DEUTSCH-ÄTHIOPISCHER VEREIN E.V. GERMAN ETHIOPIAN ASSOCIATION

INFORMATIONSBLÄTTER 3/2017 Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Die folgenden Quellen wurden in dem Heft verwendet (Originale teilweise geringfügig gekürzt)

Political unrest simmering in Ethiopia ………………………………………………………… 1 Merga Yonas Bula, Deutsche Welle, 10.2.2017 Opposition parties to negotiate with EPRDF in unison ……………………………………. 3 Ethiopian News Agency ENA, 9.2.2017 Timely Ethiopian teachers’ warning against TPLF divisiveness …………………………. 3 Ethiopia Observatory, 9.2.2017 Public ultimate guarantor of nation’s peace and security ………………………………… 4 Ethiopian Reporter, Editorial, 4.2.2017 Ethiopia: A Gathering Political Storm ………………………………………………………… 5 Alem Mamo, Nazret.com 1.2.2017 Ethiopia claims success in quashing wave of anti-government unrest ………………… 6 John Aglionby, Financial Times in Addis Ababa, 1.2.2017 Ethiopia: The Slow Death of a Civilian Government and the Rise of a Military Might … 7 Addis Standard, 24.1.2017 A Wish List for Successful Opposition and Government Negotiations ……………….. 11 Solomon Gebreselassie, Ethiopian Observer, 22.1.2017 Salvaging Political Pluralism ………………………………………………………………….. 13 Asrat Seyoum, Ethiopian Reporter, 21.1.2017 Analysis: Inside the controversial EFFORT ………………………………………………. 14 Oman Uliah, Special to Addis Standard, 16.1.2017 Ethiopia: Justified Fears ………………………………………………………………………. 18 Desta Heliso, Nazret.com, 30.12.2016 Ethiopia in the eyes of a veteran scholar ………………………………………………….. 20 Ethiopian Reporter, 17.12.2016, Interview by Tibebeselassie Feeling the Pulse of the People ……………………………………………………………… 24 Ethiopian Reporter, Editorial, 10 Dec 2016, by Staff Reporter Ethiopia at a crossroads as it feels the strain of civil unrest ………………………….. 26 James Jeffrey, Irish Times, Addis Ababa, 9 December 2016 New television channels in Ethiopia may threaten state control ………………………. 28 The Economist, 9 December 2016 Reacting To Lefort’s Article On The Ethiopian Crisis ……………………………………. 27 Messay Kebede (PhD), 27.11.2016 Ethiopia’s crisis. Things fall apart: will the centre hold? ………………………………. 28 René Lefort, Open Democracy, 19.11.2016 The EPRDF that I knew ………………………………………………………………………… 36 Gebru Asrat, Ethiopian Reporter, 27.8.2016, Interview by Wudineh Zenebe

Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen

Political unrest simmering in Ethiopia Merga Yonas Bula, Deutsche Welle, 10.2.2017 http://www.dw.com/en/political-unrest-simmering-in-ethiopia/a-37490527 Four months after declaring a state of emergency in a crackdown on protests, Ethiopia's government claims the country has returned to normal. Critics says the emergency decree remains an instrument of repression. This coming April marks three years since protests broke out in Ethiopia. They were triggered by students in Ambo town, some 120 kilometers (74 miles) west of the capital Addis Ababa. The students were protesting against a controversial government plan dubbed "Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Master Plan”. The Ethiopian government maintained that the purpose of the plan was to amalgamate eight towns in Oromia Special Zone with Addis Ababa. The scheme would promote development. However, residents in the eight towns were resentful of a plan they said had been devised behind closed doors. They were also worried that the plan, under the guise of development, would deprive farmers of their land, and have an unfavorable impact on local language and culture. The protests which started in Ambo then spread to other towns in Oromia Regional State. On January 12, 2016, the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), which is the local ally in the country's ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), revoked the plan. But although the OPDO nominally represents regionally interests, the real power in the EPRDF is in the hands of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). This sense of underrepresentation helped drive the protests in Oromia Regional State, which soon reached Amhara Regional State. The response by the security forces to these protests, which had a strong following among young Ethiopians, was harsh. Hundreds were killed, thousands were injured, hundreds 'disappeared' and others went into exile. But the protests conituned despite this lethal crackdown. In October 2016, the government responded by declaring a state of emergency for six months.

Political crisis Negeri Lencho, the minister who heads the government's communications office, told DW that the government had announced the state of emergency "not because it wanted to do it, rather it was forced to do it” because of the political crisis. The administration of Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn claims that the state of emergency has already brought peace back to the country. Critics could therefore argue that it would be possible for the government to lift the decree even before the six months have expired. However, Lencho says that no timeframe has been declared so far either for the repeal or for the extension of the decree. Opposition figures and members of the public DW spoke to dispute the claim that the state of emergency has restored peace to Ethiopia. The protests and the gunfire may have ceased, but the arbitrary arrests and human right violations continue. Negeri Lencho claims the government was forced into declaring a state of emergency

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One Ambo resident, who asked to remain anonymous as he took part in the protests, said that the state of emergency had "unsettled the public's inner repose".Repression was still in place, he said, despite the government "falsely" claiming that life was returning to normal. "You cannot go out after curfew. You cannot stand anywhere with a few people. People are filled with fear. They fear the Command Post." The Command Post is the government body charged with implementing the state of emergency. The town of Sabata, located 20 kilometers southwest of Addis Ababa, was part of the "Master Plan." One local resident said calm appears to have been restored to the town which was heavily affected by the protests. However the arrests and repression under the state of emergency continue, he said. "For example, there are youths who got arrested without a warrant and have been in prison for over three months on the charge that they have listened to music,” he told Deutsche Welle. "The state of emergency is being used by the state to take revenge against youth," he said. Mulatu Gemechu, deputy chairperson of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), said a de facto state of emergency had been in force in Oromia for some time, but by making it public the government had acquired a legal shield for further acts of repression. Gemechu added that the country can become peaceful only when the state security forces with their firearms keep their distance from ordinary citizens and stop arresting people. "If government claims peace is returning because of soldiers' presence, then it isn't peace,” Gemechu told DW. Thousands of people were arrested following the declaration of the state of emergency. Although the Ethiopian parliament set up an inquiry board to investigate human right violations in the wake of the state of emergency, it has yet to submit its first report. Lencho says he has no knowledge of any such report.

Uncertainty over number of arrests Government and opposition parties differ over the number of people who have been detained during the state of emergency. The government says 20,000 people have been arrested in Oromia, but Gemechu puts the figure closer to 70,000. The government has said it will release more than 22,000 people. More than 11,000 were set free last Friday (03.02.2017). The authorities said the prisoners were given "training in the constitution of the country and promised not to repeat their actions”. But prisoners said that the government, in bringing together people from different areas to one location, had give them an opportunity to get to know each other and "strengthen their struggle and learn more about politics of the country”.

Opposition parties to negotiate with EPRDF in unison Ethiopian News Agency ENA, 9.2.2017 http://www.waltainfo.com/news/national/detail?cid=27491 Some 11 political parties, which have different agendas, said they have agreed to work together in the political negotiation to be held with the ruling party, EPRDF. Lauding the government’s initiation for the negotiation, the parties in a joint press conference said that they are hopeful that the negotiations will help to accelerate political, economic and social development of the country. Chairperson of the partnered parties and Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, Tigistu Awolu, said the parties have agreed to work in partnership to get better results from the negotiations. The basic reason to forge collaboration among the parties is to sit in the negotiations with common negotiating points, Tigistu said. Renewing the collaboration among the parties in maintaining democracy, justice and equality in the country is also the objective of the partnership, Tigistu said. “We don`t have difference in what the final achievement for this country should , rather in the ways we follow to maintain it and we are working on it.” The parties have already submitted the modalities for debating, discussion and negotiation after reaching consensus on the issues, Tigistu added. Ayele Chamiso, Chairperson of Coalition for Democracy and Unity Party, on his part said, “We believe that disagreements could easily be resolved through discussion and negotiation.” The parties proposed that three moderators should be present in the negotiations. Each, the ruling party and the opposition group, will have one moderator representing them, while a third moderator who represents both groups will be chosen

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen during the negotiations. Presence of domestic and international observers, professional moderators and access for the media are among the demand of the opposition parties to be fulfilled during negotiations. Responding to questions regarding the current partnership of the parties in comparison to the 2005, Ayele said “the then united parties are like a family which divorced before they even got married. But now we have common grounds to unite especially on the core ideas we would set for the negotiation.” Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP), Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, Ethiopian Democratic Unity Movement and New Generation Party are amongst the parties agreed to work together for the negotiations to be held with the ruling party, EPRDF. (ENA)

Timely Ethiopian teachers’ warning against TPLF divisiveness Teachers accuse TPLF of promoting supremacy of its ethnic group at the expense of others Ethiopia Observatory, 9.2.2017 https://ethiopiaobservatory.com/2017/02/09/timely-ethiopian-teachers-warning-against-tplf-divisiveness-teachers-accuse- tplf-of-promoting-supremacy-of-its-ethnic-group-at-the-expense-of-others/#more-49527 Editor’s Note: The article hereunder is a very serious warning by the Amhara region teachers about the consequences of ethnic discrimination primarily for the TPLF regime itself and also for the continued existence of Ethiopia. This comes a day before similar rebuke to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) from the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). It is rather the strongest warning to date and the first of its kind by one of the four-member coalition of the Ethiopian Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) supposedly running Ethiopia. ANDM forewarned that, if the people of Tigray do not cooperate and collaborate with the people of Ethiopia, they should recognize that the time is not in their favor, citing the example of the deepening ‘hatred of the Amhara people towards TPLF’. In that context, ANDM urged Tigreans to honor their obligation to join the fight against destructive forces that sow the seeds of division amongst Ethiopians. Any attempt against the nation’s peace, ANDM noted, would be not only against to the leadership in power. But also the daily lives of ordinary citizens could be disrupted. In like manner, note that on February 8, 2017 civil servants in Oromia became amongst the first in the nation to reject the TPLF regime’s endless meetings in the name of national renewal and reforms. People all over are angered by the TPLF regime’s bundles of lies it keeps on rolling out from time to time to deceive the public. Now lies and the cheating reached the limits, forcing the employees of the urban development and housing agency of Oromia to refuse to attend anymore of such meetings. Interestingly such sentiments in Ethiopia are the same all over. Late arriving news from SNNPR is showing the same protests occurring amongst civil servants regarding the endless TPLF deception about reform and renewal, which they rejected early this week. Already after temporary calming of the popular protests of the last one year, this should be taken as a huge signal, if only the TPLF could read it right and heed it, lest it greet it harvest its ultimate debacle! Day in and day out citizens’ patience has been challenged and unlike any time before impatience has started to set in. The TPLF leaders, the most hated vagabonds in power in Ethiopia in scores of decades, it seems, have now been served their notice from the public throughout the country. Posted by The Ethiopia Observatory (TEO)

ESAT News , February 8, 2017: Teachers in the Amhara region say Ethiopia is a country where schools have been used as forums to promote the doctrine of a regime that works for the supremacy and dominance by one ethnic group. The teachers in the Amhara region said schools are not free from the ethnic politics espoused by the ethnocentric regime. A leaked minute from a conference by teachers in the Amhara region obtained by ESAT indicate that teachers in the region had enough of a Tigrean regime that only works to unfairly benefit Tigreans while at the same time deterring other ethnic groups.

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The teachers have also expressed their grave concern that the quality of education is at its worst and the curriculum as well as the facts in textbooks have been deliberately altered to miseducate the generatio. The teachers further said at the conference that a considerable number of students attend classes hungry. The conference by the teachers refute claims by the Tigrean ruling clique that it had the support of 85% of the teachers in the Amhara region. The teachers say only 5% of corrupted members of the school community have aligned themselves with the corrupt system. The teachers at the five day conference also said it is deplorable that superintendents of schools were required to be ruling party members. Raw materials have been taken out of the Amhara region to be used as inputs to factories built in Tigray, the teachers said adding that the regime’s only focus is accumulating wealth in Tigray at the expense of other people in the country. The document obtained by ESAT also indicate that the teachers have demanded compensations to the lives lost in the hands of regime’s security forces as well as loss of property in the anti-government protests last year. Several other grievances were also aired during the five day conference attended by close to 6,000 teachers in the Amhara region.

Public ultimate guarantor of nation’s peace and security Ethiopian Reporter, Editorial, 4.2.2017 http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/public-ultimate-guarantor-nation%E2%80%99s-peace-and-security Foreigners visiting Ethiopia to attend the annual summit of heads of state and government of the African Union or for other purposes generally are treated cordially and enjoy a safe stay due to Ethiopians’ centuries-old tradition of according hospitality to guests. One attribute which they are renowned for, this proud custom has continued to this day. Incidents encountered by visitors to Addis Ababa, the third largest diplomatic hub after New York City and Brussels, are usually minor and resolved swiftly. The government owes such a proud and hospitable people the responsibility of governing fairly and respecting their liberties. After all, it should not be forgotten that sovereign power resides in the people. The welcoming treatment that Ethiopians extend to foreigners during their visits is a valued asset that bears more dividends besides the economic benefits gained. At a time when it is difficult to provide a safe and secure environment at the continental and global level, it is quite a coup for Ethiopia to be able to provide absolute safety for its guests. As the ultimate guarantors of this security, the proud people of Ethiopia are entitled to a fair treatment and protection they rightly deserve. The more the safety of visitors is assured as a direct result of the patriotism evinced by Ethiopians, the more the country will be elevated as a sought-after player. It would be possible to scale even greater heights if the people are accorded genuine respect and allowed to freely exercise fundamental freedoms. This, in turn, ensures durable peace and security. One of the major factors setting some members of the public on a collision course with the government, and potentially lead the country to a dire situation is the skewed outlook on issues of national interest. As the public aspires for the country to be led by a democratically-elected government, it very much wants the elections to be free and a manifestation of its will. It is also desirous for the prevalence of the rule of law, a constitutional order that promotes respect for human and democratic rights, the elimination of the propensity to assume/consolidate political power through violence and other unlawful acts, the enhancement of its participation across all spheres of life, and the equitable distribution of political power and wealth. If these basic demands are met, the public will pay whatever sacrifice is necessary in terms of guaranteeing peace and stability with a view to not only protecting the sovereignty of the nation but also accelerating its economic development. Over the past two decades, commendable results have been registered on the economic front on the back of the full commitment the government has shown towards executing mega projects in the road, railway, energy, sugar, house construction and industrial parks sectors, among others. These projects serve as important launch pads for a structural transformation of the economy and have earned the country rave reviews on the global stage. This said, the growth should be owned by the public. If citizens feel economically disenfranchised and a handful of rent seekers are getting spectacularly rich at their expense, a serious political crisis of the kind we saw in 2016 is bound to arise. Given that the problem’s root cause is a lack of dialogue between the people and the government, it is imperative to organize forums whereby a consensus can be reached on the way forward. Any initiative which is not participatory cannot guarantee peace and stability. The strong bond existing between the people of Ethiopia and their love of country has rendered their differences irrelevant. Consequently, frequent attempts by parochial elites to exploit ethnic differences to sow discord have failed. These elites are

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen guilty of shirking their duty to facilitate the conditions which enable a people who possess a strong sense of unity to taste the fruits of democracy. The ruling party and the opposition camp need to give precedence to the public interest over the trappings of political power. Both have wreaked havoc in their bid to consolidate or assume the reins of power. Though the two sides are not equally culpable, their irresponsible acts have one way or the other harmed both the nation and its people. Hence, it is high time that they extricate themselves from this quagmire and demonstrate the commitment to engage in civilized negotiations on the fate of the country. All the public wants is democratic governance. This is the sole guarantor for peaceful co-existence. As we have pointed out time and again, the global order is in a precarious position. Leaving aside other developments, the executive order signed by U.S. President Donald Trump last Friday that bars people from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the U.S. for 90 days, suspends all refugee admission for 120 days, and also bars all Syrian refugees indefinitely, has exacerbated the plight of people fleeing their country. At this critical juncture, therefore, it is incumbent upon each and every Ethiopian to desist from internecine conflicts and work tirelessly towards building a united, peaceful, democratic and prosperous nation. This calls for empowering the public by enabling it to have a decisive role in the affairs of the country and benefit fairly from the country’s development in cognizance of the fact that it is the ultimate guarantor of the nation’s peace and security.

Ethiopia: A Gathering Political Storm Alem Mamo, Nazret.com 1.2.2017 http://www.nazret.com/2017/02/01/ethiopia-a-gathering-political-storm/ nazret.com – Beneath the surface, away from the “economic boom,” “peace” and “stability,” there is serious trouble brewing in Ethiopia. The ever-increasing state institutional violence against citizens is bringing people together to challenge the authority and legitimacy of a rejected regime. The 25-year old political system that is rooted in sowing hatred and suspicion between communities is no longer a ‘working’ formula for the regime. From north to south, east to west people are joining hands to end quarter century old authoritarian rule. The ethnic barriers and suspicion that were intentionally planted in the society by the regime are having the reverse effect by uniting citizens across four corners of the country. This unity and joining of forces is rapidly changing in form and structure becoming a powerful and dynamic force capable of bringing about long awaited political change. The ongoing popular discontent against the repressive regime is gaining momentum and maturing in consciousness, form, tactics and strategies. Shaken by these prevailing realities as a threat to its grip on power, the regime has introduced two self-preserving measures over the last few months. The first one is the declaration of the “state of emergency” intended to pacify the popular uprising and secondly call for “negotiation” with opposition parties. Both these measures, however, are having the reverse impact. The declared “state of emergency” is transforming the non-violent rebellion into a clandestine armed resistance while the call for “negotiation” is having zero impact in resolving the long standing political crisis. In the north of the country, there is a fast-developing dynamic that could have a significant impact over the political and security future of the country. At the same time in the west, east and southwest of the country, new and powerful forces of resistance are emerging. In response to the brutality of forces loyal to the regime, many are changing approaches and preferring more a clandestine resistance. The regime’s strategy of “ethicizing politics in this country no longer works in favour of the regime,” said a political science educator who spoke under the condition of anonymity. Another civil servant described the political situation in Ethiopia as “an explosive situation that could sweep the country with an unpredictable outcome.”

The “constitution” as a tool to intimidate and terrorize citizens In a democracy, the promulgation of a constitution is a function of the citizens. Simply because the people exercise sovereignty, they decide what rules and principles they want government to follow. Furthermore, a portion of any constitution in a democracy is delegated by citizens to the legislature, hence allowing it to participate in the process of amending the constitution. Under the current authoritarian regime in Ethiopia, the construction of constitution is based on the will and design of a small minority group. Thus, it is used to intimidate and terrorize citizens instead of being a living document that safeguards citizens’ rights. The regime’s usage of the “constitution” as an instrument of oppressing and brutalizing citizens devalues the very value of a constitution. The defence of a constitution that protects and safeguards citizens’ rights is the duty of the people. On the other hand, a constitution whose purpose is to serve as tool of operation will ultimately be replaced with a new constitution that is crafted with full participation of the people.

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Smoke and mirrors or genuine political negotiation There is a new propaganda and public relations buzz word in Addis Ababa these days and the word is “dialogue.” In its organic and authentic form, political dialogue is a very valuable and irreplaceable approach to establishing genuine political discourse and sustainable peace. Unfortunately, the record of the regime shows manipulation of dialogue and using it as a propaganda forum to create a smoke screen for consumption of donor nations and a gullible few. On January 16, 2017, the Head of the Office of the regime declared his government’s “readiness for dialogue and consultation with political parties.” Genuine political dialogue cannot be conducted from a hegemonic position where a group is dictating the general terms and process of the dialogue. Most importantly, any political dialogue and negotiation must first identify the political, social and economic challenges facing the country. In the current environment, the regime’s web of political and economic corruption has reached a point where the regime doesn’t have the moral authority to govern the country let alone to sit at a table and negotiate the future direction of the country. The inherent source of the problem in Ethiopia is the regime itself and to think otherwise is a failure of imagination and deficiency of insight to observe, understand and see what is in front of us. The regime in Addis Ababa has manipulated certain groups as political pawns to advance it is own objectives. Sadly, there are some opportunistic groups who are readily available to be used for such a gimmick. Negotiation with manufactured political pawns can only further deepen the country’s political crisis. Genuine negotiation takes place with those who have critically opposing views, not with the “Yes” men. Genuine negotiation is to discuss and explore common ground for coming to an agreement. Negotiation in its true sense voices a conciliatory tone so that a compromise may be reached and each negotiating party may obtain a certain degree of satisfaction. In true negotiation, the parties do not feel ridiculed, coerced or manipulated. They express their respective needs freely to build understanding, and they feel respected. On the other hand, to manipulate is to seek to control the other by using fear or by making them feel guilty to convince them of something and surrender their vision and integrity. Genuine political dialogue could only take place if the regime gets out of its obsessive-compulsive power impulses, stop framing and defining other political groups and look inwards for the problems the country is facing instead of outwards. One cannot be a genuine negotiator while imposing its views. The true meaning of negotiation is to listen, validate and accept the views and positions of others even if it means surrendering the helm of power. The regime’s primary objective of negotiation is to consolidate its grip on power. Prior to starting any political dialogue or negotiation in Ethiopia, the regime must release all political prisoners, journalists, and human rights activists. Secondly, the regime must share the public media with all opposition political parties, lift the state of emergency and dissolve the so called “command post” which put the country under military rule. As the saying goes “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.” The regime must stop playing tricks with manufactured political pawns and quit being an impediment to the country’s political, economic and social progress. Building a free, inclusive and democratic Ethiopia will requires not politically calculated negotiation with political pawns, but a genuine and whole hearted willingness to sit and conduct genuine transition of power with all political groups. The writer is a regular contributor to nazret.com and can be reached at [email protected] .

Ethiopia claims success in quashing wave of anti-government unrest Addis Ababa vows to eliminate economic threats as violent protests rattle investors John Aglionby, Financial Times in Addis Ababa, 1.2.2017 http://www.nazret.com/2017/02/01/ethiopia-claims-success-in-quashing-wave-of-anti-government-unrest/ The Financial Times – The government of Ethiopia has vowed to crush all threats to its economic model and insists it is succeeding in restoring order as it grapples with the most serious threat to its 26-year hold on power. Negeri Lencho, the communications minister, told the Financial Times that a state of emergency imposed in October had succeeded in quashing a wave of nationwide anti-government protests that left hundreds of people dead. He insisted that Addis Ababa would not “give opportunity to any party to block the fast-growing economy and the attempt or efforts of the Ethiopian government to change the lives of the people”.

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But in an apparent acknowledgment of the failings of the government’s state-driven development model, he admitted that anger over high unemployment was a factor behind the unrest. “The government educated the youth and there was not enough employment,” Mr Lencho said. “So the extremists used this fertile ground to incite violence.” More than 500 people have been killed and tens of thousands detained over the past 18 months as anti-government protests spread across the country. The violence, which also targeted foreign-owned business, and the autocratic government’s response, has rattled investors . The unrest has also called into question the sustainability of Addis Ababa’s economic model , which has helped drive some of the world’s fastest growth rates and lured billions of dollars of foreign investment to the Horn of Africa nation. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, a Marxist-Leninist coalition that has ruled with an iron grip since taking power in 1991, has concentrated on state-led infrastructure and industrialisation projects rather than opening up the private sector as it has sought to develop the impoverished country. The model has been widely lauded in development circles, but the government has been accused of taking repressive measures and committing human rights abuses. Mr Lencho said authorities had detained more than 20,000 people for “training” on the constitution since the protests erupted — initially over land disputes — in 2015. The minister refused to speculate on how long the state of emergency, imposed for six months, would last. He said “armed groups” and “terrorist organisations” bent on regime change, most of which were overseas, and which he did not identify, were no longer able to incite violence because of the restrictions on demonstrating and access to, and use of, social media. But he gave few specifics, apart from the creation of a “forum” of political organisations, about how the government was addressing people’s underlying frustrations to ensure the protests did not re-erupt. The grievances, which he accepted were largely justified, were a lack of “good governance, justice, fairness [and] equity in benefiting from development”. Pro-democracy activists and foreign diplomats have dismissed the forum as being a sham because it comprises few credible opposition figures. They say it is indicative of the government’s refusal to countenance meaningful reform. Ethiopia’s political opposition has been severely weakened, and the EPRDF and its allies control all the seats in parliament. “They’re worried that if they give an inch they won’t be able to control the fallout,” a diplomat said. Activists say Ethiopians flocked to the demonstrations because the government had steadily curtailed democratic freedoms since post-election protests in 2005 were ruthlessly crushed. Protests flared periodically thereafter, but began in earnest in November 2015 when the government sought to extend the capital Addis Ababa into Oromia. This plan was eventually shelved but because of the authorities’ repressive response the demonstrations spread and became increasingly violent. Hailemariam Desalegn, the prime minister, has admitted that about 500 people might have died while human rights groups and activists believe the toll is much higher. Mass arrests followed, which Mr Lencho said fell into two categories: protesters who needed “training” for a few months and people considered more hardened criminals. Initially about 11,000 people underwent “training”, of whom more than 8,000 have been released. A further 12,500 have been incarcerated for training in a second wave of detentions, he added. No figures have been given for the total number of arrests but activists believe it is more than 50,000.

Ethiopia: The Slow Death of a Civilian Government and the Rise of a Military Might Addis Standard, 24.1.2017 http://addisstandard.com/analysis-ethiopia-the-slow-death-of-a-civilian-government-and-the-rise-of-a-military-might/ 7

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To the media’s keen observation, the immediate cause that triggered Ethiopia’s recent nose-dive into the unknown began when, on November 12, 2015, the residents of Ginchi, a small town some 80 Kms South West of the Capital Addis Abeba, took to the streets demanding authorities in Oromia regional state, the largest and most populated regional states to which Ginchi is a part, to halt a move to give a football pitch to private investors. What followed was a year-long incessant public protest against the ruling EPRDF at a scale never seen in its quarter- century rule. It was unprecedented in many ways than few, but something that the government thought would be easily put down using brutal interventions both by the region’s and the federal’s security apparatus. That was until the hitherto region- wide protests, dubbed #OromoProtests, were joined, nine months later, by yet another unparalleled anti-government protest in the north , home to the Amhara regional state, the second largest regional state in the federated Ethiopia, and was dubbed #AmharaProtests. Following these protests, which by then have shaken almost two-thirds of the country and have claimed the lives of hundreds of Ethiopians , in mid-August 2016, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn announced that he had given an order to the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) to intervene in Amhara regional state to control the spiraling anti- government protests. In his announcement, Prime Minister Hailemariam asserted that the government would use “its full forces to bring the rule of law” into the region. As one catastrophic event continued to lead to another, a ministerial cabinet meeting of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), chaired by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, declared a state of emergency throughout the country effective as of Oct. 08, 2016. The state of emergency was declared as an immediate remedy to control intensified anti-government protests particularly in Oromia regional state that followed a mass death of civilians at the annual Irreecha festival on Sunday, Oct. 2 nd. (A hysteric stampede was caused as a result of security officers’ act of firing live ammunition and rubber bullets into the air, as well as teargas bombs in the middle of major parts of a gathering of millions.) By all reviews so far, the declaration of the six months state of emergency is nothing short of a free pass to the ever militarized security apparatus of the regime to brutally put down increasing dissent by the public. Already, the “full force” that Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn referred to in mid-August was in full display for nine months in most parts of the country, making one fact crystal clear – the civilian government led by a grand coalition of four parties and five smaller proxies, has continued to heavily rely on its military and intelligence might to engage with the public. This is further aggravated by none other than the sheer fact that the last 26 years have been marred by a systematic gradual deterioration (and in most instances) demise of independent institutions (both state and non-state in nature) that were initially incorporated into the body politics of the country in the advent of EPRDF as a governing coalition.

The slow, tragic death of a multi-party parliamentary system In the general elections held in May 2015, the fifth since EPRDF assumed power in 1991, the incumbent and its affiliates have unashamedly won all the 547 parliament seats , putting the final nail on the coffin of a prospect of a multi-party parliamentary system. In the preceding election, held five years earlier, the Parliament had a single representation from the opposition. A closer look at the opposition’s presence in the national parliament over the years demonstrates a country in regress. In the first election after the passing of the Constitution in 1995, the EPRDF and its affiliates had managed to win 471 seats while 75 seats were gone to opposition parties mostly from peripheral regions such as Somali, Gambela, Benishagul- Gumuz, and Harari as well as a people who ran independently. In the next election in 2000, which registered a 90% voter turnout, according to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) , EPRDF had increased its seats in the Parliament by 10 to 481 while members from several opposition parties took 53 seats. Thirteen seats went to independents. In the highly contested, yet much disputed 2005 election, which was marred by allegations of vote rigging that followed deadly riots, (and which is considered, rightly, as the turning point in Ethiopia’s contemporary political moment) official results put EPRDF’s win at 327 seats, while the two major opposition parties, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) won 161 seats collectively, the largest share of opposition seats in the country’s history. Girma Seifu had been the only opposition member in the 2010 Parliament representing his party, Unity for Justice and Democracy Party (UJD). Girma finds it difficult to recognize the parliament “back then or even before” as a properly functioning institution. “You got to see heated debates sometimes but that was attributed to the [few] opposition [party members] who had seats. For members of EPRDF, however, the parliament was a place where it threw its inconsequential

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen members just to raise their hands and agree on whatever is said by the high priests of the party,” Girma tells Addis Standard . “The senior members, those with real power, ran the government. Some were in the parliament of course, but some were not,” he said during an interview. Whatever is decided at the party headquarters is poured down to the Parliamentarians and “they accept without blinking an eye.” One hardly sees the checking and supervision of the government’s actions that is expected from them, according to him. Ezekiel Gebissa, a Professor of History and African Studies at Kettering University in Flint, Michigan, agrees. “It would be a misnomer to suppose that there was ever a functioning parliamentary system in Ethiopia. Since 1995, elections have been held and governments have been formed every five years. However, the formal government structure has not functioned independently of the party structure. The government is simply the party’s instrument of control,” he told Addis Standard . “The actual governing structure is the party structure. The federal arrangement was only a scheme used to feign power decentralization and deny responsibility for when things go awry.” According to him, the EPRDF coalition members, created by the TPLF during its advance on Addis Abeba, are ostensibly the governing party in their respective regions. “But they were never independent of the Executive Committee of the EPRDF which is in turn closely controlled by the TPLF cabal.”

Discourse on a deathbed: From non-existent opposition to suffocating political space One of the glaring aspects of political reality in today’s Ethiopia is one that is often exploited by the EPRDF: absence of a well-organized opposition bloc that can offer an alternative policy to the discontented public. While several parties are incubated, from time to time, more often than not, their very existence is known to the public during election years. In the 2015 election, for example, 47 Political parties, including the incumbent, have participated by fielding a total number of 1828 candidates. Some go as far as pointing their fingers at the opposition bloc’s own mismanagement of its problems as the root cause of its failure. The oppositions are not only fragmented, they say, but also spend much of their time and energy on inter-party squabbles. For Ezekiel, this “is a tortured argument” because “as a matter of historical fact, the failure of state-building in Ethiopia has always been the refusal of the ruling elite to share power with competing forces. Just as its predecessors, the EPRDF has refused to share power in any meaningful way with the representatives of the disenfranchised.” To make his point clear Ezekiel states as an example the year 1991, when members of the TPLF and Oromo Liberation Front, OLF, came out triumphant against the militarist Derg and vowed to construct a decentralized federal state together. But once securely ensconced in power, the TPLF felt no need to share power and ousted the OLF, which eventually ended up designated as a terrorist organization by Ethiopia’s parliament. For Girma the prime responsibility for the country’s lack of well-organized opposition bloc lies within the regime itself, which, “with its irrational laws that it passes as it sees fit hampers the growth of any dissent in the country.” “Take [the national electoral board] for example; as it happened to my party [during the run up to the 2015 election], one day you wake up from your sleep and you find out that your party is taken over by a bunch of rascals, and the NEBE, without having any mandate whatsoever decides the party is theirs, not yours,” he says. As the government continues to jail, to force into exile and intimidate “the best and the brightest in politics, it is weakening not only the opposition but also the discourse itself. Thus, with no outlet or means of expressing their dissent, the people choose the last resort, public demonstration.” The series of restrictive laws that were adopted by the parliament, argues Ezekiel, have made it impossible for opposition parties to form, recruit members, and organize. And, according to him, the EPRDF makes no secret that it must continue to rule without opposition on the basis of the following reasons: it takes longer than one election cycle to bear fruit; it is the only guarantor of Ethiopia’s unity and stability; it is the only defense against genocidal civil war, and it has the right to rule indefinitely because it has removed a brutal dictatorship. “It is only the government that can open up or close off the political space. No one else can be culpable of decimating the political opposition and civil society institutions. It is axiomatic.” Furthermore, in the wake of the fateful 2005 election, the EPRDF has taken measures that would stiffen the rules of procedure in the parliament, thereby limiting the discursive space even within the EPRDF-dominated parliament in which a member of the Parliament is not urged to make his or her points for not more than three minutes. This was followed by a series of legislations constraining freedoms that are instrumental for the construction of a democratic system. Among them, the most infamous ones were the Freedom of Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation (Proclamation N0.

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590/2008), the Anti-terrorism Proclamation (Proclamation No. 652/2009), and the Charities and Societies Proclamation (Proclamation No. 621.2009). As the government’s intolerance of dissent became crystal clear, self-censorship has become the new normal among journalists and other writers who could otherwise contribute to the flourishing of critical discourse. This was further degraded by the blocking of several websites (perceived to be in opposition to the regime in power), and jamming of other press/media outlets, including those based outside of the country. Civil societies that were engaged in the cultivation of a democratic culture and the promotion of human rights were also forced to change either their focal areas or left out to play a negligent role on issues essential to the country’s political health. Institutions like Inter Africa Group, a civil society which played a pivotal role in organizing debates on various issues in the run-up to the 2005 election, have receded from the public eyes and seem to be lingering in oblivion. Despite that, however, “the news of the death of civil society institutions in Ethiopia is premature,” argues Ezekiel. “They have gone under, but not dead,” so if the government is courageous enough to allow civil society institutions to operate freely and within the confines of a reasonable regulatory framework, they will flourish again. The problem is, “the government knows these institutions can be effective” thus “it wants to reduce them to an instrument of coercion and control to perpetuate itself in power.” But Ezekiel still sees hope in indigenous institutions which can somehow play the role of civil societies, for instance, in terms of conflict resolution which work “to resolve conflicts at the local level or even step in to govern for a while. In the Oromia region, the Abba Gadaa institutions could play the role of mediation to resolve the impasse or even serve as a caretaker in situations where a civil administration has collapsed.”

Damning reports, government dismissals One such institution that is deeply affected by the Charities and Societies Proclamation is the Human Rights Council (HRCO). Founded in 1991, the Council vows to work towards building a democratic system, promote rule of law and due process, and encourage and conduct human rights monitoring. “In earlier times, the HRCO used to issue frequent reports on various human right issues often confronting the regime for its misdeeds,” says Girma. “But now they don’t have the same capacity they had once; because of EPRDF’s restrictive rules they can’t raise enough funding, the result of which is a debilitated capacity to move around the country and see what is going on first hand.” But the pressure doesn’t end there; as of late, the council has fallen under the spell of government forces. In the months of July and August 2016, the Council has reported that four of its members were detained in Oromia and Amhara regions, measures that it believes were related to the members’ monitoring and documentation of the crackdown against the protests in these regions. Among them was Tesfa Burayu, Chairperson of the council’s West Ethiopian Regional office, who was detained at his home in Nekemte, Oromia. In its report, “Respect the people’s Right to Demonstrate! Stop the Violence by State Security Forces!” , focusing in North Gonder zone of the Amhara Regional state, and which was on Sep 06 2016, the Council urged the government to stop the violence against protesters and condemned the violence by security forces, including killings, and arbitrary detention of citizens for exercising their constitutional rights. But the government has always reacted in the same manner for reports like this; it often undermines the level of severity, it denies any wrong doing on its part and it even blames “outside forces,” “those who hate to see Ethiopia’s growth” and “neoliberal ideologues” for being behind damning reports. It also has its version of a similar institution, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission , EHRC, which is often used to directly counteract against reports by other independent institutions. However, unlike the report EHRC, HRCO’s report was widely distributed by a group of other civil society organizations including the East and Horn of African Human Rights Defenders Project, the Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE ), Amnesty International, the Ethiopia Human Rights Project (EHRP), Front Line Defenders, and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). Unfortunately, most of these institutions are now allowed to o pen offices in Ethiopia. Their actual absence from the ground gives the government in Ethiopia the unbridled opportunity to vehemently deny any of the reports produced by them. Take for example Ethiopia’s response to the report by the HRW released in mid-June 2016. The then chief spokesperson of the government, Getachew Reda, dismissed the report stating that an organization far removed from a presence on the ground has no mandate to issue an accurate account of the human rights situation in Oromia. He then argued the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, has issued its own report which recognized the death of only 173 people in Oromia and declared it “proportional”.

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Partial police, politicized military In theory, the police in Ethiopia, which includes the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission (EFPC), is constitutionally mandated, among others, to prevent and resolve conflicts, strengthen the federal system, uphold federal-regional relations in the country, and maintain good relations, peace and tolerance among different religions and beliefs. The Regional Police Commissions, Community Police Offices throughout the country, and law enforcement apparatus established under Federal government bodies like the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA), the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) and the Federal Prisons Administration Commission (FPA) are also constitutionally mandated to be politically impartial and loyal only to the country’s supreme law, the Constitution. The Federal Police Proclamation No. 720/2011, for instance, asserts that the commission shall “maintain and ensure peace and security of the public and the state by respecting and ensuring the observance of the Constitution.” However, in practice, like in all authoritarian countries around the world, their loyalty is to the political party in power . The police, in Ethiopia, together with the army, are instruments of a government that always appears to be keen to resort to its prowess to resolve political crises of any kind as is manifested by Prime Minister Hailemariam’s recent claim that his government “has ample capacity” to subdue the rising tide. This stems from EPRDF’s origins. “TPLF, which is the architect of the entity we call now EPRDF is essentially a militaristic group to its bones,” says Girma. “The group has never walked past its history. It has never evolved into being a civilian party. Beneath the surface, it’s all guns and armors.” Girma’s sentiments were shared by Ezekiel. “From its guerilla days, the TPLF had a party army whose commanders acted as diplomats, administrators, judges, and social workers,” Ezekiel says. After assuming power to reconstruct a state on the verge of collapse “the Front installed its military leaders and political commissars as ministries, ruling party’s officials, heads of business organizations and top leaders of the new national defense force. In this respect, the reconstructed state was essentially a military government whose political power depended entirely on the gun.” Even after the parliamentary system was put in place and elections were conducted to form a representative government, the military’s influence has always been enormous, Ezekiel asserted. More often than not, “the military has been called in to deal with the opposition. The [ENDF] isn’t just a politicized military; it has been a militarized civilian government since the EPRDF’s accession to power. The military has always been politically connected. And its engagement in economic activities as an institution has made it economically powerful. The military has a stake in politics.” Now, with a state of emergency to contain the widespread protests all over the country, the governing structure is in crisis, argues Ezekiel. “What remains intact is a politically connected, heavily armed and economically powerful military. [The government’s] institutional interests are in danger. It has to use force to protect them. But force will breed more instability and the use of more force. Another cycle of collapse and reconstruction, and a perpetually failing state.” As Ethiopians look at what is to follow anxiously, the incumbent, spoiled by the respite brought by its excessive military deployment in the name of the state of emergency, is busy conducting what it called “deep reform” in order to address the grievances. It is also busy showcasing the boom in infrastructure; a topic the government always gave precedence to the people’s well-being. But Girma (who was interviewed for this piece before the state of emergency was declared) likes to speak prudently about what to expect; “there is what I hope to happen, say in the next six months,” he said in September 2016, “which is the government would truly understand the severity of the problems it and the country are facing. I would like to see the government taking drastic measures up to declaring a transitional period in which all the stakeholders both inside and outside the country are invited to participate. The military can be part of this transition,” he said. However, “what I think would actually happen is far from this. It’s in EPRDF’s nature to falsely believe that it has managed the situation whenever protests subside. Buying time is what it strives for. But the protests are coming back again more ferociously.” Given how things evolved since then, Girma’s statement comes as an alarming forecast. AS

A Wish List for Successful Opposition and Government Negotiations Solomon Gebreselassie, Ethiopian Observer, 22.1.2017 http://www.ethioobserver.net/Ethiopian_opposition_negotiaions.htm The fact that the TPLF/EPRDF regime initiated a negotiation proposal with the opposition inside the country regarding the multi-faceted problems of the country is commendable. The regime further stated that it was dropping its stubborn demand from years past that MEDREK sign its civic charter as a precondition to negotiate. This is also a welcome sign. 11

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Obviously not all the legal opposition invited by the government to the negotiation are genuine opposition parties. Some are clones of the regime, and still others have a high negative rating by the people. And then of course there are opposition groups that are not part of what the government calls “legal”, a few of which have even been categorized as terrorist. Despite all these caveats and markers, the fact that there is going to be a negotiation gives rays of hope. Following the recent massive anger of protest, the regime has been taking patchy and inadequate steps to address the people’s grievances. Many are not convinced by the regime’s contemporary slogan of “deep rejuvenation”. Some of the invited opposition have correctly warned that this time around this call for negotiation should not be a ploy for cheap political scores and vacuous exercise. The warning is based on recent history, and the regime should heed of the warning. Similarly, the invited opposition should not shy from raising the basic and main political problems that have been gnawing at the country’s fabric for a quarter of a century. The opposition should be mindful of the fact that the unrest in the last 2 years in particular, and generally the protests of citizens over the last 2 decades indicts the opposition as deep and as wide as it does the regime. 1. The most pressing problem needing immediate attention is national dialogue and reconciliation. Sadly in the past, TPLF/EPRDF has been utterly dismissive of this notion when it was presented with the demand and the opportunity. It is no secret that a large segment of the Ethiopian population resents the Tigrean community at their real and perceived possession of the lion’s share of the socio-economic pie. While a case has been made of such favoritism for those aligned with TPLF and EPRDF, it is unfortunate when the resentment is extended to a blanket indictment of a whole community, including some victims in their ranks. The cyber wars that have turned Ethiopian chewannet on its head by stereotyping whole communities is but a surface symptom of what is bubbling in society and what has reached the boiling point. This was not the case in the long history of the country, and it can be reversed with the implementation of dialogue and reconciliation that has at its core some concrete corrective measures. For instance, the fact that the army and security brass in Ethiopia is dominantly by members of the Tigrai community needs to be corrected swiftly. Torture victims of this regime routinely complain at their Tigrean torturers, and this has immensely contributed to the resentment. TPLF/EPRDF should be able to rein in their die hard and extremist ethno-racist members and supporters that believe in a lion’s share entitlement in Ethiopian resources. As General Tsadikan reminded them, this is a no-starter for peace and a non-sustainable enterprise. The fact that up to 60,000 TPLF fighters died in the struggle should be viewed in the context of the deaths and murder of all Ethiopians who valiantly fought against the Dirgue that is 7 times or higher than that number. All sacrifices are equal, and it is neither logical nor legal to claim permanent favoritism based on one-sided notion of sacrifice. There are other disagreements that should be subjects of dialogue and reconciliation, such as religious animosity within and between religions, on the history of Ethiopia, between the regime and the Moslem community, etc. Religious leaders could play a crucial role in leading these dialogues and resolving the problems. Then there is the issue of famine and undernourishment. Although this government has done a commendable job to deal with famine and undernourishment, the problem is a recurring one. Currently up to 200,000 pastoralists and millions of hinterland citizens are facing famine and the regime has made a plea (once again) to the international community for help. This is a huge shame for Ethiopia. The patriotic Ethiopian Diaspora alone would have been able to deal with the preparation, prevention, and alleviation of famine in Ethiopia even in the face of unpredictable global climate that may deny our country of necessary rain from time to time, or flood our crops. The Diaspora has the financial and technical resources to deal with this scourge that has permanently blemished Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the regime and the Diaspora are like hodna jerba. This can be resolved through a national dialogue and reconciliation. There is also the question of inequality and corruption. Again it is no secret that a large segment of Ethiopian society believes the regime’s top officials are deeply corrupt, and that they have robbed billions of the country’s resources, and they protect their minions from facing charges, and only the fleas are hauled to courts while the tigers are untouchable. The prime minister’s recent answer to a question on this issue where he said there simply is no evidence is regrettable and, had not the case been directly related to the livelihood of our people, laughable. Through dialogue and national reconciliation, an independent committee has to be established to provide the Ethiopian people fact-based investigation results for a solution. There may be honest and unblemished TPLF/EPRDF leaders whose names might be entangled with the corrupt ones. Only an independent investigation sheds light on this dark secret. While millions of Ethiopians survive on scraps and without a decent meal every day, it simply pricks one’s conscience to see corrupt officials and their allies selfishly gobble up the nation’s resources. 2. Democratizing the Ethiopian political system: Even many ardent supporters of the regime admit that while the regime has made tangible results in the economic arena, there is a lot of blame on the slow and negative rate of democratization in the country. One of the biggest impediments is the ethnicized politics introduced by the TPLF/EPRDF. The results are here to see after 25 years of experimentation and self-congratulations. We have seen the shameful expulsion of Ethiopians from

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen their birth places or abodes because they are considered as “Others”. Mainstream Ethiopian politics says the rights of ethnic groups have to be respected and codified within a democratic and united Ethiopia. Ethnicity is not the end-all, be-all, organizing principle as it has been for 2 ½ decades under this regime and its disastrous results amply show. Mainstream Ethiopian politics says Ethiopiawinet, as understood unity in diversity, has to be affirmed and not weakened as its fate has been so far. We should not be seduced by the allure of the here and now. Ethnicity as the end-all, be-all organizing and inspiring principle has led the country to a zero sum game. In the 21 st century, there are more modern, non-primordial methods of democratizing and organizing themes. To start with, TPLF/EPRDF has to agree to unconditionally stop hounding and restricting independent and lawful civic and professional organizations. EPRDF has historically leaned towards cloning puppet organizations and has been intolerant of independent organizations. The zero sum game of ethnic gamesmanship will be diluted if multi-ethnic and profession-based organizations like the following were to be set in motion: a) Ethiopian journalists association – independent journalists have unsuccessfully attempted in the past years to form such an organization. Because they were persecuted and prosecuted, they were exiled en masse leaving behind a government media to which few pay attention. We have seen a glimpse of the power of unfettered investigative journalism in the Diaspora. An Ethiopian government would be helped tremendously by a free media to correct the ills of society, and to focus its attention on the nation’s priorities. b) Union of Ethiopian workers and laborers: This is akin to a labor union. Workers in industrial and service sectors would be organized to negotiate for better wages and working conditions, and as citizens of a modern nation to volunteer in woreda, kebelle and school board councils. c) Ethiopian women professional associations: this would not include degreed professional women only, but also house maids and street cleaners and sex workers. They would fight for the recognition of women’s role in society and better working conditions. d) Union of pastoralists and land workers; This would include the coastal people of our country, and they would focus on grazing land rights, land grabbing issues, fair compensations, etc. These types of associations and others may be how the foundational bricks for democracy are laid, and where the whole society would be stakeholders with mutual recognition, equality and pride. Dividing Ethiopian administrative regions not exclusively by languages, but also by ease of management and service provisions, historical geographic divisions such as rivers, etc. would complement the democratic foundations. Finally, confidence building measures between the regime and the opposition should include releasing all political prisoners, doing away with undemocratic laws and regulations used to stifle democracy, legalizing all political parties and establishing an independent electoral commission. Any party/ies that wins the first democratic free and fair election should pledge to form a coalition government with members of the opposition that lost in the spirit of charity and national reconciliation. This would create a precedent for understanding and country-first worldview.

Salvaging Political Pluralism Asrat Seyoum, Ethiopian Reporter, 21.1.2017 http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/salvaging-political-pluralism (…) According to Asnake Kefale (PhD), professor at the Addis Ababa University Department of Political Science and International Relations, starting from the transitional period right after 1991, there was a realization that it would not be easy for the opposition camp to compete in election process with a party like EPRDF. In his scholarly paper entitled The (Un)making of Opposition Coalitions and Challenges of Democratization in Ethiopia, Asnake argues that joining forces was the only feasible strategy for the opposition to withstand influence of the ruling party at the time. In fact, Asnake recounts the rise and fall of ten opposition coalition created between 1991 and 2010: Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF); Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Coalition (SEPDC); The Joint Political Forum (JPF); The Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE); Coalition of Ethiopian Opposition Political Organizations (CEOPO); Joint Action for Democracy in Ethiopia (JADE); Union of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF); The Coalition of Unity and Democracy (CUD); Ethiopia Federal Democratic Unity Forum-Medrek; and Alliance for Democracy (AFD).

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Out of the ten coalitions created thus far, one politician, the veteran Beyene Petros (Prof), originally chairman of the Hadiya Nation Democratic Organization (HNDO), and later of the Ethiopian Social Democratic Party (ESDP), was an instrumental figure in as much as seven of them. However, he says these coalitions were neither stable nor effective to bring about a meaningful political change in the country. In fact, Asnake is in agreement with scholars when attributing the eventual demise of most of these coalition organizations to an inhibitive political atmosphere, basing coalition on the purpose of toppling the ruling party, impact of the diaspora, lack of internal democracy, public pressure to form coalitions, intense internal power competition and mistrust. (…) In fact, in past five years, signing the code has been a standard precondition for the ruling party to engage in any form of political negotiations with any of the opposition forces in Ethiopia. But, last week, the ruling party has finally lifted this conditions and invited parties who have not signed the code of conduct. (…) Beyene says that for the negotiations to go forward, the government (ruling party) has to meet certain conditions as well. For one he says, the state of emergency has to be lifted as it would not be possible to negotiate free in this political climate. Furthermore, the chairman also argues that imprisoned political leaders have to be free and that the government has to reassure the opposition that it is committed to make constitutional amendments if necessary as a result of the negotiation. (Unnamed commentator says) the weakness of oppositions groups in Ethiopia emanates first and for most from the parties themselves. He says, those with less clear political ideology, lacking commitment, well functioning internal party democracy, distinguishable social base and constituents and finally having the needed financial capacity could (not?) be expected to progress. There are little or no opposition political parties who have the above mentioned quality,” Molla says; and as long as they lack these qualities they could never compete with a party like EPRDF. He asks how a party that is fight to secure financial resource controlled by the ruling party could be expected to mount strong challenge to latter’s incumbacy. He also noted that primary political problem in Ethiopia at this time is lack of justice. He says, lack justice is observed in all walks of life in Ethiopia today and a party worthy of becoming strong opposition that will test the ruling party should have well articulated idea of the current problems in Ethiopia.

Analysis: Inside the controversial EFFORT Oman Uliah, special to Addis Standard, 16.1.2017 http://addisstandard.com/analysis-inside-controversial-effort/ Every authoritarian regime has its own symbol of economic exploitations and monopoly either in an individual face or in an organizational mask. Ethiopia, despite its success in persuading its western allies that it is combating poverty using its fast economic growth and democratization, remained to be one of the poorest and most closed countries where a group of few individuals control vast economic shares and absolute political power. Unlike many other authoritarian regimes, the most dominant ruling elite group in Ethiopia has a complex behavior in that it claims to represent a minority ethnic group from the northern part of the country, Tigray. In response it has gotten a relatively overwhelming legitimacy among the people of Tigray as compared to other regions; or at least many people, including myself, believe it receives better legitimacy only in that specific region. Moreover, this elite group has established a chain of several multi-billion dollar worth business firms under a home-grown umbrella called EFFORT, ‘Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray’, which was originally established to serve a harmless looking purpose of ‘rehabilitating’ Tigray, a war-torn region deprived of a fair chance to prosper during decades of successive regimes. In the past 25 years of TPLF’s dominated political rule in Ethiopia, therefore, EFFORT has emerged as one of the leading economic powerhouses in the name of ‘rehabilitating’ the region.

What is in the name? On the surface, EFFORT is an umbrella company for a group of businesses which are involved in major industrial activities in Ethiopia, such as banking and insurance, import and export, media and communication, construction, agribusiness, and mining, among others.

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Having started with an initial capital of around US$100 million, EFFORT’s worth has now reached more than a staggering US$3 billion in paid capital, creating more than 47,000 employment opportunities . EFFORT companies were first registered as private share companies owned by some of the top leaders of TPLF. Later on, however, the companies were re-registered as “endowment” companies whose profits will not be divided to individuals, according to the 1960 Ethiopian civil code. However, top officials of the TPLF, the most powerful member of Ethiopia’s ruling party EPRDF, remained as the CEOs and GMs of these companies; and some of whom reportedly own small shares designed to motivate them in helping EFFORT stay competitive.

‘The original sin’: How did TPLF accumulate its wealth? EFFORT’s official profile claims it was established by using seed money from the liquidated amount of capital of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), accumulated during Ethiopia’s 17 years civil war of the militarist Derg regime to establish these companies. In 2008, Aregawi Berhe, a former veteran of TPLF who later on left the party, did his Ph.D. dissertation on ‘The Political History of TPLF’ for Vrije Universteit in Amsterdam, somehow corroborates the story. In his account of the party’s earliest times, Aregawi wrote about one of the first successful operations that the then guerilla fighters ever had: ‘Axum Operation’. It is a military operation that succeeded in raiding a police garrison and a bank in the historic city of Axum in the north during which the TPLF fighters made away with “substantial amounts of arms and ammunition and 175,000 birr (US$ 84,000)”, according to Aregawi. Having started by raiding public banks, members of the TPLF continued to accumulate wealth and went on to dominate the contested use of ‘aid money’ for political purposes before the party came to control power in 1991. TPLF had also founded the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a humanitarian wing, during the civil war. “By June 1985,” wrote Aregawi Berhe, “REST had received more than US$100 million from donors in the name of saving famine victims. [… however] the late Meles [Zenawi’s] proposal for the allocation of the relief aid money was as follows: 50% for MLLT [Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray] consolidation, 45% for TPLF activities and 5% for the famine victims.” Predictably, Aregawi’s claim, especially that of aid money allocations, has been vehemently denied by the current TPLF leaders. Gebru Asrat, another former TPLF veteran who later on established an opposition political party Arena Tigray , has briefly raised this issue in his book, ‘Lualawinet Ena Democracy beEthiopia’ , (Sovereignty and Democracy in Ethiopia), and said that the guerilla fighters used to get a lot of money in foreign aid and; ‘it was up to the TPLF [leadership] to allocate which money goes where.” Gebru neither confirmed nor denied Aregawi’s claim that aid money was used for political purposes. If anything, he is of the view that it is impossible to make such allegations. However, legally questionable ways of accumulating wealth seemed to have continued within the party even after it took control of state power. Ermias Legesse, a former Communication State Minister, who is now in exile, has recently published his second book, ‘Yemeles Leqaqit’ , in which he raised multiple controversial points against the establishment and functions of EFFORT. In Chapter six of this 565 pages book, Ermias tells several stories on how EFFORT used to get its finances unfairly from the Ethiopian state and how it transferred it to its own account. Ermias went an extra mile to display a letter written in 1994 and was signed by the then Prime Minister, Tamrat Layne, demanding the Addis Abeba Health bureau to refund TPLF’s medical expenses of the civil war time. The money requested amounted to more than four million birr (almost 67% of the city’s annual budget at that time), but the total amount paid by the Ministry of Health was actually 17 million birr. Ermias also wrote that the medicines that TPLF had distributed to the locals during the civil war, for which it had requested a refund, was actually robbed by the guerilla fighters from public pharmacies. The money that was paid back in such a bizarre demand by the then Prime Minister was put in TPLF’s accounts.

Of continued sins & controversies Companies that are currently under the umbrella of EFFORT were originally established as PLCs having a few members of TPLF leaders as shareholders. Later on, in August 1995, they were re-registered as ‘endowment’ companies and still remained under the umbrella of EFFORT. The re-registration of these PLCs as ‘endowment’ companies was done to justify that these companies were established using the money donated by the shareholders of the preceding PLCs, which in itself portrays a picture that EFFORT, as a conglomerate of these companies, did not use public money to be established. According to the Ethiopian civil code, 15

Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen endowment companies are legally prohibited from distributing their profits to individuals. This fact effectively obscures the few individuals controlling these companies behind a party cover. In 2004, the Amharic version of the ‘ Ethiopian Reporter’ , a bi-weekly newspaper owned by a former member of the TPLF rebel group, published series of stories concerning EFFORT and its debt in public banks, including the controversial cancellation of the debt. (The copies of these publications are annexed in the latest book of Ermias Legesse, referred above.) According to this series of publication, EFFORT had borrowed 1.7 billion birr from the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) which later on has risen to 1.8 billion birr debt including the interests. First, CBE officials have denied and said that ‘they did not loan money to EFFORT’. But later on CBE had transferred the debts to yet another state-owned bank, Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE), for ‘better management’. Finally, DBE reported that the amount of money loaned to EFFORT was ‘none performing’ loan. Ermias claims that the CBE had loaned EFFORT the money with no collateral in the first place. The following year it was reported that DBE, the bank that took over the loan for “better management” was facing a bankruptcy of some 3.5 billion birr; certainly not exclusively attributable to the loan provided to EFFORT, but due in a significant part to it. The other controversy surrounding EFFORT lies in the manner in which its businesses affiliates operate. Its leaders claim that their extreme obedience to the rule of law and their refusal to bribe local officials often poses a great challenge to their operations, disadvantaging their businesses. However, EFFORT companies are generally known to enjoy a great deal of support from officials. A good example to prove this is a rare ruling by a federal court on the 19th December 2012. The federal First instance court at Lideta ruled that one of EFFORT’s companies, Mega Entertainment Center, which was led by the widow of the late PM Meles Zenawi, Azeb Mesfin, has been running its business in a fraudulent manner by reporting more expenses than the actual and without paying value-added taxes collected from its customers during the preceding eight years. But the secrecy of most of these companies is such that details like this come to the public’s knowledge only when there is disagreement between stakeholders; this time, it was between Azeb and another management member of Mega, Eqoubay Berhe.

Still, just what is EFFORT? According to a letter by former US ambassador to Ethiopia, Donald Yamamoto, which was one of the Wikileaks documents , Ex-TPLF veteran Seyee Abraha (who later on fell from favor and was subsequently jailed for corruption) was quoted as saying the objectives of EFFORT during its foundation were “to study, and then establish profitable companies that use locally-available resources and provide employment [opportunities] for Tigray.” In this sense, EFFORT, even though it also gets raw materials from and markets its end products to other regions in Ethiopia, mostly (though not exclusively) hires Tigrians. In principle, its profit should be used to rehabilitate the region. However, many Tigrians despair the fact that the “Endowment” is merely used by a few corrupt TPLF elites to enrich themselves. Former veteran and ex-president of the Tigray region for a decade, Gebru Asrat, in his book mentioned above admitted that the “endowment” was being exploited by a few TPLF top leaders; he suggested that there must be ways of diverting EFFORT’s profits/wealth to the people of Tigray as the endowment belongs to the Tigrians. His suggestion indicates a return, once again, of the endowment to a share company in which as many individuals could become shareholders. Many Tigrian pro-democracy activists agree with Gebru Asrat’s suggestions.

What do ‘others’ own? Without a doubt, other regions of Ethiopia have also suffered significant social and economic devastations during the 17 years civil war before it ended in 1991. Military expenditure was Ethiopia’s biggest expense during the entire rule of the militarist Derg regime. Suffice to say, therefore, other regions also needed ‘endowments’ of their own. It seemed it was in response to this concern that TPLF ‘provided’ seed money for other rehabilitation funds. In Oromia regional state is Dinsho endowment, which was established in 1992 and was renamed Tumsa Endowment for Development of Oromia in 2001. It is led by top officials of the OPDO, the party representing the region within the EPRDF coalition. In Amhara regional state is ‘TIRET’, first established in 1995 and went on to incorporate several pre-existing companies. TIRET is led by senior officials of ANDM, the party representing the region within the ruling EPRDF. And in Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR) is WENDO trading, which was established in 1994 and is led by senior officials of SEPDM, the party representing the region within the ruling EPRDF.

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Seyee Abraha has admitted: “TPLF gave a portion of its capital to each of the three parties within the EPRDF to establish their own endowment funds”. However, the combined numbers of companies run by these three ‘endowments’ are less than twenty; whereas at least 24 companies are listed under EFFORT; (some put these numbers as high as 380). The nature of secrecy surrounding this delicate matter means one may never find out the real figures. Nonetheless, the three “endowments” run by OPDO, ANDM and SEPDM were supposed to create employment opportunities for more than 80% of Ethiopia’s population as compared to EFFORT’s targeting of 6% of Ethiopians in Tigray regional state. According to a research titled ‘Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia’ , published in 2011 by Sarah Vaughan and Mesfin Gebremichael, “[TIRET] companies employ only 2,800 staff, as compared with the more 14,000 permanent employees or 34,000 contract staff of EFFORT and its companies.” And the poorest regional states of Ethiopia, namely, the Somali, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions do not have ‘endowment companies’ of their own to help them rehabilitate their respective regions, although they are politically administered by EPRDF’s sister parties.

What’s not and what’s owned by EFFORT? There is a big deal of confusion in identifying EFFORT’s business complexities. Selam Bus Share Company is a good example. Established in 1996, 99.6% of this interregional transport service providing company share is held by Tigray Development Association (TDA); the rest is held by individuals. Although Selam Bus board members, as are EFFORT companies’ board members, are members of the TPLF, EFFORT has no registered share in Selam Bus. However, Selam Bus is a company many people name first when asked to list EFFORT’s businesses. This blurry ownership status is perhaps one of the reasons why Selam Buses were targeted by the last year’s widespread public protesters in Oromia and Amhara regions. Dejennna Endowment is another example. Established to ‘help promote development in Tigray,’ on the surface Dejenna Endowment is a part of the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). There are 11 companies listed under Dejenna Endowment in its website. In 2009, Dejenna has merged with EFFORT following the appointment of Azeb Mesfin, widow of the late Meles Zenawi, as head of the later. Companies under EFFORT usually hold shares in one another’s companies so that one pulls up when another fails. However, until today little is known about the merger of EFFORT and Dejenna. Besides, the information on the official websites of the two endowments mis-inform readers as if the two are independent of one another. But, some of the companies that are known to be under EFFORT are actually listed as the properties of Dejenna endowment.

The Sheger vs Mekelle narrative By now, keen observers of the relationship between politics and business in Ethiopia can safely assume that business and politics in Ethiopia are radically divided into two major narratives in defining and perceiving the current TPLF dominated regime. I call these narratives ‘the Sheger narrative’ – a political narrative that is mostly advocated from here in the capital Addis Abeba, and ‘the Mekelle narrative’ – usually advocated by the people in Mekelle, the capital of the Tigray regional state, home to the all too powerful members of TPLF. However, both narratives go beyond these respective centers depending on whose political view is solicited. The two narratives are only thoughts that do have majority acceptance in their respective centers. ‘The Sheger narrative’ (the most popular one) considers the TPLF dominated administration as a total failure that holds power by force; whereas ‘the Mekelle narrative’ generally sympathizes with the regime and considers it as a legitimate administration, albeit admitting some of its fault lines mostly due to the corrupt practices of some of its leaders. This definition makes it clear how and why Tigrians (in most cases driven by ‘the Mekelle narrative’) and non-Tigrians (driven by ‘the Sheger narrative’) view the relationship between TPLF and EFFORT differently. Tigrian pro-democracy activists’ criticism of EFFORT can be clearly seen by how they react to the manner in which former leaders of TPLF, who were expelled during the party’s infamous split in 2001, view EFFORT. Former top leaders of TPLF, Seyee Abraha, as we read him on wikileaks documents, and Gebru Asrat, from his book, both criticize EFFORT’s management. Both regret EFFORT’s failure to rehabilitate Tigray as was stipulated in its foundational principles. However, both believe the people of Tigray are the rightful owners of these ‘endowment’ companies under EFFORT. On the contrary, most non-Tigrian activists and politicians disown EFFORT and also the rest of ‘endowments’ that are being manipulated by EPRDF leaders. Lidetu Ayalew, former leader of the opposition Ethiopian Democratic Party, and Dr. Berhanu Nega, current leader of the outlawed Ginbot 7, both condemned EFFORT as a party business that monopolized

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen the economy, and both concluded the “endowments” should be dissolved or privatized. Similarly, many other activists want to (and sometimes advocate) boycotting EFFORT services and products to stop TPLF’s hegemonic march. In the same manner, Tigrian activists claim other home grown charity organizations operating in Tigray, namely REST and TDA, are used to create grassroots networks to dictate the people of Tigray become loyalists of the TPLF, whereas non- Tigrian activists, such as Ermias Legesse, disagree and say these organizations are replicas of EFFORT to simply promote disproportionate social development of Tigrians at the cost of others. This leads us to conclude that ‘the Mekelle narrative’ generally portrays EFFORT as an organization that rightfully belongs to the ‘Tigrian people’ which is unfortunately being exploited by few members of the top management for personal gains. ‘The Sheger narrative’, on the other hand, defines EFFORT as ‘a tool to exploit the wealth of Ethiopian people and create economic monopoly for the benefit of a [small] group’.

The red line What is indisputable is speaking truth in a country governed by the TPLF dominated EPRDF is always a dangerous exercise; speaking the truth about EFFORT is even more dangerous. A tax controller from Adama, 100kms south east of Addis Abeba, who is now in Qilinto prison on the southern outskirt of Addis Abeba suspected of ‘corruption’ has recently told me that ‘EFFORT trucks were known to be untouchables on their way to and from Djibouti port’. Similarly, investigating companies under EFFORT is normally a red line no journalist in Ethiopia would like to cross, contributing to the secrecy of the ins and outs of the giant umbrella. Concealed in this intimidating rubble are crucial facts about EFFORT such as details on tax returns. That is why this article cannot be taken as an exhaustive look into the functions of EFFORT and its affiliates, but just the tip of the iceberg to demonstrate in part some facts about the economic exploitations of the authoritarian regime currently governing Ethiopia.

Ethiopia: Justified Fears Desta Heliso, nazret.com, 30.12.2016 http://www.nazret.com/2016/12/30/ethiopia-justified-fears-2/ There are some people who think that perfect peace, justice, freedom and democracy will usher in Ethiopia if EPRDF is toppled through violence. I have heard some confident assertions along this line, but I am not sure such confidence corresponds to the complex reality on the ground. On the one hand, our country has multiple problems such as increasingly endemic corruption, maladministration, curtailed freedom of expression, tightly controlled media, lack of free and fair elections, non-EPRDF members being regarded as second-class citizens, relative absence of level-playing field in politics and business, and politically driven educational system. On the other hand, over the last decade or so, the country has seen positive things that we would only have dreamed of years ago. Freedom of religion, increased number of universities, infrastructural development (roads, railways and bridges), growing manufacturing industry, growing hotel and tourism sector, banking industry, mega dams such as Gilgel Gibe and Great Renaissance Dam (GRD), aviation industry, growth of the middle class, higher life expectancy and relative economic growth are some of the examples. All these signs of progress have their own particular flaws and failings, but they have enabled many Ethiopians to cope and hope. And if these changes could be achieved in the face of all the deficiencies of systems of administration coupled with human frailties, how much more could be achieved if we managed to resolve even some of the above mentioned problems? We are divided over the means through which these problems can be addressed. Many of us, including myself, believe that Ethiopia will achieve a better future characterised by better freedom, justice, democracy, equal opportunity and development only if we safeguard the imperfect peace and stability and limited freedoms and developments we currently have. The terms ‘safeguard’ should not be understood in terms of maintaining the status quo in its entirety, but rather it should be understood in terms of working patiently within the status quo in order to build on that which is good and change that which is bad. There is no question that any serious instability in our country would be a hindrance for this. It could also potentially jeopardize the integrity of the country we love so very much and plunge the entire region into absolute chaos. This is not an apocalyptic prophecy based on mere imagination. This is a genuine view based on reality and held by a very large number of people up and down the country. Many reasons or justifications could be enumerated but let me mention only a few.

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First, an attempt to change the current system through public unrest and violence could stir up historical antagonisms. Human history is never tidy and Ethiopia is not an exception. Over the last millennium and half, political power in Ethiopia has been shifting from one region to another, the process of which was often bloody. That inevitably has left a scar (to a lesser or greater degree) in the psyche of each region, hence creating what I call a historical volcano. The last theocratic regime kept this historical volcano from constantly erupting by employing shrewd diplomacy and politically arranged marital structures. The military-communist regime kept it under control by brute force and an insidious focus on the ‘Mother Land’. The EPRDF has tried to bring the threat posed by this historical volcano to an end by introducing political administrative structures along ethnic lines (with some exceptions). Despite some positive results, this has not worked as well as expected. Indeed, the philosophy underlying EPRDF’s political and administrative system may need to be rethought. But any attempt to remove the current regime by force could potentially lead to dangerous disintegration of the country. Think, for example, of Somali, Gambela, Afar and Oromia regions, which have their own governments. There are also rebel groups in relation to each of these regions: Oromo Liberation Front, Afar Liberation Front, Gambela People’s Liberation Movement, Ogaden National Liberation Front. Imagine what could happen in these regions if the current imperfect administrative arrangements are violently dismantled. Imagine what could happen to our country if the current toxic political rhetoric that targets a certain people group bears fruit. One might say that setting up an all-inclusive transitional government in the event of removing the EPRDF government by force will prevent this from happening. However, second, the last 25 years have shown us that so long as ideological values are driven by ethnically orientated and regionally framed programmes, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to come up with a common agenda. This is precisely why opposition parties have struggled to succeed. Let alone at the national level, it is sometimes difficult to bring people around a common purpose and goal in an ethnically homogeneous region with strong clan-structures. One might say that if EPRDF could achieve commonality of purpose and political programme, anyone can achieve it. I would say that EPRDF has not achieved it. The dream of unity-in-diversity still remains a dream. The desire in the 1990s was to achieve stronger national consciousness through affirming (rather than denying) ethnic identity. But at the moment, our sense of diversity does not match our sense of unity. The journey towards finding a healthy, inclusive and affirmative sense of identity is not yet achieved. This is not an easy journey, of course. Countries like England, Scotland and Wales still struggle with finding a balanced sense of identity. Our situation is even much more delicate and volatile than theirs. Any violent attempt to achieve what they have achieved over centuries could take us back to where they were 400 years ago. Violence does not always breed peace; violence often breeds violence. Third, internal conflicts within Ethiopia will make the security situation in the country extremely vulnerable. External forces such as the current Eritrean government, Al-Shabbab in Somalia, Islamic State, rogue and radical military and religious elements in Egypt and Sudan could easily capitalise on internal instabilities in Ethiopia. This could result in an attempt to spread religious extremism, which could lead to religious conflicts. It could also result in the destruction of some of the projects such as GRD, for which the people of Ethiopia have paid a huge price. Furthermore, instability in Ethiopia could worsen conflicts in neighbouring states such as South Sudan and Somalia (both of which benefit from Ethiopian military support), potentially destabilise Kenya, strengthen the brutal regime in Eritrea, and terminally endanger the country’s territorial integrity. Fourth, the Ethiopian army is made up of diverse people groups. While protecting and defending the security of our country with great pride and sense of nationalism, military personnel have their own ethnic identity, of which they are also proud. If the current military structure is dismantled, God forbid, there is a real possibility of ethnically based militia groups propping up here and there. Comrades could become enemies and turn their guns against each other to protect or expand newly created territories. This will take us back to the situation our country was in centuries ago. The level of loss of life and destruction of properties in all this could be unimaginable as well. We don’t want this to happen. Nor do we want the creation of Somalia-style territories with their own militias. Finally, many poorest people in the countryside have benefited from various schemes such as, for example, the safety net scheme, which puts cash in their pockets and enables them to feed their families. There are also various agricultural, health and small-scale business initiatives, which have helped improve the lives of many of the poorest in our country. People dislike EPRDF’s party-centred approach that seeks to benefit party members more than others, and yet many believe that the schemes are useful in terms of creating jobs, reducing poverty, improving general health of the population and lessening mother-infant mortality. Violence could disrupt all these and take the country many steps backwards. From all this, I would argue that the disadvantages of changing the current government through violent means far outweigh the advantages, if any. So I would plead, in the name of God, with all parties who are engaging in violent activities to stop and engage in peaceful political undertakings, difficult though that may be. I would equally plead with the ruling party and the government of Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn to fully appreciate that use of force alone would not solve our problems. No one, not even the government, possesses universal panacea for Ethiopia’s problems. National problems 19

Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen require collective effort in an open, inclusive and patient manner. No superficial effort with party political goals will bring lasting solutions. Indeed, any course of action, whether it be establishing the root causes of current civil unrest and coming up with solutions or determining the future direction of our nation, must include opposition groups and people of good will. A nation-wide process of peace building, forgiveness and reconciliation needs to be initiated. In this process, the role of prominent community elders and religious leaders should be central. National healing must be the goal of all efforts. And all of us – who believe in the survival of Ethiopia as a nation in all her wonders and beauties – ought to help each other to realise that we are all wounded beings and must see ourselves as wounded healers.

Ethiopia in the eyes of a veteran scholar Ethiopian Reporter, 17.12.2016, Interview by Tibebeselassie http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/ethiopia-eyes-veteran-scholar A household name at institutions of higher learning in Ethiopia, John Markakis, a Greek national, is a renowned political historian of Ethiopia. He received his BA in political science from Brooklyn College and his MA and PhD in government and African studies from Columbia University. He specializes in the economy of African states, with a particular focus on Ethiopia and its neighbors in the Horn of Africa. For most part of his life, he taught at the University of Addis Ababa, the City University of New York, St. Johns University (New York), Universities of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Edinburgh and the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague. A scholar enriched with a deep knowledge of Ethiopian’s political history, he also published historical books, namely “Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity ,” “ Class and Revolution in Ethiopia ,” “ National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa ,” “ Pastoralism on the Margin ” and others. In addition to that, in his book entitled “The Greeks in Black Africa,” he showed the extensive relationship of Greece with the continent. Throughout the years, he also published and presented numerous research papers on issues concerning state building, national integration, ethnicity, religious and ethnic conflicts, pastoralism, cross-border trade and regional security. In his latest publication “ Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers ,” Markakis presents an over-reaching, yet concise, historical profile of the momentous effort to transform a multicultural empire into a modern nation state. Regarding his latest book and his experience in Ethiopia, Tibebeselassie Tigabu of the Reporter caught up with John Markakis. Excerpts:

The Reporter: Let’s start from the beginning. How did you first come to Ethiopia? John Markakis: It was totally a coincidence. I had no plans to come to Ethiopia. I had just finished my studies in the US, which included courses in African studies. During that period, Africa was very interesting; decolonization movements, nationalist political parties, election, and freedom fighters such as Kwame Nkrumah were at the center of newly independent Africa. So I wanted to come to Africa and asked for a position in Nigeria. They said the post was not open anymore. The only available and somewhat unwanted job offer was in Ethiopia. I did not know much about Ethiopia. There were no nationalist political parties, no elections; but I had to take it because there was nothing else. I came in 1965 during the reign of Emperor Haileselassie. I went to the Political Science Department of the Addis Ababa University College and the department head was an old Polish man. He was a very conservative Catholic man. At that time, the Jesuits were still controlling the university and they hired only Catholics. They did not allow students to smoke or drink. He showed me the courses which were offered by the department. There was nothing, not even a single course, on Ethiopia. So I asked why they were not teaching anything about Ethiopian government or the politics of Ethiopia. His response was, ‘‘No, no; we do not talk about these things in this country.’’ I asked why not. He said that politics was the job of the emperor; nobody else had anything to say about it. I asked what the students thought about that. He said the students were not supposed to think about politics. Later on, when I got to know the students, I found out that the reverse was true. In fact, what they all thought about was politics and nothing else.

What was the course you were assigned to teach?

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I was teaching about government structures in the west, mostly in the US: the checks and balances, and the bicameral legislature. I also taught about totalitarian states and democratic states. These were issues that had nothing to do with Africa let alone Ethiopia. The students were not interested at all. All they wanted to talk about was revolution.

The students at that time were highly influenced by Karl Marx, Lenin, Frantz Fanon, and Mao. How did you reconcile your teachings with their ideology? It was very difficult for me. The department requested us not to talk about Ethiopian politics and I did not know much about Ethiopian politics either. I was teaching them concepts that were of no interest to them. They sort of ignored me. They would not come to class; and when they did they won’t ask any question. When they asked questions, they would try to embarrass me. Questions such as, ‘‘Do you think revolution is good for Ethiopia?’’ (Laughs) and I will say, ‘‘Well, maybe a reform is better, and so on.’’ So, the first year I had a hard time. I could see that I was not having a rapport with them and I asked other fellow lecturers for advice. They told me that since I came from the US, my students might think that I was a CIA agent. Secondly, they were not interested in American politics. The students I had were the most radical, the very ones which influenced the historical student movement here. Berhane Meskel Reda, Gebru Mersha, Walelegn Emanuel, and Tilahun Gizaw were all my students. Then, I noticed what they were reading: Frantz Fanon’s “Wretched of The Earth,” Mao’s “On Contradiction,” and “What is to be Done” by Lenin. These were books that I have never read. Fellow friends advised me to read what my students were reading; and to let them talk what they wanted to talk about in class and learn about Ethiopia. The system of land tenure was at the epicenter of the student movement and they held slogans calling for land- tenure reform at the demonstrations in 1965. By my second year, my class became open for any political discussion. Following that, the students warmed up and they started trusting me. In the following years, our relationship grew closer. We had departmental parties where we all gathered and the students were drinking Coca-Cola and other types of soda. Then I asked if other drinks like beer or alcohol were available? They told me that the Jesuits would not allow it. I said I was not a Jesuit and I asked them what they wanted to drink. They said tej. They brought tej and then I started drinking; and then I took out a cigarette and started to smoke. They said I broke the law twice. (Laughs) That is how we became friends gradually and became interested in how the imperial regime works. The system was very traditional and yet highly developed. Everyone knew his or her place. The society was highly hierarchical. Everyone knew how to behave with other people. If one was a balabat or a tilk sew, there was an understanding on how to even wear the shema when people talk to them. It was like going back to the Middle Ages but it was working as a state. On top of that, it was Emperor Haileselassie who knew everything and he was in control of everything and everybody. His control extended to such private matters as divorce. He was a remarkable man. I know he was later discredited by many, but now when I look back, I think Haileselassie was an extraordinary man. He made himself an imperial autocrat. He put the imperial state together, which put everything in place. He had that kind of control and the system worked. Nevertheless, there were communities and regions in Ethiopia that did not go along with the system. The regime had difficulties to sustain that kind of absolute rule. Ethiopia had the largest army in black Africa in the 1970’s with the US and Spain providing it with training and weapons among other things. The army was fighting in Eritrea and Somalia. There was a big uprising in Gojjam and the army was not able to control it because it was trained for conventional warfare: what they called at the time a positional warfare where the army holds a position and bombards the other side. They could not manage guerilla warfare and gradually things became very difficult. With that, the army started to become highly dissatisfied since the troops were not treated well. In the first mutiny in Bale, soldiers rose up because they did not have water to drink. The army was also split along class lines and they rebelled against their own officers. Once this happened, the regime started to collapse because the army was its pillar.

Why was Marx important to the student movement? Was it because of the division of the two blocs: capitalism and socialism? Or was it because of the hierarchical structure of the society at that time? Why is class the main concern in the student movement? First of all, Marxism was the liberation ideology throughout the colonial world including the oppressed people in China, Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. Naturally, the students here went in that direction. But, it also fits Ethiopia’s situation at the time since it was a rigidly class-divided nation. The students were determined to attain what they called a telescope development. They wanted the state to jump to socialism without passing through capitalism. It was the idea of quick development, and they wanted it very badly. They knew that they had to overthrow the feudal regime if they were going to achieve anything. The land situation in Ethiopia was a time-bomb. In the southern part of Ethiopia, there was huge ethnic division which coincided with class segregation. It was bound to explode. This is why the students were preoccupied with land. Thus, the slogan, ‘‘Land to the tiller’’ was meant to prevent further turmoil that would potentially threaten Ethiopia’s statehood.

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What about the question of nations and nationalities that students like Walelegn Makonnen advocated? What was the policy of the government then? Emperor Haileselassie had a policy towards integration. The regime presumed ethnic differences were dangerous to the country’s stability. The policy of cultural integration and bringing about national unity and homogeneity of identity was a classic one. The plan was to assimilate southerners and others into Orthodox Christianity and the Amharic-speaking community. The regime pushed this. To some extent, it was successful in a sense that many people converted to Christianity in the south. Many people took Christian names. Place names were changed, Adama into Nazareth, for example. Assimilation into the ruling class was granted through Christianity and the Amharic language. This was the policy. But for such a policy to work, it would take a long time. Before they could get very far there was a reaction against assimilation. Walelegn was an Amhara but he reacted against forced assimilation. The Oromos, even in those times, were very much against being assimilated. The Somali could not even understand what it takes to be assimilated. Therefore, the policy was very archaic and it would take a long time to succeed. The rebel movements intensified in Eritrea, Ogaden and Bale. A huge army presence was felt in the country but it was divided which only meant that the center itself was divided. Therefore, the pressure from the periphery divided the center and it collapsed. The Derg tried to respond to some of these challenges immediately. This is one of the reasons why the students resorted to Marxism because Marxism was a theory that transcends ethnic differences. It contends that ethnic differences would dissipate if class differences were resolved. That is, if the system made sure that the worker/peasantry class is treated as equal. The Derg took the ideology from the students, which says ‘‘we are workers and peasants; we have nothing to divide us.’’ The second concept the Derg took from the students was the policy of nationalizing land. It was a great move forward. It was anticipated to dissolve the explosive tension in the periphery. In addition to that, unlike the previous regime, the Derg recognized Ethiopia as a multi-cultural society. Haileselassie went to the US Congress in the 1950s and he said that Ethiopia was a Christian nation in the middle of an Islam-dominated neighborhood while half of its people were Muslims. Many of the things that the Derg did were intended to prevent the same situation from happening again. One thing they did not do or has not been done yet was power- and resources-sharing among different groups equally. Haileselassie would not do that; he would not even think of it. The Derg as well could not think of it. So eventually, the Derg found itself in a more difficult situation than the emperor. More revolts, rebellion movements and guerrilla wars broke out all over the country. In my book, “Ethiopia: the Last Two Frontiers”, this was one of the political frontiers which I tried to describe.

What are these last two frontiers? The first frontier is the political or the monopoly of power, which was inherited from the empire-builders and zealously guarded ever since by the ruling class of an Abyssinian origin. The descendants of the people subjugated by the empire- builders remained excluded from power, a handicap that bred political instability and violence in Ethiopia. The second frontier is the arid lowlands on the margins of the state, where the process of integration has not yet taken place and where resistance was the greatest. Until this frontier was crossed, the Ethiopian state would not have a secure border as a mature nation state. After the downfall of the imperial regime, the military regime was highly centralized. The Ethiopian army was not capable of defeating guerrilla movements across the country. There were too many groups fighting against the Derg, the Tigrians and the Eritreans being the major ones. Then the center started to crack, and it collapsed eventually. Looking at the actions of those at the helm of power at present, the EPRDF, one can see that they have again exerted great effort not to repeat the same mistake. When EPRDF took power, there were too many guerilla movements fighting all over the place. Thus, the government designed ethnic federalism as a mechanism to decentralize power and recognize all regions. It was a great step forward. A new Ethiopian identity that no longer forces assimilation or Amharaization upon the people was introduced. It advocated having one’s own culture, identity and belongingness in the country like everyone else. They devolved power, in a sense that they gave the regional governments responsibility to administer themselves, the people to elect their own representatives, to speak their own languages, etc. However, again, this regime has not addressed the political frontier fully. Power still remains highly centralized at the center. The center decides and then the periphery administers. The center refuses to decentralize power and share resources equally and this would eventually threaten the system. Force is not enough to keep a state together. Like the previous regimes, EPRDF is now facing a similar crisis. As its predecessors had done, the government seems to be calling upon the army to resolve the situation.

Many of the territories in the south were incorporated into present-day Ethiopia during the 16th century by the highlander Christian kingdoms. What were the historical mistakes in that process if there were any? Abyssinia is a very old homogenous nation state. However, its people had a great problem with land shortages due to over- cultivation as well as climatic and geographical conditions. They had a tremendous need for more land. It was a matter of survival. So, the expansionists were strong in military, more populous, and better organized. Therefore, military expeditions

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen to the southern parts of the country followed. Northerners flooded the south and became the neftegnas (landlord). They ruled by the gun, took the land from the people forcefully. The land was not enough. The expansion also had a system of taking the labor. Due to the expansion, Ethiopia was no longer a nation. Abyssinia was a nation. The people they conquered were not Abyssinians. They were composed of various nations. Ethiopia was not and is not a nation because of its diverse population. Obviously, the people to whom this happened to were not content for a long time. The truth is Ethiopia became a multi-cultural society. Under Haileselassie, decisions were made at the center and then the local balabats executed them. Under the Derg, decisions were made at the center and the cadre who were mostly locals executed them. The structure is always the same. There is a center, which is homogenous, which controls the vast periphery, but they cannot afford to rule the periphery by themselves. It is not economical. Therefore, the states found local allies to do the job and they paid these allies quite handsomely. When EPRDF came, it also tried to forge allies in the peripheries which are paid to administer the regions well. In my opinion that is not a stable system.

There is no integration in the real sense; is that what you are saying? There is no political integration. The periphery I think is well integrated. This is a success. People travel throughout, communicate, inter-marry, and they share food throughout the highland peripheries. All it needs now is a political solution.

What would be the political solution? Power and resources should be shared equally among various groups; otherwise, the system will be in danger of breaking down. A state cannot have some of the ethnic groups excluded. It is impossible. Maybe, five centuries ago it would have been possible. So there has to be a new political arrangement. I am not talking about democracy, rather in some way the people have to choose for themselves. Therefore, they will feel that they are represented by the system that they have chosen. Power- and resource-sharing with the periphery has never been done satisfactorily in Ethiopia’s history. Even though the government wants reforms and reshuffles its cabinet to that effect, that is not how to go about power- and resource-sharing.

Regarding the question of ethnic oppression versus class oppression, there are groups which argue the center prefers the northerners more. While on the other hand, there are also those arguing the oppression is an elite, class-based, and that all are excluded from the center economically and by other means. What do you say about that? The oppression by the center, the imposition of the cultural hegemony, came from the so called Habesha elites. The Habesha peasants are part of the hegemony from a psychological point of view. However, economically, they did not benefit; rather they were poorer than those in the lowland periphery areas. The southern part retained a lot of its fertility whereas the northern lands were over-cultivated. Until a few years ago, if you go to Gojjam or Tigray, there was almost nothing there. Therefore, you are right in a sense that the peasantry class has not benefitted from this and that is why they are creating problems. What are they saying in Tigray now? They are saying that they were accused of benefitting from the system but they have nothing. Therefore, obliviously, we are only speaking about the political elite. In Oromia, there are political elites who are living very well but it does not mean that they represent the vast majority of the Oromo people.

Can we say the system benefited the political elite from anywhere? Yes, we can say that.

Whether they are from the highland periphery or the lowland periphery? Well, the lowland periphery is a different case. The lowland periphery was not integrated and that was the problem. The imperial regime did not do anything because there was less material benefit to be extracted from the area. The land is semi- desert. These pastoralists did not use money so they could not be made to pay taxes. They were heavily armed too. You could not account for them because they are highly mobile, crossing borders. They were mostly led by their own local chiefs. They lived by their own rules. In addition to pastoralists, there are also what you call subsistence agriculturalists. They are the ones who scratched the land, cut the trees and branches, and plant there. After a few years, the ashes become no longer fertile. They leave the land and go somewhere else. They come back to it after a few years and again start the job from the scratch. For so long, nobody bothered them. The Derg came and it was not able to integrate the lowlands in any way because it did not have enough time. Sixteen years is not much time to integrate them politically or economically to the center. The literacy campaign that was undertaken elsewhere in the country was not feasible in the lowlands. All in all, government presence was limited in those areas. Now for the first time, EPRDF is trying to start integrating these areas. They have established a court system, and provided health, education and other services. The area is conflict-prone. It is a

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen very unstable region. It is a threat to security because again there is no complete control over regional territory. They have to be integrated and power, representation, resource, and so on should be granted.

Do you think ethnic federalism has gone wrong? If so, where did it go wrong? Was it even right for Ethiopia to begin with? The system aspired to respect language, culture and identity at regional and sub-regional levels. In retrospect was it a feasible plan? It did; it tried to integrate. They gave recognition to the various nations. The question, however, comes from those who are from the center. This section of the society is worried what federalism means to the country’s unity in the long run. I do not think any one group would have the interest to break away from Ethiopia. Where are they going to go? What some groups are asking is just to share power, to be represented by their own deputies, to choose their representatives fairly, and so on. So, it is the political issue that needs to be resolved. Ethiopia was not made culturally diverse by the EPRDF. It was always like that. EPRDF recognized it and this encouraged others to stand up and be proud of their identity. So, I think this fear of disintegration would go away once the center starts to share political power fairly.

In your book’s conclusion, you argued for market to be the only deterministic force in allocation of land, contradicting the concept of land belonging to the state. How did you come to hold such a view? In a historical context, land is the source of all value, wealth. Of course, that is why land has become a very important resource. Who controls it? Classically, it was controlled by the state but peasants in the north had very strong rights to land in the past. You could not take land away from Abyssinian peasants unless they rebelled or failed to pay taxes. Families owned land. To show this strong relationship, they call it Atsme-rest . Land was passed down through generations. So, there was no market for land. Towards the end of the Haileselassie’s regime, the World Bank, IMF, and other institutions were pushing towards privatization. The regime was under great pressure. Therefore, they began taking surveys and registering the stock land and so on. They were moving towards privatization of land. What did the Derg do? It nationalized it. The state owns land and of course, the Derg said you could not hire labor, sell or rent but the land was not given to the peasants to do what they like. The nationalization proclamation did not intend for the state to take over land; to the contrary Derg had a different idea. Today who owns land theoretically? It is the state. They did nothing to change this. Control of land enables the state to control the peasantry. In order to rule Ethiopia, you have to be able to control the peasantry. This was abused by various regimes. The Derg abused it by cooperatives, collectives, and state farms. In the end, the peasants turned against the system. Under EPRDF, the land is again under state control. There has always been a strong push by the elite to privatize land. This of course would be a catastrophic for Ethiopia because Ethiopia does not have the urban economy to take in the peasants who could be displaced from their land if land were privatized. Mechanized farms are expanding, so the question is what is going to happen to the peasants who are displaced by machines. You know the opposition in Ethiopia or what used to be the opposition, it is an incoherent opposition. There were two branches; one was the Habeshas who are against federalism who want to go back to the old system. The other group was the Mereras’s, Beyene Petros, and others who represent to some extent the periphery and they wanted more federalism, more power. The two wanted opposite things. The likes of Merera and others who represent the periphery are afraid if land is de-nationalized (privatized). They contend that market forces will deprive their people of their land. Privatization is the worst possible thing for them. Nevertheless, this seems to be happening already. Land is being sold, decided by market forces. Nowadays farmers complain openly because the land they had sold for a few thousand birr is now worth millions.

There seem to exist two distinct political forces in Ethiopia. One group resents ethnic federalism for sowing division among the people of the country. While others, mostly members of liberation fronts, believe that ethnic federalism did not give them real power. How do these two groups reconcile for the country to continue as a state? I do not think EPRDF has any intention of dividing Ethiopia. They instituted federalism to keep the country together at the time. They recognized diversity, changed the idea of citizenship and culture, and gave administrative rights to people with the right to speak their own language. All this was done to pacify the country. I believe this is what they wanted. At the same time, by having a political system which is ethnically arranged, they themselves had become part of that system. I think it was a calculated effort to prevent exactly what their enemies accused them of. Moreover, it is a great injustice actually; can you imagine this group made up of people from the northern part of the country wanting to break up Ethiopia? It is ridiculous. They are the most radical Habeshas , if you ask me. Therefore, it was a very clever way of preventing internecine conflicts at the time. The essence of it was that the center would retain its power. Well, it did not take long before the others really understood that and then the liberation movements started getting momentum. This is the political frontier. Then the question is how Ethiopia could get out of this. EPRDF can’t go forward with the original design because it will be accused of giving more power to those who want to break Ethiopia. It cannot also go backwards; it is impossible. It is critical to calmly

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen charter the road ahead. But EPRDF’s attempt to externalize some of the political problems is also counter-productive. This could be taken as a lack of serious effort at bringing about permanent solution.

Feeling the Pulse of the People Ethiopian Reporter, Editorial, 10.12.2016, by Staff Reporter http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/feeling-pulse-people As the entity that puts into practice the laws, regulations, policies and strategies of a nation, the Executive (the government) shoulders the grave responsibility of governing in a manner that defends the enduring interest and sovereignty of a nation and its people. This requires of it to work in harmony with the other branches of Government—the Legislature and the Judiciary. The actions it takes across such areas as the administration of the civil service, law enforcement, education, health, agriculture, trade, industry, diplomacy, infrastructure building, land management and development, etc. must necessarily take into account the demands of the public and the reality on the ground. It’s then that citizens will be proud of their country and be motivated to put in the extra effort. If the government is to discharge ably the tasks entrusted to it by the people it is obliged to appoint officials which the public has confidence in and trusts. When officials who are attested to possess the requisite educational qualifications, experience and work ethics make it a habit to feel the public pulse of the public, either directly or indirectly, and do their jobs properly that the specter of internecine conflicts will not come to pass. In fact fulfilling the needs of the public will lead to a raft of positive developments including, among others, the upholding of the rule of law, the equitable distribution of political power and national wealth, increased respect for human and democratic rights, the holding of free and democratic elections, the flourishing of civil societies and the political engagement of the citizenry, and the internalization of transparency and accountability as cherished values. This democratization process will eventually lead to the creation of a political space that accommodates the diverse interest of everyone as well as a generation that constantly enquires rather than resort to violence out of frustration. Like in other countries the loss of public trust in the government and a poor delivery of public services is a recipe for the occurrence of a rift between the government and the people. However much the government toils to accomplish development plans it purports to bring about prosperity, it cannot succeed without active public participation. The extent to which the government obeys the public, from which it derives its power and legitimacy, is proof of its commitment to advance the interest of the electorate that voted it into office. The relationship between different government agencies and taxpayers or other stakeholders must be founded on mutual trust. Such a trust can develop when the agencies carry out their duties with a sense of public service, strive to keep pace with rapidly changing times, and make transparency and accountability their hallmark. Sticking to the business-as-usual attitude will not get them or the country anywhere. Merit should be the only criteria for the installment of government officials in office. Hence, they need not necessarily be affiliated with the ruling party. There are countless highly skilled and vastly experienced citizens both at home and abroad who are desirous to serve their country and compatriots selflessly. Characterized by technological advances and fast evolving thinking the age of globalization we are in calls for leadership that keeps abreast of current developments. The government would do well to appreciate that power is an instrument by which it serves the public, not be served by it. Leave alone political appointees, political parties themselves ought to take the reins of power through the consent of the public. Instead of concluding that the ruling party alone knows what is best for and is wise enough to govern a diverse country like Ethiopia, it would be in the interest of the nation and its people to give an opportunity to anyone who has far better ideas on how to govern. Doing so will enhance the government’s standing even on the international arena. The government must not, as it is wont to do, just pay lip service to the gravity of the widespread dissatisfaction with bad governance, miscarriage of justice and rampant corruption that has prompted a simmering discontent. Should long-term solutions are not sought for these critical challenges they are bound to constitute a serious threat to the very survival of the nation. Even as stop-gap measures are taken to quell the ensuing protest it would be wise to address the underlying causes in a manner that is compatible with the concrete needs of the public and existing conditions. Taking the longer view is imperative for the government as it makes decisions that adversely impact the country. Rushing into action without accountability and due regard to the outcome has been shown to have dire consequences that have cost Ethiopia and its people dear. This should be avoided at all costs.

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The peace and security of any country is dependent on how contented its people are. The majority will rise up when a select few have it all their way. On the contrary, they will be delighted when the rule of law is upheld and their demands are answered. Even the minority stands to benefit then. The will of the public should particularly be respected as regards issues of national importance. Ensuring that government decision-making is reflective of present-day realities and promotes the public interest is instrumental in forging national consensus and averting unnecessary conflicts. Essential to all this is not losing sight of where the long-term interest of the nation lies as opposed to giving in to the urge to satisfy immediate needs. This is why the actions the government takes must be informed by the demands of the public and tangible conditions.

Ethiopia at a crossroads as it feels the strain of civil unrest Ethnic tensions could see Ethiopia descending into civil war James Jeffrey, Irish Times, Addis Ababa, 9.12.2016 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/ethiopia-at-a-crossroads-as-it-feels-the-strain-of-civil-unrest-1.2898411 (…) “This government came into being with the support of the rural poor,” says Abebe Hailu, a human rights lawyer who was in college during the student movement that precipitated the 1974 downfall of emperor Haile Selassie, and who lived through the ensuing military dictatorship that eventually fell in 1991 to the rebel-founders of the EPRDF. “Now it is the rural poor that is against them– this is the irony,” he says. (…) “More than 50 per cent of the Ethiopian population was born under this government,” says Robert Wiren, a French journalist writing about the Horn of Africa for the last 15 years. “This young population does not compare the present system with its predecessors but receives news from abroad which contradicts the governmental rhetoric. People in the street know that journalists and opponents are jailed, that the security forces kill demonstrators. There is a real danger of ethnic hatred against the Tigrayans.” Matters aren’t helped by the fact that wealth from the surging economic numbers has failed to trickle down to the vast majority of Ethiopians, who eke out the daily grind while wages stagnate, and inflation and living costs rise. All the while, rank corruption results in a select few monopolising lucrative deals in the economy, to be then observed splashing out on oversized shiny pick-up trucks and drinking bottles of Black Label whiskey in the capital’s swanky new hotels, which seem to pop up daily. “Since Ethiopia’s economic growth is due to a centralised driven process, a lot of non- Tigray people suspect the Tigray elite to be the only beneficiary of the economic boom,” Wiren says. (…) “The TPLF has trapped itself by ethnicising political life without accepting a real autonomy for every regional state,” Wiren says. “It is an open secret that behind each regional state leader there is a kind of unofficial political supervisor.” (…) “What does the Ethiopian public want? Firstly peace, secondly stability, thirdly prosperity,” says one Addis Ababa-based foreign politico. “In most cases the Ethiopian opposition have conflated opposition with opposite. When asked for details of the programme for achieving those three needs they revert to type and complain about how difficult it is to be in opposition.” (…) At the same time all sides, from government to opposition, whether in Ethiopia or acting overseas, appear hobbled by how the vocabulary of Amharic, the lingua franca of Ethiopia, doesn’t lend itself to terms such as negotiation and compromise. The polarisation of US politics pales in comparison to the mire found in Ethiopia: here you are either with the government or against, there can be no middle ground. Nevertheless, many point out that it is the EPRDF, as the holders of power, who need break the deadlock. “They must bring all concerned Ethiopian opposition political groups both home and abroad to the negotiation table,” says Endalk Chala, a prominent Ethiopian blogger studying in the US, who is unable to return to Ethiopia following the arrest in Addis Ababa of his fellow Zone 9 bloggers. “That is what I call a reform and all the rest is nonsense.” (…) “Ethiopia has been the only reliable country in the Horn of Africa,” says Lidetu Ayele, founder of the opposition Ethiopia Democratic Party. “If Ethiopia is not strong, other countries will suffer. This government has used the threat of regional terrorism to its own advantage, but that threat is very real.” Stepping back from the brink (…) Opinions about where Ethiopia is heading cover a range of scenarios. It is feasible that a renewed uprising could prove successful, or its attendant pressures result in the internal disintegration of the EPRDF. Both appear unlikely, however, certainly in the short-term. Honed by decades of experience fending off rebellions, Ethiopia’s security apparatus is ruthlessly effective – hence the apparent success of the state of emergency. If judged necessary, an even more blistering government crackdown can’t be ruled out.

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Ethiopia doesn’t have to fear, according to observers, a military coup: the army is professional, well trained and its higher echelons respect the constitution and harbour no ambitions to rule. But how they might react to some of the worst-case scenarios predicted – Ethiopia descending into civil war or a failed state torn by ethnic strife - is another matter. Most observers suggest the best way to avoid the worst case scenarios would be to, at a minimum, release all political prisoners, unshackle the media and allow freedom of expression, and begin reforming key institutions that have been found wanting, such as Ethiopia’s judicial system. When it comes to the EPRDF’s future role in all this, opinions vary. Some say it has lost every shred of legitimacy and must immediate make way for a transitional government. Others say is not feasible nor in Ethiopia’s best interests. Rather, the EPRDF should, in addition to carrying out meaningful reforms, establish a new electoral commission that would guarantee the next local elections in 2018 and national elections in 2020 were freely contested. “That is the best course of action as it would provide a solution that isn’t orchestrated by the government but which is chosen by the Ethiopian people,” Lidetu says.

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New television channels in Ethiopia may threaten state control News programmes are likely to follow soaps and state control The Economist, 9 December 2016 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21711274-news-programmes-are-likely-follow-soaps-and-game-shows-new-television-channels (…) The proliferation of these dishes symbolises the frustration that Ethiopia’s 90m citizens feel with state-owned television. But after years of hankering for a choice in what they can watch, Ethiopians are fast becoming spoilt for one. Four private satellite channels have launched so far this year. More are on the way. Kana TV, which first broadcast in March, has taken the country by storm. (…) So far they have stuck to light entertainment, but a slew of news and current-affairs programmes are reportedly in the pipeline. More significantly still, in October the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA) announced that it was granting licences to three privately owned satellite channels, a first in the agency’s history. It says it also plans to grant licences to private terrestrial ones early next year. (…) The dearth of private local channels was not due to legal obstacles. The constitution permits both public and private media. But at the very least the government did little to encourage the latter. This is changing. “We are trying our best to help them,” says Zeray Asgedom, the EBA’s director. There is a recognition inside the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that squeezing private media was a mistake. “Opening up should have happened earlier,” Mr Asgedom admits. The lack of credible independent news left the field open to social-media propagandists, which helped to inflame unrest over the past year, he says. (…) Producing alternative news will be difficult, since the EBC enjoys a near-monopoly on information and access to ministers. And Ethiopian media have “a long history of co-option and capture”, notes Iginio Gagliardone of Oxford University. Indeed, the channels so far licensed by the EBA are not entirely independent of the state. But the signs are positive. So long as Ethiopians stock up on satellite dishes, controlling what they watch will be harder.

Reacting To Lefort’s Article On The Ethiopian Crisis Messay Kebede (PhD), 27.11.2016 http://cyberethiopia.com/2013/?p=1702 I have read with great interest René Lefort’s article , “ Ethiopia’s Crisis Things Fall Apart: Will the Center Hold? ” With his usual perspicacity and deep knowledge of Ethiopia’s history and contemporary politics, Lefort analyzes the current crisis with penetration nourished with revealing details, often gathered from well-placed informants. One learns a lot from the article, but paradoxically one is also assailed with questions triggered by a vague feeling that the article downplays the essential factor of the whole crisis. Lefort explains the current crises by three mutually enforcing factors: they are: (1) “the weakening of the central authority” following the demise of the strongman, namely, Meles Zenawi, which weakening strengthened peripheral attempts at emancipation; (2) “democratic aspiration ” essentially originating from the sectors which, having benefited from the economic success of the regime, are now demanding for less authority and control; (3) “collateral damage from super-rapid growth” caused by the exorbitantly unequal enrichment of the ruling elites at the expense of peripheries and ordinary people. When we combine the three factors, we get one commanding idea: the current crisis of Ethiopia is nothing but an outgrowth of the success of the ruling party. This idea is so pervasive that the whole article criticizes the ruling elite, not for the wrongness of its policy, but for being unable to deal with the negative fallouts of its success except by the intensification of suppression, as evidenced by the proclamation of the state of emergency. Nowhere do we find in the article the suggestion that the main cause of the crisis may be the inherently defective nature of TPLF’s social and economic policy. Because Lefort perceives the crisis as an outgrowth, and not as the unfolding of an originally bad policy, he believes that the crisis is a call for the ruling elite to undertake the necessary reforms. He is accordingly disappointed by the apparent inability of the ruling clique to respond to the call in a constructive way. Yet, the main question should have been whether the ruling elite is anywhere near to acknowledging that it needs to reform itself. The answer is a resounding no! The proof of this is that Lefort cites senior officials who claim that “the current crisis is simply ‘ the price of our successes ’. It was preceded and

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen will be followed by others, because it is nothing more than a stage, unremarkable and inevitable, on the path that will undoubtedly culminate in the nation catching up with developed countries in the next few decades.” In the eyes of these officials, the main culprits for the popular unrests are the diaspora, the opposition parties, Amhara chauvinism, the Eritrean government, secessionist Oromo forces, foreign governments, etc. That is why it is naïve to expect reforms: the TPLF, which is the real force behind the EPRDF, is doing and has been doing what it had planned to do since it became an important guerrilla force, to wit, the establishment of a long-lasting hegemony of Tigrean elite on Ethiopia. For the TPLF, the question was never about the well-being of Ethiopia, but about an all- embracing hegemonic control of Ethiopia, one of its essential means being the policy of divide-and-rule or ethnic federalism. Accordingly, the ruling party sees the popular uprisings as nothing more than attempts to stand in the way of the hegemonic project. As such, they are not to be tolerated, but instead crushed violently and without mercy. Unless the hegemonic agenda is viewed as the core issue, the intrinsic depravity of the regime does not stand out. Thus, Lefort makes the mistake of characterizing the federal government as a “center” opposing peripheries. In reality, the TPLF did not create a non-regional or cosmopolitan state machinery and elite, as did the imperial regime or the Derg; rather, what we have is a system of tight control of peripheries by a regional elite whose defining feature is its awareness of illegality inscribed in its minority status. This control is the very obstacle that blocks democratization and a fair distribution of resources. In a system constructed to perpetuate the hegemony of one regional elite, there cannot be fair distribution, any more that there can be an all-inclusive economic growth. The main cause of the crisis is, therefore, neither the weakening of the center, nor the emerging democratic aspiration, still less the negative consequences of rapid growth; the main cause is the ethnic factor, that is, the economic and political dominance of a regional elite. What is needed is not the reform of the regime, but the dismantling of the hegemonic structure. The negative consequences are not regrettable or avoidable outgrowths, nor are the democratic aspirations derived from economic prosperity. They are but the very application of the original intent of the TPLF. They are not mistakes or deviations; they are implementations of an originally divisive political program, the only one liable to safeguard the supremacy of a minority elite. Far from engaging in reforms, the TPLF’s reaction to the popular demands will model itself on its close relative, namely, the Syrian regime. The proclamation of the state of emergency is the first step in a gradual escalation toward civil war.

Ethiopia’s crisis. Things fall apart: will the centre hold? René Lefort, Open Democracy, 19.12.2016 https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-lefort/ethiopia-s-crisis Almost exactly a year ago, Ethiopia entered its worst crisis since the arrival of the regime in 1991. Last month, a state of emergency was proclaimed. These two events have generated a flood of commentary and analysis. A few key points, sometimes underplayed if not ignored, are worth closer attention.

“Mengist yelem!” - “Authority has disappeared!” People waited in vain for the government to react other than by brute force alone to the opposition it was facing and the resulting chaos. The unrest in Oromya, Ethiopia’s most populous state with 35% of the country’s total population, began on November 12, 2015; the uprising in part of the Amhara Region, the second largest by population (27%), on July 12, 2016. For 11 long months the government was content to quell protest and to release information in dribs and drabs, the epitome of one-sided doublespeak. A handful of cryptic press releases repeated the same platitudes ad nauseam . When in June 2016 the ruling power finally realized the severity of the crisis, launching a series of internal deliberations, these took place in total secrecy. This pseudo-communication destroyed its credibility and in turn lent credence to the sole alternative source of information, the diaspora, which itself is often hyperbolic to the point of implausibility. On both sides, the space available for information that exhibits even a degree of measure, not to say simple rationality, is shrinking alarmingly. [1] On both sides, the space available for information that exhibits even a degree of measure, not to say simple rationality, is shrinking alarmingly.

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People have stopped taking notice of anything the ruling power says, seeing it as incapable of handling the situation. In short, trust has gone. “ It is not even able to listen… It has lost its collective ability to reach the collective mindset of the governed” .[2] The general view is that Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn “ always promises but never delivers ”. Both in central government and in the regional authorities, or between one and the other, authority has dramatically deflated. A multitude of anecdotes confirm that it is being ignored – officials simply turn their backs – or even mocked, right up to the highest levels. The man in the street could only conclude: “ Mengist yelem !” – “Authority has disappeared!” . This perception, initially confined to the cities, is increasingly reaching into the rural areas as they open up more and more. An even more serious indictment is spreading. The government’s primary role is to maintain law and order, and it has proved incapable of doing so; worse still, the violence of repression is further fueling discontent. In the end, rather than fulfilling its first duty, the ruling power has become the principal cause of revolt. In the end, rather than fulfilling its first duty, the ruling power has become the principal cause of revolt.

“Meles left with the password” Why this impotence and loss of credibility? Under Meles Zenawi, the all-powerful Prime Minister who died suddenly in August 2012, the system of power was like a pyramid. Meles sat enthroned at the summit, and below him, every tier – executive or legislative, political or economic, national or regional, even local – was simply a transmission belt from the top. Party and State were inextricably intertwined. This profoundly centralized and vertical system, intensifying over the years, hung on him alone. For most observers, the smooth succession from Meles Zenawi to Hailemariam Desalegn proved the robustness of the regime and the reliability of its institutions. However, Hailemariam lacks what it takes to “fill the boots” of his predecessor. Most of his authority comes not from his own resources but has been handed down to him through a constellation of powers – baronies one might call them – characterized not just by their diversity, but also by the rivalry, or even conflict, between them. In short, Ethiopia is left with a system of power tailored for a strongman and filled accordingly, but which now lacks a strongman. “Meles left with the password”, the joke goes. The succession couldn’t be a change of personnel only. The whole power system too needed reshaping, and this is in full swing. Hence the misfires in response to the crisis. People used to say that Ethiopia was like a plane on autopilot, controlled by the Meles software (“ Meles legacy” ). To pursue the metaphor in current circumstances, the more turbulence the plane encounters, the more ineffective the software has proved to be. It is noteworthy that constant references to that legacy have practically disappeared from official rhetoric. So the software has been disconnected, but no pilot – whether individual or collective – has been able to take over the controls.

Three big sources of the crisis The weakening of central authority – Addis Ababa – has thus released centrifugal – regional – forces that had been steadily stifled in Meles Zenawi’s iron grip. The first source of the current crisis is the trial of strength between central authority and the peripheral powers that it originally created – a sort of bid for emancipation from the father – as well as between the peripheral powers. At stake is the sharing of powers and resources, notably between the regions and Addis Ababa, where Tigrayans are perceived to be overrepresented, wrongly in their view, quite obviously according to all the other ethnicities. In other words, what is at stake is the place that should be assigned to the “ people’s fundamental freedoms and rights” enshrined in the constitution, collective rights. How can the country make the transition from a bogus and ethnically weighted federalism to real decentralization, which would bring about a more authentic and ethnically fairer federalism, or even confederalism? The immemorial “national question” remains as acute as ever: what will the name Ethiopia come to refer to? In other words, why should and how can an Ethiopian state exist, and on what basis? What will the name Ethiopia come to refer to? This question has deep historical roots. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the economic centre of gravity shifted from the North – Abyssinia – towards the Centre. But power always remained Abyssinian. At stake in the current crisis is a historic break that would also shift power to the Centre, i.e. to Oromya. Despite their internal divisions, this claim unites the vast majority of Oromo, justified by their numbers and their major contribution to the economy. It is generally agreed that a genuine application of the constitution would be sufficient for this claim to be satisfied.

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For the Amhara, whose elite dominated Abyssinian power for more than a century, the challenge is to revamp their identity. They have to say farewell to their historical ascendancy and accept that their place in the Ethiopian state should reflect their numerical and economic importance, no more, no less. In other words, the only way out of the undoubted ostracism they suffer is not to re-establish the former status quo. The assertion of “Amhara-ness” – legitimate as it is – cannot become a cover for the aspiration for a return to an “Ethiopianness” based around Amhara, with the other ethnicities in a lesser role. This metamorphosis is under way, but not yet complete. Nonetheless, many Oromo and even more Tigrayans deny that anything has changed, convinced that this elite has not abandoned its “ chauvinism” and “ revanchism”, and that the federal system that they defend tooth and nail could therefore never satisfy its deeply cherished ambition. The only way out of the undoubted ostracism [the Amhara] suffer is not to re-establish the former status quo. The only way out of the undoubted ostracism [the Amhara] suffer is not to re-establish the former status quo. These ethno-nationalisms have become inflamed and even paranoid. Today, “ all the politics is revolving around ethnicity ”, a former senior TPLF official told me, and in a previous remark: “ what I see now dominantly… is the proliferation of racial or ethnic hatred ”. [3] It is focused on the Tigrayans, not only because of the major role of the Tigrayan Peoples’s Liberation Front (TPLF), but because both Oromo and Amhara equate Tigrayan silence in the face of repression with approval. “ The preliminary rhetoric of ethnic cleansing is already here ”, opines one social scientist, a man familiar with the grass roots of the country. The second source of the crisis relates to what might be called “ democratic aspiration ”. In this respect, Ethiopia’s leaders are right to talk about the price of success. Economic growth has brought the emergence of a new middle class, not just urban but also in the countryside, which has seen the rapid enrichment of an upper tier of farmers. In parallel, education has dramatically expanded. This upper tier has opened up to the outside world, in particular through social media. However, the aspiration for “individual rights” runs up against a system of power which, everywhere in Ethiopia, from the summit of the state to the lowliest levels of authority, from the capital to the smallest village, shares the same defects: authoritarianism, stifling control, infantilization. Finally, the third source of the crisis relates to collateral damage from super-rapid growth. Such damage is inevitable, but has been exacerbated by the type and methods of development pursued. First, forced imposition through ultra-centralized and secretive decision-making, and brutal execution. “Land grabbing”, and more generally almost instant evictions with absurd levels of compensation, are commonplace. Second, the overwhelming role of the ruling power through the “developmental state” has produced an ever more powerful and arrogant oligarchy embedded in the Party-State. The stakes in the crisis are not only political: they directly concern the mobilization, distribution and therefore the accumulation of resources in the hands of the ruling power, and hence the division of the cake between central and peripheral authorities and/or oligarchies, but also between these oligarchies and the population in general. The present crisis is particularly acute because these three factors reinforce each other. The demonstrators chant “ we want justice” and “ we want freedom ”, but also “ Oromya is not for sale” and “ we want self rule” or, in Gondar, the historic capital of the Amhara, “ respect for Amhara-ness” .[4] “The preliminary rhetoric of ethnic cleansing is already here. ” “The preliminary rhetoric of ethnic cleansing is already here.”

“Alarmists” and “complacents” In this poisonous climate, the vigour and scale of the protest accentuated the “ crisis of leadership” .[5] It was the first factor responsible for the government’s paralysis, as confirmed by one participant in the last meeting of the Central Committee of the TPLF, in early October. He ascribes it first of all to pure and simple “ power struggles ”, leading to a tussle that is all the more confused in that these conflicts run through every regional party, the relations between those parties, and between those parties and the centre, while on the same time the centre originates from the peripheries: the supreme decision- making body is the Executive Committee of the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), composed equally of representatives of the TPLF, ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation) and SPDM (Southern People’s Democratic Movement). These conflicts are first of all personal in nature, based on local affinities, religious solidarities, family connections, not to mention business interests. However, the crisis triggered a new and crucial division, between “alarmists” and “complacents”, the former advocating a rapid shift from the status quo, the latter seeing neither its necessity nor its urgency. The “old guard” is the backbone of the “alarmists”. It consists of the survivors of the founding group of the TPLF, including the heads of the army and the security services, Samora Yunus and Getachew Assefa, plus some old comrades in arms such as Berket Simon, guiding light of the ANDM. They became involved in politics in the early 1970s, within the student 31

Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen protest movement against Haile Selassie. Their long journey together gives them an experience, a maturity, and a cohesion greater than that of any current within the EPRDF. Concentrated in the centre, in Addis Ababa, most of them were sidelined from official positions as Meles imposed generational change. Returning in force behind the scenes after his death, they are the strongest backers of Hailemariam Dessalegn. They ascribe the crisis to the breaking of the bonds between “the people” and the party. In their view, those most responsible are the regional parties, starting with their new leaders. The urgent priority is to restore those bonds and to reinforce central power, to compensate for the failures of the regional authorities. Everywhere in Ethiopia… shares the same defects: authoritarianism, stifling control, infantilization. Everywhere in Ethiopia… shares the same defects: authoritarianism, stifling control, infantilization. Hailemariam expressed the anxiety of this group when he said that the issues facing the regime are a matter of “ life or death ”, [6] and that Ethiopia is “ sliding towards ethnic conflict similar to that in neighbouring countries ”. [7] Abay Tsehaye, said to be the most political head of the TPLF, raised the specter of a genocide even worse than Rwanda’s. [8] Bereket Simon warned the leadership of his party that the country was sliding towards the abyss. In vain. In contrast, Debretsion Gebremichael, member of the Politburo of the TPLF and until recently Deputy Prime Minister, one of the foremost of the second generation of leaders, retorted that there had simply been a few, geographically limited “disturbances” , that they did not reflect the overall situation in the country, that “ there is no mobilization against Tigrayans anywhere” . And even, dogmatically: “ It is not possible to have people to people [i.e. ethnic] conflict in Ethiopia ”. [9] The “complacents” are usually described as “ technocrats ” and “ careerists ”. They are considered to be “ apparatchiks ”, lacking any political fibre, owing their position and the privileges and advantages – often undeserved – that they enjoy, entirely to it. They will only be able to conceal and perpetuate those benefits as long as the Party remains a bunker. Any opening up, any movement towards a little good governance, transparency, and accountability, would be the end of them. They are also haunted by the implacable rule of “winner takes all” that has accompanied every previous regime change. However, their attitude is ambivalent. On the one hand, they are tooth and nail defenders of the EPRDF’s monopoly of power, and therefore equally implicated in the repression. The ‘complacents’ will only be able to conceal and perpetuate those benefits as long as the Party remains a bunker. On the other hand, they ascribe responsibility for the crisis to excessive central power, claiming that it hinders regional authority. In order to reverse this imbalance, and thereby strengthen their own positions, they are taking advantage of the outbreaks of ethno-nationalisms, notably by attempting to exploit the corresponding popular demands to their own advantage, up to and including the serious slide into anti-Tigrayan sentiment.

“The fate of Ethiopia would be determined by its periphery” In Oromya, at least part of the OPDO, right up to leadership level, encouraged the opposition to the Addis Ababa Master Plan, the scheme to extend the capital’s administrative scope into adjacent areas of Oromya, which triggered near universal unrest across the whole State. The same actors then did everything they could to prevent Oromya being placed under military command from Addis Ababa and then, having failed, to put a stop to it. At least locally, the authorities – necessarily members of OPDO – and the militias – under their sole control – went so far as to lend the protesters a hand. This ethno-nationalist outbreak contributed to the appointment of Lemma Megersa and Workneh Gebeyehu to the leadership of the OPDO, after the forced resignation of numbers one and two Muktar Kedir and Aster Mamo, who were seen as puppets of Addis Ababa. The new duo are long-time members of the security services, but are said to be protégés of Abadula Gemadah, the OPDO’s only strongman, hence formerly sidelined by Meles Zenawi. The main thing is that the OPDO was able to assert its autonomy by electing leaders without external pressure or diktat. In the Amhara region, it is equally unquestionable that the big initial demonstrations, though officially banned, were held with the support or tacit approval of part of the ANDM. At least at local level, the authorities and the security forces allowed “ethnic cleansing” against Tigrayans to take place, prompting 8000 to flee to Tigray. [10] Gedu Andergatchew, ANDM strongman, who is accused of having at least turned a blind eye, is still in place.

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Even in Tigray, the regional authorities – “TPLF Mekele” – are playing the nationalist card. Abay Woldu, President of the region and Chairman of the TPLF, went so far as to declare that the integrity of Tigray was non negotiable, in a clear allusion to Tigray’s retention of the Wolkait area, whose restoration is demanded by some Amhara, and despite Addis Ababa’s call for the Amhara and Tigrayan governments to negotiate this long standing issue. This firmness played a big part in the shift in at least part of Tigrayan opinion, expressed with rare vehemence by some circles. They vilified the “TPLF Mekele”, despised for its lack of education and impotence. They placed all their hopes in the Tigrayan old guard, “TPLF Addis”. According to them, only this old guard could bring about the democratization essential to the survival of the regime and, in the long term, the Tigrayan minority’s control over its own affairs. The same old guard, they now complain, has doubly betrayed the Tigrayan people: by evolving into an oligarchy that neglects the latter’s economic aspirations; and by turning its back on their national interests. On the first point, they rightly emphasize that Tigray still lags behind in terms of development. But at the same time Tigrayan businessmen are said to earn exorbitant profits from undeserved privileges. In fact, the paradox is only apparent: there is so little potential in Tigray that they invest elsewhere. Regarding the “national betrayal”, these critics highlight the old guard’s loyalty to its Marxist past, claiming that they remain “internationalist ”, “ cosmopolitan ”, and “ universalist ” out of political ambition and material interest. Addis Ababa offers positions and advantages that Tigray, poor and small as it is, would be hard put to provide. The more the balance between centre and periphery shifts towards the centre, the more attractive these positions and advantages become. In short, the view is that the old guard has yielded to a centuries-old tradition of Ethiopian history: letting itself be “ assimilated ” by the centre and prioritizing the latter’s interests over those of the periphery. As the historian Haggai Erlich has written, “ a central position ” in Addis Ababa has always been preferable to remaining a “ chief in a remote province ”. [11] The more the balance between centre and periphery shifts towards the centre, the more attractive these positions and advantages become. In consequence, these Tigrayans feel they have no other choice than to take charge of their own destiny and count only on themselves, i.e. something like building a “fortress Tigray”. It is up to the new generation to take over from the old, which has given up, even if this means embracing the “ narrow nationalism” of which its critics accuse it. This goes as far as to see a re- emergence of the hope of reunifying Tigrayans on both sides of the Ethiopia/Eritrea border into a single nation state. In this view, the other regions’ demands for self-rule should therefore be heard. Central government should be content with “regulating” , “balancing” , “ moderating” , “ arbitrating” , “ coordinating” , etc. That it should be headed by an Oromo prime minister would be in the natural order of things, since Ormoya has the largest population, and would help to calm feelings in the region. In short, one Tigrayan intellectual has joked, a new Age of the Princes would be established, but one in which the Princes did not fight amongst themselves, [12] more seriously going on to express the wish that, for the first time in history, “ the fate of Ethiopia would be determined by its periphery ”.

State of emergency The indignation aroused by the carnage in Bishoftu during the traditional Oromo annual festival (October 2), [13] the widespread destruction that followed the call for “five days of rage” in response, made the ruling power’s paralysis even more untenable. At the same time, the series of internal consultations within the EPRDF was coming to an end. The package of measures announced on October 9 reflects the shakiness of the snatched compromise. However acute their lack of mutual trust, the political currents and/or the ethnic components of the EPRDF had to arrive at an agreement: they knew that they had “ to work together or else to sink together ”. The state of emergency was proclaimed in order “ to deal with anti-peace elements that… are jeopardising the peace and security of the country ”. [14] Commentators see it as evidence that the regime was “ overwhelmed ”. But it adds little, whether to the existing legislative arsenal, [15] or to the operational capacities of the security forces since, in practice, they have never seen themselves as severely restricted by the law. The first objective is to instil fear and uncertainty, especially as several provisions are so vague that they can be interpreted in almost any way. They are now in everyone’s mind. For example, for the first time, long-standing informants have cancelled interviews because of the potential risk. The first objective is to instil fear and uncertainty. The second objective is to give the military the legal sanction that army chief Samora Yunus was demanding as a condition of continuing to maintain internal order.

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However, this proclamation also demonstrates that the centre has won a round in its trial of strength with the peripheries. The state of emergency places all the forces of order under the authority of a federal Command Post, with Hailemariam Dessalegn at its head and the Minister of Defense as its secretary. They thus control the mono-ethnic Special Regional Police in each state, who with 80,000 members far outnumber the Federal Police (around 40,000), and even more so the Army Special Force (the famous Agazi red berets, around 4000). The 500,000 or so militiamen also come under their authority. That is why the proclamation encountered ferocious opposition within the OPDO and ANDM. Essentially, however, the state of emergency is a show of strength. Not only to try to reassure increasingly nervous foreign investors, [16] but above all to convince the population of the regime’s determination to recover total control of the entire country by any means – the obsession of any Ethiopian ruling power worthy of the name – and, at the same time, to make its promise of reforms credible. Otherwise, it would have been perceived as a capitulation. Sebhat Nega, patriarch of the TPLF, explained that the purpose of the state of emergency was “ to create a situation to make us able to reform” .[17] Ultimately, the aim of the compromise reached within the party was to drive a wedge between the “ violent, extremist and armed struggle ” – to be repressed through the state of emergency – and the “ democratic peaceful engagement ” expressed by so many demonstrators – holding out a hand via reform. [18]

“Leadership has miserably failed” Interviews with senior officials cast light on the analysis that the leadership as a whole finally agreed upon. Emollient though it may be, they are all now sticking by it and keeping their previous disagreements to themselves. [19] The analysis goes as follows: the spirit and letter of the constitution are perfect, as are therefore the federal structure, the format of the institutions, the political line. The latter is not “ based on ideology but on the natural laws of development ”, as it previously was on Marxist “science”. “ Show me a developing country anywhere in the world which has a political strategy and guidelines as well articulated as Ethiopia! ” This perfection has accomplished “ miracles” . The current crisis is simply “ the price of our successes ”. It was preceded and will be followed by others, because it is nothing more than a stage, unremarkable and inevitable, on the path that will undoubtedly culminate in the nation catching up with developed countries in the next few decades. However, this stage, like any other, requires “ adjustments ”, especially as the society – richer, more educated, more mature – has become a “ demanding society ”. The young in particular, the spearhead of protest, are making demands that are socio-economic rather than political. The regime is facing “ challenges ” for having failed to make these adjustments in time. The main problem is deficiencies in implementation. In sum, things have gone off the rails because of human failings. Yielding to corruption, bad governance, lack of accountability, etc., “ leadership at various levels of the government structure has miserably failed to fully and timely [sic] address the demands made and the questions raised by the people ”. [20] The response to the crisis must therefore take two forms. First a massive purge at all levels of the Party, regional governments, the administration. Then, “ to delineate ” – the new watchword – the Party from the government, from the Assemblies, from justice, etc. in order to develop a system of checks and balances, since the self-correcting mechanisms within the Party have proved inadequate. The essential thing is “to discuss… with all stakeholders” in all possible and imaginable “debating platforms”, “assemblies”, “fora”, but with no specific goal or timetable, and under the sole authority of the EPRDF. For youth employment, a “Mobile Youth Fund” funded to the tune of 500 million dollars – some 4% of the annual budget – will be created, though the details are vague and it will take several years before its effects are felt. Above all, it is part of a largely endogenous strategy of industrialization, focused on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) on the edge of the rural areas, whereas heated debate continues within the leadership with those who advocate prioritizing foreign investment in “Industrial Parks”. In strictly political terms, “ our democratization process is still nascent. It is moving in the right direction, but it has not yet come up with inclusive engagement ”, stated the PM. [21] Electoral law will be reformed to introduce an element of proportional representation into majority rule. However, the next elections are in 2020, and the dozens of opposition MPs present before the 2005 elections could do almost nothing to temper the authoritarianism of the regime. The essential thing is “ to discuss … with all stakeholders” in all possible and imaginable “ debating platforms” , “ assemblies” , “ fora” , but with no specific goal or timetable, and under the sole authority of the EPRDF. A promise reiterated year after year, without impact. One of the essential causes of the crisis, its federal dimension, is covered in a single short sentence in the 15 pages of President Mulatu’s speech: “ more should be done for the effective implementation of the federal system ”. In any case, “Ethiopia is an idol… and exemplary for the world for peaceful [interethnic] coexistence” , declares the State Minister for Federal Affairs. [22] 34

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Anticipating the worst What emerges from all the interviews with nonofficial contacts is that the expectation of a symbolic gesture, one that would be significant and have immediate impact, proving that the regime had grasped the essence of the crisis and wishes sincerely to address it, has not been met. According to them, the regime is relying first on repression, and on reforms only as a “ footnote ”. Merera Gudina, a long- standing leader of the opposition, sums up the general sentiment: “ too little, too late” .[23] Nothing has been done to reach out to either the main opposition forces, even the legal opposition, nor the civil society or the media, quite the contrary. This could be envisaged only after the end of the state of emergency, Hailemariam is said to have told one figure from the international community. These interlocutors share the dark pessimism of an editorial in the Washington Post : “ the state of emergency will bottle up the pressures even more, increasing the likelihood they will explode anew… It won’t work ”. [24] According to this view, the chances of a genuine opening up on the part of the regime are so small that there is a high probability that the worst will happen: a threat to the very survival of the country, the only question being when this dislocation would occur. Washington Post: “the state of emergency … It won’t work” While the official media bang on about the “ strong commitment” of the leadership “ to make its promise of deep reform a reality” ,[25] interviews with top officials provide hints of the form and scope of reform, which remain consistent with the official analysis of the crisis.

Focus on “service delivery” There is no urgency: change will be “ an ongoing endless process” . The first specific deadline is in seven months, in June 2017, to report back on the purge and examine a document currently in preparation, on what the EPRDF should become in the next ten years. In this view, the crisis is not systemic. So neither the constitution, nor the institutions, nor the political line will be touched. How could the latter be challenged since it obeys universal “ laws ”? For that reason, regardless of all the promised “discussions ”, no convincing reasons are given for the much touted opening up to entail any restructuring of the political arena. The EPRDF alone, as sectarian as ever, has understood and applies these “ laws ”, whereas the opposition parties oppose or reject them. The EPRDF alone has the near monopoly of skills needed to implement them, skills that the other parties lack. In short, the opposition is still not “ constructive ”. If the regime needs to become more inclusive, it is essentially in material terms, by sharing the cake more fairly through improvements in “ service delivery” . To do this, it is necessary and sufficient to put an end to individual erring through the self-reform of the EPRDF, i.e. reform by and for the Party itself. To achieve the famous “ delineation” , MPs, judges, ministers, civil servants, etc. would split themselves in two, remaining obedient to the Party but putting their mission first. Why would they do this, given that they never have before? “ Because they have become aware of the crisis” , is the explanation. So responding to the crisis requires no systemic reshaping through the establishment of independent counterforces. A U-turn in individual behaviour will be enough. Why would they do this, given that they never have before? The EPRDF sticks to the same age-old paradigm. Since Ethiopia is still at a precapitalist stage, the intelligentsia is the only social group capable of setting the path to follow and leading the way. The EPRDF contains its best elements. Ethnic identities continue to be society’s main structuring factor. The EPRDF alone represents them. As one senior official confirmed, it is not until the country enters a capitalist stage that pluralism will impose itself: with the emergence of social classes, each will construct its own political party to express its interests. What the EPRDF is still seeking is not simultaneous development AND democracy, but development THEN democracy. Why would they do this, given that they never have before? In this respect, the arrival of technocrats – brandishing the indispensable PhD and with no major party position – was widely interpreted as evidence of a new openness in the cabinet reshuffle. Yet it perpetuates the monopoly rule of the “intellocracy”.

The paradox of the strongman

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The consensus reached on October 9 is fragile and hence precarious. Nothing proves that the “reformers” have won the long-term game, though they have scored a point. Deep down, they do not share the same views. They lack a standout personality to act as a leader. They have a clear view of where they want to go, which is to apply the constitution to the letter, but over a very long timescale and with no precise and concerted idea of the steps needed to get there. As for their rank-and-file adherents, they make no secret of still embracing the same paradox: we need reforms, but we need a new strongman to manage and impose them, for fear that they will otherwise lead to chaos. We need reforms, but we need a new strongman to manage and impose them. On the opposition side, all the Oromo we spoke to emphasized the generational gap between the educated youth, broadly aged 16 to 25, spearhead of the protests notably in Oromya, and their elders. The latter are ambivalent. They feel a sincere empathy for the grievances and aspirations of the younger generation, but have reservations, even hostility, regarding the violent methods sometimes employed. In some cases they even physically opposed attempts at destruction during the “ five days of rage” .[26] They remain traumatized by the Civil War under the previous regime, the Derg. Then they acquired military know-how that the young activists don’t have. The latter also lack coordination and leadership. For all these reasons, a historian of armed popular uprisings in Ethiopia in the twentieth century has concluded that it is unlikely that the protests could become a significant guerrilla campaign, or that a sustained armed peasant upsurge - a “jacquerie” could occur. As for the pockets of insurrection that have appeared in the Amhara region, they mainly affect areas where the authorities’ control has always been weak, even essentially formal. Ethiopian history teaches that a regime only falls if its forces of repression, or at least part of them, turn against it. Today, apart from a few unconfirmed incidents, cohesion seems to be holding, say experts close to them. It might only break down if the EPRDF became divided to the point of being torn apart by centrifugal forces. However, the military command has always let it be known that it would intervene before this happened, as ultimate saviour of the regime. Under these circumstances, steady deterioration – a kind of rotting, seems a possible scenario. Under these circumstances, steady deterioration – a kind of rotting, seems a possible scenario. Without any substantive resolution, the regime could re-establish law and order, as the first effects of the state of emergency seem to suggest. The reforms would not tackle the core problems. The ruling power would remain contested and delegitimized but, in the absence of an alternative, Ethiopians would toe the line. Investors would remain cautious, not to say skittish, affecting economic growth. But neither of the two opposing camps would gain the upper hand, any more than they would reach a constructive compromise. Ultimately, what might possibly occur is a classic scenario in Ethiopian history: the demise of one strongman, followed by a period of great disorder until a new strongman takes up the reins.

[1] See for example Foreign Affairs , November 7, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ethiopia/2016-11-07/twitter- hurting-ethiopia [2] Unless otherwise specified, all quotations are taken from interviews conducted in October 2016 in Addis Ababa and Mekele, with people who, for obvious reasons, wished to remain anonymous. [3] Interview, Addis Ababa, October 2016 and Addis Standard , September 28, 2016, http://addisstandard.com/ethiopias- gradual-journey-verge-crisis/ [4] Tigray On Line , July 31 2016, http://hornaffairs.com/en/2016/07/31/ethiopia-massive-protest-gondar/ [5] See René Lefort, Open Democracy , July 4, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren%c3%a9-lefort/ethiopia- leadership-in-disarray [6] Walta , August 30, 2015, www.waltainfo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20802:eprdf-determines- to-cease-talking-but-deliver-good-governanace&catid=71:editors-pick&Itemid=396 [7] BBC , August 3, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-africa-36883387 [8] Ethiomedia , September 10, 2016, http://www.ethiomedia.com/1016notes/7451.html [9] AlMariam , September 25, 2016, http://almariam.com/2016/09/25/disinformation-in-t-tplf-land-of-living-lies-pinocchio- preaches-truth-against-perception-in-ethiopia/

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[10] Tigray Online , October 10, 2016, http://www.tigraionline.com/articles/tigraians-victims-inamara.html [11] Haggai Erlich, Ras Alula, Ras Seyum, Tigre and Ethiopia integrity, p. 364, Proceedings of the Eight International Conference on Ethiopia Studies , Vol. 1, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa, Froebenius Institute, Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 1988. [12] During the Age of the Princes (1769-1855), the Emperor's power was purely nominal, and local warlords, in constant conflict, ruled the provinces. [13] Human Rigths Watch has published the most exhaustive narrative of this event but with some omissions, which put its balance into question. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/08/qa-recent-events-and-deaths-irreecha-festival-ethiopia [14] Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation , October 9, 2016, cited by http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/ethiopia- declares-state-emergency-protests-161009110506730.html [15] Addis Standard , November 2, 2016, http://addisstandard.com/why-ethiopias-freewheeling-regime-does-need-a-state-of- emergency/ [16] See for example Washington Post , November 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/investors-shy- away-from-ethiopia-in-the-wake-of-violent-protests/2016/11/01/2d998788-9cae-11e6-b552-b1f85e484086_story.html [17] Interview, Addis Ababa, October 2016. [18] Ethiopian News Agency , October 11, 2016, http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/politics/item/2082-pm-reaffirms- government-s-commitment-to-democratization [19] Unless otherwise stated, the quotations that follow are taken from these interviews. [20] Speech by President of the Republic Mulatu Teshome before both Houses, October 10, 2016. [21] Ethiopian News Agency , October 11, 2016, http://www.ena.gov.et/en/index.php/politics/item/2082-pm-reaffirms- government-s-commitment-to-democratization. [22] Walta , November 7, 2016, http://www.waltainfo.com/index.php/news/detail/25576 [23] AFP, October 11, 2016, http://en.rfi.fr/wire/20161011-ethiopia-pm-seeks-reform-electoral-system-after-protests [24] Washington Post , October 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ethiopia-meets-protests-with- bullets/2016/10/11/0f54aa02-8f14-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html [25] Walta , November 5, 2016, http://www.waltainfo.com/index.php/news/editors_pick/detail?cid=25549 [26] See for example Washington Post , November 2, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/investors-shy- away-from-ethiopia-in-the-wake-of-violent-protests/2016/11/01/2d998788-9cae-11e6-b552-b1f85e484086_story.html

The EPRDF that I knew Gebru Asrat, Ethiopian Reporter, 27.8.2016, Interview by Wudineh Zenebe http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/eprdf-i-knew Gebru Asrat is a former president of Tigray Regional State (1991–2001) and one of the top leaders and executive and central committee member as well as politburo member of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. After the Ethio-Eritrea War two factions were created in TPLF and the faction critical of Meles Zenawi, the then Chairman of the TPLF/EPRDF and Prime Minister of Ethiopia, led by Defense Minister Siye Abraha, and Gebru Asrat, the then influential governor of Tigray, disagreed with those aligned with Meles over "key issues of ideology", accused their supporters of corruption and Meles of failing to act quickly or decisively enough over the crisis with Eritrea. Then the party was divided into two groups. One group, which included Gebru, Tewolde Woldemariam, Aregash Adane, and Siye, believed that the leadership was bent on serving foreign "imperialist" interests. The other group which included Meles Zenawi argued that the

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TPLF was sinking into decadence, involving itself in Bonapartism. Eventually, Gebru left the TPLF/EPRDF in the early 2000s after the division and went on to establish Arena Tigray, an alternative political party to TPLF in Tigray. Gebru became its chairman in 2007; Arena Tigray merged with other opposition parties in Ethiopia to form the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (Medrek). Gebru ran for the parliamentary seat representing the city of Mekelle in the 2010 parliamentary elections but came short of winning, according to The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). Regarding the latest protest and other pertinent issues, Wudineh Zenebe of The Reporter sat down with Gebru for an exclusive interview. Excerpts:

The Reporter: It has been 15 years since you left the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and formed a political party, Arena Tigray. How do you see these 15 years in retrospect? Gebru Asrat : As you know, 15 years is a very long time for a politician and a citizen. As a citizen of this fair country of ours, I have experienced a lot of ups and downs during this period. Especially, the so-called reform process in TPLF, which took place some 15 years ago, has left a lasting impact both on the nation and on me personally. Our party has endured a lot during this time. We have seen a lot of our members imprisoned, exiled and three of our members killed. We still have 20 of our members imprisoned, including farmers. Generally, our party and I have endured a lot of repression and abuse; so I can say that this has been the most testing 15 years for me.

Although you have parted ways with your party comrades, do you still keep in touch with your friends in the party? Do you have the opportunity to meet and hold political discussions with them? As you know, 12 of us had left the party during the fateful split. Out of that, three of us organized ourselves under the Arena Tigray umbrella and have continued our political struggle. So, we keep close contacts both on the account of our party work and personal level. With the others, I can’t say that we have a common political platform to discuss. However, we see each other on social occasions and the like. Unfortunately, we don’t have that cordial relationship since then because it has been the case that the political and social life is highly intertwined in the TPLF. By the way, when someone leaves a party, he or she is considered as an enemy. I do understand that political life should have been kept separate from our social and personal lives. And for people who went to the bushes to take part in one of the longest guerilla resistances in Africa, we should have had a bond that transcended political boundaries; but that is not the case. I know this is not modern, but, you see, that is the nature of the TPLF.

You have held key party and government positions for more than a decade before the split. How do you see that party back in those days and the party today? When you think about the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the problems it is facing today, you have to understand where all these issues are emanating from. I think the mother of all the problems that the party is facing today emanates from the ideological foundation of the party. As you know, the EPRDF is a Marxist party and most of the political direction that it follows comes from Marxism. This has crystallized particularly during the days of struggle. This is a party which has set out to ensure a dominant party system in Ethiopia. This is also a party that believes that democracy is class-based and that it is deserved only by those classes which are affiliated to the party. In general, it has worked to ensure the dominance of one party or the dominance of a proletarian party in Ethiopia. So, when the world started to change, the party also realized that it could not go further with those sorts of ideas in the new world order. Hence, it reformed some of the ideas slightly to make it more suited to administer the nation in the new global context. This sudden shift can be seen in the remnants of the so-called revolutionary democracy which includes party hegemony, democratic centralism, lack of checks and balances and separation of power in today’s EPRDF and the government. So, if you must talk about the issues, which are overflowing today, it is instructive to consider the basic nature of revolutionary democracy. If you follow that system of governance, it will not allow citizens to have political and economic freedom. So this is the true nature of the party but owing to the political context of the rest of the world, it was forced to introduce a generally liberal constitution. This provision, in my opinion, is just a cover-up to address pressure coming from outside. Articles 14 to 44 of the constitution are generally fundamental democratic and human rights. In my opinion, this is a document drafted for the benefit of donor nations; it is a façade to say that the party is really democratizing the nation. But, the real document that is used to rule the nations is those emanating from revolutionary democracy ideology and those which divide the population along friend and foe lines. So, these contradictions have resulted in a major division in the party’s higher level leadership right after the Ethio-Eritrea War. This division ended with Meles Zenawi emerging as an authoritarian leader in the party. After that, the party faced a big challenge in the post-2005 period from opposition parties. As usual the party dealt with this challenge by force and violence. But, forceful repression was not enough to settle the nerves in the party; rather it has taken other legal measures such as the Antiterrorism Law, the Media Law and the Charities

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen and Societies Law. After all, the long-time strongman of the party, Meles Zenawi, passed away and the party did not prepare someone to fill the shoes of its leader. Now, tactically, the party is weakened to its cores. The party did not have a leadership which controls the party, the government and the army altogether. So, this has weakened the party tactically and resulted in being overrun by corruption and maladministration. In fact, it has reached to a point where it has been detached from the public. This has to do with the overall centralist tendencies of the party. The party ideology from the start is a centralist and controlling ideology.

You said that Meles has been a center of gravity in the party for a very long time. So, since his passing away, where would you say this purported centre of gravity lies in the party? One thing I have noticed after the passing away of Meles Zenawi is that the party did not make any changes to its ideology and overall thinking. They are saying that they are upholding his legacy. So, the question is what they are calling the legacy of Meles Zenawi. Is it a legacy of authoritarianism and thus far we have not seen any strongman emerging from the party; it does not seem that it will happen anytime soon. So, now, the political centre of gravity is dispersed. One is the member parties of the EPRDF while the army, the regional states and government are various centers of gravity in the politics of Ethiopia. If you look at the regional states, they are not under the control of the central government as it was the case before; now each are trying to establish their own independent governments. So, this has its own conflicts and grievances; I think this is what we are seeing in Ethiopia at this point in time.

The EPRDF is a four-party coalition, and there are some five affiliate parties which are active in all regional states. Now, the decision that is passed at the EPRDF level will have consent of all the four parties but the affiliate parties are not in the coalition and hence are not in the decision-making process. How did you reconcile this contradiction when you were in the party? As I have said before, I don’t think affiliate parties have any meaningful role in the political decision of the country. As I remember it, all and every decision that matters to the nation is made by the EPRDF Executive Committee. Practically, government and party have no distinct separation of power in Ethiopia. Because this is the basic essence of the so-called dominant party system, the party controls the government, the army, the civil society and other key structures. Let alone the affiliate parties, I don’t think the members of the party itself have any real decision-making power; it is the executive committee that calls all the important shots. It has been this way always. Previously, it was the decision of Meles that goes down to the kebele level. Now, the executive committee is one stirring the nation.

After the succession, most of the members of the EPRDF Executive Committee are a new batch of leaders. On the other hand, the veteran members of the party are still in the party structure but not in the leadership anymore. So, how do you see the two playing out in the decision-making process? When Meles put this so-called succession plan on the table, I expected that he had his own political calculation. He perhaps had an idea that the old guards might not be suitable to conduct business the way he wants to conduct business. This is what he did by the so-called reform process; he retained a group of “yesmen” around him and got rid of the rest. Then, he came up with a succession plan because he was not content with the outcome of the so-called reform process. If you look at the succession, he did the same thing; he still managed to retain a batch of old veterans who pose less challenge for him. So, as I see it, the succession process had no value other than weakening the party. However, as I said it before; the problem of the party is in its ideology not the personalities. So, empowering young leaders under the same political ideology would bear very little fruit. My assessment now is that the old guards are a bit worried about handing over the party to weak leaders. I see that from what they have been doing and saying. They are saying things that undermines political leaders at various levels in the party. This is a sign that they are not comfortable. I hear them saying on different occasions that the current leadership is generally weak. This, I think, is the legacy of Meles; he picked these leaders because they were weak; because they don’t pose any challenge. And the old guard is of the view that all these problems are now reigning in the party because the leadership is weak. Of course, I don’t fully agree with this assessment; I think when the party sets out to build a political system where everything rests on one party that is when that party set itself up for failure. In the first place, I think if the party is democratic internally, strong leaders would have the chance to emerge. Nevertheless, no amount of strong leadership would undo what is being ruined by the founding ideology of the party. Now, if you see the reform period, Meles raised the agenda of corruption and internal party democracy to get rid of us. However, you can see that he used that agenda just to get rid of us since the problem of corruption and maladministration escalated even after we left. Now, had we remained in the party, would these condition change? I highly doubt it because corruption and maladministration are reflections of the internal democratic nature of the party first, and the rest of the country in general.

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You see, you can’t get rid of corruption unless you have free media, free democratic institutions, free law enforcement institutions and free civil society; they are watchdogs.

But, if I may ask, even from the time when you were in the party, the four parties in the EPRDF were accused of nurturing their own economically empowered support base which resulted in the current severe disparity in wealth distribution in the country. Is that a sound argument? You see, one cannot build a dominant party system without a critical mass that has serious economic stake in the party. There must be a group which carries the system forward. In other countries, they call it chronic capitalism. Even when you look at the drive to become a member of the ruling coalition, you can see that it is the economic advantage that overwhelms all the other drivers. These so-called million-plus members have joined the party for exactly the advantage that they expect to get from membership. This could be in terms of accessing bank loans or other advantages. I think the party has a name for it; they call them developmental capitalist. But, at the end of the day, this business people have one intention that is using policy rent to accumulate wealth. This is common for all the parties and as I told you before this process had already started back in the day when I was in the party.

I can understand individuals with less than genuine intentions joining the party to strike their personal advantage. However, did these parties have a grand scheme to empower such individuals, which is approved at the party level? I don’t think it needs an open endorsement or a grand plan. If you see, some of the biggest businessmen in Ethiopia today and ask how they make their wealth you will have your answer. You will see that most of them had relations with politicians in one way or the other. But, for sure, there is not official party slogan to this effect; in fact, at the party level the narrative would be that the party will be fighting rent-seeking. If you think about it, how can you expect business to grow genuinely in a country where almost every aspect of business and social life is controlled by one party; and that there is no visible system of fair competition? This even goes down to the education system. Grades and all-round academic excellence are not going to land you a job these days. Now, this does not mean that all the six or seven million members benefit from the system. Only a few reap the benefits. However, for the majority, they hope to benefit one day.

The party is said to have a very strong individual and institutional evaluation process; you and your friends felt the brunt of this evaluation back in 2001. But, how do you see this now? Many people claim that it has gone soft. Do you agree? When I was in the party, there was a strong belief in the evaluation process. Whatever the basis—be it from the ideology or from the political direction—there was always a strong belief in the process of evaluation. Some of us had a genuine trust in the process of evaluation and I know of many party comrades who fell prey to this process. The basic issue is that the evaluation process is not institutional; it has no formal structure. For example, if someone accuses you of something, there is no way of defending that or check the facts. If the evaluation process is conducted following the country’s legal framework and if it has the freedom and the institutional structure to ensure the implementation of legally accepted principles; including the framework to respect the right of appeal and the like, then it will be acceptable. However, without those systems, the so- called evaluation process would become an instrument to attack a few people. This is what we are seeing these days. However, I don’t think having a stronger or a weaker evaluation would make a difference. It is like what Albert Einstein said: insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. As far as I am concerned, it is equally insane for the EPRDF to try to use the same evaluation tool that it used during the struggle days. Rather it should have focused on reforming the evaluation process based on the rule of law, freedom and justice; it should focus on nurturing the institutional structure of evaluation. I think that it is the toughest challenge for the party to date. I think the so-called Good Governance Deficit Survey that was conducted by the government last November and which was revealed to officials is one indication of this challenge. As we know, after all that fanfare about the survey and the political determination to uproot issues of good governance, rent-seeking mentality and corruption, the agenda was not able to move an inch in the past one year. This is clearly because the party is entangled by patronage networks all over its hierarchy and even with personalities outside of the party. This complicates things and makes it difficult to take any concrete measures. This was also admitted by the leadership of the party even during Meles’s leadership. Meles was quoted as saying, “our hands and legs are tied”.

Now, the party is planning another round of evaluation, targeting abuse of power among mid-level and high-level leadership of the party. Do you think this evaluation would bear fruit? I am afraid I don’t expect anything different from this round of evaluation either. I have heard the press statement that was released by the executive committee this week and found it to be completely off base with regard to the current situation in Ethiopia. If you look at demonstrations across the Oromia and Amhara regional states, they both are about basic freedoms.

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They are also about free and fair elections; which mean the people are saying that they did not vote for the government. The other is fair distribution of wealth. As much as there are some unnecessary questions advanced by the demonstrators, most of the questions are basic and fair. So, it is a platform for the public to express its grievances. Hence, one can judge that the party leadership is way off in its evaluation of the political turmoil. If you see what the party has identified as challenges, these are issues which were recognized a year ago. So, I don’t suppose, this is a credible evaluation.

What does that tell you about the next course of action? Do you think the party would concentrate on taking measures than solving the problems? I think you have to note two points. If you have noticed, the party has stopped citing progress in the political arena to justify its rule of the country. I think it has noticed that it could no more claim gains in the political aspect such as democracy, freedom or justice since its track record is an utter failure in all these aspects. So, the other alternative in absence of legitimacy is force. You can see that from the statements issued during the protest in Amhara and Oromia regional states. Especially, in the TPLF what is heard is really absurd. They are reverting back to narratives which are befitting to the struggle days some 25 years ago. If you look at the whole EPRDF structure, you can see some of them say that the problem is caused by extremists, narrow- nationalists or chauvinists or some say it is the involvement of the foreign forces in the political life of the country. They also lack overwhelming unity in what has been the source of the unrest. If we evaluate the claims deeper, there is Eritrea which is our next-door neighbor and enemy of Ethiopia. Yes, I do see Eritrean leaders tying to destabilize the country. But, if the Eritrean leading party is able to conjure such huge political avalanche in Ethiopia, EPRDF should really look inward and identify why it has been outdone by the leadership in Asmara.

Can you please clarify it more, because, given the fact that the protests are organized and having slogans, flags and other stuffs which require a great deal of finance to organize. In this regard the government and some commentators argued that there are some external factors such as the Governments of Eritrea and the others behind the protest in Oromia and Amahra regions. How do you react on this matter? I don’t think it is possible. It is difficult to argue that a movement, which incorporates thousands and millions, can be led by external forces. I don’t also think external forces conspire to organize such massive movements. If there was no problem internally those forces are not capable to organize and lead such a movement whatever they propagated. In my view, such comments are humiliating the youth and public who are asking a legitimate question and demanding their rights. The questions are crystal clear. Even the regime itself admits that unemployment, corruption, bad governance and so on are the problems in the country. Of course, since the movements are spontaneous, have some elements of irrationality and ethnic interests focused attacks. However, we have to look at the base and the extent separately. Bear in mind that the movement is not led by any political party, association or anybody who takes the responsibility. In this regard, it might miss its intention. Flags were down but the public itself did it. But the sentiment to down the flag is there within the society. So, we should discuss it critically. Some ethnic-based clashes and targeting a certain ethnic group were evident which in my view should be criticized. Though these were evident during the protests it is difficult to conclude that external actors back the protest. It is totally unacceptable and wrong. I don’t mean that there are no external actors or interests at all; I am not that naïve. Eritreans, some neighboring countries, and the Arabs might be involved but the key issue is that these groups would use the opportunity to destabilize or back the movement if only there is a problem internally and where there is no democracy and freedom. If these issues are addressed and the internal administration is proper any external force can’t do anything let alone finance and support others. It is very difficult to win Ethiopians through wars. For me the greatest danger that is directed against our country is that shifting the cause of the current problem into other issues and blaming external forces, narrow-mindedness and chauvinism. This will lead the future of the country into uncertainty and an unnecessary path. Take my party for instance. Members of my party are detained, harassed and are suffering a lot and are able to witness the problems in the country. In this regard, closing all ways of peaceful protests will result in mutiny, chaos and radicalization. Therefore, if radicalization and unlawful activities erupt in this country, the entire responsible body is going to be the EPRDF itself.

There are ongoing protests in Oromia and Amhara regional states. The Amhara protests are associated with the identity question of the Wokait people. Given the fact that you were the President of Tigray Regional State, how was the issue back then and what do you think is the possible solution?

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen

Both the issue of the master plan in Oromia and the question of identity of Wolkait for me are just phenomenon or manifestations; I don’t think these are the fundamental questions that the public demanded. Our land is grabbed, the election was rigged, the administrators are dictators, there is no justice at all, the youth are unemployed, party affiliation is important to secure jobs and so on were the major questions raised in Oromia. The same is true in Amhara as well. However, a certain movement erupted as a result of a certain phenomenon. In Amahra region the organizers believe that the Wolkait issue has mobilized the public into one. In Oromia they believe that the issue of the master plan will do the same. These questions are indeed questions by themselves, but their role as mechanism to address other questions is much stronger and in this regard it played a great role to triggering the public. I was the administrator of Tigray and concerning the issue of Wolkait we should look at two things. Let me discuss the issue of Wolkait and the regional administration generally. Wolkait was bordered based on the federal arrangement enshrined in the constitution putting in to consideration language, culture and patterns of settlement. In this regard, half of the Wolkait population speaks Tigrigna and half of the Tsegede population also speaks Tigrigna. Those who speak Tigrigna are incorporated in the Tigray region and those who speaks Amharic in the Amhara region. From Tigray those who speak Agewegna were also incorporated in the Amhara region. Five weredas, which were administered under Tigray region before the federal arrangement was implemented, were also incorporated in Afar Regional State. Here we have to look at the cause of this issue carefully the cause was not about resource or land grabbing. Because, if the issue was about land grabbing or resource, the Afar region, which has a large deposit of salt, potash and other resources is much vital than Humera or Wolkait, which is in the Amhara Regional State. Concerning the border demarcation issue, the previous border demarcation was changed but it was not only in Tigray, the new Oromia border demarcation itself incorporates areas, which were called Shewa, Bale and Hararge provinces. The Afar region also incorporates areas from Wello and Tigray. However, proper demarcation can be questionable and arguable. The principle might be arguable but the demarcation of Wolkait and other areas were conducted under this principle. This question should be raised not only in Tigray; it should rather be raised all over the country. If we said that this issue affects the people living in the area the issue should be resolved through political discussion. Now people raised the question in relation to the identity of Wolkait and the question should be addressed in a democratic and peaceful manner.

Are you saying that the federal arrangement, which is implemented in the country, focuses on ethnic lines rather than geographic lines? By the way, I don’t buy this argument. I don’t consider a federal arrangement that follows ethnic lines is the source of all the problems that the country is facing now. The issue is that there is no democracy. All the problems that we are facing now will happen even if the federal arrangement is based on geographic lines. There were geographic-based demarcations in this country but the question is why did different ethnic groups mobilize their forces to fight against the Emperor? There was chaos during the military regime too. However, the key issue here is that one of the major sources of problems was lack of democracy. Hence, if the federal arrangement is implemented without democracy the end result will be chaos and war. Therefore, I don’t consider the debate over the federal arrangement is mainly about geography or identity. The major question here is whether the regions are exercising their powers democratically or are they simply following a top-down approach. I believe that these regions are controlled by a dictator from the center. In this regard, I also don’t believe that there is real federalism in Ethiopia. In any country, federalism exists when there is democracy. If you look at the cases of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and other countries, disintegration occurred not because the system follows ethnic lines; it is rather due to the undemocratic and dictatorial nature of the regimes and leaderships. What I suggest is that there is a 25-year-old border demarcation in the country and the ruling party focused on identity and eroded unity. This sentiment has influenced the relation of the people of this country. The values and procedures of unity are loosely held and the major propaganda of the regime is focused on the rights of nations and nationalities. The regime detached the issue of respecting the rights of nations and nationalities from democracy and made it its foundation. When the regime campaigns in Tigray, they say that chauvinist Amharas and narrow-minded Oromos are coming for you. While campaigning in Oromia and Amhara, they do the same. The regime propagates these elements. Previously, the Amhara elites did not raise the issue of ethnicity; however, now some sections of the Amharas are also raising this question.

So are you telling me that the regime focuses on dividing than uniting this country? Yes, especially during the election campaign period. Since each party is running in this own localities and constituencies, each party is ordered to focus on its differences from other ethnic groups and terrorize the society based on the differences. The extent of the campaign through time reached this level.

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Deutsch - Äthiopischer Verein German - Ethiopian Association Findet Äthiopien Wege aus der Krise? Infoblätter 3/2017 Verwendete Quellen

In the case of Wolkait the population speaks both Tigrigna and Amharic. Was there any effort to incorporate the consent of the public during the border demarcation or was it simply implemented through a top-down approach? Generally speaking, the demarcation was conducted based on the agreement of the political parties of the respective regions, which were established during the time. It was not like a referendum. So there was no say from the public. When the demarcation was conducted, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) was there from the Amhara side and the TPLF represented Tigray. The decision was made based on the language of the population not based on referendum. It was taken for granted, except for some debatable issues, but it was not that contentious.

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