U.Sr-China Policy

The new United States policy initiated under the Nixon Administration aimed at the "normalization" of our relations with the People's Republic of

China. This policy was highly successful and beneficial to the United States.

It took advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict to establish independent United

States' policies and relationships with Peking and Moscow without taking a stand in the conflict. These independent relationships strengthened the

United States' position and certainly greatly contributed to the successful agreement in Paris regarding Vietnam.

The new China policy has found broad support within the United States from very different sides of the political sp,ectrum_and not always for the same reasons. It served the purpose of American policy and security.

If the policy' served our purpose, it clearly also served that of

Peking by strengthening the position of the People's Republic in the face of what then appeared as an imminent danger of Soviet intervention in Chinese affairs, and by enabling the People's Republic to enter the United Nations with the added advantage of excluding the representatives of the Republic of China government. U.S.-China policy led eventually to a new formal relationship between the People's Republic and the United States, expressed by the exchange of diplomatic missions between Peking and Washington, ·D.C. without any-curtailment of the formal diplomatic relations between the

United States between the United States and the Republic of China on

Taiwan. This singularly successful policy then led in practice if not in theory to a two-China situation, the principle of one country--two govern­ ments, as it has since been realized in the case of East and West Germany -2- and attempted, so far unsuccessfully, in the case of North and South Korea and North and South Vietnam.

This highly successful policy has therefore gone as far as possible in exploiting the reality of the situation to the mutual advantage of the

People's Republic and the United States.

Today, sources, who seem to believe that rather basic changes. are occurring in Peking and Moscow; want to ·go beyond the present arrangement and are willing to sacrifice allies and commitments in the hope of effecting permanently the policies of our adversaries in these capitals. The goal, sometimes clearly expressed, sometimes hinted at, is the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Peking at the sacrifice of our formal diplomatic recognition of the Republic of C~ina goyernment on Taiwan.

The arguments in.favor of this departure from present policy vary. Some­ times they are the result of a concern with the possibility of Sino-Soviet reconciliation and are meant to provide the means by which this could be prevented; sometimes they are regarded as a means to speed the Chinese

Connnunists along a "pragmatic course" which is assumed to have replaced the doctrinal and totalitarian goals and policies of the past. For others, it is an expression of a continued hostility and disdain towards the Republic of China government on Taiwan which for some Americans still remains under the shadow of corruption and disintegration perceived at the time of the loss of the mainland at the end of World War II. These· arguments never consider fully the legal and political consequences of such a move and its impact on American policy and American security. It is this lack of full realization of the potential consequences of such a policy which causes deep concern. -3-

For some who think of themselves as political realists, the question of the moral issue of our defense of 16 million Chinese on Taiwan against a forced Communist takeover is discarded because of the larger con­ cern of maintaining peace by balancing existing forces. They also do not believe in the danger that anyone-sided retreat from our commitment may seriously affect our credibility in the eyes of other allies and neutral nations as well as of .our antagonists.

The legal issue of our ability to defend Taiwan in case of military action by the People's Republic is, by some, regarded as remote today. If, however, any promises on the side of the People's Republic not to use military force against Taiwan ~ere broken, any move by the United States to support a Nationalist defense of Taiwan against Communist attack would be assailed as intervention in what, after a U.S. diploma tic recognition of

Pekin&would become an internal Chinese affair.

The question of our continued formal diplomatic relationship with the government of the Republic of China is however of larger importance.

It affects our whole negotiating ability in this delicate international system that Dr. Kissinger has managed with such extraordinary virtuosity .

It is the trump card in a game which has no foreseeable conclusion. As it stands, the new relationship with the ~Si-diplomatic representations in

Peking and Washington, D.C. has accomplished for the United States every­ thing that could conceivably be gained from normalization with Peking.

In order to maintain the restraint which normalizatioR has helped to impose on Peking's goals of revolution and subversion, the chief weapon of our relations with Taiwan must not be abandoned. There appears to be no possible qqid pro quo that could justify such a crucial step. Paper -4- agreements with a Communist nation, as we have learned before, cannot be

expected to last unless the po~itions of strength remain constant on our

side. Thus for the continuation of the negotiations themselves, it is vital that our position should remain as strong as it is at the present

time.

If it is our concern to restrain any move by a future leadershIp

in Peking towards a realigp~ent with Moscow, no sacrifice at this time f would in any way prevent this possibility nor indeed would any action on

our side place us in a position to influence the domestic power struggle which may result from Mao's departure. On the other hand it appears vital I for the United States to retain a fall-back position if a new cooperative

policy of Peking towards Moscow should materialize.- This fall-back position

presumably would be based primarily on our security treaty with Japan. Not

only our credibility" in Japan but also the weight of our influence on Japan's

future international policy will be strongly affected about our position in

Korea and in Taiwan, the two basic screens for Japan's security and freedom

of action, with Taiwan crucial in relation to Japan's supply line for the

energy resources on which her survival depends.

Normalization with the People's Republic going beyond the present

balance of strength, would therefore provide no guaranteed nor visible

results, nor gain possible advantage, but would on the contrary weaken our

position and, more important, weaken our bargaining strength in future

negotiations with the People's Republic. It would clearly undermine our

security position in Asia. From Francis o. Wilcox (e d.), China and the Great Powers, Praeger"New ~ York, \ '. 1974. CHAPTER ~ ~~;) CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES: WHEN WILL THE "NORMALIZATION"

I, OF RELATIONS BE COMPLETED? I I Jerome Alan Cohen

I

The joint communique of February 22, 1973, ushered in Phase II of the reconciliation between Washington and Peking. Phase I, coin­ ciding with the first Nixon Adm'inistration, was the period in which the United States sought to establish friendly, if tentative, communication with the People's Republic of China (PRC) while gradually extricating itself from the Indochina conflict. The termination of American military operations in Vietnam cleared the path for what has now begun: a serious effort to "normalize" Sino-American relations, which I both governments define as the establishment of formal diplomatic " relations at the ambassadorial level.

.J THE S~GNIFICANCE OF THE "LIAISON OFFICES"

By imaginatively agreeing to establish "liaison offices" in each ,other's capital, the two sides made a great leap forward toward the ."" gOpl of normalization. The liaison offices are a new kind of official mission in the state practice of both countries. Japan and China had I '. "exchanged unofficial commercial liaison offices in 1964, while Tokyo maintained diplomatic relations with the Republi<; of China I)n Taiwan (ROC). Egypt and China had exchanged official trade offices in 1955,

6S .

. .. '66 CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS Jerome Alan Cohen I· 67 shortly before Cairo severed diplomatic relations with the ROC and of the contribution that Soviet hostility toward China has made to their established diplomatic relations with the PRC. But · the new achievement. Washington and Peking liaison offices are neither unofficial nor ex­ Do these concessions mean that Peking is preparing to jettison its clusively concerned with trade. In the words of Henry Kissinger, opposition to a "two China" policy and establish diplomatic relations . although the liaison office is "not a formal diplomatic office," it covers with Washington while allowing Washington to maintain diplomatic "the whole gamut of relationships," handling not only trade but also relations with Taipei? Kissinger's November 1973 visit to Peking, his '''all other matters except the strictly formal diplomatic aspe'cts of the first as Secretary of State, touched off a fresh round of speculation relationship: " along these lines. The liaison offices are already functioning in fact, though not in In dealing with the PRC at any given time, the art is to discern those name, as embassies. lvloreover, the "Chief of the Liaison Office" in questions that it regards as matters of principle and therefore not each capital is not merely a foreign service officer of ambassadorial subject to negotiation and those thatit regards as matters of detail and rank but as distinguished a diplomat as each government could ,. open for compromise. It is also vital to understand the time-frame and muster. The status of the new liaison offices as de facto diplomatic: sequence that the PRC sees as appropriate for resolving matters of I missions has also been emphasized by the conferral upon their per­ I principle, for strategy, and therefore "principle," necessarily evolves sOlmel of full diplomatic immunity. To accomplish this in the United over time. . States required special Congressional authorization, and the two' . It seems likely that Peking will continue to insist, as a matter of governments are negotiating a detailed agreement on the rights and principle, that any government wishing to enter into formal diplomatic duties of diplomats. relations with it must recognize it as the sole legitimate government of Peking may have been outmaneuvered by Washington's appoint­ China. Premier ~hou En-lai re-emphasized this a few days after an­ ment of David Bruce. The selection of so illustrious a figure may have 'nouncing creation of the liaison offices. And he reiterated this to flattered the PRC, and his knowledge of West European affairs uno . reporters who accompanied Kissinger on his November 1973 visi~ . . doubtedly was appreciated by the Chinese, who are seeking to forge If the PRC were willing to accept a "two China" policy. Washington close ties with the continent. But the presence of Bruce in Peking would be delighted to formalize relations on that basis. The two sides endows the liaison office with a status beyond that envisaged by China have been ull2ble to formalize relations precisely becau~e Peking has and diminishes the American incentive to formalize relations. Never­ not be en willing to abandon what Japan 's Foreign l\Iinister Ohira theless, the principle of reciprocity led the PHC to respond by ap­ properly acknowledged to be the PRC's "indispensable prerequisite pointing as chief of it.s Washi ngton liaison office a man who has not for .the normalizatioll of relations." . only stature but also po litical influence. It is probably not an over­ Yet now that the li aison offices have been established, how im­ statement to identify Huang Chen, a member of the Central Committee portant is it to Peking to complete the normalization process in the of the Chinese Communist Party, as one of China's policy-makers in foreseeable future? the field of forei gn affairs. The liaison offices are obviously of great vallie to the P I1C as well as The PRC's permitting the U.S. to establish the functional equivalent to the United States. In many ways they facilitate political contact, of an official embassy in Peking while the U.S. maintains diplomatic ' economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and other activities. Indeed, relations with the ROC is a significant modification of its long-standing their advent ma:-ks the transition in Sino-American relatiollS from . policy, briefly ignored in the 1955 Egyptian case, of rejecting official largely pCl'sollal diplomacy to institutionalized d1plomacy. Henry relations with any government that continues to recognize Chiang Kai-· . Kissinger has to keep a few other matters in mind besides China, and shek's regime as the legitimate government of China. For the PRC to can travel on.1y infrequently to Peking. The February i973 visit was his set up a de facto embassy in Washington, where the Nationalist first in eight mont.hs, and his next visit came after an even longer Chinese still have a de jure embassy, is even more of a concession. hiatus. Moreover, no PRC. diplomats had negotiated in Washington President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have every reaso~ to be proud of p~ior to the opening of the liaison office. There had been regular' this significant diplomatic success, although they are obviouslya~are . . contacts between American and Chinese representatives in Paris and 68 CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS Jerome Alan Cohen 69

occasional contacts at the UN and elsewhere, but these cannot be '. In these circumstances not only WaShington's, but also Pcking's, compared to the systematic and comprehensive channels of com­ · incentives for normalizing relations must bp. said to have diminished. munication that are developing now that diplomatic missions are Surely, the fact that certain arrangements are unlikely to be concluded established in the two capitals. in the absence of diplomatic relations-for example, a friendship, During the December 1972 bombing of North Vietnam, PRC commerce, ~nd navigation treaty that would regulate a host of diplomats seemed to be questioning for the first time whether their problems including the inheritance of property-cannot weigh heavily confidence.in Nixon and Kissinger may have been misplaced. Also, the in the Chinese calculus. Such treaties imply a degree of intimacy be­ widespread rumors of a rift between the two and of Kissinger's im­ tween. the treaty partners that should be some time in coming. even in . pending departure must have made the leadership in Peking acutely the rapidly evolving Sino-American relationship. Should any problems aware of the fact that Kissinger was the only responsible American ordinarily dealt with by an F, C, and N treaty require Sino-Ame:-ican official whom they knew well. It is in the interest of neither Washington r, attention at the present stage, they can probably be handled·. by less nor Peking to have their relations so dependent on a single personality. I formal agreements or by tacit understandings . . The liaison offices have placed matters on a more solid, if less flam­ I Does this mean that, by choosing .the device of the liaison office, boyant, basis. As Kissinger himself recognized in A World Restored, i China has signalled its willingness to settle for '·half a .loaf" for the there is a ' time for individual statesmen to dominate international foreseeable future and currently has no serious interest in achieving politics, but there is also a time for statesmen to recognize the im·- · normalization? Many American analysts. both in and out of govern­ portance of a transition to a situation where foreign affairs bureauc­ ment. believe that the form of Sino-American c6ntacts is relatively racies forge broader, more predictable patterns of interaction. ., unimportant in China's eyes at this stage in the relationship. The crucial thing is that favorable contacts take place iq one form or another, thereby providing what might appear in Moscow to be im­ ARE FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS NECESSARY? plicit American support for China's number-one concern: resistance against Soviet pressure. We can expect the liaison offices to playa useful role in negotiating many of the arrangements in which formal embassies would normally One might even argue that the Chii1e~e preoccupation with the Soviet be expected to participate. The absence of diplomatic relations should threat is so great that, despite a generation of rhetoric to the contrary. in no way impede the settlement of property claims that the PRC and Peking could now be reluctant to ha ve the United States follow the the United States have pending against each other. It is also probable .. Japanese example by suddenly breaking relations with the Chiang that, before formalizing diplomatic ties, agreements can be reached Kai -shek regime in order to establish relations with the PRC. That for Washington to extend most-favored-nation treatment and govern­ might so destabilize the situation in Taiwan as to give tile Soviets an ment financial credits to Peking, although Congress has yet to indicate opportunity for a foothold on the island, as some Nationalist sources a disposition to exempt China from the Jackson Amendment's have broaOJy hinted. Virtually completing the Republic of .. China's prohibiQo!1 of such trade benefits to Communist countries that restrict diplomatic isolation might also precipitate its transformation into ar:! . emigration. The desire for closer economic cooperation and other independent Republic of Taiwan and frustrate the attainment of practical exigencies are also likely to lead China and the United States Peking's long-sacred goal of restoring 'China's territorial integrity. . to conclude intergovernmental trade agreements, similar to those · Therefore, the argument runs, the wiser course for Peking would be to recently made by the USSR and the United States. Even airline and improve its political, economic, and cultural contacts with the United shipping agreements may be reached in the near future, despite .the States without establishing diplomatic relations, postponing the latter ~ . fact that Peking has generally not acted in these areas until the until it can be accomplished without initiating an uncertain and ' establishment of diplomatic relations. The same could also be true of a possibly adverse chain of consequences on Taiwan. In the interim .' formal or informal consular agreement that might prescribe certain . Peking would seek to develop its neW-found friendShip with protections for the nationals of each country when visiting the other. · Washington in ways that would preclude U.s. 'support for any

I' CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS 70 Jerome Alan Cohen 71

unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, thereby inaking promote, are designed to speed the day when Washington will such a declaration less likely to occur. recognize Peking and not Taipei. Despite the plausibility of these arguments and the utility of the Yet when will that day dawn? Before the February 22, 1973, joint liaison offices, my own view is that Peking is at this time neither in­ communiq'ue was issued, Senator Henry Jackson, who is not notorious different nor opposed to establishment of diplomatic relations with for being "soft on communism," added his name to the list of Washington. Indeed, 011 returning from his most recent visit to China, prominent legislators advocating normalization of relations now. Even Secretary Kissinger made it clear that Peking wants to accelerate the more significantly, Senator Edward Kennedy, another l~ading normalization process. Democratic prospect for president in 1976, introduced a Senate res­ olution calling for "immediate steps to establish full diplomatic Obviously, Peking still has much to gain from the establishment of . relations." After the joint commuhique was issued, Kennedy pointed diplomatic relations, which would strike a heavy blow against the rival • out that the administration continued to prevent normalization by government on Taiwan and, if carefully managed, should actually clinging to "the foolish fiction" that Chiang Kai-shek's government is improve rather than retard prospects for the reunification of Taiwan· still the government of China. ' with the mainland. There is at present little probability of either serious Soviet interference in Taiwan or a Bangladesh-type revolt by the Taiwanese against the ROC. And, at least so lone as Chiang Kai­ I THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEFEND TAIWAN shek lives, his government is not likely to declare itself an independent republic of Taiwan. Once Chiang passes from the scene, however, the. Yet, in his dramatic July 15, 1971, announcement of his intended trip situation might change significantly. Moreover, every year that I to Peking, President Nixon said that "Our action in seeking a new Taiwan remains separated from the mainland, and under a very relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the different socioeconomic system, its distinctiveness and the difficulty expense of our old friends." He subsequently spelled out this of ultimate assimilation by the PRC increase. assurance, stating that the United States intended "to honor its In addition, we should not assume that understandably proud and defense treaty commitments to the Rf'public of China and to maintain sensitive Chinese diplomats will long tolerate the discriminations of the continuing friendship with her." protocol that derive from their lack of formal accreditation in This defense commitment, embodied in the 1954 Mutual Defense . Washington. Not until ambassadors are formally exchanged will Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, is the Peking be satisfied that the United States has finally put Sino­ second of the three Taiwan-related major obstacles that still block the American relations on the same plane as Soviet-American relations, normalization of relations between W3shington and Peking has recognized the legitimacy of the PRC as the sole legal government (recognition of Taipei rather than Peking is the first). In the treaty of China, and is prepared to promote friendly cooperation "on the basis each party pledged its cooperation "to resist armed attack and' of equality and mutual benefit," as the Chinese like to say. The communist .subversive activities directed from · without";. each significance of symbols should not be underestimated in this context . . . promised that, in the case of armed att3ck agRinst the territory of the' other, "it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its ' For these reasons, rather than signalling abandonment or post­ , constitutional processes." Taiwan and the Pescadores were defined as pohement of the effort to normalize relations, Peking's concessions in t~rritory of the ROC for purposes of the treaty. Thus the treaty approving liaison offices seem to me to reveal a new and bold guarantees the islands against faIling victim to the civil war in- . . flexibility in pursuing the goal. As Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'ia9 terrupted ·by the United States on June 27, 1950, when, upon the out­ . Kuan-hua emphasized in welcoming David Bruce to Peking, both sides br~ak of the Korean conflict, President Truman ordered the. Seventh should ··work . together . towards accelerating the normalizing of .' Fleet to prevent any Communist attack across the Taiwan Strait. relatiolls." The liaison offices, together with the expanded political, 'By breaking diplomatic ties with Taipei and establishing. them with economic, scientific, cultural, journalistic, and other contacts they will Peking; Washington would automatically be terminating that defense 72 CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS Jerome Alan Cohen 73

commitment to the Chiang regime, for our treaty partner would then Chinese civil war might eventually resu·me and that the people on the officially expire. Its successor government, the PRC, would surely not island might be forcibly subjected to Communist rule. Because of these choose to maintain a treaty that it has always condemned as void-one increased risks, termination of ollr defense commitment would have a that would be all absurdity with the PRC as treaty partner. This is why much greater destabilizing impact upon the people of the island than it cost Peking nothing when it agreed to omit from the Shanghai would the simple breaking of relations with the Nationalist government. Communique an explicit reiteration of its long-standing opposition to If a simple break in formal relations were softened by assurances that the treaty. Peking had only to do what it did do in the communique: to we would continue to defend Taiwan, in addition to continuing our eco­ reaffirm itself the sole legal government of China. If the United States nomic, cultural, and other contacts with it, the island, which has pros­ should establish diplomatic relations with the PRC on this basis, the pered despite some heavy blows to the pretensions of the Chiang govern­ defense treaty with the ROC would necessarily terminate. ment,shouldbeable tosurvive that blow as well. Rutif a shadow were cast It is significant that President Nixon, in January 1973, reassured the across the physical security of the island, prosperity could turn to panic. Nationalists' Vice President, C. K. Yen, that the United States would For these reasons, although 'American public opinion- never a neg- . maintain diplomatic relations with his government and abide by the ligible factor in the making of our China policy- would easily accept defense treaty. At approximately the same time, former Vice Pres­ long-overdue recognition of the {act that the PRC is the sole legitimate ident Agnew reportedly informed Taipei that this treaty . was government of China, it would be reluctant to do so without some "irrevocable," despite the fact that it contains a one-year abrogation continuing assurance against the PRC's violent takeover of Taiwan. clause. Lesser American officials have continued to voice U.S. support This is undoubtedly why Senator Jackson, while calling for a break in for the Nationalists, even while implementing the Shanghai Com­ . diplomatic ties with the ROC in order to establish diplomatic relations munique by gradually removing the bulk of the American servicemen with the PRC, urged that the United States maintain its defense treaty remaining on Taiwan as tensions in the area decrease. And, after with the ROC: In terms of international Jaw this would be difficult. returning from China in November 1973, Secretary Kissinger stated Nevertheless, although the defense treaty with the ROC would lapse that further progress toward normalization with Peking in no way after withdrawal of U.S. recognition from the ROC, it would be meant a change in American policy toward Taiwan. possible to assure ~he security of Taiwan in some · other form _ Some State Department humorists suggest that the president is providing Peking is agreeable. standing "1000 percent" behind Chiang Kai-shek, much in the manner If Washington promises to break with Taipei, Peking m·ight well , that Senator McGovern assured Senator Eagleton of his continuing agree to formalize relations on terms that would continue (0 guarantee support. But Illany observers believe that Nixon is sincere and will not the security of Taiwan even after the necessary termination of the 1954 break with th e Nationalists, even if Chiang Kai-shek should die, and defense treaty. This is probably what Premier Chou En-lai was hillting . that the president will leave the hard questions of recognition and the at when, a few days after Kissinger's February 1973 visit, he said that defense commitment, and the closely-related question of the status of normalization could occur "reason ably soon," once Wa shington faced Taiwan, to hi s successor. up to the recognition probiem. And in dealing with the American press If it is difficult for President Nixon to abandon the government of during Kissinger's November 1973 visit, Chou and other Chinese of­ "old friend" Chiang Kai-shek, it is more difficult for him to terminate ficials reiterated the importance of Washington's ending its the commitment to defend the 15 million people on Taiwan. Th,e PRC recognition oCthe Nationalist government but did not re-emphasize the has not thus far attained the military capability required to launch a · PRC's p·osition regarding the island of Taiwan. successful attack across the Taiwan strait, and for a decade it has One obvious way to provide a security guaranty for Taiwan in new demo!lstrated no intention to attempt such an attack; the Nationalists, form would be for the United States to announce unilaterally that it who now manufacture or purchase almost all of their arms and ammu- , would continu-e· to defend t.he island. The recently enacted War Po\';ers nition, have a substantial capacity for defending Taiwan on theiJ;' own Act, which prohibits the president from committing armed forces to for· the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, eliminatjon of any U.S. com­ comba.t abroad for mor~ than 60 days without specific 'Congressional mitment to defend the island woul~ increase. the risks that tne bloody authorization, creates some uncertainty abQut the significa'nce of such

.< , , 74 CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS i Jerome Alan Cohen 7S ! a unilateral declaration, but that legislation equally affects execution war. Upon the outbreak of the Korean conflict, however, the United of our existing treaty commitment to defend the ROC. It would also be States changed its position by announcing that. the legal status of possible, if improbable, for us to conclude a new defense agreement Taiwan had yet to be determined, and on this basis justified its with the present government of the island, not as the ROC but as the de decision to prevent completion of the Chinese civil war by 'using the facto authority in control. Or, without making any express unilateral Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan. Consequently the 1951 Treaty of or bilateral commitment, we might simply wish to maintain token Peace merely stated that "Japan renounces all rights, title and claim defense units in the Taiwan Strait and/or on the island as a symbol of to Formosa and the Pescndores" and did not confirm the restoration of our implicit continuing concern for the island's security. the islands to the ROC. The United States maintained this position at least until President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972.

Informed observers waited to see how tilC president would hal~dle THE LEGAL STATUS OF TAIWAN the three related questions of recognition, the defense commitment, and the status of Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communique that concluded Here, however, it becomes obvious that the United States confronts his visit, the United States made no changeon the recognition question, not only the problems of recognition and the defense treaty but also a and it only implicitly referred to the defense commitment by reaf- ' third Taiwan-related obstacle: the legal status of Taiwan. Peking's firming "its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by maximum terms for the normalization of Sino-American relations the Chinese themselves" and by promising to reduce, and ultimately have long included a demand that the United States combine withdraw, its forces from the island, "as the tensi'on in the area recognition of the PRC as the sole government of China with a dec­ diminishes." But the United States appeared to make a significant laration that Taiwan is Chinese territory. But if the United States change regarding the status of Taiwan by stating that it :'does not should comply with this demand, none of the above-mentioned options challenge;' the claim, advanced by "all Chinese on either side of the for newly guaranteeing Taiwan's security would be available, for Taiwan Strait," that Taiwan , is a part of China. The official U.S. each - apart from maintaining our fleet in that part of the Taiwan position is that the communique changed nothing regarding the legal Strait that constitutes international waters - would plainly constitute status of Taiwan. But some observers have interpreted this language, illegal intervention in Chinese affairs. which the United States repeated in the Sir,o-American Communique From the end of World War II unti11950, although no peace treaty of November 14, 1973, to constitute a tacit U.S. return to our pre­ :. had yet been concluded, the United States regarded Taiwan as having Korean War position. Others have noted at least an important change been reincorporated into China by the ROC in accordance with the of attitude. Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. In the 1943 Cairo Declaration the heads of In these circumstances the problem arises whether some form of government of the United States, the United Kingdom and the ROC had assurance for the security of Taiwan will prove consistent with 'estab­ jointly stated that "[ilt is their purpose-that all the territories Japan lishment of ,diplomatic relations with Peking. In unilaterally r.eaf­ has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pes­ firming its position on "the Taiwan question" in the Shanghai Com­ cadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." Article 8 of the munique, the PRC indicated how grave a challenge this problem . 1945 Potsdam Proclamation had provided that "[t] he terms of the presents to diplomacy. It maintained not ' only that it is the sole Cairo Declaration shall be carried out . .. ," and the Japanese In­ legitimate government of China, but also that "Taiwan is a province of strument of Surrender had accepted the terms of the PotsdamProc­ China, which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation lamation. Shortly thereafter the ROC announced that it had resumed of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other cotll1try has the sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores, and its action elicited no right,to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations,must protests from other states. be withdrawn from Taiwan." Then, to leave absolutely no doubt in The reincorPoration of Taiwan into China was eventually expected to , anyone's mind, it went on to state: "The Chinese Government firmly be confirmed in the peace treaties that would formally conclude the oppOses any activities which aim at the creation of 'one China, two , 76 CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS Jerome Alan c:ohen 77

governments,' 'two China[s],' an 'independent Taiwan' or advocate ment would have to recognize not only (1) the government of the PRC that 'the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.' .. as the sole legal government of China and (Z) Taiwa n as Chinese Despite this clearly articulated position, there may yet be hope of territory,but also (3) the 1952 Peace Treaty between Japan and the coupling establishment of diplomatic relations with some form of Republic of China as illegal, void, and abrogated. Japanese authorities assurance against a violent takeover of Taiwan., The Shanghai Com­ realized, of course, that there was no hope that the PHC might yield on munique itself, and the entire development of the Sino-American re­ the first condition and permit Japan to recognize bo th Taipei and lationship since ping-pong diplomacy captivated the world in April Peking as legal governments of China. As to the second condition, 1971, suggest that in the present era we should not underestimate however, the evidence suggested that the PHC might be willing to Peking's wilIingness to prove flexible. After all, for more than a s::!ttie for something short of an explicit declaration that Taiwan is decade, prior to ping-pong, the PRC had maintained the position that it Chinese territory. The experience of other countries offered a whl)le would not permit Sino-American trade, cultural exchange, and other range of possibilities. . contacts until all aspects of the Taiwan question had been settled on Many states had established ' diplomatic r el.:l~ions merely by rec­ the PRC's terms. And, as recently as June 1972, Premier Chou En-Iai ognizing Peking as the sole legal government either "of China" or "of told this writer t.hat Peking could not even establish any form of all the Chinese people," with · nothing said about Taiwan; some had unofficial representation in Washington- not to mention an official never explicitly recognized Peking at all but had simply established liaison office-so long as Taipei maintained an embassy there. diplomatic relations. Canada had initiated a modest trend by stating Nevertheless, one may argue-as the PRC has-that it is one thing to that it "takes note". of the PRC claim to Taiwan. In the joint com­ relent and sanction liaison offices prior to resolution of the Taiwan muniqu~ in which the United Kingdom and the PRe agreed to raise problem, but that ·it is another to permit diplomatic relations to be their existing missions to the ambassadorial level, the United King­ established before that problem is resolved. Moreover, thus far in the ' dom went further, "'acknowledging the position of the Chinese Govern­ Sino-American rapprochement the PRC's flexibility has not reached ment that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic" and agreeing the point of willingnes~ to discuss the que,ition of providing assurance to withdraw the consulate that it had maintained on Taiwan: In raising against a violent takeover of Taiwan. its diplomatic relations with Peking to the ambassadorial level, the Yet, in the Sino-American Communique of November 14, 1973, the Netherlands had stated that it "respects" Peking's claim to the island. PRC, unlike the United States, did not restate all of the terms for And, as we have seen, although it failed to establish

ciple of one China. II This vague short-hand has led both Americ~n As my previous discussion of the status of Taiwan recalled, the diplomats and outside observers to speculate that the PRC might be . Japanese Instrument of Surrender had obligated Japan to accept the. hinting at its readiness for compromise. Moreover, the Sino-Japanese Potsdam Proclamation, which had provided that "[t)he terms of the reconc.iliation of 1972 indicates that, in the interest of larger political Cairo Declaration shall be carried ouL" Yet when Japan formally goals, the PRC can be flexible even with respect to the terms for renounced all claim to Taiwan in the 1951 San Francisco 'freaty of normalizing relations. Peace, the treaty failed to confirm that the island had been restored to . the ROC, as the Cairo Declaration had pledged it would be. . . Prior to the September 1972 negotiations in Peking, in responding to THE SPECIAL CASE OF. JAPAN the PRC's conditions for establishing diplomatic relations, Japan had . taken the position that·, as a defeated power, it had "no right" to For that reason the Japanese case deserves serious consi~eration . comment on the isla.nd's present legal status. For a variety of Peking had insisted upon three principles as the prerequisites for hi~to.rical, political, ' ~ilitary, and economic reasons Japan· was establishing diplomatic relations with Ja.pan: The Japanese govern- . . reluctant to accompruly recognition of th~ PRC with a· statement that Jerome Alan CQhen 78 CHINA AND THE GREA T POWERS 79

Taiwan was Chinese territory. This was an especially sensitive Potsdam Declaratiori, it has all along been the opiniori of the· problem because, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan is . Japanese Government, which accepted the Potsdam Declaration, committed to cooperating with the United States not only to defend that Taiwan should be returned to China in line with the intent of Japan itself but also "to maintain international peace and security in these two declarations. And this opinion is expressed i:1 that part of the Far East area"--:-and this commitment has long been interpreted the joint communique which says the Government of Japan as including the defense of Taiwan as well as South Korea. Japan "firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Dec­ would plainly have no business maintaining such a commitment if laration."· Taiwan were territory belonging to China, and the PRC the sole legal government of China. Foreign Ministry officials informally informed the press that, con­ In the final negotiations in Peking, therefore, Japan sought to win trary to a widespread impression, J apan had not agreed with Peking's PRC acceptance of a formula according to which Japan would merely claim that Taiwan was Chinese territory. They asserted that Japan have stated that it "fully understands and respects" the PRC claim to continued to take the position rhat it was the prerogative of the vic­ Taiwan. This would have left the Japanese position conveniently torious Allied powers to determine the status of Taiwan and that the ambiguous. But Peking wanted more. Not so much concerned about question had not yet been settled. the immediate implications of Sino-Japanese normalization for the Significantly, for our purposes, Pekil1g issued no protest against this U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as about the long-run possibility of an interpretation of the communique. This suggests that the PRC, while independent Taiwan, the PRC sought to deny Tokyo any legal basis for maintaining its own pOSition, did Qot challenge Japar:t 's interpretation some day supporting Taiwan's separation from China. Thus, after the of Japan's position on the issue. In other words, the PRChad to com­ preliminary paragraphs noted that Japan was proceeding to seek nor­ promise on this key demand. It got half a loaf in winning Japan's malization of relations "from the stand of fully understanding the commitment to the future reunion of Taiwan and the mainland-the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward · first time that this Japanese commitment has been madeto the PRC. by" the PRC, the communique later stat~d: But it relented on its insistence that, as prerequisite to establishi~g diplomatic relations,. Japan had to state that Taiwan had already (3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms become Chinese territory. . that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Similarly, the PRC also yielded on the third of its principles {ar the Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands normalization of· Sino-Japanese relations. Although Japan was and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to Prepared to abrogate its 1952 Peace Treaty with the ROC upon the its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. establishment of relations wilh the PRC, it refused to admit that the [Emphasis added.) treaty was illegal and void. Such an admission \vCluld not only have represented a great loss of face but wOllld also have cast legal doubts What do these words mean? Do they constitute Japanese acceptance upon two decades of Sino-Japanese relations. Peking could not, of of the claim that Taiwan has already been reintegrated into China? A course, accept the validity of the 1952 treaty. So the two s{des decided . month after announcement of the Sino-Japanese communique, the to use language each could interpret in its own way, each giving the Japanese Foreign Ministry slated: other some cooperation in clearing away the obstacle. . Thus, although the 1952 .Japan-ROC Peace Treaty was never ex­ [A]s for the status of Taiwan, the Government has heretofore plicitly mentioned in the communique, the problems it had raised had repeatedly made clear that as Japan renounced all rights and title to be handled with delicacy. For example, even though that treaty had to the island in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it is therefore in no position to make any independent judgment on -B'ecause the PRC and Japan did not have time to agree upon an English . the legal status of Taiwan. On the other hand, however, ·in light of . ver~ion of the joint communique, their respective English translations diller in the circumstances leading up to the Cairo Declaration ·and the . various ways. . 80 CHINA AND THE GREAT .POWERS Jerome Alan Cohen 81 i ~ officially terminated the state of war between China and Japan, in the ,~ recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China but also 1972 communique J apan agreed to language that permitted Peking to expressly reaffirms its intention to honor the commitment that it made interpret the communique as terminating the state of war between in the Cairo Declaration to restore Taiwan to China. This could be Japan and China. As previously mentioned, Japan also stated that it interpreted as moving beyond the U.S. position in the Shanghai was proceeding "from the stand of fully understanding the [PRC's) Communique, because the United States would be stating to the PRC three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations . ... " The for the first time not only that it does not challenge the claim that PRC, on the other hand, agreed to state unilaterally that "it renounces Taiwan is Chinese territory but also that it has an affirmative its demand for war indemnities from Japan." Japanese negotiators obligation legally to confirm it. Yet such a statement would make believed that it was necessary that this renunciation by the PRC be clear, at least in the American view, that Taiwan had not yet been unilateral in form because Japan had previously settled the question of formally restoreq to China. This would permit the president, the secre­ war indemnit.ies in a protocol to the 1952 Peace Treaty with the ROC. tary of state, or some other U.S. official, immediately after release of Immediately after ennouncement of the Chinese-Japanese Joint the joint communique, to state that, although the 1954 Mutual Defense .. Communique, Japan's Foreign Minister Ohira issued a formal Treaty with the ROC had necessarily lapsed, and although all U.S. statement to the press in Peking that left no doubt that Japan had not military forces and installations· were being withdrawn from Taiwan, yielded to the demand that it declare the 1952 treaty illegal and void. the United States continued to contemplate a peaceful settlement of .Ohira said: : the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves and would continue to maintain security in the area. . The Japanese Government holds that as a result of the nor­ The P:R,C might well accept this formulation as a device for per­ malization of Japan-China relations, the Japan-China peace mitting the establishment of diplom:ltic rebtio!ls whilemo\'ing closer treaty [the 1952 treaty) has lost the meaning of its existence and is to ultimate resolution of the Taiwa:l question. It seems more lik ely to declared to be terminated, although this question is not mentioned accept this formu.Jation than one that witnessed a new U.S .. defense in the joint settlement. agreement with "the authorities on Taiwan." Pe~ing · would un­ doubtedl y prefer to have no new U.S. statement whatever concerning our continuing defense of the island. But it would probably be unhappy POSSIBLE BASES FOR AGREEMENT if the United States sought to maintain token forces on Taiwan or in Taiwan's coastal waters, or retained a joint U.S .-ROC military The moral of all this, of course, is that where there is a will on the planning staff, as would probably be necessary if we were to attempt to.. part of both sides to establish diplomatic relations, there is a way. The communicate our continuing intention to defend the island in purely United States .would do well to follow Japan's example. It should in: symbolic terms, without providing any new verbal assurances. tensively explore with the PRC the possibilities for establishing dip­ lomatic relations while still providing some form of assurance for the Of course, the PRe might take the position that the suggested security of Taiwan. Even though the difficulties confronting the United formulation represents an un acceptable step backward. It might States-as the principal victorious power in World War II, the ar­ argue that while in the 1972 Shanghai Communique the United States chitect of the anti-PRC coalition, and the state responsible for the had tacitly accepted the claim that Taiwan had already been re­ continuing separation of Taiwan from the mainland-will be greater·· ~tored to China, the suggested formulation would merely reaffirm than those faced 9Y Japan, it must not be assumed that resourceful our long-standing obligation to effect this restoration in the future statesmen are necessarily doomed to failure ~ . and would justify further U.S. intervention in the Chinese civil war. On the other band, the calculated imprecision of the Shanghai ·Com­ Obviously it is impossible to predict the precise terms upon which munique has elicited much debate and uncertainty. The.PRC has even the parties might eventually agree. One likely-possibility of success - mairita.ineQ official silence in the face of statements to the press by would be a joint communique in which ~e United States not only· U.S. officiais asserting that the communique made· no change in the

" • 82 CHINA AND THE GREAT POWERS Alan Cohen Jerome 83

status of Taiwan.· And Peking must be almost as disturbed as Taipei Taiwanese independence would oppose it, from the viewpoint of most by statements such as those in the president's 1973 report on foreign U.S. policymakers, such a consummation is devoutly to be wished. policy, which refers to "the skill and energy of the people of Taiwan" Yet prospects for peaceful conclusion of the Chinese civil war in the (not "China" or "the ROC") having "made Taiwan a leading trading near future do not seem bdght. Although it is still early and mllch may nation"; the report goes on to emphasize America's "friendship for be taking place beneath the surface, P eking's recent intensive cam­ the 15 million people of Taiwan" and our diplomatic ties, defense paign to woo the Nationalist.s and even leaders of the Taiwanese in­ treaty commitments, and economic conbcts "with them." The dependence movement has thus far failed. Fearing that, because of its suggested formulation would offer the PRC for the first time an weaker position, it could only emerge as the loser from the unambiguous U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of China. negotiations with Peking, that the very an!Jouncement of negotiations If Peking should reject this formulation, other approaches might would accelerate erosion of its internal and external power, Taipei has provide some assurance against a forcible takeover of Taiwan. The steadfastly refused to enter into, negotiations. It is a nice question how . PRC has previously refused to renounce the use of force against long Taipei can resist negotiations in an era of detente, when the Taiwan on the ground that the struggle is a domestic rather than an contending governments of other divideJ nations-Germany, Korea, international problem. Yet one can envisage a communique in which, and Vietnam-have been talking to each other with varying degrees of in return for U.S. recognition, express acknowledgement that Taiwan success. I suspect that, after Chiang Kai-shek's passing, the ROC may is Chinese territory, and agreement that the PRC has the right to use be pressured into reconsidering its . opposition to exploratory force against Taiwan, the PRC would state that there is no need to use negotiations, if only in order to present a posture oI.!"easol),ableness to .. force and that, because of its belief in peaceful unification, force would the United States and to world opinion. Growing self-confidence in its not be used. Another possibility is that Premier Chou En-Iai or some ability to weather rough political seas may even now be fostering sllch other Chinese leader might unilaterally make such a formal statement a reconsideration. following issuance of a communique that does not carry with it any Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the rival regimes will reach an ac­ limitation upon the PRC's discretion in disposing of the rival regime. commodation during the next few,Years. Thus we will have.to confront The point, of course, is that some form of mutually satisfactory the question of bow long the United ~t

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