Made in China – Assimilating Ethnic Minorities in the 21St Century an Examination of Xi Jinping’S Efforts to Sinicise Ethnic Minorities in China Through Framing

Home , Forced assimilation, Han Chinese nationalism, Sinicization

Made in China – assimilating ethnic minorities in the 21st century An examination of Xi Jinping’s efforts to sinicise ethnic minorities in China through framing

Wiam Lena Khalid Jamel

JONATHAN BARTLETT ILLUSTRATION FOR FOREIGN POLICY

Department of Political Science Independent Research Project in Political Science – SV7052, (30 credits) Autumn term 2020 Supervisor: Johan Lagerkvist Word count: 20 715 words Abstract

The study aims to analyse how China, under the Xi Jinping administration, assimilates its ethnic minorities by exploring white papers' underlying motives. The ambition is to understand China’s actions and how they can affect the future. The research asks three questions: How does China frame ethnic minorities in white papers? What arguments are used to justify assimilation and sinicisation? How and why is China assimilating its ethnic minorities now?

The results show that China depicts ethnic minorities through two accounts, oneness and backwardness. The former stresses the significance of unity within ethnic minorities and between ethnic groups. The latter describes the condition that ethnic minorities end up in if they do not conform to China’s socialist values. One can be stuck by backwardness if one follows declared enemies or shows signs of separatism, terrorism and religious extremism. The results reveal how China uses ‘war on terror’ and modernisation narratives to justify its assimilation and sinicisation acts. The results also point to three areas where ethnic minorities can stick to backwardness and should, therefore, assimilate Han Chinese. These are language, religion and employment. The study reveals that the CPC and Xi Jinping intend to fix anything that disturbs them from realising the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. Consequently, China’s attempt to attain uniformity means that anything which may be prioritised above the party must be eradicated or sinicised.

Keywords: Ethnic policy, assimilation, sinicisation, China, Xi Jinping, framing theory.

Contents

Abbreviations ...... 3 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Research problem ...... 1 1.2 Aim and research questions ...... 2 1.3 Disposition ...... 2 2. Ethnic policies in the PRC ...... 2 2.1 Ethnic policies before Xi era ...... 3 2.1.1 Mao era 1949–1976 ...... 3 2.1.2 Deng era 1976–1989 ...... 5 2.1.3 Jiang era 1989–2002 ...... 6 2.1.4 Hu era 2002–2012 ...... 6 2.2 Xi’s ethnic policies, 2012–present ...... 7 3. Previous research ...... 12 3.1 Framing studies ...... 12 3.2 Ethnic minority policy ...... 14 3.2.1 Influential researchers in the field of ethnic policies in China ...... 15 3.3 The role of previous research in this study ...... 16 4. Theory ...... 17 4.1 The concept framing ...... 17 4.2 Framing as a theory ...... 17 4.3 Is framing theory sufficient? ...... 20 4.4 Operationalisation ...... 21 5. Material and method ...... 22 5.1 Text analysis ...... 22 5.2 Qualitative content analysis, with a dash of grounded theory ...... 22 5.2.1 Elements from grounded theory in this study ...... 23 5.3 Coding scheme and content analysis table ...... 24 5.3.1 Content analysis table ...... 25 5.4 Data challenges ...... 26 5.5 Choice of material ...... 27 5.6 Reliability and validity ...... 28 5.7 Alternative methods ...... 29 6. Results and analysis ...... 30 6.1 How does China frame ethnic minorities in white papers? ...... 30 6.2 What arguments are used to justify assimilation and sinicisation? ...... 36 6.3 How and why is China assimilating its ethnic minorities now? ...... 41 7. Concluding discussion and summary ...... 45 8. References ...... 48 9. Appendixes ...... 54 Appendix 1: Coding scheme based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) five framing functions ...... 54 Appendix 2: Content analysis table ...... 56 Appendix 3: Material for analysis ...... 57 Appendix 4: Visual images ...... 60 4.1 Vocational and Education Training Centres (Re-education camps) ...... 60 4.2 Demolished or altered religious buildings ...... 62

Abbreviations

§ AI – Artificial Intelligence

§ BRI – Belt and Road Initiative

§ CCP – Chinese Communist Party

§ CPC – Communist Party of China

§ ECA – Ethnographic Content Analysis

§ Han Chauvinism – Han Chinese nationalism

§ Hui – Muslim Chinese ethnic minority

§ IJOP – Integrated Joint Operations Platform

§ Minzu – Ethnic groups in China

§ PRC – People’s Republic of China

§ Ronghe – Fusion and intermingling

§ TAR – Tibet Autonomous Region

§ Uyghurs – Muslim Turkic ethnic minority in Xinjiang

§ XUAR – Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

1. Introduction

1.1 Research problem

In 2013, Xi Jinping was elected president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). During his tenure in office, the country has become more insular. Following the abolition of the two-term limit for presidency, Xi Jinping can remain in power for life, enabling him to follow through with his vision to reform China (Ng, 2007). At the opening of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping spoke about his political philosophy, which he called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’ and explained “the party resolutely opposes all attempts that will weaken, distort or reject the leadership of the party and the implementation of socialism” (Ng, 2007). The increased detachment of China during the last decade has also been accompanied by reduced access to civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of movement and freedom of press.

The laws and policies implemented under Xi Jinping share a common purpose: to make China more Chinese. This means that any perceived threats to the party must be eliminated or ‘sinicised’. However, the attempts to unify China and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity have had devastating effects on minority groups. The policies and laws constrain ethnic minorities by forcing them to assimilate the dominant Han Chinese culture. The harsh treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang seems to be only the start.

Due to lack of transparency from within the country, it is easy for China to claim that it is working to improve the country’s ethnic minorities' opportunities. By framing Xinjiang's subjugation within the ‘war on terror’, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been able to carry out relentless repression against ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region. New reports and data show that the assimilation process is now being applied beyond Xinjiang’s borders, demonstrating how other ethnic minorities in China are at risk of similar oppression in the name of sinicisation (Buckley & Ramzy, 2019).

This study tries to help us gain knowledge about why China is implementing a draconian ethnic policy, why now? What are the goals? Can we, by understanding the motivating philosophy,

gain a better understanding of how China acts? How do the current implementations affect the future?

1.2 Aim and research questions

To map out how China works to assimilate non-Han Chinese, this essay will analyse white papers issued under Xi Jinping's leadership to explore the underlying philosophy by applying framing theory. The study will look at how China frames ethnic minorities in white papers and examine their justification for assimilating and sinicising ethnic groups and conclusively reflect on why they are taking these steps now.

- How does China frame ethnic minorities in white papers? - What arguments are used to justify assimilation and sinicisation? - How and why is China assimilating its ethnic minorities now?

1.3 Disposition

This study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the nature of Xi Jinping’s policies and their effects on ethnic minorities and presents the aim and research questions of the study. The second chapter provides a historical perspective on the development of ethnic policies in China. This will allow for a contrast to be made between the previous and current leadership. Chapter three presents previous research that sheds light on framing and ethnic policy studies on China but also highlights the contributions of known researchers in the field. The theoretical framework of the study is described in chapter four. This is followed by a breakdown of the choice of method and material in chapter five. Chapter four and five also present an account of delimitations where applicable. The sixth chapter presents the results from the white papers and analyses them. The last chapter discusses the significance of the results and draws final conclusions.

2. Ethnic policies in the PRC

This chapter of the study will present an overview of central ethnic policies since the PRC’s formation in 1949. The chapter consists of two sub-sections. The first consist of the Mao, Deng,

Jiang, and Hu era, and the other presents Xi’s policies. This section will allow the researcher to compare current policies to those of the past and will provide perspective for the analysis section when exploring why China is implementing current policies.

2.1 Ethnic policies before Xi era

2.1.1 Mao era 1949–1976

With a new People’s Republic of China in 1949, led by Mao Zedong, came new principles of navigating China and its future. One of the crucial changes for ethnic minorities at the time came as a result of the 1949 Chinese Common Program, which set forth equality of all minzus; ethnic groups. Claiming itself as a representative of all minzus and distributor of equal rights, the CCP’s ideology and policy was put into effect. By identifying ethnic groups, the party could use its power and revive its economy. To reduce any resistance by ethnic groups, the CCP made visitations to ethnic areas and explained their ethnic minority policy. By winning over locally elected and comforting local minorities, the party could gather social information from each region. From 1954 to 1963, the second stage of minzu identification took place, and by 1963, the CCP had classified 53 ethnic minorities as minzus. Identifying minzus stopped since the recognition of Jinuo in 1979, making them the last 55th and last identified ethnic minority (Yang, 2014, pp. 368–377).

The minzu identification still has an impact till this day. The ethnic minorities that were not recognised have it harder to survive in contemporary times as they struggle to pass on their ethnic languages, customs, traditions and beliefs to the younger generation. Considering that over 400 groups had applied for minzu identification, many are left forgotten, especially in remote areas. The recognition of minzus differed in practice from theory due to the great variety of circumstances in different areas. The abrupt stop of minzu identification policy shows how the implementation of policies, in general, holds unpredictability (Yang, 2014, pp. 383–385).

Another ethnic policy objective of the time was to preserve China’s territorial integrity. Mao began to launch campaigns of a total overhaul on the land ownership system with the aim that China’s territory should belong to everyone in China (Bernstein, 1985, p.719). The crackdown was backed up by the ambition for territorial unity and belief that existent social, economic, and political tensions were the outcome of a class struggle. This shift in discourse influenced

the debate about minorities. Mao condemned Han chauvinist ideas and deemed them as intolerable for communists. However, the definition of a Chinese nationality, which includes non-Han Chinese people (Kwan & Yu, 2013, pp. 263–264), functioned as a long term assimilation plan to preserve China’s territorial conformity by protecting the nation from alien threats but also thoughts about secession within the territory (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.456).

Mao was not fond of culture and traditions in China. Instead, he wanted to create his own socialist culture for the Chinese people, and he expected everyone to conform to his ideas. The policies demonstrated that he would go to great lengths to achieve his goal, which affected the whole population. During the Great Leap Forward and later under the Cultural Revolution, the citizens would suffer severely (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.456). The Great Leap forward, which intensified the collectivisation, resulted in mass starvation, epidemics, and a cut birth rate (Fenby, 2008, p.397). The policies aiming to take full control over the territory were creating more problems than solutions. The tension between ethnicities also intensified because of Han Chinese immigration in closed-off ethnic minority areas, such as in Xinjiang. The nation's dissatisfaction kept increasing, and it would become less promising when a Tibetan revolt erupted in 1959 and sped up the assimilationist policies that many Chinese minorities would experience in the Cultural Revolution (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.465).

During the Cultural Revolution, an increased emphasis on class struggle at the expense of traditional cultures led to a crackdown on everything which did not align with Mao’s desired socialist culture. Insults against minorities throughout China increased. Destroying and shutting down religious prayer grounds such as Buddhist temples, mosques, burning religious scripts, prohibiting traditional holidays and ethnic dress by forcing older men to shave their beards, and forcibly cutting ethnic minority girls’ long hair, became a widespread practice. The crackdown generated massive damage to the initial goodwill, which existed in the 1950s (Millward, 2009).

2.1.2 Deng era 1976–1989

Between the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of Deng’s reform era, the relationship between ethnic minorities and Han ethnic majority was improving. Leaders recognised that earlier rules were excessive and had severely damaged the relationships. The primary objectives became to restore political stability in the nation and develop the economy. In practice, it meant that the CCP’s authority was not to be challenged directly and that the

market would become more relaxed with a focus on increasing growth (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.457). Likewise, change of previous ethnic minority policies began. With the passing of a new Regional National Autonomy Law in 1984, increased tolerance toward ethnic minorities’ religious and cultural traditions was stressed (NPC, 1984). This led to the reopening of sacred temples, monasteries, and reviving the presence of ethnic minority languages in education (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.457). One of Deng's allies, Hu Yaobang who had seen the poverty and despair that the Cultural Revolution caused, advocated for genuine autonomy, particularly for Tibetans. He supported economic initiatives helping local conditions and was accepting towards liberal practices. He also ordered the gradual transfer of Han officials from the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and indicated that those who remained should learn the ethnic language of the region. Likewise, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Hu Yaobang suggested that the soldier farmers leave the grounds (Bovingdon, 2004, p.21).

Although Hu Yaobang’s efforts changed the situation for some minorities, other policies were still affecting minorities in different aspects. For instance, in Xinjiang, the main issues were nuclear testing in the area and continued Han Chinese migration into Xinjiang from the east. The family planning policy started intervening with people’s private life. Although ethnic minority groups were not affected like Han Chinese regarding the one-child policy, limits were starting to get applied. Not long after the sudden death of Hu Yaobang in 1989, students began demonstrating for more rights. In what would be known as the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests, the students demanded freedom of speech and democracy by going into a hunger strike (Millward, 2009). The protest, which lasted over a month, was viewed as a direct threat towards the CCP who considered its sovereignty to be sacred; consequently, the authorities carried out mass detentions. Deng claimed that the protesters’ ambition was to sabotage the leadership and China’s socialist ideology and asserted that the protest resulted from Western influence (Fewsmith, 2001, p.69).

2.1.3 Jiang era 1989–2002

After Deng stepped down from his post, the power was passed to Jiang Zemin. In contrast to Mao and Deng, Jiang Zemin did not attempt to implement new ideological principles for China's people. Instead, Jiang maintained the emphasis on political stability and economic growth. The gradual assimilation of ethnic minorities remained, and geopolitical significance of border regions persisted (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.458). Simultaneously, the uncertainty

among people had yet to calm down, and this tension would only increase in 1990, when a religiously inspired rebellion attacked a police station in Baren, Xinjiang. The party framed the attack as a riot against China to establish an independent Uyghur Islamic State. When compared to previous leaderships by Mao and Deng, Jiang's weaker approach in the party produced an increasing pressure towards restrictive ethnic minority policies to prevent criticism by the CCP elites. Consequently, thousands of people were arrested, and the implementation of several anti- crime campaigns surfaced. One of them was the 1996 Strike Hard, Maximum Pressure policy against the Uyghur nationality (Millward, 2009).

The slogans of unity of the nationalities from the reform era, which used to be a common sight in Xinjiang began to vanish, and segregation within and between groups became more visible. For instance, Uyghurs began to mistrust their co-ethnics in the state administration and viewed them as Han Chinese footmen. At the same time, regional Communist Party officers were worried about Uyghur’s loyalty, which led to an increased presence of Han Chinese cadres at Xinjiang’s administration (Millward, 2009). This continued towards the end of the Jiang era, and in 2002 the state formed policies on education and organised investigations in schools. It involved discarding Uyghur literature in school and monitoring teachers to prevent them from potentially passing on separatist and religious opinions. Besides, the party started restricting ethnic minorities’ movement by denying studies abroad and travel out of the border. Apart from educational policies, the party was preoccupied with limiting the religious impact in the region by setting restrictions on religious practices, such as the call to prayer, entry to mosques for those under 18, and banning early morning prayers (Millward, 2007, p.343).

2.1.4 Hu era 2002–2012

In 2003, Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao got into office. The previous tensions of his predecessors’ policies persisted into his rule. Similar to Jiang, Hu Jintao was not expected to make significant changes to policies, but rather reinforce existing ones. With pressure from rivals in the party and a growing Han chauvinist public opinion, resorting to more assimilationist policies was the most uncontroversial approach (Li, 2012). However, previous regulations and continuous austerity would lead to several ethnic minority uprisings [e.g., Tibetan unrest 2008; Sichuan riots 2008; July 2009 Ürümqi unrest; September 2009 Xinjiang unrest; Tibetan language protest 2010], which only increased the tension between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese. The state retaliated the uprisings with new policies. Such as increasing state security presence through

street patrols, having monitored surveillance and increasing the transfer of Han Chinese cadres in ethnic minority regions to ensure control over local administrations (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.468).

For instance, demographically, the Xinjiang region's population increased from four million at the beginning of the ’50s to 21 million in 2010. The distribution was segregated regionally, with most Han Chinese in east and north while Uyghurs lived in the south and south-west, as in Kashgar and Hotan. The Han Chinese migration caused a considerable shift in Xinjiang, going from a 5% Han Chinese and 90% Uyghur division in the 1950s to 40% Han Chinese and 40% Uyghurs in 2010. Due to this, Han Chinese arriving in the region could operate with minimal interaction with Uyghurs. Thus, no effort was put into challenging stereotypes of Uyghurs, whereas in the past Han Chinese were somewhat compelled to interact and even learn the Uyghur language. The growing gap between ethnic groups meant that Han Chinese maintained the view of Uyghurs as lazy. In contrast, Uyghurs continued to believe that they got rejected from job opportunities (Millward, 2009).

The influx of Han Chinese also helped local administrations justify their preference for Han Chinese, thus preserving a continuous underrepresentation of Uyghurs at higher administration levels. Finally, similarly, with the Jiang era, Hu Jintao amplified policies in education. The aim to increase Chinese literacy at the expense of minority languages was supposed to help economic growth. Equivalent to previous language policies, it has instead acted as immediate repression against ethnic minorities (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.470).

2.2 Xi’s ethnic policies, 2012–present

The numerous attacks China experienced in the 2000s were commonly blamed as a result of outside forces creating ethnic division. However, this incitement was not accepted by everyone. Instead, many in China meant ethnic policies are partly to blame. Dissidents, generals, and intellectuals called for the rethinking of ethnic policy by stating the need for a new chapter or second generation of ethnic policies (Leibold, 2012). The professors Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe who are invested in policy development, argued that China should reduce the ethnic minority identity while the shared national identity needed to be strengthened. They described that China is in a pickle. It can either follow the former Soviet Union’s approach to ethnic

policies and share the same fate or follow the global norm of a melting pot formula (Hu & Hu, 2011).

The new generation of ethnic policies which Hu & Hu hoped would be based on a melting pot approach is not what the next president of China Xi Jinping applied. In November 2012, Xi emphasised “the great revival of the Chinese nation race” as a shared dream for everyone in China (Leibold, 2013, p.47). Xi further stressed Chinese unity in his inaugural speech in 2013 and accordingly embraced the China Dream slogan to reaffirm the essence of the nation and nationality by striking at both existing and potential threats directed against the communist regime (Schianvenza, 2013).

Xi created a drastic change in the political landscape which differed from the Jiang and Hu era. Through the Xi Jinping thought, he produced an ideology which legitimises the CCP’s authority. Already in 2014, Xi launched a Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism in the province of Xinjiang. The new ‘war on terror’ in China led to increased mass surveillance in the region, followed by the construction of Vocational and Education Training Centres as China calls them, or as re-education and intermittent camps for how they are portrayed based on descriptions about their purpose (Buckley & Ramzy, 2019).

What’s happening in the centres is a controversial subject. According to the Chinese government, the centres house trainees who have been influenced by religious extremism. The aim is to get rid of extremist thinking through a set program consisting of mandatory courses, including mandarin and Chinese law, and vocational training where trainees are taught different skills to utilise when they graduate from the programs (Wang, 2019).

Conversely, journalists and non-governmental organisations who have collected stories from exiles and refugees who have fled China, and examined reports and documents that have been leaked from China, explain that centres are targeting and cracking down on Uyghur and Kazakh ethnic identity, culture and religion (Buckley & Ramzy, 2019). The conditions are far worse than what China depicts. The centres are referred to as camps where mental and physical torture occurs and where women are forcibly sterilised. They also rip families apart since children are separated from their parents and siblings (Allen-Ebrahimian et al., 2020). A document obtained by The New York Times reveals how Chinese officials are told to describe the disappearance of parents and families to students returning to Xinjiang. The papers show how students asking

about their families are advised not to worry and are told that their families will return, but also how the students need to undergo ideological re-education to believe that their parents are receiving concentrated education to eradicate erroneous thinking such as religious extremism and terrorist ideas (The New York Times, 2019). Moreover, what Chinese officials refer to as vocational training that will equip ethnic minorities with life skills that they can make a living from, is groundwork for forced labour system where ethnic groups are underpaid and under surveillance according to previous detainees (Allen-Ebrahimian et al., 2020). On December 9th, 2019, chairman of XUAR, Shohrat Zakir, stated that all trainees have graduated and that the camps were closing down (Wang, 2019). However, there are still reports about missing ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, and accounts of minorities being targeted and required to perform forced labour (Lehr, 2020).

Other leaks of classified Chinese government documents, such as four ‘bulletins’ and China’s manual “Autonomous Region State Organ Telegram” from 2017 have exposed the surveillance of ethnic groups and how the centres are operated (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019). The bulletins connect the surveillance to the centres and provide information on how the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) collects, with help of artificial intelligence (AI), data which identifies potential candidates for the centres. The data includes facial recognition, use of certain mobile phone apps, and information on possible anti-regime action. According to James Mulvenon, an expert in authentication of Chinese government documents, IJOP is more than a pre-crime platform but a platform to substitute human judgement with AI. Similarly, Maya Wang, China researcher at Human Rights Watch, describes IJOP as a “background check mechanism, with the possibility of monitoring people everywhere” (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019).

In addition, the leaked telegram reveals both how personnel at the centres should maintain full secrecy about the camps’ existence and prevent escapes, but also how the centres operate a behaviour modification system for punishments and rewards of ethnic minorities (Allen- Ebrahimian, 2019). Through an investigation study, Shawn Zheng has exposed the scope of the centres. Using satellite images, Zhang has tracked how old buildings have been reconstructed into re-education camps and how new structures have been built in various places in Xinjiang. A common sight between the centres is the watchtowers and barbed wires surrounding the facilities (see appendix 4.1). Although Zhang’s study does not verify how many camps are in use, the facilities' number and size give an idea of how many people are put in there (Zhang, 2019).

The international response toward the centres is divided. In 2020, a statement on behalf of 45 countries was signed to support Chinese policies. Among them were many countries with a large Muslim population. China refers to the support of these countries to justify its policies and argues it is creating opportunities for influenced people to reintegrate with China. The opposing statement on behalf of 39 countries, many of them European, called for China to respect human rights of religious and ethnic minorities. The division demonstrates Western and Chinese narratives, and China maintains its view that the Western narrative is flawed (Putz, 2020).

Furthermore, the CCP has continuously increased its efforts to assimilate ethnic minorities (UHRP, 2020). In 2016 and 2018, China issued counterterrorism laws targeting ethnic groups, and at the same time, the CCP instigated a five-year plan, 2018–2022, to sinicise Islam (Introvigne, 2019; Mingxuan, 2020). Besides affecting Xinjiang, it has also impacted Ningxia’s Hui Muslims who have started to witness similar assimilation policies to Muslim minorities in XUAR. Ningxia officials were encouraged to “learn from Xinjiang” as part of a “cooperation agreement against terrorism” (Stroup, 2019). Although the ‘war on terror’ did not produce Islamophobia, it has succeeded with providing a discourse where Muslims can be represented in certain ways (Tyrer, 2013, p.145). In the guise of counterterrorism, many ethnic minorities can be claimed to be under the influence of separatist and extremist beliefs and consequently be labelled as a potential terrorist. Such charges can due to the law's vagueness be based on possessing items that can support extremism or merely advocate for independence (HRW, 2018, pp. 22–23).

In September 2019, Xi held a speech where he emphasised the party’s significance over ethnic work and its promotion of mingling ethnicities, managing ethnic issues according to law, and harshly opposing acts of extremism, splitism, terror and violence (Leibold, 2019a). Since extremism and terrorism were viewed as an inspirable part of China, Xi’s solution has been to use “the organs of dictatorship” to show “absolutely no mercy” in the “struggle against terrorism, infiltration and separatism” in Xinjiang (Buckley & Ramzy, 2019).

Xi’s autocratic leadership has expanded state control and intensified repressive instruments in civil society through the new policies. The expanded surveillance system creates an environment of being monitored at all times. The new administration has also increased the

resistance against activists and protesting, thus number of ethnic protests has declined, which the party explains to be a successful outcome of their policies (Ong & Tsang, 2020). Simultaneously, under the Xi Jinping rule, journalists from abroad have reduced significantly, and reporting protests in China has become more challenging due to the harsher environment with surveillance and censorship. The fear of punishment can also be an influencing factor as to why protests and the reporting of them have reduced (FCCC, 2019).

Furthermore, the variation of repression in China has grown greater under Xi’s leadership. There is a visible relationship between domestic security spending and the assortment of repression. In regions where spending on public security has increased, such as in TAR, XUAR, Beijing, Qinghai, more severe repression is visible. Those regions' policies are instantly affecting minorities and cracking down on their ethnic customs and religious beliefs. The most extreme repression has been aimed at ethnic minorities in Xinjiang (Zenz, 2018a).

To elucidate about Xinjiang, it is the largest region in China, and it is rich in both natural resources and ethnic minorities (Chau, 2004; Dong & Zhang, 2011). It has become a region that best reflects Xi’s policies. The CCP’s emphasis on cultural normality being measured through levels of Chineseness and consequently the cultural sinicisation of people who are not Chinese enough represents a profound shift in the CCP’s management of ethnic policy (Stroup, 2019). Similar to previous leaderships, the party is implementing language policies in education where Chinese literacy is encouraged at the expense of ethnic minority languages. The language policy affects ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and other regions like TAR and Inner Mongolia, where protests against the language policies have taken place [2020 Inner Mongolia protests] (Gan, 2020).

Moreover, comparable with the Cultural Revolution, and Mao’s crackdown on everything which did not align with his desired socialist culture, the current Xi administration has taken the same drastic measures on religious symbol through the “Regulation on De-extremification”. The regulation aims to eradicate and prevent extremism, but also achieve social stability and lasting peace and order. For instance, in article 9, section 7 and 8 prohibit the wear of burqas and having abnormal beards and naming (China Law Translate, 2017). The current administration is also demolishing and rebuilding religious buildings (see appendix 4.2) and ethnic architecture to cater for tourists. A sightseeing guide regulates the route, and tours showcase an exotified version of ethnic minority culture with dance performances by ethnic

minorities and visitations of Uyghur family houses. As a result, tourists are shown only what the party wants them to see (He, 2005).

Finally, apart from ethnic policies, initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) rely entirely on Xinjiang’s geostrategic significance, which makes the region even more important to Xi Jinping (Lifos, 2018, p. 10). Controlling the border of XUAR allows China to manage external influence that may lead to internal threats being imposed on China’s national security (Finnegan, 2020, p. 6). Xi’s administration has so far enforced multiple radical policies, and it remains to be seen how China’s politics will develop in the future. However, the policies introduced during Xi’s presidency have already left a significant mark on China’s ethnic minorities.

3. Previous research

Two research fields are essential for this study. One concerns studies on framing, the other concerns PRC’s ethnic policy and noteworthy researchers within the field. This chapter will present and discuss previous research to elaborate on how it will contribute to the research area.

3.1 Framing studies

Framing studies exist in various disciplines and are great at revealing how different actors construct societal issues and how they affect the problem's management. As countries around the world have more insight into each other’s politics and may be monitoring the development of some issues, it becomes more critical for governmental and non-governmental actors to review how they present problems and solutions. With increased access to different news outlets, framing studies on a national and international scope have become common. The framing studies related to Chinese politics typically highlight how China frames various issues or how others frame China.

In a study by Marie Trédaniel and Pak Lee (2017), the ambition is to explain China’s framing of terrorism in Xinjiang province. The authors depart from securitisation theory and argue that China has seen Xinjiang from a security framework since the middle of the eighteenth century. With this framework, China has developed a security strategy that encourages mass migration

of Han Chinese to the region and is framing radical Uyghurs with foreign Islamic jihadists. Trédaniel and Lee (2017) argue that China has taken advantage of the historic securitisation to continue its aim of a Sinocentric system. By studying the Urumqi riots and 2014 Kunming attack, the authors conclude that the former has led to a broader gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. Simultaneously, the latter asserts that China has failed to eliminate the terrorist threat, which raises the question of why the Chinese leadership did not rethink its securitisation framework.

Departing from a similar framework, Pablo A. Rodriguez-Marino (2019) argues in his study that China’s current framing of terrorism was in the past framed as counter-revolution. The study looks at how the framing of violence in Xinjiang has changed over time by analysing the discursive construction of Baren, 1990, and Maralbeshi, 2013, incidents. The author believes that China is marginalising violent factors that do not fall within the framework of extremism and separatism, especially the frictions created as a result of the Chinese government’s crackdown. He concludes that China has replaced the counter-revolution narrative with a terror lexicon to justify its crackdown in a new geopolitical context.

Juha A. Vuori (2011) has in his study focused on security framework in the Chinese political context. The author explains that China uses propaganda and media as functional actors to spread its securitisation framework. In reference to Buzan & Wæver (2009), he exemplifies that words such as counter-revolution, socialism and terrorism are key terms in the framework of security. Vuori also applies securitisation theory to explain China’s way of securitising matters. The author analyses four revolution cases in China and describes how the security process has developed in them. After a thorough investigation, the author concludes that framing of security can take place through different actors and target different audiences. The study emphasises how one is influenced to varying degrees, where some are fundamentally impacted or may change their worldview. In contrast, others may be completely non-believers, which means that the framing has failed to affect them.

Moreover, the framing can change as the process changes; this also means that one can target different audiences throughout the process. Important to stress is that the author departs from securitisation theory. Thus, the analysis proceeds from a speech act to understand securitisation.

The recent framing studies in China focus on securitisation framing and how China has moved on from a counter-revolution framing to a terrorism framing. Through Vuori’s research, which analyses cases from the 20th century, the distinction of framing narrative showcases the shift from the 20th to 21st century. A common conclusion within the previous research on framing is that China continues securitising matters that, they consider, defy the party. Although some authors have questioned this path, it is visible that China will not steer clear from it as Xi Jinping stated in May 2014 that the party’s ruling strategy is correct and must continue in the long run (Wong, 2014).

3.2 Ethnic minority policy

Yuen Siu Tim’s (2009) paper illustrates how the Chinese government has developed its ethnic minority policy and the difficulties it has encountered. After clarifying what a minority is, it explains that ethnic minority policy experienced a setback under Mao Zedong’s rule when he presented the matter as a class struggle, consequentially banning expressions of ethnic identity. However, with Chairman Mao's death and the end of the Cultural Revolution, a new ethnic minority policy was confirmed, debunking the class struggle. The author interprets the policy as a hybrid of Confucian paternalism and Marxist economic determinism. The policy seeks to uphold the Confucian principle of ‘harmony with differences’ in hope of minimising conflicts between Han Chinese and China’s ethnic minorities and facilitating national unity. The paradox is that China’s attempts to bring ethnic minorities under the goal of development, combined with lack of democratic practice and monitoring systems, leads to disregard and violation of ethnic minorities’ constitutional rights. Moreover, the rapid economic development in ethnic autonomous areas is breeding social and economic injustices, which spreads social instability between minority groups and Han Chinese.

Equally, Baogang He (2005) claims that ethnic minority policy in China has Confucianist and Marxist elements. However, he suggests that China is becoming influenced by western liberal ideas of multicultural citizenship. He elucidates that within the Confucian framework, the right of minorities is a customary practice with an emphasis on ‘duty’. In contrast, ethnic minority policy within a Marxist framework is subordinated to, and revoked by, the revolutionary cause. The author explains that ethnic minority groups face several problems in China. One problem is that the global commercialisation of multiculturalism is exotifying ethnic minority identities,

their culture, clothing and dances. This act puts ethnic minorities under exploitation for the sake of tourism that generates economic growth.

Another problem is how China’s Ronghe policy, which encourages intermingling instead of forced assimilation, focuses on soft areas of culture and considers the discussion of political institutions of multiculturalism or national security as a threat to the unity in China. Thus, those who highlight the discussion of ethnic issues end up under suspicion of undermining national unity and stability and refusing to assimilate (He, 2005, p.227).

3.2.1 Influential researchers in the field of ethnic policies in China

James Leibold, a noteworthy researcher on ethnic politics, race, and national identity in China, has studied China's shifts over the past decades. His research is an excellent contribution to the studies on PRC’s ethnic policies. Leibold scrutinises ethnic policy-making and ethnic disputes and has in his work focused on radical policy implementations under Xi’s presidency. He describes how the CCP over the last decade has expanded surveillance in XUAR and is now correcting the thought and behaviour of ethnic minorities (Leibold, 2019b). But also, how ethnic minorities who are ‘graduating’ from re-education camps are transferred to forced labour factories where they continue to be monitored (Xu et al., 2020). Leibold’s up to date research uncovers the effects ethnic policies have on ethnic minorities and gives one an insight to the experiences of ethnic minorities in China.

Another researcher is Adrian Zenz; his focus areas within China’s ethnic policy are Tibet and Xinjiang. Zenz’s research has provided a synopsis of the Tibetan experience in China and demonstrated a more transparent insight into the magnitude of the re-education camps in Xinjiang (Zenz, 2018b). His most recent work, published in 2020, covers how China is forcibly sterilising Uyghur women in a campaign to control the population (Zenz, 2020). The Chinese government has criticised his work and published numerous articles where they claim that his work consists of lies (CGTN, 2020).

James Millward, who is well known for the knowledge he has provided about the Qing empire and Silk Road, has also contributed remarkably to the study of China’s ethnic policies. His historical perspective allows for an insight into the evolution of policies that impact ethnic

minorities in China. His research focus is historical and contemporary Xinjiang and the current case of Uyghurs. In his articles, he stresses the necessity for solutions that can end ethnic minority groups’ suffering in Xinjiang (Millward, 2020). Millward also connects the assimilationist policies which target Muslim ethnic minorities to Islamophobic motivations. (Millward, 2019). He explains that the ‘war on terror’ initiated following the 9/11 events led to China rebranding the East Turkestan separatists with new terminologies such as religious extremists and terrorists which implies that the motivation is jihadi religious rather than ethnonational (Millward, 2014).

3.3 The role of previous research in this study

The previous framing and ethnic policy research indicate that China has used a securitisation framework where they employ the terrorist narrative to justify its crackdown. This is shown through key terms such as socialism and terrorism. Moreover, previous research suggests that China’s ethnic policy is characterised by the Confucian principle of harmony and Marxism elements. The relation between the two philosophies in China aims to facilitate national unity. However, they are said to focus on shallow matters and not cover deeper areas of ethnic issues. Consequently, bringing up social instability is considered as undermining assimilation and national unity.

The different approaches to ethnic policy in China allow for several perspectives to the ongoing issues. Apart from academical studies, this study has benefitted from investigation of non- governmental organisations and journalists*. Their explorations have uncovered ethnic minority groups’ experiences of PRC’s ethnic policy implementations. They have provided this study with a more in-depth understanding of ongoing issues, which will help identify the frames used by the Xi administration in China. This study will explore whether the white papers confirm previous research and disclose other dominant frames. The ambition is to contribute to the framing studies of communist societies and analyse how the underlying philosophy prompts ethnic policies in China in hope of gaining a better understanding of China’s actions.

* See work by Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, World Uyghur Congress, Uyghur Human Rights Project, Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Jojje Olsson, Matt Schiavenza and Megha Rajagopalan, to name a few. 16

4. Theory

4.1 The concept framing

In this study, the concept of framing will be implemented to investigate how China justifies assimilation of its ethnic minorities in its political discourse. I have chosen to use framing as a theory since it explores how the representations of some issues are made more salient and given more significance. Before going deeper into the framework, I will present a short preliminary paragraph of the concept framing.

When one speaks about framing in layman terms, one often refers to how media shows a specific piece of information to the audience and how it influences people's perception and impact their decision-making. The concept framing explores the constructions of social realities and showcases how different it can be depending on one’s framework. The mental representations and interpretations are referred to as ‘frames in thought’, whereas the communication patterns and communicators fall under ‘frames in communication’ (Druckman, 2001, p.228). The next section will go more in-depth about framing as a theory.

4.2 Framing as a theory

The notion of framing in communication started developing in the mid 20th century. Erving Goffman (1974) used the concept to explain the purposive selection of ways to present and represent social phenomena. He developed the framework ‘schemata of interpretation’ to make sense of and give meaning to everyday experiences and events of human communication (Goffman, 1974, p.21). The concept has been developed further both in sociological and psychological studies. Focusing on the former, the development of the notion demonstrates a shift in its position, moving from the understanding of individuals’ everyday communication to an elite discourse where the concept is studied in the context of news making (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

Robert Entman (1993) extended the concept of framing by giving it a more tangible definition. In his framing theory, he underlines the purpose of framing:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993, p.55).

Entman identifies four functions in framing: defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgements and suggesting remedies. These functions are not interdependent; instead, the researcher may recognise several or solely one in a sentence (Entman, 1993).

Moreover, the frames go through four positions in the communication process: communicator, text, receiver, and culture. The communicators make conscious and unconscious choices, based on their schemata, which shape the information in various ways. Through the presence or absence of certain words, formulations, stereotyped images and facts or judgements, thematical clusters are reinforced and thus manifest the frames within the text. When a document showcases a particular part of a matter or emphasises specific aspects of an issue, it is consequently silencing other elements for the audience to receive a specific image. However, the frames that navigate the receiver’s thoughts and conclusions may or may not be the same as the textual framing or the communicator’s framing intention. As for the culture, it is sets of typically conditioned frames of discourse and thoughts of most people in a social group (Entman 1993, pp. 52–53).

Through framing theory, the researcher can analyse what the audience should receive. However, to do that the researcher must understand the complex dynamics of framing, but also their position in the analysis. Frames work to highlight specific information. This can be achieved through repetition and placement. For instance, the appearance of a concept in an obscure part of the text, which accordingly makes it more salient. One of the essential points to recognise in framing theory is the researcher’s schemata which affects what they notice, interpret and remember. The schemata or stereotypes one holds affect how information is processed and what becomes salient. Consequently, this means that the frames in a text do not guarantee reflection by the audience. It becomes crucial for the researcher to recognise their position before analysing the material and keeping in mind that the same text may be understood in various ways, thus having a different impact on the receivers.

Realising the great impact frames can have, if the framing is successful, it can change people’s values and perspectives (Entman, 1993). However, if the framing is of low relevance, there is a risk that the receivers reject it, and consequently, the credibility of the media outlet or source is affected negatively (Yioutas & Segvic, 2003).

Dietram Scheufele (1999) illustrates the typology of framing research and distinguishes between studies examining frames as media frames or individual frames, but also whether they are dependent or independent. The concepts of media and individual frames are defined differently by researchers; however, they still share the same underlying belief. The media frame is according to Entman (1991, p.7) “attributes of news itself”, according to Kinder and Sanders (1990, p.74) the concept serves as “devices embedded in political discourse”. As for the individual frame, it is according to Entman (1991, p.7) “information-processing schemata” or “infernal structures of the mind” as Kinder and Sanders describe it (1990, p.74). To detect media and individual frames in practice, this study applies previously mentioned reference about the purpose of framing by Entman (1993). In short, making some aspects more salient to promote a definition, interpretation, moral evaluation or treatment, but also understanding the underlying ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.

As mentioned earlier, these frames can be dependent or independent. A dependent variable is frame-building; the emphasis is on how frames emerge and form. Whereas, an independent variable is frame-setting; the emphasis is on how frames affect the recipients (Scheufele, 1999, p.107).

Media frames as a dependent variable focus on what factors impact journalists and groups in society to frame issues in a certain way, but also how these factors work. Media frames as independent variables stress what sorts of media frames impact the audience’s perception of issues, and how the process works. Moreover, individual frames as a dependent variable probe the aspects that influence the formation of individual frames, and if individual frames merely are duplicates of media frames, but also, how recipients can actively construct the meaning of media frames or resist them. Lastly, individual frames as an independent variable focus on how the individual frame can affect the recipients’ respective perception of issues (Scheufele, 1999, pp. 106–109).

The frames' distinction is valuable for comprehending how they form at different levels and areas in society, such as the media, politics, and the audience. It also clarifies the different perspectives frames may bring along depending if the studied material is from news accounts or individuals’ expressions on social media.

In this study, the aim is to understand how and why China’s ethnic policy is assimilating ethnic minorities. Therefore, the focus will be on individual frames as a dependent variable. Xi Jinping and the CCP are seen as active actors and not only as executors of policies. Their roles are crucial for understanding how frames emerge and form, and it is an ambition of the study to review the aspects that influence the formation of frames that impact the ethnic policies.

4.3 Is framing theory sufficient?

Each theory has its merits and demerits, and framing theory is no exception to that. An insight into the shortcomings helps one better understand the limitations of the theory and gives one insight into areas it could develop further. One weakness of the theory is how it can generalise a frame's impact and thus cluster the audience as a homogenous group and neglect the individual frame of mind. Along the same line, the generalisation runs over the point that the frame's intention might not coincide with the individual experience nor proceeding actions. Another weakness is that the researcher schemata may impact the analysis, but also exaggerate whether a frame is positive or negative. Besides, it can also build mistrust against the media as legitimate news outlets.

On the other hand, there are many advantages to the theory. Firstly, the theory can be applied to a broad range of ideas and fields. It can be used to explore representation, discourses, and as an illustrative tool. It can analyse how framing affects individuals and society. Secondly, it encourages and gives people a chance to understand framing in media and teaches one to be more critical. For instance, in an attempt to demonstrate how framing of the same information can impact people’s choices, also known as equivalence framing. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979, 1984) found that people were prone to take risks when losses were highlighted, whilst they were cautious when gains were stressed. The studies of equivalency show how vast the impact of framing is on the audience. Thirdly, the theory allows us to go back to events and better understand them through the concept of framing. Historical matters and actions of

individuals can be understood by studying their schemata and individual frame by viewing the media frames they were exposed to.

4.4 Operationalisation

To use framing theory in practice, Entman’s four functions of framing: defining problems; diagnosing causes; making moral judgements; and suggesting remedies, will be the point of departure. To utilise them, this study will apply Holli Semetko and Patti Valkenburg’s (2000) elaboration of these functions. They identified five popular functions of framing: conflict; human-interest; attribution of responsibility; morality; and economic consequences. Conflict emphasises disputes or disagreements between individuals, groups or institutions. Human- interest stresses personality over other aspects, taking into consideration the emotional element in the framing of a person, group, question or event. Attribution of responsibility specifies a person, group or phenomenon as accountable for the described issue or event; it thus answers who the responsible is. It also includes the functions of diagnosing causes and suggesting remedies by Entman (1993). Morality is when the frame applies a moral or religious context, it can play out as guidelines or statements about how one should act and behave toward the issue. The economic frame recognises the financial consequences in short- and, or long-run, and refers to the economic consequences of actions or the lack of them (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.95).

The five functions will indicate if any function appears frequently, or if it is absent. They will also show if certain functions are mentioned together or separately. This helps one understand the connection throughout the material and reveals if there are some repetitive patterns. I will discuss the relationship between the functions in the results and analysis chapter. But before that, I will explain in the following chapter, how the functions are analysed with the help of a coding-scheme and content analysis table.

5. Material and method

5.1 Text analysis

Generally speaking, analysing means to identify and examine components. In different textual analysis styles, the ambition is to distinguish and explore various parts of the text and phenomena that relate to the textual aspects. Regardless of the type of textual analysis, the common point is to interpret something: a historical stage, a societal process or an actor’s intentions with a particular action. Content analysis is a textual analytic technique from the onset of the 20th century. The primary usage was on advertisements, magazine articles, newspapers and political speeches (Cho & Lee, 2014, p.3). It applied a quantitative approach to analyse “the content of media text to enable similar results to be established across a group of text coders” (Priest et al., 2002, p.35). Today, the research within content analysis applies both a quantitative and qualitative approach and is used in a wide range of fields.

5.2 Qualitative content analysis, with a dash of grounded theory

This study will apply qualitative content analysis to study the material. I will depart from Kristina Boréus and Göran Bergström’s definition (Bergström & Boréus, 2012). As mentioned in the previous section, content analysis is a research method for the study of documents and communicatory reports, which can be texts of different formats, images, audio or video. Content analysis has two approaches, quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative approach aims to quantify and count the occurrence of words, arguments, headlines, and images in the material (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p.50). Quantitative research approach tends to be deductive and apply a top-down logic. It departs from a theory-driven hypothesis which it wants to test or observe in hopes of confirming or rejecting it (Blackstone, 2012, p.20).

In the qualitative approach, the aim is to make more elaborated interpretations of written texts, images or speeches. By studying the content of the material, the researcher better understands what is meant by it. Besides, qualitative content analysis allows the author to make in-depth breakdowns of their topic since the researcher can go more profoundly into the case (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p.50). Another reference to the method is that it describes meaning to the material (Schreier, 2012, p.1) through subjective interpretation with the help of systematic coding schemes and thematic patterns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1278). This approach is

generally associated with an inductive procedure. It applies a bottom-up logic, which uses the research question and data to observe potential patterns that could generate a hypothesis or theory (Blackstone, 2012, p.19; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, pp. 1279–1281).

However, it is possible to combine deductive and inductive techniques and use a hybrid, an abductive approach, or use both aspects within the study, which this study does. The qualitative content analysis allows for such flexibility, but the researcher must clarify the approaches' use. A critical distinction between the two is how one develops the codes or categories. The deductive approach is suitable if the purpose is to test theories in a new context. In contrast, the inductive approach is fitting when there is limited prior knowledge in the field of research (Cho & Lee, 2014, p.4). This study will use a deductive approach in the development of the coding scheme and an inductive approach in the content analysis table. I will discuss this further in the section 5.3.

5.2.1 Elements from grounded theory in this study

Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss introduced grounded theory and defined its ambition as discovering theory from data that is systematically acquired and analysed in social research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.1). Its two notable features are constant comparative analysis and theoretical sampling. Both grounded theory and qualitative content analysis are based on a naturalistic objective of identifying patterns and themes by using coding in the pursuit. Both also analyse and intend to decode qualitative data. Although they share similarities, they are not the same. Grounded theory is an inductive method, not to be mistaken for qualitative content analysis. It seeks to generate conceptual categories or theories through systematic research and can be applied to both qualitative and quantitative data (Cho & Lee, 2014, p.2). Therefore, the approach is practical for researchers who aim to develop a theory that explains the phenomenon in a particular context where a theoretical framework does not exist or is too abstract to be tested (Martin & Turner, 1986, p.142). Although both grounded theory and qualitative content analysis utilise coding processes to generate answers, the content analysis concentrates on bringing about categories or themes from the data. In contrast, the grounded theory focuses on theory building (Schreier, 2012, p.3).

A prominent characteristic of qualitative content analysis is to ask questions such as what, why and how. By employing a consistent set of codes to organise the research, the study

investigates whether there is a distinct pattern within the data (Cho & Lee, 2014, p.6), which is what this study does. This study also employs the notable feature of comparing from grounded theory. Generally, the selection of data is collected based on comparing views or perspectives. For instance, a researcher will try to find opposing or contrasting material to demonstrate the comparative aspect, in practice researchers systematically select comparison groups before conducting the study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.9). I have not selected my material based on comparison groups, nor will I forcibly try to contrast views. However, I will refer to sources that include a western perspective and show aspects of ethnic minorities’ own experiences. These two sides will certainly add to the comparative elements and be contrasted to the statements made by China. I will also compare the answers generated from the framing functions through a content analysis table to apprehend a broader perspective of the white papers and their development throughout Xi’s leadership period.

5.3 Coding scheme and content analysis table

The researcher needs to develop a coding scheme to analyse the material. There are two main ways to go about, deductively and inductively; another way is a hybrid of the two. The deductive approach relies on existing literature and theory to create a codebook for the coding scheme. In contrast, the inductive approach uses the material itself as a base for the coding scheme. Harold D. Lasswell (1942) stresses that theory should be the point of departure for coding schemes since we use the theory to provide data for the science of politics. Similarly, Donatella della Porta remarks that the theory controls the coding of the material and generates analysis tools; therefore, it is through the theory that the material's content is interpreted (della Porta, 2008, p.211).

This study has operationalised the functions of framing theory to create a coding scheme. The coding scheme has been developed based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) five functions, which further develop Entman’s framing functions to systemise the analysis. The coding scheme resembles a table that shows how the material compares with the central concepts of framing theory (see appendix 1). The advantage of coding schemes is that the analysis becomes consistent, and the study becomes transparent and have increased validity. The coding scheme can contain arguments, themes, words or expressions that clarify what is to be analysed (Bergström and Boréus, 2012, p.55).

The following step of systematising the analysis is to take the result from the coding scheme and place it in a content analysis table. This step is inductive and will allow for further depth and show whether the data's framing is consistent. A content analysis table helps the researcher to structure the result of the coding scheme. Since one of the ambitions is to explore whether the framing is uniform, the comparative element of grounded theory is applied in the content analysis table.

The content analysis table utilised in this study takes inspiration by David Altheide’s ethnographic content analysis (ECA) which resembles grounded theory in its comparative element. ECA documents and tries to understand the communication of meaning and verify theoretical relationships. Its ethnographic aspect implies that in the diverse modes of communication interaction, for instance, format, style, visuals, and contextual nuances, one can assume the meaning of the data message (Altheide, 2013, p.26).

This study will use the framework of ECA to develop a comparative qualitative content analysis table. The analysis table compiles the answers from the yielded data of questions asked in the coding scheme. Firstly, it summarises the responses. After that, it takes the response from each question and compares the similarities and differences between them. This step helps show whether the framing is uniform and if there are opposing views between the data. Subsequently, a culmination of the results is compiled, and an overall conclusion is drawn. See the table below for clarification of the method.

5.3.1 Content analysis table

5.4 Data challenges

When researching China, there are some common issues a researcher may face. Bruce Stening and Marina Zhang (2007) explain the methodological challenges researchers may encounter. Their focus is mainly within the field of cross-cultural management researchers. However, the issues they raise are common for researchers in other areas as well. They discuss five common issues (Stening & Zhang, 2007, p.121):

- cultural factors that might impact on what is a researchable question - sampling issues - difficulties in developing valid research instruments - problems pertaining to data collection - challenges of data interpretation

Conducting a study about a place outside one’s background or experience requires that one recognises one’s cultural filters and schemata that may unconsciously affect the results. It is expected that when one compares cultures, one also judges them (Stening & Zhang, 2007, p.134). While this study does not have an ambition to compare China to other nations, it still has a comparative aspect which has been explained earlier. To reiterate, the comparative aspect aims to explore whether the material is uniform and if there are any contradictions. A more relevant issue to this study concerns access to data collection and interpretation of data.

Pertaining data from Chinese sources online can be challenging. If one is trying to access Chinese webpages, it is not abnormal if they are inaccessible from abroad since China’s internet censorship system can block alien access. A way to go about is to use a virtual private network (VPN) to guarantee entry to the websites, which is a course this study has employed as a precautionary measure. Another issue one may encounter is accessing documents within webpages. For instance, the Chinese Government webpage, which presents a wide range of content, as it should, does not provide a consistent search engine throughout the page. To clarify, the search engine on the website's front page is not equivalent to the search engine when one enters the sub-categories in the site. In addition, although it would be more beneficial for the study if I knew how to read, or understood spoken Chinese, it is still not a justification to not conduct the research. Especially since the data in this study has departed from governmental English translated documents.

To elucidate, the data collection of this study consists of white papers. They are available at the Chinese Government’s webpage. However, since the search engine does not offer enough filters, I have taken a detour and used the website en.pkulaw.cn. The page is maintained by Chinalawinfo Co., Ltd., and the Legal Information Centre of Peking University. The website’s search engine, which is available in English, has a vast database and allows for advanced search options with various filter options, such as year, type of document, fuzzy and precise searches to mention some (en.pkulaw.cn, FAQ, 2020). I have accessed the titles of the white papers through the website and after that used them to read the full documents through the Chinese Government’s website. Some of the white papers are uploaded as texts, while others are uploaded as documents that can be downloaded. This means that there are no consistent page numbers to refer to. Therefore, I will refer to the whole paper in the result and analysis section.

5.5 Choice of material

As mentioned in previous section, the choice of material consists of white papers. A white paper is an authoritative report which is explanatory in nature. The aim is to inform the audience about an issue and justify and encourage specific methods or solutions. Accordingly, it presents the instigator’s philosophy on a particular subject. White papers are excellent for this study, which aims to explore the Chinese Government's underlying thought process under the leadership of Xi Jinping and the motivations behind the implementations of ethnic policies. White papers usually do not contain any visual information that might generate feelings, this means that the researcher solely relies on explicit statements, which is also the case for this study.

Through the search engine on the website: pkulaw, I have used the keyword: ethnic to access documents that mention these terms explicitly. I have limited the material to Xi Jinping's presidency since the interest of the study is to disclose the ethnic policies under Xi’s rule. After that, I have checked whether the documents are relevant for this study or not. For instance, whether the terms are mentioned in passing or if they have a central part in the paper. The former type is irrelevant for this study and has not been included. Apart from the documents generated from the search word, I have also used other search words [Tibetan, Tibet, Uygur, Mongol, Inner Mongolia, Hui, Xinjiang, minorities, minority, ethnicity, minzu] to ensure that I have not missed any documents. One should take into account that there may be more possible search words associated to ethnic minorities and that I risk missing out on some, which is something do not disregard. One should acknowledge that the material used in this study does

not represent everything the Chinese Government has said or will say about ethnic minorities and ethnic policies. Instead, one should view this study as a breakdown of the specific white papers that this study examines. Besides, by only looking into white papers that mention the words explicitly, I will avoid the risk of reading into the material.

The State Council Information Office under the Xi Jinping administration has from 2013 delivered 42 white papers that include the search words for this study. Out of 42 documents, 17 documents have been used for this research. The selection has been based on the documents’ relevance to the research and its purpose. White Papers that focus on ethnic groups in the United States or where the search words have been mentioned in passing are thus not included. Four themes can be depicted in the studied white papers on ethnic minorities, issued from 2013– 2020; these are human rights, protection of religion, Tibet, and Xinjiang. This alone shows that these are essential topics under Xi’s leadership and allows one to study whether they have been spoken of in more than one way. To see the selection of the white papers, check appendix three.

5.6 Reliability and validity

Researchers should always strive for quality results in their study, two matters to keep in mind when aiming for quality research are reliability and validity. Reliability concerns how consistent the outcome is if the study was to be repeated more than once. Whereas validity regards how well the tools measure the attributes that the researcher needs them to measure (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p.19).

Reliability and validity in a study do not always go hand in hand. A reliable analysis method does not automatically equal increased validity. In content analysis, a common problem in the quantitative approach is when the coding function is taken out of context, and when the function one is measuring has several meanings (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p.82). To avoid these problems, the researcher benefits from manual coding schemes instead of automated coding schemes that are common in the quantitative content analysis, but also by having discursive knowledge to make complicated judgements of the meaning. In this case, the qualitative content analysis methodology will be beneficial since it focuses on fewer data and thus allows the researcher to spend more time on the interpretative work. To assess the validity of a study, one needs to ask whether the type of information about the linguistic significance, which the content

analysis provides, is sufficient and adequate for one’s research statement (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, pp.83–85).

A point worth emphasising again is the researcher’s perspective. In previous sections, I have touched upon the significance the result can have depending on the researcher’s schemata. One’s environment shapes the schemata, which includes knowledge, beliefs and past experiences that researchers rely on when they attempt to make sense of new input, such as experiences and information. The new input is thus always built upon a previously existent foundation. Therefore, it is important to stress that the way I analyse and see the data will involuntarily be affected by my perspectives and standards, regardless of how objective I attempt to be. One should not misinterpret this as a reason for decreased reliability or validity. Rather, it is only a fact that both the researcher and reader shall keep in mind for clarity. Moreover, one should also keep in mind that the researcher’s schemata might bring forward unique perspectives and discussions to the study.

5.7 Alternative methods

This chapter started with stating the aim of textual analysis before moving on to this study's approach. When analysing texts, power or other social phenomena, there are numerous analysis methods one can apply. Depending on the material, one can use different analysis methods, such as content-, argumentation-, qualitative-, narrative-, and discourse- analysis, to name a few. The researcher must choose a methodology which suits what they wish to investigate. However, this does not entail that researchers should restrict themselves to a method when aspects of other methods can benefit the analysis. For instance, the comparative element which gets great attention in grounded theory has been employed; likewise, the content analysis table is inspired by an ethnographic approach to content analysis. Borrowing elements or using various methodologies for different parts of the research does not weaken the study. Instead, it ensures that each portion of the investigation has the most beneficial tool for analysis. On the other hand, researchers should not feel pressured to apply several analysis tools, but rather focus on what suits the study the most.

6. Results and analysis

The analysis will answer how China under the leadership of Xi Jinping frames ethnic minorities in white papers, and present how it justifies the assimilation and sinicisation of ethnic minorities. The questions will be scrutinised through the studied framing functions. This chapter will also, based on the studied material (see appendix 3), examine possible reasons for why China is assimilating its ethnic minorities now.

6.1 How does China frame ethnic minorities in white papers?

By studying and analysing the white papers' content through the framing functions, I have found repetitive depictions of ethnic minorities. One is what I will call the oneness characterisation. In this depiction, China speaks positively about ethnic minorities. It celebrates and supports ethnic minority culture and tradition and uses approving adjectives when describing them. Another aspect is how China stresses the vital role of ethnic minorities and expresses that the ethnic groups’ coexistence makes up China's wholeness. Following are some segments from the white papers that show different aspects of the oneness.

Starting with the ethnic groups’ coexistence, China stresses through the human-interest framing function, which stresses personality and takes into consideration the emotional element in framing, how the shared history of ethnic minorities has created a bond between them, making them bound together by feelings of very close association. This depiction is consistent throughout the white papers from 2013–2020. When comparing excerpts from 2015 and 2019, there is an apparent similarity in the description of ethnic groups, although the white paper from 2015 concerns Tibet while the one from 2019 regards Xinjiang.

The People’s Republic of China is a united multi-ethnic country created through the joined efforts of the peoples of all the ethnic groups in China. Over the long course of history, these ethnic groups have grown into a single community that responds to each and every challenge under the single name of the Chinese nation (WP 9, 2015)

Different ethnic groups with diverse livelihoods and lifestyles communicated with and complemented each other, and migrated and lived together. They experienced both conflict and integration, and pushed China to move forward and become a unified multiethnic country (WP 35, 2019).

The narrative of ethnic minorities is frequently presented in connection with Tibet and Xinjiang. Apart from the intricate portrayals of those two regions, the oneness depiction is evident in the white papers that focus on Tibet and Xinjiang. Considering that the two regions are explicitly mentioned in the titles, in ten out of the seventeen examined white papers, it shows their significance in China's ethnic policies. Undoubtedly, they are autonomous regions with a great mix of ethnic minorities. However, the concentrated emphasis on Tibet and Xinjiang may disregard ethnic minorities in other areas of China. On the other hand, it gives a more in-depth perspicuity into those regions' ethnic minority policies. For instance, the white papers on Xinjiang have been published in more recent years, six out of seven white papers that include Xinjiang in their title are issued after 2017, while one is from 2015. While two out of three white papers that have Tibet in their title are published in 2015, and the other is from 2019. This suggests that the later ethnic minority policies attend to the ethnic groups in Xinjiang to a greater extent.

The oneness of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang is greatly celebrated. China highlights several times that ethnic minorities in Xinjiang make up a substantial part of China and is a driving force for China's philosophical objectives: "Known for their hard working, wisdom and bravery, the ethnic groups of Xinjiang created a distinctive multiethnic culture, which became an important part of overall Chinese culture" (WP 15, 2015). The positive descriptions of ethnic groups in Xinjiang are likely due to the CPC’s desire to incite harmony as they often conclude that the ethnic groups are interrelated.

The ethnic groups of Xinjiang live together, study together, work together, and share happiness. They influence, assimilate and integrate with each other in language, diet, costume, music, dance, painting, architecture and other aspects of social life, culture and art. A common feature of these ethnic cultures is that all are interrelated (WP 31, 2018).

Likewise, they are also described as a big family. By giving out detailed insights into the lifestyle of ethnic groups in Xinjiang, China succeeds in delivering a cheerful and festive depiction of the ethnic minorities, which creates the impression of them living in harmony.

Workers of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang have forged profound friendships while working, studying and living together. They care for and help each other like family, demonstrating

ethnic unity and mutual assistance built on a close bond toward each other. The workers often gather together to enjoy themselves, singing, dancing, having parties, shopping, traveling, and cooking pilaf and kebabs like a family (WP 42, 2020).

The symbolic portrayal of ethnic groups being a family is repetitive in the white papers. In WP 35, from 2019 it is noted that "in this family of the Chinese nation, the ethnic groups in Xinjiang are like brothers and sisters who work and live together and help each other out". However, the description of the oneness is not solely bound between ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. Instead, the oneness is also tied to Chineseness and the Chinese ethnic majority. The documents stress that the unification of ethnic groups in China is a result of sharing the notion of the oneness with each other, "the unification of multiethnic China was a result of common efforts made by the whole Chinese nation, including the ethnic groups in Xinjiang" (WP 35, 2019). Consequently, a collective oneness between the ethnic minorities and ethnic majority is considered a crucial factor for upholding ethnic unity.

It has become an important ideological guarantee for ethnic unity that the Han Chinese cannot live without the ethnic minorities, the ethnic minorities cannot do without the Han Chinese, and no any one minority group can live without the other minority groups (WP 15, 2015).

The collective oneness, which makes up China also includes Tibet and the ethnic groups in that region. Similar to ethnic groups in Xinjiang, the ethnic groups in Tibet are "working hard, along with the whole nation, to build China into a prosperous society in all respects and realize the great dream of rejuvenating the Chinese nation" (WP 13, 2015). Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between the documents that concentrate on Xinjiang and Tibet. In the latter, the focus of ethnic policies is directed towards Tibetan more often than the ethnic groups in Tibet. Accordingly, specific descriptions of Tibetan arise in the white papers. The material collected within the human-interest frame function demonstrates how the documents depict Tibetan as:

people [who] have shared one mind, and in the face of every challenge have stood together with the people of other ethnic groups of the Chinese nation. Together, they have established a harmonious relationship featuring equality, solidarity and interdependence...Tibetans have been one communal member of the Chinese nation. The destiny of Tibet has always been closely connected with the destiny of the great motherland and the Chinese nation (WP 9, 2015).

Although China uses the oneness characterisation to stress ethnic unity, it on the contrary depicts ethnic minorities’ negatively when it regards their past. The pleasant adjectives are switched with negative formulations. One of the most repetitive words within this negative depiction is backwardness. This description is predominantly concentrated in the white papers about Tibet. The documents describe that not only was society in Tibet backward it was also poor and undeveloped. Moreover, it emphasises this sentiment as a joint perception by anyone who has visited Tibet: “Those who had visited Tibet in person, whether Chinese or foreign, were all struck by how backward the place was, and many of them have left factual records” (WP 9, 2015). According to the papers, China has helped Tibet move forward and develop as a region, this is repeated in WP 9 and 13 from 2015, but also WP 34 from 2019.

In order to help Tibet develop rapidly and get rid of poverty and backwardness, the central government has fully exploited the institutional advantages of the socialist system to pool nationwide strengths to support the construction of Tibet (WP 9, 2015).

Tibet has been able to transform from a society under feudal serfdom to socialism, from poverty and backwardness to civility and progress. As Chinese socialism has entered a new era, the ethnic peoples of Tibet, led by the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core, are working together with the people of the rest of the country to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation (WP 34, 2019).

The term backwardness relates to the serf debate of Tibet, where China argues that it has allowed the ethnic groups to gain personal freedom through its liberation of the region. The serf debate of Tibet is considered to be a political tool used by the PRC to justify its control over the Tibetan region. The Chinese government's argument declares that Tibet between 1912–1951 was barbaric and it was only through China’s occupation of the area, which is described as a peaceful liberation, that it could start developing. China emphasises that the backwardness can be detected through some facts; these are:

Until its peaceful liberation in 1951, Tibet did not have a single school in the modern sense; its illiteracy rate was as high as 95 percent among the young and the middle-aged; there was no modern medical service, and praying to the Buddha for succor was the main resort for most people if they fell ill; their average life expectancy was 35.5 years; there was not a single standard highway, and all goods and mail had to be delivered by man and beast of burden; and the region’s single hydropower station, with a generating capacity of 125 kw, served only the 14th Dalai Lama and a few other privileged people (WP 9, 2015).

The counterargument from supporters to the Tibetan independence movement point that China is exaggerating the extent and nature of serfdom in Tibet for political gains and to justify the annexation of Tibet. However, China means that such arguments come from separatist forces. Consequently, China uses conflict and attribution of responsibility framing functions in the white papers (WP 9, 2015; WP 34, 2019) where they blame the 14th Dalai Lama and reproach him for supporting Tibetan independence.

The only sensible alternative is for the Dalai Lama and his supporters to accept that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity, to abandon their goals of dividing China and seeking independence for Tibet, and to begin to act in the interests of Tibet and the country at large (WP 9, 2015).

Apart from underlining their conflict with the 14th Dalai Lama, China is firm in its opinion that “its peaceful liberation and democratic reform to the establishment of the autonomous region…was a correct choice” (WP 9, 2015). This emphasis contributes to a moral expectation of how one should view or behave toward the matter; in other words, ethnic groups should not oppose the PRC’s opinion nor take sides with the 14th Dalai Lama whom China disapproves of, nor should they pursue Tibetan independence. Moreover, the documents do not forget to remind that Tibet is a part of China and has always been, which implies it will continue to be a part of China.

History demonstrates clearly that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times, and it has never been an independent nation. In today’s world, all countries acknowledge this as a fact; no country has ever acknowledged “Tibetan independence”… the 14th Dalai Lama has no authority whatsoever to represent the people of Tibet, nor has he the right to decide the future and destiny of Tibet… Tibetans have been one communal member of the Chinese nation. The destiny of Tibet has always been closely connected with the destiny of the great motherland and the Chinese nation (WP 9, 2015).

Not only are the regions inseparable parts of China, but so are ethnic groups. In several of the white papers, it is stressed that ethnic groups in China are Chinese. Therefore, they should not identify themselves with political movements that have the aim to separate them from China, such as the Tibetan or East Turkestan independence movements. Furthermore, the documents use both historical and economic reasons why ethnic groups should not identify themselves

with the backward, separatist and extremist movements that “attempt to separate ethnic groups… from the Chinese nation and ethnic cultures in the region from the diverse but integrated Chinese culture” (WP 33, 2019). About Uyghurs they explain that:

The Uygur ethnic group came into being in the long process of migration and ethnic integration; they are not descendants of the Turks. The main ancestors of the Uygurs were the Ouigour people living on the Mongolian Plateau during the Sui and Tang dynasties. In the Yuan and Ming dynasties, the various ethnic groups in Xinjiang further merged; Mongolians, especially those of the Chagatai Khanate, were fused with the Uygurs, adding fresh blood to the Uygur group (WP 33, 2019).

They are economically interdependent and embrace each other’s culture, and are a unified whole that has become impossible to separate (WP 35, 2019).

Those who identify with these movements are considered to be separatists with bad intentions towards China, making it problematic for ethnic minorities that relate to a heritage China does not accept. Moreover, the documents also express that backwardness refers to other power control tools, such as religious and political power from the past that does not align with China’s socialist conditions. When speaking about the religious system in Xinjiang, it is stressed that people should not go back to the backwardness of the past “We must develop and encourage secular, modern and civilized ways of life, and abandon backward and outdated conventions and customs” (WP 35, 2019).

Although the descriptions show clear contrasts in terms of positive and negative aspects related to ethnic minorities, the moral framework has remained consistent. It emphasises how ethnic minorities should behave and feel towards China. The most important part is to maintain the right image of China and act in a way that benefits the state and its utopia, the Chinese Dream. Ethnic minorities should achieve it by adapting their beliefs in all areas of their life, privately as well as in general.

In China, the core of maintaining national unity and ethnic solidarity lies in anti-secessionist work. For a long time, Xinjiang religious circles have been enhancing the concept of the rule of law, abiding by laws and regulations, and fostering the national consciousness, civic awareness and sense of community of the Chinese nation. They have taken the lead in setting an example in the maintenance of national unity, in stopping words and deeds undermining national unity, and in publicizing local role models of national unity. They have striven to

become fine examples of national unity, and have led religious believers in contributing to the Chinese Dream of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (WP 17, 2016).

Finally, the framing of ethnic groups in China is positive for the most part. It stresses both the joyful experiences and the hardships, whether in work or in general, ethnic minorities have shared. The white papers accentuate oneness through ethnic unification and emphasise the significance it has for China to continue moving forward and progress. The documents also point out enemies that ethnic groups should dissent since identifying with them would mean accepting backwardness and being disloyal to the motherland China.

By pointing out a common enemy, two opposites are constructed, which strengthens the shared identity. The purpose of the portrayal of ethnic minorities, even if it is contradictory, is to create us against them mentality which ethnic minorities can associate with. The white papers show that the last leadership has been consistent in both their representation of ethnic minorities, and their goal, which is for ethnic groups to work together with the rest of the country "to realise the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, led by the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core" (WP 34, 2019).

6.2 What arguments are used to justify assimilation and sinicisation?

Through the studied material, it is possible to distinguish recurring arguments used to justify ethnic policy implementations that aim to change fundamental aspects of the ethnic minorities’ lives. The previous section which analysed the framing of ethnic groups reveals through the depiction of oneness and backwardness that China stressed unification and shared values as motivational factors for moving forward to accomplish the China Dream. This desire has led to the implementation of remedial policies that aim to fix anything that is not Chinese enough. The sub-arguments that are used to achieve this are, China is protecting itself from evil forces, and China is striving for modernisation.

The white papers issued under Xi Jinping's leadership have through the conflict and attribution for responsibility framing functions, that often get mentioned together, highlighted some enemies that have bad intentions for China and are the causing unrest in and outside China. These are the 14th Dalai Lama and the Tibetan-, and East Turkestan- Independence movements. China refers to them as separatist, religious and extremist forces. The former is said to preach

the middle way, which aims at creating a “state within a state” which goes against Chinese unity (WP 13, 2015). The latter is said to spread Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in an attempt to create a theocratic state called “East Turkistan in Xinjiang” (WP 37, 2019). It is explained that they deceitfully use ethnicity and religion to spread religious fanaticism, extremism and encourage ethnic minorities to join terrorist activities (WP 33, 2019). China refers to them as “hostile forces…[that]…have tried to split China and break it apart by distorting history and facts”, but that “[h]istory cannot be tampered with and facts are indisputable”. They further explain that “Xinjiang has long been an inseparable part of Chinese territory; never has it been the so-called East Turkistan. The Uygur ethnic group came into being through a long process of migration and integration; it is part of the Chinese nation” (WP 35, 2019).

The white papers also depict these evil forces as promoting backwardness and terrorism and explain that some have fallen victims to the “evil barbaric forces” (WP 35, 2019) and “their minds have been poisoned to the extent of losing reason and the ability to think sensibly about their lives and law (WP 37, 2019). Consequently, “without necessary intervention measures it will not be possible for them to cast off the shackles of religious extremism, get back to normal life, and improve their prospects for a better future” (WP 37, 2019). Therefore, they need to be “rehabilitated according to the policy of compassion and severity” (WP 37, 2019).

The documents state that they attribute responsibility by “addressing both the symptoms and root causes in its fight against terrorism and extremism, by striking hard at serious terrorist crimes…and by educating and rehabilitating people influenced by religious extremism and involved in minor violations of the law” (WP 37, 2019). They suggest that vocational education and training centres will help with the rehabilitation process. On the one hand, they will “prevent the breeding and spread of terrorism and religious extremism” (WP 37, 2019). On the other hand, they will hold courses to teach “trainees to distinguish between lawful and unlawful religious activities…so that they can eventually break free from the influence and control of terrorism and religious extremism” (WP 37, 2019).

The differentiation between lawful and unlawful religious activities is not specified. However, accounts from ethnic groups in Xinjiang convey that it can be about minimal things, which is also how many individuals end up in the centres. According to the white papers, there are three types of people who are admitted to the centres:

Those who have been inspired to commit in extremist activities but cannot be labeled as a serious crime. Those who have participated in terrorist or extremist attacks but did not cause a real danger or actual harm – they are remorseful for their actions and are willing to receive training. Those who have committed a crime, served a prison sentence but still pose threat to society. They and those in the first category; who are influenced to commit in extremist activities but can’t be labeled as a serious crime will receive education at the centers. A small number of those in the second category should be punished severely, while majority will be rehabilitated according to the policy of compassion and severity (WP 37, 2019).

The first of the three categories is puzzling since the decisive factors for being inspired can be vague, specifically since the white papers do not precise who falls under that category. However, in Xinjiang, ethnic minorities state that having some Islamic scriptures on their mobile phones, certain apps, peacefully advocating for independence or relating to a Turkic nation is enough to be considered as inspired or affected by extremist thoughts (HRW, 2018, pp. 22–23). This corresponds with the type of data AI collects from peoples’ devices (Allen- Ebrahimian, 2019).

Another perplexing problem is that the documents state that they do not interfere with trainees’ freedom of religion (WP 11, 15, 17, 27, 29, 33, 34, 37) and that they have not made any attempts to change trainees’ religious beliefs (WP 37). Yet, ethnic minorities are expected to limit their practice of faith in many aspects, both outside and inside the centres. Some regard the measures taken against religious dress such as burqas and men’s beards (China Law Translate, 2017). While other regard that trainees are not allowed to hold, preach, establish or take part in any religious activities in the centres (WP 37, 2019). This would imply that trainees cannot perform their daily prayers, fast, or practise any religious activities inside the facilities during their time there. In this respect, the centres directly target non-Han ethnic minorities with different beliefs from the majority and infringe on civil liberties such as freedom of religion.

Moreover, the documents specify that the infiltration of terrorism and religious extremism has impacted some ethnic minorities’ speech, reading and writing skills in standard Chinese. Accordingly, those people are said to have a weak understanding of law and lack employability skills. For this reason, the centres also have the ambition to teach the law and teach spoken and written Chinese so that ethnic minorities can become “useful individuals and individuals of value to society” (WP 33, 2019).

Apart from counterterrorism being used as a pretext to rehabilitate ethnic minorities, its use for teaching the Chinese language, even at the expense of ethnic minorities’ languages, indicates that the campaign serves a greater purpose in China’s assimilationist ethnic policies. One can just look back at Jiang and Hu’s eras, where the implementations of language policies were supposed to help the economy grow. In reality, it acted as immediate repression against ethnic minorities (Horowitz & Yu, 2014, p.470). China did it in the past, and Xi is implementing it now but under a different narrative. Moreover, to solve the problem of employment in the long run, the trainees are expected to develop vocational skills which will be utilised outside the centres as this would be “pivotal to people’s well-being” (WP 42, 2020). Conversely, through think tank reports and testimonies from inside Xinjiang, it is described that the vocational skills cultivated in the centres are later used to produce goods through forced labour (Lehr, 2020).

When faced with criticism about the centres and forced labour China explains that certain international parties are guilty of ideological bias. They supposedly have fabricated facts and support false claims and are prejudiced towards China and their approach (WP 42, 2020).

They have fabricated facts to support their false claims of "forced labor" in Xinjiang, and smeared the local government's work on employment and job security. Their acts amount to a denial of the fact that the local people in Xinjiang enjoy the right to work, aspire to move out of poverty and backwardness and are working toward that goal. Such groundless allegation would be strongly opposed by everyone who values justice and progress (WP 42, 2020).

This anti-Chinese sentiment argument was also used as late as on December 18th, 2020 where State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi stressed that some politicians, in reference to the U.S., have fabricated information about Xinjiang and Tibet and that China, as an independent sovereign state, naturally has to respond. He continued:

We shall not allow the law of the jungle to govern our world again. At the same time, for our foreign friends who truly care about China and wish to know more about Xinjiang, Tibet, and other parts of China, we are always ready to share the facts, what is truly happening to China. We welcome you to visit the regions at your convenience; there you will see first-hand, a situation different from what you see and hear in the news. You will see a Xinjiang and Tibet that enjoys social progress, ethnic harmony, freedom of religious belief, and a vibrant economy (Rudd & Wang, 2020).

Furthermore, another concept used to justify the ethnic policies is that China is striving for modernisation. The white papers stress how people need to become modernised and this is also an ambition of the centres. The education and training centres are said to “vigorously spread the concept of modern civilization, so that trainees can divest themselves of outdated conventions and customs” (WP 37, 2019). Besides, the centres have “won the support of all ethnic groups” and “[t]hey thank education and training for turning them back” (WP 35, 2019). It is also portrayed that when ethnic cultures “assimilated, integrated and accommodated the diverse culture of the Central Plains” (WP 35, 2019), they became more apparent and could make better progress. Therefore, ethnic groups are advised to keep pace with times, exchange and integrate with other ethnic cultures in China and play their role in “fostering a shared spiritual home for all China’s ethnic groups” (WP 35, 2019).

In the documents, religion is a vital area of development for achieving a modern society. According to the latest white paper, terrorists, separatists, and religious extremists have by preaching that “the afterlife is fated” and “religious teachings are superior to state laws”, been able to incite the public to resist learning the Chinese language and reject modernisation. As a result, this has led to some local people having outdated ideas according to the party (WP 42, 2020). Another point that is said to have impacted ethnic groups, specifically in Xinjiang, is that Islam entered by force through conflict and war (WP 35, 2019). To advance from these influences “religion in China must be Chinese in orientation” (WP 29, 2918). In other words, religion needs to be sinicised:

To survive and develop, religions must adapt to their social environment. The history of religions in China shows that only by adapting themselves to the Chinese context can they be accommodated within Chinese society. The 70-year history of the PRC also shows that only by adapting to socialist society can religions in China develop soundly…We must develop and encourage secular, modern and civilized ways of life, and abandon backward and outdated conventions and customs. We must carry forward religious practices adapted to Chinese society, inspire various religions in China with core socialist values and Chinese culture, foster the fusion of religious doctrines with Chinese culture, and lead these religions, including Islam, onto the Chinese path of development (WP 35, 2019).

A common element between the white papers is that they refer to Islam as a religion that needs to be sinicised. Other religions are not explicitly told to adapt. However, believers in China are expected to get along: “[r]eligious believers and non-believers respect each other, and live in

harmony, committing themselves to reform and opening-up and the socialist modernization, and contribute to the realization of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation” (WP 29, 2018). It is further developed that assimilating religions entails that they adapt to socialist society by loving their country, safeguarding national unity and being subordinate to and sever the interests of the Chinese people and the nation:

It also means guiding religious groups to support the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system; uphold and follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; develop religions in the Chinese context; embrace core socialist values; carry forward China’s fine traditions; integrate religious teachings and rules with Chinese culture; abide by State laws and regulations, and accept State administration in accordance with the law (WP 29, 2018).

When religions become Chinese in orientation, they will utilise aspects in their faith, which benefit Chinese society. The document provides, through the morality frame, guidelines on how communities from each religion should act:

The Buddhist community integrates patriotism with love of religion, focusing more on worldly concerns, promoting Buddhism to benefit all living creatures, public charity, and cultural exchange. The Taoist community is committed to promoting its religious principles such as “respecting the Tao and valuing morality”, “Tao follows nature”, “being quiet and serene” and “embracing simplicity and wisdom”, to help carry forward and promote traditional Chinese culture. The Islamic community focuses on interpreting the thoughts in its religious doctrine of patriotism, peace, unity, tolerance and the Middle Path, serving to form correct belief, discerning right from wrong, opposing secession, and resisting religious extremism. The Catholic community actively promotes the localization of churches, managing church activities and making decisions in a democratic manner. The Protestant community draws nourishment from traditional Chinese culture, helping to foster mutual respect and harmony between Protestants and believers of all faiths so as to allow Protestantism to better integrate into modern Chinese society (WP 29, 2018).

The excerpt reveals that secession and religious extremism refer to the Islamic community. Thus, the vocational education and training centres expected to eradicate extremist thought and teach one to fit in with mainstream Chinese society are targeting Muslim minorities. The aim is for ethnic groups to assimilate a modernised lifestyle that follows socialism with Chinese characteristics. Associating with the past is like clinging to backwardness, and anything that is deemed as backwards needs fixing. Moreover, China states it has the right to implement its own

ethnic policies and that it is, similarly to other countries, striving for bettering human rights and getting rid of radical extremism and terrorism that many countries suffer from. Finally, the repetitive portrayals when framing ethnic minorities can make one subconsciously think of them in those terms. The framing also affects how we feel one should deal with the matter. With the protection of evil forces arguments that employ Anti-Terrorism Law (WP 27, 2017) and uses a counterterrorism narrative, the framing of ethnic minorities suggests that the issues should be dealt with using corrective measures, like re-education centres. Whereas under the modernisation narrative, matters should be dealt with using reformative measures, like sinicising religion and assimilating dominant Chinese culture. While the double framing makes it possible to move between the measures, it still indicates that taking action is needed.

6.3 How and why is China assimilating its ethnic minorities now?

It is evident that Xi has a long-term vision for China, and the abolition of the presidency’s two- term limitation in 2018 is enabling him to follow through with his China Dream (Ng, 2007). The various framing functions show that there has been a constant intensification towards a more draconian ethnic policy under Xi's leadership. To begin with, the white papers confirm previous research that claims China is using a securitisation framework with a counterterrorism narrative to justify its crackdown. Within the conflict and attribution of responsibility framing functions, the white papers express that the causing entities are foreign parties, such as the 14th Dalai Lama and separatist independence movements that incite extremism.

Simultaneously, the government and ethnic minorities are perceived as the actors that can alleviate the problem. While China portrays itself as a protagonist who tries to save its ethnic minorities from evil infiltration, the ethnic groups have a responsibility to assimilate Chinese socialist society to avoid influence by backward forces. The assimilation is expected to occur mainly by the sinicisation of religion and de-radicalisation through the vocational education and training centres: “As trainees have fallen under the influence and control of religious extremism to a greater or lesser extent, the centers integrate deradicalization into the whole process of education and training” (WP 37, 2019). Apart from the de-radicalisation, the centres are supposed to speed up the assimilation process by “educating and rehabilitating people” to ensure they know the law, speak the Chinese language, and develop a vocational skill to utilise for employment purposes (WP 37, 2019).

Moreover, the responsibility ethnic minorities hold is further shown through the human-interest and morality framing functions. Through these functions, one can see the features of Confucianism that previous researchers such as Baogang He (2005) and Yuen Siu Tim (2009) have suggested are prevalent in China. Confucianism's prime intention, which is for the minority and majority to assimilate and live in harmony, could be observed in the oneness framing in section 6.1. To recap, “Han Chinese cannot live without the ethnic minorities, the ethnic minorities cannot do without the Han Chinese” (WP 15, 2015). The cases of oneness show how China has tried to embrace the principle of harmonious coexistence of different cultures by expanding the national identity and accentuating national unity. The aim is for ethnic minorities to relate to the shared national identity more than their own heritage.

Furthermore, through the morality frame, ethnic groups have been told how to behave to fit in with Chinese society. The persistent instructions explain that ethnic minorities should modernise themselves and their thinking. A salient point presented earlier concerns how people believing in religion should practice their faith (WP 29, 2018). The measures against religion share similarities with the Cultural Revolution under Mao’s leadership. The crackdown on religious symbols (appendix 4) and religious dress (China Law Translate, 2017) demonstrates the CCP’s sinicisation efforts. While the religious sinicisation in recent years has mainly targeted Muslim Turkic minorities, officials from other regions are told to learn from Xinjiang and apply the same methods, such as in Ningxia (Stroup, 2019). The CPC’s ambition is to sincise religions to the extent where people are required only to keep the aspects that benefit the state even if it infringes on human rights.

In my opinion, religion is considered a threat because it often represents a person’s most profound loyalty which the party has a hard time competing with. The devotion to faith weakens the party’s ideological foundation, hence why the papers describe beliefs that consider “the afterlife is fated” and “religious teachings are superior to state laws” as outdated ideas (WP 42, 2020). Suppose the sinicisation of religion succeeds, and people start to follow the sinicised versions. In such a case, China would strengthen the demos and use national solidarity as a progressive political resource to achieve the China Dream. It would also stand stronger against potential trojan horses that intend to overthrow the regime’s political agenda.

In addition, the white papers that fit into the economic framing function emphasise how increased assistance and support by the government has helped regions develop economically

and has offered job opportunities to minorities (WP 15, 27, 32, 34, 35, 39, 42). Making ethnic minorities employable by having them learn a vocational skill and the Chinese language, has been a consistent policy practice under Xi’s leadership. It allows the CCP to track ethnic minorities’ lives outside the centres and is another long-term plan for assimilating ethnic groups. By creating an atmosphere where ethnic groups are under constant surveillance, the party has full control over uprising ideologies and belief systems that oppose the party.

So, is there a definite reason as to why China is taking these measures now? This question will have different answers depending on whom one asks. However, this study has established that there are several arguments as to why China could be implementing assimilationist policies, and some are more substantial than others. One could argue that Xinjiang is particularly significant to the CPC due to its geographic position which acts as a gateway to countries in the west, but also that it is rich in natural resources and is home to one of China’s most grand projects, the BRI (Lifos, 2018, p. 10). Therefore, China has an interest in assimilating its ethnic minorities. However, that would not explain why ethnic minorities in regions with neither geostrategic significance nor richness in natural resources are forced to assimilate. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that China has greater plan with its assimilation policies, which is to eliminate all parts that are not beneficial for their modernisation goals.

On the other hand, one could argue that China has experienced many attacks from separatist and terrorist movements and that the implementation of the counterterrorism framework targeting ethnic minorities in XUAR and TAR is an unintentional occurrence. However, that does not explain why the party is assimilating regions without active independence movements like Ningxia or Inner Mongolia. Neither does it explain the sinicisation of religions other than Buddhism and Islam, such as Christianity.

Instead, the studied material demonstrates that religion plays a significant role in China’s implementations of strict ethnic policies. Ethnic minorities that turn to religion become a threat to Xi Jinping since they put their God and leaders, such as the 14th Dalai Lama, above Xi and the party and may not contribute to the Chinese dream. Considering it would be hard to wipe out religion with millions of followers, sinicising it becomes the next best step to ensure that Xi can be the 21st century’s Mao Zedong.

This might raise the question if the ethnic policies would be any different if somebody else were the president, which I believe it would. The previous leaderships under Jiang and Hu's era employed assimilation policies, but they were never as severe as Xi’s policies. Nor did they promote and campaign their dream for China as much as Xi, which indicates that the current ethnic policies may go through drastic changes since they emulate Xi’s own ambitions.

Finally, while China’s recent measures to achieve national unity are questionable. It is for the future to reveal whether the assimilation policies could lead ethnic groups to develop deep- rooted resentment towards the CCP and its vision for China, and consequently lead to mass protests. Or, if ethnic groups will adhere to their cultures, religions and languages more than before, and cause the leadership to expand its strict ethnic policies even more. This can have one wonder, who is responsible for the ethnic minorities’ well-being and protection if China decides to extend its harsh ethnic policies further? Does the international community have a responsibility? I will discuss these difficulties in the next and final chapter.

7. Concluding discussion and summary

In the last chapter of this research, I will discuss the significance of the results and draw final conclusions. I will also go through questions that have emerged along the way and explain how the international community should act handle it on a national level.

This study has analysed white papers issued under Xi Jinping's administration. It has examined how ethnic policies have evolved within the last leadership by applying framing theory and studying the material through a coding scheme and content analysis. By reviewing white papers, this study has explored China’s underlying ambitions and philosophy that encourage the application of contemporary ethnic policies. This study also compares the findings to previous research. It confirms that the party has used the ‘war on terror’ to justify its actions and that China includes Confucian principles in its reasoning. Moreover, similar to previous researchers and journalists' conclusions, the study demonstrates how civil liberties have decreased and consequently silenced the voices of the people, not least minorities.

Through the framing functions, the study shows how China describes their image of ethnic groups and tells them to behave in specific ways. The results reveal the tendency to portray ethnic minorities as a unified entity, which this study has referred to as oneness. The material also shows how ethnic groups are told to leave backward aspects that hold them back from reforming themselves. This means that one should not relate to specific enemies, as the 14th Dalai Lama and Tibetan, or East Turkestan independence movements.

Besides, apart from the ‘war on terror’ narrative, the study uncovers another narrative. The white papers depict the goal of modernisation as one of China’s primary reasons for implementing particular policies and sinicising religion. Modernising ethnic minorities, their beliefs and lifestyles, is done to fit in with Chinese socialism as a part of a larger purpose to achieve uniformity and the China dream. The idea of eradicating anything which does not align with the party’s interests and goals can be compared to other political issues in China. For instance, how they have handled the 2019–20 Hong Kong Protests. Although the matters differ, the leadership’s response to both has been similar. Anything that can pose a threat to the state, such as people choosing an ideology, religion, or notion that does not consider Xi Jinping and the CPC as supreme powers will face drastic and inhumane measures.

While the results show that ethnic policies since the PRC’s formation have infringed on ethnic groups’ lives, the current implementations have a rougher approach. In reference to previous eras, one can see that Xi has moved on from economic integration, as it is considered not enough, to higher levels of governmental repression. Xi’s approach shares great similarities with the Cultural Revolution. By implying that evil forces have impacted ethnic minorities, China claims that the re-education camps will eradicate the infiltration and ‘heal’ the ethnic groups. Besides, China continues to stress its unwillingness to change its stringent strategies and opposes all external criticism directed towards the party and its politics.

One cannot but wonder how the party’s policies will affect ethnic groups in the upcoming years. If China does not change its ethnic policies by themselves, it will be necessary with pressure from the outside. The main pressure has come from the U.S. which has increased the tension between the two great powers to acute levels. Moving from the Trump to Biden administration, we will have to see what happens next. However, since the U.S.-China relations affect other countries, the international community, supporters and opponents, have a shared responsibility to follow China’s development and through democratic means safeguard minorities and ensure

their fundamental rights. While it is likely that China will not make significant policy changes, one can hope that holding China accountable to international norms of human rights and their own criteria of ethnic minority rights could positively influence them. After all, China has given the 55 ethnic minorities a degree of cultural autonomy, and therefore this right should not be ignored. To give an idea, the international community can inspire ethnic researchers and leaders in China to develop ethnic minority rights in alignment with human rights. The brutality against religious and ethnic minorities must not become normalised for upcoming generations. So, regardless of political ideologies, one should oppose the repression and change the current course for a better and safer future for all humans. This also means that those responsible for ethnic minorities’ suffering should be held accountable for their actions.

Finally, countries need to protect ethnic minorities who have fled from China. This requires that relevant authorities in each country, stay up to date about China's political environments. Mainly, countries should avoid issuing quick denials of residence permits to Chinese refugees, and consequently putting their lives in danger by risking sending them back to appalling conditions. It is essential to listen to the ethnic minorities' own stories and experiences and not turn a blind eye to what is happening. The study shows that although China frames ethnic minorities in a positive way, it does not indicate that they are living in a harmonious environment as the party describes. This is a crucial aspect to keep in mind since the framing intended to navigate the receiver’s thoughts does not need to correspond with the textual framing or the communicator’s framing intention, or with reality.

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9. Appendixes

Appendix 1: Coding scheme based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) five framing functions

Material 1 Material 2…etc Conflict frame Does the material reflect disagreement between parties- individuals-groups-countries? Does one party-individual-group- country reproach another? Does the material refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue? Does the material refer to winners and losers?

Human-interest frame Does the material provide a human example or human face on the issue? Does the material employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy, or compassion? Does the material emphasise how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem? Does the material go into the private or personal lives of the actors? Does the material contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy- caring, sympathy, or compassion?

Attribution of responsibility - Diagnosing causes - Suggesting remedies Does the material suggest that some level of gov’t has the ability to alleviate the problem?

Does the material suggest that some level of the government is responsible for the issue/problem? Does the material suggest that an ind. /group is resp. for the issue- problem? (Includes Entman’s diagnosing causes) Does the material suggest the problem requires urgent action? (Includes Entman’s suggesting remedies) Does the material suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue? (Includes Entman’s suggesting remedies)

Morality frame Does the material contain any moral message? Does the material make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets? Does the material offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?

Economic frame Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future? Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved? Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?

Appendix 2: Content analysis table

Coding schemes 1. 1. 1.

2. 2. 2.

3. 3. Documents 3.

Answers from function ‘1’

Comparisons 1. 2. 3.

1. 2. 3.

Results 1.

Summary:

Appendix 3: Material for analysis

Following is a list of the white papers which include my search word. They have been issued from 2013 till 2020, in total 42 documents, whereby 17 have been analysed in this study (they have been marked with a blue bold italic font). Throughout the research these white papers (WP) are referred to by the number in this list, for instance a reference to the fifth white paper on this list will look like (WP 5, 2014). The white papers are organised in a chronological order, starting with the oldest to the newest.

1. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2013-04-01 2. Intellectual Property Protection by Chinese Courts in 2012 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2013-04-22 3. Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2012 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2013-05-01 4. Development and Progress of Tibet 2012 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2013-10-01 5. Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2013 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2014-05-01 6. Report on the Work of the People’s courts (2013) Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2014-06-01 7. The History and Development of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2014-10-01 8. Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-03-01 9. Tibet’s Path of Development Is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-04-15 10. China’s Military Strategy Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-05-01 11. Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2014 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-06-01 12. Human Rights Record of the United States in 2014 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-06-01

13. Successful Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-09-01 14. Gender equality and Women's Development in China Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-09-01 15. Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2015-09-01 16. Human Rights Record of the United States in 2015 & Chronology of Human Rights Violations of the United States in 2015 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-04-14 17. Freedom of Religious Belief Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-06-01 18. Assessment Report on the Implementation of the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-2015) Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-06-14 19. New Progress in the Judicial Protection of Human Rights in China Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-09-01 20. National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020) Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-09-01 21. China’s Progress in Poverty Reduction and Human Rights Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-10-01 22. Traditional Chinese Medicine in China Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-12-01 23. The Right to Development: China's Philosophy, Practice and Contribution Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-12-01 24. China’s Space Activities in 2016 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2016-12-01 25. China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2017-01-01 26. Human Rights Record of the United States in 2016 & Chronology of Human Rights Violations of the United States in 2016 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2017-03-01 27. Human Rights in Xinjiang - Development and Progress Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2017-06-01 28. Development of China’s Public Health as an Essential Element for Human Rights

Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2017-09-01 29. China's Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2018-04-01 30. Human Rights Record of the United States in 2017 & Chronology of Human Rights Violations of the United States in 2017 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2018-04-24 31. Cultural Protection and Development in Xinjiang Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2018-11-01 32. Progress in Human Rights over the 40 Years of Reform and Opening Up in China Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2018-12-01 33. The Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism and Human Rights Protection in Xinjiang Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-03-01 34. Democratic Reform in Tibet——Sixty Years On Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-03-01 35. Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-07-21 36. China's National Defense in the New Era Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-07-24 37. Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-08-16 38. Equality, Development and Sharing: Progress of Women's Cause in 70 Years Since New China's Founding Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-09-19 39. Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-09-22 40. China and the World in the New Era Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2019-09-27 41. The Record of Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2019 Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2020-03-01 42. Employment and Labour Rights in Xinjiang Issuing authority: State Council Information Office, Date issued: 2020-09-17

Appendix 4: Visual images

4.1 Vocational and Education Training Centres (Re-education camps)

Google Map compiled by Shawn Zhang of the locations of what he believes are re-education camps. https://medium.com/@shawnwzhang/list-of-re-education-camps-in-xinjiang-新疆再教育集中营列表-99720372419c

Detainees in Xinjiang, picture was uploaded on a WeChat MP platform https://web.archive.org/web/20180820154817/https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1564669932542581&wfr=spider&for=pc

Satellite image that overlooks one facility, the four circles show the watchtowers and the piles point out the wired fences https://medium.com/@shawnwzhang/satellite-imagery-of-xinjiang-re-education-camp-新疆再教育集中营卫星图-2-d6d2ad768977

Closer look at the watchtower, barbed wires and high walls https://medium.com/@shawnwzhang/satellite-imagery-of-xinjiang-re-education-camp-新疆再教育集中营卫星图-2-d6d2ad768977

4.2 Demolished or altered religious buildings

”Five domes with star-and-crescent symbols were removed from a mosque in Minquan county’s Chumiao townshi” – Bitter Winter https://bitterwinter.org/numerous-mosques-sinicized-amid-the-pandemic/

”The spires and religious characters were removed from a Three-Self church in Zhaobao town” – Bitter Winter https://bitterwinter.org/sinicized-mosques-and-churches-changed-beyond-recognition/

”The domes of a Xugezhuang town mosque now look like Chinese-style pavilions” – Bitter Winter https://bitterwinter.org/ccp-sinicizes-mosques-to-weaken-muslim-faith/

”A Buddhist statue replaced with an image of Confucius” – Bitter Winter https://bitterwinter.org/confucius-replaces-buddha-in-sinicized-temples/

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