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Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (FC) Is One of Key Problems of Nuclear Power As a Whole

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Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (FC) Is One of Key Problems of Nuclear Power As a Whole International Atomic Energy Agency Status and Prospects of Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles Alexander Bychkov DDG-NE INPRO Dialogue Forum “Drivers and Impediments for Regional Cooperation on the Way to Sustainable Nuclear Energy Systems” July 30 – August 3, 2012, Vienna International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Fuel Cycle International Atomic Energy Agency Main issues • Assurance of Supply for Nuclear Fuel • Spent Fuel Management Options • Spent Fuel Storage • Spent Fuel Direct Disposal • Spent Fuel Recycling International Atomic Energy Agency Assurance of Supply for Nuclear Fuel The principles of assurance of supply In implementing assurance of supply and future related mechanisms, the basic principles are: • The LEU would be available for all eligible IAEA Member States wishing to continue or introduce civil nuclear power programmes; • The supply mechanism is entirely voluntary and shall not distort the functioning of the commercial market but rather reinforce existing market mechanisms. It should neither have any disadvantages for those States which choose not to join the mechanism; and • The rights of Member States, including establishing or expanding their own production capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle, shall remain intact and shall not in any way be compromised or diminished by the establishment of international assurance of supply mechanisms. International Atomic Energy Agency Assurance of Supply for Nuclear Fuel Current activities Efforts to establish mechanisms to ensure that countries can be confident of a assure fuel supply have progressed in several fronts. The most advanced proposals for an additional level of assurance for the front end of the fuel cycle are: • The IAEA LEU bank; • The UK-lead Nuclear Fuel Assurance (NFA); • The guaranteed LEU reserve (a physical reserve of LEU and the supply of the LEU therefrom to the IAEA and its Member States in Angarsk); • The International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) in Angarsk; and • The Multinational Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP). International Atomic Energy Agency Status of Spent Nuclear Fuel 500 450 Discharged 400 Reprocessed Stored (including storage for reprocessing) 350 300 250 1000 t HM 200 150 100 50 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 • The total amount of spent fuel that has been discharged globally is approximately 334 500 tonnes of heavy metal (t HM). • The annual discharges of spent fuel from the world's power reactors total about 10 500 tHM per year. International Atomic Energy Agency Spent Fuel Management Options REACTOR MOX SNF Classical focus : fissile material recycle classical option storage reprocessing fabrication FP MA reactors TRANSMUTATION Accelerator the ‘3rd way’ s option direct disposal • refabrication • conditioning (intact/destructive) wastes Recent focus : optimize disposal system packaging DISPOSAL International Atomic Energy Agency Challenges - Spent Fuel Management • Strategy for spent fuel management – resource or waste; • Long term storage becoming a progressive reality…storage durations up to 100 years and even beyond possible; • Use of MOX and higher enrichment/burnup lead to higher decay heat levels and more brittle fuel; • License extensions for existing facilities. International Atomic Energy Agency Spent Fuel Storage • Wet and dry storage have provided flexibility for spent fuel management Wet Storage (CLAB-Sweden) Dry Storage (Surry – USA) International Atomic Energy Agency Interim Storage technologies 2 technologies Wet Interim Storage Dry Interim Storage • Metallic casks: Spent fuel storage • Dual-purpose casks • Passive system, and independent to the plant pool • Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, USA • Canister systems: Spent fuel stored • The fuel is stored in a metallic canister, stored inside an overpack inside racks • To transport the fuel, the canister is inserted in a transport cask • Passive system, and independent to the plant • USA, Spain, Republic of Armenia International Atomic Energy Agency At Reactor / Away From Reactor Storage • The AR option has lower costs that the AFR one • For capacity below 300 tU, the AFR option is not convenient because the cost is very high • For capacity over 1000 tU, the AR option may not be adequate • In the AFR option, the wet storage technologies present higher costs that the dry storage solutions • The dry storage solutions offer a modular approach that has a positive effect on financing costs AR Storage AFR Storage Advantages •No additional siting •Centralized protection •Less Transportation Drawbacks •Public acceptance •Additional siting/licensing •NPP Decommission •More Transportation International Atomic Energy Agency Spent Fuel Recycle When is waste not waste? When it is valuable. International Atomic Energy Agency REPROCESSING AS AN OPTION FOR SFM • EVOLUTION OF PURPOSE • PAST : The classical option for spent fuel management (to recover fissile materials for recycle as MOX, especially in FBR) • PRESENT: A fraction of spent fuel inventory recycled to thermal reactors (mainly in LWR) • FUTURE : Anticipation for innovative nuclear systems, P&T,etc • INDUSTRIAL MATURITY • Currently, the only industrially available option (~1/3 of global inventory of spent fuel being reprocessed) • Technical and/or infrastructural base for future applications to other futuristic options (i.e., P&T) International Atomic Energy Agency Fuel Recycle U-238, PUREX Recycle 92.4% U-238, U-235, 92.4% 1.0% U-235, 1.0% Pu, 1.3% MA, 0.1% FP, 5.2% Pu, 1.3% FP, 5.2% MA, 0.1% International Atomic Energy Agency The Case for Recycling Front-End benefits • Uranium savings • Energy security Competitive and predictable economics Back-End benefits Optimizes final repository Volume Nuclear Decay heat acceptance Radiotoxicity Standardized waste forms Introduces long-term storage as a viable complement: flexibility in repository timing International Atomic Energy Agency Spent Fuel Recycle Main Steps in PUREX Process Spent Fuel Storage Off-gas Treatment Mechanical Disassembly Hulls (HLW) High Level Waste Acid recovery Acid dissolution Solvent Extraction Solvent Treatment Fission Product Uranium Oxide Consolidation (HLLW) Solvent Extraction High Level Liquid Waste & Partitioning Conversion Plutonium Oxide Reprocessed Conversion Uranium Plutonium International Atomic Energy Agency Fuel Recycle: Aqueous • Mixer-settlers • Pulsed columns • Centrifugal contactors Heavy Phase Weir Light Phase Weir Heavy Phase Collector Ring Heavy Light Phase Phase Collector Ring Outlet Light Light Phase Phase Outlet Intlet Separating Heavy Zone Phase Intlet Stationary Cylinder Rotor Interface Annular Mixing Rotor Orifice Radial Vanes Zone International Atomic Energy Agency Spent Fuel Recycle country site plant Operation time Capacity (tHM/y) present future China Lanzou RPP (LWR) 2008 50 50 CRP (LWR) 2020 800 France La Hague UP2-800 (LWR) 1994 800 800 La Hague UP3 (LWR) 1990 800 800 India Trombay PP Research 1964 60 60 Tarapur PREFRE1 (PHWR) 1974 100 100 Kalpakkam PREFRE2 (PHWR) 1998 100 100 Kalpakkam PREFRE3A (PHWR) 2005 150 150 Tarapur PREFRE3B (PHWR) 2005 150 150 Japan Tokai-mura PNC TRP (LWR) 1977 90 90 Rokkasho-mura RRP (LWR) 2012 800 800 Russia Chelyabinsk RT1 (WWER-440) 1971 400 400 Krasnoyarsk RT2 (WWER-1000) 2020 1500 UK Sallafield B205 (GCR) 1967 1500 Sallafield Thorp (LWR/AGR) 1994 900 900 Total 5900 6700 International Atomic Energy Agency Specific waste volume for the UP3 plant Bitumen Volume of waste in m3/tHM Grout concrete 4 Technological waste Glass 3 Concrete Hulls & end fittings 2 Compaction Hulls, end fittings & 1 technological waste Conditioned 0 spent fuel 1989 1995 2000 (Design) Pu losses 1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 100 % International Atomic Energy Agency Which Recycling? UOX Fuel Used Fuel Used Direct Uranium Front-End Fuel Disposal Disposal Used Fuel UOX Final Waste Fuel Final Gen III Disposal Uranium Recycling waste Recycling Front-End Light Water Recycled Fuel Reactors (U, Pu) Used Fuel This image cannot currently be displayed. Final Final waste Gen IV Recycling Waste Disposal Recycling Fast Neutron Recycled Fuel Reactors (U, Pu and possibly minor actinides) International Atomic Energy Agency Repository Potential Radiotoxicity Minor Actinides + Fission Products Pu + U-Pu LWR MA + Gen III FP Recycling Used fuel Direct disposal Uranium Ore (mine) U-Pu recycling + Fission MA transmutation Products Gen IV Recycling Time (years) Assuming an optimistic 100% efficiency in the partitioning and transmutation of all Minor Actinides with Gen IV recycling International Atomic Energy Agency Fast Reactor Fuel Cycles Fast neutron spectrum reactors can: • Produce more fissile material (Pu) than they consume (breeding) • Effectively fission (transmute) long-lived minor actinides. U-238, 99.3% U-235, 0.7% International Atomic Energy Agency Compared Benefits of Recycling Options • Gen IV recycling through fast neutron reactors holds great promises • Significant extension of the uranium resource • From several hundred to several thousands of years of availability of the total Uranium resource • Benefiting from directly available resources such as depleted Uranium • Much reduced radiotoxicity of the final waste • But today’s Gen III LWR recycling already starts to address those issues • 25% uranium savings through LWR MOX and Enriched Reprocessed uranium fuel • Radiotoxicity reduction by 10 compared to direct disposal • … using proven technologies and commercial models International Atomic Energy Agency Recycling Strengthens Non-proliferation • Recycling restricted to a few regional centers under international safeguards
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