SOUTH CHINA SEA the NEW DRAGON’S LAIR by Ty Bomba

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SOUTH CHINA SEA the NEW DRAGON’S LAIR by Ty Bomba above — A Malayasian CB90 - CB stands for Combat Boat right — Chinese Marines in their distinctive uniforms. It would be troops such as these that would be used in any operation to seize all the Spratly Islands SOUTH CHINA SEA THE NEW DRAGON’S LAIR By Ty Bomba ighty percent of the world’s freedom of navigation across the Central Committee of 15 (from an over- total sea-transported oil goes area––have done little more than all civilian population of about 1,000). E through the South China Sea engage in diplomatic handwringing At the same time, the People’s and, of course, that means the area over the issue. During that time the Liberation Army has created a inescapably has international signifi - mainland Chinese have fortifi ed seven division-level “garrison headquarters” cance. At the same time, within that of the Spratlys (named after the British on Sansha, and it fi elds an estimated transshipment total, about 60 percent whaling ship captain who, in 1843, was 6,000 military personnel across the two of China’s oil imports move across the the fi rst Western navigator to chart island groups. Airfi elds large enough to area. From the Chinese perspective, the island) and an equal number of accommodate fourth-generation Su-27 especially given the fact their energy the Paracels (the modernized form and Su-30 fi ghter aircraft have been importation needs are expected to of the old Portuguese word “pracel,” built, along with hardened revetments double by mid-century, all that comes meaning shallow seas or banks). to protect the planes on the ground. together to mean their interests in The idea diplomacy is going to On the naval front, Sansha now has the area trump those of all others. move the Chinese to roll back their docks large enough to service the During the past few years, the other claims to the islands, or disassemble fl otilla of seven frigates and destroyers regional nations with claims to por- their military engineering within them, (total) that home-port from there. tions of the sea––Vietnam, Malaysia, is a non-starter. Beijing has declared Lastly, signals intelligence communica- Brunei, Taiwan, the Philippines, as Sansha Island (previously “Woody tions intercept stations have been set well as the US, which has no territorial Reef”) a “prefecture city,” which will up all across the Chinese-claimed area. claims but maintains an offi cially henceforth maintain a provincial Aside from China, four other declared interest in maintaining the People’s Congress of 60 members and a nations are also taking part in the 22 MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016 Chinese Navy destroyers on patrol in the South China Sea militarization of the islands, which On Shallow Reef, the Royal within that nation’s Sulu region. altogether comprise some 30,000 Malaysian Navy maintains a The front has recently come out in islands, shoals, and reefs. squadron of CB90 assault craft and full support of the Chinese claims. On Taiping Island, the Republic a Starburst air defense battery. In their press release about it, the of China (Taiwan) has a military On Thitu Island, the Philippine Muslim Moros said both China and airfi eld large enough to land C-130 army maintains a 60-man infantry pla- the Moro people were equal victims transport aircraft, and sorties of that toon, which mans a position centered of US and Philippine “colonialism.” type now average one per month, around a complex of concrete bunkers. Last, on Spratly Island––the but with no reliable word on what’s Manila’s air force runs Rancudo namesake locale for the entire being fl own in. The nation’s Coast Airfi eld, which, like the Taiwanese archipelago, and which is also Guard also maintains a squadron facility on Taiping Island, is large claimed by Taiwan––the Vietnamese of three M8 patrol craft there. enough for military transport planes, military maintains a helicopter Ironically, if there’s any issue that and which is being further expanded. pad and meteorological station. could potentially bring together the At present, though, only reconnais- In sum, all the involved nations two Chinas, it’s the Spratly Islands. sance fl ights sortie from there. There have some military personnel That’s because both Chinese govern- is also a civilian settlement on Thitu stationed on their respectively claimed ments make identical claims for them. with a population of some 300. islands. Any forceful Chinese move to Further, the Taiwanese state-run Ominously since 2014, the Chinese take over some or all of the Spratlys, oil company offi cially identifi es have specifi cally cited Thitu as one of will have to involve at least a small “Vietnamese aggression” in the area the islands they intend to “reclaim.” ground force to land on the islands, as the greatest threat to regional Further, in 1999, on Second Thomas capture or kill the enemy troops they peace. In that same regard, the Beijing Shoal, the Philippine Navy purposely fi nd there, and then occupy those regime has offered the Taiwanese a grounded a World War II-era “LST” places in order to maintain the basis share of the oil and gas to be found (landing ship tank), which they’ve for Beijing’s territorial claims and pre- in the region if it will offi cially meld kept in place there, armed and vent other militaries from returning. the two claims into one. For its part, crewed by Marines, ever since. Exact numbers remain uncertain, the US State Department and Navy The Philippine claim is undercut but the ground force contingents never mention Taiwan whenever they by the Moro National Liberation from the different claimant countries offer press releases on the topic. Front, which wages an on-again- off-again independence struggle continued on page 26 » MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016 23 24 MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016 MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016 25 » continued from page 23 have been formed into a standing prior to the start of the First World liaison team for those two services. War––is spreading across the region. seem presently to be on about At the same time, Japanese In addition to all the above, the 45 of the islands: 6,000 Chinese, personnel have been sent to “advise” overlapping sovereignty claims are fur- 90 Malaysians, 100 Filipinos, 100 Vietnamese submariners on various ther heightened by the fact each new Taiwanese, and 1,500 Vietnamese. aspects of those operations. Further, geologic survey of the region raises A fi nal player has recently entered Vietnam and the Philippines have the estimates of the oil and gas to be the scene: Japan. Though Tokyo signed the preliminary agreement found in it. The South China Sea has makes no territorial claims in the to form a “strategic partnership” proven oil reserves of around 11 billion South China Sea, it’s involved with aimed specifi cally at sharing naval barrels, with an estimate of 28 billion its own similar dispute with China in intelligence, technology, and training. barrels likely there in total, along the East China Sea. Accordingly, early Since Manila already has such an with natural gas reserves of about in 2015, Tokyo and Manila signed an agreement in place with Tokyo and 266 trillion cubic feet. In comparison, agreement whereby their two navies Washington, it’s easy to see a spider the US has a proven oil reserve of have begun regular joint exercises, web of interlocking alliances––similar 36.5 billion barrels and a natural gas and their vice ministers of defense to the one that came to cover Europe reserve of 31 trillion cubic feet. 26 MODERN WAR 24 | JUL–AUG 2016 Chinese Strategy • China Needs Armed Strength for use against them in the Spratlys The Beijing government has to Secure Disputed Territories. and Paracels (much as the British identifi ed the South China Sea China must amass the military avoided attacking the Argentine as an area of “core interest” since wherewithal necessary to abort homeland during the Falklands War). March 2010. That means they or defeat other nations’ efforts Attacks against enemy homelands apply the following three strategic to make the status quo the per- would inescapably raise the stakes. principles–– simultaneously and manent reality. Beijing therefore In one way or another, that would with equal weight––in relation to it. ultimately needs suffi cient military cause China to have to pay a higher capacity to secure all the disputed price for its seizures, both immedi- • Territorial & Maritime territories, whole and intact, while ately in the possible form of enemy Sovereignty are Indivisible. warding off all adversaries intent counterattacks on China proper, and Neither territorial nor maritime on reversing those gains. in long-term damage to regional or disputes can be allowed to • China Will Impose a New Regional even global economic relations. remain unresolved indefi nitely. Order. To facilitate the above two China would therefore likely only Though temporarily shelving principles, while also consolidat- expand the war to enemy homelands if claims, for the sake of effi cient ing national unity, China must its forces turned out to be unexpected- joint international extraction of establish a new regional order. It ly thwarted by some particularly deter- natural resources is allowable, will establish that new order by mined opponent. Even then, China's each claim remains sacrosanct. consensus, diplomacy or coercion, approach would have to be careful, for No claim, or part of any claim, will depending on case-by-case example, in attempting to wrest con- be traded away to secure another circumstances. As a fi rst step trol of islands claimed by Taiwan or the claim.
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