Michael Callahan on Tanganyika Under International

Peter A. Dumbuya. Tanganyika Under International Mandate, 1919-1946. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995. xxiii + 282 pp. $42.50, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7618-0063-7. Reviewed by Michael D. Callahan Published on H-Africa (December, 1997) The First World War sparked a far-reaching For the frst time, an international organiza‐ debate in Europe and the United States about the tion, through a Permanent Mandates Commission purpose and future of colonialism. Those who (PMC), had the authority to press a colonial gov‐ considered themselves "anti-imperialists" and hu‐ ernment to comply with specific regulations, pro‐ manitarians, including the American president, tect Africans from "abuses," and "promote to the Woodrow Wilson, insisted that "old-fashioned" utmost the material and moral well-being and so‐ imperialism threatened world peace. Wilson re‐ cial progress" of peoples who were "not yet able jected crass annexation of the conquered German to stand by themselves" in the modern world. African colonies and called for a "free, open- Mandates formed "a sacred trust of civilization" minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all and the larger world now held the imperial pow‐ colonial claims" based on the principle that "the ers hostage to their own rhetoric. Still, Berlin com‐ interests of populations concerned must have plained that the mandates system allowed Britain equal weight with the equitable claims of the gov‐ to virtually annex Germany's former colonies. ernment whose title is to be determined." Many historians have agreed and have argued At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, many that the mandates differed only in name from oth‐ British leaders hoped to annex most of Germany's er colonial possessions.[1] colonies. Instead, Wilson coerced Britain to accept Peter A. Dumbuya explores the impact of the a plan that placed the German possessions, in‐ mandates system on the British administration of cluding German East Africa, under the supervi‐ "the Tanganyika Territory," the former German sion of the new League of Nations. This solution East Africa, from 1919 to 1946. A fresh interpreta‐ gave Britain control of German East Africa, but as tion of this subject is overdue, but Dumbuya a "mandate" within a framework of international claims his study "shows that British policies in the accountability rather than as a "colony" or "pro‐ Tanganyika mandate, far from promoting self- tectorate" under national sovereignty. rule and political independence for Africans, merely excluded them from political participation H-Net Reviews at the national level" (p. xiii). This is not a new cured the same rights and privileges enjoyed by conclusion.[2] Dumbuya also argues that Britain's all members of the League in the tropical African colonial policies merely "strengthened British rule mandated territories without ever joining the further and sought to enhance the political and League.[5] strategic interests of the British empire in Africa" The book's faws, however, run deep. The text (p. xiii), but this too fts with older scholarly is often unnecessarily repetitious and burdened views.[3] Lastly, Dumbuya echos the sentiments of by factual errors, but the central arguments suffer the League's harshest critics by concluding "the more from a lack of context. There is almost no mandate system was a front for Allied territorial discussion of the nature or importance of interna‐ expansion at the expense of the defeated Central tional law for international relations during the Powers" (p. xv).[4] interwar period. Also, there is not enough analy‐ Dumbuya's book is a revision of his 1991 Uni‐ sis of the dramatic shifts in Britain's domestic, im‐ versity of Akron doctoral dissertation and is based perial, and foreign policies from 1919 to the end on secondary sources as well as a selection of of the Second World War. More important, there public, diplomatic, and private papers. Specifical‐ is too little consideration of imperial ideology and ly, he draws on American and British official pub‐ the climate of opinion in which administrators, lications, newspapers, the British Foreign Office politicians, interest groups, and the League were "General Correspondence" fles (FO 371) at the working. Public Record Office in London, published League This lack of context produces certain prob‐ of Nations documents, and the manuscript collec‐ lems for Dumbuya's analysis. Those who created tions of leading American officials. Dumbuya does and defended the mandates system were dedicat‐ not include Tanzanian or German archival mate‐ ed to a progressive agenda of gradual reform and rials. He also does not use British Cabinet papers, pragmatic paternalism in Africa under interna‐ Colonial Office papers, or the private papers of tional supervision.[6] Yet, the ambiguous promise relevant special interest groups, British political to administer peoples who were "not yet able to leaders, colonial officials, and members of the stand by themselves," caused serious division and PMC. confusion among contemporaries.[7] Notions of Tanganyika Under International Mandate is "self-rule," "development," "self-determination," divided into nine chapters. The author explains "trusteeship" and "independence" were even the origins of the mandates system, American in‐ more controversial and often did not mean what terests in the mandate system, the colonial admin‐ they do now. istrations of Sir Horace Byatt (1916-1924) and Sir Dumbuya contends that "(s)elf-rule for Tan‐ Donald Cameron (1925-1931), the issue of federa‐ ganyikans remained a distant goal and a cher‐ tion in British East Africa, and what Dumbuya de‐ ished dream in the 1920s" and "the British govern‐ scribes as "the twilight years" of British rule in the ment in the 1920s did not begin to fulfill its obliga‐ mandated territory from 1933 to 1946. Chapter 3, tion to prepare Tanganyikans for the long road to entitled "Great Britain, the United States and the political independence" (p. 148-149). He does not, B' Mandates in Africa, 1919-1925: The Road to however, explain what Africans and Europeans Confirmation," is probably the most effective. It meant by "self-rule," "obligation" and "political in‐ relies on the papers of important American offi‐ dependence," making it difficult to measure the cials, including Arthur Sweetser, a member of the actions of individuals by the contemporary expec‐ American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and tations, aspirations, and limitations of their specif‐ adds to recent studies of how the United States se‐ ic historical setting. 2 H-Net Reviews What is perhaps most troublesome about concerning the mandated territory and the less Tanganyika Under International Mandate is the public connections between the many people who source material. Newspapers and Foreign Office were concerned with the administration of Tan‐ documents expose little about the British colonial ganyika during this twenty-five-year period. As a policy-making process. American sources reveal result, he is unable to construct a convincing in‐ even less. The sanitized published minutes of the terpretation of either the complex nature of the PMC, London's equally superficial annual reports British colonial structure that linked Tanganyika to the League, and other similar documents were with the metropole or the multiplicity of individu‐ designed to obscure internal policy debates, con‐ als, interests, and ideas that gave shape to that flicts and confusion between government bureau‐ structure. Such an approach is essential if histori‐ cracies, and potentially embarrassing political ans hope to begin to evaluate the impact of both problems. Both Geneva and London had a vested the terms as well as the spirit of the mandates on interest in avoiding damaging criticism that might the perceptions and actions of those within this undermine either the League's credibility or vast and changing imperial system that integrated Britain's imperial legitimacy. For these reasons, a range of colonial, national, and international in‐ the public record projected a purposeful image of stitutions. cooperation and general agreement that obscures Notes much about the influence of the mandates system [1]. For example, see Judith Listowel, The on the administration of Tanganyika. Making of Tanganyika (London, 1965), p. 72; Wm. The League and mandates system were prod‐ Roger Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost ucts of international law. The PMC had to rely on Colonies (Oxford, 1967), p. 7; and Brian Digre, Im‐ moral suasion, the threat of public condemnation, perialism's New Clothes: The Repartition of Tropi‐ and the force of its own reputation to convince cal Africa 1914-1919 (New York, 1990), pp. powerful sovereign states like Britain that con‐ 196-199. For similar views concerning the French forming to international law was in their long mandates, see Christopher M. Andrew and A.S. term national and imperial interests. Thus, the Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War meaning of the mandate for Tanganyika was of‐ and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion ten subtle and indirect, but significant. In 1938, (London, 1981), p. 184 and 235; Robert Cornevin, Lord Hailey (himself the British member of the Le Togo: Des origines a nos jours (Paris, 1987), pp. PMC from 1936 to 1939), in his extensive survey of 233-278; and Dieudonne Oyono, Colonie ou Man‐ Africa, noted that dat international? La politique franaise au Only those who have had experience of the Cameroun de 1919 a 1946 (Paris, 1992), pp. internal working of an official administration, in 203-204. circumstances where there is no organization of [2]. See Walter Morris-Hale, British Adminis‐ public opinion, can appreciate the strength of the tration in Tanganyika from 1920 to 1945 with spe‐ influence which can be exerted by publicity of the cial references to the Preparation of Africans for nature of that involved in [the League of Nations Administrative Positions (Geneva, 1969), pp. mandates system] . It is not surprising, there‐ 301-308. fore, that many consider the value of [the system] [3].

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