read it. In the strategy. Witness the results of the lack of cushioned and sometimes eushy language of British and French military preparedness in international relations, we tend to overlook the face of Munich, or the threatening a hard fact: winners and losers still exist. V.s. MILITARY STRATEGY: PARADOXES IN PERSPECTIVE 5 Another fact which should not be forgotten In contrast to Clausewitz, who believed is that the winner achieves dominance (the that nothing short of “great and general word victory currently being somewhat engagements will produce great results,” 5 passé) through superior force or threat of Mao would choose initially to hit and run, force. to avoid decisive confrontation. Indeed, Thus, limited war is a contest in which this decision is more the product of pru- one forcibly drives the hardest possible dence than doctrine, for insurgency begins bargain for gain which he believes the other as a frail flower (or weed, depending upon side will find acceptable.