Law as Tradition Author(s): Martin Krygier Reviewed work(s): Source: Law and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Aug., 1986), pp. 237-262 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3504690 . Accessed: 16/03/2012 09:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Law and Philosophy. http://www.jstor.org MARTIN KRYGIER LAW AS TRADITION* ABSTRACT. This essay argues that to understand much that is most central to and characteristic of the nature and behaviour of law, one needs to supple- ment the 'time-free' conceptual staples of modern jurisprudence with an understanding of the nature and behaviour of traditions in social life. The article is concerned with three elements of such an understanding. First, it suggests that traditionality is to be found in almost all legal systems, not as a peripheral but as a central feature of them. Second, it questions the post- Enlightenment antinomy between tradition and change. Third, it argues that in at least two important senses of 'tradition', the traditionality of law is inescapable. Legal philosophers disagree about many things, few more than the nature of law.