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Experiments in Bombing Technique

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Experiments in Bombing Technique CHAPTER 1 2 EXPERIMENTS IN BOMBING TECHNIQU E T the beginning of 1942 bombing policy was the cause of much concern Aand criticism, not only within the Air Ministry, but also in the pres s and the House of Commons . It was in this general state of unease, at a time when general war strategy was going badly and the bomber seemed the only means for striking directly at the enemy, that two previously divergent streams of thought were brought together to form the broad river of bombing action. This continued unchecked for two years, an d then—such was its impetus while in spate—it was directed only wit h great difficulty into fresh channels . The two tributaries were concentration on area bombing and new methods of navigation and target identification . The selection of large centres of population as the main target was the final pragmatic decision consequent upon the apparent failure of th e previous campaign against transport targets, but the underlying polic y was one of necessity rather than virtue. The new methods of navigation then being developed as urgent measures were originally intended, how - ever, to remedy the obvious failure of bombers to seek out and destro y small targets by night ; and were thus primarily intended to check th e deviation of bombing policy from "spot" to "extended" target systems. They did not come into being before influential opinion both inside and outside the Air Ministry had virtually already decided upon area bombing ; and in the event they became complementary rather than competitive t o this trend. l During the winter of 1941-42, "Gee", the first of a number of radio and radar instruments designed to overcome the basic problem of naviga- tion within Bomber Command, had been tested in air exercises ove r England . 2 Gee had given such successful results that, although only a few sets were immediately available, the Air Ministry decided to base the coming spring bombing offensive on tactics . involving its use for target identification and marking. Its anticipated range of accuracy was 350 mile s from Mildenhall, and, therefore, included the dense enemy industria l region of the Ruhr . In the expectation that before all bombers could b e equipped with the instrument the enemy would have found means of jamming transmissions, Bomber Command was instructed to make th e maximum use of this "revolutionary advance in bombing technique" with- out delay. On 14th February the previous list of enemy transport target s was revoked, and factories and industrial areas were stipulated as th e main targets to be attacked with the help of Gee . Four primary industrial 1 This excerpt from an air staff paper dated 23 Sep 1941 may be taken as a typical example : "The ultimate aim of the attack on a town area is to break the morale of the population whic h occupies it . To ensure this we must achieve two things; first, we must make the town physicall y uninhabitable and secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant personal danger . The immediate aim is, therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i) destruction and (ii) the fear of death. " s Gee was a semi-radar device by which a navigator could fix his position at any moment by measuring the time between the arrival of short-wave pulses broadcast from a chain of groun d stations. Feb 1942 MAIN TARGETS 299 areas within the range of Gee—Essen, Duisburg, Dusseldorf and Cologne —were listed for the main weight of attack . Three alternative targets of lesser importance (Bremen, Wilhelmshaven and Emden), within the rang e of Gee, and eleven alternative targets (Hamburg, Kiel, Lubeck, Rostock , Berlin, Kassel, Hanover, Frankfurt-on-Main, Mannheim, Schweinfurt an d Stuttgart), outside the range of Gee, were also to be bombed in favourabl e weather. A number of precise targets, key factories in otherwise secondar y industrial districts, were also indicated, but area bombing "to focus attack s on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular of th e industrial workers" was firmly stated as the paramount task of Bombe r Command. Previously, though individual raids had achieved success, no lastin g industrial damage had been done in Germany, which could call on almost unlimited labour and resources from the occupied countries for repair work; and, indeed, enemy industrial output for war purposes then stoo d higher than ever before . Now, however, by making German towns "physic- ally uninhabitable and the workers conscious of constant personal danger", it was intended to strike a blow at enemy potential even more serious than the loss of factories which, in any case, would proceed side by sid e with the offensive against morale. French factories known to be workin g for the enemy, especially those producing armoured vehicles and engines , were also detailed for night attack, although, in their case, care was to b e taken that civilian property was not damaged . In addition, the main strategic bombing force was to be called on, as required, to assist in com- bined operations, or in attacking targets of importance to the war at sea ,. A fortnight after this far-reaching statement of R .A.F. bombing policy was received, Air Marshal Harris3 became Air Officer Commanding-in- Chief, Bomber Command, replacing Air Marshal Peirse ;4 and to Harris fell the task of making the projected offensive a reality . The difficulties were tremendous, for the expected large expansion of Bomber Command had not taken place ; enemy air and ground defences were now greatl y strengthened in a wide belt running from Denmark to northern France ; and Gee, however optimistically its trials were hailed, was untested i n action, and was available for only a few aircraft of No . 3 Group . Inevit- ably, therefore, the next few months were devoted to experimental tactic s designed to make the best use of existing forces . At the same time a satisfactory method was sought not only of carrying a maximum number of bombs through the enemy defences, but, when over the target, o f ensuring that they were dropped accurately to cause the most damage . Practically all the raids mounted during this period added something t o the general pattern of development, although many failed to create sig- nificant damage. 3 Marshal of the RAF Lord Harris, GCB, OBE, AFC . AOC 5 Gp RAF 1939-40 ; Dep Chief of Air Staff 1940-41 ; Head of RAF delegation to USA 1941 ; AOC-in-C Bomber Cd 1942-45 . Regular air force offr ; of Rhodesia ; b . Cheltenham, Eng, 13 Apr 1892. + Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, KCB, DSO, AFC . Dep Chief of Air Staff 1937-40 ; Vice Chief of Air Staff 1940 ; AOC-in-C Bomber Cd 1940-42, India 1942-43 ; Allied Air C-in-C SE Asia Cd 1943-44; b. 1892 . 300 BOMBING TECHNIQUE 1942 Although an unchallenged policy had thus been formulated and bot h operational research and industry were then providing much help with tactics and means of attack, the campaign itself developed slowly .° The main retarding factor was the size of the bomber force regularly available during the spring and summer of 1942 . Over-all war strategy demande d that five squadrons be transferred to Coastal Command and another five to the Middle East, while additional attachments of other squadrons fo r a month or two were made to the former . It is true that in hitting power the Whitleys and Hampdens released to Coastal were becoming unsuitabl e for coordinated raids at increasingly higher altitudes, but the loss of fiv e squadrons of Wellingtons (then the backbone of the bomber force) wa s more serious; in any. case the loss of trained ground staff was a heavy burden. However unwelcome, this setback was only a temporary on e and mere statistics, which show that the strength of the night-bombe r force declined from 740 to 570 between January and July, give a fals e impression of real capabilities . Whitleys and Hampdens were in any case to be eliminated and squadrons of Nos . 3 and 5 Groups re-equipped with four-engined aircraft . Thus in fact, while the medium-bomber forc e sank from approximately 600 to 300 during this period, the heavy bombers increased in number from 140 to 280, and because several squadrons wer e out of the line for re-equipping at that time, the proportion of four- engined bombers was soon to increase still further.° The bomb-lift of the Command naturally increased even during the first six months because each heavy bomber could carry more than double the load of a mediu m bomber against any type of target. Furthermore the Command soon found that the Lancaster (which was basically an emergency re-design of the Manchester fuselage with four instead of two engines) was by far the most satisfactory aircraft for weight carrying, range and altitude potential , yet produced. Already by July 1942 there were as many Lancasters a s Halifaxes (the next most powerful type) in operation and thereafter the y predominated until the end of the war. Two R.A.A.F. squadrons, Nos. 455 and 460, were among the forty - seven squadrons of bombers available in February to prosecute this ne w offensive. This apparent representation, however, in fact obscured the tru e nature of Australian effort within Bomber Command, because aircrew s continued to be scattered among squadrons in all groups . No. 455, which had finally settled in at Wigsley, a satellite airfield of Swinderby, had bee n complimented for achieving, during January, the highest proportion of attacks against primary targets of any squadron in No .
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