april 2012 . Vol 5 . Issue 4

Contents An Overview of Syria’s Armed

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 An Overview of Syria’s Armed Revolution Revolution By Derek Henry Flood By Derek Henry Flood

Reports 5 French Counterterrorism Policy in the Wake of Mohammed Merah’s Attack By Pascale Combelles Siegel 8 Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians in Northern Nigeria By David Cook 10 Revisiting Shaykh Atiyyatullah’s Works on Takfir and Mass Violence By Christopher Anzalone 13 Mangal Bagh and LI Marginalized in Khyber Agency By Daud Khattak 15 Militants Turn Against Pakistan’s JUI-F Islamist Party By Zia Ur Rehman

18 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 20 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Free Syrian Army supporters display their flag and flash the “V” sign for victory. - Photo by Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images ince the start of the Syrian its security forces were killed by rebels.1 uprising on March 15, 2011, The Syrian regime’s countermeasures in it has morphed from largely Jisr al-Shughour created an exodus of peaceful mass street protests refugees into Turkey and the declaration Sto the current climate where parts of the establishment of the FSA. of the country are engaged in armed conflict pitting the Free Syrian Army Turkey’s Syrian refugee crisis has only (FSA) against the Alawite-dominated worsened in recent months as regime security forces of President Bashar al- forces moved back into northern cities About the CTC Sentinel Assad. Syria’s demonstrations began once under de facto FSA control. The Combating Terrorism Center is an in the wake of the largely successful Civilians and rebels alike are entering independent educational and research revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia and in southern Turkey in greater numbers, institution based in the Department of Social the midst of the violent regime responses indicative of Damascus’ brutal efforts to Sciences at the United States Military Academy, to their counterparts in Yemen, Bahrain, regain control of population centers in West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses and Libya. After small-scale events Idlib and Halab governorates. Former the Center’s global network of scholars and spiraled out of control in the southern UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has practitioners to understand and confront city of Dera`a, the critical juncture in brokered a joint UN-Arab League cease- contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the evolution of the FSA occurred when fire and tentative monitoring mission, other forms of political violence. regime forces moved into the northern but it has little chance of affecting the town of Jisr al-Shughour with heavy situation on the ground in Syria. armor beginning on June 4, 2011, after The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Damascus claimed that more than 100 of the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 1 “Syria: What Really Happened in Jisr al-Shughour?” BBC, June 7, 2011.

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This article asserts that the FSA Syrian National Council (SNC)2 have version in 1961 until the Ba`athist coup is foremost a national liberation reverted to a flag pre-dating the current of March 8, 1963, in Damascus. The fact movement determined to overthrow regime as a way of visually asserting that Syria’s historic national flag, rather the al-Assad regime through a war of claims on their country’s semi- than transnational caliphate imagery attrition. The FSA would prefer a rapid mythologized earlier history.3 emphasized by al-Qa`ida, is being paced revolution, but as the prospect promoted suggests that the mainstream for an external military intervention Syria’s armed opposition proudly flies FSA is overwhelmingly not a jihadist evaporated over the course of the past the pre-Hizb-ul-Ba`ath-era (Ba`ath movement even while it uses some year, the rebels have had to be self- Party) flag as a way of differentiating traditional religious language in its reliant while hoping for touted help itself from those Syrians still loyal to statements. The FSA’s strategic goal is from individual nation-states. The the regime. The flag hoisted by the narrowly limited to the overthrow of the FSA sees a campaign of protracted FSA and SNC is the green, white and Syrian state, rather than the borderless warfare coupled with an increase in black tricolor with three five-pointed jihad espoused by al-Qa`ida. military defections as its only realistic way forward. The isolation and “Although a few of the Although a few of the FSA’s declarative unanticipated duration of the conflict videos have featured a black jihadist has led to increased sectarianism in FSA’s declarative videos banner as a prop similar to that used by Syria, encouraged regional powers have featured a black the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the FSA is aligned with President Bashar al-Assad largely a desperate, isolated movement to grant him support, and kept the jihadist banner as a prop unconnected to al-Qa`ida or other conflict a highly asymmetrical one as similar to that used by the global jihadist movements.5 Its mandate the outgunned FSA continues to battle is strictly limited to the overthrow well-armed, pro-regime forces. Islamic State of Iraq, the of the al-Assad government and the FSA is largely a desperate, liberation of Syria from tyrannical rule. Between Nationalism and Sectarianism The FSA, the SNC, and the opposition Although the FSA describes itself as isolated movement Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) a national liberation movement, it unconnected to al-Qa`ida have all rejected the terrorist label remains primarily a Sunni outfit, whose bestowed upon them by the al-Assad aim is to dislodge the elite Alawite or other global jihadist regime and espouse the democratization minority government in Damascus. movements.” of Syria. An LCC statement issued in The FSA strongly believes that the February echoed this sentiment: “acts in demise of the al-Assad government torturing and killing its [the regime’s] is nothing short of inevitable. Such a opponents are very similar to those used stark development would signal the end stars symbolizing the three vilayets by al-Qaida members in annihilating of pan-Arabism borne of anti-colonial (administrative regions) of Damascus, anybody who disapprove with their sentiment in the region during the Aleppo, and Deir-ez-Zor dating back dark believes [sic] and ideologies.”6 1950s and 1960s along with the Arab to the French Mandate period. First As the conflict’s convoluted narrative Socialism envisioned by Hizb-ul-Ba`ath flown in 1932, it was used during the drags on, the regime continues to insist ideologue Michel Aflaq. Unable to decolonization period from France in it is battling internationally-backed burnish genuine Islamic credentials in 1946 until the formation of the United terrorists without providing verifiable the eyes of orthodox Sunnis and Shi`a, Arab Republic in 1958, which united evidence and denying unfettered access the emerging Alawite political elites of Syria with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt.4 to international journalists. Videos the middle Cold War period led by the After the dissolution of that short-lived have surfaced on YouTube and jihadist al-Assad family cloaked themselves in union, Syria briefly reverted to this forums claiming responsibility for the banner of Arab nationalism that suicide bombings in Damascus and was prevalent in the Levant and North 2 The Syrian National Council is an exile political opposi- Aleppo, which appear to feed some of Africa at the time. They attempted to tion body headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey. The SNC the regime’s claims. Opposition activists stifle potential sectarianism by creating was formed on August 23, 2011, to coordinate the efforts have claimed that at least some of these a one-party secular Ba`athist state that of differing dissident factions seeking the overthrow of attacks have been false flag operations 7 tolerated no dissent. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. See “Syrian Opposi- designed to demonize their cause. The tion Moves Toward Setting up National Council,” Asso- FSA dismissed an overture by Ayman Syria’s rebels take inspiration from ciated Press, August 23, 2011. those who toppled the Libyan regime 3 The forces of Libya’s National Transitional Council 5 For example, see “Homs | Formation of Al-Bara’a Bin by colloquially referring to themselves employed the tricolor flag that existed during Libya’s Malik Battalion – FSA,” accessed February 29, 2012, as “al-Shabab” (“the youth,” and pre-Qadhafi, post-independence period under King- Id available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jk3jAlfKn9s. unrelated to the group by the same riss Sanussi, while destroying the monochromatic green 6 Lara Jakes and Mazin Yahya, “Iraqis Profit From Syr- name in southern Somalia) and making flag designated as Libya’s national symbol in 1977 denot- ian Arms Smuggling,” Associated Press, February 18, a “V” sign with their index and middle ing the enforced ideology of Qadhafi’s pervasive Green 2012. fingers while posing for photos. In Book. 7 Albert Aji and Lee Keath, “Syria Says Suicide Bombers another act of apparent mimicry of their 4 Cleveland Henry Smith and Gertrude Rhoda Taylor, Kill 28 in Aleppo,” Associated Press, February 10, 2012; more successful Libyan revolutionary Flags of All Nations (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Com- “Syrian Opposition Figure Says Assad’s Regime Plotting counterparts, the FSA as well as the pany, 1946), p. 137. a Massive Blast in Aleppo,” al-Arabiya, January 6, 2012.

2 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 al-Zawahiri aimed at encouraging an rather than erupting in a historical The Regional Struggle al-Qa`ida-style jihad in Syria. Being vacuum, were in fact sown decades ago The FSA believes it is under siege not primarily a horizontally rather than with the brutal repression of Sunni only from the al-Assad regime, but vertically integrated movement, the FSA Islamism from the very outset of the from a vast cross-section of regional cannot singularly control all of its media al-Assad dynasty. Some of the parallels state, sub-state, and extra regional state output, but the overwhelming majority between Hama in 1982 and the current actors. A conflict in Syria is one that of its published statements refute war in Syria are startling. Rifaat al- cannot help but pull in regional and possible alignment with international Assad, Hafez’s younger brother, was global actors due to its critical geography jihadism, insisting that their war is an the brutal enforcer then in Hama in in the Levant. The FSA argues that such indigenous one.8 much the same manner as Maher al- interlopers harbor deep fears of Syria Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, is becoming a representative democracy The FSA is also keen to insist that its today. Indeed, Hama’s phone lines and with a Sunni-led governing structure. defectors do not singularly hail from road connections were cut-off in 1982, While the forces of the Maher al- Syria’s Sunni majority and that it has at and today the government has pursued Assad-led Fourth Armored Division least some support from both Alawites the same strategy in Homs, although coupled with the various tiers of Syria’s and Syrians from differing Christian with contemporary updates such as the mukhabarat intelligence services are seen denominations. “The regime is killing disruption of internet service.11 as the armed opposition’s main battlefield people, not just one sect” were the words opponents, the FSA also views Iran along of an FSA commander on the issue, who The FSA commanders who spoke with with its Lebanese and Iraqi clients as explained that there were still Sunnis this author in Syria on January 29, principal belligerents in the conflict. who had prospered under massively 2012, were keen to reinforce the notion corrupt cronyism who remained allied that they had no agenda, sectarian Since the late Syrian President Hafez al- with al-Assad in the face of mass or otherwise, other than ending the Assad began to tilt toward Hizb Allah at shelling of Sunni communities in Homs, al-Assad family’s hold on power for the end of the 1980s after it defeated its Idlib and other cities.9 the past four decades. They vaguely Shi`a peer competitor Harakat Amal in a stated that they sought to turn Syria sub-conflict within Lebanon’s civil war, Oppositionists of all hues insist that into an open democratic society with Syria has acted as a land and air bridge the al-Assad regime is purposefully a representative government, ending for Iranian arms and materiel to reach manipulating sectarian divisions decades of Alawite minority tyranny. Hizb Allah in Lebanon.14 When Bashar to strengthen itself as it confronts Yassin, a local commander, stated, al-Assad ascended to power upon grave danger. The Sunni revolt by the “we don’t belong to any group. Not the death of his father in 2000, Syria Muslim Brotherhood that took place Salafi, not Ikhwan. We are not allied became a principal supplier of arms to from 1976-1982 in many ways set the to any [pre-existing] interest [group] Hizb Allah as well as being an Iranian stage for the current conflict. Hafez in Syria. Our struggle is a search conduit.15 Syria and Iran have little to no al-Assad saw not a hint of irony in for freedom.”12 Abu Muhammed, a common ground in terms of theological obliterating his domestic Islamist regional commander, explained that ideology, which makes opposition to opponents, culminating in the not all Alawite social cohesion in the Israel the glue that bonds these two notorious February 1982 scorched regime’s armed forces is voluntary. He very different states together. earth campaign in the northern said that some high-ranking military city of Hama while simultaneously officers are simply obliged to enforce The FSA stated to this author that openly supporting Lebanese and the bloody writ of Bashar al-Assad Tehran is supplying highly trained Palestinian Islamist resistance groups because the regime can exploit its military men including experienced that threatened Israel.10 A component capacity to punish the relatives of snipers to assist its regular army of the confrontation currently tearing those who refuse to cooperate in the as well as the freelance shabiha Syria apart stems from Hafez al- regime’s extraordinarily repressive militiamen.16 A pro-FSA humanitarian Assad’s diligence to consolidate measures.13 Contradictory often to logistician claimed that non-lethal Syria’s fragmented minority mosaic their own insistence that the Syrian Iranian materiel used to suppress by pitting non-Sunnis fearful of being conflict is not explicitly sectarian in demonstrators was being offloaded disenfranchised by political Islam nature, FSA fighters and supporters at the port of Latakia.17 The FSA also should the Alawite regime be toppled took no pains to hide their contempt for spoke of a civilian airfield in the against Syria’s majority Sunni religious the Alawite sect, whom they felt had not Latakia area that was being upgraded demographic. Sectarianism in Syria was only oppressed Syria’s Sunni masses to accept Iranian aircraft so that they therefore entrenched by the state, and for years but also failed to adhere to could swiftly offload weapons to Syrian the fissures occurring in early 2012, their more conservative religious and cultural norms. 14 Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Hezbollah’s Thirty 8 Abdul Sattar Hatita, “Free Syrian Army Reject Jihad- Year Struggle Against Israel (New York: Random House, ists Help,” Asharq al-Awsat, February 23, 2012. 11 Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon 2011), pp. xvi, 90-92. 9 Personal interview, regional FSA commander, Idlib (New York: Nation Books, 2002), p. 183. 15 Ibid., pp. 337-338. Governorate, Syria, January 29, 2012. 12 Personal interview, local FSA commander, Idlib Gov- 16 Personal interview, regional FSA commander, Idlib 10 William Harris, Challenges to Democracy in the Middle ernorate, Syria, January 29, 2012. Governorate, Syria, January 29, 2012. East (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 13 Personal interview, regional FSA commander, Idlib 17 Derek Henry Flood, “Looking into the Syrian Abyss,” p. 10. Governorate, Syria, January 29, 2012. Asia Times Online, January 28, 2012.

3 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 forces fighting the FSA.18 They believe criticizing Saudi and Qatari talk of openly Prospects for Arming the Free Syrian Army the regime would crumble in short order arming the FSA.22 The al-Assad regime has repeatedly without such steadfast Iranian support. claimed that it is fighting “foreign- At least a limited amount of small arms backed terrorists” while refusing to Lebanese Hizb Allah became are being smuggled into eastern Syria cite any empirical evidence for its subordinate to a Damascene agenda from Mosul, and it is likely that some assertions.26 If the FSA has indeed when it “sacrificed its political fighters from the ISI or other al-Qa`ida been successful procuring small arms independence and integrity…for the fighters have entered Syria. This belief from outside Syria, it is most certainly sake of preserving the resistance to is being used as a wedge issue by the through its own crude financing and Israeli occupation.”19 The FSA accuses international community to avoid logistics networks. The FSA sees the Hizb Allah of being directly involved in intervening militarily in the conflict only possible conduit for outsiders the conflict in its support of the Syrian as it did in Libya in 2011. The Iraqi arming them as through Turkish regime, a charge the group’s leaders government has said that it is beefing territory with Ankara being the only flatly deny, contradicting their well- up security along its 373-mile long friendly power in the region. Although known stance, stating, “After some border with Syria to thwart possible there are non-state Sunni actors in Iraq Syrian opposition parties and Arab infiltration of arms and presumably that are sympathetic to their cause, the media accused Hizb Allah of shelling the Sunni fighters.23 FSA views the Shi`a-led government in city of Zabadani, Hizb Allah deems this Baghdad as being overtly hostile to their accusation silly, funny and baseless.”20 The Russian Federation has been aims. While a certain amount of arms deeply involved in supplying Syria with have been smuggled into southeastern As for Iraq, under former leader Saddam arms for many years. As the primary Syria from Lebanon, the FSA sees the Hussein the country was isolated for successor state of the defunct Soviet fractious Lebanese state as being either decades by Iran with which it fought an Union, Moscow has ties to the al-Assads dominated by, or fearful of, Hizb Allah’s eight-year long war. After a bitter schism that date to their earliest days in power power and hence unable to aid Syrian developed within the Ba`ath, Iraq also at the outset of the 1970s. The Soviets rebels. Hizb Allah Secretary General sparred with Syria for the leadership of supplied Syria with a massive amount Hassan Nasrallah has enacted what he Arab socialism. With both Saddam long of arms in the build-up to the October calls a “disassociation policy” to avoid an dead and the U.S.-led military coalition 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Soviet military internal split among Lebanon’s political in Iraq almost gone, a Baghdad no longer advisers were on the ground inside leaders between those supportive of al- tethered to Washington is able to pursue Syria, and Israeli Defense Minister Assad and the anti-Syrian, pro-Western an overtly pro-Iranian foreign policy, Shimon Peres revealed to the Knesset March 14 Alliance led by Saad Hariri.27 with its Shi`a prime minister Nuri al- in July 1974 that Israeli forces had killed Maliki openly buttressing the al-Assad Soviet officers on the Golan Heights front An FSA commander who spoke with regime. The al-Maliki government had during battle.24 Irrespective of Western this author at a front line position in quarreled with Syria for several years, but pressure, the SNC believes that the northwestern Syria’s Idlib Governorate Baghdad has moved closer to al-Assad. Russian armaments pipeline is continuing said that the only practical way for his Al-Maliki is unable, however, to back uninterrupted during the current rebels to get the arms they claim to al-Assad as unequivocally as Iran due conflict, whereby shipments embark desperately need is vis-à-vis Turkey. In to possible spillover effects that could from the small Ukrainian commercial his view, Turkey, in its capacity as both a upset Iraq’s fragile sectarian and ethnic port of Oktyabrsk near the Black Sea, comparatively open society and a NATO balancing act. In fact, more recently al- transiting the narrow Bosphorus Straits military power, is the only realistic Maliki softened his supportive stance, that divide Istanbul, stopping at the prospect for creating the desired “buffer stating in the Saudi daily Okaz that al- Greek Cypriot port of Limassol before zone” and delivering arms to the rebels.28 Assad was not immune to the winds of finally arriving at the Russian naval Turkey has strenuously avoided getting change. A statement issued by the Iraqi facility in the Alawite stronghold of militarily involved in the Syrian war prime minister’s office read, “Iraq backs Tartus to be trucked to various military despite such egregious transgressions change in Syria…Change is necessary. installations throughout government- as Syrian forces shooting and killing The situation will not be stable without held or contested areas of Syria.25 individuals in the Oncupinar refugee change.”21 As the head of a fractious camp inside Turkey’s Kilis Province on 29 coalition government beguiled by a 22 Mohamad Ali Harissi and Ammar Karim, “Iraq Slams April 9. fugitive Sunni vice president, al-Maliki Qatar, Saudi on Arms for Syria Rebels,” Agence France- now insists that Iraq must remain neutral Presse, April 1, 2012; “Iraqi PM Says Syria’s ‘Neutral- omon, “Russia Boosts Arms Sales to Syria Despite World with regard to Syria while simultaneously ity’ is for the Country’s ‘Best Interest,’” Agence France- Pressure,” Reuters, February 21, 2012. Presse, April 15, 2012. 26 Dominic Evans, “Friends of Syria to Call for Ceasefire, 18 Personal interview, local FSA commander, Idlib Gov- 23 Ahmed Rasheed, “Iraq Tightens Security at Syria Aid Access,” Reuters, February 24, 2012. ernorate, Syria, January 29, 2012. Border to Stop Arms Flow,” Reuters, February 18, 2012. 27 “Hezbollah: Disassociation Policy, Compromise to 19 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’allah: Politics & Religion 24 Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Keep Cabinet,” Now Lebanon, February 24, 2012. (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 116. Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (Cam- 28 Personal interview, local FSA commander, Idlib Gov- 20 “Hezbollah Slams Accusations of Shelling Syria’s Za- bridge, NJ: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 123- ernorate, Syria, January 29, 2012. badani,” Now Lebanon, January 18, 2012. 124, 135. 29 Elizabeth A. Kennedy and Andrea Glioti, “Syria Vio- 21 “UN Urges Immediate Ceasefire Amid Worsening 25 Personal interview, Khaled Khoja, Istanbul, Turkey, lence Crosses into Turkey, Lebanon,” Associated Press, Conditions in Syria,” Gulf News, February 29, 2012. February 4, 2012. Also see Thomas Grove and Erika Sol- April 9, 2012; Tulay Karadeniz and Khaled Oweis, “Syr-

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The FSA boasted to this author that they French Counterterrorism Journalists questioned why the Direction could “finish off the [Assad] regime in a Policy in the Wake of Centrale du Renseignement Interieur month’s time” if an outside actor would (DCRI) failed to uncover Merah’s plan step in and arm them. Unfortunately for Mohammed Merah’s before it was executed, and why it took the FSA, NATO command in Brussels Attack so long to identify him as the assailant.2 has adamantly and consistently stated Others wondered why the police took it will not become involved in the Syrian By Pascale Combelles Siegel 32 hours to neutralize Merah when he conflict in the manner it intervened in was barricaded in an apartment.3 In Libya even if a UN mandate were to for 16 years, French counterterrorism the aftermath of Merah’s death, French emerge providing NATO the crucial officials successfully prevented a Foreign Affairs Minister Alain Juppe legal framework to do so.30 number of terrorist attacks. Human spoke of a DCRI failure,4 while Minister and technical surveillance, close of Defense Gerard Longuet asked The arms race between the two coordination between justice and police, whether too much time had been spent belligerents in Syria is quintessentially special courts exclusively composed of on ultimately irrelevant leads.5 Front asymmetrical as a trickle of well-worn, magistrates, legal authority to arrest National presidential candidate Marine light weapons fall into rebel hands and detain, and the ability to prosecute Le Pen accused the government of being while the military, irregular shabiha individuals based on intent to commit too soft on radical Islamists and called militia and mukhabarat continue to a terrorist attack enabled the French for stricter immigration laws.6 Socialist be supplied with guns and materiel government to “neutralize an average candidate Francois Hollande asked for allegedly from Russia and Iran as of two to three groups representing a a review of all current antiterrorism well as China and North Korea. Rebel serious menace every year; that is to say laws, organizations, and procedures.7 prospects may change if saber-rattling groups ready to spring into action and Green candidate Eva Joly and several Saudi Arabia or Qatar follow up with conduct attacks,” according to French Socialist deputies criticized the police recent statements of support they have antiterrorism judge Marc Trevidic.1 raid as ineffective or unlawful. Some issued in the wake of a hamstrung Last month, however, a 23-year-old called for the resignation of Minister of international community,31 the latter of Frenchman of Muslim faith, Mohammed Interior Claude Gueant.8 which is unwilling to act on the FSA’s Merah, evaded the system and killed behalf due to concerns about igniting three French soldiers, three Jewish This article will examine how a much wider conflict in the region or children, and one Jewish teacher in an Merah slipped through France’s enabling further destabilization.32 eight day shooting spree from March counterterrorism defenses, as well 11-19, 2012. Merah was identified and as why it took so long to apprehend Derek Henry Flood is an independent located the day after the last shooting him. It will then review the legal, analyst focusing on MENA, Central and at the Ozar Hatorah School in Toulouse organizational, and political fallout as a South Asia. Mr. Flood is a correspondent and killed by police on March 22 after a result of the incident. for Asia Times Online and has written for 32-hour siege. Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst. Previously, he served as editor of The Jamestown The first successful terrorist attack Foundation’s Militant Leadership Monitor, in 16 years in France is shaping up to a terrorism publication he launched. Mr. be a watershed moment for French Flood regularly speaks on insurgency, counterterrorism policy. The failure to irregular warfare and geopolitics in the prevent the attacks, the eight-day delay 2 Yves Bordenave and Laurent Borredon, “Questions media and at conferences in the United in identifying Merah as the assailant, sur la surveillance de Mohammed Merah par la DCRI,” States and in the European Union. and the police’s inability to capture him Le Monde, March 22, 2012; François Heisbourg, “Une alive to stand trial after a 32-hour media commission d’enquête s’impose,” Le Monde, March 29, frenzied stand-off prompted unusually 2012. vocal public and pointed criticisms 3 Laurent Borredon, “L’opération du RAID à Toulouse of the French counterterrorism en cinq questions,” Le Monde, March 22, 2012; “Des ex- establishment. Such criticisms militaires israéliens critiquent l’opération menée par le are uncommon in France because RAID,” Le Monde, March 23, 2012. counterterrorism operations usually 4 “Toulouse: Juppé évoque une faille du renseignement,” ian Border Clashes Wound at least 5 in Turkey,” Reuters, occur far from the public sphere and Le Monde, March 22, 2012. April 9, 2012. parliamentary oversight is limited. 5 “La piste d’ex-militaires a fait perdre ‘un temps con- 30 Simon Cameron-Moore and Tulay Karadeniz, “NATO Of course, the fact that the shooting siderable,’ selon Gérard Longuet,” Le Monde, March 23, to Stay out of Syria Even if U.N. Mandate Emerges,” Reu- spree occurred amidst a presidential 2012. ters, February 18, 2012. campaign fueled the controversies, but 6 “Marine Le Pen: Merah: La partie emerge de l’iceberg,” 31 The normally quiescent Saudis have become increas- the criticisms go beyond politics as usual RTL.fr, March 26, 2012. ingly and unusually vocal about the prospect of openly and raise key questions for the future of 7 “François Hollande évoque à son tour une ‘faille’ dans arming the FSA. Saudi Arabia and Iran have fought nu- French counterterrorism policy. la surveillance de Merah,” Le Monde, March 23, 2012. merous sectarian proxy battles for decades, most notably 8 Faustine Léo, “Toulouse: La charge de Joly contre Gué- in Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. ant et le pouvoir,” LeParisien.fr, March 22, 2012; “Tou- 32 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syrian Army Pounds Rebels, 1 Marc Semo, “Affaiblie, la nébuleuse passe par des voies louse: L’UMP et le PS s’accusent tour à tour d’indécence,” New Move at U.N,” Reuters, February 28, 2012. détournées,” Libération, November 1, 2010. Le Monde, March 22, 2012.

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What Went Wrong? to Afghanistan and Pakistan—which for a few months. The surveillance According to French Internal would have flagged Merah—might have revealed no suspicious religious or Intelligence Chief Bernard Squarcini, prevented the last two attacks. ideological activities.15 This raises the nothing went wrong. In an interview question as to whether the DCRI is to Le Monde, Squarcini argued that Why did the DCRI only learn of Merah in the fall prepared to effectively disrupt plots Merah went undetected because he of 2010? by true “lone wolf” terrorists with no was “undetectable,” the product According to Bernard Squarcini, the organizational links to an established of an atypical Salafi-jihadi self- DCRI first learned of Mohammed Merah cell. Moreover, it appears that the DCRI radicalization process. He became after he was captured by Afghan security prioritizes identifying and disrupting radicalized alone while reading the forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in terrorist cells, rather than developing Qur’an in prison. He was neither November 2010.12 According to the better methods to mitigate the risk from connected to any known jihadist Nouvel Observateur, however, in 2006 the a lone wolf. organizational structure, nor did Renseignements Generaux (RG)—a he travel to the Middle East and the service that would later be fused with Should Merah’s extensive travel throughout the Caucasus through the established the Direction de la Surveillance du Middle East, Central and South Asia raised more and monitored organized channels.9 Territoire (DST) into the DCRI—had alarm? Nevertheless, there are a number of key According to Bernard Squarcini, questions in light of Merah’s attack. Merah traveled extensively, to “Based on the DCRI’s own Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Was Mohammed Merah misdiagnosed as a recognition that profiles Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In 2010, dangerous individual susceptible to engagement in he was picked up by Afghan security terrorist attacks? such as Merah were forces in Kandahar, handed to U.S. In May 2011, Bernard Squarcini susceptible to act, a fair forces, and then put on a Paris- identified three key risk factors for bound plane after alerting the French propensity to engage in terrorism: question is why Merah military intelligence services. Neither membership in or association with al- was not more closely the DCRI nor the Direction Generale Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE) had having attended a militant training monitored before his move known that he was in Afghanistan. Yet camp in Pakistan, and being a societal to violence.” by that time, Mohammed Merah and his loner.10 Merah was known for being brother, Abdelkader, had already been a loner with psychiatric troubles, a involved with the ringleader of a small propensity for violence, and for having group accused of sending young French traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan determined Merah to be a threat to aspiring jihadists to Iraq. Mohammed in 2010 and 2011.11 Based on the DCRI’s the state’s security. An administrative visited the ringleader in prison, and own recognition that profiles such as note written in 2006 categorized him the Merah brothers arranged for the Merah were susceptible to act, a fair as a “member of the radical Islamist ringleader’s father to marry their question is why Merah was not more movement likely to travel abroad and mother.16 Mohammed had traveled closely monitored before his move to provide logistical assistance to extremist extensively in the Middle East on the violence. It is also surprising that after militants.”13 Squarcini’s interview modest salary of an auto mechanic. Yet, the first murder, controlling those indicates that the DCRI did not know according to the Nouvel Observateur, after individuals known to have traveled to about the RG record. According to interviewing Merah upon his return Afghanistan or Pakistan—about two the Nouvel Observateur, the record was from Pakistan in December 2011, the dozen, according to terrorism expert lost in 2008 at the time of the DCRI’s DCRI labeled him a “militant close to the Francois Heisbourg—did not become a creation. The French government has jihadist movement” and requested that top priority. Merah was not identified as neither confirmed nor denied this new they be notified if he crosses any state a possible suspect until after the second information.14 borders.17 This begs the question as to attack on March 15; his connection to whether the DCRI misinterpreted key the first victim was uncovered on March Does the DCRI have the capability to detect lone clues based on the countries to which 17, two days before the attack at the wolves? he traveled, the conditions in which he Ozar Hatorah School. An early check According to Bernard Squarcini, the traveled, and his connections to people on the whereabouts of known travelers DCRI questioned Mohammed Merah who had been involved in an effort to after his 2010 journey to Afghanistan. send foreign fighters to Iraq in 2007.

9 Laurent Borredon and Jacques Fallorou, “Bernard The service contacted him when he was Squarcini: Nous ne pouvions pas aller plus vite,” Le in Pakistan in 2011 and interviewed him Monde, March 23, 2012. again upon his return to Toulouse. At 10 Yves Bordenave and Rémy Ourdan, “Bernard Squar- that point, he was put under surveillance cini: La France est la cible nº2 d’Al-Qaeda,” Le Monde, May 7, 2011. 12 Borredon and Fallorou. 11 Emiline Cazi and Ariane Chemin, “Mohammed Mer- 13 Cécile Deffontaines and Olivier Toscer, “Comment le 15 Borredon and Fallorou. ah, l’homme aux cent visages,” Le Monde, March 22, 2012; contre-espionnage a égaré la fiche de Merah,” Le Nouvel 16 Isabelle Monnin, “Mohamed Merah: vie et mort d’un Gilles Souilles, “Mohammed Merah, Docteur Jeckyll et Observateur, April 18, 2012. fanatique,” Le Nouvel Observateur, April 3, 2012. Mister Hyde,” La Dépêche du Midi, March 22, 2012. 14 Ibid. 17 Deffontaines and Toscer.

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Why did the police operation fail? and anti-Western rants, provocative to regulate speech—even if took a The failure to arrest Mohammed Merah public demonstrations, and ambiguous prudent approach. The new law uses during a surprise night raid and the incitement to violence. Under current dispositions that have been deemed subsequent media frenzied siege on legislation, the government accused the constitutional in other domains such as his apartment also raised numerous group of masterminding the kidnapping criminalizing the consultation of child questions. According to Claude of a French judge. Coming in the pornography websites or the application Gueant, minister of the interior, the aftermath of the attacks in Toulouse of the principle of extra-territoriality police’s goal was to take Merah alive and Montauban, the arrests seem to that enables the French government to so he could face justice. Yet after a indicate that the French government prosecute people who engage in sexual 32-hour siege and countless hours of is intensifying its offensive against tourism abroad even if it is not illegal in negotiations, the police failed to erode groups and individuals whose actions the country where they committed the Merah’s will to resist or to convince might incite others to commit violence acts. It also finally includes a European him to surrender.18 As one Socialist and acts of terrorism. directive criminalizing the instigation deputy, Jerome Guedj, provocatively of a terrorist act into the French legal put it: “So if I understand correctly, Second, immediately following Merah’s framework. It is not clear how effective in 30 hours, the RAID [Recherche death, French President Nicolas such dispositions might be. Assistance Intervention Dissuasion] Sarkozy announced two new legislative is unable to go pick up an individual initiatives designed to strengthen Meanwhile, the government quickly alone in his apartment.”19 Meanwhile, the legal arsenal against would-be quelled the Socialist Party’s effort to retired officials from the RAID and terrorists: one designed to curtail investigate the intelligence services in from the Groupe d’Intervention de la access to jihadist websites, and the response to Merah’s attacks. On March Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN, the other designed to criminalize traveling 31, the Socialist Party in the senate Gendarmerie counterpart to the RAID) to “insurrectionary countries.” Socialist asked that the internal and external both questioned the tactics used in the candidate Francois Hollande indicated intelligence service chiefs, Erard Corbin raid to capture Merah.20 Observers that he was favorable to a law dealing de Mangoux and Bernard Squarcini, be blamed the government for politicizing with the second problem. On April 4, questioned by a Senatorial Committee and micro managing the police the government released a draft new on Legal Affairs.24 The request fulfilled operation.21 law that encompasses both problems.23 the Socialist Party’s quest for a greater The new proposed law is designed to parliament role in overseeing and Legal, Organizational, and Political Fallout curtail the promotion of terrorism. Key controlling the intelligence services. For the time being, the fallout of Merah’s provisions include: Yet it also was an attempt to support attacks concerns the legal framework candidate Francois Hollande’s effort for combating terrorism and the role - regular surfing (without legitimate to conduct a full assessment of the and missions of the DCRI. Despite the purpose) of or the promotion of jihadist antiterrorism laws and structures in criticisms of its operation to capture websites would become a misdemeanor; France in the aftermath of the Merah Merah, the RAID is not the subject - glorification of terrorism on the incident. The government, seeing no of reform proposals. Facing intense internet would incur a seven-year reason to give grounds to the main criticism, the government responded prison sentence; opposition party, flatly refused, quickly with several initiatives. - the police would gain expanded power arguing that the two officers have no to shut down internet servers; role in assessing antiterrorism laws and First, the Ministry of Interior initiated - instigating acts of terrorism would that, particularly amid a contentious a crackdown against radical Islamists. become a new misdemeanor under presidential campaign, they are held to The government targeted Forsane French law; a strict obligation of confidentiality.25 Alizza, a small group known for calling - the legal definition of “plotting in for France’s Islamization, preaching relation with a terroristic enterprise” Besides adding legislation, Sarkozy’s hate, and promoting Usama bin Ladin.22 is expanded to include those who travel government does not appear inclined Thirteen of the 17 people arrested abroad to attend ideological or military to modify the current structures and remain in detention and charged with training camps. services. That could change if Francois terrorism-related offenses. The group Hollande, the Socialist candidate, wins became known for fiery anti-French It is likely that parliament will pass— the presidential run-off on May 6, 2012. possibly with some amendments— At this time, the Socialist candidate 18 “La stratégie du RAID: purger la dimension the proposed law, as a debate on is predicted to win. Before Merah’s d’hyperviolence du suspect,” FranceTV.fr, March 21, the wisdom of the proposed rules attacks, the Socialist Party was already 2012. might look like an effort to impede planning a reform of the intelligence 19 “La polémique enfle sur l’assaut du RAID et l’enquête,” the government from doing what is services. Details of this reform plan Libération, March 22, 2012. necessary. How these new dispositions have not been publicized. It is, however, 20 “Toulouse: Le Fondateur du GIGN critique l’opération will impact counterterrorism efforts du RAID,” Ouest-France, March 22, 2012. remains to be seen. The new law wades 24 “Renseignements: L’aveu d’impuissance,” Le Monde, 21 Floran Vadillo, “Une opération policière trop politi- into a complicated territory—how March 31, 2012. sée,” Le Monde, March 29, 2012. 25 Laurent Borredon, “Le government refuse l’audition 22 “Le coup de filet dans les milieux islamistes debouche 23 Jean-Marie Leclerc, “Mercier: Réprimer la provoca- des chefs du renseignement par les sénateurs,” Le Monde, sur 17 gardes à vue,” Libération, March 30, 2012. tion au terrorisme,” Le Figaro, April 10, 2012. March 30, 2012.

7 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 known that the presumptive Socialist Boko Haram Escalates which targeted Christians more at nominee for minister of interior, random and did not appear to be a Francois Rebsamen, met with Bernard Attacks on Christians in priority for the group. Squarcini in Paris to discuss the tenets Northern Nigeria of a reform of the intelligence services.26 Boko Haram’s new phase of attacks on It is too soon to assess whether or how By David Cook Christians can be divided into several the most recent revelation on the lost target categories: 1) attacks against Merah record during the fusion of the during the past six months, Nigeria’s local Christians in Boko Haram’s core RG and the DST into the DCRI will Boko Haram extremist sect has continued operating area of Borno and Yobe affect the Socialist Party’s plans. to demonstrate the ability to execute states, and the adjacent state of Bauchi; attacks. It has both solidified its hold 2) major suicide operations or bombing After Mohammed Merah’s killing spree, over the region of Maiduguri in Borno attacks of high-profile churches in Jos Francois Hollande gave a few clues as to State, as well as expanded its operating in Plateau State and the capital of Abuja; where he wants to take the intelligence area to include the major Muslim and 3) minor operations against church services. They hint at a broader reform population centers of northern Nigeria.1 or parachurch personnel throughout than that envisioned by President To date, the Nigerian government seems the north and “middle belt” regions of Sarkozy. Hollande proposed to exert incapable of responding to Boko Haram, greater control on those who travel and through a series of mistakes has “Although it is commonly to “sensitive countries.” It remains revealed what outside observers have to be seen whether the proposed new long suspected: certain elements of the discussed in the popular legislation is enough for him. He also security forces and political leaders of press, it is important not to proposes to increase and improve Muslim-majority northern Nigeria are coordination between the DGSE and either complicit with Boko Haram’s assume that Boko Haram the DCRI. Finally, he said that the operations, or they are taking a rather is about to transform into a services needed adequate funding to complacent view of its success. fully implement the painstaking work transnational Salafi-jihadi of monitoring and surveillance. The most significant changes to Boko group.” Haram’s operations have been a Pascale Combelles Siegel is President of departure from high-profile operations Insight Through Analysis, a consultancy firm with international implications—such specializing in strategic communications, as the suicide attack on the United Nigeria. These operations represent a military-media, and civil-military relations Nations headquarters in Abuja on fairly major shift in the goals of Boko research, analysis, planning, and assessment. August 26, 2011—and an escalation of Haram, which are still squarely Nigeria- Her work currently focuses on providing attacks on Nigerian Christians as well focused, and represent the opposition analytical support to cultural intelligence and as a renewed focus on attacks against of certain elements of the Muslim north counterterrorism/counterinsurgency efforts the Nigerian security apparatus (police to the spread of Christianity in the in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ms. Combelles and army). region.2 Siegel has several monographs, chapters and sections in books and official studies. These Although Boko Haram’s basic goal of Attacks on Christian targets in general include a solicited chapter in the Combating creating a Shari`a state either in part are boundary-creating operations Terrorism Center at West Point’s recent or in the totality of Nigeria remains a that can command a certain level of Making the Grade: Assessing al-Qa`ida’s constant, its methodology has changed popular support within the Muslim Learning and Adaptation, and Target slightly since the summer of 2011. This community—or at least not generate the Bosnia, a well-received study of NATO article looks at Boko Haram’s increase broad Muslim opposition that was seen psychological operations and public affairs. in attacks on Christians, reviews when Salafi-jihadi groups in various its continued targeting of Nigerian countries targeted Muslim civilians security forces, and finally assesses the beginning in 2003. The Salafi-jihadi implications for the future. groups that today are at the forefront of the movement targeting Christians Boko Haram Escalates Attacks on Christians (which remains peripheral to the much Starting with the major attacks in broader field of political radical Islam) Damaturu in Yobe State on November such as al-Shabab in Somalia, al- 4, 2011 and the Christmas Day series Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of operations in 2011, Boko Haram’s in North Africa, radical Muslims in renewed focus on Christians is a southern Thailand, the Taliban in departure from its previous operations, both Afghanistan and Pakistan and

1 Nigeria is nearly equally divided between Muslims 2 The other angle, if one wants to avoid the religious and Christians. Nigerian Muslims, who are primarily component, is ethnic, where certain elements of the north 26 Marcelo Wesfried and Jean-Marie Pontaut, “Ren- Sunni, are concentrated in the northern part of the coun- oppose the spread of Igbos and other southern ethnic ele- contre Secrète entre Rebsamen et Squarcini,” L’Express, try, while Christians dominate the Middle Belt and the ments to the region. The author, however, does not be- March 16, 2012. south. lieve that the ethnic angle applies in this context.

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Indonesian radicals are achieving that is through draconian state-security prominence because they are returning methods (akin to Algeria in the 1990s) to the pre-2003 formula of “defending or by acceding to the group’s demands. Islam.” This trend is likely the wave The latter option would indeed cause of the immediate future, at least until a civil war, as the Christians through these groups can establish themselves fall 2011 and spring 2012 have become in a geographic base. increasingly impatient with the lack of tangible governmental progress Boko Haram follows this paradigm. against Boko Haram. There is a strong It emphasizes in its propaganda and danger of revenge attacks by Christians operations two basic themes, both of on a local ad hoc basis,9 or even worse the which resonate with Nigerian Muslims: creation of an equivalent vigilante group 1) the security forces are tools of the that could mirror Boko Haram’s tactics. Christian-dominated government in Abuja, and are actively preventing Continued Targeting of Nigerian Security the formation of a Shari`a state Forces using brutal methods and attacking The most spectacular series of attacks innocent, pious Muslims;3 and 2) carried out during the recent period the growth of Christianity through A map of Nigeria. The country is largely equally divided was the January 21, 2012, operations between the Muslim-majority north, and the Christian- aggressive proselytizing will eventually majority south. against police and military targets disenfranchise Muslims (even in the in the major northern Muslim city of Muslim-majority north) and render the The next series of operations focused Kano, which killed at least 186 people.10 creation of a Muslim state (or society) on Jos and Abuja, both cities with a This operation was spectacular not in the north either impossible or substantial expatriate population and only for its high casualty count, but meaningless.4 While substantive proof good media coverage. These attacks the complex nature of attacks upon no that Boko Haram commands actual occurred on Christmas Day 2011, less than three different police targets, broad-based support among Muslims again a symbolic date guaranteed to a prison break and approximately 12 does not exist,5 the evidence of the past make headlines.7 These operations car bombs either exploding around the year confirms that these two messages used suicide attacks against churches city or found unexploded. Although this do resonate with the broader Muslim and killed at least 25 people. It is a incident was grander in nature than population as long as Boko Haram does mystery as to why this attack came as previous attacks, it was no different not itself kill large numbers of Muslim a surprise given that Boko Haram had in kind than past Boko Haram attacks civilians. previously executed spectacular attacks against security targets throughout on Christian targets on Christmas Day 2010-2011. It was followed by a brazen Boko Haram’s operations during the in 2010. In Jos and Abuja, however, suicide bombing against the armed period of fall 2011 to spring 2012 began in contradistinction to the Damaturu forces General Headquarters in Kaduna with the major series of suicide attacks, attacks (and others in the northeast), the on February 9, considered to be the bombings and targeted murders in Christian population is quite strong— Nigerian equivalent of the U.S. Army’s the Yobe state capital of Damaturu,6 even at a majority level—and therefore West Point. Although this operation which killed at least 100 people. These there is no chance that Boko Haram, failed to actually penetrate the base, the operations were clearly designed to lacking broader military options, can mere fact that it was attempted, and in expel Christians from northern mid- do anything other than provoke terror. Kaduna (at the center of the country), range towns. (Much of the Christian There have also been major thematic has been a major propaganda victory population of Maiduguri already fled attacks on Christian targets on January for Boko Haram. There have also been the city during the previous period, 5, 6, 10, 11, 24 (all in either Maiduguri, a number of attacks against schools, fall 2010-spring 2011.) Anecdotally, it Adumawa or Jos), February 19 (Suleja, hospitals, markets and other public seems that the Damaturu and follow-up near Abuja), and February 25, 2012 locations (including sports events), operations in the states bordering Boko (Abuja and Jos), of which the Jos attack primarily in Maiduguri. All of these Haram’s core region of Borno and Yobe was a suicide bombing.8 latter attacks fall under Boko Haram’s have succeeded in causing the balance rubric of attacks involving al-amr bi-l- of the Christian population to flee. Boko Haram has managed to take a ma`ruf wa-l-nahy `an al-munkar (enjoining semi-dysfunctional society lacking basic the good and forbidding the evil)— security and the rule of law and drive such operations are typically directed 3 Mark Lobel, “Kano Bombings: ‘Extra-Judicial’ Killings it into a complete state of dysfunction against non-Islamic practices, such as Spark Nigeria Fury,” BBC, February 2, 2012. where the only obvious means by the consumption of alcohol. 4 “Boko Haram: Nigerian Islamist Leader Defends At- which order can be re-established tacks,” BBC, January 11, 2012. Synthesis of statements by 9 “Nigeria Unrest: Mosque Attacked in Benin City,” BBC, Abubakar Shekau from YouTube. January 10, 2012; Jon Gambrell and Njadvara Musa, “Ni- 5 “Emir Of Kano Weeps Over Boko Haram Attacks – 7 “Deadly Nigeria Bomb Attacks Condemned by World geria Sect Kills 15; Christians Vow Defense,” Associated Premium Times,” African Spotlight, January 23, 2012. Leaders,” BBC, December 25, 2011. Press, January 7, 2012. 6 “Violence in Yobe State, Nigeria Aimed Mainly at 8 Mindy Belz, “Targeted Christians,” WORLD Magazine, 10 “Kano Attack: Emir Leads Prayers in Nigerian City,” Christians,” Compass Direct News, November 11, 2011. February 29, 2012. BBC, January 23, 2012.

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It is important to recognize that while scale of all of these attacks indicates Revisiting Shaykh Boko Haram has expanded its field that Boko Haram must consist of of targets through the Kano attacks several thousand hard-core members Atiyyatullah’s Works on by moving away from its base in and sympathizers.14 Takfir and Mass Violence northeastern Nigeria and its usual range of targets in the center, it has yet to move To date, the Nigerian government has By Christopher Anzalone beyond this core region or strike at any not demonstrated the ability to contain of the major cities of the northwest or the Boko Haram,15 and strong evidence that in the eighth installment of his series Christian south. Moreover, to counter the group has been curtailed by any of the of messages on post-Mubarak Egypt, the U.S. congressional report on Nigeria measures taken by the government does al-Qa`ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in December 2011, Boko Haram does not not exist. There is also no evidence that finally confirmed the killing of one of present any threat thus far beyond the Boko Haram is making the transition the organization’s senior ideologues and borders of Nigeria.11 to a more broad-based jihadist group (a reputed operations chief in a U.S. drone transition that is usually marked by the strike in Pakistan on August 22, 2011.1 Implications for the Future creation of a countersociety), nor has it Jamal Ibrahim Ishtaywi al-Misrati, As Nigerian reporters have speculated, succeeded in gathering mass support. better known by his nom-de-guerre it appears that Boko Haram has several Indeed, Boko Haram could very well “Shaykh Atiyyatullah,” was one of al- interlocking elements at the present have alienated Muslim public opinion Qa`ida central’s most versatile leaders time. One is most probably centered by some of its indiscriminate killings. and a longtime veteran of the Libyan around the figure of Abubakr Shekau, Although it is commonly discussed in Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).2 Among who represents the most doctrinally the popular press, it is important not his most significant contributions Salafi-jihadi section of the group. It is to assume that Boko Haram is about to to Sunni jihadist thought was his to him that one can attribute the most transform into a transnational Salafi- participation in intra-jihadist debates doctrinaire statements, such as his jihadi group. The public evidence that on the issue of takfir (excommunication), January 28, 2012, release threatening Boko Haram actually has ties to the the practice of declaring another Muslims who do not fully observe Somalia-based al-Shabab or with North Muslim an apostate. These debates Shari`a: “There are no exceptions. Even Africa’s AQIM is weak. With the sole have proven to be both bitter and long- if you are a Muslim and you can’t abide exception of the attack upon the UN lasting, pitting those Sunni jihadists by Shari`a we will kill you. Even if you headquarters in Abuja, there are no who argue for a broad use of takfir on are my own father, we will kill you.”12 attacks carried out by Boko Haram thus any perceived enemy against those who It is tempting to see attacks such as far that cannot be explained within argue for a more restrictive and cautious the January 21 incident in Kano as the the context of a local jihadist group, implementation. work of this faction of Boko Haram with a Salafist leadership, seeking to (since they represent a type of revenge establish a Shari`a state over part or all Atiyyatullah argued for the latter, even for Muhammad Yusuf, the murdered of Nigeria. intervening in a debate with the late charismatic founder of Boko Haram), founder and leader of al-Qa`ida in Iraq while attacks against Christians are Dr. David Cook is associate professor of (AQI), Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, over the perhaps farmed out to other sections of religious studies at Rice University. He mass targeting of Iraqi Shi`a Muslims the group.13 completed his undergraduate degrees at and even Sunni Muslims who did not Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and support AQI. Atiyyatullah’s caution Nigerian journalists have speculated received his Ph.D. from the University of about the use of takfir was likely tied to that the group now exists on a Chicago in 2001. His first book, Studies his experiences in Algeria during the franchise basis, and that some attacks in Muslim Apocalyptic, was published 1990s, when he was an LIFG emissary on Christians, murderous as they are, by Darwin Press in the series Studies in to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). represent local grievances. Of course, Late Antiquity and Early Islam. Two it is possible that a number of driving further books, Understanding Jihad and This article examines Atiyyatullah’s factors could be at play in the anti- Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic position on takfir and how it fits into Christian attacks. It is interesting that Literature were published during 2005, the broader intra-jihadist debate on there is also no evidence of Muslim and Martyrdom in Islam as well as excommunicating and using violence clerics joining Boko Haram; indeed, the Understanding and Addressing Suicide against other Muslims. Atiyyatullah’s group has continued to kill its religious Attacks (with Olivia Allison) have been efforts to regulate the use of takfir and opponents, such as on February 18 in completed recently. violence, particularly after the Iraq Maiduguri. In the author’s analysis, the debacle, were one of the most pragmatic

11 “US Congress Warns of Nigeria’s Boko Haram,” BBC, 1 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “A Message of Hope and Glad December 1, 2011. Tidings for our People in Egypt: Part 8,” December 2, 12 Monica Mark, “Boko Haram Vows to Fight until Nige- 14 Other estimates, such as from Nigerian security offi- 2011, available on various jihadist web forums. ria Establishes Sharia Law,” Guardian, January 27, 2012; cials, place the number of cadre at a few hundred. 2 Atiyyatullah was also known as Abu Abd al-Rahman “Shekau Leading Boko Haram From the Shadows,” 15 For example, Kabiru Sokoto, the bombmaker accused Atiyatullah al-Libi and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman. It is Agence France-Presse, January 28, 2012. of the December 25, 2011, church bombing in Abuja, es- believed he was also the writer of a December 2005 letter 13 Yusuf Alli, “Kabiru Sokoto Gives SSS Clues on Sect’s caped from police custody on January 17, 2012. He was from a senior al-Qa`ida central ideologue to Abu Mus`ab Leaders,” The Nation, February 13, 2012. recaptured, however, on February 10. al-Zarqawi. That letter was signed simply as “Atiyah.”

10 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 attempts at intervention in this debate. the group’s leadership determined, In 2004-2006, the takfir discussion His continued cautioning of jihadists failed to actively support the GIA.6 The returned to the fore with the beginning to not misuse or misapply takfir and GIA’s brutal violence was eventually of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s campaign violence serves as an unintended condemned by even its staunchest of mass violence against Iraqi Shi`a confirmation that these were continuing supporters, including Abu Qatada al- and others who he deemed to be problems among them, belying his Filistini, who provided legal opinions apostates because of either their attempts to deflect the allegations. (fatawa) from the United Kingdom support or participation in the new Even in death, Atiyyatullah continues that legitimized the GIA’s violence Iraqi government or their failure, in to serve as a charismatic voice for al- throughout much of the 1990s.7 In the his view, of adequately supporting Qa`ida central and its allies, with the mid-1990s, Atiyyatullah and other AQI. This led to an exchange between posthumous publication of writings Libyan jihadists traveled as part of al-Zarqawi and al-Qa`ida central’s and audio messages and citation of his a delegation of LIFG and al-Qa`ida leaders, including second-in-command previous work by al-Qa`ida central, its members to the GIA to inquire about Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al- allies such as al-Shabab in Somalia, and the status of missing LIFG fighters Libi, and Atiyyatullah. Al-Zarqawi was “cyber” jihadists. who had earlier traveled to Algeria.8 also criticized by his former teacher, Atiyyatullah’s experiences in Algeria, the prominent jihadist scholar Abu Encountering Extreme Takfir in Algeria including a period when he was held Muhammad al-Maqdisi, which led to Atiyyatullah began his career in the captive by the GIA, likely influenced the late AQI leader’s supporters to turn 1980s as a member of a large contingent his views on takfir and the employment on the latter. Atiyyatullah entered the of Libyans, many of whom would later of mass violence against other Muslims, back-and-forth debate between al- form the LIFG, a group that was for two issues on which he later addressed Zarqawi and his critics with a December much of its existence dedicated to the repeatedly in his writings and audio 11, 2005, letter addressed to the AQI overthrow of the regime of Libyan and video statements. leader.10 He warned al-Zarqawi against dictator Mu`ammar Qadhafi. Few casting a negative light on the Iraqi details are known about his early days Intra-Jihadist Debates on Takfir insurgency through his actions and in the LIFG, although he traveled to The related issues of takfir and the use noted that jihadists’ military decisions Afghanistan in the late 1980s with of mass violence by jihadists against must be subservient to the “judicious a contingent of other Libyans for other Muslims has been the subject of Shari`a,” which lays out specific military training.3 In 1992, following intense debate among Sunni jihadists guidelines for behavior that even the the Soviet withdrawal from the country for decades.9 Can large groups of people, mujahidin must follow. Reminding al- and the beginning of a brutal civil war even entire societies, be classified as Zarqawi of the catastrophic missteps between Afghan mujahidin factions, apostates for either their support of of the GIA in Algeria, Atiyyatullah the hundreds of LIFG members began the irreligious “tyrants” of the Muslim urged the AQI leader to be cautious to return to Libya to start the fight world or their acquiescence to their in his use of takfir, warned him against against Qadhafi.4 During the 1990s, the rule and failure to support jihadists severe criticism of Iraqi Sunnis and period when it had a major presence fighting them? Which groups can be those religious scholars (`ulama) who in Afghanistan, the LIFG had close the legitimate target of takfir? What are righteous, even if they make errors, relations with al-Qa`ida before the core makes an individual who claims to be a and instructed him to send emissaries organization became affiliated with Muslim abandon their faith and become to al-Qa`ida central’s bases in Pakistan other groups in North Africa, Yemen, an apostate? These questions are at the to enter into consultation with the core Iraq, and Somalia. Atiyyatullah was an forefront of this debate. organization.11 early al-Qa`ida recruit.5 6 For an overview of the development of the GIA and Atiyyatullah on Takfir, its Restrictions, and Following its return to Libya, the the group’s increasingly broad use of takfir against even Mass Violence against Muslims LIFG attempted to aid the GIA in Algerian civilians who did not support the group, see The debate over the legitimate use of its insurgency against the Algerian Mohammed M. Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements and violence remained a key interest of government. The GIA’s ideology, Political Violence in Algeria,” Middle East Journal 54:4 Atiyyatullah’s until his death, and he however, became increasingly extreme (2000): pp. 572-591. continually urged jihadists to exercise throughout the 1990s and it began to 7 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al- caution with regard to the use of takfir commit massacres of both its enemies in Qaida Strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia and mass violence against Muslims. the Algerian government and security University Press, 2008), pp. 188-189; Brynjar Lia, Specifically, he sought to delineate the forces, as well as Algerian civilians who “Destructive Doctrinarians: Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s boundaries and limitations of what he it deemed as “apostates” because they, Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current,” in Roel considered legitimate violence in light Meijer ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement 3 Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa’ida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 292- 10 The letter was signed simply “Atiyah,” but it is and the Arab Jihadists (London: Saqi Books, 2011), p. 51. 293. believed that Atiyyatullah was its author. See “Letter 4 Ibid., p. 64. 8 Tawil, p. 87. Exposes New Leader in Al-Qa’ida High Command,” 5 Ian Black, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group—From 9 Mohammed M. Hafez, “From Marginalization to Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September Al-Qaida to the Arab Spring,” Guardian, September 5, Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA 25, 2006; Karen DeYoung, “Letter Gives Glimpse of Al- 2011; “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” in “Al-Qaida Violence in Algeria,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz ed., Qaeda’s Leadership,” Washington Post, October 2, 2006. Sanctions List: Narrative Summaries,” United Nations, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach 11 Atiyyatullah, “Letter to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi,” undated. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 52. December 11, 2005.

11 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 of his interpretation of Islamic law. He of attacks on Muslims] and believes Jihadists must “abide by the guidelines also used his public position on takfir and that they are a forum of spreading of God’s law,” which forbids the violence to defend al-Qa`ida central and corruption, falsehood, oppression, and unlawful killing of people regardless of its allies from allegations that it carries transgression and are contrary to the “the extent of the enemy’s transgression out attacks targeting Muslim civilians. pure religion of Islam.” Furthermore, and despotism.” They must seek “the Thus, his seemingly principled stances the bombings could not have been success of earning God’s approval” on takfir and against mass violence had carried out by jihadists because Islamic because this is the loftiest goal. For a key strategic goal: defending the fighters follow Shari`a, which prohibits this reason, jihadists do not engage transnational Sunni jihadist current, such attacks. Using hadith to illustrate in violence against Muslims or the with al-Qa`ida central at its helm, from his point, Atiyyatullah said that those innocent, Atiyyatullah argued again damaging charges that it perpetrates who disregard the prohibition of spilling in March 2011. “Our legal (shar’i) and lethal attacks on Muslims. Muslim blood “without regard” are akin blessed jihad is one that has lofty and to the tyrannical rulers of disbelief noble goals, which have the qualities Atiyyatullah further elucidated his (kufr), degenerate and unrepentant of justice, mercy, goodness, nobility, views on takfir following an October sinners, and the Khawarij, an extremist honor, respect, reform, and success,” 2009 car bombing that ripped sect that emerged in the seventh century he concluded. “We remind our through the Mina Bazaar in Peshawar, in opposition to both the Umayyads and brothers, the mujahidin, everywhere killing 137 people. The Pakistani and the caliphate of Ali ibn Abi Talib.14 of the importance of emphasizing U.S. governments blamed Tehrik-i and spreading knowledge about the Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al-Qa`ida Atiyyatullah reiterated his caution importance of the sanctity of the central for being behind the attack, against the incorrect implementation of Muslims’ blood and the obligation but both groups issued quick denials takfir and discussed its restrictions in a to take great precautions to protect and condemnations.12 The TTP and al- second question-and-answer booklet and preserve it.”16 Atiyyatullah even Qa`ida central launched a coordinated called, “Responses to the Ruling on cautioned against wanton, retaliatory media blitz to both deny responsibility Leaving for Battle and the Precondition bloodletting against those who worked for the Mina Bazaar attack and other of Takfir,” which was released on for the Qadhafi regime, instead urging bombings in civilian areas carried out August 1, 2010. The judgment of takfir Libyan rebels to “keep forgiveness in late 2009. against a specific individual, he stated, and tolerance at the forefront when is restricted to those knowledgeable dealing with those people who erred In the midst of this media campaign, in religion, such as `ulama, and is and committed the evil of following an 18-page question-and-answer prohibited to all Muslims who do not certain [political] trends and making booklet was issued to jihadist internet have “access to [religious] knowledge incorrect decisions previously [of forums by the al-Fajr Media Center, (‘ilm).” Muslim laity are required to ask backing tyrannical Arab regimes],” the shadowy online distributor of a qualified religious scholar if asked and call on them to “make true al-Qa`ida media materials. Entitled about whether a specific individual has repentance.”17 His pragmatism in “Advice and Compassion Regarding the become an apostate. Both `ulama and the embracing and attempting to “advise” Bombings in the Markets: Question and laity, however, are sometimes capable of the popular uprisings in his home Answer concerning the Bombings of the recognizing the unbelief of some groups country, Tunisia, and Egypt was also Peshawar Markets,” the booklet was such as those who are not Muslim or marked by prioritizing grassroots composed of Atiyyatullah’s responses those who openly declare their apostasy. missionary work (da`wa) over the to a number of questions regarding Overt signs of apostasy, he said, include forcible implementation of Shari`a, as bombings, takfir, and the use of mass cursing God, the Prophet Muhammad, interpreted by jihadists.18 violence against Muslims.13 Asked or Islam as a religion, and those who about whether it was permissible to express disbelief and ridicule of them. Conclusion “rejoice and celebrate” the bombings It is the `ulama, however, who should Atiyyatullah’s career as a major al- because they had killed many people determine what is classified as serious Qa`ida ideologue was marked by who had “serious shortcoming in cursing or mockery.15 In his response, pragmatism, particularly with regard to religious affairs, thought only of their Atiyyatullah sought to place clear the legitimate use of takfir. He cautioned worldly life, refrained from jihad, restrictions as to who was qualified jihadists, including the renowned deserted the mujahidin, and lived to determine whether an individual battlefield commander Abu Mus`ab al- contentedly under the authority of an Muslim had become an apostate and Zarqawi at the height of his popularity apostate government,” he responded thus lessen the chances of a repeat of in transnational jihadist circles, against strongly in the negative, saying: the GIA’s bloodletting in Algeria. the use of mass violence and wanton “Rather, the religious obligation is takfir. As he wrote to the AQI leader, that one objects to them [these types 16 Atiyyatullah, “Maximizing the Sanctity of the Muslims’ 12 “Taliban Denies Peshawar Blast Role,” al-Jazira, Blood,” March 13, 2011. October 29, 2009. 17 Atiyyatullah, “Tribute to Our People in Libya,” March 13 Atiyyatullah, “Advice and Compassion Regarding 17, 2011. the Bombings in the Markets: Question and Answer 14 Ibid. 18 Atiyyatullah, “The People’s Revolution and the Fall of concerning the Bombings of the Peshawar Markets,” 15 Atiyyatullah, “Responses to the Ruling on Leaving for the Corrupt Arab Regime: The Demolishment of the Idol January 21, 2010. Battle and the Precondition of Takfir,” August 1, 2010. of Stability and the New Beginning,” February 23, 2011.

12 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 military decisions must be subordinate Mangal Bagh and LI Yet in April 2011, a group of locals from to jihadists’ strategic and political the Zakhakhel sub-tribe6 in the Tirah goals. Atiyyatullah used his opposition Marginalized in Khyber Valley formed a militia and demanded to the overly broad, careless use of takfir Agency that LI leave the area. Shortly after the to defend jihadists against charges that demand, armed clashes occurred between they engaged in illegitimate violence By Daud Khattak Zakhakhel tribesmen and LI members, against innocent Muslims, arguing that with both sides suffering casualties. The because they were fighting “for Shari`a” pakistan’s khyber agency has long been Zakhakhel tribesmen eventually named they could not logically contravene a stronghold for the militant group their militia Tawheedul Islam (TI), and it by perpetrating such attacks. His Lashkar-i-Islam (LI) and its leader, they continued to attack LI throughout pragmatic approach toward takfir Mangal Bagh. Multiple operations 2011. By November 2011, the Zakhakhel further manifested itself in his response launched by Pakistan’s military in succeeded in pushing LI out of the Bara to the outbreak of popular uprisings Khyber failed to dislodge LI from its area of Khyber. in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in the safe haven in the Bara area, which is winter of 2011-2012 and spring of 2012. located just 12 miles from Pakistan’s The situation in Khyber is a pertinent Rather than sternly lecturing the people northern city of Peshawar.1 Although example of how quickly militant groups of these countries about their duty Mangal Bagh and LI had to contend operating in the tribal areas can fall to immediately implement religious with a number of competing militia out of favor. This article discusses the legal codes, as al-Zawahiri has done, groups in Khyber, by 2007 his group emergence of TI and reviews how the Atiyyatullah congratulated the people had emerged as the most powerful in group managed to defeat LI in Khyber while gently but firmly advising them to the agency, recruiting young men into Agency. It then assesses the current work toward the implementation of an its ranks, forcing civilians to grow their strength of LI in light of its recent “Islamic state.” The key to doing this, beards, barring women from markets, losses. he wrote, was through da`wa rather than banning music and imposing taxes on force, an argument mirroring that of the wealthy locals and minorities.2 LI’s The Emergence of Tawheedul Islam late Yemeni-American preacher Anwar consolidation of power came after a One of LI’s key support bases in al-`Awlaqi.19 rival militia, Qazi Mahboob’s Ansar- the strategic Tirah Valley was the ul-Islam (AI),3 fled into the remote Zakhakhel sub-tribe. Members of the The posthumous publication of new Tirah Valley after months of clashes Zakhakhel comprised a significant material by Atiyyatullah and the citation with LI,4 and after another rival leader, portion of LI’s ranks. Yet in April of his works by al-Qa`ida central and Haji Namdar Khan of the Taliban-style 2011, a group of the Zakhakhel revolted its regional affiliates as well as online Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of against LI chief Mangal Bagh. Key jihadists show that this dynamic Vice (AMNAM) group,5 was reportedly Zakhakhel commanders, such as Tayyab Libyan battlefield scholar-ideologue assassinated by militants from Tehrik- and Ghuncha Gul, deserted Mangal remains influential even after death i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Bagh following a monetary dispute.7 In and further highlights the ideological addition to this disagreement, another blow inflicted by his killing. In addition incident further alienated the Zakhakhel to his important role in al-Qa`ida from LI. In March 2011, LI kidnapped central’s media messaging campaign and killed Zakhakhel tribesman and and operational aspects, he was also one religious leader Maulana Hasham on the of the group’s last remaining members belief that he was conspiring against the of the “old guard.” This fact, coupled group.8 Zakhakhel tribesmen demanded with the unusual way in which he was that Mangal Bagh punish Hasham’s built up as a top-tier ideologue, means 1 Khyber Agency has three sub-districts: Bara, located killers, yet he reportedly refused. At that he is likely irreplaceable. southeast of Peshawar; Jamrud, located east of Pesha- the same time, Ghuncha Gul, who war; and Landi Kotal, located further east of Jamrud and defected from LI, was captured by Christopher Anzalone is a doctoral student sharing the border with Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Prov- Mangal Bagh’s forces. As a result of in the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill ince at the Torkham border crossing. these incidents, Zakhakhel youth took University where he studies modern Muslim 2 Hundreds of Sikh families are living in the Bara and up arms against LI, which caused a socio-political movements including Tirah areas of Khyber and parts of neighboring Orakzai number of LI’s Zakhakhel members to transnational jihadi groups, Shi’ite Islam, Agency. The Sikh families were living in peace with the leave the organization and join their and Islamist visual culture. tribesmen until the emergence of Taliban-affiliated mili- tribal compatriots in TI. tants in those areas. 3 Ansar-ul-Islam follows the Barelvi sect, which places emphasis on mystical Islam and supports listening to 6 The Zakhakhel are one of the eight sub-tribes of the music and visiting the shrines of saints. LI, on the other Afridi tribe living in Khyber Agency. The other seven hand, is Deobandi and opposes music and the worship of sub-tribes are: Adamkhel, Kamarkhel, Qambarkhel, saints or visits to shrines. Kookikhel, Malak Dinkhel, Akakhel and Sipah. 19 Anwar al-`Awlaqi, “The Tsunami of Change,” Inspire, 4 Ghafar Ali, “Mufti and Pir’s Supporters Fight it Out: 7 Personal interview, Sajid Ali, journalist based in Jam- March 30, 2011; Christopher Anzalone and Bruno- Five Dead,” Daily Times, March 28, 2006. rud, April 12, 2012. Olivier Bureau, “Death of an Ideologue,” The AfPak 5 “Pakistan Militant Leader Killed,” BBC, August 13, 8 Manzoor Ali, “Militancy: Mangal Bagh Loosens Grip Channel, October 21, 2011. 2008. over Khyber Agency,” Express Tribune, April 4, 2011.

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With the formation of the TI militia, ammunition, trucks and money. TTP Darra Adamkhel chapter) and the Zakhakhel tribesmen engaged in Nevertheless, in their fight against LI, the strength of the Zakhakhel sub- numerous clashes with LI in the Bazaar TI did not receive any direct combat tribe, many of Mangal Bagh’s members Zakhakhel area, located near the town help from Pakistan’s military.13 reportedly trimmed their beards and of Landi Kotal and a key entry point to fled to cities to start a civilian life.17 the Tirah Valley. By November 2011, TI, TI also receives income from smuggling Today, the number of core volunteers of with the support of the local political goods to and from Afghanistan, such as Mangal Bagh’s LI likely does not exceed administration, largely succeeded in spare automobile parts, imported fabrics 300, yet he could probably call upon a expelling LI from the Zakhakhel tribal and food.14 This same smuggling route few thousand more from allied tribes if areas.9 Today, TI maintains security in through Khyber was previously used by necessary.18 the Bazaar Zakhakhel area of Khyber, LI, from which it earned thousands of preventing the return of LI. dollars daily. Indeed, it was the issue LI’s primary revenue sources were of how to divide the profits that caused previously the control of smuggling Although TI could be considered a the original split between LI and the routes to and from Afghanistan, lashkar (tribal militia), they prefer not to Zakhakhel in early 2011. kidnap-for-ransom operations, and the identify themselves as such.10 Lashkars are generally considered anti-Taliban, The Current Status of Lashkar-i-Islam and Taliban factions are known to target Once the strongest militant group in “TI also receives income any newly-formed lashkar. The Zakhakhel Khyber Agency’s Bara area as well from smuggling goods to who comprise TI have no enmity with as in the Tirah region, LI’s operating space has been reduced dramatically and from Afghanistan, “The recent developments in the past two years. Although there such as spare automobile are several causes for this weakness, in Khyber Agency, the key factor has been the desertion of parts, imported fabrics and particularly the stiff the Zakhakhel from its ranks and the food.” formation of the rival TI. Two other resistance from the sub-tribes in Khyber, the Kookikhel and Zakhakhel, Akakhel and Akakhel, have also organized lashkars to keep their areas secured from LI and forceful collection of taxes from wealthy Kookikhel sub-tribes, other militant outfits. tribesmen, including Khyber-based have marked at least the parliamentarians, as well as locals. Since As a result, LI has been largely the rise of TI, however, the smuggling temporary end of Mangal restricted to the Naray Baba, Sandapal routes have been closed to LI, denting Bagh’s reign.” and a few other areas of the Tirah its revenue stream dramatically.19 Valley.15 LI mainly draws support from the Sipah (Mangal Bagh’s own tribe), The kidnap-for-ransom business has Malak Dinkhel, Kamarkhel and Shlobar also been squeezed with the shrinking the Taliban in general or with other sub-tribes, which are providing its of LI’s sphere of influence and closure militant groups active in the area. Their volunteers a safe route to move back of roads. When LI used Bara as its only aim is to prevent Mangal Bagh and and forth between the Tirah Valley and base camp, it was easy for the group to LI from gaining access to Zakhakhel the Bara region. As a result of the recent kidnap people in Peshawar and then areas.11 Therefore, they likely choose to phase of Pakistani military operations, shift them to the safety of Bara or Tirah. downplay the fact that they are a tribal the increasing attacks on LI from the This is no longer possible due to the militia out of fear of reprisal attacks. TTP’s Geedar Group16 (also known as success of TI. Moreover, the presence of army troops in Bara has forced Bagh’s TI is estimated to have 300-350 13 Personal interview, Major Fazal, spokesman for the members to take refuge in the Sipah 12 members. Under tribal traditions, each paramilitary Frontier Corps, April 13, 2012. and Shlobar areas of the Tirah Valley family among the Zakhakhel is required 14 This information was acquired from an interview where movement to and from Peshawar 20 to send one person as a volunteer to the with a local elder in the Landi Kotal area who wished to is difficult if not impossible. As for militia. TI also receives support from remain anonymous. the political administration in the area, 15 Personal interview, Brigadier (retired) Mahmood establishes himself in Bara, it would mean the loosening from which it has received weapons, Shah, former secretary of security for the Federally Ad- of Mangal Bagh’s grip on the area. ministered Tribal Areas, April 13, 2012. 17 Personal interview, Ibrahim Shinwari, local journal- 9 Personal interview, Sudhir Afridi, journalist based in 16 The Geedar Group is led by Taliban commander Tariq ist, March 30, 2012. Landi Kotal, April 13, 2012. Afridi. Tariq Afridi belongs to the Geedar village in the 18 Personal interview, Brigadier (retired) Mahmood 10 Local journalist Farhad Shinwari was threatened for semi-tribal Darra Adamkhel town, which borders Bara Shah, former secretary of security for the Federally Ad- calling Tawheedul Islam a lashkar in his radio report. of Khyber Agency in the east, Peshawar in the north and ministered Tribal Areas, April 13, 2012. 11 Personal interview, Shirin, Tawheedul Islam com- Kohat city in the south. The exact reason for the differ- 19 Personal interview, Shirin, Zakhakhel commander, mander, March 12, 2012. ences between Mangal Bagh and the Geedar Group is not April 12, 2012. 12 Personal interview, Sudhir Afridi, journalist based in known, but Tariq Afridi wants bases for his group in the 20 The road from Peshawar to the Sipah and Shlobar Landi Kotal, April 13, 2012; personal interview, Sajid Ali, Bara region of Khyber, while Mangal Bagh opposes their areas in Tirah passes through Bara. The Bara area now journalist based in Jamrud, April 12, 2012. presence. It has become a war of survival. If Tariq Afridi has a number of army checkpoints, making movement

14 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 extortion, this revenue stream has Similarly, the formation of lashkars by Militants Turn Against also been constrained. The majority different sub-tribes such as the Akakhel, of locals in the region have vacated Kookikhel and Zakhakhel can easily Pakistan’s JUI-F Islamist their homes as a result of the Pakistani spark a tribal war, particularly when the Party military’s ongoing operations, and they sub-tribes often quarrel on issues such have moved to Peshawar or the Jalozai as ownership of forests, mountains, By Zia Ur Rehman internally displaced persons camp.21 roadways, and water channels. jamiat-i-ulama-i-islam-fazlur (jui-f) Mangal Bagh’s current whereabouts It is the Pakistani government’s is one of the leading Islamist political are unknown. In March 2012, there responsibility to restore the people’s parties in Pakistan. The JUI-F is was speculation that he may have been trust in the state. This outcome is only considered ideologically similar to killed while fighting rival militias in possible when the state security forces the Taliban, and the party is popular the Tirah Valley.22 Yet officials from KP take measures to eliminate all armed in northwest Pakistan’s Khyber have been unable to confirm the report, militias, not just those that are against Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP) and the and a spokesman from LI said that the government. Selective measures Federally Administered Tribal Areas Mangal Bagh is still alive. Other reports on the part of the security forces may (FATA). Yet in the past four years, suggest that Mangal Bagh and his key create short-term peace, but the history several activists and leaders of the commanders fled to Afghanistan’s of the tribal areas shows that a friendly JUI-F have been targeted and killed in Nangarhar Province.23 Yet the provincial militia one day becomes a hostile one in KP and FATA by unidentified Islamist government of KP, as well as Pakistani the future. militants. Even the JUI-F’s right-wing military officials, has no information leader, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, has about these reports.24 Daud Khattak is Senior Editor with RFE/ been targeted in two failed assassination RL’s Mashaal Radio in Prague, Czech attempts.1 Conclusion Republic. Besides working in Afghanistan The recent developments in Khyber as Editor at Pajhwok Afghan News from Although no group has claimed credit Agency, particularly the stiff resistance 2005-2008, Mr. Khattak worked with for the attacks, analysts believe that from the Zakhakhel, Akakhel and Pakistani English daily newspapers the operations have been executed Kookikhel sub-tribes, have marked covering the situation in KP and FATA. by irreconcilable Pakistani militant at least the temporary end of Mangal He also worked for Sunday Times London groups that disapprove of the JUI-F’s Bagh’s reign. The actions of the sub- and contributed articles to the Christian “appeasement” policies. These include tribes have allowed Pakistan’s security Science Monitor. In 2010, his paper the JUI-F’s decision to support the forces to more vigorously pursue LI in on the situation in Swat, “The Battle for present ruling coalition in Islamabad, the Tirah Valley, where the presence of Pakistan: Swat Valley,” was published by which is carrying out military operations government-friendly militias such as the New America Foundation. against Pakistani Taliban groups in Tawheedul Islam and Ansar-ul-Islam FATA,2 as well as the party’s reported are providing support to the security attempts to engage the United States on forces. peace talks for the war in Afghanistan.3

While the weakness in LI is encouraging, Attacks against the JUI-F can be dated the emergence of TI as another powerful to 2008, when the JUI-F became part armed group is beginning to concern of Pakistan’s coalition government after locals. TI members, with their long participating in the country’s general hair, beards and heavy weapons, are elections. The JUI-F took control of three regularly visiting the Lwargi and Landi federal ministries as part of the coalition. Kotal towns in their pick-up trucks. By partaking in democracy, the JUI-F Civilians are starting to see TI as a appears to have turned its former patrons harbinger of trouble to come.25 in the Pakistani Taliban into enemies.

This article profiles the JUI-F and examines the party’s ties to Pakistani and Afghan Taliban factions. It also difficult for LI. explains why Taliban factions have 21 Personal interview, Sajid Ali, journalist based in Jam- turned against a party that, to outside rud, April 13, 2012. observers, appeared to be an ally. 22 “Mangal Bagh Killed?” The Nation, March 20, 2012. 23 Personal interview, Aqeel Yousufzai, expert based in 1 Javed Aziz Khan, “March 31 Charsadda Attack,” The Peshawar, March 31, 2012. News International, April 2, 2011. 24 Personal interview, Major Fazal, spokesman for the 2 Manzoor Ali and Qaiser Butt, “Charsadda Strike: Sec- paramilitary Frontier Corps, April 13, 2012. ond Target Attack on Maulana Fazlur Rehman,” Express 25 Personal interview, Farhad Shinwari, journalist based Tribune, April 1, 2011. in Landi Kotal, April 13, 2012; personal interviews, local 3 “Wikileak: Fazlur Rehman’s Votes Were ‘Up to Sale,’” civilians in Landi Kotal, April 13, 2012. Express Tribune, June 1, 2011.

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A Profile of JUI-F leadership were also in attendance at had abandoned the preaching of “jihad” The JUI-F, led by Maulana Fazlur Abdul Ghani’s funeral.9 and had stopped supporting the Afghan Rahman, is Pakistan’s leading religious Taliban.12 Incidentally, the JUI-N, led political party. It follows the Deobandi Nevertheless, although the JUI-F is by Maulana Asmatullah, a member of movement within Sunni Islam, and it linked to Taliban militant groups parliament from Baluchistan, was the is the most influential organization operating in both Pakistan and first religious party that organized a in Pakistan calling for a “pure Islamic Afghanistan, the party has never protest rally on May 2, 2011 in Quetta state.” It primarily functions as an openly supported sectarianism and to pay homage to slain al-Qa`ida chief “electoral party” where success in violent jihad. As a result, many leaders Usama bin Ladin. The JUI-N, unlike elections, no matter how limited, terminated their association with the the JUI-F, is openly supportive of the provides the party the opportunity to Afghan Taliban. form governments at the provincial level as well as have a presence in federal “The JUI-F’s members Attacks on JUI-F Leaders cabinets. This gives the party resources have also reportedly After the JUI-F’s successes in the and power.4 2008 general elections, many Taliban become concerned about militants appeared to turn against the The JUI-F has a firm organizational the ‘new Taliban’ leaders in party. From 2008 forward, Pakistani structure, and it has widespread Taliban groups began to execute support in KP, FATA and Baluchistan Pakistan who do not seem suicide attacks against the JUI-F’s Province. Indeed, it is considered to appreciate the party’s leadership. Dozens of JUI-F leaders, Pakistan’s only political party that including former parliamentarians, has a strong organizational structure long-standing contribution have since been killed.13 in the volatile tribal areas. Much of to the Taliban’s cause.” the party’s support derives from its Most recently, on January 25, 2012, Haji connections to northwest Pakistan’s Gul Rahman Afridi, the former local network of madrasas (religious chief of the JUI-F in the Landi Kotal seminaries).5 JUI-F after differences erupted over area of Khyber Agency in FATA, was issues of sectarianism and violence in shot to death in the Shahi Bagh area of The JUI-F has influence with many of the 1980s and 1990s and then formed Peshawar by unidentified assailants.14 Pakistan’s militant groups, including their own militant organizations—such Another JUI-F leader and former mayor, those led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur as Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Haji Muhammad Azeem, was killed on and Waliur Rahman Mehsud.6 In Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM) and January 3, 2012, in the Naverkhel area June 2010, for example, the JUI-F Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JM). All of these of Lakki Marwat District of KP.15 pressured the government to release organizations are now declared banned approximately 300 alleged Taliban by the government.10 Maulana Merajuddin, a former member members from prison, as the men were of parliament from South Waziristan also JUI-F party members.7 The JUI-F itself is one of three splinter Agency and head of the JUI-F in the groups. One faction, known as Jamiat- FATA region, was shot dead in May 2010 The party is known for its close ties i-Ulama-i-Islam-Samiul Haq (JUI-S), in Tank District of KP.16 Merajuddin to Afghanistan’s ousted Taliban was formed by Maulana Samiul Haq in was a key figure in the government’s regime. Demonstrating the connection the mid-1980s after Rahman refused to talks with tribal elders and militants, between the groups, on October 26, support the military ruler at the time, and he helped to broker peace deals in 2011, the Afghan Taliban issued an Ziaul Haq. Samiul Haq is commonly South Waziristan Agency in 2005 and unprecedented condolence statement referred to as the “Father of the Afghan 2007. Maulana Salimullah, a leader of for the death of Maulana Abdul Ghani, Taliban” due to his leadership of the the JUI-F, was shot dead by unidentified a deputy leader of JUI-F who died in a Darul Uloom Haqqania madrasa in assailants in Karak District of KP on car accident in Baluchistan Province.8 Akora Khattak, from where many of May 29, 2010.17 Members of the Afghan Taliban the top leaders of the Afghan Taliban movement, including Mullah Omar, 11 4 “Islamic Parties in Pakistan,” International Crisis graduated. 12 Personal interview, Hafiz Fazal Barech, a leader of the Group, December 16, 2011. JUI-N, November 12, 2011. 5 Personal interview, Ahmed Wali, journalist based in Another faction, Jamiat-i-Ulama- 13 Tom Hussain, “New to Pakistan’s Taliban-heavy Trib- Karachi, March 3, 2012. Islam-Nazariati (JUI-N), was formed by al Areas: Political Campaigns,” Christian Science Monitor, 6 Hafiz Gul Bahadur is a Taliban militant commander hardcore pro-Taliban leaders of the JUI-F January 31, 2011. operating in North Waziristan Agency, while Waliur Re- in Baluchistan Province in the 2008 14 “JUI-F Leader Shot Dead in Peshawar,” Dawn, Janu- hman Mehsud is the chief of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s general elections. This splinter group ary 26, 2012. South Waziristan Agency chapter. Personal interview, complained that the JUI-F leadership 15 “JUI-F Leader Killed Near Naverkhel,” The Nation, anonymous journalist based in Bannu, March 6, 2011. January 3, 2012. 7 Zia Khan, “Govt to Set Free over 300 JUI-F Activists,” 9 Ibid. 16 “Peace Broker Gunned Down in Pakistan,” UPI, May Express Tribune, June 14, 2010. 10 Personal interview, Ahmed Wali, March 3, 2012. 21, 2010. 8 Syed Shoaib Hassan, “Rare Taliban Praise for Paki- 11 “Islamic Parties in Pakistan,” International Crisis 17 “JUI-F Leader Gunned Down in Karak,” Daily Times, stan’s Maulana Abdul Ghani,” BBC, October 27, 2011. Group, December 16, 2011. June 1, 2011.

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Similarly, another former member of development could be one of the causes parties—formed after a NATO parliament from South Waziristan for the attempts on Rahman’s life. airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers Agency, Maulana Noor Muhammad Other analysts believe that the attacks in November 2011.25 After the incident, Wazir, was killed along with 30 other on the JUI-F’s leadership are a result Pakistan blocked NATO’s road-bound people in a suicide attack at a mosque of a growing ideological divide among supply routes into Afghanistan. The in Wana in South Waziristan on August Pakistani Taliban militants concerning DPC and Taliban militant groups 24, 2010.18 Muhammad was also an the legitimacy of the Pakistani state. opposed the resumption of NATO influential figure who had several Pakistani Taliban militants openly supply convoys to Afghanistan, yet times acted as a negotiator between the denounce democracy and label the on April 12 Pakistan’s parliament Pakistani Taliban and the government, Pakistani state “un-Islamic,” while the recommended allowing the convoys but was opposed to the presence of JUI-F supports democratic means as to continue. After a meeting among Uzbek militants in the region, providing well as the authority of the Pakistani JUI-F chief Rahman, U.S. ambassador support to dislodge them.19 state.21 Indeed, it participated in the Cameron Munter and President Asif Ali ruling coalition government. Zardari, the JUI-F reluctantly approved Haji Khan Afzal, the former district of the decision.26 mayor of Hangu District in KP and a It is difficult to say which factions central leader of the JUI-F, was killed among the Pakistani Taliban have These actions show that the JUI-F is on September 18, 2009, when a bomb an interest in attacking the JUI-F. now acting on the policy of adopting ripped through a mosque in Kach The North Waziristan-based militant democratic and parliamentary politics Bazaar Killay in Hangu. Afzal played an commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur, instead of supporting militant and important role in freeing government however, condemned the attacks and jihadist groups. employees and others kidnapped by announced that an investigation will the TTP during and after clashes with be conducted into the assassination Conclusion Pakistan’s security forces in the Doaba attempts.22 Security analysts believe that The attacks on JUI-F’s leaders reveal area of Kohat District in 2009. the TTP may be behind the attacks, as it intra-jihadist struggles in Pakistan. It is thought that the TTP’s relationship also suggests that the JUI-F, Pakistan’s Then, in 2012, the most egregious with the JUI-F has deteriorated over the largest Islamist political party, has likely attacks on the JUI-F occurred. On March last five years, and that the JUI-F has reduced its support to Taliban militants 30, militants attempted to assassinate reduced some of its political support of all factions. The attacks on JUI-F’s JUI-F head Fazlur Rahman near Swabi to the Taliban in general. As a result, rallies and leaders have compelled the District in KP. The following day in the TTP and other Taliban groups party to present a more moderate face Charsadda District, militants again have viewed the JUI-F’s actions as a in public, criticizing the Taliban for tried to assassinate Rahman. Both betrayal, and have attacked its leaders un-Islamic acts and denouncing suicide attempts failed. and activists.23 attacks. Although the JUI-F draws much of its support from the more conservative Implications The JUI-F’s members have also and religious sections of Pakistan, this Although political killings are part of reportedly become concerned about base does not necessarily support the Pakistan’s history, attacks on the pro- the “new Taliban” leaders in Pakistan violent actions of the Taliban. Taliban JUI-F—especially on Rahman who do not seem to appreciate the himself—are especially peculiar. The party’s long-standing contribution to Additionally, the unwillingness of assassination attempts on Rahman the Taliban’s cause.24 Attacks on public the JUI-F to join the DPC is also an came days after leaked U.S. State rallies and the killing of JUI-F leaders indication that the party is interested in Department cables revealed that the have likely caused the party to rethink pursuing democracy in Pakistan rather JUI-F leader purportedly wanted to its support to Taliban militants of all than increasing its support to banned mediate between the United States and factions going forward. militant groups and right-wing parties. the Afghan Taliban in 2007. After this disclosure, Afghan Taliban militants It is pertinent to mention that the JUI-F Zia Ur Rehman is a journalist and and the al-Qa`ida leadership reportedly has not joined the Difa-e-Pakistan researcher and covers the militancy in decided to sever links with the JUI- Council (DPC)—an alliance of religious Pakistan. He has written for several F.20 Some experts believe that this international and national publications Getting Isolated After Wikileaks Exposure,” The News including The Friday Times, Central Asia 18 “South Waziristan Tense After Cleric’s Killing,” Daily International, December 8, 2010. Online, The Jamestown Foundation, Himal Times, August 25, 2010. 21 Personal interview, Ahmed Wali, March 3, 2012. South Asian and The News International 19 Manzoor Ali, “Bomber Targets ex MNA in Wana,” Ex- 22 Pazir Gul, “Militant Leader to Investigate Attack of and has contributed to the New York press Tribune, August 24, 2010. Fazl,” Dawn, April 5, 2011. Times. 20 In the words of one former Taliban official, “Maula- 23 Nicholas Schmidle, “Next-Gen Taliban,” New York na Fazlur Rahman, who has been an ally of the Pervez Times, January 6, 2008. Musharraf regime and is also a partner in the present 24 The JUI-F played a key role in the anti-Soviet Afghan 25 For a detailed analysis of the DPC, see Arif Rafiq, “The ruling coalition, had strong contacts with militant groups jihad of the 1980s. Yet the current leadership of the Paki- Emergence of the Difa-e-Pakistan Islamist Coalition,” in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan but nobody did even stani Taliban was too young to participate in the Afghan CTC Sentinel 5:3 (2012). imagine until now that he is constantly in touch with the jihad, and as a result they do not appear to respect the 26 Raja Asghar, “No Arms Conduit, Green Signal for Americans also.” See Mazhar Tufail, “Fazlur Rehman JUI-F’s contribution to that cause. Non-Lethal Nato Supplies,” Dawn, April 13, 2012.

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Recent Highlights in March 3, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide group. No reason was given, but in the bomber on foot targeted the convoy of past Faqir Muhammad and other TTP Terrorist Activity Aftab Khan Sherpao, a senior politician leaders have disagreed over strategy. and the former interior minister of Faqir Muhammad operates out of Bajaur March 1, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Pakistan, in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Agency in the Federally Administered Three militants shot to death two U.S. Province. The official escaped Tribal Areas. – BBC, March 5 soldiers inside a joint Afghan-U.S. unharmed. – Voice of America, March 3 military base in Kandahar Province. March 4, 2012 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida in Two of the militants were reportedly March 3, 2012 (ALGERIA): A suicide the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) fighters Afghan soldiers. U.S. forces returned bomber rammed an explosives-laden overran a military post near Zinjibar fire, killing two of the assailants and vehicle into the paramilitary gendarmerie in Abyan Province. After entering the wounding the third. – CBS/AP, March 1 headquarters in Tamanrasset, injuring facility, the AQAP fighters reportedly at least 23 people. The Movement for seized armored vehicles, artillery March 2, 2012 (GLOBAL): The U.S. Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, pieces, assault rifles and rockets, and Treasury Department placed sanctions considered a splinter group of al- then used those weapons against Yemeni on a top Afghan Taliban bombmaker, Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, claimed troops, killing at least 180 soldiers. identified as Abdul Samad Achekzai. responsibility. It was reportedly the One Yemeni military official described – AFP, March 2 first time militants launched an attack in it as a “massacre.” Another 55 soldiers the area. According to Agence France- were captured and paraded through a March 2, 2012 (UNITED STATES): Presse, “The Movement for Oneness neighboring town. Approximately 32 A U.S. court sentenced Betim Kaziu, and Jihad in West Africa (Jamat Tawhid AQAP fighters died in the assault. – AP, a New York City man, to 27 years in Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya) surfaced March 5; Voice of America, March 4; Telegraph, prison for traveling to the Middle East in December [2011], when it claimed to March 5; AP, March 6 in a failed attempt to join al-Qa`ida. be holding three Westerners kidnapped The 24-year-old man wanted to kill U.S. from a Western Sahara refugee camp March 4, 2012 (YEMEN): Muhammad troops to avenge the abuse of Muslims. in Algeria in October. Security sources al-Hanq, a regional commander for – AP, March 2 said it had broken off from the main al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula group, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP), died from illness, according to March 2, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Militants (AQIM), in order to spread jihad to west an AQAP statement. – AFP, March 8 attacked a Pakistan Army position in Africa and not confine themselves just the Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency to the Maghreb or Sahel regions.” – AP, March 5, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A in the Federally Administered Tribal March 2; AFP, March 3 suicide bomber detonated explosives Areas. At least 10 Pakistani soldiers near the entrance to Bagram airbase, and 23 militants were killed. – Reuters, March 3, 2012 (SYRIA): A bomb killed killing at least two civilians. – RTTNews, March 2 seven people near a military checkpoint March 5 in Dera`a’s Rawda district. Syrian March 2, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide authorities allege that the explosion March 5, 2012 (IRAQ): Gunmen bomber targeted the Lashkar-i-Islam was from a suicide bomber in a vehicle. disguised as an official security force militant group in Khyber Agency in the – Reuters, March 3 opened fire on Iraqi police at multiple Federally Administered Tribal Areas, checkpoints in Haditha, killing 27 killing at least 20 people. Lashkar-i- March 3, 2012 (YEMEN): Two suicide people. At approximately 2 AM, at Islam is led by Mangal Bagh, and the bombers attacked a Republican Guard least 14 black SUVs with more than 30 group has been weakened recently in camp in Bayda in central Yemen, killing gunmen wearing SWAT-style uniforms its Khyber Agency stronghold. – BBC, one soldier. According to reports, entered Haditha, moving from target to March 2 “the bombers deceived the guards by target and executing Iraqi police. – CNN, bringing in an ox that they said was a March 5 March 3, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): present for the camp commander. Once Afghan General Abdul Hameed said that inside [the camp], they detonated their March 6, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): the Taliban have a sophisticated method explosives.” – AP, March 3 A bomb ripped through an armored to infiltrate Afghanistan’s security Warrior vehicle and killed six British forces. “Placing the rogues inside the March 3, 2012 (PHILIPPINES): A bomb soldiers in Helmand Province. – AFP, army is well-planned by the enemies,” ripped through a commercial district on March 8 he said. “The Taliban give them special Jolo Island in the southern Philippines, training. We must enhance intelligence killing two people. Authorities believe March 6, 2012 (RUSSIA): A female gathering on the movements of recruits, that the Abu Sayyaf Group was suicide bomber killed five policemen in tap their cellphones and we must find responsible. – AFP, March 4 the Russian North Caucasus republic of out who they are in contact with outside Dagestan. – CNN, March 6; Voice of America, the army.” According to Reuters, “About March 4, 2012 (PAKISTAN): According March 7 70 members of the NATO-led force were to press reports, Hakimullah Mehsud, killed in 42 insider attacks from May the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan March 7, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An 2007 through the end of January this (TTP), demoted Faqir Muhammad, who Afghan policeman allowed Taliban year [2012].” – Reuters, March 3 was previously the deputy head of the fighters to enter and kill nine other

18 april 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 4 policemen while they slept at a March 11, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): The March 15, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide checkpoint in Uruzgan Province. – New Taliban vowed revenge after a U.S. bomber killed a senior Pakistani police York Times, March 8 soldier allegedly shot and killed 16 officer in Peshawar. – AFP, March 15 Afghan civilians in Kandahar Province. March 7, 2012 (IRAQ): A car bomb U.S. forces immediately placed the U.S. March 16, 2012 (GLOBAL): According exploded outside a restaurant in a Shi`a soldier in custody. – Fox News, March 12 to documents recovered in Usama area of Tal Afar, Ninawa Province. As bin Ladin’s compound, provided to people gathered to help the wounded, March 11, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide a Washington Post journalist, Bin Ladin a suicide bomber detonated explosives bomber targeted a funeral in Peshawar, wanted to assassinate U.S. President among them. At least 14 people were killing at least 13 people. – AFP, March 10 Barack Obama and David Petraeus killed. – CNN, March 7 in Afghanistan. According to the New March 11, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suspected York Times, “The documents include March 8, 2012 (NIGERIA): British Boko Haram group suicide bomber one in which Bin Laden asked his top citizen Chris McManus and Italian attacked a Catholic church in the central lieutenant, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, citizen Franco Lamolinara, who were Nigerian city of Jos, killing three people. to find out from a Pakistani terrorist being held hostage, were killed in a After the bombing, Christian youth named Ilyas Kashmiri ‘the steps he has failed UK and Nigerian military rescue killed at least 10 people in reprisal taken’ toward assassinating Mr. Obama attempt. According to UK Prime attacks. – Reuters, March 11 and the top American general in the Minister David Cameron, “A window region.” All three of those men—Bin of opportunity arose to secure their March 12, 2012 (PHILIPPINES): A Ladin, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman and Ilyas release. We also had reason to believe senior Malaysian police official said that Kashmiri—are now dead. – New York that their lives were under imminent and Zulkifli bin Hir (also known as Marwan), Times, March 16 growing danger. The early indications a senior Jemaah Islamiya member who are clear that both men were murdered was reported killed on February 2, is March 16, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida by their captors, before they could be likely still alive. A Philippine military leader Ayman al-Zawahiri called on rescued.” Nigerian authorities allege official disputed the Malaysian report, Pakistanis to join the Arab Spring that the Boko Haram group was holding saying that they believe Zulkifli bin Hir uprisings and protest against their the two hostage, but the group denied is dead. – New York Times, March 13 government. Al-Zawahiri said, “O our involvement. – Bloomberg, March 9; Voice of people in Pakistan! The Arab world America, March 9 March 13, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide around you is surging in a wave of bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle revolution. Tyrants and oppressive March 9, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik- killed at least three Yemeni soldiers rulers are falling. Why are you not i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) warned that outside the town of al-Bayda. Ansar al- making any move? Why are you not they will attack government, police and Shari`a claimed responsibility. – BBC, deposing these tyrants? Why are you military officials if three of Usama bin March 13 not toppling these treacherous bribe- Ladin’s wives are not released from takers?” – CNN, March 16 Pakistani custody. “If the family of March 14, 2012 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab Osama bin Laden is not released as soon militants launched a suicide bombing March 17, 2012 (SYRIA): Explosions as possible, we will attack the judges, against the presidential palace in ripped through several government the lawyers and the security officials Mogadishu. The bomber, who blew compounds in Damascus, killing at least involved in their trial,” said a TTP himself up at the gates of the palace, 27 people. – Voice of America, March 17 spokesman. – Reuters, March 9 killed at least five people. – BBC, March 14 March 18, 2012 (SYRIA): An explosion March 9, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Al-Qa`ida occurred near a government security reportedly announced the death of Badr March 15, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): building in Aleppo, killing at least two Mansoor, a key commander, saying that Afghan President Hamid Karzai people. – AP, March 17 he was killed in a U.S. drone strike last demanded that NATO troops withdraw month. – AP, March 9 from rural areas, and the Taliban March 18, 2012 (YEMEN): Gunmen shot declared a suspension of peace talks to death an American teacher in Taiz March 9-10, 2012 (YEMEN): Suspected with the United States. According to Province. Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian U.S. airstrikes killed an estimated 33 the Los Angeles Times, “In practical terms, Peninsula claimed responsibility. al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula both developments might prove largely – CNN, March 20 militants in Yemen’s Abyan and Bayda symbolic. Karzai does not have the provinces. – RFE/RL, March 12 power to enforce specific demands as March 20, 2012 (IRAQ): A wave of to where Western troops are deployed, bombings rocked cities across Iraq, one March 10, 2012 (KENYA): A grenade and U.S. contacts with the Taliban week before the country hosts the annual killed at least six people at a bus station were in the very early stages.” The two Arab League summit for the first time in in Nairobi. Kenyan police have linked developments occurred in the wake more than 20 years. The bombings killed the Somalia-based al-Shabab to the of a March 11 incident where a rogue at least 52 people. The Islamic State of attack. – Voice of America, March 11 U.S. soldier allegedly killed 16 Afghan Iraq claimed responsibility. – Christian civilians. – Los Angeles Times March 15 Science Monitor, March 20; AP, March 21

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March 22, 2012 (FRANCE): French March 29, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen CTC Sentinel Staff police killed Mohammed Merah, a opened fire on the staff of the United Frenchman of Algerian origin, after Nations Food and Agriculture Editor-in-Chief a 30-hour standoff at his apartment Organization in Baluchistan Province, Erich Marquardt in a suburb of Toulouse. Merah was killing two people. – AP, March 29 Senior Editor, CTC responsible for a shooting spree that began on March 11, and resulted in the March 30, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Editorial Board deaths of three soldiers, three Jewish A member of a U.S.-backed Afghan COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. children and a rabbi. French authorities village police force opened fire on his Department Head said that Merah operated alone, and that fellow officers as they slept in Paktika Department of Social Sciences (West Point) there is no evidence he had any contact Province, killing all nine of them. After with established terrorist groups. – AP, the attack, the gunman took all their COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. March 23; Reuters, March 22; Christian Science weapons, placed them in a pickup truck, Deputy Department Head Monitor, March 23 and drove away. The Taliban claimed Department of Social Sciences (West Point) responsibility. – AP, March 30 March 23, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A LTC Liam Collins suicide bomber targeted militants from March 30, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A Executive Director, CTC Lashkar-i-Islam, killing five people in suspected U.S. drone killed three Khyber Agency’s remote Tirah Valley. alleged militants in Miran Shah in North Lashkar-i-Islam is currently fighting Waziristan Agency of the Federally a number of rival militant groups in Administered Tribal Areas. – AP, March Khyber. – BBC, March 23 29

March 25, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- March 30, 2012 (YEMEN): A suspected Taliban Pakistan warned that it would U.S. drone killed four al-Qa`ida in the Contact assassinate lawmakers in Pakistan if Arabian Peninsula militants in Shabwa Combating Terrorism Center they decide to reopen NATO supply Province. A second suspected drone U.S. Military Academy routes to Afghanistan. – Reuters, March 25 attacked a building used by militants, 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall but it was apparently empty at the time West Point, NY 10996 March 27, 2012 (SPAIN): Spanish police of the strike. – AP, March 30 Phone: (845) 667-6383 arrested a suspected al-Qa`ida member Email: [email protected] who “administered one of the world’s March 31, 2012 (KENYA): An assailant Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ most important jihadist forums.” threw a hand grenade into a crowded The man, who was not identified, is restaurant in Mombasa, injuring * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Jordanian-born with Saudi citizenship. five people. There was no claim of According to Spanish authorities, he responsibility. – Reuters, March 31 was known within al-Qa`ida as the “librarian,” and he worked 8-15 hours a March 31, 2012 (THAILAND): A series day from home for al-Qa`ida, al-Qa`ida of bomb explosions tore through Yala in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qa`ida Province in southern Thailand, killing support in the Arabian Peninsula. – Fox News, 14 people. The attacks marked the most The Combating Terrorism Center would March 27 deadly coordinated bomb assault in like to express its gratitude to its financial years in southern Thailand. – Reuters, supporters, for without their support and March 27, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): March 31; AP, April 1 shared vision of the Center products like the Afghan intelligence officials reportedly CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you arrested 16 people connected to a March 31, 2012 (YEMEN): Militants are interested in learning more about how mass suicide bombing plot in Kabul. linked to al-Qa`ida in the Arabian to support the Combating Terrorism Center, Approximately 11 suicide bomb vests Peninsula launched a surprise attack please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call were seized from inside Afghanistan’s on an army base in Lahj Province in Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association Defense Ministry. Some of the suspects southern Yemen. The militants were of Graduates at 845-446-1561. were members of the Afghan National forced to retreat after airstrikes were Army. – Fox News, March 27 called in. As a result of the fighting, 17 soldiers and 13 militants were killed. March 28, 2012 (NIGERIA): Suspected – AP, March 31 Boko Haram group gunmen attacked a police station and military base in Yobe State, freeing 14 inmates. – This Day, The views expressed in this report are those of March 29; Reuters, March 30 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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