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Amy's Report.Qx ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT NO. 112 JUNE 2003 INSIDE Fighting Terrorism DAVID WRIGHT-NEVILLE on the Southeast Asian Front Prospects Dim: Counter- Terrorism Cooperation in Southeast Asia page 5 ABSTRACT: These five essays suggest that U.S.–Southeast Asia relations have improved since the United States launched its war against terrorism, but many potential pitfalls lie ahead. David ANGEL M. RABASA Wright-Neville maintains that corruption, anti-U.S. sentiment, and institutional weakness at Southeast Asia: The the multilateral level may disrail meaningful counter-terrorism cooperation in the region. Angel Second Front? Rabasa is more optimistic, implying that U.S. relations with Southeast Asia are deepening and likely to improve—although he points out that under weak governments extremists tend to page 11 wield influence that is disproportionate to their numbers. Sheldon Simon makes suggestions SHELDON W. SIMON for improving coordination of efforts but expresses concern that the United States may involve itself too closely in domestic political disputes. Larry Niksch expresses similar concerns and U.S. Policy and Terrorism emphasizes the importance of non-military activities such as law enforcement assistance and aid in Southeast Asia programs that target the fundamental causes of conflicts. Carolina Hernandez outlines the page 16 links between Philippine extremists and global networks, and also points out that while more than 80 percent of the Philippine public supports U.S. military assistance, resentment may be LARRY A. NIKSCH building among Muslim and other Filipinos. Southeast Asian Terrorism in U.S. Policy page 22 Introduction military training in the Philippines to what the Amy McCreedy U.S. State Department calls “quiet, nuts-and- CAROLINA G. HERNANDEZ bolts support” in the Muslim-majority coun- Te rrorism is not new to Southeast Asians.What tries of Indonesia and Malaysia.1 As the contrib- Fighting Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A View has changed since September 11, 2001, is rela- utors to this Report make clear, each country from the Philippines tions with Washington, which quickly began and situation requires a different approach, but referring to the region as the “second front” at the same time efforts must be coordinated page 25 (after Afghanistan) in its war against groups across borders to combat enemies who are linked to al Qaeda. For Southeast Asian govern- increasingly sophisticated and internationally ments, the U.S. war on terror opens up new linked. opportunities and pressures, as they struggle to David Wright-Neville,senior research fel- marshal efforts against extremists while main- low at the Global Terrorism Research Project at taining political support from Muslim popula- Monash University in Victoria, Australia, tions. addresses many of the challenges involved in On March 23, the Asia Program sponsored a coordinating efforts against well-organized ter- ASIA PROGRAM seminar to look at U.S.–Southeast Asia relations rorist networks. Generally more pessimistic than and what has been accomplished in counter- the other writers in regard to U.S.-Southeast terrorism cooperation.The essays in this Special Asia cooperation, he cites corruption, political Report are the result of that event (with an expediency, governmental interference and additional paper by David Wright-Neville, who anti-Western rhetoric as major obstacles. was unable to attend). Collectively, the essays Multilateral forums such as APEC should be show the sheer complexity and variety of the encouraged, but are too often nothing more war on terror, which involves everything from than “grandiose statements of intent” because of Amy McCreedy is program associate in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT historically embedded rivalries that prevent mean- eration. He also maintains that “at least from the ingful intelligence sharing among Southeast Asian standpoint of political will, Indonesia might have governments. For example, Singapore does not want turned a corner in the war on terrorism” as the to reveal the extent of its intelligence capabilities for result of the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002. fear of fanning anti-Singaporean sentiment in Hearteningly, the arrest of senior figures in Jemaah Malaysia and other neighboring countries. Islamiyah (which can be considered “the regional Interaction among security personnel is confined to subsidiary of al Qaeda”) was supported by domestic specific operational issues—“a poor substitute” for mainstream religious groups. In light of these devel- the swapping of raw data and joint scenario plan- opments, Rabasa implies that U.S. relations with ning.True cooperation may not last past the “initial Southeast Asia are deepening, and likely to burst of enthusiasm,”Wright-Neville fears. improve—although he acknowledges that the war Wright-Neville maintains that Southeast Asian against terrorism has polarized Southeast Asian soci- leaders have given terrorist networks a “decade head eties to some extent and has been exploited oppor- 2 start.”And now that the leaders have boosted their tunistically by certain leaders to thwart their opposi- own positions by scapegoating the United States tion. and contributing to anti-Western rhetoric, how can Rabasa argues that while anti-Americanism is a they be seen cooperating with Washington? Is it problem, it is not as alarming as many fear. He points realistic to think that counter-terrorism can be out that, according to a survey of Indonesian depoliticized, especially when major leadership demonstrations against the U.S. war in Iraq, partici- transitions are imminent in several Southeast Asian pation dropped sharply during the war’s second states? Because of these and other stumbling blocks, week. Two weeks after U.S. forces swept into cooperation is “unlikely to yield positive long-term Baghdad, a Jakarta-based risk analysis firm was benefits.” Wright-Neville recommends that the reporting that the war’s effects had all but disap- United States look to itself and concentrate on deal- peared. Rabasa also notes that Southeast Asian ing with Singapore, with which it enjoys a congen- extremists are not necessarily linked to global net- ial relationship. works. Some have domestic aims that are no direct Angel M. Rabasa, senior policy analyst at threat to the United States. RAND, also focuses mainly (though not exclusive- Rabasa emphasizes that Islamic militancy in ly) on Indonesia and Malaysia. But while Wright- Indonesia is not as great as sometimes assumed. For Neville emphasizes continuity, Rabasa describes example, self-defined Islamist parties (those support- new energies that have galvanized the region. Much ing an Islamic state) received less than 6 percent of has been learned about terrorist networks in the past the vote in the 1999 parliamentary election.Within year, he maintains, and ASEAN has revitalized itself this minority,an even smaller fraction advocates vio- as a vehicle for intensified counter-terrorism coop- lence or terrorism.All this is not to warrant compla- cency. The danger is that extremists can wield THE ASIA PROGRAM greater influence than their small numbers would seem to suggest, because governments and civil soci- The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposi- ety institutions are weak. tion that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can begin Sheldon W. Simon,professor of political sci- to understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldest regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical ence at Arizona State University, discusses Singa- and cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s pore,Thailand and the Philippines, paying particular capital. In seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences, attention to military links and intelligence sharing. prominent scholars of Asia interact with one another and with He agrees with Rabasa that the sharing of meaning- policy practitioners to further understanding of the peoples, tra- ful information through ASEAN is improving, ditions, and behaviors of the world’s most populous continent. though there are short-term stumbling blocks. He Asia Program Staff: points out that the expansion of Cobra Gold, an Robert M. Hathaway, Director annual U.S.-led multilateral exercise, may facilitate Gang Lin, Program Associate cooperation and interoperability as well as to Amy McCreedy, Program Associate Wilson Lee, Program Assistant demonstrate American commitment to the region. Timothy R. Hildebrandt, Program Assistant Though there are problems with Cobra Gold (e.g., its anti-terrorism exercise is jungle-based instead of FIGHTING TERRORISM ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN FRONT urban), the U.S. Pacific command would like to see they have their own agendas, which may not neces- up to five countries participating. Although only sarily further U.S. interests. For example, the Singapore and Thailand have taken part so far, at Philippine Armed Forces have become increasingly least 18 governments will send observers in 2003. assertive in arguing for offensive action against the Simon suggests that the United States could help MILF and questioning Manila’s policy of trying to Singapore by giving more anti-piracy training, X- maintain a cease-fire. In Indonesia, elements of the ray technology and signals intelligence. Singapore is military hope to maintain dominance in the outer at the forefront of counter-terrorism and maritime provinces, and have attempted to weaken civilian security; a terrorist incident in the Straits of Malacca
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