EAST ASIA POLICY PAPER 5 M AY 2015 Tides of Change: Taiwan’s evolving position in the South China Sea And why other actors should take notice Lynn Kuok Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation. Executive Summary aiwan, along with China and four Southeast The People’s Republic of China (PRC) inherited its Asian countries, is a claimant in the South claims from the Republic of China (ROC) after the TChina Sea, though this fact is sometimes Chinese civil war. Thus, the ROC’s interpretation overlooked. On paper, Taiwan and China share of its claims is relevant to the PRC’s claims. No- the same claims. The dashed or U-shaped line en- tably, a more limited reading of the claims would capsulating much of the South China Sea appears not be inconsistent with China’s official position on both Taiwanese and Chinese maps. as set out in its 2009 and 2011 statements to the United Nations. Neither China nor Taiwan has officially clarified the meaning of the dashed line which could be Taiwan’s overtures have largely, however, been ig- seen as making a claim to the wide expanse of wa- nored. At the root of this is China’s “one-China” ter enclosed within the dashed line or (merely) to principle, which has cast a long shadow over Tai- the land features contained therein and to mari- wan. This paper argues that in order to carve out a time zones made from them in accordance with modest political space for itself in the South Chi- the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law na Sea, Taiwan should: of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law. 1. Clarify that its claims accord with UNCLOS In the past year, Taiwan has taken small but sig- and international law without expressly es- nificant steps toward clarifying that its claims are chewing the dashed line. from land and in accord with UNCLOS and inter- 2. Tread carefully on any public education national law. It has also adopted a more concilia- on Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea tory position by advocating that its East China Sea to avoid unleashing nationalist sentiment, Peace Initiative, which calls on parties to shelve which would limit policy options. disputes and promote joint exploration and devel- 3. Continue promoting President Ma Ying- opment in the East China Sea (where China, Tai- jeou’s plan for the East China Sea in the wan and Japan have competing claims), be applied South China Sea. in the South China Sea as well. 4. Push behind the scenes for participation in code of conduct negotiations and in coop- These movements are significant in that they could erative activities involving all claimants. have a stabilizing effect in the South China Sea. TIDES OF CHANGE: TAIWAN’S EVOLVING POSITION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES iii 5. Provide evidence that Taiping Island is an For China, supporting Taiwan’s participation in “island” capable of sustaining human hab- cooperative activities would support both Bei- itation or economic life under UNCLOS jing’s desire for better cross-strait relations, and Article 121. its dual-track approach to the South China Sea dispute, which seeks one-on-one negotiations on The paper also argues that all parties who have an sovereignty issues and multilateral arrangements interest in better management of the dispute and within the region to promote peace and stability a more peaceful region—including China—have in the South China Sea. an interest in supporting Taiwan’s inclusion in ne- gotiations and activities relating to the South Chi- The paper lays the foundation for these argu- na Sea. This can be done in ways consistent with ments by taking a closer look at calls within the China’s one-China principle. Proper management United States for Taipei to “clarify” or “abandon” of the dispute necessarily involves Taiwan: Taiwan its dashed line; examining Taiwan’s claims in and controls the largest land feature in the South Chi- evolving position on the South China Sea; and na Sea, its vessels regularly patrol the area, and it highlighting salient Chinese responses and the has one of the biggest fishing industries in the Pa- broader context within which Taiwan operates as cific. a means by which to gauge the viability of various courses of action. TIDES OF CHANGE: TAIWAN’S EVOLVING POSITION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES iv Tides of Change: Taiwan’s evolving position in the South China Sea And why other actors should take notice aiwan (also known as the Republic of Chi- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea na), along with China (the People’s Republic (UNCLOS) and international law. Neither Taiwan Tof China) and four Southeast Asian coun- nor China has officially clarified the dashed line’s tries—the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and intended meaning. Brunei—is a claimant in the South China Sea. But even its most important ally, the United States, ap- In the past year, however, Taiwan has taken small pears to sometimes overlook this fact. As recent- but significant steps toward clarifying that its ly as in December 2013, a senior U.S. State De- claims are from land and in accord with UNCLOS partment official equivocated on whether Taiwan and international law. It has also adopted a more was a claimant in the South China Sea, labeling conciliatory position by advocating that its East the question of whether Taiwan was a claimant an China Sea Peace Initiative, which calls on parties “interesting theological” one.1 to shelve disputes and promote joint exploration and development in the East China Sea (where On paper, Taiwan and China share the same China, Taiwan and Japan have competing claims), claims. The dashed or U-shaped line encapsulat- be applied in the South China Sea as well. Under ing much of the South China Sea appears on both UNCLOS, a coastal state is entitled to a territori- Taiwanese and Chinese maps. The meaning of the al sea extending up to 12 nautical miles from its dashed line is ambiguous: it could be seen as mak- coast, as well as an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) ing a claim to the wide expanse of water enclosed extending up to 200 nautical miles over which it within the dashed line or (merely) to the land has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve features contained therein and to maritime zones and manage natural resources; territorial seas made from them in accordance with the 1982 and EEZs are measured from land territory.2 An 1 “Background Briefing En Route Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam,” special briefing, Office of the Spokesperson, Senior State Department Official, en route Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, December 13, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218719.htm. 2 UNCLOS Articles 3, 56 and 57. TIDES OF CHANGE: TAIWAN’S EVOLVING POSITION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES 1 “island,” a naturally formed area of land, sur- virtually indistinguishable from China’s and there rounded by water, which is above water at high are lingering concerns about cross-strait co-oper- tide, is also entitled to its own territorial sea. It is ation to defend claims in the South China Sea, de- entitled to an EEZ if it can sustain human habita- spite clear statements from Taipei that this is out tion or economic life of its own.3 of the question. The clarification of Taiwan’s claims, though not China is cautious about Taiwan’s involvement in (as yet) formalized, is significant in that it could the South China Sea as it regards this as a slippery have a stabilizing effect in the South China Sea. slope toward recognition of ROC sovereignty. The PRC inherited its claims from the ROC after Beijing also appears to have linked flexibility on the Communist Party defeated the ROC govern- Taiwan’s regional and international participation ment in a civil war. Thus, the ROC’s interpretation to Taipei demonstrating a greater willingness to of its claims is relevant to the PRC’s claims. No- discuss the island’s political relationship with the tably, a more limited reading of claims would not mainland. Till then, China’s default position is to be inconsistent with China’s official position as set stand firm against it. This, however, is counterpro- out in its 2009 and 2011 statements to the United ductive insofar as it is resented by Taiwan and un- Nations, which are discussed below. dermines cross-strait relations. Taiwan’s recent moves and approach notwith- Proper management of the South China Sea dis- standing, very little has been made of the role Tai- pute necessarily involves Taiwan. It can also be pei can play in contributing to better management undertaken without falling foul of China’s one-Chi- of the dispute and overall stability in the South na principle. Since 1956, the ROC has controlled China Sea. At the root of this is China’s “one-Chi- Taiping Island, which is also known as Itu Aba na” principle, namely, “there is only one China in Island, the South China Sea’s largest land feature. the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the gov- Taiping Island is significant in that if there were ernment of the PRC is the sole legal government any feature in the South China Sea capable of gen- representing the whole of China.”4 The principle erating an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles, this has cast a long shadow over Taiwan and has re- would be it, given its size and water source.