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One-To-One Relationships Between a Political Party's Programme and Its Broader Ideology Are Extremely Rare, and British Libera

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One-To-One Relationships Between a Political Party's Programme and Its Broader Ideology Are Extremely Rare, and British Libera The LIberal Party and the New LIberalism One-to-one relationships between a political party’s programme and its broader ideology are extremely rare, and British liberalism at the turn of the nineteenth century was no exception. The cumbersome and frequently conflicted machinery of political parties does not often allow for the quick assimilation of the radical or innovative ideas that are normally initiated at its periphery. Nevertheless, an Leaders of the t is intriguing to explore – as a preliminary to the political unusual amount of New Liberalism: what had happened to propel upheaval. In ideological terms – in David Lloyd liberal thinking and practice the public discourses that com- ideological change George and along a path that would take pete over the control of political Winston it from a focus on entrepre- language and action – a dramatic filtered through into Churchill Ineurship, free trade and a gov- transformation was taking place, the Liberal Party, and ernment largely concerned with one that had begun in the 1880s. law, order and the legal protection That transformation was partly even onto the statute of private spaces, to construct- due to the extension of the fran- ing the rudiments of what was to chise and the gradual introduction books, following become the UK’s greatest domes- of new – and less privileged – sec- the famous Liberal tic achievement, the welfare state. tions of society into the political But one also needs to ask: did the arena, both through the vote and landslide electoral new liberalism fundamentally through unionisation; partly due change the Liberal Party? to the growing awareness among victory of 1906. conscientious intellectuals of the Michael Freeden unacceptable costs of the indus- Setting the scene trial revolution in terms of dis- examines the Before we begin to assess the ease, unemployment, squalor and changes that the Liberal Party the sheer exploitation of the poor relationship between actually underwent in that proc- by the rich; and in part due to the ess, we need to take on board percolation of innovative theo- the New Liberalism the ideational changes that took ries of social structure concern- and the Liberal Party. place – as is so often the case ing human interdependence and 14 Journal of Liberal History 67 Summer 2010 The LIberal Party and the New LIberalism vulnerability through academic sanctity of individual liberty and curious mixture of radical and channels into the public domain. private property over and above conservative imperialist) left The awareness that new social other liberal values such as the the Liberal Party en masse. The classes would now play a perma- development of individuality and remodelled Liberal Party lacked nent role – and a quasi-demo- decency towards others. Indeed, funds (although it still retained cratic one, within the franchise that was one of the central divides: the support of some rich indus- constraints of the period – made between those who had advocated, trialists) but not the potential for it obvious that competition over and were satisfied with, political a sweeping reinvention of itself, their support and consent would reforms such as a fairer and less which it proceeded to carry cause changes in public policies. corrupt electoral system, while through over twenty years. The During the 1880s, various ‘unau- fiercely guarding individual liber- party, unsurprisingly, chose to be thorised’ programmes emerged ties, and those who believed that far more reluctant to speed along from the pens of radicals, socialists social reform had to begin where the path demanded by its radical and liberals which – despite some political reform left off. While left- wing and many of its intellectu- crucial differences – displayed an leaning liberals still retained some als, because it was fearful of losing extraordinary amount of com- standard political reforms on their too much support among its tra- mon ground. From the 1890s, agenda – in particular, they had ditional middle-class base. As the the increasing number of reports, their eye on the unrepresentative Liberal politician and reformer surveys and newspaper articles on nature of the House of Lords – C. F. G. Masterman, expressed it, the abject suffering of the socially they were convinced that the polit- the Liberal dilemma was whether marginalised – in particular those ical authorities had now to address it would ‘retain, for example, its of Charles Booth on London and urgently questions of social justice few men of wealth, without los- Joseph Rowntree on York – had and human need.1 ing those adherents who demand started to make an impact on the In the 1880s, party-political direct taxation of that wealth in public mood. And theories of Liberalism was still display- the interests of social reform’.2 the organic interdependence of ing the features of an older era Of course, there were other society, with its imperatives of – the importance of Noncon- movements afoot towards fun- support for others being as impor- formity, temperance and finan- damental social reform among tant as the cultivation of personal cial retrenchment – and those budding socialist groups – not autonomy, began to replace the features did not go away; indeed, the least the Fabian Society who highly individualistic strictures they continued to have substan- the remod- had mastered the dissemination of English utilitarianism and the tial adherents alongside the radi- of propaganda pamphlets among self-help injunctions of Victorian cal elements of liberalism. But elled Liberal working-class sectors. But ini- moralists. they no longer characterised the tially only the Liberal Party had The debate took place, tellingly party as a whole and they exposed Party lacked the clout, range and organisation enough, in periodicals, newspapers serious problems relating to its that would enable such reform to and popular books long before it middle-class social base. Gener- funds, but reach national platforms. That infiltrated into parliament. The ally speaking, identifying the Lib- first became evident in the New- pages of august monthlies such as eral Party as middle class requires not the castle Programme of 1891, itself the Contemporary Review, the Fort- some caution. Then, as now, it is the successor both to Joseph nightly Review, and the Nineteenth too broad and undiscriminating a potential for Chamberlain’s ‘unauthorised pro- Century, as well as those of pro- term. The middle class included gramme’ of 1884–5 and to the Star gressive and radical weeklies and bankers, lawyers, administrators a sweeping newspaper’s programmes of 1888– monthlies, foremost among which and merchants as well as teachers, 9. That said, the Liberal Party was was the Speaker, later to become journalists and social reformers of reinvention initially very slow to react. Dur- the Nation (and later still to be many stripes, both religious and ing W. E. Gladstone’s final term amalgamated into the New States- secular. The financial, cultural of itself, as prime minister, in 1892–3, the man), became major forums in and ideological differences among which it Grand Old Man rejected the novel which proposals for a national pol- those categories were glaring. political idea of publishing a party icy were deliberated. The liberal The hairline splits in the Liberal proceeded programme, insisting that one daily press, in particular the Man- Party were already a generation issue at a time was the right way chester Guardian, also had a crucial old before they began to widen to carry to proceed, and immediately got role in forging new attitudes. But to create a potential schism, as bogged down in the Irish prob- their readership was limited to the Whigs among the Liberals through lem at the expense of other social small groups of the educated mid- drifted toward the conservative issues. Gladstone’s moral brand dle classes. No less importantly, ranks, a movement exacerbated over twenty of crusading liberalism was pro- they still had to contend with well- in 1886 when the Unionists under found but it was also beginning established liberal views on the Joseph Chamberlain (himself a years. to be stranded on the shores of a Journal of Liberal History 67 Summer 2010 15 the liberal party and the new liberalism creed that in later decades would that stretched way beyond the the Rainbow internal to liberalism itself. We typify enlightened conservatism, budding Labour Party – one has may also observe that some of free trade excepted. Thus, a year to appreciate that London in par- Circle is a the more radical social proposals before his death he praised one ticular was host to a lively scene of the Labour Party, such as the liberal essayist for ‘all the efforts of social reformers, journalists, marvellous right to work, were rejected out of you may make on behalf of indi- religious activists and others in hand by the Liberal Party, and that vidual freedom and independence patterns of discourse and inter- example of it was mostly resistant to plans to as opposed to what is termed Col- action that criss-crossed the city, nationalise industries. lectivism.’3 His successor, Lord with the result that plans and pro- what was The Rainbow Circle is a mar- Rosebery, was no closer to radi- grammes of political and social vellous example of what was hap- cal circles, and the Liberal Party transformation were common happening pening behind and across the seemed destined to widen its among a wide range of progres- behind and party scenes.5 It was a fascinating internal rift between the reform- sives. When Sir William Har- site of ideological formation: a ists and an increasingly ossified court, Liberal Chancellor of the across the discussion group founded in 1894 middle-class conventionalism. Exchequer in the early 1890s and that met monthly and included Ten years in the wilderness from hardly a radical himself, declared party scenes.
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