The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

THE CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE CHINA RELIEF

EXPEDITION OF 1900

A Dissertation in

History

by

Xiangyun Xu

 2019 Xiangyun Xu

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

August 2019

The dissertation of Xiangyun Xu was reviewed and approved* by the following:

Amy Greenberg George Winfree Professor of American History Dissertation Co-Advisor Committee Co-Chair

David Atwill Associate Professor of History Dissertation Co-Advisor Committee Co-Chair

Sophie De Schaepdrijver Professor of History

Nicolai Volland Associate Professor of Asian Studies and Comparative Literature

Michael Kulikowski Head of the Department

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the significance of the China Relief Expedition of 1900 in the history of the United States as an empire. It demonstrates how the American decision to intervene in the Boxer Uprising and their perception of the ensuing expedition were entangled with political, gender, and racial norms in the United States formed through westward expansion, Chinese exclusion, and the Spanish-American War of 1898. The transmission and application of these norms across national boundaries applied not only to statesmen and ordinary people at home, but also servicemen in China, even though the latter’s experience in

China had the potential to modify some of those stereotypes. The dissertation also reveals that by observing other forces in action, U.S. servicemen learned valuable lessons that would later be of help in the Philippines and other future encounters, and formed opinions of other countries that would later influence their stance on issues like the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-

05 and World War I. Last but not least, it underscores contemporary American debates and controversies around the expedition, especially how both sides linked events in China with those in the Philippines to advance their respective arguments regarding imperialism and expansion, and elaborates on how the expedition contributed to the Republican victory in the

1900 election.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ...... v Introduction ...... 1 Chapter One: Putting American Empire to the Test ...... 18 Chapter Two: Fighting Alongside Other Forces and Interacting with Them ...... 59 Chapter Three: Forming Opinions of Other Forces ...... 99 Chapter Four: Images of China and its People, Transplanted and Transformed ...... 144 Chapter Five: Portraying, Experiencing and Debating the China Relief Expedition ...... 193 Epilogue ...... 233 Bibliography ...... 259

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Acknowledgements

Looking back at the journey that I have taken this far, I cannot express my gratitude enough for the Department of History at the Pennsylvania State University and all the wonderful people I meet here. I owe greatest debt to members of my committee. Without the kindness and offer from Professor Amy Greenberg and Professor David Atwill, I would not even have the chance to pursue PhD study here in the U.S. Along the way, Professor

Greenberg is always there to answer my questions and concern about PhD study. Her encouragement and meticulous reading and editing help me get through the initial rough patch in PhD study, navigate the world of grant application, and smooth edges in the dissertation writing. Had it not been for Professor Atwill’s reminder, I would have never realized the vast potential and possibility in the field of the Boxer Uprising. In addition, I learn a lot about conducting researches in history by serving as both professors’ research assistant in different semesters. Professor Sophie De Schaepdrijver’s seminars on wars in the twentieth century Europe introduce me to recent trends in the study of military history, and broaden my horizon on the relationship between colonial wars and European wars, especially in the case of imperial Germany. Besides, the gatherings she and Professor Ronnie Hsia host in their house reduce international students’ homesickness and enhance the sense of community. Professor Nicolai Volland brings the inter-disciplinary perspective into my research, and demonstrates how literature could be powerful indicator of historical figures’ mindset.

Other professors I meet in the coursework offer great help too. Professor Ari Kelman,

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Professor Lori Ginzberg and Professor William Blair’s seminars provide keen insight into the nineteenth century U.S., especially the Civil War, the American west and gender perspectives, while Professor Gary Cross enhances my understanding of popular culture in the United

States. Professor Anthony Kaye leads me into slavery and other forms of coerced labor as transnational systems, including the Chinese coolie labor. I truly felt a sense of loss when learning about his early demise. Professor Kate Merkel-Hess guides me through the world of late imperial China, and offers professional advice on teaching when I served as her teaching assistant. Professor Maia Ramnath introduces me to classics in the study of world history, and

Professor Michael Kulikowski enriches my research methods by familiarizing me with representative methodology in the historical discipline. Last but not least, Professor On-cho

Ng carefully reads through all my writing response in his course and gives valuable feedbacks and suggestions.

The training I received at the Department of History, Peking University prepares me well for PhD study in the United States. Professor Niu Ke constantly reminds me of the need to figure out what the China Relief Expedition meant in terms of the American production of knowledge on China. Professor Wang Xi immerses me in the journey that African Americans took in the U.S. history, and inspires me to explore different ethnicity's experiences in the

China Relief Expedition. Professor Wang Lixin introduces me to the study of transnational and international history in the first place, and always underlines the importance of delving into cultural aspects of the American diplomacy. Professor Li Jianming broadens my horizon on the study of political culture in the United States. Although his expertise lies in the colonial period and early republic, it turns out that political culture around the turn of the

vi twentieth century shared a lot in common with its predecessors. Chen Xiao, a friend I met there in the undergraduate years, makes photo copies of Louis Livingston Seaman papers that loom large in the epilogue.

Conducting archival researches is essential for a dissertation. In this aspect, I’m fortunate to receive the travel grant from the Department of History and the Center for Global

Studies at Penn State, the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, and the

Massachusetts Historical Society. During my archival trips to these institutions as well as the

American National Archives, the Library of Congress, the British National Archives, the

British Library, and two libraries at Harvard University, staffs and archivists there are always kind and responsive to my inquiries. The convenient online catalog and easy access to archives are everything that a scholar in history could wish for.

Presenting one's work in academic conferences always comes as the nervy moment. In this aspect, I'm fortunate to have the friendly, encouraging, and constructive atmosphere in the Berlin Global History Student Conference 2017, Roosevelt Institute for American Studies in Middelburg, Netherlands, and the Association for Asian Studies annual conference 2018.

It's so wonderful to know that there are other scholars in the world who share interest in the transnational history and the Boxer Uprising. My thanks especially goes to Professor Jeffrey

Wasserstrom for organizing the awesome panel in the AAS annual conference, and refers me to various valuable sources and scholars through frequent correspondence. Professor Rana

Mitter's chairing also leaves strong impression on me. In addition, the Jerry Bentley World

History travel grant from the American Historical Association enables me to audit panels at

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AHA annual conference 2017, and observe how other scholars go about with their presentation.

Pursuing PhD study is like a marathon. I cannot reach the finish line without the emotional support from my family. My parents, Xu Jingbo and Wang Lirong, always encourage me to pursue my dreams abroad, even though that means I cannot be around to accompany and look after them. My aunt Virginia Wang lends every help during my stay in the United States. I can always count on her welcome when visiting New York for visa applications and flights. My wife Yanan Qizhi gives me so much inspiration that I cannot even count. Besides, being my academic soul mate, her company makes the journey far less lonely. The time we spent in those great cities in Europe truly helps me get away from the

U.S. centered perspective on history, and grasps the diversities and interconnectedness of the human history.

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Introduction

In June 1900, the United States deployed around 3000 troops, most previously stationed in the Philippines, alongside seven other nations’ forces (Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan,

Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) to intervene in the Boxer Uprising, an anti-foreign movement in Northern China targeting Western civilians and Chinese converts. The U.S. military referred to it as the China Relief Expedition. By mid-August, allied forces had occupied Tianjin and Beijing, two major cities where the Boxers and Chinese troops laid siege to Western civilians and Chinese converts.1 This seemed to signal an end to an episode that had captured newspapers’ attention for the previous two months. The remaining task was to negotiate a postwar settlement addressing the issues of indemnity and retribution. In June 1901, the American forces withdrew from China after negotiating parties reached agreement. As part of the agreement, the Chinese government promised to punish prominent statesmen responsible for abetting the Boxer Uprising, suspend civil examinations in areas where foreigners were murdered, and grant foreign powers the right to station troops in the communication lines between Beijing and the sea.

For generations, studies of the Boxer Uprising have described a monolithic Western imperialism at war with China. Most scholars have concentrated on foreign relations and diplomatic activities surrounding the Boxer Uprising. Their conviction that Realpolitik took prominence in such activities, and that empires looked out for their respective material interests,

1 The persecution of Western civilians and Chinese converts also occurred in the countryside. However, incidents in these places generally did not result in a siege like the one in Tianjin and Beijing. Some compounds that Western civilians and Chinese converts occupied as sanctuaries got overrun by Chinese forces. Only a few strongholds survived the Chinese onslaught. 1 sidelined analysis of the role cultural factors played in the conflict.2 While the latest works on the diplomatic history of the Boxer Uprising incorporate cultural elements like historical memories and personal egos, they still mostly focus on prominent figures and their activities without examining the overall social background.3

Problematic as they were, these works on diplomatic history rightly illuminate major aspects of Chinese foreign relations around the time of the Boxer Uprising. The Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 revealed the country’s impotence despite ambitious self- strengthening programs in previous decades. Three years later, under the pretext of compensating for two murdered missionaries in Shandong Province, Germany forced Chinese government to lease Jiaozhou Bay, which gave the German Navy a crucial foothold in the Far

East. This act set off various empires’ scramble for concessions and sphere of influence in

China.4

For the United States, these moves by other empires posed both challenges and opportunities. Since the voyage of Empress of China in the early republic, China Trade had been the cash cow for some Americans, especially those in New England. The envisioned huge

Chinese market later also proved lucrative for the American South eager to rehabilitate its cotton economy after the destruction of the Civil War.5 As a result, other empires’ land grab in

China threatened to shut off the American trade in this country. This prospect became especially

2 Paul Henry Clements, The Boxer Rebellion: A Political and Diplomatic Review (New York: Columbia University, 1915); Victor Purcell, The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1963). 3 Lanxin Xiang, The Origins of the Boxer War: A Multinational Study (Routledge, Abingdon: Routledge, 2003). 4 John E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Shantung (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 5 Susanna Delfino, Michele Gillespie eds., Global Perspectives on Industrial Transformation in the American South (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2005), p.86. 2 unsettling for the United States that recently emerged as a potent power in the West Pacific after annexing Hawaii, snatching the Philippines from Spain, and settling land disputes with

Germany in Samoa. In response, Secretary of State John Hay issued the Open-Door Note that called for all nations to respect the Chinese territorial integrity and refrain from land grab there.

Yet it remained to be seen how binding this note was for other empires.

Material interests aside, cultural relations also linked China with the United States.

Pioneered by John King Fairbank, generations of scholars have been exploring American missionary activities in China, and how these events helped shape the U.S. perception of China.

Preaching for contributions and concern for missionaries’ wellbeing glued the attention of small American towns like Oberlin, Ohio to China.6 In addition, scholars like John Haddad have come to reveal that apart from material gains, commodities and relevant advertising possessed cultural significance to contemporary Americans too. These materials contributed to the construction of images of China in the United States. Many merchants and missionaries became instrumental in formulating the American policy toward China at a time when specially trained China hands were not available yet.7

While missionary and commercial activities introduced ordinary Americans to a faraway

China, Chinese immigrants and students “brought China” to the United States. As the first racial group to be systematically excluded by the federal immigration legislation, the history of Chinese immigration has received the academia’s increasing attention in the age of multi- culturalism and heated debates over the American immigration policy. Although widely blamed

6 John King Fairbank ed., The Missionary Enterprise in China and America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). 7 John Rogers Haddad, “The American Marco Polo: Excursions to a Virtual China in U.S. Popular Culture, 1784-1912,” PhD dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2002. 3 for bringing “oriental vices” like coolie labor, prostitution, poor hygiene, and opium to the

United States and became the target of anti-foreign ferment that resulted in the passage of

Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the Chinese immigrant community continued to thrive thanks to a series of legal battles, loopholes in the immigration system, and familial bonds. Chinatowns and their residents became the major source of American impression of China.8 Meanwhile, as part of the self-strengthening movement, Chinese government sent 120 children to the

United States for education. They would become the harbinger of millions of Chinese students in the United States in the next century.9

Despite all these existing scholarship on the Chinese relationship with the outside world, for scholars of Chinese history, Western imperialism was merely a backdrop against which

Chinese people engineered their responses. Chinese scholars especially don’t distinguish between different empires’ behavior in China. Paul Cohen’s call for “discovering history in

China” further enhances the tendency to concentrate on Chinese history without much attention to the situation in those empires scrambling for China.10 Admittedly, he himself seeks to explore internationals’ experience more in his later book on the Boxer Uprising. But on the whole, in this classic study of the Boxer Uprising, Cohen mostly focuses on the besieged internationals and examines their stories in this particular historical moment without much information on their lives before and afterwards. This observation largely stands, even though

8 Charles J. McClain, In Search of Equality: the Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). 9 Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? A History of American Educated Chinese Students(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2004); Edward J. M. Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872-81(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011); Guoqi Xu, Chinese and Americans: A Shared History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014). 10 Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). As the practitioner of this trend, Joseph W. Esherick produced the classic work on the Boxer Uprising. Joseph W. Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987). 4

Cohen reflects upon historians’ losing interest on “the ‘dispersion’ phase of the process,” in which “individuals return to their ordinary biographical existences, retreating once more into the shadows of unnoticed, ‘uneventful’ history.”11

Because of the event’s dramatic effects, in addition to these works on diplomacy and

Boxer activities, there are books on the siege of internationals in Tianjin and Beijing. As their representative, Diana Preston’s book points out the event’s significance quite early in the prologue, including the beginning of the United States’ role as a “world policeman” as well as the demonstration of “Japan’s growing confidence and military prowess to a startled world.” It also alludes to worldwide imperial expansions, contemporaries’ gloat at seemingly endless

Western progress and technological innovation, their sense of racial superiority manifest in the

Chinese Exclusion, fear over the looming war between major empires, and Victorian womanhood. Yet chapters that follow mostly narrate stories with an occasional reference to larger thematic issues.12 It epitomizes a phenomenon that to some extent still characterizes the study of the Boxer Uprising: most books in the field feature narration of the Chinese crisis and anecdotes without serious analysis that situates these episodes in their historical contexts.

Marilyn Blatt Young’s The Rhetoric of Empire stands out as an exception. While exploring the “formation of United States policy toward China in the key years of transition from 1895 to 1901,” it does not confine itself to the study of diplomatic activities. The book argues that politicians, businessmen, and missionaries’ rhetoric became a force in this process,

11 Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.65-6. 12 Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China’s War on Foreigners that Shook the World in the Summer of 1900 (New York: Walker & Company, 1999), pp. x, xv-xxvi. See also Christopher Martin, The Boxer Rebellion (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1968); William J. Duiker, Cultures in Collision: The Boxer Rebellion (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978). 5

“influencing behavior, coloring reality, determining policy.” As a result, in dealing with the

Boxer Uprising, the work briefly touches a variety of topics, such as contemporaries’ comparisons with the Spanish-American War of 1898, the importance of the Philippines for the action in China, the media coverage of the event, and political calculations amidst the 1900 presidential election.13 Its publication heralded a recent boom in diverse studies of the China

Relief Expedition.

The general neglect of the role of empires in the study of the Boxer Uprising started to change with the rise of transnational and global history as a subject in the historical discipline.

James L. Hevia pinpoints the rise of global history that raised questions on previously underexplored Western imperialism in the China-centered approach, and attempted to “place developments in China within a broader global framework.”14 As a result, more and more scholars have paid attention to the China Relief Expedition, especially the transnational and global waves that converged in this event. Hevia explores the Western coercion of China into the new international system and the accompanying accumulation and creation of knowledge about China starting in the 1850s, before turning to the Boxer Uprising. In this process, he constantly invokes similar imperial projects elsewhere to demonstrate that events in China were part of a global process. Robert Bickers and R. G. Tiedemann selected papers from the conference “1900: the Boxers, China, and the World,” and turned them into an edited volume.

It features articles on wide-ranging topics such as an Indian soldier’s experience in China, the international press’ coverage of the Taiyuan Massacre as well as the plunder of Beijing, and the

13 Marilyn Blatt Young, The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895-1901 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp.1, 12, 137-71. 14 James L. Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 11. 6 allied forces’ administration of Tianjin. This effort once again demonstrates the transnational connection that scholars seek to establish between the Boxer Uprising and the larger world.15

These recent works on the China Relief Expedition both benefit from and engage in discussions with the booming study of empires in the historical discipline. Academia as a whole has been examining European empires and colonialism, especially since the collapse of the colonial system after World War Two.16 Recently, instead of treating each empire and colony as a closed entity without much interaction with others beyond economic transactions, scholars underline the frequent cultural interplay between these regions. They explore the transmission of colonial knowledge and statecraft between different colonies and even across imperial boundaries.17 Relatedly, they reexamine those seemingly familiar historical episodes under the imperial framework rather than from local perspectives.18 In addition, scholars have expanded the definition of the term “empire.” Rather than merely focusing on the formal surrender of sovereignty and established bureaucracy delegated from the center to rule over diverse subjects, scholars now look out for any sign of power imbalance between different people. As a result, even Native Americans, once seen by the general public as the passive victims of the Western

15 Robert Bickers and R. G. Tiedemann eds., The Boxers, China, and the World (Lanbam, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007). Another examples of situating the Boxer Uprising within a larger international context is David J. Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012). 16 Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001). 17 George Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Andrew Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Susanne Kuss, German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence (translated by Andrew Smith, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). 18 One such example is the reexamination of the American revolution. Rather than merely reiterating the founding fathers’ ventilation of grievances towards the Parliament, scholars explore the episode under the framework of the British empire and its conflicts with France. See for instance Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001); David Armitage, M. J. Braddick ed., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Andrew Jackson, The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); David K. Allison and Larrie D. Ferreiro eds., The American Revolution: A World War (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2018). 7 expansion, now emerge as possessing significant control over vast territories even long after the European arrival.19

The ascendancy of global and transnational history, including the study of empire, also manifests itself in the field of the American history. Living in the age of globalization, scholars challenge the idea of “the self-contained nation as the natural carrier of history,” and aim at

“understanding the historical production of the nation and locating it in a context larger than itself.”20 These works demonstrate how people and thoughts away from the American shores contributed to U.S. history, including the struggle over women’s rights, slavery, and social reforms, and how American development shared similarities with its counterparts in other parts of the world rather than moving along an exceptional path. 21 They also delve into the experience of Americans abroad, and how events in the United States cast ripple effects across the globe.22

While American empire and imperialism used to be terms that only leftists from the Cold

War would use for historical analysis, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration’s

19 Jane Burbank, Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp.8-10. For new trends in the study of Native Americans, see for instance Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1640-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Pekka Hamalainen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 20 Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), p.3; Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), p.vii. 21 Ian Tyrrell, Woman’s World/Woman’s Empire: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998); Margaret H. McFadden, Golden Cables of Sympathy: The Transatlantic Sources of Nineteenth-Century Feminism (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999); William Mulligan and Maurice Bric eds., A Global History of Anti-Slavery Politics in the Nineteenth Century (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 22 Philip M. Katz, From Appomattox to Montmartre: Americans and the Paris Commune (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 8 identification with the Roman Empire pushed these terms to the forefront in academic studies.

In addition to the informal American empire manifest through economic and cultural influence, more and more scholars pay attention to continental expansion and overseas possessions like the Philippines and Cuba. They explore how the U.S. government promoted expansion, and how American rule transformed these regions and influenced the people there.23 They also delve into how these overseas adventures helped shape American culture.24 Some even point out that U.S. reformers experimented with social engineering in these overseas possessions before applying them in the United States.25

Interest in transnational history has also driven scholarship on media representation and social norms that drove the American perception of the Boxer Uprising. A few scholars had already started to explore American impressions of China prior to the publication of Michel

Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge and Edward Said’s Orientalism. Later works benefited from both Foucault and Said’s insights and the popularity of transnational history. While many of them concentrate on images themselves without referring to the American political and social background that influenced their creation and perception, some take note of the Spanish-

American War and the Open-Door Policy that marked the rise of the United States as an assertive empire in East Asia.26

23 Eileen Findlay, Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870-1920 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 24 Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); David Brody, Visualizing American Empire: Orientalism and Imperialism in the Philippines (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010). 25 Alfred W. McCoy, Francisco A. Scarano eds., Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 26 Yao Bin, Quanmin Xingxiang zai Meiguo: Yihetuanyundong de Kuaguo Yingxiang (The Boxers‘ Images in the United States: The Transnational Impact of the Boxer Uprising), (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2010), pp.68- 9. Jane E. Elliott examines how British press covered the Boxer Uprising. See Jane E. Elliott, Some Did It for Civilisation; Some Did It for Their Country: A Revised View of the Boxer War (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002). For studies of Chinese impression of the United States, see Merle Curti, John Stalker, 9

The cultural turn in the history of the U.S. foreign relations has further prompted scholars to employ racial and gender discourse when presenting the Boxer Uprising. Scholars refer to

Western racism manifest in the discovery of Java man, the stereotypes about China and the

Chinese formed through experience in Chinatowns, and the fear of Yellow Peril.27 John R.

Haddad examines in detail how dime novels like Buffalo Bill Stories presented Chinese figures in the American West, and how the China Relief Expedition got adapted into a special edition of the Wild West show that glorified allied valor. Unlike previous versions of the Wild West show that revolved around bygone battles with Native Americans, this one looked to current overseas events that embodied America’s future, and served to help Americans overcome anxiety over the industrialization and accompanying loss of masculinity. Yet these two histories were connected through the hiring of Native Americans to play the role of the Boxers, not to mention various themes and binary antagonism they shared. 28 Inspired by Kristin L.

Hoganson’s Fighting for American Manhood, Liu Qing explores how the American response to the Boxer Uprising revealed its cultural perception of itself and the outside world.29

However, these works have several shortcomings. First, they mainly concentrate on the media portrayal of developments in China while largely losing sight of how the American audience actually perceived these coverages. Second, they rarely explore whether the

“ ‘The Flowery Flag Devil’: The American Image in China 1840-1900,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 96:6 (December, 1952), pp.663-90. 27 Robert McClellan, The Heathen Chinese: A Study of American Attitudes toward China, 1890-1905 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1971), pp.31-68, 207-10; Oliver Turner, American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp.51-69, 74-6; Colin Mackerras, Western Images of China, revised edition (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.60. 28 John R. Haddad, “The Wild West Turns East: Audience, Ritual, and Regeneration in Buffalo Bill’s Boxer Uprising,” American Studies, 49:3/4 (Fall/Winter 2008), pp.5-38. 29 Liu Qing, “Jiaodao Zhongguo”: Meiguo dui Yihetuanyundong de Fanying yu Diguo Wenhua (“Tutoring China”: Americans’ Responses to the Boxer Movement and the Culture of Empire), PhD Dissertation, Peking University, 2010. 10

McKinley administration adopted these gender and racial discourses. As a result, while these cultural studies diversify the field of diplomatic history, their lack of attention to the decision- making process renders them vulnerable to challenges regarding causal effects. Third, they almost exclusively deal with war correspondents, missionaries, and officials creating the image of China for American audiences without recognizing U.S. servicemen’s role in this aspect.

Downplaying American servicemen’s part in both creating and transmitting cultural images demonstrates that studies of the China Relief Expedition have much to catch up in terms of new trends in the military history. For a long time, most military historians approached the

China Relief Expedition as a series of battles that culminated in the relief of the besieged internationals in Beijing. Only Michael Hunt explores the administration of the U.S. zone in

Beijing, especially how American personnel utilized the service of local Chinese collaborators.30 Meanwhile, military historians have increasingly turned to the cultural and social aspect of military campaigns to rejuvenate the field. These efforts have come to be known as “new military history.”31 Yet in terms of China, military historians have mostly concentrated on the time period after the China Relief Expedition, since it occupied a much longer time span and featured figures who had significant influence on the Sino-U.S. relations.32 While some works address the issue of multinational cooperation and conflicts in the China Relief Expedition, their emphasis on technical details of the military operation

30 Michael H. Hunt, “The Forgotten Occupation: Peking, 1900-1901,” Pacific Historical Review, 48:4 (Nov., 1979), pp.501-29. 31 Mark Moyar, “The Current State of Military History,” The Historical Journal, 50:1 (March, 2007), pp.225- 40. 32 Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (London: Macmillan, 1970); Dennis L. Noble, The Eagle and the Dragon: the United States Military in China, 1901-1937 (Westport, CT: Greenwood publishing group, 1990); Edward M. Coffman, “The American 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938: A Vignette in Social History,” The Journal of Military History, 58:1 (Jan, 1994), pp.57-74. 11 renders them unable to fully explore cultural norms and cross-cultural encounters in this campaign and occupation.33

Exploring American servicemen’s China experience can not only deepen our understanding of the China Relief Expedition beyond military operations, but also provide a clearer sense of the transnational nature of this campaign. American servicemen in the China

Relief Expedition grew up in the era of Chinese Exclusion, and came to China after fighting and performing occupation duties in the American West, Cuba and the Philippines.

Consequently, they had accumulated rich experience and formed a certain mindset about dealing with “uncivilized people” before sailing for China. What’s more, in China, they served alongside forces of seven other nations, some of which either featured colonial troops or boasted experience in the colonial warfare. In addition, most U.S. servicemen returned to the

Philippines after the China Relief Expedition was over.

Besides American servicemen’s multiple deployments and missions, revealing the transnational nature of the China Relief Expedition also means taking the U.S. domestic politics into account. As numerous works have shown, Americans had been contemplating empire and imperialism since the Spanish-American War of 1898 that resulted in the United States gaining vast overseas possessions, outstandingly the Philippines. In these debates, both sides referred to other empires’ examples and lessons, especially the Boer War in South Africa. The fact that

33 Carleton Frederick Waite, Some Elements of International Military Co-operation in the Suppression of the 1900 Antiforeign Rising in China with Special Reference to the Forces of the United States (Los Angeles: the University of Southern California Press, 1935); Eric Ouellet, “Multinational Counterinsurgency: the Western intervention in the Boxer Rebelion 1900-1901,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 20:3-4 (September 2009), pp.507-27; Umio Otsuka, “Coalition Coordination During the Boxer Rebellion: How Twenty-Seven ‘Councils of Senior Naval Commanders’ Contributed to the Conduct of Operations,” Naval War College Review, 71:4 (Autumn 2018), pp.111-30. 12

1900 was a presidential election year enhanced these debates’ intensity.34 It seemed impossible that developments in China, where the United States had enormous commercial and political stakes, would elude the attention of imperialists and anti-imperialists.

The lack of attention to these aspects of the China Relief Expedition reveals the event’s relatively marginal status in American historical scholarship. For scholars of Sino-U.S. relations, the Boxer Uprising mattered for showcasing the dilemma of missionary endeavors in

China, reiterating the Open-Door Policy, and paving the way for the Boxer Indemnity

Scholarship supporting Chinese students to pursue higher education in the United States through refunds from the indemnity. For works on American imperialism and overseas military operations, the short duration of fighting as well as the absence of annexation rendered it far less significant than the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-American War. For others, it was just a small war occurring in a faraway land that did not concern American society much except for the thrilling siege and relief of the internationals in Beijing.35

In fact, several underexplored questions arise from transnational journeys and exchanges in the China Relief Expedition. First, what were the previously formed mindsets that helped shape American servicemen’s interaction with the Chinese during the China Relief Expedition,

34 E. Berkeley Tompkins, “Scylla and Charybdis: The Anti-Imperialist Dilemma in the Election of 1900,” Pacific Historical Review, 36:2 (May, 1967), pp.143-61; Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire: The Anti- Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972); John Butler, “The American Imperialism Argument at the Turn of the Century: The Philippine Question Revisited,” PhD dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1998. 35 Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002). As an example of the general lack of attention to the China Relief Expedition, while pointing out the involvement of a small American contingent from the Philippines, Bender thought that the Boxer Uprising “aimed to overthrow the Qing dynasty.” Bender, A Nation Among Nations, p.238. A recent work on the U.S. overseas intervention also fails to even mention the China Relief Expedition. Noel Maurer, The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect American Property Overseas, 1893-2013 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 13 and how exactly did these encounters take place? Second, how did U.S. servicemen interact with their counterparts in other forces, and what were the American impressions of them both in war and occupation? Third, did the China experience influence later American action in the

Philippines? Fourth, how did imperialists and anti-imperialists integrate the China Relief

Expedition into their debates over empire and imperialism?

A variety of primary sources are crucial for answering these questions. Court martial records and largely untapped documents on the China Relief Expedition in the American

National Archives reveal details of U.S. encounters with other forces as well as Chinese civilians. Documents and personal papers in the British National Archives and British Library as well as published memoirs and sources provide insights into how other troops perceived their American counterparts. Personal papers in the Library of Congress, Massachusetts

Historical Society, Bentley Library in the University of Michigan, microfilmed presidential papers, and databases on American historical newspapers as well as Congressional documents contain rich information on how U.S. statesmen and the general public responded to the Boxer

Uprising in the context of contemporary debates over imperialism and the 1900 Presidential election.

Answering these questions marks a major step towards constructing a transnational narrative of the China Relief Expedition. Rather than merely exploring the high-level Sino-U.S. relations as well as images of the Boxer Uprising in the United States, this dissertation examines how American military personnel, statesmen and the general public correlated the

Chinese crisis with developments in the Philippines. It suggests that contrary to existing works’ claim that the China Relief Expedition was at the fringe of American politics, this event loomed

14 large in contemporary U.S. debates over imperialism. It also argues that U.S. servicemen’s observations of other troops helped shape American opinions of its own forces, highlighted potential aspects for improvement in the U.S. armed forces, and influenced their later actions in the Philippines. Therefore, it engages in conversation with scholarship on inter-imperial borrowings.

This dissertation also treats the China Relief Expedition as a social and cultural event beyond mere political jockeying and military struggles, and demonstrates how preexisting perceptions of European and Asian nations influenced American military personnel’s interaction with other people. It argues that while embodying contemporary American perceptions of its place in the world as well as impressions of China and its people, U.S. servicemen became the creators of new perceptions in these aspects through their encounters with their counterparts in other forces as well as Chinese people. As a result, this dissertation reveals that the China Relief Expedition went far beyond the antagonism between China and foreign empires, and featured encounters between personnel from various empires that resonated in both China and the United States, as well as interaction between fringes of empires like China and the Philippines. These encounters and their ensuing impressions mattered, as these episodes later got weaved into the American historical memories and influenced public opinions in military clashes to come.

The following five chapters seek to address these issues. Chapter One traces the initial

American response to the Boxer Uprising, including how statesmen evaluated the situation, how they mobilized troops for the expedition, and how different groups perceived and debated these actions. It provides the reader with background information on the China Relief

15

Expedition, and more importantly, situates the event within its historical context. It teases out some political and cultural elements in the United States, including expanding global influence and interests especially after the Spanish-American War of 1898, gender and racial norms, and memories of the past that would continue to shape the American experience in the China Relief

Expedition.

Chapter Two underlines how American servicemen perceived and remembered fighting alongside troops of other nations. It highlights American servicemen’s sense of the United

States as a rising world power that possessed enormous interests in East Asia. Such assertive stance led to clashes with servicemen from other nations who saw their interests in China differently than those of the United States. It further hindered a joint operation already plagued by problems with coordination and communication. Still, the joint forces managed to relieve the Chinese siege of internationals in Tianjin and Beijing, and cultivated friendship with each other through both military and social interactions. Besides, such occasions helped highlight traits and flaws in the American forces.

Chapter Three elucidates American servicemen’s evaluation of other forces. It underlines the transnational nature of the China Relief Expedition by revealing cultural exchanges between different nations during this time. The chapter illuminates how U.S. officers summarized other forces’ traits, and looked for aspects that American troops could emulate and benefit from, especially those related with military operations in the tropics like the Philippines.

These cases demonstrate how as a relative latecomer in the overseas colonial enterprise, the

United States was keen on learning from other empires to help mold its own imperial rulership.

They also formed opinions of other troops through contacts during both war and occupation.

16

Many of these comparisons between different forces and impressions of other troops reached the United States through newspaper articles that featured servicemen’s letters home.

Chapter Four delves into U.S. servicemen’s encounters with China and its people. It reveals another transnational aspect of the China Relief Expedition by demonstrating how existing notions of Chinese and other “savage” people generated in decades of westward expansion and global imperialism influenced American servicemen’s interaction with the

Chinese, and to what extent the China experience helped modify these stereotypes. It also explores some servicemen’s fascination with Chinese culture, and how they lamented the destruction of life and architecture in this campaign. What’s more, the chapter illustrates how some Chinese strove to make a living through business in connection with the U.S. forces.

These all serve to illuminate complexities in cross-cultural encounters.

Chapter Five focuses on American newspapers’ portrayal of U.S. servicemen’s valor, and examines continuing controversies over the China Relief Expedition in the United States. It reveals how contemporary notions of heroism formed in previous wars shaped the newspaper coverage of events in China, and how these ideas downplayed women’s experiences in war. It also demonstrates the perseverance of both imperialists and anti-imperialists in debating the expedition and linking it with concurrent events in the Philippines, long after the 1900

Presidential Election. These episodes elucidate the extent of American society’s involvement in the China Relief Expedition.

17

Chapter One: Putting American Empire to the Test

The climax of the Boxer movement in 1900 touched the lives of people in the United

States, China, and the Philippines. All these groups emerged from this crisis with a new sense of America’s expanding role in Chinese affairs in both geopolitical and economic terms. The new American world status also had cultural connotations, especially those linked with gender and race. Yet not all people involved praised the growing U.S. role on the world stage. Anti- imperialists mounted serious challenges to American imperialism in light of developments in

China, while some racial and religious minorities attempted to exploit the crisis to their own advantage.

Responding to the Alarm from China

The end of May 1900 signified the coming of another Decoration Day, and President

William McKinley as well as members of his cabinet visited Fredericksburg and Antietam to observe the occasion. In 1900, Decoration Day still signified division rather than unity, as

Southern states had days different from the North to commemorate the Confederate’s dead. But this year’s speeches sought to facilitate reconciliation between the North and South. When a monument in Fredericksburg was dedicated to the Fifth Corps of the Union Army, Secretary

Elihu Root offered “a touching reference to the heroism and sacrifice of both Federals and

Confederates who contested the field.”36 He stated that “there will still march the heroes of the

Fifth Corps, there will still live and fight in God’s battle, the men who charged up the hill and

36 “The Cornerstone Laid,” The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, May 26, 1900, p.3. 18 the men who withstood them, the men who fought with Burnside, and the men who fought with

Lee.” The fact that these two generals’ names replaced “on the victorious side” and “were defeated” in the original draft spoke volumes about the efforts to achieve reconciliation between both sides.37 President McKinley’s speech at Antietam also linked reconciliation with the Spanish-American War two years prior, and the ongoing Philippine-American War:

Standing here today, one reflection only has crowded my mind---the difference between

this scene and that of thirty-eight years ago. Then the men who wore the blue and the men

who wore the gray greeted each other with shot and shell and visited death upon their

respective ranks. We meet, after all these intervening years, with but one sentiment---that

of loyalty to the government of the United States, love for our flag and our free institutions,

and determined, men of the north and men of the south, to make any sacrifice for the honor

and perpetuity of the American nation…When we went to war two years ago the men of

the south and the men of the north vied with each other to show their devotion to the United

States. The followers of the Confederate generals with the followers of the Federal generals

fought side by side in Cuba, in Porto [Puerto] Rico and in the Philippines, and together in

those far-off islands are standing today, fighting and dying for the flag they love.38

Indeed, much had changed in the past thirty-eight years, both for individuals and the

37 Speech of Secretary Root, May 25, 1900, William McKinley Papers, Series 4, Reel 83. For studies of the extent of reconciliation between the North and South during this period, see David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Caroline E. Janney, Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 38 Speech of President McKinley at Antietam Battlefield, May 30, 1900, William McKinley Papers, Series 4, Reel 83. 19 country. An eighteen-year old man from Ohio who delivered food and drink to the front under enemy fire in the Battle of Antietam now served as the President of the United States, presiding over a unified country stretching from sea to sea and possessing footholds in Hawaii and the

Philippines. Secretary of State John Hay might recall his days as President Lincoln’s personal secretary when the president anxiously anticipated a Northern victory in battle so he could issue the Emancipation Proclamation without the world regarding the document as a desperate move by the North to win the war. The prospect of European intervention on behalf of the South loomed large over the North. The Battle of Antietam turned out to be the pivotal moment that paved the way for the Emancipation Proclamation and temporarily checked the European desire to intervene. Now Hay was Secretary of State, and in the previous year had delivered the Open-Door Note urging European empires and Japan to respect China’s territorial integrity.39

Across the Pacific, General Arthur MacArthur, a young officer in the Civil War, led a force of more than 60000 strong trying hard to suppress Filipino insurgents and maintain U.S. rule on this archipelago. Although the situation was far from settled, it could not hinder the observance of the Decoration Day in Manila. A military escort proceeded to the cemetery and decorated tombs of fallen American soldiers with flowers. The gun salute and memorial exercises served to both show respect for the dead and demonstrate American power to local inhabitants. Servicemen in other posts also laid flowers and flags on their fallen comrades’ graves.40

39 William H. Armstrong, Major McKinley: William McKinley & the Civil War (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000); John Taliaferro, All the Great Prizes: The Life of John Hay, from Lincoln to Roosevelt (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013). 40 “Memorial Day in Manila”, The St. Albans Daily Messenger, St. Alban, VT, May 30, 1900, p.1; “Nebraska Boys in the Philippines”, Sunday World-Herald, Omaha, NE, July 29, 1900, p.13. 20

Around the same time in Beijing, a fellow Union veteran, U.S. Minister to China Edwin

Conger, was in no mood for Decoration Day. He had become more and more anxious lately. In late May 1900, the Boxers, mostly farmers practicing martial arts and claiming spirit possession, had flooded from Shandong into Zhili Province where the Chinese capital Beijing was located, and persecuted missionaries as well as Chinese converts there. According to the Boxers’ propaganda, “missionaries converted people who then believed in God rather than deities and ignored their ancestors.” It also blamed the drought on “churches blocking the heaven.”41 At first, Minister Conger estimated that the Boxers’ proximity to the capital would finally prompt the Chinese government to effectively suppress them. In his May 21 telegram to Secretary Hay,

Minister Conger stated that “I hope and believe the worst has passed.”42 Yet the situation soon turned from bad to worse. The Boxers not only increased in number, but also started to tear up rails, which threatened to cut off transportation between Beijing and Tianjin, a booming commercial city near the sea with European concessions where internationals resided and governed themselves. Diplomatic delegates in Beijing repeatedly requested that the Chinese government crush these Boxers, to no avail. Under these circumstances, they urged their respective governments to land sailors for protection.43 This lifted the curtain for what came to be known as the China Relief Expedition.

The China Relief Expedition occurred at a time when the United States had emerged as a prominent power in the Pacific. The country looked across the vast ocean as contemporaries

41 Yihetuanshiliao (Sources on the Boxer Uprising)义和团史料 (Beijing: China Social Science Publishing House, 1982), p.18. 42 Conger to Hay, May 21, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 43 Conger to Hay, May 29, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; U.S. Consul Tianjin James. W. Ragsdale to Admiral Kempff, May 29, 1900, ibid. 21 claimed the closing of the American frontier. It officially annexed Hawaii and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War of 1898, and in 1899 delivered the Open-Door Note urging

European empires and Japan to preserve Chinese territorial integrity amidst their scramble for concessions in China starting in 1897.

Secretary Hay and Minister Conger’s thoughts on how to deal with the Boxer movement reflected this two-faced strategic situation. On the one hand, the United States asserted itself as a noble nation distinguished from other land-grabbing empires with respect to China. In the

March 22 telegraph, Hay censured Conger for joining French, British, and German ministers to demand immediate Chinese suppression of the Boxer activities, since the U.S. stance in

Chinese issues necessitated separate action “without the cooperation of other powers.”

Moreover, he reminded Conger to utilize every opportunity to impress Chinese officials with the various empires’ assurances about maintaining Chinese territorial integrity obtained by the

United States.44 After assurances of the success of negotiations around the Open-Door Policy,

Conger conveyed this information in his May 9 letter to Zongli Yamen, the foreign ministry of the Chinese empire.45

On the other hand, the latest war and ensuing acquisition put the United States on a par with other empires in terms of standing and power, which prompted its representatives to adopt ways of thinking not so different from that of other powers. Back in late January 1900, Conger was frustrated at the Chinese government’s failure to suppress the Boxers, and the emperor gifting his hand-written letter of happiness, a gesture of appreciation and favor, to former

44 Hay to Conger, March 22, 1900, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1900 (as FRUS afterwards, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1900), pp. 111-2, p. 111 45 Conger to the Tsungli Yamen, May 9, 1900, FRUS 1900, p. 125. 22

Shandong Governor Yu Xian who ministers held responsible for emboldening the Boxer movement in that province. Consequently, he suggested a naval demonstration together with

Great Britain, France, and Germany. He believed that “the Chinese government really care little for anything but power, and an earnest exhibition of it always promptly moves them.”46 In early May, Conger mentioned Zongli Yamen’s past slight of his predecessor Charles Denby, and reiterated that “nothing short of an exhibition, and I believe the actual employment of force will ever constrain the Imperial Government to punish such officials.”47

Given the urgency of the situation, the Philippines, with its massive American garrison and proximity to China, became the ideal source of the forces needed to both demonstrate U.S. power and secure the safety of the internationals. At this time Rear Admiral Louis Kempff, the second-in-command of the Asiatic Station based in the Philippines, had been stationed in Japan with U.S.S. Newark in case of any emergencies in China. 48 On May 17, 1900, Conger telegraphed Kempff to bring the ship to Dagu, a fortified location at the mouth of Hai River that went through Tianjin, as soon as possible. The following day, he specified that the danger was not yet imminent, though “it may become so at any time,” and hoped that “the presence of one or more war ships in the vicinity of Dagu will have a good influence on the Chinese

Government.”49 This followed his logic of employing force to pressure China into submission.

It soon turned out that a naval demonstration was insufficient to secure the legation’s safety. Works on the U.S. foreign relations and naval strategies by distinguished scholars like

Marilyn Young have systematically examined relevant primary sources, especially the William

46 Conger to Hay, January 29, 1900, FRUS 1900, p. 94. 47 Conger to Hay, May 8, 1900, FRUS 1900, pp. 120-3, p. 121. 48 William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1958), p. 81; Conger to Hay, May 3, 1900, FRUS 1900, pp. 119-20, p. 120. 49 Conger to Kempff, May 17, 1900, FRUS 1900, p. 127; Conger to Kempff, May 18, 1900, ibid., p. 127. 23

McKinley papers, to trace the McKinley administration’s response to the Boxer Uprising and the reluctance of military commanders in the Philippines to spare troops for China. This chapter seeks to enrich the picture by closely analyzing these commanders’ telegrams, especially what they stated before and after addressing the crisis in China, by looking into the military situation in the Philippines, and by revealing the extent to which Minister Conger pinned his hope on forces from the archipelago.

American diplomats and officers at the scene looked to the Philippines in order to protect

U.S. citizens in China. While Kempff was still on the way to China, Conger telegraphed the

State Department for authority to solicit legation guards from him.50 In response to both

Conger and U.S. Consul in Tianjin James. W. Ragsdale’s request for guards, Kempff landed one hundred marines and sailors ashore to Tianjin on May 29.51 Meanwhile, Kempff tried to summon more forces from the Philippines in order to prepare for contingencies. From his conversation with American residents in Tianjin, Kempff knew that the drought was responsible for the Boxer Uprising. As he stated in the telegraph to the Department of Navy,

“crops are likely to fail thereby causing very probably trouble in the future.”52 His service in the Union Blockade Fleet during the Civil War taught him the close connection between food scarcity and civil unrest.53 As a result, Kempff urged his superior, commander of the Asiatic

50 Conger to Hay, May 26, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 51 Kempff to the Secretary of Navy John D. Long, May 30, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; James W. Ragsdale to First Assistant Secretary of State David J. Hill, July 16, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11; Bowman H. McCalla to Kempff, July 2, 1900, ibid; Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 26: The Newark, 1900-1901, the Boxer War in China, pp. 4, 6, in The Papers of Bowman H. McCalla, The Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 52 Kempff to Long, June 3, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 53 Flag Officer Commanding West India Squadron G. J. Pendergrast to Flag Officr Commanding Atlantic Blockade Squadron S. H. Stringham, August 24, 1861, in Naval War Records Office, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol.6: Atlantic Blockading Squadron (July 16, 1861-October 29, 1861); North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 29, 1861-March 8, 1862), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), p. 103. 24

Station Rear Admiral George C. Remey who was also a veteran of the Union Blockade against the South, to send in a small gunboat with fifty men ready for landing. However, Remey responded that “no vessel can be spared from the Philippines.”54

Kempff’s prospect of obtaining timely reinforcements did not improve much even after he appealed to the Department of Navy. Secretary John D. Long ordered another warship with additional marines departing for China. Yet Remey still bluntly replied that he “cannot supply them,” since “affairs in Philippines are considered paramount.” Moreover, he even suggested that Kempff “is cooperating [with] foreign powers to an extent incompatible [with] the interests of the American government,” and advised his lieutenant to “withdraw force all excepting force for protection of American interests.”55 It was only under the pressure of another order from the Department of Navy that Admiral Remey sent the U.S.S. Nashville with thirty marines and two lieutenants aboard. However, in the same telegraph, Admiral Remey also mentioned active insurgents in Southern Luzon and Samar as well as the navy taking over Cavite peninsula as far as Delehecan Isthmus, both of which required ships and marines.56

While Kempff and Remey haggled over the allocation of ships and manpower between the Philippines and China, the situation deteriorated in Tianjin and Beijing. The Boxers continued to rip rails, attack foreigners, and even started to have skirmishes with Russian

Cassocks deployed to protect the threatened internationals, most of whom were railroad

54 Report of Lieutenant Remey, February 24, 1863, Naval War Records Office, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Volume 13: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (May 14, 1862-April 7, 1863) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 685-6; Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909, p. 82. 55 Kempff to Long, June 5, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Kempff to Long, June 6, 1900, ibid; Long to Remey, June 6, 1900, ibid; Remey to Long, June 6, 1900, ibid. 56 Assistant Secretary of Navy Frank W. Hackett to Remey, June 8, 1900, ibid; Remey to Long, June 8, 1900, ibid. 25 engineers. The location of such attacks became closer to Beijing day by day. Surviving and fleeing missionaries and converts brought tales of horror to Beijing. In the meantime, Chinese firemen were holding secret meetings. The situation reminded Consul Ragsdale of the Tianjin massacre in 1870 in which this class of people initiated the slaughter of dozens of missionaries, nuns, foreign residents, and Chinese converts.57

In the face of such increasing threats, Conger and consul Ragsdale called for more reinforcements. After meeting with other ministers, Conger conveyed on June 5 that they might be besieged in Beijing, and urged the State Department to give Kempff instructions on cooperating with other forces to relieve them from the siege. Although Kempff had landed another fifty men from the U.S.S. Newark, the force ashore still seemed inadequate to deal with future disturbance without further reinforcement from the Philippines. 58 Frustrated at the navy’s sluggish deployment of ships and troops from the Philippines to China, Conger mentioned to Hay that “twenty-four foreign war vessels are at Dagu. The United States has only one.”59 His implication was that this level of force in China did not fit America’s new status as a world power equal to its European counterparts. In his June 9 telegraph to Kempff,

Conger pointed out that “much more help should come quickly from Manila.” The Chinese government’s denial of their request to bring in more legation guards the previous day fueled his sense of urgency.60 What’s worse, the appointment of xenophobic Prince Duan as the head

57 Robert Coltman telegrams, June 9, 1900, Houghton Library, Harvard University; Ragsdale to Kempff, June 4, 1900, ibid. For an account of the Tianjin massacre, see Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp.229-33. 58 Conger to Hay, June 4, 1900, ibid; Conger to Hay, June 5, 1900, ibid; Kempff to Long, June 5, 1900, ibid; 59 Conger to Hay, June 8, 1900, ibid. 60 Conger to Kempff, June 9, 1900, in Kempff to Long, June 9, 1900, ibid; Conger to Hay, June 11, 1900, ibid. On June 30, a correspondent for the Collier’s Weekly would indicate in his letter the longing for more major ships to represent the American interest in China. According to him, “considering the importance of our interests in the best, we are very poorly represented, indeed, by a small cruiser and a good sized gunboat.” “In the Field 26 of the Zongli Yamen seemed to further reveal the Chinese government’s anti-foreign stance.61

The highly anticipated relief’s botched arrival enhanced internationals’ anxiety. On June

10 an international column of around 1800 strong, including 112 American marines, departed from Tianjin in an effort to pry their way into Beijing. The arrival of more Russian and French forces the next day boosted their strength to a little over 2000. But the relief column failed to reach the Chinese capital due to the torn railway. Residents of the international legations were so sure of their arrivals that carts and escorts had headed for the train station on June 11 to bring them into the city.62 Such contrast between high expectations and cruel realities must have made them more worrisome about their fates.

Other news and scenes in Beijing only further enhanced the anxiety of international residents. On the same day, Chinese soldiers under General Dong Fuxiang’s command redeployed to Beijing. Some cavalry units encountered the secretary of the Japanese legation near Yongdingmen, the South Gate of the walled city of Beijing. The latter just returned from inquiring into the Seymour detachment’s whereabout, and got killed by Chinese soldiers.

Around the same time, the Boxers flooded into Beijing unopposed, and set fire to churches, converts’ residence and houses containing imported commodities within the city, which resulted in numerous fatalities. As no one dared to bury them, those converts’ bodies, exposed on the roadside, were devoured by pigs and dogs. The Boxers even accused anyone attempting to put out the fire as foreigners’ accomplices and murdered them. Only the Tartar wall separating the Manchu from the Chinese section of Beijing and the wind direction prevented

Against China,” The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, August 24, 1900, p.4. 61 Conger to Hay, June 11, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 62 Robert Coltman telegrams, June 10, 1900, Houghton Library. 27 the fire from spreading to the international legations.

In response to these threats, foreign civilians had to barricade themselves in the international legations and accumulate as many goods as they could.63 The siege that Minister

Conger feared now became the reality. Thirty-six years after winning his first military honor in the Battle of Peach Tree Creek, the last battle before the siege of Atlanta, Minister Conger would experience another siege.64 This time he was on the receiving end. According to him, internationals were “prisoners anxiously waiting relief.” 65 Mrs. Conger described their position as being “on board ship in unknown seas and battling with a terrific storm.”66

In spite of the precarious situation, Minister Conger still strove to demonstrate strength in his dealings with both Chinese officials and members of the American legation. On June 17, in a meeting with Zongli Yamen officials in the American legation, he deplored the Chinese incompetence, and claimed that “if he had one thousand American soldiers he could kill every

‘Boxer’ in Beijing.” Minister Conger also threatened that “if any member of his family, or member of the United States Legation was injured, the American troops would destroy

Beijing.”67 Conger’s threat made explicit his view of the connection between American power and its influence in China.

Meanwhile, as Mrs. Conger described, her husband “at all times shows good cheer and offers a helping hand wherever he can…he acts quickly and fearlessly. He does not accept all

63 Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Science ed., Gengzi Jishi 庚子记事(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1978), pp. 11-5; Conger to Hay, June 11, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Conger to Hay, June 15, 1900, ibid; Conger to Hay, June 18, 1900, ibid; Sarah Pike Conger, Letters from China (Chicago, IL: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1909), pp. 96, 98, 100; The British National Archives, WO 106/6247, Journal of Principal Events in China, p.5. 64 “Texas Veterans Will Attend”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, July 13, 1900, p.6. 65 Conger to Hay, June 18, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 66 Sarah Pike Conger, Letters from China, p.108. 67 Memorandum of an interview had at the U.S. Legation, June 17, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 28 the dreadful rumors as facts. In his reasoning way he at once shows many of them to be false.”68

These sentences portrayed an ideal man with courage and rationality who could protect presumably weaker members of society. Minister Conger must have taken these qualities to heart. In his June 11 telegram to Hay, he stated that “we regret exceedingly the presence of so many women and children, but are doing the best we can for safety of all.”69 As historians like

Kristin L. Hoganson and Amy Greenberg have illuminated, overseas enterprise was shaped by gender norms, and masculine male figures epitomized a powerful nation. 70 American servicemen in the China Relief Expedition would have agreed. In a letter to his mother after the relief of internationals in Tianjin, marine Lieutenant Smedley Butler wrote that “the fighting and marching have been terrible but to see all the women and children we had saved, it was worth all the hardships we had endured, and to a fellow like myself with a mother and brothers like I have it certainly seemed worth all our suffering.”71 The portrayal of delicate women falling under men’s protection obscured the significant roles that women actually played during the siege. They sewed beddings for hospitals as well as sand bags for defense out of all kinds of clothing, cooked meals, and cared for the sick and wounded. As Mrs. Conger stated, “women serve in these capacities, as men must serve in other ways.”72

While internationals endured the siege in Beijing, department heads in Washington D.C. scrambled to spare more troops in the Philippines for China. On June 11, the Department of

68 Sarah Pike Conger, Letters from China, p.98. 69 Conger to Hay, June 11, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 70 Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 71 Waller to the Brigadier General Commandant of U.S. Marines, June 28, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Wise to Kempff, June 24, 1900, ibid; Anne Cipriano Venzon ed., General Smedley Darlington Butler: The Letters of A Leatherneck, 1898-1931 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p.20. 72 Sarah Pike Conger, Letters from China, pp.121-4. For a detailed examination of women’s role during the siege, see Susanna Hoe, Women at the Siege, Peking 1900 (Oxford, UK: Holo Books, 2000). 29

Navy ordered Remey to send another one hundred marines to China.73 This time Remey chose

Major Littleton W. T. Waller and Company A of the First Battalion that had been scheduled to leave for Guam.74 Three days later, Army Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin telegraphed

General MacArthur about the time he needed to send a regular regiment to Beijing when required to do so.75 In his response, General MacArthur, who a colonel praised as “ever ready to obey my command” in the Second Battle of Murfreesboro in the Civil War, first demanded sending as “quickly as possible two thousand shot-guns, pattern furnished prison guards” and corresponding ammunition. Then he stated that “force in Philippines has been disseminated to limitation of safety,” yet he had to slowly concentrate his troops to “avoid evacuation of territory now occupied which would be extremely unfortunate.” Immediately following these sentences, General MacArthur added that he had “not cared to emphasize this feature of situation.” These depictions of the grave situation in the Philippines served to pave the way for his main message: “loss of a regiment at this time would be a serious matter.” It was only after all these statements that he answered Corbin’s question by stating “if critical emergency arises in China, can send a regiment two days notice [sic].”76 These exchanges again demonstrated different perceptions regarding relative priorities of affairs in the Philippines and China.

While General MacArthur, like almost all other generals, had the tendency to underline

73 Long to Remey, June 11, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 74 Smedley Darlington Butler to Maud D. Butler, June 17, 1900, in Anne Cipriano Venzon ed., General Smedley Darlington Butler: The Letters of A Leatherneck, 1898-1931 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 17. 75 Corbin to MacArthur, June 14, 1900, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902 (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, U.S Army, 1993), p. 411. 76 Report of Col. Nicholas Greusel, January 15, 1863, United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol.20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), p.356; MacArthur to Corbin, June 16, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. It is necessary to point out that Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902 leaves out information in the same telegraph that was not related with the China Relief Expedition, which takes the message out of context. 30 his theater’s needs, the situation in the Philippines prompted this move too. On the one hand, the fight in the Philippines seemed to show signs of improvement as more insurgents surrendered themselves to U.S. authorities. Some of them came in complete organizations like entire company. General MacArthur described these cases as “significant,” “important,” and

“very encouraging.” Buoyed by these surrenders, he proposed to provide amnesty to Filipinos who did not violate laws of war. On the other hand, small bands of Filipino guerrillas continued to attack U.S. forces, mostly in Luzon but also in Mindanao and Panay. As the new military governor assuming office in early May, General MacArthur would like to maintain, if not to increase, his current force level to handle these attacks.77

However, a new development in Dagu would render an infantry regiment insufficient.

Admirals of various naval forces regarded Dagu forts as potential threats to maintaining the communication with troops and their nationals ashore. On June 16, citing the escalating

Chinese hostilities like troops deployed along the railroad and torpedoes in the entrance of Hai

River, they demanded the garrison surrender the fortress before 2:00 am the next day. If the garrison would not yield by then, they would take the stronghold by force.78 Around 12:45 am on June 17, Dagu forts fired at the allied navy, who then returned fire and landed sailors to occupy them at 6:00 am.79

Kempff did not join either the ultimatum or the attack due to his concern over its

77 MacArthur to Corbin, May 22, 1900, in Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902, p.1171; MacArthur to Corbin, May 28, 1900, ibid., p.1172; MacArthur to Corbin, June 5, 1900, ibid., p.1175; MacArthur to Corbin, May 21, 1900, ibid., p.1171; MacArthur to Corbin, June 2, 1900, ibid, p. 1173. 78 Copy of Demand for Temporary Surrender of Taku Forts, June 16, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 79 Taussig, June 17, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 31 implication for war, and ordered his warships not to shoot unless fired upon.80 As a veteran of the Battle of Port Royal and the following expedition upriver in 1861 and 1862, Kempff was no stranger to storming coastal and riverside forts.81 But he chose to follow the instruction he received about not initiating an act of war. 82 This decision formed a strong contrast to

Commodore Josiah Tattnall who, despite the U.S. neutrality, joined the fight against Dagu forts to save British warships from destruction in 1859.83

Nevertheless, an incident amidst the fighting around Dagu forts forced Admiral Kempff to reevaluate the American stance regarding the military operation in China. In the process of the exchange of fire, a couple of Chinese shots either passed over or hit the U.S.S. Monocacy, even though it had moved out of the line of fire between the opposing sides to show its neutrality.84 Admiral Kempff regarded such fire without warning “an act of war,” and thought it now “necessary to join with the other foreign powers for common defense and preservation of foreign people and the honor of our country.”85 This sentence reveals his understanding of both the material interests and masculine attributes involved in joining the military operation in China.

Additionally, the bombardment of Dagu forts prompted the Chinese government to finally

80 Kempff to Long, June 16, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 81 Flag Officer Commanding South Atlantic Blockading Squadron S. F. Du Pont to the Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, January 4, 1862, in Naval War Records Office, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol.12: North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (February 2, 1865- August 3, 1865); South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 29, 1861-May 13, 1862) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 447. 82 Kempff to Long, June 17, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. David J. Silbey offers a more condemning evaluation of Kempff’s acts. He argues that by positioning the U.S.S. Monocacy near the Hai River, Kempff anticipated the U.S. involvement in the fight. See Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China, pp.93-4. 83 Stephen R. Platt, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2012), p.47. 84 Commander F. M. Wise to Kempff, June 17, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 85 Kempff to Long, June 20, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 32 cast its lot on the Boxers’ side. The Chinese imperial troops, who encamped along the railway and let Admiral Seymour’s relief column pass unmolested before, began to directly attack this international force.86 As British naval officer John Jellicoe wrote in his diary, “the banners captured by us during this engagement proved conclusively that the attacking force included

Chinese imperial troops belonging to the army of General Dong Fuxiang.”87 Additionally, the

Chinese imperial forces commenced shelling the international concessions in Tianjin on June

17.88 As Rev. J. H. Pyke described in a letter to the Missionary Office at home, the shells were

“flying thick and fast over our heads.”89 The bombardment proved more hazardous to others.

In a letter to her family, British missionary Francis Emily Scott narrated that “we were in rather a hot corner as it happened, and three shells struck the place we were in.”90 The Chinese bombardment became even more accurate the next day. Paymaster George M. Lukesh of the

U.S.S. Monocacy, who was trapped in the international concessions, recorded in his note that

“prominent buildings were all hit,” and “a tower a few hundred yards away, containing French soldiers was hit four times in rapid succession.”91

This new situation in China demanded more American troops. Admiral Kempff suggested that “a very large foreign force will be required to restore order, as a state of war now exists,” and “one brigade necessary to properly represent our government.”92 On June 22 he also

86 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 27, The Seymour Relief Expedition, pp. 8, 19; McCalla to Kempff, in Kempff to Long, June 28, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 87 “Narrative of Events, Peking Relief Expedition 1900”, Supplementary Jellicoe Papers, MS 71558, Western Manuscripts, the British Library. 88 Kempff to Long, June 22, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Lieutenant N. E. Erwin to Kempff, June 27, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 89 “Thrilling Description of the Bombardment of Tien-Tsin”, Zion’s Herald, 78:34 (August 22, 1900), p.1081. 90 “Letters May 20-July 12 1900 from Francis Emily Scott to her family during the Insurrection of the ‘Boxers’”, Supplementary Jellicoe Papers, MS 71558, Western Manuscripts, The British Library. 91 Notes of Paymaster Lukesh, in Kempff to Long, June 27, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 92 Kempff to Long, June 18, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Kempff to Long, June 19, 1900, ibid. 33 required all marines in Cavite sent to China, a demand that commander of the marines ashore

Captain McCalla already made back on June 9.93 In light of the situation, Admiral Remey asked General MacArthur to keep the Cavite peninsula under the army occupation for more time until the new marine battalion arrived, and set sailed on U.S.S. Brooklyn with 300 marines aboard on June 26.94 Around the same time, the Department of War sent for the Sixth Cavalry

Regiment stationed in the United States.95 Nevertheless, these troops seemed insufficient to deal with the escalating situation in Northern China, let alone possible contingencies in other parts of China. Depictions of the local unrest and the cry for warships from various U.S. consuls in China inundated both the Department of State and Navy.96

Under these circumstances, the hope of a speedy relief lay on extracting army units from the Philippines, which again proved to be a thorny task. On June 22, General Corbin inquired whether General MacArthur could send another infantry regiment to China without endangering his mission. General MacArthur responded that he could not, and reiterated his troops’ scatter in the Philippines that the withdrawal of the Ninth Infantry Regiment had further aggravated. According to him, “as a purely military proposition Ninth Infantry cannot be sent as ordered without risking material interests here.” He elaborated that maintaining the current troop level and military pressure could induce the Philippines to accept the U.S. ascendency.

In contrast, “every able-bodied soldier who leaves this army at present weakens the military

93 Kempff to Long, June 22, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Report of Trouble Between the Allied Powers and the Boxers, June 21, 1900, ibid. 94 Remey to Long, June 25, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 95 Corbin to General Shafter, June 23, 1900, in Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902, p. 416. 96 Consul Fowler (Chefoo) to Hay, June 20, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Telegram from Senior Consul (General) Shanghai to Fowler, June 23, 1900, ibid. 34 situation. The detachment of regiments jeopardizes the entire enterprise.”97 On the next day, the Philippine Commission concurred with MacArthur’s opinion by stating in its report that a

“favorable outcome would be hindered by further reducing army and relaxing military grasp.”98

In the face of General MacArthur’s strong opposition, Secretary of War Elihu Root had decided to bring in troops from somewhere else, only to change his mind after a telephone call with President McKinley. The president argued that since the situation in China now harbored higher risks compared with the Philippines, he would extract more troops from the Philippines for service in China in order to save time for the rescue mission. This plan had much in common with its British counterpart that first deployed regiments from Hong Kong and Singapore, and then filled the void in these two colonies with troops from India. Likewise, Secretary Root had been mobilizing troops in Cuba and Puerto Rico. These regiments would fill the void in the

Philippines left by units embarking for China.99 On July 7 General Corbin officially informed

General MacArthur of this scheme, and required him to send another infantry regiment and one battery regiment from the Philippines to China, where they would meet up with units deployed from the United States, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. This expected American force in China consisted of three infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment, and one battery regiment. 100

General Adna Chaffee would command them to battle, while General MacArthur would be responsible for this forces’ logistics that mostly came from the Philippines.101

97 Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902, pp. 415, 417. 98 The Philippine Commission to Root, June 25, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 99 Telephone conversation between Root and McKinley, in Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin company, 1916), pp. 236-8. It is Marilyn Young’s book The Rhetoric of Empire that called my attention to this source. The British National Archives, WO 106/6247, Journal of Principal Events in China, pp.6, 9. 100 Corbin to MacArthur, July 7, 1900, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902, p. 422. 101 Corbin to MacArthur, July 20, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 35

Grappling with the Operation’s Political Implications

While decision makers scrambled to assemble troops for China, the American public closely followed them out of concern, curiosity, and excitement. Since 1900 was a presidential election year, the McKinley administration’s moves possessed domestic as well as international implications. Consequently, numerous Republicans pondered the possible influence of events in China on the coming campaign.

Most Republicans regarded the China Relief Expedition a boost for the McKinley administration. Before the bombardment of Dagu forts and the formation of any definitive decision regarding the American troop level in China, Sylvester Chamberlain, a Republican in

Buffalo, assured Secretary Root that “the first gun will unite the American people in a defense of the flag and our commercial future…no campaign document will add to the prestige of the administration so successfully as a proper defense of the commercial expansion.”102 Myron T.

Herrick, an Ohio Republican, wrote to President McKinley, in which he saw it “apparent that the people would strongly approve the sending of a large body of soldiers to China should you deem it necessary, the larger body, the better.” His reasoning was that “a move of this kind would spoil their (Democrats) best campaign cry by arousing the patriotism of the people.”103

Rev. Earl Cranston also believed that “the American people are fond of bold leaders. If they only knew as I know what an insignificant factor our country has been in the affair of the other side of the world they would be proud of the man who made their power felt in such a crisis.”104

102 Sylvester Chamberlain to Secretary Root, June 8, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Box 7, The Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 103 Myron T. Herrick to President McKinley, June 14, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 104 Earl Cranston to William McKinley, June 16. 1900, William McKinley Papers, Series 3, Reel 72. 36

In a letter to Henry White, the first secretary of the American embassy in London, Senator

Henry Cabot Lodge stated that “I do not think the fact of a Presidential year is going to hamper us in China, for ninety percent of the country are obviously with the administration in a vigorous policy in this direction. The danger to the legations and our citizens in China have

[sic] settled this.”105

Many Republicans wrote to congratulate McKinley on his course of action as it unfolded, and to assure him of the nation’s support. Sylvester Chamberlain wrote that “there may be a sudden phase in events, rapidly moving toward a crisis in the Far East, which will change affairs into a national support of your careful policy in that direction.”106 Charles G. Dawes from the Department of Treasury mentioned how George Perkins, a prominent New York businessman, depicted McKinley’s Chinese policy as “a general topic of discussion” among his circles who credited it with “having already made the United States the leader in the effort which the world must make to solve one of its greatest problems.”107 U.S. Consul General in

London William M. Osborne thought that “the Chinese question is so delicate that no person of some sense would ever vote for Mr. Bryan in preference to you.”108 While these flowery sentences might contain exaggerations in their writers’ efforts to flatter President McKinley, they still revealed a common conviction that events in China would help the incumbent.

Women offered their congratulation to President McKinley as well. Clara Bell Brown was an outspoken female anti-suffragist of the time. Yet such opinion did not prevent her from assuming an active role in politics. She had been a frequent visitor to the White House during

105 Senator Lodge to Henry White, June 29, 1900, Henry Cabot Lodge papers, reel 15, Massachusetts Historical Society. 106 Sylvester Chamberlain to President McKinley, June 24, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 107 Charles G. Dawes to President McKinley, July 29, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 108 William M. Osborne to President McKinley, July 30, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 37

Grant’s presidency as a friend of First Lady Julia Grant. “A woman of great talent and energy,” she interviewed the prominent Chinese statesman Li Hongzhang on his visit to America in 1896, mostly about his opinion on the role of women in China and the United States. She also served as the general director of the Women’s Cuban League that called for aid to ease women and children’s suffering in Cuba, and put an end to the Spanish colonial rule in that island. To achieve this goal, she would recruit young ladies, including bicycle girls, to lobby statesmen, congressmen, and newspaper editors.109 Given these past political activities, it was no wonder that she would express her perception of the administration’s China policy. “Your policy in the present crisis in China, is so splendidly upholding the dignity of America, is the lead with the great powers, will utterly satisfy each patriot heart.”110

These Republicans’ assessment of the situation matched many of their equivalents on the anti-imperialist side. In his June 4 letter to Herbert Welsh, Edwin Burritt Smith mentioned Carl

Schurz’s concern over Republicans “get[ting] back on the fence” on the Filipino issue, which constituted anti-imperialists’ “greatest danger.” As Schurz saw it, “an indefinite promise of

‘autonomy’, or eventual freedom for the Filipinos ‘when they shall be fit for self government’, would allay the fears of many hesitating Republicans.”111 If such a tactic worked in the Filipino issue that had been stirring so many controversies in the United States, the McKinley administration’s handle of the China Relief Expedition, with all the promise of maintaining the

Open-Door policy and protecting American lives and interests, would only draw more voters.

109 “Clara Belle Brown to Deliver Lecture”, San Francisco Call, San Francisco, CA, June 2, 1901, p.19; “American Women”, The Morning Herald, Lexington, KY, September 14, 1896, p.6; “Women for Free Cuba”, Idaho Daily Statesman, Boise, ID, May 30, 1897, p.4. 110 Clara Bell Brown to President McKinley, June 26, 1900, William McKinley Papers, Series 3, Reel 72. 111 Edwin Burritt Smith to Herbert Welsh, June 4, 1900, in Carl Schurz Papers, Reel 68, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 38

Even Maria P. Wilson, who claimed President McKinley “is the man responsible for the war with Spain, and he alone” in her following sentences, admitted in a letter to Schurz that “he has shown some other traits in China,” and that “his one and only desire and interest is to see himself returned to the White House in March 1901.”112 Anti-imperialist analysis from a different perspective proved equally gloomy. Charles B. Wilby from Cincinnati predicted that if a war with China broke out and became “a matter of national concern and enthusiasm,” then

“Bryan’s chances would be lost.” He expressed concern that Senator Mark Hanna and President

McKinley would “see this opportunity and use it.”113

In taking advantage of the McKinley administration’s response to the Boxer Uprising for campaign purposes, Republicans moved beyond China and set their eyes on the Philippines.

Above all, they made sure to hammer home the Philippines’ significance for the China Relief

Expedition. American controversies around this archipelago had been incessant since Admiral

George Dewey sank the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay and U.S. troops landed in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. The ensuing Treaty of Paris ceded the whole archipelago to the United States, which added more fuel to the emerging American anti-imperialist movement.

It took extensive heated debates and William Jennings Bryan’s calculation to exploit this issue in the upcoming presidential election for the Senate to barely ratify the treaty.

Republicans had been defending the possession of the Philippines as the key to the U.S. commercial expansion in China. In a June 10 letter to Edward Atkinson, founder of the

American Anti-Imperialist League, James Callaway from Georgia observed that “many seem

112 Maria P. Wilson to Carl Schurz, July 16, 1900, in Carl Schurz Papers, Reel 68, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 113 Charles B. Wilby to Carl Schurz, July 25, 1900, in Carl Schurz Papers, Reel 68, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 39 to think great commercial gain is in store for us and that the ‘open door’ to China is dependent upon ‘permanent possession’ of the Philippines.” 114 Nevertheless, the continuing Filipino resistance to American rule further fanned many Americans’ doubt on the value of the

Philippines, which rendered this issue an explosive topic in the 1900 Presidential Election.

Under these circumstances, Republicans needed to demonstrate the Philippines’ importance to the United States in order to sway voters.

The China Relief Expedition presented Republicans with an ideal opportunity, and they soon jumped on it. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), one of the most prominent proponents of the American thrust into East Asia, fired the first shot. The occasion was the Essex club that ratified nominations from the recent Republican National Convention. In front of an array of guests present, Senator Lodge portrayed holding the Philippines as the key to the swift

American response to the Boxer Uprising, and underlined the need for the United States to participate in the international contest in Asia in order to protect its interests. Here is what he said:

But if it had not been for the war in the Philippines our missionaries, our traders, our

Consuls, and our merchants would be today unprotected in China or left in the protection

of some other nation. As it is, holding Manila, we are the strongest naval power in the East

and can protect our own…I’m not afraid ever to see the United States take her place in the

struggle of the great world powers where she belongs. I do not mean that I want her to

meddle in Europe; God forbid, but I do say that the other side of the Pacific is an American

114 James Callaway to Edward Atkinson, June 10, 1900, Edward Atkinson papers, Carton 9, Massachusetts Historical Society. 40

interest, and I want to see the United States protect her own throughout the East.115

While his opponents might view this speech as a campaign stunt, Senator Lodge in fact adhered to his conviction. In a letter to Secretary Hay on the same day, Senator Lodge stated that “the situation in China is very grave. What [a] fortune for us to have the Philippines, and yet there are people who would throw them away.” In another letter to industrialist and historian

James Ford Rhodes nearly a week later, he pointed out that “for good or for ill we have come out of our hermitage and we are in the affairs of the world to stay.”116

Lodge was not alone in this mode of thinking. A letter from William Michael Byrne,

Attorney of Wilmington, Delaware and a prominent speaker in Republican campaigns, to

President McKinley explicitly illustrated the ascending American power and the significance of the Philippines that shaped his perception of the U.S. response to the Boxer Uprising.117

Byrne pointed to an article he published in the Catholic weekly magazine Ave Maria, in which he compared the United States to the Roman Empire in protecting its citizens, especially missionaries, abroad, and underlined the Philippines’ importance in this enterprise:

As Saint Paul was saved from stripes through the dignity of the Roman name, so let the

brutal Celestials know that the same virtue inheres in the dignity of American citizenship.

Make it known that an American the world over, acting within the scope of his citizenship,

will command the whole force of our government for the protection of his essential rights

115 “American Policy in China”, Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, June 24, 1900, p. 2. 116 Lodge to Hay, June 23, 1900, Henry Cabot Lodge papers, Reel 14, Massachusetts Historical Society; Senator Lodge to James Ford Rhodes, June 29, 1900, Henry Cabot Lodge papers, Reel 15, Massachusetts Historical Society. 117 “Addicks Men ‘Sore’”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, June 17, 1899, p.2. 41

to life, liberty, and property. The unhappy war now waging on the part of the misguided

Filipinos will have its compensations.118

Anti-imperialists questioned such a connection between holding the Philippines and guarding American interests in China. They highlighted the delay in deploying American troops to China for the rescue mission, which contradicted imperialists’ claim about the whole archipelago’s importance for responding to the crisis in China. As The Springfield Daily

Republican asked, “many weeks have now passed since the legations were threatened, but what have the 60,000 soldiers in the Philippines and the war ships on the Asiatic station accomplished in the way of rescuing Minister Conger at Pekin?”119

Some anti-imperialists took a step further and accused the American move in the

Philippines of provoking the Boxer Uprising. As president of the American Anti-Imperialist

League George S. Boutwell put it at the National Liberty Congress of Anti-Imperialists, “when we entered into the Philippines it was the additional menace to the Chinese Empire that has led to the revolution in China.” He asked his audience to ponder “what would be the condition of the mind of America, if…it should come to pass that the Emperor of Germany, with the approval of England and the silent acquiescence of all Europe, had seized the island of San

Domingo and Haiti.” This rhetorical question took direct aim at the Monroe Doctrine that the

United States took pain to enforce in the second half of the nineteenth century.120 Democratic nominee for the House of Representatives in the fifth congressional district of Michigan

118 William Michael Byrne to Cortelyou, July 5, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 119 “Protection of Americans in China”, The Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, July 5, 1900, p. 6. 120 George S. Boutwell, Bryan or Imperialism (Boston, MA: The New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1900), pp.8-9. 42

William F. McKnight made the same argument while campaigning.121

More importantly, anti-imperialists took advantage of this opportunity to promote their vision for the American course of action in the Philippines. The Boston Daily Advertiser urged the McKinley administration to fulfill its promise of self-government to Filipinos who would cease fighting under that circumstance. This move would free up most of the American troops in the Philippines for service in China.122 A related article in The Springfield Daily Republican traced the slow deployment of troops to the administration’s choice of occupying the whole archipelago rather than merely establishing a naval base that could have freed up more garrison troops for the mission in China. In addition, it stressed that San Francisco equated to Calcutta in British India in terms of their respective distance to Northern China. Meanwhile, Hawaii was midway along the sea route between the United States and China, just like Singapore’s location in the maritime journey from British India to China. Relatedly, a naval base in the

Philippines was sufficient to be Hong Kong’s equivalent in the speedy mobilization of troops for China. In the end, the article mocked Senator Lodge’s speech by stating “what a melancholy refrain seems even now Mr. Lodge’s chanticleer crow …when the United States government appears as powerless as a child to save its own envoy from possible murder, only 75 miles from the mouths of the cannon on its war ships in the gulf of Pechili.”123 The image of the United

States as a frail child constituted a strong contrast to imperialists’ portrayal of a muscular Uncle

Sam who both nurtured and disciplined barbaric Oriental kids.124

121 “For Chinese War too”, The Grand Rapids Herald, Grand Rapids, MI, August 20, 1900, p.4. 122 “The Chinese Troubles”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, June 13, 1900, p.4. 123 “Protection of Americans in China”, The Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, July 5, 1900, p. 6. 124 For a comprehensive discussion of gender discourse in contemporary foreign affairs in the United States, see Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars; Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 43

In the face of anti-imperialists’ onslaught on this issue, imperialists attempted to undermine their opponents’ credibility. On the one hand, they labeled these doubts as nothing but campaign stunts. As an article in Summit County Journal questioned, “if we had allowed the Philippine

Islands to escape us, would not such unheard-of stupidity on the part of the government …make excellent Democratic campaign material at the present time?”125 This accusation appeared valid in light of Democratic leader William Jennings Bryan’s shifting position in terms of the

Treaty with Spain that ceded the Philippines to the United States. Republicans like Senator

Hoar and Senator Lodge repeatedly attacked Bryan for lacking political principles.126 Rev.

Cranston also predicted that “the anti-imperialists would be the first to condemn the administration for any disaster that may ensue from diplomatic caution,” and the contrast between waging war in the Philippines and failing to protect American citizens in China would be their reasoning.127

Imperialists were equally quick to point out the flaws in the logic of anti-imperialists. The

Boston Journal put The Portsmouth Times on the spot for pushing the Republican agenda to the extreme: “Nobody dreams of establishing a naval station in Spitzbergen, or of developing another Manila in Van Diemen’s Land, or of building dry docks and marine barracks in the

Indian Ocean. We have no important interests in these remote quarters of the world.”

Meanwhile, the United States had numerous citizens and trade in China, which demanded protection that the American government could not have provided without its foothold in the

125 “If We Hadn’t the Philippines (Summit County Journal)”, Colorado Springs Gazette, Colorado Springs, CO, June 27, 1900, p. 4. 126 Senator Hoar to Edward J. Cornish, July 16, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79; Senator Hoar to Senator R. F. Pettigrew, September 6, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 80; Concord Speech, October 12, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 106; Senator Lodge to Brooks Adams, June 29, 1900, Reel 14, The Massachusetts Historical Society. 127 Earl Cranston to William McKinley, June 16. 1900, William McKinley Papers, Series 3, Reel 72. 44

Philippines. “It is therefore mere childishness to conjure what we could do or should do in other quarters of the world, where we have no commerce, no citizens to shield from peril.”128 Here the fatherly imperialists hoped to give a lecture on the affairs of the world to their unruly children (anti-imperialists).

Indeed, it was difficult to imagine that the United States, with its enormous commercial interests in China, would stand by while other nations deployed troops to restore order and gain influence at the expense of American exports. As historians like Walter LaFeber and Bruce

Cumings point out, the legendary lucrative Chinese market had captivated generations of

Americans to expand westward. This trade relationship gained more traction as the overproducing U.S. economy sought to recover from the Panic of 1893 by increasing its exports.129 The category of American commodities to China included “flour, coal oil, lumber, iron, locomotives, mining plants, piece goods, drugs, tobacco, canned goods, notions” and others.130 The Open-Door policy meant to safeguard these American exports in the face of other nations’ grabbing an exclusive sphere of influence in China.

Under these circumstances, the United States must deploy troops to protect its commercial interests in China. As an analysis of the Chinese situation in Outlook magazine pointed out,

“America will hardly agree that the commercial door which Mr. Hay has opened should be closed or even half closed by Count Muraviev, as soon as the Trans-Siberian railway enables him in a fortnight to land several hundred thousand Russian troops in North China.”131 Henry

128 “One Thing at a Time”, Boston Journal, Boston, MA, July 4, 1900, p. 4. 129 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Bruce Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010). 130 Charles Denby, “The Chinese Crisis”, The Independent, 52:260 (June 21, 1900), p.1477. 131 “The Chinese Situation”, Outlook, 65:6 (June 9, 1900), p.338. 45

White wrote to Theodore Roosevelt that he was “glad to see that our government is taking its full share in the proposed restoration of order, as a Great Power with our enormous commercial interests should do.”132 After his meeting with Secretary Root, Lieutenant General Nelson A.

Miles sent a follow-up note underlining “the vast commercial interests of this country in China, and the great indebtedness of that country to the people of the United States for our products which she has imported” that should be taken into consideration in developing the China policy.133 Helen Marot, the Philadelphia librarian and labor activist who opposed imperialism, also sharply pointed out in her letter to Carl Schurz that “the Chinese situation is the last touch needed to make opposition [to expansion] hopeless,” and that “a positive commercial policy in the East would appeal to the whole Pacific Coast.”134

On the other hand, like the debates around the Philippine-American War, imperialists accused anti-imperialists of being unpatriotic and inducing further Chinese violence against

American civilians. This tactic dated back to the early republic when Democratic-Republicans branded Federalists “treasonous” in the War of 1812 to result in the latter’s decline, and found its recent application in the Civil War and Reconstruction when Republicans were “waving the bloody shirt” to dismiss Democrats. In fact, Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Theodore

Roosevelt constantly referred to these precedents in his private letters. For instance, in a letter to former Senator from Illinois J. M. Palmer, he mentioned “in ’64 we had a right to make a similar appeal on behalf of Lincoln and against men like Vallandigham…in 1812-14, the

Federalist party…declared itself to be the ally of a foreign foe.” 135 By comparing anti-

132 Henry White to Theodore Roosevelt, June 24, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, Reel 5. 133 Nelson A. Miles to Root, July 18, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 11. 134 Helen Marot to Carl Schurz, July 31, 1900, Carl Schurz Papers, Reel 68. 135 Theodore Roosevelt to J. M. Palmer, August 9, 1900, in Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 2, Reel 324. 46 imperialists to Clement Vallandigham, a prominent anti-war Democrat in the North during the

Civil War who was arrested, tried, and deported to the South, Roosevelt indicated that these dissenters of the Philippine-American War were on the wrong side of history.

Imperialists exploited this strategy whenever they saw fit. The Civil War precedent came in handy for The Boston Journal: “If the Times and its party challenge it they will be acting as madly as they did in 1864, when they also demanded that we should haul down the Stars and

Stripes, scuttle out of the territory that our armies held, and shamefully evade obligations that fate had laid upon us.”136 Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court David L. Snodgrass, who advocated American expansion and campaigned for a seat in the U.S. Senate, also mocked the Democratic platform on the Philippines by suggesting “it is a matter of congratulation to the party that the platform went no further---that it did not contain a resolution of sympathy with the Boxers.”137 This sentiment found its most intense expression by Theodore Roosevelt.

As Senator Lodge suggested, since McKinley would not campaign much as the incumbent president according to the contemporary norm, Roosevelt would be “the central figure of the active campaign.” He should advocate for McKinley in everything he said. 138 Theodore

Roosevelt must have taken these directions to heart when making the following speech:

In the Philippines, the policy which our political opponents now champion, the streets of

Manila would have witnessed such scenes as those of the streets of Pekin. The Chinese

policy has always consistently been against expansion, and she offers today the best

136 “One Thing at a Time”, Boston Journal, Boston, MA, July 4, 1900, p. 4. 137 “Judge Snodgrass Sore”, The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, July 6, 1900, p. 3. 138 Lodge to Roosevelt, June 29, 1900, in Theodore Roosevelt Presidential Papers, Series 1, Reel 6. 47

example of the fruits of such a policy when logically carried out. Nominally, her policy

has been one of peace; in reality it has simply been one which invites aggression from

without and incites her own people to ferocious and hideous barbarism.139

While critics would perceive this speech as another campaign lambasting, Theodore

Roosevelt was sincere. In a July 13 letter to General Leonard Wood whose wife had a sister in

Beijing, Roosevelt ended by writing “it is a dreadful situation in China, and a sufficient commentary of what the anti-imperialists would bring us to.”140

Anti-imperialists soon responded by underlining the alleged difference between the administration’s China and Philippines policy. After reiterating the limited number of American troops that the administration could spare for China even in an emergency, an article in Life magazine pinpointed the American claim to respect China’s territorial integrity and support a

Chinese government capable of maintaining order, which stood in contrast to the U.S. deprivation of home rule in the Philippines. It ended by stating that “there is a good deal about the Chinese outbreak that would tend to make the country more loath than ever to see the

Administration change hands, but it is not of much value as an argument to make our policy in the Philippines any more popular.”141 This sentence revealed that despite all those differences in opinions on the Philippines’ significance for the China Relief Expedition and the war in that archipelago, both camps largely agreed on the necessity of deploying troops to protect

American lives and properties in China.

139 St. Alban’s Daily Messenger, St. Alban, VT, August 1, 1900, p. 4. 140 Roosevelt to General Leonard Wood, July 13, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 2, Reel 324. 141 Life, 36:925, August 2, 1900, p.84. 48

Nevertheless, while many Americans felt reassured by the presence of strong U.S. forces in the expedition, some were concerned about the ultimate American purpose in China and the future foreign policy behind this wielding of power. Existing works on Sino-U.S. relations tend to highlight the Open-Door Notes in 1899 and 1900 in which the United States urged other empires to maintain China’s territorial integrity and refrain from grabbing an exclusive sphere of influence. Yet a vast number of contemporary Americans deemed China to be a decaying empire whose dismemberment was inevitable. A partitioned China appeared more likely than ever after the Boxer Uprising. According to chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign

Affairs Cushman Kellogg Davis (R-MN), “that the powers are in a dilemma which they would have been glad to avoid may be taken for granted. It seems inevitable that China will be partitioned.” 142 Former American Minister to China Charles Denby, after listing possible

European and Japanese territorial ambitions in China, admitted that “no nation, not even our own, has objected to the seizure of Chinese territory by the European Powers, just as no nation raised its voice when England commenced its war on the African republics.”143

Amidst this atmosphere, it was natural for the American public to assume that the

Scramble for China would repeat itself. As William Fowler, a British living in 43 Grosvenor

Square, London, wrote to Atkinson, “McKinley will be compelled to cooperate with us and others, what may follow, who can say?”144 Edward J. Cornish, a Republican from Nebraska, mentioned in a letter to Senator Hoar that “Senator Lodge speaks of ‘stern justice’ to be applied in China in a way that makes us suspect that he desires some sort of occupation in China.”145

142 “Davis Predicts a War”, The Minneapolis Journal, Minneapolis, MN, June 21, 1900, p. 9. 143 Charles Denby, “The Chinese Crisis”, The Independent, 52:260 (June 21, 1900), p.1477. 144 William Fowler to Edward Atkinson, June 14, 1900, Edward Atkinson papers, Carton 9, Massachusetts Historical Society. 145 Edward J. Cornish to Senator Hoar, July 13, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79. 49

A businessman from California, E. E. Crandall, reported to Bryan that manufacturers he met in

Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburgh, and Chicago all believed that “the dismemberment and division of China is now an absolute necessity,” and “when the time came for allotment and disposition…the administration would be forced into an alliance and acceptance.”146 In fact, some newspapers even reported that European empires had decided on the dismemberment of

China, and offered the United States a share, which the McKinley administration would act on after the election.147

Under such circumstances, some anti-imperialists suspected that the United States deployed troops to China in anticipation of gaining a share in the division of booty, despite the

McKinley administration’s reiteration of the Open-Door Policy. Some Republican politicians’ utterances only enhanced such an impression. Congressman Jacob H. Bromwell (R-OH) was among the first public figures to advocate an American land grab in China following European examples after the Boxer Uprising. In his mind, holding the Philippines would be futile if

European empires closed the Chinese door to American commerce.148 Even Senator Lucien

Baker (R-KS), who held the Open-Door Policy as the proper U.S. course of action in China, stated that “if the present trouble results in dismemberment, the United States will be rightfully in China, and will procure its just share and control of territory.”149

Such a scenario seemed more possible in light of lessons from the Spanish-American War.

As former Senator John. B. Henderson (R-MO), who signed a petition to Senate against the

146 E. E. Crandall to William J. Bryan, William J. Bryan papers, Box 24. 147 “American Government Asked to Indicate What Share it Will Want”, The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, June 23, 1900, p.1. 148 “A Foraker Boom for 1904 Launched”, Cleveland and Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, June 23, 1900, p. 1. 149 “Lucien Baker Believes His Chances Good”, The Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, Topeka, KS, June 26, 1900, p. 1. 50 annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, commented:

We disclaim any purpose of partitioning the Chinese empire; we only ask the “open door”;

but Philippine aggression, beginning with a claim of Manila as a coaling station, then a

small sphere of influence around that city, then Luzon, and then suddenly broadening into

the acquisition of 1200 islands, teaches us the rapacity of greed and the weakness of

virtue.150

In another letter to Schurz ten days later, he also mentioned that “McKinley is clearly in for the partition of China, and for American participation in the dirty business.” 151 This demonstrates that he truly believed in the existence of such a scheme to divide China rather than just churning out bombast for the campaign’s sake.

The concern over a possible U.S. land grab in China also emerged in the Democrat campaign. Based on Missouri Democrat William J. Stone’s advice, Bryan suggested adding a plank on China to the Democratic platform. It included the protest against “the use of present disturbance in China as a pretext for the seizing of territory or as an excuse for joining with

European nations in the dismemberment of that ancient empire.”152 Former Texas governor

James Stephen Hogg spoke out in the Democratic National Convention: “We want a declaration that we are ashamed of Uncle Sam if he goes across the waters to join John Bull, the German

150 “Against the Treaty as It is”, New York Tribune, New York, NY, February 6, 1899, p.3; J. B. Henderson to William A. Croffut, August 14, 1900, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The Papers of William A. Croffut, Box 2. 151 J. B. Henderson to Carl Schurz, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 68. 152 William J. Bryan to William J. Stone, June 30, 1900, William J. Bryan papers, Box 24. 51 emperor and the czar of Russia to divide old China.”153

These statements illuminated anti-imperialists’ concern about America losing its innocence after being contaminated by the greed and corruption of European empires. In one letter, the

English journalist H. Y. J. Taylor asked Senator George Hoar “what’s the fate of China? Is it to be retreat from English, French, Russian, American, and Japanese mercenary adventurers?”

Later he suggested that “I hope America will never tarnish her glorious independence by shaking hand with European tyrants.”154 This stern warning must have sounded close to home for American anti-imperialists familiar with the admonitions of the founding fathers on the same point.

Others feared that American soldiers’ sacrifice would only serve to fulfill other empires’ appetite for either Chinese territories or a land grab in other corners of the world. Referring to the Seymour expedition, the new Tammany Hall leader Richard Croker argued that American soldiers were “marching and fighting and dying in China, and serving under a British Admiral in a campaign inaugurated by the British Empire for the purpose of seizing territory to which she is in no way entitled.”155 In a letter to the editor of The Sun, a person under the pen name

Republican asserted that due to the ongoing war in the Philippines, the McKinley administration could only send the Ninth Infantry Regiment “to be placed under a British general to be sacrificed as the English were under Buller of South Africa.”156

These words indicated that Anglophobia ran rampant among American anti-imperialists.

153 “William J. Bryan, Democracy’s Choice”, Fort Worth Morning Register, Fort Worth, Texas, July 6, 1900, p. 1. 154 H. Y. J. Taylor to Senator Hoar, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79. 155 “Tammany Leader’s Opinion on Platform Planks”, The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, June 27, 1900, p. 6. 156 “China and the Philippines”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, August 25, 1900, p.10. 52

They sympathized with Boers in the latter’s conflicts with Great Britain and perceived imperialism as a British spell that American imperialists fell under. Even some British corresponding with American anti-imperialists admitted the country’s guilt in imperialism.

William Fowler insisted that it was the Boers who started the war, yet stated that “the story of

English relations with China is a sad one. We treated China very badly 40 years ago about opium.”157 Under these circumstances, it was no wonder that the president of the American

Anti-Imperialist League Boutwell asked the following rhetorical question. “If in the month of

June we had treated China as we should have treated Great Britain under similar circumstances, there would have been no considerable difficulty. If…there was an outbreak in London and that our minister there was in peril of his life, should we undertake to send a military expedition up the Thames river?”158

How would the United States behave amidst such a gloomy prospect for China and other nations’ territorial ambitions bewildered even many of those who advocated an expanding

American role in East Asia. Henry White predicted that “it is comparatively easy to restore order in Beijing by an overwhelming allied force, but the question is what would happen after that, with large military contingents belonging to Powers with widely different interests on the spot.”159 In a letter thanking James B. Angell, former Minister to China, for recommending him for Chinese service, William W. Rockhill highlighted the possible difficulty this job entailed. “If we were alone to have a row with the Chinese the question would not be so difficult, but when we are mixed up in one with eight or ten other Powers, each one pulling a different

157 William Fowler to Edward Atkinson, June 14, 1900, August 12, 1900, in Edward Atkinson papers, Carton 9. 158 Boutwell, Bryan or Imperialism, p.9. 159 Henry White to Theodore Roosevelt, June 24, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, Reel 5. 53 way, it is a very much more serious thing.”160

On the whole, though, while anti-imperialists lashed out at the perceived American role in service to imperial projects in both China and other parts of the world, imperialists sensed it as a unique opportunity to assert the U.S. leadership and expand its influence in China. They claimed that with its distance from other nations’ scramble for China, the United States would become the “Power of all Powers to assume the leading role” in dealing with the Boxer

Uprising and its aftermath. Besides, since British forces got bogged down in the Boer War, the

United States stood as the only nation capable of checking Russian ambition in China.161 The successful U.S. assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the border dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela five years earlier enhanced American confidence in this aspect. As an article in

The Independent proclaimed, “if America gives fair warning, sharp and clear, as in the

Venezuela case, Russia will pause.”162

The tie between masculinity and imperialism manifested itself in discussions around the embroilment in some sort of cooperation with other nations. As an article in The Independent put it, “do not tell us that we must avoid entangling alliances. That is a rule for weak states, not for strong ones; for babes, not men.” It went on to state that “the duty of strong states is to use their strength, not as giants for cruel plunder, but beneficently for the welfare of the world.”163

This sentence illustrated what scholar Gail Bederman explores as the combination of manhood and civilization during this period.164 In a letter to Cecil Spring Rice, a British diplomat who

160 W. W. Rockhill to James B. Angell, July 24, 1900, James B. Angell Papers, Box 5, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. 161 “China’s Critical Condition”, Congregationalist, 85:24 (June 14, 1900), p.867; “Editorials: The Duty of America in China”, The Independent, 52:2689 (June 14, 1900), p.1454. 162 “The Crisis in China”, The Independent, 52:2688 (June 7, 1900), p.1399. 163 “Our Duty in China”, The Independent, 52:2690 (June 21, 1900), p.1511. 164 Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 54 used to station in Washington D.C., Theodore Roosevelt hoped that “the great powers will be able to act in concert and once for all put China in a position where she has to behave.”165

Similarly, Winthrop Chanler, a former Rough Rider fighting under Theodore Roosevelt in Cuba, expressed his wish to “superintend the spanking of several Mandarins.” 166 Here China emerged as either a naughty girl or rebellious woman who required a manly figure, like a father or husband, to discipline. Although the latter would use force against the former, it was for education rather than destruction.

Imperialists’ trouble did not end with the concern over foreign entanglement, though.

Many people also expressed their desire to put the domestic agenda on an equal if not higher footing with foreign affairs. Religious and ethnic minorities stood out in this aspect. On July

21, a mob violence against Catholic Rev. Cyrus B. Fockler occurred in Mansfield, Ohio. The mob pushed him out of his hotel, dragged him for more than half a mile to a gas station for tarring, removed his clothes, and beat him while the mayor did nothing to stop them until his life might be at stake. At the end of his appeal to President McKinley, Rev. Dowie, General

Overseer of the Christian Catholic Church in Zion, stated that the president should not “tolerate in Mansfield what seems to be a closely intended imitation of the crime of the ‘Boxers’ in

China.”167

African Americans called for public attention to their plight as well. They had been constantly subject to violence in both the city and the countryside since the Civil War and

Reconstruction. The mob detested the idea of African Americans shattering their shackles,

1880-1917 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). 165 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, July 20, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 4A, Reel 415. 166 Winthrop Chanler to Theodore Roosevelt, July 10, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, Reel 6. 167 Rev. John Alex Dowie to Governor G. K. Nash, July 26, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel.11; Rev. John Alex Dowie to President McKinley, July 26, 1900, ibid. 55 possessing political rights, and forming families after the Civil War, and sought to employ violence to deprive them of their rights and put them back on their knees.168 The latest riot against African Americans occurred between July 24 and 27, 1900, in New Orleans. What started as a manhunt for a black man named Robert Charles, who was accused of shooting at white policemen, developed into a mob violence against the African American community. The mob stabbed or shot at African Americans who they either ran into or searched out, destroyed an African American school in the city, and poured bullets into Charles’ dead body.

In the aftermath of the New Orleans riot, African-American newspapers wasted no time underlining the contrast between the assertive U.S. foreign policy and the neglect of domestic mob violence. As scholars like Eunsun Celeste Han have demonstrated, African Americans had formed trans-Pacific networks since the Civil War.169 So they had no problem obtaining news from China. The Congregationalist magazine urged that “atrocities by Mongolians in China wreaked upon innocent Caucasian diplomats and missionaries should not blind the American public to atrocities by Caucasians in New Orleans wreaked on innocent Afro-Americans.”170

The Colored Citizen also mocked President McKinley for “dropping his fishing pole and hastening back to Washington” when “a few white men were killed in China,” and questioned if “anybody heard of his making any inquiry about, or protest against, the wholesale slaughter of innocent colored men, women and children at New Orleans last week.”171

168 Hannah Rosen, Terror in the Heart of Freedom: Citizenship, Sexual Violence, and the Meaning of Race in the Postemancipation South (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 169 Eunsun Celeste Han, “Making a Black Pacific: African Americans and the Formation of Transpacific Community Networks, 1865-1872,” The Journal of African American History, 101:1-2 (Winter-Spring 2016), pp.23-48. 170 “Murderous Mob”, The Albuquerque Daily Citizen, Albuquerque, NM, July 26, 1900, p.1; “Negroes Murdered”, Congregationalist, 85:31 (August 2, 1900), p.135. 171 The Colored Citizen, Topeka, KS, August 3, 1900, p.8. 56

The transnational nature of the China Relief Expedition becomes quite manifest when one places the incident under the microscope of the American empire. The event went far beyond a more assertive U.S. role in East Asia, and involved the mobilization of resources within the

U.S. empire to meet the Chinese crisis. This process entailed not only the contest over the relative importance of the Filipino and China theaters, but also the invocation of racial and gender discourses as well as historical elements in perceiving the Chinese crisis. Statesmen and officers referred to historical memories and their past experiences, especially the Civil War, to help them understand the present. Meanwhile, both sides in the imperialist debate frequently linked developments in China and the Philippines to advance their respective arguments about the archipelago’s fate. For imperialists, the expedition elucidated the archipelago’s importance for safeguarding American interests in East Asia. For anti-imperialists, this purpose could not be achieved without granting Filipinos sovereignty and thus terminating the war in the

Philippines.

Assuming the role of a rising empire also meant more frequent contact with its peers. The

China Relief Expedition was the first major multinational operation that the United States participated in since its War of Independence, which put enormous pressure on the American servicemen involved. As General Chaffee wrote while crossing the U.S. continent, “I worry not a little for myself and reputation on this service because of its international character. A misstep or serious mistake might involve our country in a serious quarrel against its wish and to my everlasting undoing.”172 In his diary, Lieutenant Rhodes, General James H. Wilson’s

172 William H. Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917), p.176. 57

Adjutant General in the September joint expedition to Badachu, described getting out the order for the next day’s march as “a rather worrisome duty for a lieutenant of very limited experience, in a foreign country, with troops of two nationalities.”173 The next chapter will address how

American servicemen dealt with such problems and interacted with other forces.

173 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, pp.15-17. 58

Chapter Two: Fighting Alongside Other Forces and Interacting with Them

The China Relief Expedition was a success in terms of the result. The joint forces first relieved the siege in Tianjin concessions and rescued Admiral Seymour’s troops trapped in the

Xigu Arsenal in late June. After gathering enough troops, allied forces occupied the walled city of Tianjin more than half a month later, which completely removed the Chinese threat to Tianjin concessions. On August 4, 1900, they advanced on Beijing. Overcoming Chinese resistance and trying weather along the way, they occupied the walled city of Beijing on August 14, thus ending the fifty-five-day siege of the international legations there. A few subsequent expeditions to the countryside that U.S. forces participated in removed the Chinese threat to the allied communication line and logistics.

However, the ideal outcome should not blind us to challenges befalling the American troops in this multi-national expedition. Units of diverse nations brought their different military tradition and training into battle. The issue with coordination inherent to joint operations plagued allied forces during the whole duration of the expedition. The recent scramble for concessions and spheres of influence in China further added to the operation’s complexity, as each contingent watched out for any sign of other forces advancing their respective countries’ interests in China.

The tight rope that U.S. forces walked between avoiding unnecessary international complexities and maintaining harmonious relationship with other troops also existed outside battle. Recent trends in the study of military history have revealed the importance of military

59 operations’ social and cultural dimensions. 174 The China Relief Expedition was not an exception. Servicemen from different forces mingled with each other in clubs and ceremonies.

They strove to cultivate nice relationship with one another while adhering to their respective orders. Meanwhile, these encounters also highlighted traits and flaws in the American forces.

As the commanding officer of the U.S. contingent in the Seymour expedition, Navy

Captain Bowman H. McCalla was among the first American officers to experience tension in the eight-nation forces. On May 31, when arranging for legation guards’ departure for Beijing,

British Consul in Tianjin W. R. Carles could not obtain definitive answers regarding the strength of troops from his Russian and French counterparts. As he would like to send the exact number of British soldiers as others, this caused delay in the troops’ deployment. As Captain

McCalla remembered, “this was the first evidence of international friction which came to my notice.” His speculation was that Russian and French consuls either tried to drag out the operation or irritate the British Consul.175

The friction with Russian and French representatives occurred again on June 9 when consuls and ranking officers in Tianjin convened to discuss American and British Ministers’ call for reinforcement to the legation guards in Beijing. Captain McCalla noted that the French

Consul and Russian officer twice absented themselves from the discussion, and remained non- committal to the proposed international column. In his diary, British naval officer John Jellicoe also recorded that “the French and Russians had received no order to join us, but all other

174 See for example Graham Smith, When Jim Crow Met John Bull: Black American Soldiers in World War II Britain (London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 1987); Norman Gelb, Ike and Monty: Generals at War (New York: W. Morrow, 1994); Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under British Command, 1918 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008). 175 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 26, pp. 8-9. 60 nations were willing, except Germans, [who were] also awaiting orders.” 176 As a result,

Captain McCalla complained that “the policy of the Russo-French representatives was throughout one of opposition and obstruction.” Consul Ragsdale had the same observation in his own report, depicting them as “throw[ing] every obstacle in the way of immediate action.”

His distrust of these nations had become so entrenched that he believed they instigated the

Chinese to destroy the railroad leading to Beijing.177

The perceived Russian and French hesitation in committing to a multinational expedition stemmed from their stance in Chinese matters. Other powers had seen Russia as attempting to keep Northern China to itself after the trilateral intervention in 1895 that forced Japan to relinquish some of the gain from the First Sino-Japanese War. Then came the signing of Sino-

Russian Secret Treaty in 1896 that sealed these two countries’ alliance against future Japanese aggression, as well as the 1899 agreement with Great Britain that designated Manchuria and

Outer Mongolia as within the Russian sphere of influence.178

Meanwhile, like Russia, France had been watching out for any openings that Great Britain could potentially exploit to expand British influence in China. It was part of these two countries’ competition on the world stage that culminated in the Fashoda incident two years earlier.179

Since a British company controlled the railroad between Tianjin and Beijing, Russia and France had reasons to suspect that Great Britain would take advantage of the situation to send in a

176 “Narrative of Events, Peking Relief Expedition 1900”, Supplementary Jellicoe Papers, MS 71558, Western Manuscripts, the British Library. 177 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 27, The Seymour Relief Expedition, p. 3; Ragsdale to First Assistant Secretary of State David J. Hill, July 16, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 178 A. V. Ignat’ev, “The Foreign Policy of Russia in the Far East at the Turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in Hugh Ragsdale ed and translate., Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.247-67, pp.253-4; Alena N. Eskridge-Kosmach, “Russia in the Boxer Rebellion,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 21:1, March 2008, pp.38-52, pp.39-41. 179 Darrell Bates, The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984). 61 large British detachment and control Beijing. As Captain McCalla himself observed, “with

English Officials directing the management it was to have been expected that they would be more or less influenced by the British interests.”180

However, Frenchmen and Russians at the scene would suggest that apart from geopolitical motives, they indeed had military concerns about the proposed march. Both the French Consul du Chaylard and Russian Colonel Wogack believed that the railway between Tianjin and

Beijing had been cut off, and the available force at hand was insufficient to fix the problem and reach Beijing. It would be better to put off the advance until more forces, especially Russian troops from Port Arthur, arrived two or three days later. Yet the British insisted on marching right away by arguing that they could easily fix the cut and rely on the regular Chinese troops to protect the railway. The French Navy officer Jean de Ruffi de Ponteves deduced that the

British feared the expanding Russian influence that would be augmented by the expected troops, and determined to kick off the march when the British number on the ground still prevailed.181

Such mutual suspicion between different forces permeated the whole expedition. Between the relief of Tianjin concessions and the eventual attack on the walled city, the joint forces experienced heavy Chinese shelling while waiting for reinforcements. As the highest-ranking

U.S. officer at the scene by then, Major Littleton Waller of the marine corps reported that “the relations between the Powers are outwardly friendly. The Russians have delayed for two days in the capture of Tianjin and my prediction has come true as regards the capture of the walled city.”182 They hinted at the allied discord beneath the surface, and pinpointed his insight into

180 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 26, p.7. 181 Jean de Ruffi de Ponteves, Les Marins en Chine: Souvenirs de la Colonne Seymour (Paris : Plon-Nourrit, 1904), pp.27-9. 182 Waller to Kempff, July 2, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Waller to Kempff, July 3, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 62 the situation in Tianjin. Admittedly, Major Waller soon added that he was “in close touch with the English and Japanese and very friendly with the Russians.” But he probably did so in order to demonstrate his ability to work with other forces, in case Admiral Kempff chose someone else as the senior U.S. commander. Besides, the ensuing disclosure about his belief that

Russians “will not accompany us in the march on Beijing” illuminated the essential conflict between the American and Russian troops arising from the two countries’ diverging goals in

China. Moreover, near the end of the report, he stated that the relations between the Powers were not as cordial as before, although “there has been no rupture.” In another report two days later, he reiterated the absence of rupture among allied forces, and the fact that the Russians seemed not quite in accord with others.183

Russian and French sources, however, painted a slightly different picture regarding

Russia’s relationship with other forces. On the one hand, the allied dissatisfaction with the

Russian inaction did exist. Baron Anthouard commented in his entry for July 1 that it would take time and much difficulty for all commanders of different forces to agree to a plan for the march on Beijing. The next day, he specified that the Russians, who had saved Tianjin concessions during the siege and occupied the Eastern Arsenal, seemed determined not to act right now. Although other commanders basically agreed on the need to expand actions, their inadequate troops strength rendered them susceptible to the Russian will. French General Frey, who did not reach Dagu until July 24 and spoke well of Russians in other parts of his memoir, believed in Anthouard’s statement and quoted him in the book.184 Indeed, in the June 29

183 Waller to Kempff, July 3, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Waller to Kempff, July 5, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 184 Baron Albert Francois lldefonse d’Anthouard, Les Boxeurs: la Chine Contre l’etranger (Paris : Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1902), pp.83-4, 87 ; Henri Frey, Français et Alllies au Pe-tchi-li (Paris : Hachette et cie, 1904), p.14. 63 telegram, Admiral Alekseyev elaborated on the large number of troops required for a march on

Beijing, as well as the difficulty in uniting commanders of forces with various numbers and different interests in China. As a result, he suggested negotiating with the Chinese government to ease tensions and avoid unnecessary bloodshed.185

On the other hand, Russian forces paid attention to enhancing their bonds with certain troops while distrusting the rest of allied forces. On June 24 and July 7, the Russian Minister of War twice telegrammed Admiral Alekseyev to remind him of the need to cultivate friendship with German and French troops, since France was Russia’s ally in the West, while Germany bordered Russia. Besides, shoring up their relationship with Japanese units would help secure victory in China. 186 Probably in connection with these instructions, on July 6 Admiral

Alekseyev indicated that “for the time being, our relations with the Japanese, the Germans and the French are quite good.” 187 While one needs to take these description of the Russian friendship with other forces with a grain of salt, General Frey also wrote about how the Russian forces in Dagu lent tugs and barges for unloading French units who lacked these means.188

Besides, Russians openly expressed who they did not like in allied forces. In the same July 6 telegram, Admiral Alekseyev made it clear that “the appearance of the British and Americans triggered doubt in their sincerity.”

After the Battle of Tianjin, once again it was Russians and French who opposed a prompt

185 Alekseyev to Kuropatkin, June 29, 1900, in Materialy dlia opisaniia voennykh dieĭstviĭ v Kitaie v 1900-1901 g.g, t.3, kn.1 (St. Peterburg, Voennaia tip, 1902), p.88. 186 Aleksey Kuropatkin to Alekseyev, June 24 and July 7, 1900, in Dong Guoliang translate., 1900-1901 Nian Eguo Zaihua Junshi Xingdong (Russian Military Operations in China, 1900-1901), vol.2 (Jinan: Qilu Press Co., 1981), pp.23, 69. 187 Alekseyev to Kuropatkin, July 6, 1900, in Materialy dlia opisaniia voennykh dieĭstviĭ v Kitaie v 1900-1901 g.g, t.3, kn.1, p.133. 188 Frey, Français et Alllies au Pe-tchi-li, p.42. 64 march on Beijing. Although they eventually rescinded their objection and joined the advance on Beijing initiated by American, Japanese, and British commanders, the Russian fickleness once again got on American officers’ nerves after taking Tongzhou, the last major town on the way to the Chinese capital. General Linievitch suggested that allied forces take a rest the next day, while senior officers of other participating armies advocated an immediate forward movement. They eventually reached a compromise and decided to spend August 13 doing reconnaissance. The scouting scope should be about seven miles from Tongzhou. Nevertheless, around the same time that the remaining U.S. forces marched out after the scouting units did not encounter opposition on the road, Russian troops moved out of Tongzhou, closed in on

Beijing, and commenced their assault on the city. As a result, other participating armies had no clue regarding the Russians’ whereabout, and some mistook the sound of their firing for a desperate Chinese attempt to destroy the international legations. Upon the relief of the international legations, General Chaffee fiercely denounced General Linievitch for the act.

Mastering no English, General Linievitch turned to British General Barrow, who replied in

French, a language that General Chaffee did not understand: “he is only complimenting you on the part the Russians have played.”189

Amidst such perceived jockeying for advantage in China, U.S. officers strove to protect

American interests. In his telegrams, Major Waller repeatedly called for the arrival of sufficient

American forces, both to facilitate the occupation of Tianjin and secure U.S. interests in China.

He talked about the “very bad” firing from Tianjin that was “a great menace to us at present,”

189 Chaffee to Corbin, September 1, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), pp.38-9; Major Lee to the Inspector General of U.S. Army, September 27, 1900, RG395, Entry 921; George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, pp.148-9, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 65 complained that “our force is disgracefully small considering our interests,” and believed that

“our interests are as great or greater than any other nation.”190 Admiral Kempff also indicated that “if our country has a force of about 10,000 here we will be in a position to exercise a weight in affairs proportionate to our position before the other nations.” This number would put the

American force second only to the Japanese, and one thousand more than the British.191 Such projection illuminated Admiral Kempff’s perception of a crucial American role in handling this

Chinese crisis.

The small number of U.S. troops at the scene both undermined their officers’ standing in joint meetings and failed to match the rising American status in the world stage. As Major

Waller stated, “having so few men, my voice is small in counsel…When reinforcements arrive,

I shall be better situated.”192 Indeed, with the speedy arrival of French forces from Indo-China and Japanese forces from Japan, the ranking of American troops level in China had descended to sixth place since around June 26, only higher than Italy and Austria-Hungary.193 In his telegram, British General Dorward mentioned that “Japanese and small American force” rendered every assistance to British troops.194 On another occasion, Major Waller indicated that officers of other forces urged the United States to “get at least a battery of artillery and a squadron of cavalry from the Philippines.”195 The concern for military necessity aside, this gesture might also indicate that other participating nations recognized the United States as a

190 Waller to Kempff, July 2, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Waller to the Brigadier General Commandant of U.S. Marines, June 28, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; Waller to Kempff, July 5, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 191 Kempff to Long, July 7, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel.11. 192 Waller to Kempff, July 5, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 193 The British National Archives, WO 106/6247, Journal of Principal Events in China, pp.11, 13-4, 17. 194 Dorward to the Secretary of State for War, July 7, 1900, in Telegrams: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6265, The British National Archives. 195 Waller to Kempff, July 1, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 66 rising empire whose possession of the Philippines rendered it indispensable in settling Chinese matters.

Even with the small number of troops at hand, U.S. officers still sought to underline their country’s crucial role in solving the Chinese crisis through their actions. On May 29, Kempff landed one hundred marines and sailors ashore to Tianjin. International residents there welcomed them as they were “the first Caucasian troops to arrive,” second to twenty-four

Japanese bluejackets. 196 While underlining the U.S. initiative, this statement also reveals

American perception of racial distinction between whites and Japanese, even though Japan had achieved much toward catching up with the United States and European empires. Two days later, when the international column drawn from these landing parties approached Beijing,

Captain McCalla rode at the head of the column.197 On June 27, the U.S. detachment answered the Russian call for reinforcements and helped occupy the Eastern Arsenal that repelled their first attempt to reach the international concessions on June 21.198 According to Major Waller, the American marines went over the parapet first with a company of British bluejackets.199 On

July 9, the combined forces consisting of the Japanese, British, Russian, and American contingents attacked Chinese troops threatening allied forces’ river communication, drove them away, and seized the Western Arsenal. According to The New York World correspondent

Frederick Palmer, the U.S. detachment entered the arsenal first together with Japanese soldiers.

196 Kempff to the Secretary of Navy John D. Long, May 30, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10; James W. Ragsdale to First Assistant Secretary of State David J. Hill, July 16, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11; Bowman H. McCalla to Kempff, July 2, 1900, ibid; Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 26: The Newark, 1900-1901, the Boxer War in China, pp. 4, 6, in The Papers of Bowman H. McCalla, The Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 197 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 26, p. 10. 198 Waller to the Brigadier General Commandant of U.S. Marines, June 28, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 199 Waller to Kempff, June 29, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 67

The British military report also noted that “the arsenal was quickly captured by a rush of the

Japanese and Americans.”200

American servicemen had more reasons to take the lead after additional U.S. reinforcements arrived. On August 15, the American forces scaled four gates of the Imperial

City in Beijing before stopping in front of the last one according to the decision made in the joint conference of commanders. Writing to his friend in Wichita, Calvin Titus of the

Fourteenth Infantry indicated that “those were great days. We were in where the white men had never been before.”201 This demonstrates his pride of Americans spearheading the “white race’s” adventures into the previously unexplored Imperial Palace, the heart and symbol of the

Chinese Empire. On September 17, U.S. troops participated in the expedition to Badachu (Eight

Temples) west of Beijing in order to secure the coal delivery route to the city. In occupying the surrounding hills, American and British troops competed to see who would reach the summit first. According to Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, Indian troops, the “hill climbers,” were “easily passed by the Fourteenth Infantry in spite of the load carried by the latter.”202

Newspapers back in the United States wasted no time highlighting episodes in which U.S. forces preceded other troops, and in doing so sometimes stretched facts. They reported, correctly, that the American troops were the first to enter the Imperial City of Beijing, and that the American flag was raised above the Imperial Granary in Beijing.203 Newspapers also

200 Waller to Kempff, July 9, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11; New York World to McKinley, July 15, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11; From General A. R. F. Dorward to the Secretary of State for War, July 11, 1900, in Despatches, Reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives. 201 “The First Lad on the Wall,” The Hartford Courant, Hartford, CT, November 24, 1900, p.14. 202 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, part 4, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), p.484. 203 “Americans First,” Bismarck Tribune, Bismarck, ND, August 22, 1900, p.1; “Americans Leading,” Santa Fe New Mexican, Santa Fe, NM, August 22, 1900, p.1; “Americans Took Imperial Palace,” The Macon Telegraph, 68 identified musician Titus as the “first to climb Beijing wall,” and described that he “planted the stars and stripes on top of the masonry.”204 Another report went further to portray him as

“being the first soldier of 18,000 to enter the famous Walled City.”205 Such depiction quite deviated from the original coverage of the event. The Associated Press began its news on the allied entry into Beijing with the sentence “the American and Russian flags were planted on the east wall of Beijing at 11 o’clock this morning.”206 It signified both the assertion of the allied authority over Beijing and the shared American as well as Russian honor. Some

American newspapers even got hold of Russian sources and published the translated General

Linevitch’s report that depicted the Russian flag as the first to be raised on the wall of

Beijing.207

These articles epitomized the contemporary U.S. vision of the flag as the embodiment of the nation. Since the U.S.-Mexico War between 1845 and 1848, American soldiers had been carrying the national flag into battle. The bloody Civil War, construed by many contemporaries as a war for maintaining the Union rather than abolition, especially underlined the flag’s importance as symbolizing the country.208 The expanding global reach of the United States further enhanced this identification between the flag and the country. Edward Stratemeyer built his publishing success upon children’s books, including the Old Glory series that took young

Macon, GA, August 23, 1900. 204 “First to Climb Pekin Wall,” Boston Morning Journal, Boston, MA, August 27, 1900, p.1; “Calvin Titus, the Hero Pekin,” The Biloxi Herald, Biloxi, MS, September 30, 1900, p.10. 205 “Letter from Pekin Hero,” The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, October 17, 1900, p.12. 206 “How the Allies Entered Pekin,” The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, August 22, 1900, p.1. 207 “Gen Linevitch Report,” The Columbus Enquirer-Sun, Columbus, GA, August 24, 1900, p.4; “East Gate of Pekin Bombarded 14 Hours by the Russians,” The Grand Rapids Herald, Grand Rapids, MI, August 24, 1900, p.1; “Russians Claim Credit,” The Sun, Baltimore, MD, August 24, 1900, p.1. 208 Woden Teachout, Capture the Flag: A Political History of American Patriotism (New York: Basic Books, 2009), pp.81-103. 69 readers to scenes of the American expansion.209

Under these circumstances, it was no wonder that the flag loomed large in the media presentation of the China Relief Expedition. As the Associated Press reported, when the

American troops appeared in sight, the besieged missionary Elwood G. Tewksbury cried:

“Americans, cheer your flag.”210 Stratemeyer soon published On to Pekin as the latest work in the Old Glory series. Its main character, Lieutenant Gilbert Pennington of the Ninth Infantry came from Richmond, Virginia and served as one of Roosevelt’s Rough Riders during the

Spanish-American War before enlisting again as an infantryman to the Philippines. The book set the fictional character’s first fight on Independence Day, underlined Colonel Liscum’s upholding the flag before being shot dead, and contained sentences like “Don’t let the Chinks get the best of you! Stick up for Uncle Sam and Old Glory every time!” “Hurrah for Old Glory!” and “Americans, cheer your flag!” They all served to highlight the flag’s significance to readers.

In addition, the main character’s previous life on a plantation as well as the capital of the

Confederacy rendered him a symbol of a defeated South that regained its manhood and honor in the Union through overseas adventures.211

Meanwhile, officers from other forces were keen on aggrandizing their leading role whenever the occasion allowed. On June 23, an international column broke through the Chinese defense en route and restored Tianjin concessions’ communication with the outside world.

209 Brian Rouleau, “Childhood’s Imperial Imagination: Edward Stratemeyer’s Fiction Factory and the Valorization of American Empire,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 7:4 (October., 2008), pp.479-512. Like most works on the U.S. imperialism during this period, this article almost exclusively concentrates on children’s books on Cuba, the Philippines, and Americas, while only mentioning those on China a couple of times. 210 “The Relief of Pekin,” Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, August 31, 1900, p.8. 211 Edward Stratemeyer, On to Pekin (Old Glory in China) (Boston: Lee and Shepard Publishers, 1900), pp.5-6, 26, 31, 136, 160, 213, 293. 70

British Navy Captain Christopher Cradock reported that “the advance of the British Force entered the town 20 minutes prior to any other force.”212 On August 14, the British contingent also became the first troops to link up with the international legations in Beijing. As General

Alfred Gaselee reported, “her majesty’s troops had the supreme gratification of finding they were the first to relieve the sorely-pressed beleaguered garrison.”213 With a tinge of pity,

Colonel A. S. Daggett indicated that his unit could have been the first to enter the Tartar City had the whole regiment been there with him from the beginning.214

Friendly competition aside, fighting under the command of foreign officers, due to the earlier U.S. contingent’s small number as well as its commander’s lower rank compared with his foreign counterparts, troubled the American forces. On June 20, American troops, alongside a Russian unit, moved to a position about twelve miles from Tianjin. As Lieutenant Smedley

Darlington Butler wrote to his mother, “we could hear distinctly the booming of the Chinese guns as they shelled our people shut up in the foreign settlement of Tianjin and we knew that they must be hard pushed.”215 In spite of this situation, the instruction that Major Waller received was to hold his position, wait for reinforcements, and then push forward to Tianjin.

However, the Russian colonel decided to march towards Tianjin without reinforcements. Major

Waller demurred, but finding himself in the minority, he agreed to the move.

This attempt on the early morning of June 21 backfired. The column encountered heavy

212 From Major F. Morris, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Commanding North China Field Force, to the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, June 24, 1900, Despatches, Reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives. 213 “Affairs in China,” Glasgow Herald, Glasgow, Scotland, November 7, 1900, p.8. 214 Daggett to Captain Hutcheson, August 19, 1900, in RG 395, entry 913, Reports, 1900-1901, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 215 Anne Cipriano Venzon ed., General Smedley Darlington Butler: The Letters of a Leatherneck, 1898-1931 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p.19. 71 fire from Chinese troops, which resulted in four killed and nine wounded on the American side.

The American detachment managed to carry the wounded away by hand as they did not have any stretchers, yet they had no choice but to leave the dead on the field. In a quick note to

Commander F. M. Wise responsible for dispatching trains to the front, Major Waller reiterated that he “was really forced into this march” against his “better judgment.”216

The problem with foreign commands caused more devastating results in the Battle of

Tianjin. Words passed down from the commanding British General Dorward suggested that the

Ninth Infantry make an advance and take cover under the mud wall to avoid indirect fire from the Chinese garrison. The unit made the maneuver as instructed, and then moved further forward. From then on until 8:10 pm, heavy Chinese fire pinned them down and caused high casualties.217 In postwar reports, some American officers held General Dorward responsible for the misdirection. As Captain Noyes recalled, the messenger delivering General Dorward’s order directed the Ninth Infantry to move to the left of the Japanese troops after crossing the bridge. And yet he later heard the general stating “it makes no difference which, to the right or left, as long as they get under cover.” Captain Noyes also added in the report that he “never heard any order given as to the special part to be taken by the regiment in the affair.”218 These sentences pointed to the lack of clear instruction from the British commander and the heedless pre-war planning.

Adding to commands from foreign officers were issues with coordination between

216 Ibid., pp.19-20; F. M. Wise to Kempff, June 22, 1900, in Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1900 (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1900), pp. 1149-50, p.1150. 217 Major J. M. Lee to Captain C. R. Noyes (the Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry), July 21, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, pp.19- 20 218 Captain Noyes to Major Lee, July 16, 1900, in ibid, p.23. 72 different forces. During the Battle of Tianjin, the First U.S. Marines advanced to support the

Royal Welsh Fusiliers, yet somehow ended up in the same skirmish line with the latter. As

General Dorward reported, due to the attack “being pushed on somewhat too hurriedly in the centre,” these two units “had to move forward rather too quickly under a heavy fire.” This spoke to the ineffectiveness of the allied shelling in suppressing Chinese fire. What’s worse, as

“the Japanese attack extended considerably more to the left than had been intended,” the marines and Royal Welsh Fusiliers had to follow them to the left, which drew these two units closer to the heavy Chinese fire.219

Coordination did not really improve as the expedition evolved. In the Battle of Beicang on August 5, the leading Japanese units occupied the cramped ground and delayed the British and American forces’ movement into position.220 The problem of congestion reemerged in the

Battle of Yangcun the next day. Under the British request for support in the prewar conference, the Fourteenth Infantry advanced on a ground that was not even sufficient for British troops to deploy. The left of this unit was “overlapping the English line a good deal.” What’s worse, numerous British and American stragglers broke into the advancing U.S. line and almost destroyed its formation.221 British officers weren’t quite satisfied with the situation either.

According to Major General Sir Norman Robert Stewart, commander of the British First

Brigade, the American troops reduced the width of his front. After receiving an order, his troops

219 General Dorward to the Secretary of State for War, July 19, 1900, in Telegrams: China Expedition 1900- 1901, WO 106/6265, The British National Archives. 220 Japanese reports on operations with maps and plans, WO 32/6148, The British National Archives. 221 Chaffee to Corbin, September 1, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, pp.36-7; Captain Frank F. Eastman to Adjutant of the Fourteenth Infantry, August 7, 1900, in ibid, p.44; First Lieutenant P. H. Mullay to Adjutant of the Second Battalion, the Fourteenth Infantry, August 7, 1900, in ibid., p.45; Captain C. H. Martin to Adjutant of the Third Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, August 7, 1900, in ibid., p.50. 73

“did give way by closing in a little to the left, which, of course, meant a better target for the enemy and more casualties.” Lucky for British Indian troops, nearly all of the incoming

Chinese bullets and shells flew over their heads.222

In addition to congestion, misinformation and miscommunication plagued allied forces.

General Chaffee complained about the false information from Russians about Russian or

French troops passing the American front, which resulted in U.S. soldiers mistaking the

Chinese flag for the French one and holding their fire when they could have decimated Chinese troops. The most tragic episode in this battle occurred when British and Russian artillery continued to fire at the target after the Fourteenth Infantry had cleared Chinese troops from the ground. According to General Chaffee’s estimate, this accounted for twenty-five or thirty dead and wounded among the sixty-four casualties suffered by the Fourteenth Regiment on this day.223

But General Chaffee did not linger on this issue. Such incidents inevitably occurred in multinational campaigns. Just the day before, Russian and British forces fired at each other for a short time, which resulted in one or two casualties.224 In fact, in his memoir, French General

Frey claimed that General Chaffee wrote the following sentences in the report: “it is surprising that we did not have to record more accidents of this kind…because of the confusion that was the consequence of the fact that the command was not exercised by a single general, needless

222 Sir Norman Robert Stewart, My Service Days: India, Afghanistan, Suakin’85, and China (London: J. Ouseley, 1908), pp.212-3. 223 Chaffee to Corbin, September 1, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, pp.36-7; Captain R. H. Anderson to Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry, August 20, 1900, in ibid., p.56. 224 General Sir A. Gaselee’s diary of events and despatches, IOR/L/MIL/7/16740, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 74 to say the inevitable confusion due to the difference in languages.”225 Besides, as General

Chaffee’s biographer noted, he was wounded during the Civil War because of the friendly fire.226

By contrast, U.S. officers freely vented their frustration at other forces in both the Battle of Beijing and the expedition to Badachu over their lack of cooperation. Most U.S. troops entered Beijing through a gate that Russians battered open. Yet according to General Chaffee, the Russian forces congested in the passage with great confusion, and made no efforts to

“extricate themselves and give passage into the city.” Reports from junior officers also contained similar descriptions. First Lieutenant J. F. Gohn complained that Russians “were making no effort to keep down the fire of the enemy or to advance further.” What’s worse, First

Lieutenant P. H. Mullay claimed that they “occupied the best positions for returning this fire,” thus affecting American efforts in this aspect. Needless to say, the congestion also delayed the

American entry into the city, especially for the Ninth Infantry at the rear of the U.S. column.227

In the expedition to Badachu, a gap over the hills to the northwest became some Boxers’ escape route. In their reports, the American and British officers pointed fingers at each other over which side should be responsible for closing this gap according to the plan.228

225 Frey, Francais et allies au Pe-tchi-li, p.24. 226 Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee, p.189. 227 Chaffee to Corbin, September 1, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, pp.39-40; Daggett to Captain Hutcheson, August 19, 1900, in RG 395, entry 913, Reports, 1900-1901, National Archives, Washington, D.C; Captain Eastman to Adjutant of the Fourteenth Infantry, August 18, 1900, in RG 395, entry 913, Reports, 1900-1901, National Archives, Washington, D.C; First Lieutenant Mullay to Adjutant of the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, August 18, 1900, in RG 395, entry 913, Reports, 1900-1901, National Archives, Washington, D.C; Lieutenant Joseph L. Gohn to Adjutant of the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, August 18, 1900, in RG 395, entry 913, Reports, 1900-1901, National Archives, Washington, D.C; Coolidge to Captain Hutcheson, August 21, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.69; Frederick Brown, From Tientsin to Peking with the Allied Forces (London: C. H. Kelly, 1902), p.108. 228 Wilson to Hutcheson, September 20, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, pp.121-2; First Lieutenant G. Soulard Turner to the Adjutant of First Brigade, China Relief Expedition, September 19, 1900, in ibid., p. 125; Quinton to First Lieutenant 75

Despite these bitter episodes, there were times in the China Relief Expedition when U.S. forces worked well with others. During the June 23 advance on Tianjin, British Captain

Cradock noted that an American three-pound gun lent to British forces “ably assisted the

Russian artillery to check the enemy while the British Brigade crossed the bridge.”229 On July

2, forty American marines assisted in expelling Chinese troops from villages around Tianjin, burned down these villages to deprive the Chinese of sniping positions, and covered British retreat under heavy fire.230 They suppressed the Chinese fire to cover a British unit dragging guns on the July 9 assault on the Western Arsenal too.231

Various commanders of the joint forces spared no effort to express their appreciation of other troops’ cooperation. After the June 27 assault on the Eastern Arsenal, the Russian commander sent a congratulatory note to the participating troops. It described how “the open plain, covered by a frightful, hostile fire,” “ditches filled with water and soft mud,” and “the steep walls” did not prevent the allied troops from taking the arsenal, and underlined “the wreath of laurel with which you have docked your glorious colors anew.”232 On July 9, British officers expressed their thanks to Major Waller, and pointed out that they would have suffered heavy casualties had it not been for the American action. The next day, on behalf of his general, a Japanese officer presented a captured Krupp gun to the American forces. As Major Waller was away at the time, Lieutenant Butler received the gift. “Although very much confused” and

“not being much of a diplomat,” he then “made a little speech which consisted entirely of

Charles D. Rhodes, September 19, 1900, in ibid., pp. 126-8; Lieutenant colonel J. W. Tulloch to the Chief of Staff of the China Relief Expedition, September 18, 1900, in ibid., p. 133. 229 From Major F. Morris, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Commanding North China Field Force, to the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, June 24, 1900. 230 Waller to Kempff, July 2, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 231 Waller to Kempff, July 9, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 232 Order to the Detachment of the Expedition, June 28, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 76 expressions of friendship of the U.S. for Japan.” They also gave the Japanese officer “three cheers and the little fellow went away seemingly highly pleased.”233

A sense of belonging to “civilized” nations drew the joint forces together, despite all those tensions arising from different countries’ diverse interests in China. After allied forces rescued his relief column, Admiral Seymour sent a thank-you note to admirals of the seven other nations whose forces participated in his failed expedition. It conveyed his belief and hope that “the above expedition…will help to cement between our respective nations that mutual good feeling and respect…which, especially in China, is now so desirable in all the best interests of civilization and advancement.” 234 Further reference to “civilization” appeared in Admiral

Seymour’s special messages for French and Russian commanders. In the former, he talked about “draw[ing] together in friendship France and England, a thing certainly desirable for the civilization of the world.” As the two largest colonial empires, Britain and France deemed the civilization of colonies their duty. In the latter case, Admiral Seymour talked about how cooperation in battles helped “draw nearer to each other civilized nations like our own.”235

With his country long considered by most Western Europeans as not completely civilized, the

Russian commander must have been thrilled to receive this note. In addition, Admiral Kempff replied to Admiral Seymour that “the ties due to a common language and the fact of having marched and fought together in the cause of advancing civilization are very much more

233 From General A. R. F. Dorward to the Secretary of State for War, July 11, 1900, in Despatches, Reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives; H. Bower to Waller, July 10, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11; Venzon ed., General Smedley Darlington Butler: The Letters of a Leatherneck, 1898-1931, pp.22-3. 234 Seymour to Kempff, June 27, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 235 Seymour to Rear-Admiral Courejolles, Seymour to Major General Stessel, June 27, 1900, Admiralty: China Station: Correspondence, Disturbances in China (the Boxer Rebellion), ADM 125/109, The British National Archives. 77 important and enduring” than “material interests” that bound the two countries together.236

While the reference to advancing civilization might merely stem from borrowing Admiral

Seymour’s rhetoric, it could also originate from the contemporary American fascination with this idea. Some Americans longed to “civilize” Native Americans and freedmen in the South as well as the West Indies. In their minds, the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair, with the White City lighted up by electricity and exhibits on indigenous people in various European colonies, vividly demonstrated American progress and native backwardness. The United States further developed an awareness about its place in the civilized world and the accompanying responsibility towards indigenous people after annexing places like Hawaii and the Philippines.

Scholar Priscilla Murolo points out that American servicemen perceived the suppression of the

Pullman Strike and the Philippine Insurrection as “wars of civilization.” As scholar David

Axeen illustrates, the discourse of civilization became so prominent that Secretary Root mobilized it to justify his army reform program.237

Funerals and services for officers and soldiers fallen in battles as well as national leaders worked to unify allied forces too. On January 22, 1901, Queen Victoria passed away. The

British command decided to hold a memorial service on February 2. General Chaffee ordered a detachment of cavalry, artillery and infantry ready for the occasion. The Ninth Infantry carefully selected its representatives based on “evenness of height, soldierly bearing, and perfectness and cleanliness of dress and equipment.”238 After the ceremony, British General

236 Kempff to Seymour, June 30, 1900, Admiralty: China Station: Correspondence, Disturbances in China (the Boxer Rebellion), ADM 125/109, The British National Archives. 237 Priscilla Murolo, “Wars of Civilization: The U.S. Army Contemplates Wounded Knee, the Pullman Strike, and the Philippine Insurrection,” International Labor and Working-Class History, 80 (Fall 2011), pp.77-102; David Axeen, “ ‘Heroes of the Engine Room’: American ‘Civilization’ and the War with Spain,” American Quarterly, 36:4 (Autumn, 1984), pp.481-502. 238 E. G. Barrow, Chief of Staff, British Contingent, January 30, 1901, RG 395, entry 906, Letters Received; 78

Sir Alfred Gaselee thanked the Americans’ participation, and would “make it a point to inform

His Majesty the King of the honour so feelingly paid to our late beloved Queen by all the Allied

Nations.”239 In the telegram to the Secretary of State for India, General Gaselee mentioned that “foreign commanders have shown utmost possible marks of respect and sympathy.”240

Additionally, U.S. forces also sent representatives to attend the memorial services for officers and soldiers of other troops who died in Beijing.241 Other troops attached the same importance to U.S. forces’ memorial services as well. For instance, British officers and a detachment of

Lancers attended the funeral services for Captain Richard B. Paddock of the Sixth Cavalry.242

Small international gestures of kindness were frequent between both officers and soldiers.

On the way to Beijing, Lieutenant Rhodes invited two British officers whose troops camped alongside his to supper. In return, they provided him with two bullocks and eighteen sheep from herds under their charge.243 On an expedition to Duliu, a Boxers’ stronghold Southwest of Tianjin, officers and soldiers of British Indian troops provided the American forces with blankets and food when junks carrying the U.S. ration failed to arrive. 244 As a result,

Lieutenant Palmer regarded British Indian troops as “blood brothers of the American soldiers.”

Adjutant General, China Relief Expedition to the Commanding Officer, Camp Reilly, January 30, 1901, RG 395, entry 969, Letters and Orders Received; Adjutant, Ninth Infantry Regiment to Captain F. L. Dodds, January 31, 1901, RG 395, entry 964, Letters Sent. 239 Head Quarters, British Contingent to General Chaffee, February 2, 1901, RG 395, entry 906, Letters Received. 240 Gaselee to the Secretary of State for India, February 2, 1901, in Telegrams: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6265, The British National Archives. 241 Commander of Italian forces in China to General Chaffee, January 13, 1901, RG 395, entry 906, Letters Received; Adjutant General, China Relief Expedition to the Commanding Officer, Camp Reilly, April 19, 1901, RG 395, entry 969, Letters and Orders Received. 242 General Chaffee to the Commanding General, British Contingent, March 12, 1901, RG 395, entry 898, Press Copies of Letters Sent; General Chaffee to de Giers, National Archives, RG 395, Entry 898 Press Copies of Letters Sent. 243 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, p.10. 244 Major E. B. Robertson to Acting Adjutant-General of the Second Brigade, September 17, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.116. 79

In his memoir, he owed this hospitality to their being “followers of Mahomet,” because “no true believer can dine when there are hungry guests within his gates.” In return, American soldiers served as kitchen helpers when Indian troops cooked their own meals.245 Grateful for the Japanese help in delivering American mails, Captain Humphreys referred to them as “our

Japanese friends” in his telegram to Colonel Heistand, and suggested that American troops return the favor by transporting Japanese mails from Shan Haiguan, a major port like Dagu, to the railroad station. “This is doing very little for the Japanese in exchange for what they are doing for us, and yet it is thought this will be of great benefit and convenience to the Japanese,” he wrote.246

In addition to these everyday encounters, social events also brought servicemen from different forces together. A singular case in this aspect was the International Club located in the buildings of Lifan Yuan, a Chinese bureau dealing with Qing’s Mongolian subjects. It was open to both the armed forces and diplomatic delegates, and boasted around five hundred members.

According to U.S. missionary Arthur H. Smith, officers of the Eight-Nation alliance constituted most of its members. Numerous American officers belonged to the club. Bands of various forces took turns performing at this club. A musician wrote home that they had to do lots of playing for foreign generals, and every few days for Minister Conger.247 The music that the

Ninth Infantry band played possessed both American and international characteristics. “King

Cotton,” the military march composed for the 1895 Cotton States and International Exposition in Atlanta, Georgia where African American activist Booker T. Washington suggested that

245 The Papers of John McAuley Palmer, Box 1, Box 16, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 246 Captain Humphreys to Heistand, January 3, 1901, RG395, Entry 908. 247 “Experiences of a Musician in China,” The Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, December 22, 1900, p.11. 80 people of his race pursue economic rather than political rights, became the U.S. representative.248

The International Club also organized races and gatherings of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers from different forces, and featured the latest British and

Continental periodicals.249 The same situation applied to the Tientsin Club where “Britishers,

Americans, French, Russians, and Austrians were clinking glasses amid a chorus of ‘A votre sante!’ ‘Good health!’ ‘Svatches dorovia!’ and ‘here’s how!’.”250 In addition to such big social clubs, various forces also established their own theme clubs, such as sports and cards, and extended membership to members of other troops.251 British General Stewart had high remarks for the American club, as U.S. officers met “on equal terms as ordinary gentlemen” there, while

British officers always seemed to carry their military identities even on social events.252

Besides, officers would invite their counterparts in other forces to dinner and concert from time to time.253 Respective nation’s holidays came in handy for organizing such gatherings.

German Marshal Waldersee invited officers to dinner in celebration of the German Emperor’s

248 Music Programme by Ninth United States Infantry Band, in China, Boxer Rebellion, WO 28/302, The British National Archives. As scholar Zimmerman demonstrates, cotton growing was a crucial enterprise that linked the post-reconstruction South with German Africa, and embodied both the African American dream of racial uplifting and German imperial exploitation. See Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South. 249 Arthur H. Smith, China in Convulsion, vol.2, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1901), p.543; Colonel H. O. S. Heistand to Secretary of the International Club, December 4, 1900, RG 395, entry 898, Press Copies of Letters Sent; Colonel Heistand to Treasurer of the International Club, January 10, 1901, RG 395, entry 898, Press Copies of Letters Sent; Adjutant General, China Relief Expedition to the Commanding Officer, Camp Reilly, April 10, 1901, RG 395, entry 969, Letters and Orders Received; Gaston Kahn to General Chaffee, April 12, 1901, RG395, Entry 906. 250 Gordon Casserly, The Land of the Boxers (London: Longmans, Green, ad Co., 1903), p.20. 251 “Invites American Officers to Become Members of the Peking Games Club”, September 13, 1900, RG 395, entry 906, Letters Received; G. Shiba to the Secretary of the United States Army Club, January 15, 1901, RG 395, entry 906, Letters Received. 252 General Stewart, My Service Days, p.309. 253 “Request the pleasure of General Chaffee and officers at a concert April 27”, April 22, 1901, RG395, Entry 906; General Yamaguchi to Chaffee, May 1, 1901, ibid. 81 birthday.254 In addition to these official occasions, officers and diplomats initiated lunches and dinners every now and then. For instance, on April 15, 1901, General Chaffee hosted a party for his birthday. General Stewart recalled that “I have spent many enjoyable evenings, but never one to touch the 15th April, 1901.” Some guests had so much fun that they did not leave until 5 am the next day.255

These social gatherings worked to cultivate close relationship between different forces.

As General Chaffee reported, “many of the officers have made acquaintances and formed friendship with officers of other armies which will long endure, even though the newly made friends may never meet again.”256 General Stewart observed that when the American troops completely withdrew from Beijing except for the legation guards on May 22, 1901, “every

British officer turned out to ‘speed the parting guest,’ and the regrets were sincere and mutual.”257

Admittedly, these social gatherings still had their limits in bringing servicemen from different forces together. On July 26, 1900, American officers paid their British counterparts a visit with the band, and together they sat up “liquoring, talking and smoking till midnight.”

However, perhaps with the day’s arguing still fresh in mind, British General Barrow regarded them as “good hearted fellows, but mostly ‘bounders’.” It was only after ensuring the American participation in the proposed advance on Beijing that General Barrow wrote about the

“unbounded cordiality between us” from their surprise visit to the Ninth Infantry.258 Such

254 Staff Diary between 24 January to 6 February, in Despatches, reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives. 255 General Stewart, My Service Days, pp.354-5. 256 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, part 4, p.505. 257 General Stewart, My Service Days, p.369. 258 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, pp.134-5, 137, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading 82 conflicts of opinions aside, shared language naturally drew American and British forces close to each other. As Admiral Kempff observed, American and British forces “have mutual confidence in each other and work cheerfully together.” By comparison, U.S. officers and soldiers “also get along without any trouble at all with all others.” However, “on account of the difference of language,” they “do not associate so much with each other.” 259 Lieutenant

Rhodes’ diary frequently referred to dining with British officers and correspondents, while he and his lieutenants only visited nearby French and Russian forces for official business, especially complaining about these troops’ incursions into the American zone of control, without having meals together.260 General Barrow also recorded that Americans attended the first equestrian Gynmkhana on September 27, 1900, “in some numbers,” but no one else showed up.261

The stance of respective troops especially manifested itself when conflicts emerged. On

March 17, 1901, French servicemen in Tianjin sough trouble with British Indian troops and cried out chants like “Vive les Boers!” and “Fashoda”, while German soldiers stood by and egged on the French. This demonstrates how the scramble for colonies soured the relationship between these countries. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Foote of the Ninth Infantry got his men ready and ensured British Major-General Lorne Campbell that “we’ll stand by you…Blood’s thicker than water.”262 Once again, Commodore Tattnall’s cry in the Battle of

Room, The British Library. 259 Kempff to Long, June 22, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 10. 260 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, pp.11-15. 261 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.171, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 262 Staff Diary between 14 and 20 March, 1901, in Despatches, reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives. 83

Dagu in 1859 became the living testimony to the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain.

In spite of their limits, such social events helped reduce tensions between some nations contributing forces to the China Relief Expedition. In his staff diary, British Colonel Grierson who had lived in Germany for a couple of years and been aware of that country’s animosity towards Great Britain, wrote that “outward relations between the British and German officers are excellent, and there is a good deal of mutual entertaining going on, especially in the

Cavalry.”263 Amidst the simmering tensions over the railway construction and ownership in

Northern China, British General Barrow, who regarded Russian officers as “a boorish, dirty, drunken lot,” admitted that “they did their best to be hospitable. They ate with their knives but they drank our healths uproariously.”264

In addition to enhancing relationships between different troops, battles and social interactions also served to underline traits and flaws in the American forces. American officers welcomed other forces’ examination of U.S. troops’ equipment and operation. They gifted

American equipment, including clothing, canteen, spurs, and haversack to other forces in exchange for similar items.265 Such exchange of equipment even occurred between individual officers. Soldiers of different forces “showed one another their equipment and rifles” when on guard too.266 The American forces also asked for a cavalryman, “mounted and fully armed and

263 From Grierson to the Under Secretary of State for War, October 2, 1900, in Despatches, reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives. 264 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.188, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 265 Captain Charles Humphrey to Heistand, January 28, 1901, RG395, Entry 908, Telegrams Received; Captain George Montgomery to the Chief of Staff, French China Field Forces, March 12, 1901, RG395, Entry 957/958. 266 Henry Bathurst Vaughan, St. George and the Chinese Dragon: An Account of the Relief of the Pekin Legations by an Officer of the British Contingent (London: C.A. Pearson, Ltd., 1902, pp.62, 158; “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, p.19. 84 equipped,” to appear as a model for a painter at the German headquarter.267 The British report on the American cavalry also included paintings of such fully equipped cavalryman and his horse.268

In addition, American officers opened their drill to other forces. They set the time of the visit carefully so that visitors from other nations could view the U.S. position and aiming drill.269 According to Lieutenant Colonel Vaughan, soon after the fall of Beijing, General

Chaffee held a review of the American forces on an open ground, and “an immense number of officers of all nationalities assembled as spectators, forming a dense line just in [the] rear of the saluting point.”270 British General Stewart also noticed that on December 20, when the

British and American Battery conducted some practice, “many German officers turned out, and all were busy taking notes.”271

Such public display of military prowess was common for the allied troops in China. It served to showcase the respective forces’ capacity to potential allies and foes. Lieutenant

Rhodes was responsible for sending an invitation to the October 3 review to other generals and their staffs.272 British Colonel Grierson also recorded that on February 18, 1901, “the Field-

Marshal personally conducted field firing on the ice across the Great Lotus Pond, to enable

Major-General Reid, who is a musketry specialist, to judge of [sic] the efficiency of the German

Infantry.”273 Yet sometimes such events could backfire. On the early morning of March 30,

267 Colonel Heistand to the Commanding Officer of Camp Reilly, April 4, 1901, RG 395, Entry 898. 268 Notes on the American Cavalry, in Notes regarding the French, German, and American Cavalry in China, WO 33/184, The British National Archives. 269 Colonel Robe to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, January 26, 1901, RG395, Entry 964. 270 Vaughan, St. George and the Chinese Dragon, pp.195-6. 271 General Stewart, My Service Days, p.307. 272 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, p.21. 273 Staff Diary between 7 to 20 February, WO 32/6419, The British National Archives. 85

1901, British General Barrow went to the Hunting Park in the South of Beijing to observe the

German maneuvers. “Hundreds of Foreign officers” were also present. But “the attack was about as bad as it could be, thick lines of skirmishes, with supports in close formation.” For

British forces who had been learning lessons from the Boer War, “we have nothing to learn from them.”274

Under these circumstances, U.S. officers determined to present the best side of their forces to visitors. As early as during the voyage to China, officers of the Ninth Infantry gathered their men to practice drills, exercises, manual of arms, and even blanket-rolling “so that the regiment shall make a fine appearance by the side of the soldiers of the alliance.” The sense of urgency intensified after reaching Japan. Now the unit would reach China soon, and “this is a glorious opportunity for the Ninth.” 275 The Special Order for the October review mentioned the expected guests and required servicemen to take “utmost care” as to “the cleanliness of arms, clothing and equipments.” Besides, “the marching and soldierly bearing of the brigade shall be of a high order.”276 As Irish war correspondent George Lynch observed, he had “never seen

Americans drill as smartly as they did” one morning in Tianjin “when they were being watched by groups of critics from various armies.”277

Some visitors spared no words lauding American forces, while others held some reservations. Regarding the October 3, 1900 review, British Minister to China Claude

MacDonald who lived through various wars in Africa indicated that “nothing could have been

274 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.229, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 275 “Coolidge Tells of China”, Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, IL, July 28, 1900, p.2. 276 Special Order No.12, 1st Brigade, Pekin, October 2, 1900 in Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.322. 277 George Lynch, The War of the Civilizations, Being the Record of a “Foreign Devil’s” Experiences with the Allies in China (London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1901), p.267. 86 finer than the appearance of the ‘Boys in Blue’.” He also “greatly admired the marching and splendid bearing of the men,” and described a British cavalry officer as “loud in praise of both horses and men of the cavalry.”278 While diplomatic shrewdness might prompt MacDonald’s compliment, his view of the American cavalry indeed had some backing from military opinion.

British General Barrow recorded that “the infantry marched past well. Their Cavalry work in rank entire. They look an awful crew of swash bucklers,” although the American artillery “may be good but has no smartness.”279 In the British report on the American cavalry, General

George Richardson viewed their horses as “big boned, powerful, and very quiet, rather wanting in quality on the whole, and apparently very hardy,” while the cavalrymen were “well set up, tall, slight, wiry, and active men,” possessing “excellent” physique. He even suggested that

British cavalry try the American shooting method. In an article in Journal of the United Service

Institution of India, Major H. V. Cox of the Twenty-first Madras Pioneers wrote that “the

American cavalry ride big horses, and look after them well.”

Nevertheless, British officers had lower opinions of U.S. cavalry in action. General

Richardson quoted a Bengal Lancer Officer, who participated in the battle near Tianjin on

August 19, as saying that “the Americans were very slow in the field, and preferred fire to shock tactics.” He himself also regarded the American cavalry as “more of the nature of

Mounted Infantry than Cavalry.” According to Major Cox, the American cavalry “want dash, are too calculating, and failed to grasp the one or two opportunities they had of acting mounted in North China.”280 This criticism drew partial rebuttal from the American side. As Captain

278 Minister MacDonald to Minister Conger, October 4, 1900, RG395, Entry 906. 279 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.173, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 280 Notes on the American Cavalry, in Notes regarding the French, German, and American Cavalry in China, WO 33/184, The British National Archives; “The Foreign Contingents in China,” The Journal of the United 87

Forsyth saw it, there were “usually more ways than one of doing a thing,” and it was difficult to see “what more could have been accomplished” in that battle in the Southwest of Tianjin.281

Visitors also commented on U.S. logistics, and came to vastly different conclusions too.

According to British Lieutenant Colonel Churchill, during the campaign, Japanese officers became amused at the “amount of stores, baggage they carried, and at the 6-mule wagons in which they carried them.” As a result, Japanese officers thought that the need for these luxuries disqualified American servicemen from being good soldiers. Churchill regarded such comments as revealing the Japanese “tendency to judge from external appearances without looking far below the surface.”282 Yet Japanese officers were not the only ones who expressed concern over the effect of abundant supplies on American servicemen. After touring the U.S. camp accompanied by Captain Hutchinson on December 1, 1900, British General Barrow elaborated on the variety of items in the American ration, and concluded that “the result of all this pampering is that the Yankee is a bit too independent for a soldier, and has little of the smartness of our men.”283

On the other hand, several foreign observers expressed amazement at the comprehensive supplies that the American troops enjoyed. General Stewart admitted that the American stores

“were a sight, perfect order reigned, and any mortal thing a soldier could possibly require was procurable.” In addition, U.S. forces had “excellent arrangements for heating tents, and stables made of canvas”, although the latter seemed too hot in General Stewart’s eyes, as did the

Service Institution of India, vol.31, July 1902, p.275. 281 Captain Forsyth, “The American Cavalry in China,” Journal of the United States Cavalry Association, Vol.14, No. 49, July, 1903, p.12. 282 “Diary of the Tientsin-Pekin Operations,” WO 32/6148, the British National Archives. 283 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, pp.197-8, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 88 hospital.284 In his report, British Major H. D. McIntyre wrote that American officers were

“very willing to show me anything,” and praised that “they certainly do their men well, such luxuries as bacon, cheese, and ‘canned’ fruits being a great addition or improvement on an ordinary ration.”285 The Irish war correspondent for the British Daily Express George Lynch regarded the U.S. soldiers as “far and away the best fed in the world,” and indicated that “their standard of comfort, not to say luxury, is immensely higher.”286 Colonel C. A. Woodruff, the

Chief Commissary of the division of the Philippines, quoted an English writer stating that “the

American commissary is undoubtedly far the best of all, and the American soldiers are best fed, both in peace time and in the field.”287

Such jubilance over the abundant supply for the American forces served to repel criticism from the public about logistics problems in overseas operations. Back in the Spanish-American

War, American troops had been rumbling about the quality of the meat they received. The

McKinley administration appointed a commission to investigate the matter.288 In the China

Relief Expedition, war correspondent John F. Bass asserted that “the commissary department furnished only seventy percent of the traveling rations, and that not regularly. The American soldiers had no meat or fresh vegetable, though the English troops were well provided with both these.” In response to these accusations, General Corbin brought up an English newspaper coverage in which the writer regarded American troops as “the best equipped and best supplied

284 General Stewart, My Service Days, pp.308-9. 285 “Report on the Transport of the Allies in China,” Report on Transport of the Allies in China, 1900-1901, WO 32/6150, The British National Archives. 286 Lynch, The War of the Civilizations, p.240. 287 Report of Col. C. A. Woodruff, Chief Commissary, Division of the Philippines, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 5 (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1901), p.37. 288 Edward F. Keuchel, “Chemicals and Meat: The Embalmed Beef Scandal of the Spanish-American War,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 48:2 (Summer, 1974), pp.249-64. 89 of any force in China.”289 The Army and Navy Journal published a letter from Lieutenant

Colonel Thomas H. Barry to the Adjutant General’s office. It included the following commendations.

The Subsistence Department had everything on hand, except pie…Our commissary stores

were the amazement of all nations and all wanted to purchase. The bacon and hard bread

were especially admired, and all foreigners remarked upon feeding our men with such

excellent quality of everything.290

In the view of other forces, American troops also led the way in terms of individual initiative. British General Stewart observed that the American soldier “strikes one as being extremely intelligent,” and they and the N.C.O. “seem capable of acting in the absence of the officer, which shows an independence which is absent in our army.”291 Lieutenant Colonel

Vaughan of the Seventh Rajputs also indicated that “the American soldier appears to be very intelligent, independent, and able to act on his own initiative.”292

American officers became aware of other forces’ admiration in this aspect, and elaborated on it. Commenting on other armies’ appreciation of American soldiers’ ability to adapt to the new environment and take good care of themselves, Captain Hutcheson stated that it was because other armies gave the utmost priority to “rendering their men purely military machines, and as such they are admirable, though generally deplorably helpless when thrown upon their

289 “Criticising Our Men in China,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.232. 290 “Supplying Our Troops in China,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.259. 291 General Stewart, My Service Days, p.391. 292 Vaughan, St. George and the Chinese Dragon, p.163. 90 own resources.” In relation to this, he thought American people as a whole possessed “the natural adaptability to circumstances and surroundings” that facilitated the U.S. army’s cultivation of “personal initiative and the ability to care for oneself” in American soldiers.293

Likewise, Major Scriven of the Signal Corps also commended his men for being “very far the superior in quickness, intelligence, and independence of action” compared with British signal men. According to him, “there is probably no enlisted man in the world higher in intelligence than the soldiers of the American Signal Corps.”294 The British report partly verified Major

Scriven’s statement. It admitted that “the Americans work fast on a sounder,” and just like any other forces compared with their British counterparts, “appear to know considerably more about the way a current does its work,” and were “much better acquainted with their instruments.” But it also pointed out that Americans were “often very inaccurate,” and they were “very bad writers.”295

While taking pride in their forces’ individual initiative, equipment, and operation,

American officers also became aware of certain flaws in their servicemen that compared poorly with other troops. Disciplinary issues, which were in part the side effects of too much emphasis on individual initiative, loomed large in this aspect. In the reply to General Corbin’s letter inquiring into a New York Sun piece on the Ninth Infantry’s misconduct in July, General

Chaffee recalled that he was “struck with astonishment at the general laxness and spiritless condition of the regiment,” and soldiers as well as teamsters had “presented very many

293 Captain Grote Hutcheson to the Adjutant General, China Relief Expedition, March 5, 1901, RG395, entry 929, Letters and Orders Received. 294 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.437. 295 S. G. Loch to O. C., Telegraph Section, China Field Force, January 19, 1901, in Engineering Operations of British and Foreign contingents, IOR/L/MIL/7/16774, Asian & African Studies Reading Room, the British Library. 91 disgraceful views.” He also mentioned that “we are ashamed to exhibit the large drove of offenders in confinement to visiting officers of other armies.”296 In another letter to General

Corbin, General Chaffee lamented that “we have the best clothed, best fed, best cared for troops, from nearly every point of view, in China, but behavior is not so good as several; this notwithstanding good example by other troops and free application of our method of discipline.”297

Even newspaper reporters could identify the lack of discipline in the American forces.

Correspondent James Martin Miller, while presenting U.S. servicemen as “the most intelligent, the most self-reliant, and most independent and the bravest,” admitted that they were “careless about saluting officers,” including those from other forces. As a result, other forces complained:

“why don’t you Americans discipline your men.”298 The Irish war correspondent Lynch could sense that the American soldiers needed “a lot more discipline and drill,” since they regarded themselves as equal to their superior officers and devoted lots of attention to grumbling and expressing individual opinions rather than simply obeying. 299 Traveler and correspondent

Jasper Whiting made a similar observation.300

U.S. servicemen paid lax attention to their appearance and manners. Jasper Whiting noted that both soldiers and officers cursed a lot in the American forces.301 On October 8, General

Chaffee issued a general order highlighting problems in American dressing, and pointed out that “especial attention should be paid to military courtesy to preserve the good opinion the

296 Chaffee to Corbin, October 30, 1900, RG395, Entry 898. 297 Chaffee to Corbin, January 11, 1901, RG 395, entry 898. 298 “Correspondent Miller in Pekin,” The Sunday Oregonian, Portland, OR, October 21, 1900, p.32. 299 Lynch, The War of the Civilizations, p.240. 300 Jasper Whiting diary, part one, p.200, Massachusetts Historical Society. 301 Jasper Whiting diary, part one, p.199, Massachusetts Historical Society. 92 world now has for the American soldier…every member of this command who is proud of his country is expected to so bear himself at all times that the reason for his pride will be evident.”302 Possibly in response to continuing problems in this respect, in November the commander of the U.S. camp in the Temple of Agriculture ordered “all enlisted men not neat and tidy to return to their quarters to remedy such defects before being allowed to pass out.”303

However, these orders failed to achieve the desired result. General Chaffee still observed that some American servicemen even did not bother to button their clothing, and failed to show proper forms of respect for officers.304 In an article in the North American Review, Captain

William Crozier marveled that “American soldiers off duty walked around or rode in rickshaws without blouses, belts or leggings; with shirts open at the throat and breast, the sleeves unbuttoned and rolled up to different heights…with the military-looking campaign hat worn in every shape and at every angle.”305

In the minds of American officers, the country’s history of rapid territorial expansion should partly be held responsible for their men’s slack appearance, just as this past contributed to individual initiative in the U.S. troops. Captain Crozier observed that American servicemen came from a people “who, having only recently gone through the process of reclaiming a wide country, in which much had to be accomplished with little, have a high appreciation of the rough and ready.”306 In the banquet following the first annual meeting of the Military Order of the Dragon in Manila on July 1, 1901, Colonel S. S. Sumner of the Sixth Cavalry recalled that

302 General Order No.25, October 8, 1900, RG395, Entry 973. 303 First Lieutenant T. W. Connell to the Commanding Officer of Third Squadron, Sixth Cavalry, November 14, 1900, RG395, Entry 964. 304 Chaffee to Corbin, January 11, 1901, RG 395, entry 898. 305 “Observations on the Pekin Relief Expedition,” North American Review, 1901, pp.225-40, p.233. 306 “Observations on the Pekin Relief Expedition,” North American Review, 1901, p.234. 93 his men “wanted to look like a rough-rider.” They “would button their blouses and square up when they saw their commander coming, and unbutton again when he was out of sight.”307

While carrying the vestige of what they considered shining chapters in U.S. history, the casual appearance and manners of the American forces loomed large when compared with other troops. Lieutenant Rhodes wrote in his diary that “American troops did not appear as well as the others” in the welcoming ceremony for Marshal Waldersee “due to lack of dressy uniforms.”

He seemed to care little about this problem by adding that “we know their worth.”308 Still, other officers felt troubled by this problem. In his article, Captain Crozier admitted that “the

Japanese and Sikhs…whenever seen in public, wore their uniforms complete and properly put on, carrying themselves with military bearing and were careful in saluting officers; and the heavy and somewhat awkward Russians, while not presenting so trim an appearance, were particular in these respects.” It must have been unbearable for an U.S. officer to admit that even the widely despised Russians did better than his soldiers in certain aspects. And for Captain

Crozier, a lackluster presentation in front of the Japanese and British Indian troops was equally unacceptable. He later wrote that “their carelessness as to saluting officers must have caused some wonder among the people of the military nation considered to have recently emerged from barbarism, and among the Indian soldiers of lower civilization.”309

The problem with appearance also existed among officers. Captain Crozier observed that while British officers wore uniformed belts and shoulder-pieces, their American counterparts

“carried what they liked.”310 In February, 1901, Colonel Robe of the Ninth Infantry received

307 “Military Dragoners Feast,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.1278. 308 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, p.23. 309 “Observations on the Pekin Relief Expedition,” North American Review, 1901, p.233. 310 Ibid. 94 a letter “relative to the wearing of campaign leggings by one of our officers at a recent dinner, which letter states that such impropriety of dress does not meet with the approval of the Major

General Commanding.”311 In the War Department’s annual report, General Corbin quoted

Captain Hutcheson as saying “our officers generally fail to present the smart trim appearance of the foreigner, this being due to the somberness of their uniform and a lack of care and attention to their clothing in the field”.312 In the original text, Captain Hutcheson also stated that their shortcomings in this aspect had been pronounced in their association with foreign officers, which caused them to “feel ashamed.”313

Officers of other troops also noticed American problems with manners. As Captain

Gordon Casserly of the British Indian Army wrote, “their free-and-easy ideas on the subject of discipline, the casual manner in which a private addressed an officer, astonished and shocked their Continental critics.” He even overheard a German officer as exclaiming “That an army?

Why, with the Berlin Fire Brigade I would conquer the whole of America!”314 When looking back at the China Relief Expedition, the Army and Navy Journal admitted that “the great fighting ability of the Americans was offset by what the foreigners thought a certain slouchiness in dress and loose discipline, as judged by European standards.”315

Drunken servicemen embarrassed the American forces in China, too, especially in comparison with other troops’ performance in this aspect. According to General Chaffee, by the end of October 1900, he had “personally seen but three intoxicated men not belonging to

311 Robe to Colonel Wint and Captain Ridgway, February 19, 1901, RG395, Entry 968&969. 312 “Annual Report of the Adjutant-General of the Army”, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Reports of Chiefs of Bureaus (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), p.50. 313 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, part 6, p.515. 314 Gordon Casserly, The Land of the Boxers (London: Longmans, Green, ad Co., 1903), p.51. 315 “Our Army in China,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.994. 95 the United States since arriving in China.”316 American records contained numerous cases of soldiers drunken in the streets of Beijing. By the end of the year, 440 cases of trial in the

American forces in China directly or indirectly involved drunkenness. General Chaffee lamented that “comparison in this particular matter as it effects our troops and those of other nations in China, makes us appear in an unfavorable light.”317 Some other American officers must have had the same feeling. In the entry for a summary court case, an officer charged

Private Frank Mattimore of the Fifteenth Infantry of “disgrace[ing] the uniform of the U.S. forces by being picked up, drunk in the streets of Tianjin.”318

Apart from being drunk and disorderly in other nations’ sectors, stealing emerged as another embarrassment for American forces in China. Instances of stealing occurred in the U.S. camp every now and then. Servicemen did not have lockers to keep their items from being stolen. Their lack of awareness in taking other preventive measures further contributed to crime.

Firearms got lost after being left in the saddle or under the bed for the night. 319 Army provisions were also vulnerable to theft. In the court martial of Private Magnus Axell of the

Fifteenth Infantry for stealing, a witness stated that “reports were continually coming in” regarding pried open boxes and stolen government property in Tanggu, the town next to the

Dagu port where American forces transported rations ashore.320 Some American servicemen were also caught stealing from soldiers of other forces, which provoked letters of complaint from the allied officers. The list of items in such incidents included money, stockings, and

316 Chaffee to Corbin, October 30, 1900, RG 395, entry 898. 317 Chaffee to Corbin, January 11, 1901, RG 395, entry 898. 318 “Report of Cases Tried by Summary Court at Tianjin, China, for the Month of October, 1900”, RG395, Entry 931, Reports of Cases Tried by Summary Court. 319 Court Martial of James Tucker, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.22996; Court Martial of Frank Simmons, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.22981. 320 Court Martial of Magnus Axell, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.20727. 96 watches.321 In one extreme case in the aftermath of the powder explosion in Tongzhou on

September 14, two marines, Charles Schultz and W. Chapman, even picked up the money belt a wounded British corporal dropped on the street and then spent “freely in the Japanese canteen boat.”322

In the China Relief Expedition, the American forces participated in joint military operations for the first time since the American Revolution. U.S. troops would see more of such actions as the twentieth century went by. The campaign succeeded in relieving the Chinese siege of internationals in Tianjin and Beijing. But it also exposed U.S. forces to diverse hazards intrinsic to joint military operations, especially the conflicting interests of various participating nations, and problems with coordination as well as communication. In this process, like their equivalents in other forces, American officers strove to highlight their country’s role and protect its interests. Meanwhile, despite these conflicts and competition, servicemen of the

Eight-Nation forces sought to promote friendship through cooperation on the battlefield and social occasions like ceremonies, clubs, and banquets. Additionally, joint military operations helped highlight traits and flaws in the American troops. The U.S. contingent became renowned for abundant supplies, personal initiative, and loose discipline. American officers attached great importance to these issues, as their soldiers represented both the army and the nation.

Such frequent encounters with other troops not only generated American servicemen’s evaluation of their own performance, but also helped form impressions of other forces. U.S.

321 First Lieutenant Bumpus to Lieutenant Brown, January 18, 1901, RG395, Entry 957/958; Colonel Moale to Major Foote, November 7, 1900, ibid. 322 First Lieutenant William H. Clifford to the Assistant Adjutant General of the First Brigade, September 15, 1900, RG395, Entry 906. 97 servicemen assessed qualities of their equivalents in other troops, and reflected upon what the

American forces could learn from them. The next chapter will examine American opinions of other forces formed during this expedition, and how their views were entangled with both the needs of U.S. forces as well as racial ideas back in the United States.

98

Chapter Three: Forming Opinions of Other Forces

Exploring military operations’ social and cultural dimensions includes delving into interaction between servicemen. The China Relief Expedition featured servicemen from different cultures and nations. Encountering their equivalents in other forces during both war and occupation left strong impressions on U.S. servicemen. In addition, the U.S. Department of War directed officers to conduct systematic observations of other troops. The ensuing studies further characterized other forces based on both actual evaluations and existing norms, and pointed out areas where the American forces could benefit from emulating other troops’ practices. The China Relief Expedition became another example in the transmission of military experience across national boundaries that recent studies have come to acknowledge.323

During the fighting stage of the China Relief Expedition, U.S. servicemen had generated some initial opinions of the forces that they fought alongside and associated with. They praised some troops’ battle performance that truly impressed them. As Captain McCalla mentioned with admiration in his memoir, there was a saying among the U.S. marines: “if anything [needs] to be done, the British marines were sent to do it.”324 General Chaffee commented that the

Japanese troops “carried out to perfection” the plan of attack in the Battle of Beicang.325 In the

August 19 skirmish with the Boxers near Tianjin, U.S. cavalry officers reported that the

Japanese cavalry conducted “very intelligent and satisfactory service” in covering their right

323 Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p.164. 324 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 27, p.30. 325 Chaffee to Corbin, September 1, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, pp.33-5. 99 flank.326

Apart from performances on the battlefield, U.S. officers commented on other troops’ characters during the march too. In retrospect, Captain Cabell of the Sixth Cavalry remembered that during the advance on Beijing, Japanese stragglers were “invariably seen with all of his arms and equipments,” as one “must have taken his whole equipment” when rejoining the company.327 This formed a strong contrast to U.S. servicemen who threw away many items in the same march. First Lieutenant Turner also observed in the march to Baoding that “attention could not help being drawn to the soldierly manner and bearing of the Germans, whose extremely heavy kit did not seem to affect them in the least.”328

Adding to comments on other troops’ battle performance were impressions of their discipline during the occupation period. Shortly after the fall of Tianjin, allied forces divided the city into four quarters, with American, Japanese, British, and French forces responsible for one respectively. They applied the same practice in Beijing, with German, Russian and Italian forces gaining a share in the zone division as well.

Managing an occupation zone was like a Hercules’ task. Anarchy fell upon Tianjin in the aftermath of its fall. Many Chinese residents fled for their lives as fire devoured parts of the city.329 Amidst the chaos, both Chinese and international soldiers as well as civilians sacked the city, and countless dead bodies lay unburied in the streets and in houses. The situation in

Beijing was even worse than that in Tianjin. As Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman, who arrived

326 Theo. J. Wint to the Adjutant-General China Relief Expedition, August 20, 1900, in ibid., pp.98-100, p.99. 327 Captain Cabell, “Troop ‘M’ Sixth Cavalry in the Chinese Relief Expedition of 1900,” Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association, vol.15, No. 53, July 1904, p.55. 328 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.471. 329 Major Morris C. Foote to Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry, July 25, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, pp.28-9. 100 in Beijing on August 23, recorded in his diary, “the stench from human and other carcasses, compost heaps, and green stagnant pools, and the clouds of dust consisting of dried excreta and other filth, made traveling through the streets about as disagreeable as could be imagined.”330

U.S. officers became quite proud of their work restoring order and improving sanitation.

They deployed patrols to combat looting and employed laborers to bury dead bodies and clean streets. Major Waller declared that after this cleaning work, the American section “is cleaner today than it has been for a hundred years or more.”331 It is worth noting that a modest version of this sentiment appeared in Manila two years ago when General Wesley Merritt reported that

“the streets had been cleaned under the management of General MacArthur…A stranger to the city might easily imagine that the American forces had been in control for months rather than days.”332 Likewise, on October 29, Major E. B. Robertson of the Ninth Infantry reported with satisfaction that “fair progress is being made towards teaching the natives habits of cleanliness, and it is hoped that in a short time they will understand what is required of them in that regard.”333

By comparison, the Russian, German, and French forces drew American contempt in terms of behavior during the occupation. Commandant Wise talked about how the news of

Tianjin quieting down reminded him of the Russian report “All is quiet in Warsaw.” This phrase

330 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.478. 331 Major Foote to Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry, July 25, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.29; Lee to Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry, July 26, 1900, in ibid., pp.27-8; Waller to Coolidge, July 26, 1900, in ibid., p.27; Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Science ed., Gengzi Jishi, pp.37, 39, 49, 96. 332 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, part 1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), p.53. 333 Major Robertson to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, October 29, 1900, RG395, Entry 906. 101 mocked the brutal Russian rule in Poland.334 Similarly, more than a month and a half later,

British General George Barrow would use the phrase “Warsaw is tranquil” to portray the situation in the Russian section of Beijing.335 Also in Beijing, as late as October 20, Lieutenant

Colonel Dickman recorded that “the German section, just across the street, is almost deserted, all the shops and marketing being on our side of the avenue. The Chinese say they are robbed by the Germans and also, but to a less extent, by the French.”336

Sometimes U.S. officers protested to their counterparts in other troops about these issues, to no avail. After receiving the report showing “on testimony of Chinese, considerable misconduct by French troops” in Tongzhou, General Chaffee sent a copy to French commanding General Frey. In the note, General Chaffee indicated, perhaps with a sense of irony and confidence, that “you will be glad to know of this, as I should be glad to have you inform me of any misconduct on the part of my troops which might come within your knowledge.” 337 On October 24, 1900, in response to Major Robertson’s appeal, General

Chaffee again wrote to the French commander to complain of instances of French soldiers robbing Chinese residents in the American zone and abducting them to labor in the French sector without pay.338 This did little to end the French intrusion into the U.S. zone. In mid-

April, 1901, over French protest of the alleged U.S. mistreatment of detained French soldiers,

334 J. H. Holden to Remey, July 16, 1900; H. W. Stamford to Commandant Wise, July 16, 1900; Meade to Admiral Alexeieff, July 18, 1900; Admiral Alexeieff to Meade, July 18, 1900; Wise to Remey, July 19, 1900; Wise to Remey, July 20, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 335 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.162, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 336 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.488. 337 Hutcheson to Muir, September 3, 1900, in RG395, Entry 898; Chaffee to Frey, September 11, 1900, ibid. 338 Major Robertson to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, October 24, 1900, RG395, Entry 906; General Chaffee to General Corbin, September 13, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12; Colonel Compt to Chaffee, October 28, 1900, ibid. 102

Lieutenant Gibson complained to his superior that his district “is overrun with French soldiers, every two or three Sunday afternoons,” and that “they give more trouble than the soldiers of all other nationalities, defying arrest and nearly always seen anxious to fight the sentries” with bayonets and fists.339

Controversies over appropriating astronomical instruments in Beijing emerged as the most singular case in Americans lambasting other troops’ behavior during the occupation. Learning of the German and French plan to remove these astronomical instruments and ship them home as war spoils, General Chaffee sent Marshal Waldersee a letter of protest. It indicated that “my government would vehemently denounce any officer of its service who might enter upon spoliation of this sort, and it will sincerely regret to learn that any nation with which it co- operated to relieve the besieged legation in Peking authorizes or permits its troops to injure or remove any instruments or other part of the Observatory.” Chaffee made this protest as

“commander of one of the four cooperating columns which relieved the legation on August 14.”

The letter affronted Marshal Waldersee, who arrived with most German troops mobilized for the China Relief Expedition long after the relief, so much that he returned the communication back to General Chaffee, citing its form and contents that surprised him “extraordinarily.”

Additionally, in Marshal Waldersee’s eyes, these astronomical instruments were booty of war, and their removal could bring pressure to the Chinese government for a prompt settlement.340

In the letter to General Corbin, General Chaffee admitted that “I really had no right to muddle

339 Captain Grote Hutcheson to the Adjutant General, China Relief Expedition, May 1st, 1901, RG395, entry 929. 340 Frederic Whyte condenses and translates, Alfred Von Waldersee, A Field-Marshal’s Memoirs: From the Diary, Correspondence (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978 reprint of the 1924 ed. published by Hutchinson, London), p. 237; Translation of the letter from General Waldersee to General Gaselee, December 12, 1900, in Staff Diary between 20 November and 16 December, WO 32/6415, The British National Archives. 103 in, and should have kept my mouth closed.”341

The target of the U.S. disapproval in terms of the troops’ discipline even extended to

Japanese and British forces with whom they generally cooperated well with in battles.

Admittedly, General Chaffee declared that in Beijing, “the Japanese and American sections of the city filled rapidly very soon after the occupation of the city, and later, the English section, the people moving from other parts of the city into the sections policed by troops of the nations named.”342 Nevertheless, cases to the contrary permeated in the reports and letters of American servicemen. As Major Foote stated in his report on the situation in Tianjin, “from all I could see and ascertain the English, French, and Japanese soldiers looted the city for some time, without any restrictions in their section…Very little if any of this was done by the United States infantry troops.”343 Lieutenant Colonel Coolidge concurred in his letter to Major Hopper back home: “The Japanese looted the Chinese houses…I believed the English were granted one day to loot, but this was soon stopped.344

Also in Tianjin, Major Lee recorded several Sikhs, accompanied by some Chinese, breaking into the house of his Chinese intermediary, Mr. Hua, and seeking to pry open some boxes.345 On August 26, 1900, the American chief of police in Beijing Lieutenant Charles

Kilbourne Jr. of the Fourteenth Infantry wrote to his superior about British officers and soldiers entering the American zone, abusing Chinese residents in the area, and even kidnapping them

341 General Chaffee to General Corbin, January 26, 1901, in Henry C. Corbin papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 342 Chaffee to Corbin, November 30, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.447. 343 Major Foote to Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry, July 25, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.29. 344 “As Barbarous as Boxers,” The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, September 3, 1900, p.1. 345 Lee to Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry, July 26, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.28 104 to the British sector. As he saw it, such actions retarded “materially the work of restoring trade and a normal state of life in the district,” and cast “discredit upon the proclamation we have posted [and] broadcast throughout our district stating that the Chinese may resume their ordinary vocations under our protection.” 346 Chinese sources supported Lieutenant

Kilbourne’s complaints. As Chinese civilian Gao Bai vividly recalled in a 1959 interview, he went to Beijing four days after the fall of the city. Then foreigners snatched him and put him to work outside the South Gate. Fortunately, after the work was done, he was “taken to the

Temple of Heaven (British headquarter), given a piece of bread and eight dollars, and then released.”347

In addition to these individual opinions, U.S. officers also systematically observed other forces during the China Relief Expedition. The American army had been closely following military developments in Europe for a long time. It sent a three-men commission, including the future Union general-in-chief George B. McClellan, to observe the Crimean War back in 1855.

On their way to Crimea, the commission extensively examined military establishments in

England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria. In 1870, General Philip Sheridan went to Europe to report on the Franco-Prussian War. General Emory Upton, the key proponent of military reform in the 1870s, also toured Europe and Asia under General Sherman’s orders before crafting The Armies of Europe and Asia that illuminated the American gap with other major forces in terms of professionalization. In addition to these notable cases, individual officers also embarked on trips to observe European forces, sometimes at their own expense. Their

346 Chase Kilboume Jr. to the Commanding Officer of the American District, Chinese City, August 26, 1900, RG395, entry 906, Letters Received. 347 Li Renkai, Yang Zhuoshu, Cheng Xiaojun, Chi Zihua, Jiang Wenying eds., Zhili Yihetuan Diaocha Ziliao Xuanbian (Selected Sources from Interviews of People Who lived through the Boxer Uprising in Zhili), (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Educational Publishing House, 2001), p.468. 105 number reached around 110 before the American Civil War.348

Besides, the task of observing other forces further loomed large for the American army widely blamed for its messy logistics in the Spanish-American War.349 In 1898, the army’s military information division published works like the Autumn Maneuvers of 1896 in Europe and Subsistence and Nursing in European Armies. As General Corbin suggested in his 1898 annual report, “to neglect the employment of every known expedient for keeping abreast of the world’s progress in the military art would be neglect of what is due the best interests of the people.”350 To best achieve this goal, officers even accompanied British and Boer troops in the

Boer War.351

Under these circumstances, long before the related instruction from the Department of

War reached the command, professional sensibility had rendered American officers aware that the expedition offered an invaluable chance to observe other armies’ operations and equipment.

In a June 13 letter to his mother, Captain Henry C. Learnard of the Fourteenth Infantry in the

Philippines talked about “the grandest opportunity that was ever presented to an American officer to educate himself, as there are already detachments from all the large armies on the ground.”352 In his July 20 cablegram to General Chaffee, General Corbin mentioned the departure of Major C. H. Muir and Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman from the Philippines to

China for staff duty, who would “at the same time observe and report upon the armies of other

348 Arthur T. Frame, The U.S. Military Commission to the Crimean War, 1855-1856, MA thesis, Fort Leavenworth, 1983; Jesse Lee Harden, The First United States Army Observers of Military Conflicts in Post Napoleonic Europe (1855-1871), MA thesis, Fort Leavenworth, 2015; Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), pp.81-111. 349 H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp. 424-31. 350 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, part 2, pp. 282-3. 351 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Reports of Chiefs of Bureaus (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), p.20. 352 “Capt. Learnard”, The Jackson Semi-Weekly Citizen, Jackson, Michigan, August 3, 1900, p. 5. 106 countries.”353 Before their arrival and the march to Beijing, General Chaffee ordered Major

Samuel M. Mills to report to British General Gaselee as the liaison officer between these two forces. Major Mills took this chance to observe British units’ battle performance too.354

On August 9, 1900, the command received the Department of War’s formal instruction on observing allied forces. It regarded the China Relief Expedition as “a most favorable opportunity for studying the methods of actual service of the foreign armies in the field,” and

“an excellent opportunity for comparison.” The scope of observation included “organization, arms, equipment, ammunition, supply, efficiency, etc.,” in other words, “every feature of service of an army in the field that would be of interest or use to a military student.”355

On October 5, 1900, General Chaffee formally assigned five officers to observation duty.

These officers’ mission was to “observe and report as fully as circumstances will permit, upon the organization, arms, equipment, ammunition, supply, discipline, efficiency, etc., of the forces of the Allied Powers in North China.” Adding “discipline” to the scope of observation in the original instruction from the Department of War illustrated that this field had become a new concern to the command.356

353 Corbin to Chaffee, July 20, 1900, RG395, Entry 909. 354 Major S. M. Mills, “Observations on Equipments, Supplies, etc., of the Foreign Detachments of the Expeditionary Army in North China, September 12, 1900, Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 435-77, p. 435. 355 Army Adjutant General Corbin to General Chaffee, August 9, 1900, RG 395, entry 906, Letters Received. 356 Adjutant General H. O. S. Heistand to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. Dickman, October 5, 1900, RG 395, entry 898, Press Copies of Letters Sent. 107

Many officers not assigned to observation duty took advantage of their own opportunities to examine allied forces. Armed soldiers coming as the model became one such channel. Senior

American officers encouraged or even requested their peers’ participation in such events. On

February 24, 1901, Colonel Robe demanded the presence of officers to inspect the German infantry equipment, and desired to have “a critical inspection and comparison with our own equipment.” 357 On March 11, 1901, when “a Japanese soldier armed and equipped” was scheduled to appear in the reading room of the U.S. camp for examination, Colonel Robe hoped that “as many officers will attend as can be spared from more important duties.” 358 U.S. officers frequently encountered servicemen from other forces both in the streets and in expeditions to other cities and villages, and wrote down their impressions in reports and notes.

Photos of other forces taken in China became another potential source of information. They sometimes featured servicemen in groups of three or five dressed in the same uniform and carrying the same equipment but showing different sides of their body to the camera. This enabled U.S. officers to have a comprehensive view of their uniform and equipment in one photo.359

The ensuing submitted reports, along with officers’ notes, contained both topical studies

357 Circular, February 24, 1901, RG395, Entry 971. 358 Circular, March 9, 1901, RG395, Entry 971. 359 RG77-CR, China Relief Expedition Photographs, 1900-1901, American National Arcchives. 108 of allied forces and details on expeditions in North China after the fall of Beijing. They revealed these American officers’ perception of allied forces’ respective traits. Russian forces stood for discipline, fierceness, and crudity with their precise movement on the field, eternally fixed bayonets, and simplest rations.360 German troops, consisting of obedient soldiers thoroughly under the control of officers, maintained excellent marching order and discipline. And their officers, many of who spoke several languages, were well-educated and polite to other troops’ officers.361 Japanese servicemen, “actuated by a most intense patriotism and pride in his position as a soldier,” were “very obedient.” Relatedly, they appeared to have “great uniformity in size and build.” Still, they possessed “an individualism that does not always go with such strict discipline” and “a great curiosity to see what is going on, both on and off duty.”362 Major

Lee also commented that “the Japanese soldier stands for excellence in every military attribute, his equipment was…complete and perfect, and his conduct super, while in camp, on the march, or in battle.”363

Many of these summarized traits were entangled with notions of other nations formed from officers’ observation and the experience of fighting alongside other forces, and newspaper portrayals. Despite all the conflicts during the relief operation mentioned above, the observing

American officer gave Russian troops high marks from a purely military point of view. Yet he hinted at their notorious plunder by describing them as “industrious foragers” who “supplied meat and other items by this means from the abundant resources of the country.” And his

360 Major W. E. Craighill, “Report on the Russian Troops in Northern China”, October 15, 1900, in Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, pp. 352-3. 361 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman, “Report on the German Troops in North China”, November 10, 1900, in Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, pp. 373-83, pp. 382-3. 362 Major Charles H. Muir, “Report on Japanese Troops in North China”, October 24, 1900, in Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, pp. 354-62, pp. 357-62. 363 Major Lee to the Inspector General of U.S. Army, September 27, 1900, RG395, Entry 921. 109 mention of “always fixed” bayonets, a phenomenon that French General Frey mentioned in a more positive light, painted a picture of ferocious Russian soldiers. Major Craighill also depicted Cossacks who “were mounted on rough, shaggy little ponies, of about the size of those of the Philippines.” Such comparison of their ponies to those of the Philippines further enhanced their image as belonging to the East rather than the West.364

The portrayal of excellent marching, discipline, and well-educated officers in German troops fit many American officers’ admiration of the country’s military training and organization that enjoyed worldwide fame since the Franco-German War of 1870. Starting with

General Upton, American army officers almost universally admired the German officer corps and general staff system that they hoped to emulate in the United States.365 The object of such admiration also extended to common German soldiers. In a letter home, General Upton described that German soldiers’ bearing “denotes a good discipline.”366 General Chaffee wrote that he took two hundred American servicemen to the flag-presentation ceremony in the

German forces, not to show off U.S. military prowess, but “in order that our men might see how a military function is conducted by experts.”367 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman appreciated

German forces so much that he believed those “complaints from Tianjin and other points as to dirty appearance and rough conduct of German officers” were exceptional.368

In terms of Japanese troops, American officers expressed their amazement at the rapid

364 Major W. E. Craighill, “Report on the Russian Troops in Northern China”, p.352; Frey, Français et Alllies au Pe-tchi-li, p.47. 365 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp.83-118. 366 Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe, pp.327-31, 353; Upton’s letter from Berlin, October 8, 1876, in Peter Smith Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1885), p.385. 367 Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee, p.218. 368 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the German Troops in North China”, p.383. 110 modernization that symbolized the country’s fate. Major Muir complimented Japanese discipline as “most excellent,” and mentioned that “its military code has been borrowed from those of Europe, and retains their essential features.” 369 This depiction echoed Japan’s development process in which the country learned from the West and rapidly became modernized. He also stated that the Japanese military code had banned corrective chastisement that was widespread in “feudal times” a few years ago.370 Such a story resonated with the narrative around Japan joining the rank of civilization and removing vestiges of barbarism along the way. This perception of the Japanese troops had its roots back in the 1870s when the country rapidly advanced because of the Meiji Restoration. At the time, General Upton reported that “the sudden transition of Japan from ancient to modern civilization…is nowhere more conspicuous than in the army.”371

Alone among the other troops in China, the British Indian army featured servicemen of different races. Lieutenant Colonel Dickman noted that the British officers were “all superior in rank to the native officers.” Then he elaborated on “the caste system of India lending itself admirably to this arrangement.” As he saw it, “the sphere, officially and socially, of each is clearly defined,” and “the prejudices of each are not only respected but guarded by authority.”

Consequently, they could “to a large extent avoided” friction that was “so likely to arise in other armies.”372 In addition, Dickman praised British officers for their “superior knowledge of the character of foreign troops” and “how to conduct their intercourse with them, which was another advantage.”373 This must be linked with the British experience of managing a vast

369 Major Muir, “Report on Japanese Troops in North China”, p.361. 370 Major Muir, “Report on Japanese Troops in North China”, p.361. 371 Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1878), p.11. 372 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the British Troops in North China”, p.406. 373 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the British Troops in North China”, p.415. 111 colonial empire with diverse ethnicities and engaging with other empires in the accompanying conflicts over colonies. Such admiration of the British empire was widespread among

American officers in China. As one officer remarked upon seeing the Rajputs at the funeral service for Queen Victoria in Beijing, they demonstrated “the might of the English Empire which welds together the discordant elements of earth’s population into one homogeneous whole.”374

So strong was the U.S. desire to compare and contrast the troops, not even animals escaped a comparative critique. According to Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, Russian Cossacks’ horses were “of all colors, scrubby, shaggy, and dirty, with stallions, mares, and even colts among them.”375 The German battery used horses that were “Walers of rather coarse breed,” which appeared as “a rather sorry lot.” In observing American officer’s eyes, “no amount of training will remedy their defective conformation, such as ewe necks and goose rumps.”376 Likewise,

Major Muir observed that Japanese horses were “extremely small as compared to our own…so too, the weight they carry, live and dead, is much less than with our cavalry.”377 Although this description carried far less prejudice compared with Lieutenant Colonel Dickman’s comments, it still hinted at Japanese soldiers’ small heights that rendered them unsuitable for sturdy horses like those in the American forces. By contrast, Captain Cabell recalled that he “never saw better groomed horses” than those in the British Indian army, which were “half Arabian and neat, clean limbed, small animals that stood the march very well.” He continued this train of thought

374 “The Queen’s Funeral Services at Pekin,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.1274. 375 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p. 477. 376 Lieutenant Dickman, “Report on the German Troops in North China”, pp. 380-1. 377 Major Muir, “Report on Japanese Troops in North China”, p.360. 112 by concluding “the American and British were the only decent people” in China.378 Such desire to racially profile animals as an indication of their owners’ characteristics could find its equivalent in the nineteenth century American cattle industry.379

While detailing allied forces’ traits, U.S. officers also reflected on the potential desirability of applying those features to American troops. One such area was the ammunition supply during battle. As Major Craighill wrote, “our experience at Santiago, Tianjin, and on other occasions is sufficient to impress the lesson of the difficulty in many cases of getting ammunition forward across the fire-swept space, to a line that is hotly engaged.” Consequently, it was imperative to establish a system under which American soldiers could have an ample ammunition supply when going into combat. U.S. servicemen carried 145 rounds at most into battle (100 on the belt, 40 in the pocket, and 5 in the rifle). In comparison, Japanese servicemen carried 150 rounds (90 on the belt, 60 in the bag), a method that Major Muir thought “superior to our own,” while French soldiers brought 160 rounds. In addition, French commanders and supply units had more reserve ammunition at their disposal. So “it would seem desirable to follow the custom of the French and many of the other foreign services and provide some habitual and well-settled method of giving our men, before going into action, more ammunition than they can now readily carry.”380

Another aspect that American officers admired in other forces was the separation between combat troops and those devoted to miscellaneous duties. As Major Craighill observed, the

378 “Troop ‘M’ Sixth Cavalry in the Chinese Relief Expedition of 1900,” p.70. 379 See Kristin Hoganson, “Meet in the Middle: Converging Borderlands in the U.S. Midwest, 1865-1900”, Journal of American History, 98:4 (2012), pp. 1025-51. 380 Major Craighill, “Report on the French Troops in North China”, October 30, 1900, in Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, pp. 363-72, pp. 371-2; Major Muir, “Report on Japanese Troops in North China”, p. 359. 113

French army, “in common apparently with nearly all except our own,” had a detachment of clerks and orderlies, and special-duty men for service at different headquarters and the supply department. This arrangement would prevent “the serious drain on the strength of the fighting units so familiar in our service,” and be “conducive to the efficiency and better discipline of the various organizations of combatant troops.”381 First Lieutenant Joseph A. Baer of the Sixth

Cavalry made similar remarks in his article appearing in the Journal of the Military Service

Institution of the United States.382

American officers also spoke highly of Japanese packing methods. Their interest stemmed from the loss of property in the transportation process. Rough handling resulted in broken boxes, which rendered pilfering easy. After stealing items, suspects would shut the boxes to cover their acts. Every morning, “Mr. Wearer who had charge of this work down there, had all boxes which had been broken open or tampered with, nailed up again.” Yet this practice had limited efficacy.

As General Chaffee saw it, “neither agents or guards can be excused from participation” in theft, and “the iron bands can be partly removed, nails drawn, contents extracted, and the boxes restored to the original appearance if a little time and the opportunity” allowed. Consequently, he lauded the Japanese practice of bounding boxes with rope, a message that General Corbin contained in his part of the War Department’s annual report.383

Last but not least, American officers reported on other forces’ uniforms. This focus largely stemmed from concerns over the defect of their own troops’ uniform in battles. The high

381 Major Craighill, “Report on the French Troops in North China”, p. 372. 382 “Notes on Transportation by a Member of the China Relief Expedition,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, vol.30, No.119, September, 1902, p.624. 383 Court Martial of Magnus Axell, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.20727; Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, pp.503-4; “Annual Report of the Adjutant-General of the Army”, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Reports of Chiefs of Bureaus (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), p.50. 114 number of American casualties in the Battle of Tianjin shocked many back home, and they read war correspondents’ coverage that blamed the blue uniform for the loss. The American industrialist David L. Einstein sent Secretary Root a newspaper article on the relief of Beijing, and underlined with red pen the part on the comparison of various troops’ uniforms in China.384

Even Roosevelt wrote to Secretary Root about the matter. As the former Rough Rider described it, “ever since I came home from the Spanish War I have been appreciating the absolute need of doing away with the blue shirt in our army.” The reason he wrote the letter in late July 1900 was that the blue shirt “is the target of the men in China for the Chinese.”385

From this perspective, the observing American officers gave their opinions of the relative value of other uniforms. They regarded the Japanese summer uniform as having “the serious defect of being extremely conspicuous.” Major Mills also mentioned that “they (Japanese) and the Russians were very conspicuous as far as the eye could see.”386 By contrast, although

German forces wore blue uniforms in marching and guard duties, its field uniform was khaki.

In addition, the German cavalry was equipped with a light brown shirt.387 Meanwhile, most

British Indian regiments wore khaki shirts, trousers, and coats.388

All these observations and appeals finally prompted the Department of War to take measures on the uniform issue. In its annual report for the fiscal year 1900, the Quartermaster- general stated that the department would conduct an experiment comparing “the comparative

384 David L. Einstein to Root, October 15, 1900, in Elihu Root papers, Box 9. 385 Roosevelt to Root, July 25, 1900, in Elihu Root papers, Box 162. Indeed, Roosevelt had paid close attention to the uniform color for some time. In a letter to Hermann Speck von Sternburg, first secretary of the German embassy at Washington, D.C., he wrote that “our army uses a dark blue shirt. The effect is to make the troops almost as conspicuous as if they had black or white shirts.” Roosevelt to Sternburg, May 19, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt papers, Series 2, Reel 324. 386 Major Muir, “Report on Japanese Troops in North China”, p. 357; Major Mills, “Observations on Equipments, Supplies, Etc., of the Foreign Detachments of the Expeditionary Army in North China,” p.444. 387 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the German Troops in North China”, pp.375, 381. 388 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the British Troops in North China”, p.408. 115 range of visibility between a body of men wearing the dark blue and the khaki colored clothing.”389 After the test held at Fort Myer near Washington D.C., it turned out that “the nature of the perspective, condition of the atmosphere and elevation of the sun above the horizon” all influenced the relative visibility of these two kinds of clothing. Yet the Army and

Navy Journal also underlined that “the fact…has been well established that the khaki shirt is well adapted for field service” in the Philippines.390

Among allied forces, American officers paid the most attention to British troops due to its extensive experience with colonial warfare. Major Samuel M. Mills indicated that he “was impressed at once with the complete organization and fitness of this force as it was finally prepared for the field in the few days allotted it,” and highlighted British staff officers in this campaign, seventeen in total when “not counting transport officers and those on duty at the bases and on line of communication.” These British staff officers “had been trained in their special duties.”391 First Lieutenant Baer also commented that “every year this army is in the field against some refractory mountain tribe, and the necessities of the case have naturally evolved a most thorough and efficient system.”392

Another observing officer Lieutenant Colonel Dickman narrated in detail the mobilization of an expeditionary force to China drawn from British Indian troops, especially their transportation, equipment, rations, and payment that would impress any reader with the mobilization scheme’s “thoroughness” and “painstaking attention to every detail.” As he saw

389 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Reports of Chiefs of Bureaus, p.269. 390 “Khaki Versus Flannel Suits,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.747. 391 Major Samuel M. Mills, “Observations on Equipments, Supplies, Etc., of the Foreign Detachments of the Expeditionary Army in North China,” in Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, pp.435-447, p.436. 392 “Notes on Transportation by a Member of the China Relief Expedition,” p.628. 116 it, “the instructions contain many excellent features, evidently based on large experience, and readily appreciated.” Dickman also referred to “the completeness of the units…filled up to the full number of fighting men” in the British Indian army as another “specially commendable feature.” In order to achieve this goal, the British Indian army would take men from other regiments when necessary. He also drew the reader’s attention to “efficient men accustomed to the work, acquainted with military forms” who assumed clerical work in the British Indian army. This formed a strong contrast to American troops “being obliged to ‘rustle’ among the enlisted men of the command for clerks and typewriters inexperienced in military business.”393

The American chief signal officer in China, Major George P. Scriven, also stated that “their office equipment and linemen’s kite [kit?] are put up in a manner that might well be copied,” as the small box used “occupies little space in transportation.” Together with putting the repairman’s kit in a strong canvas bag, this practice went “far toward reducing the percentage of loss of tools from which we suffer in our service.”394

Such lessons drawn from decades of fighting appealed to American forces lacking experience in overseas operations and widely criticized for its slow mobilization in both the

Spanish-American War and China Relief Expedition. The Spanish-American War exposed problems in the American mobilization for war overseas. As then Secretary of War Russell A.

Alger described in the annual report, “the accumulation of the large amount of supplies and war materials for the 70,000 men…had crowded that place, and, owing to the absence of depots and facilities for handling that amount of material, occasioned great delay in properly

393 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the British Troops in North China”, November 1, 1900, in Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, pp. 383-415, pp. 388-95. 394 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.437. 117 equipping the expedition intended for Santiago.”395 In his report, Major Mills depicted General

Chaffee as “mobilizing himself and one aid-de-camp before leaving his country, picking up officers here and there en route for staff duty, supplying himself with a field desk and a few picks and shovels at San Francisco; finally arriving upon the scene of operations to find a few marines and the Ninth Infantry.”396 Lieutenant Palmer commented in his note on the expedition from Tianjin to Duliu that “our troops are not so well provided for actual field service as the other powers. We have a better ration but not much efficient field transport for it.”397 In the

Adjutant General’s Department in the Philippines, there were sixty clerks between July 1, 1899 and July 31, 1900, among whom 45 were “enlisted men detailed from the different organizations serving in the division.”

Under these circumstances, U.S. officers expressed a strong desire for reform. Assistant

Adjutant General in the Philippines pleaded that “there is no subject pending of such prime importance for the proper administration of the affairs of the division as the supply of adequate clerical assistance, adequately qualified and adequately compensated.”398 There was also no surprise when Lieutenant Colonel Dickman indicated that “the keeping of a mobilization box is an idea which might well be adopted in modified form in our service,” since it would “furnish a reserve supply of stationery and blanks which could be drawn on until depots are established.”399

In addition to lessons in mobilization, British forces in China also featured technical

395 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, part 1, p.24. 396 Major Mills, “Observations on Equipments, Supplies, Etc., of the Foreign Detachments of the Expedditionary Army in North China,” p.437. 397 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 398 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), pp.79, 81. 399 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the British Troops in North China”, p.406. 118 details that could be potentially useful for American troops in the Philippines. British officers were quite satisfied with their Indian mules. In his report, British Major H. D. McIntyre mentioned that these animals, “though small compared with others, have done very well and their gear and the A.T. carts---the result of much practical experience in India---have proved first rate.” In contrast, the American pack saddle for mules was “an antiquated affair, difficult to fix on and requires a skilled man to load up.” So “there is nothing to learn from it.” While appreciating U.S. wagons made of “the finest steel and best hickory wood” and therefore able to stand rough roads in China, Major McIntyre became amazed at how U.S. troops had

“brought far more than enough oats and hay from America at great trouble and expense, and never thought of getting any locally.” He owed this phenomenon to “the fact that the U.S.A. is a ‘political’ country, and all the money went into some American’s pockets and into no one else’s.” Such comment seemed to reflect the British mockery of political concerns trumping economic calculations in the American case.400

Likely aware of these defects in the American transportation system, Lieutenant Colonel

Dickman advocated adopting the Indian mule. He suggested that the Indian mules and the corresponding harness arrangement “would be most suitable for our infantry detachments operating in close or rough country in the Philippines.” He then listed the comparison of cost for Indian mules and the American pack-train, which strongly favored the former even before taking into account the expense for transporting American animals across the Pacific.401 This suggestion might also stem from his concern over American mules’ adaption to both the climate

400 “Report on the Transport of the Allies in China,” Report on Transport of the Allies in China, 1900-1901, WO 32/6150, The British National Archives. 401 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the British Troops in North China”, pp.412-3. 119 and food of the Philippines, despite the local quartermaster’s department reporting that they soon “become acclimated and keep in good condition,” even sometimes without American forage.402

Other officers also saw aspects of the British Indian forces that they admired and wished to adopt in the Philippines. Captain George Montgomery, Chief Ordnance Officer of the China

Relief Expedition, sent British Indian Army’s instructions on the care and preservation of leather to the Army Chief of Ordnance. In his mind, since “the conditions of climate in India and in the Philippines are very similar these instructions are undoubtedly of great value.”403

Major Mills deemed the British helmet to be “the most desirable head-gear for the broiling sun of the Tropics, or in other hot climates.”404 Lieutenant Palmer also remembered a talk he had with Major John Alexander Stewart of the 7th Rajputs on their way back from Duliu. It centered on the organization of the Indian Army. According to Lieutenant Palmer, “we were so ignorant of conditions in the Far East, that he was able to tell me many things that became useful later in the Philippines.”405

Adding to these technical details was the management of native troops that American officers aspired to emulate in anticipation of forming Filipino units in the future. The United

States had a long history of employing indigenous auxiliary units in its wars with European nations and Native Americans. 406 Relatedly, it held strong interest in how other empires

402 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 3, p. 102. 403 Captain George Montgomery to The Army Chief of Ordnance, March 29, 1901, RG 395, entry 906, Letters Received. 404 Mills, “Observations on Equipments, Supplies, Etc., of the Foreign Detachments of the Expeditionary Army in North China,” p.445. 405 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 406 See Robert M. Utley, “Total War on the American Indian Frontier,” in Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, Stig Forster ed., Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.399-414. 120 proceeded with the practice. In a letter to General Upton, General Sherman instructed that “you cannot devote too much time and study to the systems of military government, by which these nations (England and Russia) utilize the people and resources of interior Asia.” As an example, he suggested Upton spending time in British India to “ascertain how a small force of British troops, aided by the native troops, govern 200,000,000 people.”407 After his tour, General

Upton agreed that “the military institutions of India present more features for our imitation than those of any army or country in Europe.”408

Under these circumstances, it was unsurprising that the American army hoped to enlist

Filipinos. In the War Department’s annual report for fiscal year 1898, based on Commanding

General of the Army Nelson A. Miles’ recommendation, then Secretary of War Russell A. Alger suggested recruiting from “the inhabitants of those islands,” which would “enable the

Government to get into closer touch with their people than it would otherwise be able to do” and “relieve our own people from serving in those climates to a large extent.” 409 These statements illustrated American concern about connecting with the local population, as well as contemporary beliefs about race and climate. In the War Department’s annual report for the fiscal year 1900, Secretary Root also stated that they had given much thought to it, and “had no doubt” that organizing native troops for suppressing insurgents and “the protection of the peaceful inhabitants” was practicable.410

As a result, multiple American officers in China looked closely at the British management

407 Sherman to Upton, July 12, 1875, in Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1878), p.v. 408 Ibid., p.75. 409 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898, part 1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), pp.8-9, 46. 410 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Secretary of War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), p.53. 121 of Indian troops. Major Mills had served as a military representative in India and had reported on the native troops some years before. In China he was delighted to find that the British Indian army had increased the number of British officers in these regiments, a reform that he had suggested during his time in India.411 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman also gave high marks to

Indian troops in British forces. According to him, the caste system in India rendered native officers obedient and aware of their inferior rank to British officers. And Indian Muslim soldiers did not drink, which extinguished another source of disobedience. Meanwhile, most

British officers spoke the native tongue, thus facilitating the mutual understanding between them and Indian troops.

For American officers, mastery of indigenous languages and the enhanced understanding between whites and natives had long been essential qualities in organizing native troops. In his

1875 tour, General Upton noted that British Indian forces held examinations in various languages for officers, and it offered “pecuniary rewards” to those who passed.412 Secretary

Root required that prospective American officers in charge of native troops should not only

“organize and train the new soldiers, but also cultivate in them the habit of subordination, respect for authority, self-control, and regard for the usages of civilized warfare.”413 In short, as Lieutenant Colonel Dickman saw it, “in case regiments of native troops in the Philippines are contemplated, a detailed study of the British system in India can not fail to be of the greatest benefit to those who have the matter in charge.”414

As in the observation of other troops, preexisting notions could color U.S. officers’

411 Major Mills, “Observations on Equipments, Supplies, Etc., of the Foreign Detachments of the Expeditionary Army in North China,” p.437. 412 Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe, p.42. 413 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Secretary of War, p.53. 414 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman, “Report on the British Troops in North China”, pp. 406, 412. 122 judgement of British Indian troops. Major Banister noticed that British and Indian troops used separate part of the field hospital, and both areas “seem to be in good sanitary condition.” This arrangement arose from “the different customs and diet of the two factors, and peculiar caste customs of the natives of India.”415 Such a sense of “separate but equal” might have stemmed from racial segregation rearing its head in the United States, and would surely receive good reception back home. In fact, Major Banister missed some aspects of inequality between British and native field hospitals. British records reveal that native field hospital did not include ward servants, who numbered twenty in British troops’ hospital. In addition, native field hospital had fewer cooks, water-carriers, sweepers, other attendants, clothing, medical comforts, and miscellaneous equipment compared with its British counterpart. These differences were significant, even after taking into account that in theory native troops did not need alcohol like brandy and whisky that constituted part of the medical comforts.416

It is also interesting to note that while American officers sought to learn from the British

Indian forces, their British counterparts held mixed feelings about their Indian soldiers. On the one hand, they took pride in the performance of Indian servicemen in both battles and occupation duties. As Colonel James Moncreiff Grierson wrote in his staff diary, “the native troops are standing the climate very well and are in fact the healthiest here, and their appearance and bearing are excellent.”417 General Barrow also commented that “the 26th Baluchistan and the 7th Rajputs did the best” in the New Year parade, and “I was proud of our men and glad to

415 Major W. B. Banister, “Report on the Medical Departments of the Allied Forces in North China”, in Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China, pp. 416-34, pp. 416, 419. 416 Medical arrangements for the China Expeditionary Forces, September 6, 1900, IOR/L/MIL/7/16683, Asian & African Studies Reading Room, the British Library. 417 Staff Diary between 20 November and 16 December, WO 32/6415, The British National Archives. 123 have shown them off to advantage.”418

Meanwhile, the same British officers had enormous misgivings about depending exclusively on native troops in overseas operations because of their race. Colonel Grierson strongly objected to withdrawing all British infantry from China. He underlined “how this lowers our prestige in the eyes of foreigners, who are only too glad to think that we prefer employing our Indian troops to fight our battles, and only keep them in order by retaining the

Artillery in British hands.”419 On another occasion, he lamented that the native troops “do not know how to assert themselves and …have not the prestige of the white face.” In his mind, the looting German party would not dare to instigate violence against British soldiers. 420

Diplomats and higher-ranking British officers shared his view of native troops. When discussing the arrangements for British troops in winter, General Gaselee mentioned that

Minister MacDonald considered replacing native troops with British units.421 Three months later, in arguing for the deployment of British units to relieve Australian troops, he pointed to the “loss of prestige in having very few white troops here,” and indicated that Chinese authorities would need “their moral and physical support when dealing with foreign troops.”422

These British concerns over the image of Indian troops were not unwarranted. Lieutenant

Palmer remembered that “the stately Sikhs with their long and slender bare legs made a great impression upon our men.” He overheard an American private arguing that these Indian

418 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.206, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 419 Staff Diary between 2 and 12 October, in Despatches, reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives. 420 Staff Diary between 1 and 19 November, in Despatches, reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives. 421 Telegram from Gaselee, August 29, 1900, in distribution of troops owing to winter occupation of Zhili, IOR/L/MIL/7/16734, Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 422 Gaselee to the Secretary of State for India, January 13, 1901, in Telegrams: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6265, The British National Archives 124 soldiers could sing, because “they have legs like mocking birds.”423 Such comparison both downplayed the Indian fighting ability and had a tinge of feminizing them.

Compared to the vast amount of attention paid to British Indian troops, American officers rarely took note of the Chinese Battalion from Weihaiwei, the British concession in Shandong

Province, possibly because of its relatively small number and early withdrawal from occupation duty. But it also reflects U.S. racial stereotypes. Back in the Battle of Tianjin, none of the official American reports mentioned the Chinese Regiment in British forces, despite the fact that members of this regiment helped remove the U.S. wounded from the battlefield and brought much-needed ammunition, suffering several casualties in the process. This ignorance reveals that their deep contempt for the Chinese even extended to those fighting by their side.

They must have felt embarrassed to admit the Chinese role in bailing them out.

Major Louis Livingston Seaman, an army doctor, was an exception due to his previous interest in the topic. Several months before the Boxer Uprising, he travelled to Weihaiwei to investigate the British project of turning local Chinese into colonial soldiers, with the intent of applying these lessons to the Philippines. In the article he wrote about his experiences, he referred to the rich British experience in recruiting colonial soldiers in India, West Africa, Egypt, and the West Indies, and elaborated on how British officers drilled originally irresponsible

Chinese into qualified soldiers. “Like the negro, the Egyptian or the Malay, all the Chinaman wants is the inspiration and leadership of resolute white officers.” The American experience with black soldiers and Chinese litter bearers in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine-

American War, combined with the suffering white people experienced in the tropics, further

423 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 16, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 125 convinced him of the desirability of enlisting either Chinese or Filipinos for service in the archipelago.424

Major Seaman’s service in the China Relief Expedition enhanced his conviction on the issue. On March 9, 1901, he had a conversation with British Colonel C. H. Bower, his old contact in Weihaiwei responsible for training the Chinese Battalion, about the issue. Colonel

Bower spoke highly of the unit who did not desert amidst the Boxer Uprising, despite the fact that many of their relatives joined the movement. They also repelled a Boxer attack on

Weihaiwei, and fought gallantly in Tianjin. Combined with the information British Colonel

Shone gave him about Indian troops while in China, Major Seaman renewed his call for partially replacing white troops with native units in the Philippines.425

Many of these impressions of other forces became widely known in the United States through both war correspondents’ coverage and servicemen’s letters home. Unsurprisingly,

Russian troops received the most negative depiction. Rev. H. F. Hayner stated that “there are no bigger thieves in Tianjin than the Russian soldiers” who “not only robbed the houses of the

Chinese in Tianjin, but plundered the homes of the Christians.”426 There were also widespread accusations about Russians abusing Chinese civilians. The most horrific tale allegedly stemmed from Mrs. E. B. Drew, wife of the commissioner of customs in Tianjin, who accused

Russians of murdering infants and children by bayonet thrusts and tossing.427 Earl Ragsdale also described how Russians “disposed of the wounded in characteristic fashion and burned everything in the way of villages on both sides of the river, sparing neither women nor children

424 “Native Troops for Our Colonial Possessions,” Journal of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States, vol.10 (Carlisle, PA: The Association of Military Surgeons, 1901), pp.237-252. 425 Ibid., pp.304-6. 426 “Looted by Russians”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, August 23, 1900, p.1. 427 “Pillage and Kill”, The Minneapolis Journal, Minneapolis, MN, August 7, 1900, p.9. 126 as they went along.”428 Such coverage of Russian atrocities became so widespread in the

United States that Edward Stratemeyer incorporated this element into On to Pekin, a children’s book: “The only time a Russian soldier would pause was when he saw some wounded

Chinaman trying to escape, when the wretched fellow would immediately be despatched with a bayonet.”429

Additionally, newspapers depicted Russians as isolated in allied forces and as performing poorly in battle. As a war correspondent for The St. Louis Globe-Democrat described, “the

Russian is seldom seen drinking with the men of other nations. The Muscovite endures social isolation here and seems not to dislike it.”430 The republished piece from The Times also mentioned that the Russians “seemed to be always holding aloof.”431 Marion Sullivan, a Texan in the U.S. troops, wrote home that “in the storming of Pekin they (Russians) did nothing…they politely laid down when the fire commenced.” This might refer to repeated American frustration at Russians taking no measures to either suppress Chinese fire or move forward as mentioned above. Although Sullivan himself did not take part in the march on Beijing, he must have got this message from other army fellows, which reveals the prevalence of low remarks about Russians among U.S. troops. Based on this incident, Sullivan drew the conclusion that

“people can say what they like about Russia’s great and powerful army, but if these troops here are a sample of her army she would be out of luck.”432

Not all portrayals of Russian troops were negative. Mrs. Drew denied having talked about the Russian atrocity in Tianjin to reporters. She did not witness these outrages, and only heard

428 “Highest Praise for Capt. McCalla”, The Evening Times, Pawtucket, RI, August 8, 1900, p.7. 429 Stratemeyer, On to Pekin, p.147. 430 “Shot like Demons”, Boston Journal, Boston, MA, September 5, 1900, p.6. 431 “Armies of the Allies in China,” The Oregonian, Portland, OR, December 16, 1900, p.32. 432 “Texas Boy in China”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, October 14, 1900, p.24. 127 about those stories after arriving at the United States. Besides, according to her, “the fact is that the Russians were accounted the saviors of the white people at Tianjin the first week of the trouble. I do not know what we should have done had they not been there.”433 Newspapers also published Mrs. Charles Denby Jr.’s letter of July 20 in which she lauded Russian troops in the defense of Tianjin. As she wrote, “had it not been for them (Russians) all of us would have been slaughtered … How the Russians fought and suffered! I cannot describe their courage.”434

But such well-recognized deeds of valor could not compensate for Russian outrages on civilians. According to a war correspondent, “everybody was disposed to be friendly towards the Russians in the early days of the fighting at Tianjin because of their bravery, but such incidents as these just narrated have been so prominent a feature of the campaign that no one who is supposed to report important facts can ignore them.”435

These dismissive portrayals of the Russian forces, while partly based on real experience and observation, embodied contemporary stereotypes of Russians. Western nations considered

Russia as a more or less Asian country possessing backward Eastern traits. In discussing the alleged Russian brutality in China, The Morning Oregonian reminded its readers that “the

Russian troops, especially those stationed on the eastern part of the Czar’s dominions, are more

Oriental than European…their constant intercourse with the Chinese along the border line renders them more familiar with the Mongolian methods of dealing with foreigners.” 436

American political scientist Paul S. Reinsch mentioned in his latest work that Russia was

“semi-Oriental,” and “not far above the various tribes of the Asiatic plains as to misunderstand

433 “Stories Denied”, Boston Sunday Journal, Boston, MA, August 19, 1900, p.6. 434 “Russian Bravery”, The Anaconda Standard, Anaconda, MT, August 21, 1900, p.1. 435 “Allies Act like Savages”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, September 3, 1900, p.1. 436 “Other Rules of War”, The Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, August 18, 1900, p.10. 128 them.” 437 Sullivan even indicated that “they are more brutal and cruel than the Boxers themselves and are not civilized as much as the Chinese.” 438 This sentiment was quite widespread in the American public. In a letter to Senator Hoar, Arthur Inwood of Minnesota asked for the senator’s opinions about a series of questions about China, the final of which read:

Is not Russian civilization of too low a character to advance the civilization of China?439

While American newspapers portrayed Russian troops in diverse lights, they did not lose sight of the atrocities committed by other forces. As some saw it, the French “are remarkably conspicuous” in committing outrages “considering their small numbers.” 440 A letter by

Colonel Charles A. Coolidge of the Ninth Infantry to Major S. J. Hooper also echoed this assessment. According to Colonel Coolidge, “the French were entirely in the robber business and robbed and murdered right and left and do still.” They continued to plunder their own quarter in Tianjin after the British put an end to looting.441 This statement about the French proceeding with plunder fits with previous coverage of the French preventing the British from seizing their loot.442 British General Barrow also recorded in his diary on August 1 that “the

French are behaving abominably, raping children and women” in Tianjin.443 And according to the Associated Press, Chinese coolies serving American forces in Tianjin accused French soldiers of robbing them on their way home.444

American newspapers portrayed their servicemen as having tense relationships with the

437 Paul S. Reinsch, World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century (London: MacMillan and Co., 1900), p.49. 438 “Texas Boy in China”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, October 14, 1900, p.24. 439 Arthur Inwood to Senator Hoar, January 28, 1901, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 81. 440 “Allies Act like Savages”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, September 3, 1900, p.1. 441 “Japs Can Loot too”, The Biloxi Daily Herald, Biloxi, MS, September 4, 1900, p.1. 442 “Grand Rush for Plunder”, The Minneapolis Journal, Minneapolis, MN, August 29, 1900, p.1. 443 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.137, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 444 “Maltreating the Chinese”, The World Herald, Omaha, NE, November 19, 1900, p.5. 129

French because of these incidents. In a letter to his mother, private Thomas McAllister of the

Fifteenth Infantry stated that “we are having a high old time with the French here. We can’t get along with them at all.” He then went on to describe how the Sixth Cavalry killed around thirty

French soldiers in a fight. Although the case was a fabrication, the imagined slaughter of French soldiers reflects how much he hated them.445

Newspapers paid scant attention to German forces in battles due to their small number in

China before Beijing fell. Those that did cover German units complimented their fine equipment and discipline. As a war correspondent reported, “German troops will follow any orders that are given them, no matter what the death rate that follows.”446 Another newspaper talked about German infantrymen’s ability to march twenty miles in five hours with none falling behind, “a feat which will seem incredible to most American officers and men.”447 This admiration of German forces even spilt into their comments on the allied commander Marshal von Waldersee as “one of the most distinguished soldiers of a great military nation.” 448

Admittedly, there was contemporary coverage of the German part in plunder. But they usually just lumped Germany in with other looting powers.449

While the small German unit did not draw much attention in the early stage of the expedition, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Chinese policy caused much uproar in American newspapers.

In his speech to troops departing for China, Wilhelm II encouraged soldiers to “spare nobody.

Make no prisoners. Use your weapons as that for 1000 years hence no Chinaman will dare look

445 “Letter from Tien Tsin”, Wilkes-Barre Times, Wikes-Barre, PA, December 20, 1900, p.3. 446 “Shot like Demons”, Boston Journal, Boston, MA, September 5, 1900, p.6. 447 “Equipment of a German Soldier”, (from The Detroit-Free Press), Springfield Sunday Republican, Springfield, MA, September 9, 1900, p.15. 448 “Count Von Waldersee”, The Evening News, San Jose, CA, August 16, 1900, p.4. 449 “Looting in China”, The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, September 15, 1900, p.8. 130 askance at any German.” The Washington Post sounded the alarm by urging the McKinley administration not to join Kaiser “in the career of looting and killing upon which he has embarked.”450 Adding to the speech were Wilhelm II’s original intent to destroy Chinese cities as revenge for murdered Germans and his requirement for punishing responsible officials as a precondition for peace negotiation.451 The latter move, combined with continuous German reinforcement after allied forces had relieved the siege in Beijing, induced many American observers to conclude that Germany sought to prevent a speedy settlement and grab a large sphere of influence in China.452

American newspapers further seethed over details about German punitive expeditions and soldiers’ conduct in the campaign. These punitive expeditions targeted alleged Boxer strongholds and villages from which shots were fired. They often resulted in the indiscriminate slaughter of villagers.453 In addition, American newspapers translated German soldiers’ letters home that started to appear in German newspapers after German censorship over such materials loosened. They contained gloomy details such as the execution of prisoners of war and non- combatants. American newspapers linked these acts with the Kaiser’s call to “give no quarter,” and argued that these soldiers simply followed his orders.454

450 “Our Mission in China”, Charlotte Daily Observer, Charlotte, NC, August 17, 1900, p.4. 451 “For Every German Murdered”, Springfield Sunday Republican, Springfield, MA, September 2, 1900, p.1. 452 “What is He for?”, The Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, September 11, 1900, p.6; “Kaiser’s Acts are Warlike”, The Minneapolis Journal, Minneapolis, MN, September 27, 1900, p.1. 453 “The Chinese Culprits”, The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, October 10, 1900, p.6. 454 “They Give No Quarter”, The Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, November 2, 1900, p.3; “German Butchery”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, November 7, 1900, p.2; “More German Atrocities”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, November 9, 1900, p.1; “Medievalism in China”, The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, November 2, 1900, p.4; The Columbus Enquirer-Sun, Columbus, GA, November 20, 1900, p.4. As scholar Yixu Lv points out, German Social Democratic papers collected and published these letters to attack their government’s China policy. See Yixu Lv, “The War that Scarcely Was: The Berliner Morgenpost and the Boxer Uprising,” in Michael Perraudin and Jurgen Zimmerer eds., German Colonialism and National Identity (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.45-56, p.46. See also Sabine Dabringhaus, “An Army on Vacation? The German War in China, 1900-1901,” in Boemeke, Chickering, Forster ed., Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, pp.459-76. 131

Adding to these horrific deeds were stories about Germans mistreating Chinese and looting. As the letter of Lieutenant Pressley Price of the Fourteenth Infantry described, Chinese coolies’ “German and Russian masters communicated their commands by kicks and licks instead of by words.”455 The incident in which General Chaffee filed a strong-worded protest to Marshal Waldersee concerning the allied looting in China became widely publicized.456

Although as mentioned above, General Chaffee later sent a mild-toned letter and the two men dined together, it still caused an uproar in the United States. This incident provoked

Congressman David A. De Armond (D-MO) to introduce a resolution requiring the Department of War to launch an investigation into looting in China.457

In contrast to coverage of Russian, French, and German atrocities, war correspondents usually characterized British and Japanese troops, together with American units, as the most well-behaved among allied forces. They constantly praised the courage of British Indian and

Japanese troops in battles, though contemporary racial theory might deem these soldiers inferior.458 They also lauded these units’ observation of the rules of engagement by statements like “while the international forces were advancing the commanders, notably the American,

Japanese and British, enforced a certain degree of protection for property not needed for military purposes.”459

While largely based on facts, such diverse depictions of other forces also stemmed from the perceived stance of their respective nations regarding the U.S. Open-Door Policy. It pitted

455 “The Civilizing of The Heathen Chinese,” The State, Columbia, SC, November 23, 1900, p.5. 456 “Ate and Made Up”, Jackson Semi-Weekly Citizen, Jackson, MI, December 14, 1900, p.3. 457 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, January 16, 1901, p. 1082. 458 “Our Casualties at Tien-tsin”, The Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, July 25, 1900, p.7; “Forces in China Carefully Studied”, St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, November 6, 1900, p.5. 459 “Allies Act like Savages”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, September 3, 1900, p.1. 132 the United States, Great Britain, and Japan against Russia, Germany, and France. As Minister

Conger telegraphed on September 8, 1900, he believed that “Russia, France, and probably

Germany will obstruct general amicable settlement in order to compel territorial indemnity and as much as possible division of the Empire.” 460 Such classification explained why many reports and letters lauded the actions of the former three forces while lambasting those of the latter three troops. After reporting that American, British, and Japanese troops “are camped near together at various points, and work in the greatest harmony,” the war correspondent for

The Minneapolis Journal commented that “this augurs well for the future, for if the three countries in their diplomatic relations can preserve a like agreement, the worst hopes of China’s enemies may not be realized.”461

However, there was still dissent regarding British troops, as anti-imperialists deemed

Great Britain the main villain goading the United States into the imperial project. War correspondent Frederick Palmer accused British General Dorward of not clearly conveying his plan to U.S. commanders and scapegoating Colonel Liscum for the loss of American lives in the Battle of Tianjin.462 The Philadelphia Times indicated that the British malice in this case

“was only the more apparent because Colonel Liscum was slain and the charge was made when he could not himself deny it.”463 This topic resonated with Anglophobic readers. As mentioned above, in a letter to the editor of The Sun, a person under the pen name Republican asserted that due to the ongoing war in the Philippines, the McKinley administration could only send the Ninth Infantry Regiment “to be placed under a British general to be sacrificed as the English

460 Conger to Hay, September 8, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 461 “At Tientsin, Tung Chau and Beyond”, The Minneapolis Journal, Minneapolis, MN, November 17, 1900, p.3. 462 “Liscum Blamed”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, July 23, 1900, p.2. 463 “England Never True to an Ally,” The Anaconda Standard, Anaconda, MT, August 5, 1900, p.4. 133 were under Buller of South Africa.”464 Lieutenant L. B. Lawton of the Ninth Infantry tried to put down the controversy by arguing that his unit moved into that position in order to protect the Japanese flank rather than under General Dorward’s order.465

Meanwhile, some reporters singled out the British part in looting, despite all forces’ complicity in this act. As the Associated Press described, “English officers rode with their horses concealed under dry goods, and soldiers slung bundles on their bayonets.”466 In a New

York Sun article on the looting of Tianjin, a reporter specified the diverse races congregating in the pawnshop for plunder, including “proper British, Colonials, Pathans, Punjaubis,

Weihaiwei Chinese.” He later also wrote about British coming out in parties with officers directing them to loot. They seized other troops’ loot in the name of order, too, and then auctioned these items and divided the money.467

Japanese troops received wide praise for their bravery and endurance amidst this general discredit of allied forces. The Associated Press regarded them as “the heroes of the battle” in

Tianjin. “Their fighting was remarkably brave, and was praised by all their colleagues.” It also quoted a Japanese general as stating “when my men move, it will be forward” while other commanders discussed retreat after the heavy loss, and highlighted Japanese soldiers who

“charged the breaches in the wall made by the artillery and fought hand to hand in the streets.”468 Another reporter, James Martin Miller, stated that the Japanese “stood the heat and the deprivations better than those of any other army,” and “needs only a bit of rice for

464 “China and the Philippines”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, August 25, 1900, p.10. 465 “Liscum Saved the Japanese”, The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, September 11, 1900, p.5. 466 “Grand Rush for Plunder”, The Minneapolis Journal, Minneapolis, MN, August 29, 1900, p.1. 467 “The Looting of Tientsin,” The Sun, New York, NY, September 9, 1900, p.8. 468 “The 9th’s Disaster”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, July 25, 1900, p.1. 134 subsistence.”469

Apart from their battlefield performance, American newspapers also lauded Japanese servicemen for their conduct in the occupation period. New York Sun regarded them as the only forces besides the American detachment who did not loot in Tianjin. Many other newspapers followed agreed. 470 After talking about the horrible deeds Russian and French forces committed against Chinese, Clarence Martin of the Fifteenth Infantry wrote his brother that

“surprising to say, the Japs are considered by everybody to be the best soldiers next to our men, and they are liked and respected by all Americans.”471 Another report quoted an unnamed

American officer feeling ashamed in front of his Japanese counterpart when it came to looting:

It is pretty tough for the representative of a Christian nation to have to stand as I did today,

and hear a Japanese officer, who represents what not so many years ago we called the

heathen, tell him that it is not right to loot and it should not be permitted. And the worst of

it was I couldn’t say a word, for my own men were guilty and his were not. I couldn’t stop

it, and he could.472

Such depictions even made their way to the U.S. Congress. On January 31, 1901, Senator

Teller elaborated on the allied cruelty in China, and then added that “for the heathen Japanese, that all the testimony shows he has done less looting and less revolting things than his Christian

469 “Correspondent Miller in Pekin,” The Sunday Oregonian, Portland, OR, October 21, 1900, p.32. 470 “Looting the Heavenly City”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, July 23, 1900, p.4; “The 9th’s Disaster”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, July 25, 1900, p.1. 471 “Interesting Letter from a St. Louis Boy in China,” The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, October 28, 1900, p.1. 472 “The Looting of Tien Tsin,” The State, Columbia, SC, November 19, 1900, p.7. 135 associates in arms.”473

Admittedly, American officers and soldiers spoke highly of Japanese troops. Yet it was more or less based on the recognition that by adopting Western technologies and thinking, the

Japanese had distinguished themselves from less developed races and advanced to be on a par with Europeans. As American minister to Japan, Alfred E. Buck, who led African-American troops during the Civil War and was involved in the Reconstruction of the American South, commented, the Japanese were “not only superior in every way to the negro, but perfectly the equal of the European himself.”474

Underneath the widespread acclaim for Japanese troops lay concern over what this country’s impressive fighting strength would mean for the rest of the world. The Yellow Peril prominent in the contemporary Western world envisioned a lethal combination of Japanese technology and Chinese manpower that would set out to conquer the West. Many contemporaries suspected Japan of harboring great territorial ambition. As a poem that appeared in a couple of American newspapers put it:

The jimp little Jap

Is a miniature chap,

With a quaint little slant to his eyes,

But he seeks every scrap

All over the map

473 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, January 31, 1901, p.1725. 474 “Problem of Chinese War: The Allies and the Japanese”, Charlotte Daily Observer, Charlotte, NC, September 2, 1900, p.7. 136

And his nerve is gigantic in size.475

Contemporaries dreaded the enormous energy hidden under the tiny appearance. North

Dakotan M. C. Henry in the army service was keenly aware of some white soldiers’ prejudices towards the Japanese, and saw ominous signs in such behavior. According to him, “the little

Japs take all his insults and say nothing, but patiently await their opportunity.” 476 A correspondent for The Boston Journal also predicted that “once these little brown men of the

Land of the Rising Sun succeed in their firm intention to learn to shoot as well as the Americans do they will be an infinite factor in international warfare.”477

In depicting these foreign forces, the American media had in mind the distinction between them and U.S. troops in terms of the performance in China. As the contents above reveal,

American officers consciously compared their own servicemen with soldiers from other participating forces. High ranking officers in Washington D. C. also tried to convey such awareness for comparison to the general public. According to The Butte Weekly Miner, when learning about the Ninth Infantry’s scheduled departure for China, General Corbin indicated that “the regiment will compare with any similar organization sent by any of the other governments to China.”478

Some newspapers and magazines highlighted categories in which American forces prevailed when compared with other troops. A correspondent for The Boston Journal wrote that “when it comes to popularity, our own American soldiers are vastly and cordially admired

475 “Duty Calls Me and I Must Go!”, Patriot, Harrisburg, PA, August 16, 1900, p.2; The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, LA, August 19, 1900, p.29. 476 “As Seen At Taku”, Bismarck Daily Tribune, Bismarck, ND, October 8, 1900, p.1. 477 “Shot like Demons,” Boston Journal, Boston, MA, September 5, 1900, p.6. 478 “U.S. Troops Ordered to Seat of War,” Butte Weekly Miner, Butte, MT, June 28, 1900, p.8. 137 for the way they tackle their work in battle, and for the splendid accuracy of their infantry fire.”479 The latter sounds like an exaggeration given the vast amount of ammo American infantrymen spent in the attack on the Imperial City of Beijing. In addition, the Medical Record illuminated how other commandants first disparaged General Chaffee’ decision to house

American servicemen in tents rather than Chinese buildings throughout the winter, and then recognized this move’s ingenuity because of their own troops’ numerous cases of sickness compared with the U.S. contingent.480

American newspapers and magazines also quoted other countries’ coverage to further support their points. The Medical Record elaborated on a Japanese newspaper’s praise of the

American ambulance corps’ work in China, which included the Japanese medical staff’s opinion.481 The Oregonian also published a piece from The Times to illuminate other forces’ appreciation of the American fighting ability, despite their puzzle over America’s loose disciplinary measures.482

As with the presentation of various forces’ images, American servicemen’s voices added more credibility to this coverage. An article in Collier’s Weekly quoted a teamster as stating

“when it comes to horses and mules and teaming we’ve opened the foreigners’ eyes a bit.”483

Captain William Crozier published an article in the North American Review, in which he extensively praised American transportation, supply, and armament in China.484 At the tenth annual meeting of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States held between May

479 “Shot like Demons,” Boston Journal, Boston, MA, September 5, 1900, p.6. 480 “The American Army in China,” George F. Shrady ed., Medical Record (New York: William Wood and Company, 1901), vol.59, p.218. 481 “The American Ambulance Corps in China,” in Medical Record, vol.58, p.382. 482 “Armies of the Allies in China,” The Oregonian, Portland, OR, December 16, 1900, p.32. 483 “The Weary Way to Pekin,” The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, October 13, 1900, p.5. 484 “Some Observations on the Pekin Relief Expedition,” in North American Review, 1901, pp.225-40. 138

30 and June 1, Major Louis Livingston Seaman read his paper “Observations in China and the

Tropics on the Army Ration and the Post Exchange or Canteen.” He talked about how German medical officers boasted of their camp’s good record in preventing typhus fever and dysentery.

They also used to criticize American forces for suffering from these two diseases during the

Spanish-American War. Under these circumstances, it was amazing how German troops reported over 500 cases of typhoid fever within two months of their arrival, while U.S. forces were freed from these diseases’ onslaught, partly thanks to their water distilling plant.485

Meanwhile, other American war correspondents underlined the still existing gap between their own troops and other forces, and considered how it could be improved based on lessons learned in China. The New York Sun noted that in the Battle of Tianjin, every other force “had some contrivance for getting extra water to the field,” while American servicemen suffered from water shortage after two hours of battle. “It is no very great reform to make but it counts afield.”486 This coverage became so influential that the Army Inspector-General included it in his annual report.487 The correspondent for The Evening World mentioned in his report that

“the blue shirts of the American troops made them distinct marks where the khaki uniforms of the other allies could not be seen.”488 The Kansas City Star reported that in the expedition to

Duliu, “the American troops were the worst suffers, being much hampered by the amount of instruments they carried.” Meanwhile, “the other troops were in light marching order.”489

485 “Observations in China and the Tropics on the Army Ration and the Post Exchange or Canteen,” in Journal of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States, vol.10, p.147. 486 “Americans Short of Water,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.54. 487 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 1, p.142. 488 “’Don’t Retreat, Boys, Keep Firing’ Were the Dying Words of Liscum”, The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, July 22, 1900, p.1. 489 “To the Fame of Americans,” The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, October 15, 1900, p.7. 139

Correspondent Oscar K. Davis even wrote an extensive piece on the way in which various forces carried their weight.490

The most seismic report of unfavorable American performance compared with other troops came from Thomas F. Millard of Scribner’s Magazine, who had earlier reported on the

Boer War in South Africa. Numerous newspapers transcribed part of his coverage to make their arguments. At one point, Millard claimed that “even our armies are not free from these wanton sacrifices. Every town, every village, every peasant’s looted and then burned. A stretch of country fully 10 miles in width was thus swept.”491 He also portrayed American transportation as inferior to its counterparts in other forces, and condemned the lack of water supply and camping provisions for U.S. servicemen, as well as the high levels of sickness among the

Americans.492 Meanwhile, he praised the Japanese performance in the campaign, including their advanced telegraph work.

Millard’s article was so influential that General Chaffee felt the need to write a ten-page rebuttal to General Corbin. General Chaffee first undermined Millard’s credibility by pointing out that he did not accompany the march on Beijing. As a result, his account of the U.S. participation in atrocities was unfounded, and “the American force was absolutely free from them.” General Chaffee cited the number of the sick in the American troops to prove that

Millard’s claim that over one third of U.S. servicemen were in a hospital within one week of the allied entry into Beijing was an exaggeration. According to General Chaffee, the joint

Anglo-American line was the only telegraph that maintained the allied communication with

490 “A Study of Troops in China,” The Springfield Sunday Republican, Springfield, MA, November 25, 1900, p.5. 491 “The Shame of It,” The Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, December 27, 1900, p.6. 492 “Good Fighters,” St. Albans Daily Messenger, St. Albans, VT, December 29, 1900, p.2. 140

Tianjin during the march on Beijing, and that Japanese forces did not establish their own line until one week after the fall of Beijing. And he proudly listed the amount of provisions each force received, while complimenting the superior U.S. transportation. In terms of the water supply, all forces carried water in canteens and drank from wells found along the way. In conclusion, General Chaffee charged that Millard “could hardly help knowing also that a cleverly presented exaggeration of any condition would be accepted as a truthful statement by the uninitiated or inexperienced person who would be unable to test its truthfulness.”493

In writing this letter, General Chaffee expected that it would become public. He hoped to

“furnish to the Department the foregoing statement in rebuttal for such use as may be deemed best.”494 Newspapers did catch wind of the letter, and published some of its contents.495 One newspaper opinion commented that “for the development of thoroughbred liars the troubles in

China have beaten the world’s record.”496 Yet for The Boston Journal, Millard “has enjoyed hitherto a reputation for accuracy which gave his articles weight.”497

The depiction of different forces made its way even to the McKinley administration. As

Roosevelt wrote to Rice, “what extraordinary soldiers those little Japs are! Our own troops out in China write, grudgingly, that they think the Japs did better than any of allied forces.”498 In a letter to Sternburg on the same day, he indicated that he was going to “get from Chaffee an account of how the different troops compare in the Chinese fighting.” From what he had gathered by far, “the Russians were the worst for plundering and murdering.” He also pointed

493 Chaffee to Corbin, March 14, 1901, in RG395, Entry 898. 494 Ibid. 495 “Gen. Chaffee,” Jackson Semi-Weekly Citizen, Jackson, MI, May 14, 1901, p.1; “Denounced by Chaffee,” The Sunday Oregonian, Portland, OR, May 19, 1901, p.19. 496 “Gen. Chaffee,” The Duluth News Tribune, Duluth, MN, May 16, 1901, p.4. 497 “Gen. Chaffee,” Boston Morning Journal, Boston, MA, May 18, 1901, p.4. 498 Roosevelt to Rice, November 19, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt papers, Series 2, Reel 324. 141 to other forces’ complaints about how American soldiers failed to salute officers, and added that “our officers speak contemptuously of the French troops.”499

Examining American servicemen’s opinions of other forces further elucidates the transnational nature of the China Relief Expedition. This operation brought U.S. servicemen into contact with their equivalents in other troops who possessed diverse features. As a result, they formed initial views of other troops. They especially denigrated the Russian performance while generally praising the British and Japanese. In addition, U.S. officers closely observed other troops’ merits and flaws, in order to see if there was anything worth emulating. This task was crucial for American forces relatively new to overseas colonial warfare and administration when compared to European empires and Japan. American officers especially desired to learn about techniques of tropical warfare as well as how to organize native troops. Servicemen’s opinions contributed to the representation of participating nations’ images back in the United

States. However, these observations were not truly objective. Instead, they were twisted by impressions of other troops formed both before and during this expedition, as well as racial ideas widespread in the American society. The American self-perception also helped shape their comparisons with other troops. A large number of U.S. officers portrayed their troops as the only one abstaining from plunder.

In addition to interaction with other forces, U.S. servicemen also had frequent encounters with Chinese people. Existing notions of China, Chinese, and other “savage” people like Native

Americans and Filipinos to a large extent dictated American servicemen’s behavior in these

499 Roosevelt to Sternburg, November 19, 1900, ibid. 142 encounters. Yet the China experience also had the potential of transforming these stereotypes.

The next chapter will reveal how these encounters proceeded in China, and how they helped shape the image of Chinese in the United States.

143

Chapter Four: Images of China and its People, Transplanted and Transformed

American servicemen’s interaction with Chinese in the China Relief Expedition was part of the contemporary imperial/colonial encounters on a worldwide scale.500 Americans came to

China with impressions formed after decades of contact with the country and its people. Their

China experience both reinforced and modified these existing notions through a series of repeated tests and modifications reported in American newspapers. Meanwhile, Chinese residents in both China and the United States sought to advance their own interests, sometimes even through appealing to existing American stereotypes.

Before the China Relief Expedition, most American servicemen held the Chinese military capacity in low regard. Back in the 1870s, General Upton reported that “the Chinese army is as backward in its tactics as in its armament…the Chinese officers have not the slightest appreciation of the amount of instruction required for troops in modern war, nor do they possess any knowledge of the method of arranging and conducting troops in battle.”501 The recent

Chinese fiasco in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 gave them more reasons to hold the

Chinese army in contempt. As an article in the 1894 Army and Navy Journal described, “a few of Li Hung-Chang’s foreign drilled troops are said to have made a firm stand and to have suffered severely, but the comparative losses indicate that most of the Chinese forces were

500 For examples, see Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Re-Thinking the Colonial Encounter in Zimbabwe in the Early Twentieth Century,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 33:1 (Mar., 2007), pp.173-91; Gil Stein, The Archaeology of Colonial Encounters: Comparative Perspectives (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2005); Ellen Amster, Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco, 1877- 1956 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013). 501 Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, p.20. 144 panic struck…Several thousand Chinese fled toward a valley to the northward, and, upon finding their retreat in this direction cut off, surrendered in a body.”502

The China Relief Expedition forced American officers into a new reckoning of Chinese military capacity. After the Seymour column’s occupation of the Xigu Arsenal, Chinese forces constantly fired at allied forces, and launched several waves of determined attacks in an effort to retake the arsenal. On one occasion, they managed to get inside the arsenal, only to be repelled by the international column. During this period, Admiral Seymour also sent a small detachment in an attempt to break through to Tianjin. Yet encountering fierce Chinese fire on the way, they had to retreat to the arsenal and wait for the relief from Tianjin.503

A series of skirmishes and battles around Tianjin later further introduced U.S. servicemen to the Chinese military prowess. U.S. marine Gustave Enders described the June 27 battle around the Eastern Arsenal as “tough fighting, for the Chinese had a good position and used their field pieces very effectively.” The joint forces “charged on them repeatedly and finally they gave way.”504 This performance formed a strong contrast to their routing in the Sino-

Japanese War mentioned above. Commenting on the ensuing Chinese bombardment of the international concessions in Tianjin that lasted for around three weeks, Consul Ragsdale stated that “the shelling was far more terrific than any I experienced during the civil war, and I served under General Sherman.” 505 By invoking the name of a general who personified tough campaigning in the American South, Consul Ragsdale underlined the intensity of the Chinese

502 “The War in Asia,” Army and Navy Journal, Vol.32, p.50. 503 “Narrative of Events, Peking Relief Expedition 1900”, Supplementary Jellicoe Papers, MS 71558, Western Manuscripts, The British Library; McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 27, pp.32-6. 504 “Was in Hot Fighting outside of Tientsin”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA, August 16, 1900, p.2. 505 Ragsdale to First Assistant Secretary of State David J. Hill, July 16, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 145 shelling. The high allied casualties in the Battle of Tianjin again proved China’s military prowess. American troops alone lost twenty-four men with another ninety-eight injured as well as one missing. This number was slightly higher than the British casualties (around 94), roughly the same as the French casualties (around 110), and much smaller than the Russian and

Japanese casualties (around 200 and 400 respectively).506

Chinese forces owed part of their enhanced military capacity to modern weapons it either imported or manufactured, which caused American officers concern. In the Battle of Beicang,

Chinese troops made obstinate defensive efforts with “modern magazine rifles, Krupp quick- firing guns, and smokeless powder.” As a result, the attacking Japanese forces suffered around

300 casualties.507 In their last stand in the Imperial City of Beijing, Chinese troops shot at the advancing American column from the top of walls and trees with everything they had, including

Mausers, Remingtons, jingals, bows and arrows.508 Encountering the heavy Chinese fire first hand, Captain McCalla indicated that “no one except the agents who had been selling arms and munitions of war to China since the close of the Japanese war had any conception of the vast amount of money which the Beijing government had expended in preparations for another war.”

He sent this letter to his friend Mrs. Edward Roby while receiving treatment for three wounds inflicted during the Seymour expedition.509 In response to the Navy Department’s request for

President McKinley to prohibit further American arms sales to China, Secretary Root indicated

506 Colonel Robert L. Meade to the Brigadier-General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, July 18, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11; General Dorward to the Secretary of State for War, July 19, 1900, Despatches, reports etc: China Expedition 1900-1901, WO 106/6266, The British National Archives; Alekseyev to Kuropatkin, July 15, 1900, in Materialy dlia opisaniia voennykh dieĭstviĭ v Kitaie v 1900-1901 g.g, t.3, kn.1, p.219. 507 Japanese reports on operations with maps and plans, WO 32/6148, The British National Archives; General Sir A. Gaselee’s diary of events and despatches, IOR/L/MIL/7/16740, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 508 “Troop ‘M’ Sixth Cavalry in the Chinese Relief Expedition of 1900,” pp.65-6. 509 “McCalla’s Gloomy View,” Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, August 16, 1900, p.8. 146 that “for several years the English and German firms, particularly the latter, appear to have been selling enormous quantities of arms to China, and the mischief is probably already done.”510

Apart from opinions of the Chinese armed forces, the China Relief Expedition also tested

American views of China and its people. By the time of the campaign, the United States had witnessed decades of heated debates over Chinese immigration to the country. Those opposing this influx portrayed Chinese immigrants as alien to American culture and promulgating vice like prostitution and opium that eroded the fabric of U.S. society. Such rhetoric evolved from a mainly West Coast phenomenon to a national obsession that resulted in the passage and renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.511 Singling out a race as the object of exclusion further ratified this group’s undesirability. There were cases of hate crimes against Chinese immigrants after the act came into effect, such as the Rock Springs massacre of 1885 that saw more than twenty-eight Chinese immigrants killed.

American servicemen had also encountered locals of Chinese ethnicity in the Philippines.

About twenty-one percent of the population in Manila were “pure Chinese aliens,” while another seventy-four percent were of mixed Chinese and Filipino ancestry.512 At the time of intensive campaigning in the Philippines, American troops hired Chinese litter bearers, four for each company, for carrying the dead and wounded and bringing up ammunition. After the large- scale fighting subsided, American servicemen would retain them to “do all of the dirty work

510 Root to Long, July 17, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Box 173, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 511 Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 512 “Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, United States Army, Provost-Marshal-General, on the Military Government of the City of Manila”, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, part 5, p.102. 147 about the kitchen and camp, handle all supplies, etc.”513 The nature of this work no doubt rendered them inferior in the eyes of many American servicemen. U. S. servicemen were not above unprovoked assault against the local Chinese. In one instance, Private James A. Friel of the Ninth Infantry “did without just provocation strike with a serious blow of the hand

Chinaman Tow Lee, an old man seventy years of age,” thus “felling him to the ground.”514

In addition to these past impressions and experiences directly linked with people of

Chinese ethnicity, American servicemen also brought with them imperial mindset formed through encounters with the Native Americans and influenced by the worldwide colonial project. Onboard the voyage to China, Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes of the Sixth Cavalry, an officer who had served in the American West, read The Choir Invisible, a novel about life in

Kentucky in the early republic. It depicted white settlers’ constant fear of an indigenous onslaught, and their eventual success in driving Native Americans westward. As the teacher in the novel spoke to his students on the school’s closing day, “don’t you recollect how you little babes in the wilderness could never go anywhere?...Always, always, it was the Indians…by the time you are men and women, Kentucky will no longer be the great wilderness it still is…instead of buffalo and wild-cats and bears and wolves and panthers there will be flocks of the whitest sheep.”515 Using animals as metaphor, the teacher pointed out the eventual white replacement of Native Americans. Lieutenant John McAuley Palmer of the Fifteenth Infantry remembered one August evening just before sunset. Young officers gathered on the upper deck

513 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 3, p. 100. 514 Court Martial of John Lavery, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.22994; Court Martial of James A. Friel, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.20743. 515 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, pp. 1-6, in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Charles D. Rhodes, Diary Note of a Soldier; James Lane Allen, The Choir Invisible (New York: The American News Company, 1899), p.295. 148 and listened to Lieutenant Jerry Lynch playing mandolin “as an accompaniment to Kipling’s songs of the Far East.” He specifically referred to two such songs in the memoir. One was “On the Road to Mandalay” based on “Mandalay,” a poem about a British soldier back in London who missed his Burmese girlfriend. It epitomized the Western longing for the exotic East personified in a female figure. The other was “Loot,” which provoked a heated discussion among them over the ethics of war spoils in China.516

Given the unflattering history of anti-Chinese bias as well as the reigning imperial mindset, it is quite understandable that American forces showed no quarter to their Chinese enemy.

Several U.S. servicemen relished defeating and killing Chinese soldiers on the battlefield.

Captain De R. C. Cabell of the Sixth Cavalry mentioned in his report of the assault on the imperial city in Beijing that “I dropped two [Chinese sharpshooters] out of these trees myself.”517 In the letter to his father about the August 19 skirmish near Tianjin, William R.

Reese reported “the fellows yelled like Comanches when they swooped down upon those

Chinks,” even while U.S. horses stepped over bodies of dead Chinese soldiers on the ground.518

Comparing Chinese people to animals erased their humanity and eased the act of killing.

Lieutenant Rhodes depicted Chinese in the August 19 engagement near Tianjin as “drop[ping] like rats out of sight in a trench or ravine.”519 In the letter to his sister Alice K. Cook about the

516 The Papers of John McAuley Palmer, Box 16, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Rudyard Kipling, “Mandalay” and “Loot” in Wallace Rice ed., Kipling’s Poems (Chicago: George M. Hill Company, 1899). 517 Captain De R. C. Cabell to Captain Hutcheson, August 17, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.77. 518 “Skirmishing in China”, The Sunday News Tribune, Duluth, MN, November 18, 1900, p.24; Chaffee to Corbin, September 19, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.100; First Lieutenant E. R. Heiberg to Adjutant of the Sixth Cavalry, August 19, 1900, in ibid., p.104; Lieutenant colonel Theo J. Wint to Captain Hutcheson, August 20, 1900, in RG 395, entry 913, Reports, 1900-1901, National Archives, Washington, D.C; “American Cavalry in China,” p.8. For the cultural phenomenon of U.S. soldiers acting like Native Americans when at war, see Philip Joseph Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 519 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer 149 same battle, Alonzo Cook of the Sixth Cavalry wrote that “when we charged them it was just like charging a lot of sheep. Every Chinaman we came across we would shoot or kill with our bayonets.”520 The analogy of the Chinese as animals appeared in other forces as well. In the early stage of the Seymour expedition, Lieutenant J. L. Fownes-Luttrell of HMS Centurion recorded how they approached a group of Boxers and “bowled them over like so many rabbits.”

Following this account, he explained that “it seems rather bad luck shooting down unarmed men, but it has to be done. They are doing such a fearful lot of damage to the country.”521 This case further illustrates how the comparison of the Chinese to animals helped soldiers overcome their unease about killing.

Many officers believed in the constant need to employ force against Chinese who they regarded as inferior and with limited rights. In his report regarding the injury of a Chinese man trying to slip into the Temple of Agriculture, Second Lieutenant T. M. Baines Jr. constantly referred to Chinese as “Chino,” and mentioned his “strict orders to keep the crowd back, even by using bayonets, teaching them to respect a sentinel.”522 In his testimony against Sergeant

Frank C. Perkins for causing a commotion in his tent, Lieutenant Colonel T. J. Wint of the Sixth

Cavalry reported the sergeant as stating “I’m no Chinaman. I am an American soldier. I will talk.”523 This sentence illuminates American servicemen’s perception of the unequal status between them and the Chinese.

Many American servicemen brought such contempt in the heat of battle and conflict-

War) of the Year 1900”, p.9. 520 “Trenton Boy Writes a Letter from China”, Trenton Times, Trenton, NJ, November 12, 1900, p.8. 521 “Diary of Lt. J. L. Fownes-Luttrell of HMS Centurion, 12 June -4 July 1900”, Supplementary Jellicoe Papers, MS 71558, Western Manuscripts, the British Library. 522 Second Lieutenant T. M. Baines Jr. to the Adjutant of Camp Reilly, January 18, 1900, RG395, Entry 969/968. 523 Court Martial of Frank C. Perkins, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.21915. 150 ridden occupation to their treatment of Chinese. Most existing scholarship on the American occupation, with the exception of Hevia’s work, tends to portray it as well-organized and mostly free from looting. While the U.S. troops on the whole did behave better than other forces, examination of relevant materials in the American National Archives and overlooked passages in the notes of Chinese literati reveals cases contrary to this unsullied image. When commenting on the huge number of courts-martial during the China Relief Expedition, acting

Judge-Advocate for the expedition Captain Hutcheson stated that “advantage has been taken by our men, as well, no doubt, as by the men of other countries, of the helplessness of the

Chinese, and the former have been unable to resist the temptation and opportunities presented by a nonresisting people.”524

Some American servicemen did plunder Chinese residents. Admittedly, in some instances they also targeted European stores.525 Yet from cases reported, Chinese residents were subject to their looting the most. The chaos after the fall of Beijing provided them with the ideal opportunity for extortion. Zhong Fangshi living in the American sector recorded that on August

17, “two U.S. soldiers, accompanied by a Chinese convert, with guns in their hands, stood in front of my house and demanded watches and bullion.” They eventually left with a watch and a silver coin. The writer congratulated himself that at least they did not either break in or cause bodily harm: “I heard in other places, bandits and foreigners broke in and plundered. They would kill anyone showing any sign of resistance.” Indeed, those encountering break-ins had no choice but to escape to neighboring houses, which would have been a horrifying experience,

524 Grote Hutcheson to the Adjutant General, China Relief Expedition, May 19, 1901, Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, pp.511-2. 525 A. Preble to Captain Noyes, March 12, 1901, RG395, Entry 906. 151 especially for women. A Chinese literato’s female relatives moved to live with other family members after American soldiers broke into their home. Another Chinese literato’s relative saw stolen goods, including bedding, burned in the Temple of Agriculture on August 18.526 This entry fit the following statement in General Chaffee’s biography: “A sudden and minute inspection by the officers revealed a quantity of loot in the camps of the American troops.

Wherever possible the property was restored to the owners; that not so disposed of was burned in the presence of the looters.”527 On September 3, Russian forces seized Corporal George L

Newell and Private B. H. Birkenkotter (Fourteenth Infantry) in possession of bullion silver in their zone. Further findings revealed that these two servicemen had left the camp without permission.528

The American officers attempted to combat the robbery and trade in loot, to no avail. On

September 12, General Chaffee issued an order prohibiting American servicemen from leaving

“their camps or quarters with arms…except when on duty,” a move that could be traced back to its equivalent in Manila.529 It was obviously meant to prevent U.S. servicemen from looting with the aid of weapons at hand. Yet the illicit market in war spoils continued. Traveler and correspondent Jasper Whiting arrived in Beijing on September 19. He soon asked an old resident “where I could purchase some of the treasures myself, and was advised to go to the camp of the American soldiers.” His trip to the U.S. camp indeed proved fruitful; he purchased

526 Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Science ed., Gengzi Jishi, pp.35, 176; Ruicheng’s letter, in Yihetuan Shiliao (Sources on the Boxer Uprising), p.380. 527 Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee, p.214. 528 Captain Hutcheson to Commanding Officer of the Fourteenth Infantry, September 3, 1900, RG395, Entry 898. 529 General Orders, September 12, 1900, RG395, Entry 973, Post Returns and Special Field Returns, 1900- 1901; “Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Davis, United States Army, Provost-Marshal-General, on the Military Government of the City of Manila”, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant- General Commanding the Army, part 5, p.82. 152 a fur coat and some less valuable furs at a cheap price.530 In light of the Chinese witness to the burning of plundered clothing in late August, these items might have come from looting afterwards.

The division of Beijing into different nations’ occupation zones, while establishing demarcations that were closed to servicemen of other countries, also presented possible loopholes that soldiers could exploit to their benefit. In the afternoon of November 24, 1900,

Private William F. Mitchell and George C. Moan (Company F, Ninth Infantry) went to a

Chinese store and watch repair shop in the German zone without leave. For Private Mitchell who enlisted in February 1899 and had been away from the American camp since November

19, 1900, this was his third absence without leave in China. After buying some cigarettes, the men stole three silver watches from the shop.

When arrested by a German patrol who saw several Chinese chasing these two men, they sought every means to exonerate themselves. They claimed to be just simply walking along the street and hinted that the Chinese had attempted to extort them. This line of defense demonstrates how stereotypes about “shifty” Chinese could be mobilized to cover up U.S. crime. Mitchell and Moan abandoned the three silver watches in a basket to cover up the evidence. The Chinese interpreter at the scene also insisted on their innocence as “they were generally well-supplied with money.” It was only through the discovery of the three watches and the testimony of Private Harry Tyler (Company A, Ninth Infantry), who also left the camp without leave, contracted with Chancroid, and might have taken part in this theft, that the case against these two privates solidified. In the court martial nearly two months later, Private

530 Jasper Whiting diary, part one, p.122, Massachusetts Historical Society. 153

Mitchell still professed their innocence by calling attention to “the fact that it was a case where

German, English and Chinese were all being spoken with no competent interpreters and that a statement may have been misunderstood.”531

Similarly, Private John J. Shaul of the Ninth Infantry also sought to escape punishment by appealing to linguistic and national differences. On March 23, 1901, after having dinner with his brother in downtown Beijing, he suggested he would like to go to L Company’s quarters to visit another friend. Private Shaul then crossed the German section, as “it was nearer.” Yet he somehow ended up in a house of prostitution where he assaulted a Chinese man. A German corporal arrived at the scene in response to the Chinese call for help and put him under arrest.

On their way to the German police station, Private Shaul caught the corporal by the throat and tried to push him to the ground in an attempt to escape. But he claimed that the corporal, with resolver and bayonet in hand, repeated “six dollars” as if extracting money from him. He owed his long silence on the matter to the fact that “there was no one who could speak English” in the German guard house at first.532

When facing accusations from Chinese victims and witness, suspects in robbery cases had ample reasons to tout stereotypes about “shifty” Chinese in their attempt to evade conviction.

On the night of December 31, 1900, Private Edward Carter (Ninth Infantry) who served in the

First Connecticut Volunteer Infantry in 1898, later enlisted in the regular army, and had three absences without leave in China, robbed a fellow Chinese prisoner Yong Delu of around eight

Mexican dollars and attempted to cover up the evidence by handing the money to another

531 Lieutenant Wilde, Report by Police Station No.3 (English Translation), November 24, 1900, entry 929; Lieutenant James H. Reeves to the Adjutant General, China Relief Expedition, December 5, 1900, entry 929; Assistant surgeon Charles E. Marrow to the Adjutant, Camp Reilly, December 11, 1900, entry 969/968; Court Martial of Private William F. Mitchell, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.22554. 532 Court Martial of John J. Shaul, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.23716. 154

American prisoner. He also threatened another Chinese prisoner, Ma Dushan, who witnessed the cover-up. In his submitted testimony, Private Carter pointed out that Captain Hersey investigating this case “took the statements of Chinese prisoners which is very unreliable in any case.”533 A number of American servicemen in China held this opinion. In reporting on the allied expedition to Baoding, the seat of the Viceroy of Zhili, and the ensuing investigation into the murder of missionaries there, Captain Hutcheson mentioned “the slight regard in which the truth is held by the Chinese people.”534

Likewise, on February 15, 1901, Private Alfred Guarente (Ninth Infantry) who came originally from Naples, Italy, enlisted in January 1899, and had five previous convictions, including defying orders, absence without leave, and drunkenness, tried to discredit his Chinese accuser in trial. The charges against him were robbing Li Qingyuan of his gold watch and appropriating An San’s fine before returning him to prison for failure to pay the fine. In his self-defense, Private Guarente claimed that Mr. Li accused him of the crime as a retaliation for getting hit and performing forced labor that he required under the order. Had it not been for the five previous convictions as well as an American officer’s testimony in the appropriation case, he might have got away with the robbery.535

Deserters and discharged personnel posed a greater threat to Chinese residents than did servicemen still in units. Reports of American soldiers and teamsters with arms and uniforms roaming the countryside came in every now and then. Although sometimes the evidence relevant to their wrongdoing was lacking and difficult to attain, carrying arms might betray

533 Court Martial of Private Edward Carter, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.23005. 534 Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.464. 535 Court Martial of Private Alfred Guarente, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.23006; RG 391, Entry 1320, Descriptive Records for August 1898 to February 1902. 155 their intention to extort Chinese residents.536 Besides, the possibility of deserters teaming up with Chinese robbers always existed. In commenting on the case of musician Escuadero (F

Company, Ninth Infantry) who was charged with vagrancy and suspected of robbing a Chinese in the German sector, Colonel Charles F. Robe indicated that “he is of that idle class from which bad men get their wiling tools.”537 While embodying the colonel’s prejudice against convicted soldiers who were usually from a lower social class, this statement did hold some water in

China. On November 28, 1900, in response to a Chinese villager’s call for help, French guards detained two American servicemen and six Chinese attempting to plunder his village near

Tianjin. In the interrogation that followed, while most Chinese claimed to be forced into this trip by the two American soldiers, one admitted participating in the crime with monetary rewards in mind. Two of them pinpointed the houses where affluent villagers lived for the gang to loot.538

Adding to these cases of plunder were instances of sexual assault. On August 24, 1900,

Corporal Fred L. Smith of the Fifteenth Infantry chased a Chinese beggar woman named Mrs.

Li, drew his bayonet to prevent her escape, and then raped her on a street in Tianjin. During his defense, Corporal Smith claimed to have offered her money, and said she laid down first and gestured to him. This argument played on the widely-held American stereotype of Chinese women as prostitutes willing to trade their flesh for money, a notion arising from the lopsided sex ratio in the Chinese immigrant community within the United States.539 The Page Act of

536 Major Foote to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, February 26, 1901, RG395, Entry 908; Major Foote to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, April 18, 1901, ibid. 537 First Endorsement, November 4, 1900, RG 395, Entry 969/968; Second Endorsement, December 17, 1900, ibid. 538 “Examination of the Prisoners in the Affair of Yang-Eur-Li”, December 11, 1900, RG395, Entry 906. 539 “Across the Continent”, Springfield Weekly Republicans, Springfield, MA, October 7, 1865, p.3. 156

1875 that barred the entry of involuntary laborers from Asia, including women engaged in prostitution, further enhanced this perception. Meanwhile, as numerous studies reveal, a large number of Chinese women indeed engaged in the sex trade as a way to make a living in the

United States, and some Western states in the United States launched campaigns to combat them.540 These cases in turn reinforced contemporary American stereotypes of Chinese women.

Some other witnesses, such as Marine Private Andrew Barkley and Corporal James E.

Reamy, also “went out of the way to make it appear that the act was a mutual arrangement between the accused and the Chinese woman.” They described the woman as not resisting and her clothing untorn. Private Barkley and Corporal Reamy even claimed the woman “seemed to be more smiling than crying” and “kind of smiling” when she got up. Officers assembled for the case bought this argument, and grilled witnesses repeatedly about the payment as if it actually existed. Questions included “would a Chinese woman of the same class as the woman be probably willing to submit to a man for two dollars.” They also asked the Chinese policeman whether Mrs. Li was “a woman of easy virtue,” and questioned Mrs. Li as to “who is the father of your child,” suggesting an assumed sexual impropriety. The court eventually deemed the action as “have[ing] sexual intercourse” rather than “commit[ting] rape upon.” They reached this decision despite Mrs. Li testifying that “if I had taken money, it would have been a disgrace to me” and “I would feel that I ought to commit suicide if I had taken anything from him.”541

540 Lucie Cheng Hirata, “Free, Indentured, Enslaved: Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America,” Signs, 5:1 (Autumn, 1979), pp.3-29; Hiroyuki Matsubara, “Stratified Whiteness and Sexualized Chinese Immigrants in San Francisco: The Report of the California Special Committee on Chinese Immigration in 1876,” American Studies International, 41:3 (October 2003), pp.32-59; Kerry Abrams, “Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,” Columbia Law Review, 105:3 (April, 2005), pp.641-716; Peggy Nagae, “Asian Women: Immigration and Citizenship in Oregon,” Oregon Historical Quarterly, 113:3 (Fall 2012), pp.334-59. 541 Court Martial of Fred L. Smith, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.20742. 157

Some other U.S. servicemen found it entertaining to bully Chinese civilians. On

September 19, 1900, General Chaffee ordered that “the forcible seizure of Chinamen on the streets and compelling them to labor, will at once be discontinued.”542 This reflects the fact that such a practice existed to a certain extent among the American forces. The practice did not completely cease to exist after this order. In his self-defense regarding the robbery case, Private

Guarente stated that in late January he received orders to have people living in houses clean the street. “If there were no people in the houses, I was to take any coolies who should pass and make him work for half an hour and then let him go.”543 This order reflects that in some

American servicemen’s eyes, all Chinese civilians were potential coolies regardless of their actual profession and social class.

In addition to forced labor, other means of bullying existed. On September 7, 1900, De

Shen, while running some errands for his master Captain Frank De W. Ramsey, encountered

Private Jack A. J. Ford of the Ninth Infantry on the way. The latter asked for his identification card, and then tore it into three pieces. The private also pointed the bayonet at him for mugging.544 Similar things happened to Chinese washman, Ting Kuangshun. He reported that two American soldiers asked him for the pass into the camp as well as a list of articles he washed for the hospital, tore them up, and walked off with fragments in hand.545 By ripping those papers, American servicemen severed the connection between their forces and Chinese employees, and reestablished the boundary between them. It then paved the way for maltreating

Chinese civilians who they deemed inferior and unworthy of doing business with American

542 Captain Hutcheson to the Commanding General of First Brigade, September 19, 1900, RG395, Entry 943. 543 Court Martial of Private Alfred Guarente, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.23006. 544 Court Martial of Jack A. J. Ford, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.20720. 545 Thomas M. Baines Jr. to the Commanding Officer of Camp Reilly, March 30, 1901, RG395, entry 969/968. 158 troops. Alonzo Cook, who compared Chinese to sheep, mentioned in the same letter that “we have great fun with the Chinamen. If one of them looks cross-eyed we pull our pistols and make them dance.”546

American servicemen became quite obsessed with the queue worn by male Chinese civilians. Back in the mid-nineteenth century, some American newspapers had noticed the queue’s significance for Chinese males. As numerous scholars point out, in many

Americans’ eyes, the queue signified

Chinese inferiority, as it was called the pig- tail and had to be cut to become

Americanized. It also feminized Chinese males, as only women wore long hair in contemporary America.547 All these reasons could have provoked American servicemen to seek fun with the queue, just like some other offenders back in the United States.548 German Private Martin Herman Frederick Schmidt testified in the court martial that on December 1, 1900, he saw Private Hiram W. Disspain of the Ninth

Infantry have “a Chino by the queue” in a house of prostitution in the German sector.549 Even

546 “Trenton Boy Writes a Letter from China”, Trenton Times, Trenton, NJ, November 12, 1900, p.8. 547 “The Coolie Trade”, New York Daily Tribune, New York, NY, February 18, 1860, p.8; “Letter from Canton”, Weekly Alta California, San Francisco, CA, June 8, 1867, p.6; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, New Orleans, LA, October 29, 1868, p.1; “John Chinaman and How He Becomes Americanized”, Worcester Daily Spy, Worcester, MA, April 7, 1889, p.2; Claudia Nelson, “The Convergence of the Twain: Representations of Asians in St. Nicholas Magazine, 1888-1910,” in Benson Tong ed., Asian American Children: A Historical Handbook and Guide (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004),pp.47-64; Wendy Rouse Jorae, “The Limits of Dress: Chinese American Childhood, Fashion, and Race in the Exclusion Era,” Western Historical Quarterly, 41:4 (Winter, 2010), pp.451-71; Bryn Williams, “Chinese Masculinities and Material Culture,” Historical Archaeology, 42:3 (2008), pp.53-67. 548 “Cut Off His Queue”, Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, September 14, 1895, p.4; “Sue Sam Lost His Sacred Queue in Hop Alley”, The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, July 30, 1897, p.6; “Pacific Chivalry,” Harper’s Weekly, August 7, 1869. 549 Court Martial of Hiram W. Disspain, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.22989. 159 if Private Schmidt’s memory served him wrong, it still illustrates that the act of pulling Chinese males by the queue was so widespread that his brain added it to the recollection of Private

Disspain’s action. In fact, a few months earlier, traveler and correspondent Jasper Whiting detailed in his diary the various tricks that foreign soldiers played on Chinese seeking the allied- issued placard for protection. One such placard would read “please jerk my queue off.”550

Amidst all these forms of bullying and stereotyping, however, some American servicemen did reveal a certain sympathy and compassion for the Chinese. As scholar George Steinmetz demonstrates in his work on German colonial rule in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa, colonizers sometimes came to experience cross-cultural identification with the colonized. In the case of China, both Sinophobic feelings and Sinophilia coexisted in the contemporary perception of the country and its people.551

Examples of sympathy and compassion abounded in American servicemen’s writings.

Lieutenant Palmer vividly remembered witnessing other forces’ brutalities towards Chinese coolies upon his landing in Dagu.552 He also “began to be suspicious of some of the alleged

Boxer prisoners” they saw in Tianjin. To him, these accused Boxers might be just ordinary farmers in a rice field with irrigation ditches that allied forces identified as fortifications. “As a matter of fact, some of the poor, innocent people around Tianjin were treated outrageously and with great cruelty.” The next day, he and two other officers of the Fifteenth Infantry came across a Chinese house that Sikhs just robbed. They left some money for the terrified residents of the house.553 In his report on the allied assault of Badachu (the Eight Temples), Army First

550 Jasper Whiting diary, part one, p.128, Massachusetts Historical Society. 551 Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa, pp.xviii, 2, 26, 63, 416-20. 552 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 16, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 553 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 160

Lieutenant G. Soulard Turner stated that he could not say for sure there were shots coming from the temples, and described the sides of the hills as “filled with women and children and fleeing Chinamen who were unarmed, and, in most cases, carrying bundles of bedding and provisions.”554 Here the Chinese appeared as civilians fleeing from chaos with all they could salvage rather than the Boxers seeking to take foreign lives. In a letter to his parents, Marine

Private Joseph F. Garno, while describing Chinese coolies as “lazy and given to stealing,” lamented that such was “no reason for his being brutally treated as I have seen with my own eyes.” He went on to narrate how many servicemen boasted beating Chinese coolies, and depict these coolies’ “bare shoulders galled and raw almost to the very bone.” According to him, “if I in America had a horse I would not treat him likewise.”555 Despite comparing Chinese coolies to farm animals, at least he had some sympathy for them, no matter how condescending such sentiments were.

Such sympathy and compassion sometimes even transcended the divide between the

Christian West and the “Heathen Chinese”. On February 21, 1901, Second Lieutenant Reuben

Smith pointed a rifle at a Chinese prostitute standing in the yard of the detention hospital and shot her. He claimed it was an accident as he thought the rifle was not locked. While there was no definite evidence to prove his intention, the act of pointing the rifle at someone constituted, at the least, a desire to intimidate. Captain C. R. Noyes crafted a letter to Lieutenant Smith, in which he stated that “the camp commander instructs me to say that he cannot find language sufficiently vivid for use in condemnation of the gross heedlessness that had for…the taking of

554 G. Soulard Turner to the Adjutant General of First Brigade, China Relief Expedition, Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p. 125. 555 “Experience of a Marine”, St. Albans Daily Messenger, St. Albans, VT, February 27, 1901, p.3. 161 a human life.” This Chinese victim mattered as a fellow human being. From this point, the camp commander urged the lieutenant to search for “the living flesh and blood of the poor outcast so suddenly deprived of life” and offer them financial aid. This would serve to “assure them and the community of your regret and sorrow for the death of their relative at your hands.”

Additionally, “there is a more solemn duty…you yourself should see to it that an appeal is made to the Great Creator, and no one can be under more mandatory obligation than he who has been the instrument of this wretched creature being ushered into eternity mayhap in all her unpreparedness.”556

Chinese people did not always appear in records as prey, however. Some violently defied

American occupation. They continued the Boxers’ practice of cutting the telegraph wire that was crucial for the allied communication, an act that provoked American retaliation. 557

Anticipating this move, General Chaffee ordered commanders at stations along the communication line to “destroy without mercy any persons interfering with the telegraph line, if Chinese.” He later elaborated on his purpose. “Let it be known to any Chinese along the line that for any interference with the telegraph line, punishment will be inflicted upon persons living in the vicinity, their houses will be destroyed and inhabitants put to death unless they deliver up the persons damaging the line.”558 General Chaffee did most of what he threatened.

When telegraph lines were cut, he sent his cavalry to the site, and they burned down villages

556 Captain Noyes to Lieutenant Smith, March 5, 1901, RG395, Entry 964. 557 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, p.10; Chaffee to Corbin, September 1, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.42; George P. Scriven to the Chief Signal Officer of U.S. Army, November 7, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.436. 558 Acting Adjutant General Captain Grote Hutcheson to Commanding Officer of Matow, August 22, 1900, RG395, Entry 902, Press Copies of Telegrams Sent. 162 to intimidate the Chinese inhabitants against such actions.559

While some Chinese residents continued to defy American authority, others seized opportunities to cater to American servicemen’s needs, even though racial stereotypes still permeated such partnerships. Some Chinese had already served as servants for internationals and officers before the beginning of the Boxer Uprising. They became ideal figures to deliver messages for allied forces. Captain McCalla recorded two Chinese servants’ performance in bringing the news about their position in Xigu Arsenal to allied forces in Tianjin. Both of them volunteered for this task. The first one succeeded in reaching the outskirts of the international concessions, only to be killed by sentries mistaking him for a Boxer. The second servant, Zhao

Yinhu, started out a few days later as previous messengers failed to return. The sentries shot at him too when he approached the international concessions, and only ceased fire after seeing him make semaphore signals. Captain McCalla emphasized that this servant obtained the knowledge about semaphore signals when serving in a British gunboat, lest the reader imagine that he mastered this skill in his previous service in the Chinese navy. He later filled a vacant position of mess attendant on the Newark thanks to Captain McCalla who learned that his original master, British Captain Bigham, discharged him after departing for England. This depiction of loyalty and its rewards resonated with earlier stories of African American slaves who accompanied their masters to war and brought their bodies home in the U.S.-Mexico War and the Civil War.560

559 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, p.10. 560 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 27, pp. 36-9; Greenberg, A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), p.140; Colin Edward Woodward, Marching Masters: Slavery, Race, and the Confederate Army during the Civil War (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2014). 163

As the military operation unfolded in China, allied forces needed more laborers to tend to their logistics. Since they could not spare much of their own manpower, recruiting coolies became their obvious choice. By this time, Chinese laborers had already left their footprints in places like Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the American West and South. On many occasions, they came as the replacement in the labor market after slavery’s demise. Although those host countries eventually became divided over these people’s customs and their competition with local laborers, they recognized the Chinese contribution to completing projects that recruited them, especially since the previous workers, slaves, were no longer available.561

Under these circumstances, the American troops in China enlisted coolies to help with logistics, even though the country had excluded new Chinese immigrants since 1882. In the

August march to Beijing, each company of the American forces could take up to sixteen or twenty coolies to carry items like water, boiling and cooking outfit, as well as litters. The whole

U.S. detachment would hire up to fifty carts with their drivers to carry supplies. There were also coolies working on boats that carried supplies and the sick and wounded.562 Major Lee reported that “this help proved indispensable to the comfort of the command.”563 American forces continued to hire Chinese laborers for construction, transportation, and scavenging work like dealing with sinks and garbage after the fall of Beijing until the U.S. troops’ withdrawal.564

561 Persia Crawford Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire, new impression (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1971); Walton Look Lai, Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to the British West Indies, 1838-1918 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 562 General Orders No.5, August 2, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.88. 563 Major Lee to the Inspector General of U.S. Army, September 27, 1900, RG395, Entry 921. 564 Acting Adjutant General Captain Grote Hutcheson to Colonel Moale, September 14, 1900, RG395, Entry 902, Press Copies of Telegrams Sent; Colonel Robe to the Adjutant General of the First Brigade, September 20, 1900, RG395, Entry 943; Colonel T. J. Wint to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, May 13, 164

These Chinese laborers could supplement the shortage in U.S. manpower and came at a lower cost. Some American officers recommended employing them even when the alternative U.S. manpower and facilities were available. 565 U.S. troops relied on the coolie so much that

Company G of the Ninth Infantry hired them in excess of the number prescribed in the order.566

Comparatively speaking, American troops treated their coolies better than some other forces, which spurred massive enlistment. Zhong Fangshi constantly referred to German soldiers snatching civilians as forced laborers. In contrast, those without jobs and eager to make a living flocked to answer the American, British, and Japanese call for laborers.567 They would receive around three Mexican dollars and rice per month for their labor. Those working in the hospital received leftovers from the hospital kitchen, and rice.568

Relatively good treatment, though, did not obliterate discrimination born out of the anti-

Chinese movement in the United States. Major Lee ordered coolies to sort looted items dropped by fleeing Chinese civilians in the South Gate of Tianjin, and to burn those without any value as these articles were “believed to be infected with disease and vermin.”569 While saving the limited American manpower for more key tasks like guard duties, this decision also stemmed from the perceived Chinese disregard of sanitation and hygiene. In 1899 and 1900, both

Honolulu and San Francisco took strict measures in their Chinatowns, including the burning of

1901, RG395, Entry 908. 565 Captain Humphrey to Heistand, January 22, 1901, RG395, Entry 908; Captain Humphrey to Heistand, January 24, 1901, ibid. 566 Captain F. R. Brown to Commanding Officer, Company G, Ninth Infantry, March 8, 1901, RG395, Entry 954. 567 Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Science ed., Gengzi Jishi, pp.40-1, 44, 50. 568 Colonel Robe to the Adjutant General of the First Brigade, September 20, 1900, RG395, Entry 943; Twelve Endorsement, November 2, 1900, RG395, Entry 906. 569 Lee to Adjutant of the Ninth Infantry, July 26, 1900, Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.27. 165 houses where cases of sickness occurred, to combat outbreaks of plague.570 Coolies were believed to possess certain immunity from these diseases since they were supposedly used to such environments. Some soldiers shared these notions. As Marion Sullivan, a Texan in the

U.S. troops, described, “these coolies think nothing of pushing a corpse out of the way to take a drink.”571

Rickshaw men, laundrymen, and barbers constituted another class of laborers who gained income from U.S. troops. Pulling the rickshaw had gradually become a popular trade for poor laborers in Beijing before the Boxer Uprising.572 As Arthur H. Smith observed, the rickshaws that “were so utterly extinguished by the siege and its concomitants, again became all- pervasive,” and the rickshaw men would demand rates “somewhat advanced above those of former days.”573 A November order barred American servicemen from riding in rickshaws within the grounds of the Temple of Agriculture.574 On December 29, 1900, General Chaffee banned “all Chinese of the laboring and lower classes” from entering the Temple of Agriculture.

They could only conduct business outside its gates. The order specifically listed rickshaw men, indicating that they previously had unrestricted access to the Temple of Agriculture for their business.575

Laundrymen were subject to strict U.S. regulation as well. On April 24, 1901, assistant surgeon Irvin E. Bennett recommended prohibiting servicemen from sending their clothing

570 James C. Mohr, Battling Black Death and the 1900 Burning of Honolulu’s Chinatown (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005); Guenter B. Risse, Plague, Fear, and Politics in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). 571 “Texas Boy in China”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, October 14, 1900, p.24. 572 “Jingshi Erbi”(Notes on Beijing), Shen Bao, Shanghai, May 16, 1900, p.2. 573 Smith, China in Convulsion, vol.2, pp.525-6. 574 Special Orders No. 88, RG395, Entry 910. 575 Colonel Heistand to the Commanding Officer of Camp Reilly, December 29, 1900, RG395, Entry 969/968. 166 outside of the camp for washing after another case of smallpox occurred in the American camp, suggesting the extent of Chinese washmen’s activities connected with U.S. troops.576 While a few laundrymen brought their washing outfit to the camp and processed laundry on the site for

“officers and others,” the high expense discouraged some of them from the practice.577 In other words, most laundrymen conducted their business in stores rather than the U.S. camp. Then they would bring the washed items to the camp, but could only come to the edge of the officers’ line of tents.578 While such restriction might mainly stem from the need to prevent stealing, health concerns likely played a role as well.

The concern over contamination also put American servicemen’s patronage of other

Chinese-owned businesses into question. In connection with a smallpox outbreak, acting assistant surgeon R. E. Sievers pointed out that “some of our men have been visiting Chinese bathhouses and barbershops, a dangerous practice at this time.” He also called into question

“the use of rickshaw by the men.”579 The next day an order prohibited all these practices and urged guards to report the name of any servicemen violating this ban.580

Although the concern over Chinese hygiene cost these Chinese people their incomes, stereotypes and fantasies around them might have boosted their trade in the first place.

Rickshaws no doubt appealed to some American servicemen as a convenient and energy-saving way to get around in Tianjin and Beijing. As Arthur H. Smith noted, they formed “a useful link in the not too abundant facilities for locomotion.”581 Yet the rickshaw possessed cultural

576 Captain Irvin E. Bennett to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, April 24, 1901, RG395, Entry 969/968. 577 Circular, April 29, 1901, RG395, Entry 971. 578 Court Martial of Joseph Raymond, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.22993. 579 R. E. Sievers to Captain J. C. F. Tillson, April 29, 1901, RG395, Entry 969/968. 580 General Order No.14, April 30, 1901, RG395, Entry 910, unregistered letters. 581 Smith, China in Convulsion, vol.2, pp.525-6. 167 implications too. Originating in Japan and spreading to other Asian countries, rickshaws easily drew foreign travelers’ attention. While complementing its convenience, many visitors took note of the coolie pulling the rickshaw. As traveler Jasper Whiting noticed on his way to China in order to cover the military campaign there, even in Singapore, “the rickshaws were all drawn by Chinamen, who trotted along at a very rapid rate.”582 Running in front of passengers sitting in the cart with poles both in his hands and around his body, the coolie resembled an animal dragging a wagon. In a newspaper portrayal of touring in Japan, the writer indicated that “the cooly[sic] will run all day, stopping for say only two hours’ rest out of 12.”583 Readers would find no difficulty in replacing “the cooly” with animals like the horse, cattle, or mule in this sentence. Indeed, in a letter to his wife, war correspondent Wilbur J. Chamberlin described the rickshawman in Yokohama, Japan who “gets between the shafts like a horse.”584 Under such circumstances, riding a rickshaw in China demonstrated white superiority and reduced Chinese laborers to animals.

Similar situations applied to work done in the laundry, bathhouse and barbershop as well.

The lack of laundry facilities in the U.S. camp for a long time no doubt contributed to servicemen sending their clothes outside for laundry.585 But it is also worth noting that laundry had long been an important business for Chinese immigrants in the United States.586 In other words, U.S. servicemen would deem it natural to send their clothing to the Chinese for washing.

582 Jasper Whiting diary, part one, p.34, Massachusetts Historical Society. 583 “Among Almond Eyes”, Kansas Weekly Capital and Farm Journal, Topeka, KS, October 12, 1893, p.11. 584 Wilbur J. Chamberlin, Ordered to China: Letters of Wilbur J. Chamberlin (London: Methuen & Co. 1904), p.22. 585 Colonel Robe to the Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 27, 1900, and December 2, 1900, RG395, Entry 964. 586 Joan S. Wang, “Race, Gender, and Laundry Work: The Roles of Chinese Laundrymen and American Women in the United States, 1850-1950,” Journal of American Ethnic History, 24:1 (Fall, 2004), pp.58-99. 168

In terms of showering, U.S. troops had established two bath houses in the Temple of Agriculture by late December, and every company had the chance to shower every two or three days.587

Some American servicemen visited the Chinese bath house much more frequently for showering and shaving, much to the consternation of the Chinese, who believed bathhouses to be infested with thieves.588 It is worth noting, though, that by this time the bathhouse had become a popular place for gays to frequent in American cities.589 Some Chinese bathhouses specifically recruited handsome laborers to rub clients’ backs.590 While there is no proof of

American servicemen engaging in homosexual activities during their time in China, such possibilities still existed.

Prostitutes emerged as another group that sought gain from the presence of Americans. As of December 24, 1900, there were about “300 to 400 girls in houses of prostitution who are subjected to a weekly inspection” by native physicians in the American section.591 When U.S. forces handed over their district to British units on May 16, 1901, British General Barrow recorded that this was “a vile quarter full of low brothels.” 592 Some U.S. servicemen frequented houses of prostitution. According to Captain M. L. Hersey’s testimony based on his investigation into the case after the German patrol returned two American soldiers, the queue- grabbing incident occurred after Private Disspain and Private George F. Little “had tried the

587 Colonel Heistand to the Commanding Officer of Camp Reilly, December 21, 1900, RG395, Entry 910, unregistered letters. 588 “Tangguan Tun Wu” (The Clerk’s Embezzlement), Shen Bao, September 30, 1893, p.3; “Fajie Gongtang Suoan” (Miscellaneous Cases in the French Concession), ibid, July 12, 1895, p.9. 589 See Chapter 8 of George Chauncey, Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Makings of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994). 590 “Jiushui Weitan” (Euphemism on Salacious Matters), Shen Bao, December 15, 1890, p.3. 591 Fourth Meeting, December 24, 1900, RG395, Entry 920. 592 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.240, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 169 girls and didn’t like them and tried to get the two dollars back.”593 What’s more, American army surgeons constantly examined U.S. servicemen for venereal diseases and reported names of contracted soldiers.594

The above-mentioned American fantasies around Oriental women no doubt contributed to the trade in prostitution. Descriptions of Chinese houses of ill repute on the American West

Coast frequently appeared in newspapers. While most of them served to foment anti-Chinese sentiment, others featured alluring and exotic elements. For instance, in covering a raid on brothels in San Francisco’s Chinatown, the New York Herald focused on a prostitute named Ah

Ngoi who they called “the Chinatown belle” with “pretty lips,” and portrayed how “the beauty fought with all her strength [with the policeman], but she was soon overpowered and taken with the other captured damsels to the mission house.”595 Travelers to China occasionally elaborated on their encounters with Chinese prostitutes too. One of them described that “before nightfall a number of prostitutes came before my door and with the most unblushing effrontery sought to enter. They marched up and down the street in troops and filled all the taverns.”596

Such depictions would no doubt provoke the fantasy of contemporary males obsessed with masculinity.

In addition to these encounters with Chinese people of various vocations, American servicemen also ran into places of interest, especially in Beijing. Introduction to famous sites in Beijing abounded in American newspapers for a long time before the Boxer Uprising, even though Shanghai and Guangzhou seemed to be the more popular destinations for tourists.

593 Court Martial of Hiram W. Disspain, RG153, Entry 15, Case No.22989. 594 Charles E. Marrow to Adjutant, Camp Reilly, December 11, December 17, December 23, 1900, RG395, Entry 969 & 968. 595 “Slavery in San Francisco”, Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, December 9, 1900, p.9. 596 “Hell in a Chinese Village”, The World, New York, NY, June 11, 1870, p.2. 170

Admittedly, many of these articles referred to the city’s unpleasant aspects, such as the filth.

They nevertheless recognized and exaggerated Beijing’s long history. As an article regarding

Beijing as “a big disappointment to the traveler” described, “you are at last really and truly before the walls of the city that was old centuries before the wolf and the woodpecker found

Romulus and Remus.”597

These articles must have drawn many readers to feel fascinated by this mysterious culture in the East and even desire to visit there. As historian John Haddad points out in his dissertation on the U.S. perception of China through visual objects, Americans who visited China during the nineteenth century constantly referred to informative materials circulated within the United

States for reference.598 Here was how Captain McCalla described his mood when he was riding close to Beijing on May 31. “I found it difficult to realize, as the high broad wall of the city came in sight with its double set of heavy gates, surmounted by beautiful pagoda-like tops… that I was not dreaming, but in reality about to enter the picturesque and famous capital of

China.”599 This sentiment was echoed in an 1873 article indicating “the majestic beauty of the

‘gate’ passes like a dream.”600 Some American officers asked for leave to visit Beijing as they had never been there before, even though having been in China for a couple of months, they might have heard their colleagues’ negative comments about the city.601

In addition, some American officers got to know elements of Chinese culture. British

Major General Stewart noticed that on the October 3 review of American soldiers set to depart

597 “The City of Pekin”, Patriot, Harrisburg, PA, October 3, 1889, p.3. 598 John Rogers Haddad, “The American Marco Polo: Excursions to a Virtual China in U.S. Popular Culture, 1784-1912,” PhD dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2002. 599 McCalla, Memoirs of a Naval Career, Chapter 26, p.10. 600 “Pekin”, Pomeroy’s Democrat, New York, NY, June 28, 1873, p.7. 601 Foote to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, January 4, 1901, RG395, Entry 908; Foote to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, January 6, 1901, ibid. 171 for the Philippines, General Chaffee “wore a yellow silk ribbon over his blue coat.” He deduced that “it must have something to do with ‘the Dragon’, the yellow was quite Imperial.”602 When contemplating the country’s future in the face of possible partition by European nations,

General Chaffee became quite philosophical and quoted a famous Chinese saying: “Long united to be divided, long divided, to be reunited.”603

The war actually opened many sites that previously shut their doors to the public.

Internationals flocked to these places of interest for a visit, since they had long fantasized about what lay behind those closed doors. As an 1873 article portrayed, “there is always food for the imagination in the contemplation of the outside of objects whose interior is ‘forbidden’ and thus the traveler looks longingly at the enclosure of the sacred city…and dreams of the treasures.”604 Some visitors did feel their wishes fulfilled in this aspect. In a letter to her sister,

Mrs. Conger wrote that “we saw many elegant furnishings of the Court…These are collections of the most precious Chinese treasures. New scenes opened our eyes in great surprise…Their

Majesties, their Court, and their high officials had never before even suggested to the foreigners that China had such wealth stored from view behind her high walls.”605

While China’s long history and its artifacts captivated some, the lag in catching up with modernity manifest in municipal improvements repelled others. Many American servicemen critiqued China’s poor sanitation. Major William Quinton, commander of the Third Battalion, the Fourteenth Infantry, mentioned that he passed along “a narrow, dirty, difficult street” after entering the Chinese City of Beijing on August 14. At the beginning of the next day’s attack on

602 Major General Stewart, My Service Days, p.280. 603 Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee, p.225. 604 “Pekin”, Pomeroy’s Democrat, New York, NY, June 28, 1873, p.7. 605 Conger, Letters from China, p.171. 172 the Imperial City, he narrated that they “came to a high-storied, gloomy looking building which we passed under through a dirty sally-port and over an extremely filthy piece of ground.”606

This coincided with an 1873 article’s depiction of the city after passing through the gate: “the traveler finds its stateliness utterly reversed by the scene which it encloses. Waste land, tumble- down huts, sinuous ways…dirt, poverty, desolation.”607

Having done occupation duty in Cuba, Lieutenant Palmer was no stranger to poor sanitary conditions. As he wrote in his memoir, “it took time to clean up the filth of the Spanish regime which had been accumulating ever since the first cess pools were dug shortly after the days of

Columbus.”608 Yet he still could not help but find “the multitude of filthy, half-naked people” in the mart in Tianjin “almost nauseating.” He also saw “many poor people afflicted with unsightly skin diseases” and “disgusting running sores” that reminded American officers of

“leprosy and other Asiatic curses.” In his note book, Lieutenant Palmer wrote down the following reflection. “The China we saw in 1901, especially in the old walled city, was still the

China that Marco Polo had known. To be there was a return to the Middle Ages.”609 While

Marco Polo’s tale used to invoke Western aspirations for fortune in the East between the fourteenth and eighteenth century, the mention of the Middle Ages symbolized a period of stagnation and oppression that the West had long left behind and moved beyond.

In addition to sanitary conditions, elements of the Chinese culture and its people looked foreign and inferior to some American servicemen. Lieutenant Colonel Dickman mentioned

“the grotesque appearance of the Chinese shops still standing, with their strange lettering and

606 Major William Quinton to Captain Learnard (Adjutant of the Fourteenth Infantry), August 17, 1900, in RG 395, entry 913, Reports, 1900-1901, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 607 “Pekin”, Pomeroy’s Democrat, New York, NY, June 28, 1873, p.7. 608 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 16, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 609 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 173 gilded dragons…the numerous statues of dogs and dragons in stone or bronze, sometimes of colossal size…and the filthy Chinaman with his pigtail and garlic breath.”610 As John Mott

Boswell of the Quartermaster’s Department remembered, since the ship he took missed the high tide to get over the bar in Dagu, he “had to spend a night in a filthy Chinese bunk and subsist on strange Chinese fare, mostly rice.”611 General Chaffee also wrote in a letter that “the priests [in the Lama Temple] are a sorry looking lot…all Imperial structures are disappointing to me; having seen one, the others can be mentally photographed, such is the sameness of construction and decoration. The Summer Palace grounds are really quite pretty, but only so in comparison with things Peking---no other place.”612

In order to both ease the anxiety about serving in a foreign land and better depict the scenery to U.S. readers, some American personnel sought out the similarities between Chinese and American landscapes. Lieutenant Palmer, “a native of Illinois,” was surprised to “go to

China and march for three miles through a bigger corn field than I ever saw at home.”613

Lieutenant Colonel Dickman indicated that the Northern Chinese field in winter would be “as clean as an Arizona desert in August.”614 Lieutenant Pressley Price of the Fourteenth Infantry wrote home that the country between Tanggu and Tianjin “resembled nothing more than the

610 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.478. 611 Memoirs of Boxer Rebellion and Cuban reconstruction, 1899-1901, p.44, Harvard Yenching Library Rare Books Room. 612 Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee, p.217. 613 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Back in 1875, General Upton also wrote that “in many respects, the country which we traversed resembles the prairies of Illinois, even to its cornfields.” (“Letters from China,” October 5, 1875, General Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe, p.387.) 614 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.477. The comparison of the Northern China plain to the Arizona desert demonstrated the continuing American fascination with the Southwestern frontier, and would later emerge in other officers’ works. McCarthy in 1933 was an example. See Coffman, “The American 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938: A Vignette in Social History,” p.62. 174 unprofitable wastes of Nevada,” and the crops in lands between Tianjin and Beijing “are almost identical with those in our part of the South.”615

While articles on newspapers might pass such strangeness off as exotic and highlight the impressiveness of Chinese history and culture, many U.S. servicemen saw shadows of a failing civilization long past its heyday in their visit to places of interest. This was how Lieutenant

Colonel Dickman commented in his diary about his trip to the Forbidden City:

As a whole, the exhibition was exceedingly disappointing. The glories of the place have

long ago departed, and the puny imbeciles of today do not even keep clean the massive

works of art left by their ancestors. The filth and decay prevalent in the heart of the Sacred

Palace are a fair index to the condition of the Celestial Empire.616

In fact, this genre had its precedents in previous travel literature. After depicting buildings in palaces and temples in Beijing, an 1873 article indicated that “all this splendor is set in a frame-work of crumbling, dusty ruin. Everything is extraordinary in this wonderful place, which is an epitome of decay.” It then went on to compare the city to other ruins of classical times, such as “Thebes, Memphis, Carthage, Rome.”617 In other words, Beijing belonged to the begone past that invoked people’s sense of history and melancholy, but not hope and future.

American servicemen also frequented sites of the fighting besides those places of interest.

615 “The Civilizing of the Heathen Chinese”, The State, Columbia, SC, November 23, 1900, p.5. 616 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.480. Hevia also quotes this paragraph in his book, although he runs into it through another primary source.(Hevia, English Lessons, p.208). 617 “Pekin”, Pomeroy’s Democrat, New York, NY, June 28, 1873, p.7. 175

The international legations and the Northern Cathedral in Beijing were the most prominent ones. To some American personnel, a visit to these sites enhanced their sense of Chinese inferiority. As Lieutenant Colonel Dickman commented after his excursion to the Northern

Cathedral, “nothing can give a clearer idea of the cowardly nature of the Chinese than the fact that a handful of men was able to hold this large place against a numerous enemy armed with artillery in position on commanding walls.”618 General Wilson expressed the same opinion regarding the international legations, citing “the cowardice and incompetency of the Chinese and the never-failing courage and resources of the defenders.”619

Other American servicemen recognized that the issue was more complex than such simple denigration of the Chinese capacity suggested. In his report to General Chaffee on the siege of the international legations and the Northern Cathedral, First Lieutenant Julian. R. Lindsey noted that “the Christian converts under the missionaries rendered valuable service in all construction work,” and ten of them even received spare guns for defense in the Northern

Cathedral. In addition, he realized the lack of intent to completely destroy the international legations on the Chinese side, although he also pointed out that “the cowardice of the Chinese is well known.”620 General Wilson mentioned Chinese converts in the legations who “carried through cheerfully and successfully every plan and all the instructions of their gallant and indefatigable chief.”621

618 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.478. 619 Wilson, China (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1901), p.369. 620 First Lieutenant J. R. Lindsey to Chaffee, November, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, pp.456, 458-9. As a matter of fact, in his June 9 telegram, Robert Coltman, an American physician in Beijing, mentioned that “converts are fairly well armed by Bishop Favier and will make desperate resistance if attacked.” Robert Coltman telegrams, June 9, 1900, Houghton Library. 621 Wilson, China, p.370. 176

Additionally, numerous American servicemen still harbored admiration for Chinese architecture. General Chaffee regarded the inner tower of Qianmen Gate, the one that Major

Quinton described as “gloomy looking,” as “so prominent and important a landmark,” and regretted its destruction while the American forces were guarding it.622 In his note on the expedition from Tianjin to Duliu, Lieutenant Palmer regarded the Grand Canal as “a wonderful engineering work.” He further commented that solving “so tremendous an engineering problem speaks something of their industrial capacity,” especially taking into account that “steam engines and high explosives were not available in its construction” and “like the pyramids it was constructed with naked human labor.”623 Likewise, while accompanying other forces in their expedition to Baoding, Captain Hutcheson believed that stone bridges they encountered on the way, some of which had been there for perhaps one thousand years, “should stand solid for many years to come” even though “much out of repair.”624 Even Lieutenant Colonel

Dickman, despite his contempt for the Chinese culture and its people, wrote that the top of the

Beijing city wall “could be made one of the finest drives in the world” after “a little work, principally cleaning up.”625

Some American officers conveyed their pity or even rage at the destruction of splendid

622 Chaffee to Corbin, September 1, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.107. 623 John McAuley Palmer Papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Around the time period, many American statesmen and servicemen attached great importance to building a canal in Central America to shorten the voyage between the East and West coast. Some of them became quite fascinated with the Chinese canal. Congressman Joseph E. Ransdell (D-LA) stated back on May 1, 1900 that “the most remarkable canal in the world in many respects is the Grand Canal of China, which is about 700 miles long.” (56 Congress, 1st session, Congressional Record, May 1, 1900, p.4920). And as Yao points out, back in the 1840s, some American textbooks had already underlined the Great Wall and the Grand Canal as symbols of the Chinese civilization. (Yao, Quanmin Xingxiang zai Meiguo, p.62). 624 Hutcheson to Adjutant General of China Relief Expedition, November 12, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.461. 625 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in ibid, p.483. 177 architecture in China. In a letter to a friend, Lieutenant F. C. Marshall expressed a sense of melancholy about the situation in Tianjin. “Tianjin is a ruin, a picture impossible for me to draw for you. In May it had a million people, scattered over as great a space as Chicago, with a trade control over forty million people. Today it is as complete a ruin as Pompeii, only the corpses are putrified instead of petrified.”626 By comparing Tianjin to Chicago, a booming

American city, and Pompeii, whose destruction preserved elements of Roman civilization,

Lieutenant Marshall illuminated the city’s prosperous past. Despite complaining extensively about the filth in Beijing, Major Quinton depicted Badachu as featuring “a large white pagoda surrounded by handsome buildings.”627 Lieutenant Colonel Dickman also mentioned it as “a beautiful and conspicuous landmark.”628 General Chaffee could not hide his wrath and irony when condemning the British burning of the white pagoda in Badachu:

The large white pagoda referred to by Major Quinton, often spoken of before the date of

this expedition as an object of sufficient interest to foreigners to induce them to ride 15

miles to see, being a tall pile of stone, having no part in the Boxer movement and holding

no resentment for foreigners, has been destroyed by Christians.629

In another letter to General Corbin, he again mentioned that “the blowing up of the White

626 “Letter from China” (from The Republican Journal), Prescott Morning Courier, Prescott, AZ, October 11, 1900, p.1. 627 Quinton to First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, September 19, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p.127. 628 Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Dickman to Adjutant General of the China Relief Expedition, November 5, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.484. 629 Chaffee to Corbin, November 30, 1900, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 4, p.446. 178

Pagoda, by the British, was another outrageous performance which I frequently take occasion to remind them of.”630 Indeed, even British General Barrow at the scene had a mixed feeling about the issue. On the one hand, he thought that Minister MacDonald was “quite right in insisting on retribution for the destruction of the Mission, Chapels and Legation buildings close by.” On the other hand, he was glad that “this vandalism was not imposed on me to execute.”631

While U.S. servicemen encountered China and its people at close range, American newspapers were busy churning out coverage of the Chinese crisis that presented China to their readers. Vivid tales of Chinese cruelty further enhanced the readers’ worry about their fellow citizens in China. As numerous scholars have pointed out, in the popular contemporary perception of the event, the Boxer movement featured enormous barbarity and bloodshed, especially the siege of the international legations and the slaughter of missionaries.632 In fact,

American newspapers sought such barbarity’s manifestation in both Chinese history and the

China Relief Expedition. In a July 6 speech, Rockhill referred to previous cases of barbarity in the Chinese history, like the civil war in the 1850s and 1860s and the imprisonment of British representatives in 1860, in an effort to illustrate what would occur to those internationals in

Beijing if the Chinese overpowered them. As he saw it, these precedents were crucial, since foreigners had never been publicly executed in China before. He thought that these instances had “given rise to the customs of the conquered party putting to death its women and children before surrendering.” 633 Reporters in China also detailed currently unfolding Chinese

630 General Chaffee to General Corbin, January 26, 1901, in Henry C. Corbin papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 631 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.169, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 632 Mackerras, Western Images of China, p.60; Yao, Quanmin Xingxiang zai Meiguo, pp.96-106. 633 “Unspeakable Barbarities,” The Daily Independent, Helena, MT, July 7, 1900, p.2. 179 atrocities. According to one such article, allied forces recovered the bodies of two marines captured by the Chinese. Their capturers hacked out their eyes, and cut off their cheeks, arms and legs before death ended their suffering. The same article claimed that as a result Admiral

Seymour shot his wounded soldiers so they would not fall into Chinese hands.634

When representing Chinese ruthlessness, American newspapers and their contributors constantly invoked images of other “savages” for reference. As Hevia incisively observes in his work, “the new literature on China can partly be understood as an element within a broad discourse on race and civilization common in industrialized Europe and North America.”635

As an integral part of American history and fantasy, mentions of indigenous people frequently appeared on such occasions. 636 Rev. Frederic Poole in charge of the Chinese mission in

Philadelphia compared the situation in China to the colonial age in America when native

Americans constantly fought with European settlers and tried to eliminate them. 637 In commenting on the Chinese ferocity when they became enraged, former Senator William D.

Washburn (R-MN), who visited China three years previous, said that “I would rather trust myself in the power of a hostile Sioux Indian than with one of these infuriated Chinese fanatics.”638

For some, the analogy with Native Americans not only highlighted the Chinese ferocity, but also pointed to ways in which internationals might deal with them. After bragging about the Indian Wars in America, an article in The Morning Oregonian questioned “why should

634 “Did Seymour Kill Wounded Soldiers?” Boston Journal, Boston, MA, July 17, 1900, p.2. 635 Hevia, English Lessons, p.174. 636 Haddad, “The Wild West Turns East: Audience, Ritual, and Regeneration in Buffalo Bill’s Boxer Uprising,” pp.24-6. 637 “ ‘Boxers’ of China”, The Philadelphia Inquiry, Philadelphia, PA, June 17, 1900, p.1. 638 “Washburn on China”, Bismarck Daily Tribune, Bismarck, ND, July 9, 1900, p.1. 180 civilization lose any good opportunity of wiping out barbarism with the besom of fire and sword.” Then it turned to China where “men and women may be sliced to death, or a state criminal’s whole family may be legally murdered because of his crimes.”639 Under these circumstances, English historian H. Y. J. Taylor observed in his letter to Senator Hoar that

“thousands in this country think that the … Chinese should be with reply exterminated like the

Old American Indian tribes to form new British Colonies or homes for England’s super abundant population.”640 This reveals that while American imperialists looked at Europe for colonial inspirations, Europeans turned to the United States for lessons in dealing with the natives.

But existing works on media representation fail to fully explore the role that gender discourses played in depictions of Chinese ferocity.641 In fact, one of the representative cartoons about the Yellow Peril depicted a Western woman lying on the ground and covered in blood while a well-armed Chinese man straddled her. Although the cartoon did not explicitly portray a rape, the implication that a rape occurred is clear. Such portrayal

639 “The Original Expansionist”, The Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, June 18, 1900, p.7. 640 H. Y. J. Taylor to Senator Hoar, July 18, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79. 641 Haddad makes a few gendered analyses on movies portraying the Boxer Uprising. See Haddad, “The Wild West Turns East: Audience, Ritual, and Regeneration in Buffalo Bill’s Boxer Uprising,” pp.24-6. 181 illustrated the deep American fear of Chinese men violating the purity of white womanhood.

As scholar Peggy Pascoe’s extensive study shows, by then, various states had passed laws prohibiting miscegenation (marriage between different races), and listed Chinese or Mongolian as one of the groups targeted by these laws. Since in the public perception, the Chinese immigrant community consisted mostly of males, and the majority of Chinese women in the

United States were prostitutes, these laws mainly served to prevent Chinese men from marrying

U.S. women.642

Not surprisingly, the media fixated on the safety of Western women in China. During the

China Relief Expedition, there were reports that women in siege had prepared poison in case the Chinese overwhelmed the legation guards, and marines in Tianjin would kill all the white women and children on that occasion. 643 Fears of a possible Chinese onslaught after overwhelming international defenders indeed lingered among the besieged. As Herbert Hoover recalled the siege in Tianjin, “we did have one dreadful person who periodically wanted to know if I intended to shoot my wife first if they closed in on us. Most of the people lifted such lumps from their minds with whatever gleam of humor was possible.”644 Newspapers also suspected that the Department of War would not deploy female nurses to China, as China did not join the Geneva Red Cross convention that treated medical personnel as non-combatants.645

Such gender discourses around the Chinese issue abounded among the public too. In the

642 Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.79-86. 643 “Prepared for Death if the Worst Came”, San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco, CA, July 17, 1900, p.3; “Stories Denied”, Boston Sunday Journal, Boston, MA, August 19, 1900, p.6. 644 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), p.52. 645 “Gen. Chaffee May Lead the Allied Column to Pekin,” Boston Sunday Journal, Boston, MA, July 29, 1900, p.1. Such fear might actually exist among the American forces. As nurse Emily Friton recalled five years later, upon their landing in Dagu, an officer “gave each nurse a shining dime for luck money.” “During the Boxer Uprising in China,” The Trained Nurse and Hospital Review, vol.35, 1905, p.308. 182 commemoration of the 125th anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill in the American War of

Independence, Colonel Curtis Guild mentioned the demand for troops in China: “The American

Minister at Beijing has called for troops that American men may not be butchered, that

American women may not be ravished by the savage soldiery whose passions have been fanned to fever heat by the savage slave woman who sits upon the throne of China.” 646 While highlighting the danger that American women faced in China, it disparaged Dowager Empress

Cixi, the actual ruler of China.

The depiction of the Chinese threat to American women caused ripples in the audience.

Around this time, Southern states resorted to lynching and segregation to combat the exaggerated African American threat to white women, while Northern states either stood by or even adopted similar measures.647 So talk of the Chinese threat to white women must have struck a chord among the audience. In appealing to Secretary Long for enlisting his brother,

George V. S. Michaelis, a manager of the New England Coke Agency, suggested that “his soldier blood has been stirred beyond control with the stories of the treatment of American women by the Chinese.”648

Widely regarded as the actual ruler of China and the mastermind behind the Boxer

Uprising, Dowager Empress Cixi received a great deal of negative press. As The Wilkes-Barre

Times described it, “if the reports concerning the Dowager Empress of China are correct she is a meddlesome and blood-thirsty old wretch who should be locked up in the interest of

646 “At Trinity Church,” Boston Journal, Boston, MA, June 18, 1900, p.6. 647 See for instance Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Davison M. Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle over Northern School Segregation, 1865-1954 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 648 George V. S. Michaelis to Secretary Long, July 23, 1900, John Davis Long papers, Box 56. 183 harmony.”649 The Jackson Semi-Weekly Citizen talked about her “barbaric vigor and resolution” in elevating from Emperor Xianfeng’s common concubine to the actual ruler of China, and predicted that she would be remembered “as a jealous, implacable and perverse old woman.”650

In a letter to General Corbin after the relief, Rev. W. A. P. Martin, who worked in China, reported that “the she-wolf has fled from her lair.” 651 While dehumanizing the dowager empress, the choice of wolf as the metaphor served to underline her ferocity.

Complicating to these racial and gender discourse about Chinese ferocity was a new found respect for Chinese fighting strength. While works on media representation have noticed the connection between the Boxers and the Yellow Peril, they overlook the manner in which

Chinese troops’ performance also contributed to the discourse.652 Several American officers highlighted the intensity of Chinese fire. Major James Regan of the Ninth Infantry was transferred back to the United States due to his injury in the Battle of Tianjin. He indicated on his hospital bed in San Francisco that “I went through that little charge at San Juan Hill. I have seen some of the queer fighting down about Manila, but I never before saw war as it is in these modern days until I went up against these untutored Chinese at Tianjin.” This comment elevated the fighting in China as fiercer than previous campaigns in Cuba and the Philippines.

He later concluded that the Chinese soldiers “are utterly fearless of death; they are good shots and their artillery was suspiciously well served,” although “they will run in the face of disaster.”653 Captain E. V. Bookmiller later recalled that encountering the Chinese fire in the

649 “Dowager Empress”, Wilkes-Barre Times, Wilkes-Barre, PA, June 12, 1900, p.4. 650 “A Tartar Empress”, The Jackson Semi-Weekly Citizen, Jackson, MI, June 29, 1900, p.2. 651 W. A. P. Martin to Corbin, August 16, 1900, Henry Clark Corbin Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 652 Yao, Quanmin Xingxiang zai Meiguo, pp.145-8. 653 “Major Regan Tells How Chinese Fight,” The United States Army and Navy Journal, vol. 38, pp.6-7. 184

Battle of Tianjin, “we soon realized that we were battling with men who were more accurate than the Filipinos” He also compared Chinese fire’s intensity to “drops of rain.”654 No doubt

The Daily Picayune commented that “the fighting at Tianjin has rather upset this impression

[of Chinese incompetence]…a still more astonishing discovery has been that the Chinese gunners were able to make very good practice with their guns.”655

This newly-realized Chinese war capacity forced a fresh assessment of China’s prospects in the modern world. In early June, when elaborating on the origin of the Boxer Uprising, The

Springfield Daily Republican concluded that “one of the most impressive lessons of the situation seems to be that John Chinaman, after all, has a belligerent spirit, and will not remain absolutely lamblike during the fusing process of eastern and western civilizations.”656 The

Army and Navy Journal also recognized that “given equal conditions otherwise, the numbers of the Chinese, with their frugality and persistence, will give them a great advantage over others.

The losses of the allies at Tianjin, and the evidence the Chinese there gave of their improvement in the use of arms, is of ominous significance.”657

Just like some U.S. servicemen’s mixed sentiments in China, amidst all this talk of

Chinese ferocity, there were also depictions of the war’s toll on China. Witnessing the war’s horror first hand could send shock waves to people’s emotion. On their way to catch up with the main U.S. forces, cavalrymen of the Sixth Cavalry whistled, sang, and laughed when leaving Tianjin, only to become silent upon encountering “the sight and smell of numerous bloated carcasses of Chinese and horses scattered along the road” in the battlefield of

654 “Vivid Story of Tientsin”, The World Herald, Omaha, NE, September 4, 1900, p.7. 655 “Chinese Fighting Strength”, The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, LA, July 14, 1900, p.4. 656 “Origin of the Boxers”, Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, June 9, 1900, p.6. 657 Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.85. 185

Beicang.658 Instead of relishing victory over the vanquished Chinese, they realized the war’s brutality. Likewise, on his way to Beijing, traveler and correspondent Jasper Whiting found some children’s toys and mutilated dolls in abandoned Chinese houses. In his diary, he noted that these items were “almost shouting to me a story so full of misery that for a moment I forgot the atrocities that had been committed at Beijing and felt only pity for those who had not only been driven from their homes but had their dearest household gods destroyed.”659

Under these circumstances, it was no wonder that some articles highlighted Chinese suffering too. As a reporter based in Shanghai described it, after the allied bombardment of

Dagu forts, there were “rivers of blood and mutilated corpses piled up inside the forts.”660

Admittedly, either he or his source of information might have exaggerated the scene. Yet they still conveyed the war’s horror to their readers. A reporter working for New York Sun captured the chaos in Tianjin after its fall. “The whole city is filled with an indiscriminate mob of

Chinese and soldiers of all nationalities, who are breaking open stores and smashing chests and safes and rushing hither and thither with their arms filled with silks, furs, jewelry, silver bars and money.”661 The Associated Press reported that “hundreds of dead Chinamen along the walls, of women and children, killed by shrapnel, are lying among the smoking ruins.”662 In another dispatch, the reporter went further to state that “the pigs and dogs are eating” those

“charred bodies.”663 Another reporter described the situation in the countryside: “the soldiers are having ‘the sport’ in using as targets natives who creep back to their houses or attempt to

658 Frey, Francais et allies au Pe-tchi-li, pp.195-6; Captain Cabell, “Troop ‘M’ Sixth Cavalry in the Chinese Relief Expedition of 1900,” Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association, vol.15, No. 53, July 1904, pp.51-2. 659 Jasper Whiting diary, part one, p.104, Massachusetts Historical Society. 660 “Seymour Now at Pekin”, The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, LA, June 21, 1900, p.1. 661 “Looted the Chinese City”, The Sun, New York, NY, July 22, 1900, p.1. 662 “Sheltered in Bomb-proof”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, July 25, 1900, p.1. 663 “To Rule Tientsin”, The Daily Independent, Helena, MT, July 26, 1900, p.2. 186 work in the fields.”664

However, these reports achieved mixed results at arousing compassion among the

American audience. As scholar Eric Hayot illustrates, for a long time, Westerners had been assigning the Chinese, a people in a faraway land, the role of enduring hypothetical sufferings to provoke philosophical discussions. This in turn created the impression of Chinese people being used to cruelty and suffering, which shut off any possibility of feeling sympathy for them.665 The reported Boxer atrocities further enflamed the American desire for revenge rather than any sense of sympathy. Jesse H. Jones believed that the Chinese had already murdered all internationals in Beijing. As a result, in his letter to Secretary Long, he stated that “with the plundering of that city (Tianjin), as it was done, I have no sympathy.” His only complaint was that allied forces should have conducted the act in a more orderly manner.666 On the other hand, on the Senate floor, Senator Teller read extensively various depiction of the allied violence in

China, including Prince Qing’s complaint, and indicated that “I can not help to feel with considerable pathos” about the Chinese newspaper statement that “it is a pity to see the work that was three hundred years in accomplishing destroyed by foreigners in a few days.”667

Chinese representatives and communities in the United States strove to join the conversation and present the Chinese side of the story to their American peers. As a diplomat speaking fluent English, Minister Wu Tingfang embodied the vista of a newly transformed

China breaking free from shackles of old customs and thoughts. 668 Minister Wu took

664 “Allies Act like Savages,” The Sun, Baltimore, MD, September 3, 1900, p.1. 665 Eric Hayot, The Hypothetical Mandarin: Sympathy, Modernity, and Chinese Pain (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 666 Jesse H. Jones to Secretary Long, July 23, 1900, John Davis Long papers, Box 56. 667 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, January 31, 1901, p.1725. 668 “Wu Ting Fang”, The Anaconda Standard, Anaconda, MT, June 26, 1900, p.6. 187 advantage of this image and articulated the situation in China to the American public. He elaborated on Chinese fear of foreigners after centuries of isolation from the outside world, and the foreign haste in pushing forward railroad construction, an enterprise that he admitted to be the engine of change in China, regardless of Chinese property rights. He even asked “how you

Americans would feel if the Chinese were to come to this country and not merely try to inculcate the teachings of Confucius and Buddah, but even decry the Gospel of Christ. Don’t you suppose they would be mobbed?”669 On another occasion, he pointed to the lynching of

Italian immigrants at Tallulah, Louisiana in 1899 and questioned whether the American government rather than a local mob should be held responsible for this incident. He got this idea either from living through that time in Washington or reading sympathetic English magazines that contained the same analogy.670 While underlining legitimate Chinese concern over foreigners and absolving the Chinese government of responsibilities in the Boxer movement, these examples also highlighted mob violence against immigrants due to the competition for jobs and difference in customs in the American history.

On another occasion, he had a sharp exchange with Senator Eugene Hale (R-ME). When

Senator Hale lashed out at the Chinese treatment of missionaries, Minister Wu pointed out that people did not always receive missionaries with tolerance and respect in the United States either.

He then referred to the “Levantine affair” after the senator denied such an allegation. It suddenly occurred to Senator Hale that more than a year previous in Levant, Maine, a mob tarred and feathered George Higgins, a missionary for the “Holy Ghost and Us” sect, and tried

669 “Minister Wu Ting Fang on the Boxers”, The Kansas Semi-weekly Capital, Topeka, KS, June 19, 1900, p.5. 670 “Chinese Minister Speaks”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, June 22, 1900, p.6; “Editorial: The Disturbance in China”, New York Observer and Chronicle, 78:25 (June 21, 1900), p.815. 188 to set him on fire. After some cooler-headed people put out the flames, the mob dragged him along the road for about two miles.671 Although either The New York Tribune mistook Higgins for a Mormon missionary in its coverage or Minister Wu got his identity wrong, this case alluded to the American intolerance of “heresies” in history that the experience of Mormons epitomized.

Meanwhile, in the face of looming white violence upon their communities, prominent figures in Chinatown issued statements that distanced themselves from the Boxer Uprising. In response to the usual American perception of the Chinese as a homogeneous group, these statements underlined the difference between Northern China that was home to most Boxer activities and Southern China where these immigrants originated from. These two regions differed in language, and more importantly, their attitude towards foreigners. Apart from offering clarifications, these statements also expressed Chinese immigrants’ wishes for Western nations to help restore order in China, and even their condolences for internationals who suffered.672

In this process, some Chinese immigrants exploited similar discourses as Minister Wu to better convey their messages to the American public. A prominent Chinese man in Boston talked about the United States as the only nation that did not harbor territorial ambitions in

China, and emphasized the accompanying Chinese friendliness towards America.673 Charley

Chin, a Chinese man born in California and living in Boston, expressed his desire to suppress the Boxers as Chinese immigrants would like to see China becoming more like the United

671 “Senator Hale’s Tilt with Wu”, New York Daily Tribune, New York, NY, August 22, 1900, p.9; “Tar and Plumes Laid by a Mob on a Maine Preacher”, Pawtucket Times, Pawtucket, RI, June 7, 1899, p.1. 672 “Chinese Protest”, The Anaconda Standard, Anaconda, MT, July 9, 1900, p.1; “Boston Chinese Loyal”, St. Albans Daily Messenger, St. Albans, VT, July 18, 1900, p.2. 673 “No Boxers Here”, Boston Journal, Boston, MA, July 11, 1900, p.3. 189

States. 674 These expressions fit into the American self-perception as an altruistic nation tutoring China into modernity. Another notable Chinese, Mr. Tim of Helena, Montana, compared the Boxers to Coxey’s Army, as both originated from a small group of people, gradually drew more members, and marched to the capital. 675 The latter referred to the gathering of unemployed people who then marched from Massillon, Ohio, to Washington D.C. to petition Congress under the leadership of Jacob S. Coxey in 1894. Admittedly, most contemporary coverage disparaged these people and feared anarchy and revolution. Yet there were also reports of them receiving provisions and donations from sympathizers. Occurring in the aftermath of the Panic of 1893, this incident put industrial problems under the spotlight.676

Perhaps by invoking this analogy, Mr. Tim would like the American people in Helena to reflect on grievances that contributed to the Boxer Uprising. The attempt to appeal to American sentiment found its most intensive expression in a statement that the Mayor of Chinatown in

Philadelphia Lee Toy issued:

My people left China and came to the United States because they knew they could rely

upon the enforcement of this country’s laws upon the personal liberty which its Declaration

of Independence declared belonged to the people of all nations. They knew that the United

States was and always has been the refuge of the oppressed and the home of the man who

was willing to work for a living…So far, Philadelphia and other great cities of the United

674 “Boston Chinese Act”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, July 18, 1900, p.4. 675 “Like a Coxey Army”, The Daily Independent, Helena, MT, July 14, 1900, p.8. 676 “Coxey’s Army”, Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, March 18, 1894, p.8; “Coxey’s Army Raids an Orange Grove”, New York Herald, New York, NY, March 19, 1894, p.8; “Help for Coxey’s Army”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA, March 22, 1894, p.1; “Coxey’s Army”, The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, LA, March 24, 1894, p.8; “Their Goal Reached”, St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, April 30, 1894, p.1. 190

States have borne themselves as might be expected of an intelligent and generous people.

I believe that they will continue to act in the same wise and humane manner.677

These transplanted and transformed images of China enhanced the transnational nature of the China Relief Expedition. American servicemen brought with them existing stereotypes of

Chinese and other “savage” people formed during the era of Western expansion as well as

Chinese exclusion and reinforced by contact with people of Chinese ethnicity in the Philippines.

Besides, the frequent Chinese military defeat and the country’s decline also induced U.S. servicemen to treat the Chinese military capacity with contempt. Their China experience both enhanced and modified these existing notions of China and its people. On the one hand, the subjugated Chinese seemed to further prove their “inferiority” compared with whites, and spurred American behaviors like plunder and bullying. These acts carried the mark of whites’ treatment of the Chinese in the American West and the Philippines. Many Chinese people engaged in menial business that their compatriots performed in the United States. The shabby state of Chinese sanitation enhanced concurrent notion of the country’s backwardness. It was only the desire to distinguish itself in front of other nations, the lack of consistent resistance by the Chinese, the relatively short duration of the operation, and the temporary nature of U.S. rule in its occupation zones that helped reduce the extent of American violence in China.

Despite all those examples of plunder and bullying, there was not a single case of the massacres that repeatedly occurred in the American West and the Philippines. Besides, elements of

Chinese civilization still awed some American servicemen, while the Chinese suffering in war

677 “Lee Toy’s Statement”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA, July 19, 1900, p.9. 191 invoked their sympathy. They lamented and even protested the unnecessary destruction of

Chinese architecture, and came to respect the performance of the Chinese in battle. These transformed views of China and the Chinese were conveyed through American newspapers.

Apart from Chinese images, American newspapers also devoted themselves to presenting

U.S. servicemen to the general public. In this process, they exploited historical memories and contemporary gender norms to arouse public support for the war. Yet coverage guided by such purposes and norms also left many touching stories, especially women’s war experience, untold.

In addition, newspapers were one of the platforms upon which imperialists and anti-imperialists continued to clash over the China Relief Expedition. The next chapter will examine how

American newspapers presented the war, how ordinary Americans back home experienced the war, and continuing controversies over the expedition.

192

Chapter Five: Portraying, Experiencing and Debating the China Relief Expedition

Thanks to imbedded reporters and a world-wide telegraph system, Americans back in the

United States learned about developments in China remarkably quickly. In a campaign speech in Springfield, Massachusetts, Senator Hoar pointed to such speed in the information transfer around the globe: “What happens in Manila or Beijing is published in the Boston papers six hours before it happens.”678 While existing works have done much to explore representation of China arising from the Boxer Uprising, few have paid attention to the glorification of servicemen’s valor and the U.S. role in this expedition. They have also failed to explore how

Americans back home experienced the war, despite the fact that these topics have found ample explication in studies of U.S. wars. 679 Meanwhile, scholarship on American imperialism generally has lost sight of the controversies over the China Relief Expedition that continued long after the 1900 Presidential Election.

The American public closely followed the development of military operations in China.

People from all walks of life, including Congressmen, librarians, and editors, wrote to Secretary

Root to demand the official map of China.680 According to Buffalo banking lawyer William H.

Hotchkiss, such a map gave “an excellent idea of the movement of troops at this very important crisis in the history, not only of China, but of the civilized world,” and was “daily consulted in my home” together with Notes on China, a recently drafted War Department guidebook on

678 Speech on McKinley, unknown date, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 106. 679 Susan A. Brewer, Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 680 W. S. Coursey to Jesse Overstreet, June 15, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Box 173, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress; Elihu Root to W. B. Allison, July 11, 1900, ibid; W. S. Coursey to William Nelson, July 30, 1900, ibid. 193

China based on existing works like General Wilson’s China: Travels and Investigations in the

Middle Kingdom.681

The appeal of maps was not limited by gender. As Kristin Hoganson’s study of consumption in the making of an internationalized domesticity reveals, many middle-class

American women during this period joined travel clubs that featured map reading as a way of invoking the imaginative travelling experience.682 Under this circumstance, it was no wonder that Annie Rockwell Chaffee, General Chaffee’s wife, obtained a map of China from Secretary

Root, “hung it on the wall,” and followed “the advance of our allied forces in military fashions.”683 Many others turned to map-publishing companies to get their own copy. A joke in The Detroit Free Press illuminated the huge demand for this item. “Have you any idea what raised all this warlike spirit in China?” “Yes, I think some enterprising map-maker started it.”684

Yet while some articles meant to impartially cover the military situation with maps and plain languages, many other pieces sought to arouse readers’ emotions with sensational phrases in either headlines or contents. After all, it was the heyday of the Yellow Press that only two years earlier partly flamed the American public opinion into a war with Spain.685 The industry now used the same tricks to both shape public opinion and compete for readers. For instance, when reporting on Major Waller’s first engagement with Chinese troops on June 21,

681 William H. Hotchkiss to Root, August 10, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 10; William H. Hotchkiss to Root, August 20, 1900, ibid. 682 Kristin L. Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865-1920 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp.192-208. 683 Annie Rockwell Chaffee to Root, August 12, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Box 7, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 684 “Wise and Otherwise”, Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, July 16, 1900, p.4. Hevia also mentions that “in a few cases, advertisements were linked to maps of the theater of operations in China and military actions.” (Hevia, English Lessons, p.188). 685 David Ralph Spencer, The Yellow Journalism: The Press and America’s Emergence as a World Power (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007). 194 various newspapers used “American blood shed” as their headline, and some even wrote “the shedding of American blood on Chinese soil” in their contents.686 This line might remind readers of President James K. Polk’s message to Congress that Mexico “shed American blood upon the American soil.” In that case, Congress declared war on Mexico, which eventually led to enormous territorial gain in the West and Southwest for the United States. Although in this scenario the “Chinese soil” seemed foreign to Americans, the shedding of the “U.S. blood” there rendered it sacred and urged greater efforts on the American part so that these lives would not vanish in vain.

The Battle of Tianjin provided American newspapers with another emotional moment.

They lauded the Ninth Infantry’s shining battle record from the U.S -Mexico War to the

Philippine-American War. According to them, the regiment’s deeds included “the attacking and storming of the citadel at Chapultepec,” “having given the final blow which broke the back of the Sioux uprising,” having “fought the Utes, the Cheyennes…the Apaches,” and “the routing of the best regiment in the Philippine service at Santa Anna.”687 While embodying memories of the nation’s military feats, such listing of this regiment’s past deeds also served to prove its experience and blame the tremendous loss on General Dorward’s vague order. For anti- imperialists, this case again illuminated the hazard of entangling with other empires, especially

Great Britain.688

686 “American Blood Shed in China”, Boston Morning Journal, Boston, MA, June 25, 1900, p.1; “American Blood Shed”, Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, June 25, 1900, p.1; “American Blood Shed in China”, The Helena Independent, Helena, MT, June 25, 1900, p.6; “Shed Yankee Blood”, Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, June 25, 1900, p.1. 687 “The Ninth Regulars”, Boston Sunday Journal, Boston, MA, July 15, 1900, p.3; “Under a Terrible Fire at Tientsin”, Boston Journal, Boston, MA, July 17, 1900, p.2. 688 Boston Daily Advertiser used “Liscum Blamed” as the title to cover this battle. See Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, July 23, 1900, p.2; “England Never True to an Ally”, The Anaconda Standard, Anaconda, MT, August 5, 1900, p.4. 195

Stories of courage and heroism could always raise public morale amidst defeats. His long military career and demise in the heat of battle made Colonel Liscum stand out in the newspaper coverage. They listed names of battles he participated in during the Civil War and the Spanish-

American War, including Gettysburg and San Juan Hill that possessed special meaning for the

American public.689 His personal character became a subject of depiction as well. According to The Boston Journal, “he was firm, just and humane in his treatment of the natives, discouraged looting and chicken snatching, and punishing American and Filipino alike for breaches of military law.”690 In this portrayal, Colonel Liscum emerged as the ideal masculine figure with both authority and compassion, thus sidelining anti-imperialists’ accusations of

American atrocities in the Philippines.

His death in the Battle of Tianjin put a dramatic end to his military service, only to become the embodiment of a model officer. As war correspondent Fredrick Palmer depicted, he picked up the regiment color after its bearer fell. Major Regan urged him to get down to avoid receiving shots. “ ‘I guess not’ was Liscum’s reply. The next instant a sharp shooter’s bullet went through the Colonel’s abdomen. ‘I’ve got it,’ he said as he fell. ‘Get at them if you can,’ the dying officer said, and added as his last words, ‘don’t retreat, boys; keep firing.’”691

Standing bravely in the face of fierce enemy fire and fixating on his military duty even on the edge of death, in this portrayal Colonel Liscum epitomized qualities expected of an ideal officer.

Such a depiction fit a genre of heroic military figures’ dying words. According to contemporary

689 “Col. Liscum’s Career”, New York Times, New York, NY, July 17, 1900, p.1. The Battle of Gettysburg halted the last Southern effort to push North and induce European empires to intervene on their behalf, while the Battle of San Juan Hill witnessed the charge of Theodore Roosevelt and his Rough Riders. 690 “Under a Terrible Fire at Tientsin”, Boston Journal, Boston, MA, July 17, 1900, p.2. 691 “’Don’t Retreat, Boys, Keep Firing’ Were the Dying Words of Liscum”, The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, July 22, 1900, p.1. 196 tales, Stonewall Jackson’s last words were “Tell A.P. Hill to prepare for action,” while General

Robert E. Lee murmured “Tell Hill he must come up” before he died.692

Apart from Colonel Liscum, other officers also received attention for their deeds of valor.

According to the Associated Press, Marine First Lieutenant Henry Leonard carried wounded

Lieutenant Butler and returned to the rear, despite getting shot in his upper left arm in the process that eventually led to its amputation. Additionally, Army Captain Charles R. Noyes swam a mile with his wounded arm and leg to deliver the request for reinforcement.693 These cases highlighted their camaraderie and commitment to duty.

The American media coverage of the China Relief Expedition reached its climax after the

Battle of Beijing. Unlike Colonel Liscum, Captain Reilly was killed instantly by a bullet. This left little room to elaborate on his death and bravery, except to say that he was “standing on the wall and directing his battery” when the bullet struck him. 694 So newspapers focused on

Captain Reilly’s past feats in Cuba and the Philippines. Among these reports, the Trenton

Evening Times used the caption “he died as he wished---an American soldier.” Combined with the mention of his birth in Ireland, it told the story of an immigrant who became an American through his military service.695 Yet such reference to his Irish origins seemed to be the anomaly rather than the rule.

These news articles not only sought to cultivate American support for the troops and country, but also conveyed the rising U.S. status in the word as recognized by other empires.

As seen in Chapter Two, on many occasions American officers spared no efforts to emphasize

692 “Lee and Jackson,” Lynchburg Daily Virginian, Lynchburg, VA, October 15, 1870, p.2; “The Veil Lifted,” Columbus Daily Enquirer, Columbus, GA, June 29, 1883, p.1. 693 “The Ninth’s Deeds of Heroism at Tientsin”, Boston Morning Journal, Boston, MA, July 25, 1900, p.1. 694 “Where Reilly Met Death,” Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, August 24, 1900, p.2. 695 “Captain Reilly,” Trenton Evening Times, Trenton, NJ, August 21, 1900, p.6. 197 their soldiers as the first to take strategic positions, sometimes beating their allies in such races.

Consul Ragsdale’s son Earl Ragsdale described how American, British, and Japanese soldiers all admired Captain McCalla, and Admiral Seymour consulted him on every decision. The credit of bringing the Seymour detachment safely back to Tianjin should fall on him.696 Here

Captain McCalla emerged as the embodiment of the United States gaining respect from other empires and playing a pivotal role in world affairs. The American Minister to Germany Andrew

D. White clearly lay out the China Relief Expedition’s significance for the United States in his talk with reporters:

the German attaches who saw our men fight are most exuberant in their praises of our army

and navy, of the valor and skill of our soldiers and sailors. In this connection it may be said

that our war with Spain and the part we play in the Chinese conflict has opened the eyes

of Europe, and made it see a good deal more of us than it had done before.697

At the same time that many American newspapers concentrated on the advance of allied forces and the fate of the ministers, some others touched the war’s horror and toll, which served to further demonstrate allied forces’ perseverance. As Fredrick Palmer depicted, in the Battle of Tianjin, “the July sun was beating down on them, and they had nothing to drink but the salty marsh water. Meanwhile the wounded came struggling and crawling through the gate in the mud wall.”698 Marine John Megonigal, who had fought in Cuba and the Philippines before

696 “Highest Praise for Capt. McCalla”, The Evening Times, Pawtucket, RI, August 8, 1900, p.7. 697 “Andrew White Home”, The Kansas Semi-Weekly Capital, Topeka, KS, August 7, 1900, p.2. 698 “’Don’t Retreat, Boys, Keep Firing’ Were the Dying Words of Liscum”, The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, July 22, 1900, p.1. 198 coming to China, wrote his sister that he had “seen some terrible sights of the dead and wounded of every nation lying in the field, and we had to pass over the prostrate bodies on the march.”699 Another report on the wounded from the Philippines and China arriving at San

Francisco included the depiction of Private R. W. Adams of the Fourteenth Infantry: “the whole of his face, his nose and one eye were literally torn off by the fragment of the missile.”700

Reading these depictions of the war’s horror must have been agonizing for people whose relatives served in units deployed to China. Like the Civil War nearly forty years earlier, families learned about their loved ones’ fate through either newspapers or letters. Anxious about their relatives’ wellbeing, many wrote to the War Department and Navy Department directly or through their congressmen. As Secretary Long wrote in a letter to his wife, “you can imagine how terrible is the anxiety of the fathers and mothers and how the letters which I receive from them appeal to me.”701

These letters contained stories of both care and disappointment, and illuminated relationships inside servicemen’s families. Robert W. McBride, a Civil War veteran and longtime member of the Indiana National Guard, sought information about his son Charles, a

Spanish-American War veteran who enlisted again in July. As he wrote, “I do not disapprove of his action in enlisting, but regret that he did not see fit to communicate with us.” Receiving no news at all on this matter, he inquired again on December 20, pleading to the commander to “appreciate the anxiety of his parents.”702

699 “Jersey Soldier Writes of War”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA, September 30, 1900, p.7. 700 “Hit by Shell or Bullet,” The Butte Weekly Miner, Butte, MT, October 25, 1900, p.15. 701 Secretary Long to Mrs. John D. Long, July 18, 1900, John Davis Long papers, Vol.83, p.404. 702 Robert W. McBride to Colonel C. F. Robe, August 2, 1900, RG395, entry 969/968, Letter Received, Camp Reilly; McBride to the Commanding Officer of the Ninth Infantry, December 20, 1900, ibid. 199

Women, just like men, wrote letters to inquire into their relatives’ fate.703 Helen Jackson would like to know her son’s condition, and requested that General Chaffee “will not deny my plea, a mother’s.” She asked for “only one line to tell me he is well and the proper address.”

Unfortunately, American units in China found no information regarding her son.704 Ida M.

Peterson also wrote to General Chaffee concerning her son. As she stated, “I have written three letters to him, and not having received any reply. I am in great distress…I have been to

Washington, and saw Sargent McCullum at headquarters but he could not tell me any news.”705

What’s more heartbreaking was that after a thorough search and inquiry within U.S. forces in

China, it turned out that her son did not serve in this detachment.706

While such uncertainty and unknown would no doubt enhance people’s anxiety, receiving the news of death or punishment broke families’ hearts. Mrs. Gertrade Crawford asked General

Chaffee about the particulars of her father Robert Kew’s death on August 6, and if they could send his remains to Ohio.707 Mrs. Lilac Lalone learned about her son’s receiving punishment for looting, yet indicated that “there are thousands that has [sic] done the same thing and that are not punished.” Hoping that Colonel Robe would send him home as soon as possible after his time was up rather than continue to punish him, she pleaded for the colonel to “have pity on us poor old people,” and mentioned that “we didn’t sleep an hour a night since he went to war.” At the beginning of her letter, she also referred to this one as “my baby, the youngest of

703 Colonel Heistand to Miss Maria O’Dowd, March 20, 1901, RG395, Entry 898; Colonel Heistand to Mrs. J. L. Hendry, March 27, 1901, ibid. 704 Helen Jackson to Chaffee, August 22, 1900, RG395, Entry 906; “Requests information of her son Timothy Ryan”, ibid. 705 Ida M. Peterson to Chaffee, undated, RG395, Entry 943. 706 “Furnishes copy of letter of Ida M. Paterson, asking information about her son Charles L. Peterson”, RG395, Entry 906. 707 Mrs. Gertrade Crawford to Chaffee, August 16, 1900, RG395, Entry 906. 200 my five living children,” and indicated that “if you have children of your own, you will know how to pity a few old mother that has been sickly for the last 17 years.”708

Sometimes American newspapers did pay attention to people who had loved ones in China.

Female figures became the subject for the majority of such reports, for they both represented the home and family that soldiers strove to protect from harm and were thought by contemporaries as possessing qualities that rendered them more sentimental compared with men. The active role that Southern women played in commemorating the Confederacy might have further enhanced these notions.709 One article on women in war noted that “the certainty of his embarking for the Mongolian empire filled her heart with that peculiar dread that only a woman knows, and that only a woman recognizes.”710 Baroness Von Ketteler (Maude Ledyard) became an early embodiment of emotions linked with losing loved ones in China. Her father

H. B. Ledyard, president of the Michigan Central Railroad Company, spoke to correspondents about her “suffering from nervous prostration” when she finally arrived home in late October

1900.711

Indeed, in males’ eyes, the past two years had been trying for Baroness Von Ketteler. In a letter to Secretary Root, her father indicated that “her health has not been very good during the last year, especially since her brother was killed in the Philippines.”712 Then a Chinese army officer killed her husband, who was the German Minister in China. According to British

General Barrow’s observation, in the official memorial service for Minister Kettler in Beijing

708 Mrs. Lilac Lalone to Colonel Robe, January 11, 1900, RG395, Entry 906. 709 Nina Silber, Gender and the Sectional Conflict (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Caroline E. Janney, Remembering the Civil War: Reunion and the Limits of Reconciliation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). 710 “Woman and Society,” The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, August 16, 1900, p.6. 711 “Baroness Von Ketteler,” The Augusta Chronicle, Augusta, GA, October 22, 1900, p.1. 712 H. B. Ledyard to Root, August 25, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 10. 201 on August 18, 1900, “the poor widow [was] nearly fainting the whole time.”713 A newspaper piece on November 12 mentioned that she “is improving slowly” at home, and that “when she arrived about five weeks ago her conditions was such that her relatives for a time were greatly alarmed.”714

Besides depicting women in grief and sorrow, some American newspapers also noted their contribution to the war effort. The Louisville Courier Journal reported that “when Col. E. H.

Liscum of the Ninth United States Infantry was shot on July 13 in China his wife was in the hospitals at Manila nursing the wounded and sick soldiers.”715 The Philadelphia Inquirer also indicated that “she expected to go to Yokohama soon for work in the American hospital established there.” 716 Margaret Livingston Chanler from New York received newspaper attention as well. She was a Red Cross nurse serving in both Puerto Rico and the hospital ship

Relief off the Chinese coast. The fact that she was a member of the prominent Astor family likely contributed to her publicity as well.717

Such stories were just noted examples of these women’s determination and perseverance in the war in China and the Philippines. Miss Chanler narrated her close observation of Mrs.

Liscum’s work in a letter to Mrs. Wm. S. Cowles, an officer of Mrs. Lawton’s “Manila Hospital

Society.” Upon arriving at Manila, Miss Chanler found Mrs. Liscum spent “all of every morning over the work of her Society,” and used to follow a man being carried to a hospital on

713 George Barrow, Campaign Diaries, p.151, Mss Eur E420/27, The Asian & African Studies Reading Room, The British Library. 714 “Widow of Baron Von Ketteler,” The Evening Times, Pawtucket, RI, November 13, 1900, p.1. 715 “Mrs. Liscum in Manila,”(from Louisville Courier Journal), The San Antonio Daily Express, San Antonio, TX, August 8, 1900, p.2. 716 “Mrs. Liscum now Resides in Manila,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA, July 17, 1900, p.14. 717 “She’s A Good Girl”, The Butte Weekly Miner, Butte, MT, August 16, 1900, p.8; “An Astor to China as a Nurse,” Sioux City Journal, Sioux City, IA, August 16, 1900, p.1. 202 the docks with a broken head and find a physician for him after extensive search. Mrs. Liscum also served on the board of the American Library in Manila, a place for servicemen to frequent and read, and planned to open a ward for American women as there was no female hospital in

Manila.718 Instead of returning home right away on the Army Transport Thomas as others had arranged for her and she originally planned, Mrs. Liscum chose to visit China. Her brother deduced that she went there “either with a faint hope of bringing Col. Liscum’s remains with her (which I think scarcely practicable) or because she wanted to see where he fell or where his body is laid or that it is properly cared for.”719 She eventually achieved her goal. Together with her brother and General Wilson, she accompanied Liscum’s remains from China all the way to Arlington cemetery in December 1900.720 In doing so, Mrs. Liscum followed in the footsteps of countless men and women during the American Civil War. Accompanying remains home served as partial consolation for families whose loved ones lacked a “good death.”721

Apart from Miss Chanler and Mrs. Liscum, ordinary female nurses also contributed to the war effort in China and the Philippines. The Civil War and its aftermath witnessed the professionalization of nursing, while the Spanish-American War sparked the new recruitment of army nurses.722 There were twenty-four female nurses on army transports bound for either

China or the Philippines during this time.723 Sixteen of them ended up in China. Some of them

718 Margaret Livingston Chanler to Mrs. Wm. S. Cowles, June 30, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 8. 719 George M. Diven to Elihu Root, July 21, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 8; George M. Diven to Elihu Root, September 19, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 8. 720 “Liscum’s Body in Washington,” Trenton Times, Trenton, NJ, December 11, 1900, p.7. 721 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Random House, 2008). 722 Jane E. Schultz, Women at the Front: Hospital Workers in Civil War America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Carolyn M. Feller and Debora R. Cox eds., Highlights in the History of the Army Nurse Corps (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2016). 723 “The Red Cross in China,” in George F. Shrady ed., Medical Record, Vol.58 (New York: William Wood and Company, 1900), p.180. 203 were veterans of the Spanish-American War, while others were new recruits. Under the new contract signed on July 1, 1900, they received 50 dollars a month plus daily rations for foreign duty. Their report cards showed that many of them had “shown marked ability to cope with difficulties of newly opened, crowded hospital,” and “performed faithfully, willingly and well” in Tianjin. Although such remarks seemed to be formative and clichéd, they should not obscure the hard work that these female nurses devoted themselves to. As Agnes G. Young wrote in a letter, “we operated day and night till the most critical cases were attended. During the first twenty-four hours we only left the operating-room long enough to eat three hurried lunches.”724

Female nurses also made sacrifice in this process. As nurse Young described, “our quarters are small, but we are crowding up to make room. Some of the nurses have been ill for a few days, but all have done excellent work.” Shortly after arriving in the Philippines, Theresa Earles

McCarthy got her contract annulled because of valvular disease of the heart. She blamed this on her time in China. “I was not well in China. I remained on duty, in the operating room, and as the work was hard I became very weak.”725

Some women’s work sought to foster closer relationship between countries. A committee of American women in London had previously raised funds to convert the S.S. Maine, which was loaned by the Atlantic Transport Company’s president Bernard Baker, into a hospital ship and placed it for service in South Africa. When the China Relief Expedition gradually unfolded, these women renewed their support for another year so that they could be of use in China,

724 “Department of Army Nursing,” in The Trained Nurse and Hospital Review, vol.25, 1900, pp.277, 358; Theresa Earles McCarthy, in RG 112 Office of the Surgeon General (Army), Entry # NM-20 149 Personal Data Cards of Spanish-American War Contract Nurses 1898-1917, Container 4; Agnes G. Young, in ibid., Container 6; Mary Olive Purves, in ibid., Container 5; Henrietta McRae, in ibid.; Katherine E. Martin, in RG 112, Entry # NM-20 150 Correspondence, Spanish-American War Nurses, Box 7. 725 McCarthy to the Surgeon General of the United States army, January 22, 1901, in ibid. 204 including taking in the sick and wounded of all nationalities, especially those of the Ninth

Infantry. As an American hospital official aboard the ship, Mrs. Kinnicutt regarded her work as significant “for the relief of suffering humanity and for the credit of our country in distant parts of the world.”726 In addition, in late June, former Chief Nurse of the U.S. army and

Supervising Sister of the H.S. Maine Mary Eugenie Hibbard, who had seen action in both Cuba and South Africa, suggested the Governor General of Canada equipping a field hospital for service in either China or South Africa. She regarded it as “a splendid opening for the zeal and devotion of Canadian women” that would “draw closer the ties of goodwill and mutual assistance between the Mother Country and the Dominion of Canada.”727

While American newspapers presented these events to their readers, statesmen continued debates over aspects of the China Relief Expedition. Controversies over this operation did not fade away after the successful relief of the international legations in Beijing. Instead, the changing situation and fresh news from China added additional fuel to already heated imperialist debates. Controversies over the China Relief Expedition continued long after the

1900 Presidential Election ended.

Whether to call an extra session of Congress became the first issue that emerged in this series of debates. According to the U.S. Constitution, the power to declare war rested in

Congress, and the president could only direct troops to the war zone after Congress’s declaration of war granted him the authority. As a result, before the bombardment of Dagu forts,

726 G. Fleetwood Wilson to The Under Secretary of State, Indian Office, July 14, 1900, in Hospital ship Maine placed at Government disposal by Atlantic Transport Company and committee of American ladies, IOR/L/MIL/7/16682, Asian & African Studies Reading Room, the British Library; The Under Secretary of State, Indian Office to Gaselee, August 9, 1900, in ibid; “The Hospital Ship ‘Maine’,” Medical Record, vol.58, p.477. 727 Mary Eugenie Hibbard to Governor General of Canada, June 26, 1900, in Offer of field hospital by women of Canada, IOR/L/MIL/7/16728, Asian & African Studies Reading Room, the British Library. 205 some officials in the Department of War refused to deploy army units in the Philippines to

China prior to a Congressional authorization of force.728

The anticipation of an extra Congressional session grew after Dagu forts fired at the international warships, only to be dismissed by President McKinley. Regarding the move as an act of war, newspapers reported on rumors of an extra session in Washington D.C. to raise an army for service in China.729 But many congressmen, especially those from the midwestern and western states, could not afford to return to Washington D.C. for an extra session when contested campaigns went on in their districts. As Senator Hoar indicated to E. R. Tinker, “it would be very difficult to get and hold a quorum, even under the distressing circumstances now.”730

Besides, the situation in China had not reached a point that the existing forces and appropriation could not handle.731 On June 26, Senator George F. Hoar’s clerk Mr. Garland wrote to the other clerk Mr. Goodwin that “this Chinese puzzle looks suspicious. If it were any other country than China I suppose Congress would have to be called together to declare war.”732 Two days later, after convening with Senator Davis and Congressman Robert R. Hitt

(R-IL, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs), President McKinley announced that “the United States will maintain an attitude of neutrality, aside from taking any precautionary or aggressive steps that may be deemed necessary to protect our interests.” This

728 “Washington is Now in a Ferment over the Grave Chinese Situation”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA, June 17, 1900, p.9. 729 “Army for Foreign Service? Extra Session?”, Evening Times, Pawtucket, RI, June 19, 1900; “Oregon is Going to Taku”, The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, June 19, 1900, p.1. 730 Senator Hoar to E. R. Tinker, July 19, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79. 731 “No Extra Session”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, June 21, 1900, p.4; “They May be Snowed Under”, The Baltimore Sun, Baltimore, MD, June 27, 1900, p.2. 732 Garland to Goodwin, June 26, 1900, in George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79, Massachusetts Historical Society. 206 meant that there wouldn’t be an extra session of Congress to declare war on China. In fact, the day after this announcement, President McKinley left Washington D.C. for his summer house in Canton, Ohio.733

Lessons from American history seemed to be on the McKinley administration’s side. The

Morning Oregonian argued that deploying troops to protect American lives and properties did not constitute an act of war, and listed historical precedents to buttress its point. President

Jefferson, “a strict constructionist of the Constitution,” sent troops into disputed territories between Louisiana and then Spanish Florida to shield American citizens from harm. General

Andrew Jackson followed President Monroe’s instructions and pursued Seminole Indians into then Spanish Florida. General Zachary Taylor had several engagements with Mexicans before

Congress declared a state of war. 734 These examples were meant to silence a possible

Democratic outcry on this issue, as all but one of the figures involved were Democratic presidents.

The McKinley administration maintained this stance throughout the fighting stage of the

China Relief Expedition. Although the American loss in Tianjin as well as the alleged murder of all foreigners in Beijing looked astounding, and President McKinley travelled back to

Washington D.C. in response to this news, he and his cabinet insisted that they still had sufficient resources at their disposal to deal with the crisis in China. In addition, declaring war on China would hinder relief efforts by closing the door on Chinese officials’ cooperation. As the administration promised, “should future developments indicate that he (President

McKinley) is unable to do what is required with the means now at his command and the action

733 “Will be No Extra Session”, The Grand Rapids Herald, Grand Rapids, MI, June 29, 1900, p.1. 734 The Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, June 28, 1900, p.6. 207 of Congress is necessary to furnish either men or money or authority, he will not hesitate to call it together.”735

In deciding not to call an extra session of Congress, President McKinley faced pressure from both sides. A couple of newspapers accused him of worrying more about the ramifications of such a move on elections than the wellbeing of American citizens and soldiers. The makeshift deployment of troops from the United States and its overseas possessions both delayed the relief efforts and resulted in heavy casualties when facing overwhelming numbers of Chinese troops.736 Some Democrats insisted on an extra session, since it would serve to demonstrate their party’s support for safeguarding U.S. citizens abroad. As Congressman

David A. DeArmond (D-MO) predicted, most of his colleagues would support the administration’s demand for increased resources in an extra session, just like in the preparation for the war with Spain.737 In a letter to Secretary Root, Congressman John Hull (R-IA), although himself unwilling to return to Washington D.C., also predicted that an extra session would “result in every Democrat in the house and senate voting supplies and full authority for the President to cooperate with the other powers.”738

Many Senators from both parties also expressed concern over this matter, as did the general public. They supported the administration’s current cause of action in protecting

American lives and property, yet insisted on the Congress declaring war. In their minds, given that the Chinese government emboldened the Boxers, and Dagu forts fired at an American

735 “Cabinet Decides that America is now at Peace with China”, The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, July 17, 1900, p.1; “For Press,” July 17, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 736 “Must Raise More Troops”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, July 17, 1900, p.3; “Congress Should be Convened”, The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, July 20, 1900, p.4. 737 “The Democrats and China”, The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, July 17, 1900, p.2. 738 John Hull to Root, July 16, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 10. 208 warship, a state of war existed between the United States and China, which necessitated a

Congressional declaration of war.739 As George Edmunds wrote in a letter to Senator Hoar, he believed that “the whole thing began through the connivance and acquiescence of the Empress, and I consider, therefore, that we are in a state of war with China, whatever easier view the administration may take of it.”740

While the swift relief of the international legations in Beijing avoided the need to send more forces, keeping U.S. troops in China for occupation duties renewed the call for a

Congressional authorization of force. According to Senator Augustus O. Bacon (D-GA), who introduced an amendment barring the United States from wielding permanent control over the

Philippines during the Senate debate over the Treaty with Spain, “only urgent danger to the legation before Congress could be assembled, justifies the president in sending an army into

China. The danger having passed, the army should be promptly withdrawn, unless Congress being immediately assembled, should direct further occupation and operations.”741 As The

Springfield Daily Republican pointed out, the McKinley administration had to choose between

“the theory of peace,” rendering an occupation force redundant and immediate withdrawal imperative, or “the theory of war” that allowed for the maintenance of American troops in

China after Congressional approval.742

As seen in Chapter One, a dread of international complications lingered even among

739 “Senator Teller’s Opinion”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, August 6, 1900, p.1; “Mr. Morgan Wants War”, The Columbus Enquirer Sun, Columbus, GA, August 7, 1900, p.1; “Western Republicans”, Fort Worth Morning Register, Fort Worth, TX, August 15, 1900, p. 4; “Is it a Genuine War?” Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, August 22, 1900, p.4. 740 George Edmunds to Senator Hoar, July 18, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79. 741 Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, p. 157; “War Power Limited”, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, August 20, 1900, p.1. 742 “Expansion of the President’s War Powers”, The Springfield Daily Republican, August 25, 1900, p.6. 209 figures who embraced a larger American role in world affairs. While the eight-nation forces overcame all those differences and conflicts of interest to relieve the Boxer’s siege of the international legations, the postwar settlement presented new challenges and dangers. The problem became more thorny and acute in light of Minister Conger’s telegraphs about the arrival of forces of other nations.743 The Associated Press also reported that other forces, especially those from Germany and Russia, continued to pour into Northern China.744 Under these circumstances, the American poet Margaret E. Sangster wrote a poem depicting the war in China and rumors of upcoming wars, and prayed for the coming of peace.

The heathen swarm to the conflict; they storm with fire and sword,

And hurl their grim defiance, bitter and brave, at the Lord.

…

The great world navies hasten, the great world armies rise

…

Wars and rumors of wars, till the Master bid them cease,

For our God is King in the Heavens, and His Name is the Prince of Peace.745

The shadow of the scramble for China continued to haunt the American public. Rev. W.

A. P. Martin wrote that “it is too soon to predict, but partition between the powers appears inevitable.”746 Minister Conger also observed that “it is possible that foreign claims are so

743 Conger to Hay, August 27, 1900, William McKinley papers, Reel 12; Conger to Hay, August 30, 1900, ibid; Conger to Hay, September 4, 1900, ibid. 744 “Allies Arriving at Taku,” The Daily Express, San Antonio, TX, August 26, 1900, p.1. 745 “Wars and Rumors of Wars,” The Independent, November 1, 1900, p.2634. 746 W. A. P. Martin to Corbin, August 16, 1900, Henry Clark Corbin Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, The 210 large already, as only to be paid by cession of territory.”747

Such evaluation appeared in newspapers too. Upon receiving news of the allied entry into

Beijing, The Kansas City Star predicted that the allied occupation of Northern China “might afford a convenient pretext for the eventual dismemberment of China.” Since Germany extracted the Bay of Jiaozhou after the murder of two German missionaries there, “at what will the Kaiser value the life of his Minister?”748 The State also expressed concerns that “it is almost inevitable that there will be spoils in China and quarrel over the spoils. It is our duty to keep out of that quarrel.” It specified that occupying part of China “would require us to maintain indefinitely a large force in China and …effect a territorial occupation repugnant to our policy and fraught with danger of collision with the European powers.”749 Even Chung Sai Yat Po, a major Chinese newspaper in San Francisco, transcribed an article from a Shanghai newspaper on possible harms arising from the partition of China, especially internal fighting between participating nations.750

Such vision gripped the minds of many Americans for a long time. In mid- February, 1901,

T. R. Smith of Georgia wrote to Senator Hoar to ask for “literature on imperialism and on the partition of China.”751 More than a month later, the Philomathic Debating Society of Holy

Cross College invited Senator Hoar to judge their upcoming debate. The question was

“Resolved: that if the Powers can agree upon a division, the partition of China would be

Library of Congress. 747 Conger to Hay, August 28, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 748 “After Pekin, What?” The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, August 17, 1900, p.6. 749 “The Allies in Pekin,” The State, Columbia, SC, August 18, 1900, p.4. 750 “Lun Guafenzhongguo wei Diqiu Shouhuo,” (On the Partition of China as the Upmost Calamity on Earth), Chung Sai Yat Po, San Francisco, CA, August 16, 1900, p.1. 751 T. R. Smith to Senator Hoar, February 14, 1901, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 82. 211 conducive to the best interests of the world at large.”752

Anti-imperialists and Democrats campaigned on the occupation issue. In a September 1 speech in South Bend, Indiana, Bryan exclaimed that “if the president could haul down the flag in Cuba, 200 miles away, he could certainly haul it down in the Philippines, 7,000 miles away.

Furthermore, if the flag could never be hauled down, how was it to be got out of Pekin?”

Doubling down on the issue, he went on to say “if we become the owners of 8,000,000 Filipinos when we entered Manila we must have become the owners of 400,000,000 Chinese when

General Chaffee entered the Chinese capital.” It both mocked the Republican logic in justifying the American ownership of the Philippines and underlined the enormous task the United States faced in China if it decided to assume the duty of occupation.753

Internally, the McKinley administration weighed different options regarding withdrawal.

Shortly after the occupation of Beijing, General Chaffee telegraphed General Corbin to ask for new instructions. As General Chaffee saw it, they had accomplished the purpose of the expedition. Since it would be difficult to supply forces wintering in Beijing, he suggested the

“withdrawal of United States troops [as] soon as practicable from China.754 On August 28, the

Russian government signaled its intention to withdraw from Beijing, and hoped that the United

States would follow suit. 755 The next day, General Chaffee reiterated his point about withdrawal and elaborated on the logistical pressures that forces applied on a local population already short on food and fuel.756 After a couple of days, the French Ministry for Foreign

752 D. D. O’Brien to Senator Hoar, March 23, 1901, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 82. 753 “Awakens Indiana,” Omaha World Herald, Omaha, NE, September 2, 1900, p.1. 754 General Chaffee to General Corbin, August 17, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 11. 755 Memorandum of a conversation with the Charge d’Affaires of Russia, August 28, 1900, William McKinley papers, Reel 12; Alvey A. Adee to George B. Cortelyou, August 30, 1900, ibid. 756 General Chaffee to General Corbin, August 29, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 212 affairs expressed the country’s desire to withdraw from Beijing following the Russian example.757

These developments caused ripples in the McKinley administration. One pro-expansion

Democrat in the Senate, Senator John T. Morgan (D-AL), voiced his concern over the occupation issue. In a letter to Acting Secretary of State David J. Hill, he proposed withdrawing

American troops back to the Philippines. He attributed the quiet situation in China not to the presence of occupation forces, but to the Chinese desire for peace. More importantly, he predicted that Russia, Germany, and Japan would take advantage of the situation to declare war on China and expand their sphere of influence there. Under these circumstances, American troops in China would not only fail to maintain China’s territorial integrity, but also get involved in “entangling alliances” meant to exploit China. By contrast, a massive U.S. force in the Philippines would both serve as a deterrent against any attempt to harm American interests in China and quell the Filipino uprising. Senator Morgan wrote this letter to “prevent, if I can, any diplomatic situation, through a concert with European powers and Japan, that might make it an embarrassment to advocate, in the senate, the policy” that he laid out here. This demonstrated that he truly believed in the possibility of such a scheme for nations to together carve out spheres of influence in China.758

Secretary Root held a similar view of the situation. As he stated in a letter to President

McKinley advocating withdrawal from China to the Philippines, General Chaffee’s dispatches indicated “a very long period of diplomatic bargaining” ahead, “in which we will be but a chip floating on the surface of the currents of intrigue and aggression of other Powers.” This phrase

757 Porter to Hay, September 5, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 758 John T. Morgan to David J. Hill, September 5, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 11. 213 illustrated Root’s distrust of the Europeans and Japanese, and his awareness of the limits of

American influence in joint negotiations. If China had not “indicated a practical disposition to comply with our requirements” by the time Congress met, “Congress should authorize the sending of an adequate force to compel proper action by China.” Clearly the need for a

Congressional authorization of force still lingered in Root’s mind. As he saw it, this course of action would “have the advantage of keeping us out of complications which might discredit our policy among our own people.”759 Obviously, opposition by anti-imperialists emerged here as a factor that shaped Root’s opinion.

As historian Marilyn Young points out, the business and missionary interests pressured the McKinley administration to maintain troops in China. Rockhill telegraphed in early

September that “it will be necessary to keep troops [in] Beijing for the present.”760 Consul

Goodnow also thought “it [a] great mistake to withdraw troops from Beijing until settlement

[is] arranged.” 761 Secretary Hay warned that if American forces withdrew from Beijing following Russia who already had reached certain understanding with China and would certainly betray the United States, “Germany by superior brute selfishness will have her way, and we shall be left out in the cold.”762

Concern over the Chinese character as well as national prestige played roles as well. As

Jackson, the American Charge at Berlin, reported, “at the present moment prevailing opinion at Foreign Office is that [a] withdrawal of troops would be regarded by the Chinese as an evidence of weakness on the part of the Powers.”763 According to Perry S. Heath, secretary of

759 Root to McKinley, September 11, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 760 Rockhill to Hay, September 2, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 761 Goodnow to Hay, September 3, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 762 Hay to Adee, September 14, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 763 Jackson to Hay, August 30, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 214 the Republican National Committee, at the banquet for the Iron Brigade, Civil War General

Sickles hoped that “the President under no circumstances or developments would permit the withdrawal of our troops…as long as there was an American life in danger.” General Sickles also indicated that “the Chinese had been so treacherous and willfully uncertain in all their statements.” As Heath himself saw it, “the President’s manly and patriotic course in China has greatly aroused the American spirit among our people.”764 On the next day, the Thirty-fourth

National Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic acknowledged receiving President

McKinley’s congratulations, and mentioned that Civil War veterans General McArthur and

General Chaffee were “maintaining the honor the glory and the dignity of the Nation.”765

Given the Northern veterans’ large number and extensive influence, the McKinley administration could not afford to alienate them in an election year over the Chinese issue.

In addition, other nations’ moves also influenced the American decision about whether to withdraw troops from China. The next day after he suggested withdrawal, General Chaffee telegraphed that the “conference today decided [it] absolutely necessary to maintain troops in

Beijing for (winter).”766 On August 29, General Chaffee mentioned “reduction to reasonable guard for legation, if they remain” as an alternative to complete withdrawal.767 A few days later, Admiral Remey quoted General Chaffee as stating that he “may be able [to] dispense with half [of the] present force within two weeks.”768 Since the American government eventually decided that its legation should remain in Beijing and commence negotiations with the Chinese

764 Perry S. Heath to George B. Cortelyou, August 29, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 765 Albert D. Shaw to McKinley, August 30, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 766 General Chaffee to General Corbin, August 18, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 767 General Chaffee to General Corbin, August 29, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 768 Remey to Bureau of Navigation, September 4, 1900, in Hackett to McKinley, September 13, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 215 as soon as possible, partial withdrawal became the most viable option.769 Besides, General

Chaffee’s latest telegraph about the partially restored local trade and business in Beijing might have helped ease concerns over logistics as well.770 On September 21, Secretary Root ordered

General Chaffee to retain an infantry regiment as well as his cavalry and light artillery in

Beijing to serve as the legation guard, and send the rest of his forces to the Philippines.771

The partial withdrawal policy helped ease some public concern over the possible long- lasting American occupation of Northern China and the ensuing international complications.

In an October 6, 1900 interview with a correspondent from The World in London on October

6, 1900 before his much-anticipated return to the United States, anti-imperialist Mark Twain stated, “as to China, I quite approve of our Government’s action in getting free of that complication. They are withdrawing, I understand, having done what they wanted. That is quite right. We have no more business in China than in any other country that is not ours.”772

Yet this policy did not assuage all anti-imperialists. In late October, the Washington D.C.

Anti-Imperialist League issued a call to voters. It listed places where the United States kept an occupation force: Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and China. The call then pointed out that

“these several acts have cost the United States a billion dollars, many precious lives, and worse than all, the loss of our national ideas.”773 In the November issue of The International Monthly,

William Graham Sumner, professor of sociology at Yale University, labeled expansion as “the predominant issue” of the campaign. Near the end of the article, he made the following

769 Memorandum in response to the Russian Charge’s oral communication, August 28, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 770 General Chaffee to General Corbin, September 16, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 771 Root to General Chaffee, September 21, 1900, William McKinley papers, reel 12. 772 Gary Scharnhorst ed., Mark Twain: The Complete Interviews (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2006), p.350. 773 “National Appeal for Preservation,” The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, October 30, 1900, p.3. 216 statement: “We were told that we needed Hawaii in order to secure California. What shall we now take in order to secure the Philippines? No wonder that some expansionists do not want to ‘scuttle out of China.’”774

Bryan’s defeat in the 1900 Presidential Election did not make anti-imperialists relent on the issue. Their doubts about the continuing occupation of Tianjin and Beijing culminated in a

March 1901 meeting in Faneuil Hall, Boston, where founding fathers including Samuel Adams preached independence from Great Britain. Boutwell questioned the McKinley administration’s motive in keeping U.S. troops in China, especially considering the similar developments in Cuba:

We entered China as one of the world powers for the protection of our minister. That

purpose was accomplished many months ago, and yet we remain. Why? The President says

the integrity of China ought not to be disturbed. In like manner he has said that our pledge

to Cuba is to be kept…By what authority did the President make war upon China, a nation

with which we were at peace? Had he any purpose in view but the acquisition of more

territory?...can the President have any other motive for remaining at Pekin than greed of

territory and lust for power?775

Several figures in the decision-making process also expressed concern over other countries’ motives in China and reflected on how to allocate the American forces accordingly.

774 “The Predominant Issue,” The International Monthly, November, 1900, p.508. 775 Free America, Free Cuba, Free Philippines (Boston, MA: The New England Anti-imperialist League, 1901), p.26. 217

General Chaffee observed that other generals “believe their government will continue in occupation of Chinese soil for many years.”776 Secretary Long also expressed that “I have not a bit of sympathy with the inclination of the great powers to treat China as if there had been a war and it were a conquered province…We have held aloof, and, I think, won great credit, as well as established a claim on Chinese regard by withdrawing our troops and refusing to encourage anything like a partition of the empire or excessive punishment or indemnity.”777

Many of the American servicemen in China desired to return home or to the Philippines soon. Some of them became fed up with the dull and sedentary life in China. There wasn’t much entertainment in camp. War correspondent Chamberlin taking residence in the Temple of Agriculture wrote that the camp did not feature either gas or electric light or lamps, and candles were always in short supply. So “night work is practically out of the question.”778 For soldiers intending to play cards or read books, this lighting problem must have been tough.

Even General Chaffee, whose social schedule included dining with ministers and officers from other countries, wrote that the “situation [is] quiet, and in some respects monotonous.”779

The coming of winter further enhanced the boredom and suffering. As early as October 1, cavalryman Alonzo wrote that “our camp is pretty fair, although it is rather cold…you should see the boys shiver when it gets cold at night.”780 General Chaffee also described that “snow covered the ground about us for about half the time. Everybody has been benefited in health

776 Chaffee to Corbin, 1900, Henry Clark Corbin Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 777 Secretary Long to Margaret and Helen Long, November 28, 1900, John Davis Long papers, Vol.83, pp.566- 7. 778 Chamberlin, Ordered to China, p.116. 779 Chaffee to Corbin, 1900, Henry Clark Corbin Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. Due to the damage to the letter, its exact month is unknown. The librarian marked it as July. But since Chaffee mentioned dining with foreign ministers, it must come after the relief of the international legations in August. 780 “Trenton Boy Writes a Letter from China,” Trenton Times, November 12, 1900, p.8. 218 by the cool weather. Very quiet and awfully monotonous.”781 As James Richardson of the

Fourteenth Infantry observed, his fellows were glad to return to the tropics, since it was very cold in China.782

The question of how to allocate manpower between the Philippines and China swelled into a controversy about overall U.S. force levels. While anti-imperialists blamed the failure to quickly deploy troops from the Philippines to China on the McKinley administration’s broken promise to Filipinos, imperialists pointed to the shortage of men in uniform as the main problem.

Around that time, there were clamor for increasing the strength of the U.S. standing army as volunteer units gradually returned home.783 The Boxer outbreak in China became part of the supporting evidence. In his speech to the graduating class in West Point on June 13, former

Senator Charles F. Manderson (R-NE) mentioned this incident together with “armed resistance to legitimate sovereignty” in the Philippines, “war to the knife and the knife to the hilt” in South

Africa, and the likely war between European empires that resulted in increasing military spending in Europe, and demanded a larger American army.784 Speaking in the Hamilton club in Chicago on August 29, Senator Davis suggested that “the events in that empire demonstrate, as did our unprepared condition at the beginning of the Spanish war, how suddenly and unexpectedly crisis may arise which will call for the exercise of our military power and find it

781 Chaffee to Corbin, January 26, 1901, Henry Clark Corbin Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 782 “A Letter from James T. Richardson,” The Emporia Gazette, Emporia, KS, January 12, 1901, p.1. 783 For a discussion of contemporary debates over the size of the standing army, see Jesse David Perez, “Fear of a Standing Army: Ideology and Civil-Military Relations during the Philippine Insurrection, 1898-1902,” Master Thesis, The University of Texas at Arlington, 1996, pp.35-41. 784 Annual Reports of the War Department,1900, Reports of Chiefs of Bureaus, p. 114. 219 entirely lacking.”785 Theodore Roosevelt used the same argument in a campaign speech at

Evansville, Indiana on October 12, 1900, and added that “only the allies of Aguinaldo and the

Boxers can criticize it.”786

Anti-imperialists also realized that the emergency in China could lead to an increase in the size of the regular army, and they stood firm to oppose it. Back on August 2, Edward

Atkinson already predicted that “under pretext of service in China there may be enlistments, as there were in expectation of service in Cuba.” 787 But eleven days later, he changed his appraisal of the situation and stated that when “the Chinese contest collapses, then there will be no excuse for asking additional troops for service in China.”788

Bryan campaigned hard on the issue of imperialism and the ensuing large standing army.

In a September 8 speech in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, he stated that “twenty-five thousand soldiers were enough when the government rested on the consent of the governed, but it takes one hundred thousand when the government rested on the doctrine of brute force, for that is the foundation of an empire.” Here Bryan contrasted the consent of the governed that was the foundation of democracy and the doctrine of brute force that was the trademark of dictatorship, an antagonism originating from the American demand for independence back in the 1770s. He also suggested that such a costly large standing army could have only two purposes: “to carry on the wars in other countries for the benefit of those whom we exploit with their lands and to suppress by force in this country the discontent that ought to be cured by legislation.”789 Bryan was clearly referring to recent instances like the Pullman Strike of 1894 when the federal

785 Grand Forks Daily Herald, Grand Forks, ND, August 30, 1900, p.1. 786 Speech, October 12, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, reel 417. 787 Edward Atkinson to Senator Hoar, August 2, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79. 788 Edward Atkinson to Senator Hoar, August 13, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 79. 789 “Bryan Opens the Wisconsin Campaign,” The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, September 9, 1900, p.1. 220 government deployed army forces to break the strike.

Imperialists responded to these charges of endangering civic institutions by underlining the armed forces’ significance and sacrifice, especially the two officers whose deaths were widely covered by newspapers. As Theodore Roosevelt exclaimed in a campaign speech in

Helena, Montana on September 17, in response to Bryan’s claim about a hundred thousand

American troops marching in idleness:

…Liscum no longer walks about in idleness. Reilly no longer walks about in idleness.

Many an officer, many a soldier rests forever in peace…Are our memories so short as

already to forget the hurry with which we drew troops both from America and the

Philippines when the blood of our people called from China and the awful danger of the

women and children in Beijing stirred to its inmost soul the manhood of all

Christiandom?...Was Chaffee idle when eagerly obeying the President’s command he led

the march towards the forbidden city? Was the boy Titus idle when springing lightly from

the ranks he planted on the walls of an immemorial despot the flag which stood for rescue

and for freedom?790

The Chinese crisis continued to animate post-election debates over the expanding regular army. On December 6, 1900, Congressman John J. Fitzgerald (D-NY) supported a slight increase of the standing army by admitting that “Puerto Rico and Cuba, the Philippine Islands, and, perhaps, the situation in China for many years will require the presence of American

790 Speech at Helena, MT, September 17, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Reel 417. 221 troops.” 791 More than a month later, Senator William V. Allen (P-NE) argued that “the condition in the Philippine Islands and the condition existing in China…does not require any more troops and is not likely to require any more.” He also referred to the de facto state of war between the United States and China to demonstrate how a president, by expanding the regular army, could circumvent Congress in launching a war.792 On February 7, 1901, Congressman

Robert Adams Jr. (R-PA) elaborated on the increasing American involvement in international diplomacy, including the assertion of the Open-Door policy in China, and then stated that “our country must equip itself, and get itself ready to occupy that position…We must have an Army sufficient in size not only to protect our interests at home, but to garrison and protect our possessions abroad until they are in a position to take care of themselves.”793

Last but not least, imperialists and anti-imperialists clashed over the involvement of

American troops in the allied atrocities in China. As seen above, there was widespread coverage of the allied brutalities in this campaign. Critics in the United States railed against the veneer of civilization and the inherent human propensity to the use of violence, while the McKinley administration stuck to the American restraint from plunder as its defense.

Washington D.C was anxious to discern American innocence in the looting in light of extensive newspaper coverage of the event. On July 21, Army Adjutant General Corbin sent the following message to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Coolidge through U.S. Consul in Yantai

John Fowler: “Reported here extensive looting in Tianjin. Report immediately whether

American troops took part. If so, punish severely; repress sternly. Absolute regard for life and

791 56 Congress, 2nd session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, December 6, 1900, p.29. 792 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, January 16, 1900, pp.1070-2. 793 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, February 7, 1901, pp.2108-10. 222 property of noncombatants enjoined.”794 Admiral George C. Remey and Colonel Coolidge’s replies asserted American innocence. Admiral Remey stated, “my obtainable information clears Marines of any imputation [of] burning houses or looting Tianjin.”795 The Department of Navy released this part of his report to the public the following day.796 Three days later,

President McKinley received a July 25 telegraph from Colonel Coolidge asserting “looting by

American troops [in the] walled city Tianjin [is] unfounded and denied. Silver taken from burned mint under direction Meade commanding…American troops have orders to protect life and property non-combatants in American southeast quarter city assigned to them.”797

The desire to see American troops absolved from criminal behavior surfaced again after allied forces occupied Beijing and reports about the plunder poured in. As The Idaho Daily

Statesman put it, “if there is to be freebooting, let it be confined to the troops of other powers; we did not go there with any robber[ing] purpose and our representatives should see that the nation is not disgraced by any of its men.”798 Most early reports did distinguish between

American forces adhering to strict orders and other troops participating in looting, and provided details about their discipline. For instance, The Sun (Baltimore) described that “General

Chaffee stationed a guard around the historic temple outside the wall [in Tongzhou], forbidding his troops to enter.”799

Imperialists reveled in the innocence of American troops amidst chaos and temptation. In

794 Corbin to Fowler, Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900, Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army, Part 7, p. 10. 795 Remey to Bureau of Navigation, July 24, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 796“No Improvement in Chinese Situation.” The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, July 27, 1900, p. 1. 797 Benjamin F. Montgomery to George B. Cortelyou, July 29, 1900, William McKinley Papers, series 1, reel. 11. 798 Idaho Daily Statesman, Boise, Idaho, August 26, 1900, p.2. 799 “Allies Act like Savages”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, September 3, 1900, p.1. 223 their eyes, this performance further validated the United States as a responsible rising power in comparison with corrupt European and Oriental empires. After lauding American troops for not participating in either looting or the burning of Duliu, a reporter from The Boston Daily

Advertiser stated that General Chaffee’s influence in the allied generals’ meeting increased by

“being the leader of a body of men who have distinguished themselves not only in the face of the enemy, but equally so as against the temptation that exist in a city like Pekin under existing conditions.”800

Some imperialists used evidence of American discipline in China to refute the accusations by anti-imperialists of U.S. atrocities in the Philippines. According to Weekly News, “the world is just now complimenting the United States upon the discipline, good character, ability, and good behavior of American soldiers in China,” and they were “the same kind of soldiers this country has in the Philippines.” As a result, it accused anti-imperialists’ uproar on the occupation of the Philippines as “mere political rot.”801

Upholding the unsullied reputation of U.S. troops was not simply a matter of the country’s image on the world stage, but also helped justify maintaining American rule in the Philippines.

Imperialists like Senator Knute Nelson (R-MN) had been painting Filipinos under Aguinaldo as an ill-disciplined mob that would “burn, sack, and loot Manila, and slaughter all foreigners in the city,” and traced the origins of the Philippine-American War to these Filipinos’ unfulfilled designs in this aspect. By invoking an implied analogy with the Boxers in China, these imperialists insisted that the United States should station troops in the Philippines to maintain

800 “The Fall of Tilui”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, October 16, 1900, p. 1. 801 “Corruption in the Philippines”, Weekly News, Aberdeen, SD, October 25, 1900, p. 2. 224 order. 802 Obviously, a looting American force did not have the moral high ground over

Filipinos accused of committing the same crime.

By contrast, examples from well-managed American zones of occupation in China proved the U.S. capacity to run the Philippines. Frank Leslie’s Weekly printed reporter Sydney

Adamson’s photos of Chinese people presenting the umbrella, the item that grateful Chinese people gave officials they deemed honorable and impartial, to U.S. forces, and the caption appearing underneath these pictures read “A Peculiar Chinese Demonstration in America’s

Honor.” Below them was a photo of General Chaffee with the caption “the Commander of

Uncle Sam’s Forces Proving that America Can Properly Govern Oriental People.” In an article on the next page, editor Guy Morrison Walker, son of a missionary in China, made the same point. At the end of the article, he wrote that “with such a record made in China, from which our troops are withdrawing with so much credit, Americans are certainly entitled to expect the best results from our control in the Philippines and elsewhere. There is little comfort for anti- imperialists in this Chinese petition.”803

Some anti-imperialists tried to debunk racial stereotypes of Filipinos with the help of events in China. The Springfield Republican asked: “the ‘savage’ Filipinos did not loot IIoilo after they had taken it from the Spaniards…Over there in Pekin, however, the allied forces of civilization…proceed to loot ‘systematically.’ What is civilization anyway?” 804 As Carl

Schurz told the crowd at a meeting of the New York Anti-imperialist League:

802 “Our Policy Right”, American Citizen, Kansas City, KS, September 28, 1900, p.4. 803 Frank Leslie’s Weekly, New York, April 6, 1901, pp.331-2. 804 The Springfield Republican, Springfield, MA, August 26, 1900, p.8. 225

It is said that if we withdraw our forces from the Philippines, the Filipinos would at once

drop into anarchy, loot their cities and cut one another’s throat. What evidence is there to

support this slanderous assumption? None. They have carried on their war humanely, far

more humanely than some European troops have carried on their war in China.805

Like Schurz, some other anti-imperialists also utilized the allied atrocities in China to cast doubt on the McKinley administration’s Philippines policy without condemning the American forces in China. As Atkinson stated in a lay sermon at the Third Universalist Church, “thank

God that the efforts of this country have been exerted to the utmost to alleviate the horrors of this war and that on the whole the English-speaking troops have shared in least measure, and, so far as their officers could possibly control them, have been free from the stain which can never be wiped out from the record of other nations.” He then underlined that “this necessary and logical outcome of militarism and of war” should convince people to join anti-imperialists in preventing “the enlistment of troops or the contribution of money toward any further criminal aggression upon the people of other states and other races,” and reversing the nation’s inevitable course towards doom.806 He meant what he said, as he sent this part of the speech to Senator Hoar, and twice urged the latter to read E.J. Dillon’s article in The Contemporary

Review from which he learned about the allied atrocities in China.807

Other anti-imperialists did not buy into tales of American exceptionalism when it came to plunder. On September 9, 1900, The New York Sun published its correspondent’s letter on the

805 “Empire and Money”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, September 29, 1900, p.2. 806 “A Lay Sermon by Edward Atkinson,” Cambridge Chronicle, Cambridge, MA, February 16, 1901, p.10. 807 Edward Atkinson to Senator Hoar, January 29, 1901, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 81; Edward Atkinson to Senator Hoar, February 4, 1901, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 82. 226 situation in Tianjin after the city’s fall. It portrayed a diversity of people, including Americans, flocking to pillage a pawnshop, and described three Americans and an Englishman commandeering five rickshaws “loaded down with boxes full of furs and silks and fancy loot.”808 The Springfield Daily Republican seized on this story and reprinted it with the title highlighting “English and Americans in it.”809 Although the New York Sun’s reporter did not specify whether the Americans involved were civilians or soldiers, it still cast doubt and suspicion on U.S. troops in Tianjin.

The seizure of related items aboard a U.S. hospital ship around this time provided anti- imperialists with material proof for their claims. The hospital ship Solace left China after the fall of Tianjin and arrived at San Francisco on September 14, 1900. Custom officials in San

Francisco located “a big quantity of dutiable goods,” including “all sorts of silks and other fancy stuffs.” These goods occupied 154 cases in total. Various American newspapers reprinted the story and regarded it as the evidence of U.S. servicemen’s involvement in looting in

Tianjin.810 As The Daily Picayune suggested, “there seems to be reason to fear that American troops, though not as active in this respect as most of the other foreign troops, have, nevertheless, been guilty of plundering the vanquished.” 811 The Age-Herald urged the

McKinley administration to send these articles back to China, since “the pillaging of a city is a violation of the international law as to private property in war. Only barbarous nations of the

808 “The Looting of Tientsin”, The New York Sun, New York, NY, September 9, 1900, p.8. 809 “How Tien-tsin was Sacked”, The Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, September 10, 1900, p.7. 810 “Bear Evidence of Looting”, Morning World Herald, Omaha, NE, September 19, 1900, p.1; “Did Americans Loot?” St. Louis Republic, St.Louis, MO, September 19, 1900, p.3; “It was such rare loot, too”, The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, September 20, 1900, p.1; “Chinese Loot on the Solace”, Springfield Daily Republican, Springfield, MA, September 21, 1900, p.7; “Loot from China”, Aberdeen Daily News, Aberdeen, SD, September 22, 1900, p.1. 811 “Looting in China”, The Daily Picayune, New Orleans, LA, September 25, 1900, p.4. 227

Russian sort now rob individuals of property not needed in war operations.”812 In other words, the United States would sink to the level of Russia, a country Americans deemed as semi- civilized at best, if it failed to return pillaged articles.

Nevertheless, such incidents were still not substantial enough to directly prove American participation at looting. One could argue that American servicemen purchased these items from other participating troops and Chinese who actually plundered. For example, in his diary entry for September 10, 1900, Lieutenant Rhodes mentioned riding down to the nearby Russian camp in Yangcun with Lieutenant Dean to buy “a few curios.”813 As The Boston Daily Advertiser observed, “it would require some astounding evidence to bring the American people to believe any such tale” of U.S. looting.814 Admittedly, there were widespread reports about American troops taking possession of Chinese government bullion in Tianjin. Yet War Department officials insisted that this was “not exactly looting,” even though it occurred without an official declaration of war.815

Under these circumstances, soldiers’ correspondence became important for revealing their role in looting. Newspapers scrambled to publish these letters either to satisfy the public’s appetite for adventurous stories or condemn U.S. servicemen’s behavior in China. A marine wrote about his gain in a letter to his brother who served as a clerk in an executive department:

There is any amount of silver here. I got a few nuggets left: weigh about three ounces. I

have had bricks that weighed five pounds---all of us have---I mean marines only, as we

812 “Plundering Chinese Cities,” The Age-Herald, Birmingham, AL, September 27, 1900, p.4. 813 “A Diary of First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, 6th U.S. Cavalry in the China Relief Expedition (Boxer War) of the Year 1900”, p.14. 814 “The Discordant Loot”, Boston Daily Advertiser, Boston, MA, October 16, 1900, p.4. 815 “It was not Looting”, St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, October 16, 1900, p.12. 228

were the only Americans in the walled city when they blow the banks and vaults the day

the city was taken…I had several nice watches; got rid of them…I am sleeping on furs that

cost thousands of dollars each. There are lots of good ones yet, but we have no way of

sending them to the States...816

Even though the writer might have exaggerated the spoils in Tianjin, this account generally seemed convincing in the context of previous coverage of U.S. troops’ living environments in this city. The Associated Press claimed that “high officers had lived there and in flight had left stacks of clothing and other articles of great value…The Americans seized bearly [sic] a million taels worth of precious metals, which is piled up in the marine barracks.”817 Even the Army and Navy Journal printed this coverage, which further enhanced the story’s credibility.818 This marine would describe in the same letter the joint forces’ plunder en route to Beijing, Americans included: “We are not allowed to loot, but you know the rest.”819

As time passed, additional coverage and correspondence arrived and pointed at American complicity in looting. As Lieutenant Pressley Brice of the Fourteenth Infantry described, “the

Americans did not know how to loot, but still some of them have become fabulously rich. The officers and men have trunks full of silks, furs, silver and gold and it makes my mouth water to think I got in too late for the spoils.”820 According to marine William W. Wyatt, they “had money to burn” in Tianjin, and he sold twelve silver bricks for $60 each. 821 The Dallas

816 “Treasure Too Heavy to Carry”, The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, October 5, 1900, p.6. 817 “Grand Rush for Plunder”, The Minneapolis Journal, Minneapolis, MN, August 29, 1900, p.1. 818 “The Looting of Tien-Tsin,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.7. 819 “Treasure too Heavy to Carry,” The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, October 5, 1900, p.6. 820 “The Civilizing of The Heathen Chinese”, The State, Columbia, SC, November 23, 1900, p.5. 821 “He Fought in China”, The Sun, Baltimore, MD, January 7, 1901, p.10. 229

Morning News published the news of two American soldiers facing trial in Beijing for demanding money from villagers.822

Imperialists and the McKinley administration clung to shining American examples of virtue, and stonewalled the call for an investigation in order to counter the attack by anti- imperialists. After reading a newspaper piece on a heated exchange between General Chaffee and Marshal Waldersee, Congressman David de Armond (D-MO) introduced a resolution in the House to demand information from Secretary Root about this incident. He was especially interested in “what, if any, protest, objection, criticism, or suggestion General Chaffee or any other American officer in China made or offered concerning looting or other action or conduct deemed inhuman, dishonest, dishonorable, or improper; to whom directed or addressed.”

Secretary Root replied that he did not see fit to make any public statement on the issue as it was “so intimately connected with the diplomatic relations and negotiations concerning the critical and delicate conditions now existing in China.” In response to this, Congressman de

Armond emphasized that General Chaffee’s protest “indicated that the responsibility for the barbarity and dishonesty prevailing to a large extent in that unhappy country at this time does not rest with the American commander or the American soldiers.” He then agreed to table the resolution.823

Such tactics did work to influence some anti-imperialists’ opinions about the role of

American servicemen in looting. In February, 1901, Mark Twain published an article titled “to the person sitting in darkness.” While lambasting U.S. missionaries and other forces’ acts of plunder like stealing the ancient astronomical instruments, “looting like common bandits,” and

822 “Court-Martial in China”, The Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, January 30, 1901, p.6. 823 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, January 16, 1901, p.1082. 230

“storm[ing] frightened villages and cable[ing] the result to glad journals at home every day,” he twice emphasized that American servicemen abstained from these deeds in China. The fact that he pointed to American soldiers’ cruelty in the Philippines further proved that Twain sincerely believed in their innocence in China.824

Other anti-imperialists and Democrats wasted no time bringing up instances of looting.

On the House floor, Congressman Charles F. Cochran (D-MO) mentioned “the invasion of

China by the allied armies of Europe and America,” and asked the clerk to read an article on looting in which the author indicated that “our soldiers were nearly as successful as the others … although they were more discreet.” He emphasized that this depiction was “in line with similar revelations made by letters from private soldiers who took part in the Beijing campaign which have appeared in the newspapers,” then posed questions about both the U.S. relation with China (peace or war) and American soldiers learning from European counterpart the habit of looting.825

American newspapers paid tribute to U.S. servicemen’s valor and sacrifice with tropes well in line with contemporary norms of heroism and dedication. These norms emerged during previous American wars, especially the U.S.-Mexico War and the Civil War. This framework left little space for the contributions of women at war, especially the anxiety they lived with as well as the nursing service they performed. Meanwhile, newspapers touting American servicemen’s shining records in the China Relief Expedition and its relationship with

America’s expanding role in world affairs became part of larger contemporary debates over the

824 “To the Person Sitting in Darkness,” North American Review, February, 1901, pp.162-8, 174. 825 56 Congress, 2nd session, Appendix to the Congressional Record, February 13, 1901, pp. 250-1. 231

China Relief Expedition. Imperialists and anti-imperialists continued to have heated exchanges over presidential power, the purpose and policies of the U.S. in China, and the discipline of

American servicemen even after allied forces rescued the besieged internationals in Beijing. In this process, both sides repeatedly drew parallels to the Philippine-American War, reiterating each side’s transnational vision of the imperialist debate.

232

Epilogue

It is nearly impossible to gauge how the China Relief Expedition influenced the outcome of the 1900 Presidential Election at a time when exit polls did not exist. For many, it did not matter at all, since “the people at large take but a languid interest in the question of imperialism.”826 Even for some devoted to the anti-imperialist cause, domestic issues took priority. They thought it ironic for some Democrats embedded in machine politics to attack imperialism as endangering the country’s future. As Charles Francis Adams Jr. complained to

Carl Schurz, it was “grotesque, as well as painful, in seeing a man like your Mr.

Shepard…craning his neck to see signs affecting our political future below the horizon and on the coast of Asia, when, right there in New York…he found it necessary in so doing to put on the Tammany collar.”827 Colorado Gold Democrat Louis R. Ehrich also thought that Bryan was defeated “because he was staggering under the weight of a corpse.” He then pointed to the example of his classmate John Randolph Thayer who got elected to Congress from Worcester,

Massachusetts as “a Democrat, on a Gold Standard, Anti-Imperialist platform” in a district that

“gave McKinley 6400 majority.”828 Indeed, the Silver Standard had less appeal as the economy gradually recovered from the Panic of 1893.

On the whole, though, this expedition might still come as a gift to a McKinley administration mired in controversies around the issue of imperialism. To defeat McKinley,

Bryan had to win over some if not most independents. The anti-imperialist movement had some

826 Everett V. Abbot to Carl Schurz, October 5, 1900, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 69. 827 Charles Francis Adams to Carl Schurz, November 7, 1900, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 69. 828 Louis R. Ehrich to Carl Schurz, November 26, 1900, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 70. 233 appeal among them. As Roosevelt wrote in mid-August, “there is disaffection among the independents of the lunatic class under the lead of Carl Schurz, the Evening Post, etc.”829

Yet for some of these independents, the Chinese incident underlined the Philippines’ importance for safeguarding American interests in China. As a certain T. J. Williams wrote to

Secretary Long, “only the people opposed to everything and who propose nothing, will complain” about the U.S. holding the Philippines. “Our possessions will make not only our own subjects but all the besieged family, more safe. We shall not be found unprepared, as this uprising has found all nations.”830 For others, although they “greatly regret[ted]” or even felt

“disgusted” about the situation regarding overseas possessions, they did not have confidence that “Bryan would be able to do anything to put us in better position.”831

The McKinley administration’s satisfactory handling of the Chinese situation so far might further convince them. China expert John Barrett wrote in a letter to President McKinley’s personal secretary George B. Cortelyou that “the President’s successful policy in China is a factor in this campaign, and is being appreciated by the voters irrespective of party.”832 In an

October 12 campaign speech in Concord, Massachusetts, Senator Hoar mentioned President

Lincoln’s 1864 warning about switching horses when crossing a stream, and added that “it does not seem to me to be a very good time to swap horses now, while we are crossing the tempestuous Chinese sea in a typhoon.” In another speech in Springfield a few days before the election, Senator Hoar further asserted that “I like what they are doing and what they have done.

I want to see the Chinese question settled along those lines. It will be settled along those lines

829 Roosevelt to Mrs. W. S. Cowles, August 18, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt papers, Series 2, Reel 324. 830 T. J. Williams to Secretary Long, July 16, 1900, John Davis Long papers, Box 56. 831 Franklin Carter to Herbert Welsh, October 2, 1900, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 69; R. Fulton Cutting to Herbert Welsh, October 2, 1900, ibid. 832 John Barrett to Cortelyou, September 3, 1900, William McKinley papers, Reel 12. 234 long before any Democratic promise as to the Philippines will ripen.”833 As U.S. Consulate

General in Berlin Frank Mason of Ohio stated in his letter to Secretary Root, from this distance,

“the masterly diplomacy of the Administration in the Chinese affair” seemed to “have been the most potent elements in deciding the result” together with McKinley’s letter of acceptance and

Secretary Root’s speech at Canton, Ohio.834

Besides, the American lives at stake in China left no room for bickering. As Congressman

Hull (R-IA) wrote to Secretary Root, “if they [Democrats] tried to hamper the action of the government in maintaining our proper place among other powers in showing that we have manhood enough to punish outrages upon our citizenship, the national feeling…would sweep them off of the face of the earth as a party.”835

Some Democrats held similar views of the issue. Writing to William Jennings Bryan at the end of June, when the Chinese situation was still evolving, Missouri Democrat William J.

Stone assumed that “all will favor the protection of our representatives in China and the protection of our legitimate and proper interest in that empire.” If the Bryan campaign should make any announcements on the issue, it should be “in favor of maintaining the integrity of the empire.”836 After at first refusing to comment on the Chinese situation, Bryan stated that he had no doubt that the McKinley administration would “protect the lives and property of

American citizens residing in China,” and hoped that it would adhere to the “American policy of justice and fair dealing” that would “set an example to other nations.”837 His role as the

833 Concord Speech, October 12, 1900, George F. Hoar papers, Carton 106; Speech on McKinley, unknown date, ibid. 834 Frank Mason to Root, November 10, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 11. 835 John Hull to Root, July 16, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 10. 836 William J. Stone to William J. Bryan, June 25, 1900, William J. Bryan papers, Box 24, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 837 “Bryan Mute on China”, The Grand Rapids Herald, Grand Rapids, MI, July 19, 1900, p.1; “Government’s 235

Democratic presidential nominee forced him to tiptoe around the thorny Chinese issue by toning down his outright criticism of the administration while hinting at a possible partition of

China.

Unfortunately for him, by the eve of the election, the McKinley administration had delivered on both points. Allied forces had long since relieved the Boxers’ siege of internationals in Tianjin and Beijing. While the United States still maintained an occupation force in China, the bulk of participating U.S. troops had been redeployed to the Philippines.

Senator Hoar spoke in a campaign rally at Northampton on October 18 that “when anybody tells me that you should not haul down the American flag, I say that you have just hauled it down in Beijing and that you are going to haul it down in Cuba.”838 In a letter to Secretary

Root a few days before the election, Dr. Thomas Foster of Washington D.C. mentioned that

“now we are out of China.”839 These examples illustrated the redeployment’s impression on

McKinley supporters as if all American troops in China had withdrawn.

Despite the odds against them, anti-imperialists chose to continue pummeling the issue of imperialism, including America’s involvement in China. For some, there was a glimmer of hope that this message would tip the scale in their favor. As the Chicago counselor at law Morris

St. P. Thomas assured Bryan after the Democratic National Convention, “the anti-imperialistic plank in the Kansas City platform will attract a great many voters who were against you four years ago.”840 In voicing his opposition to an extra session of Congress for the authorization of force, Secretary Long predicted that such a meeting would descend into bitter debates with

Duty Outlined by Bryan”, The St. Louis Republic, St. Louis, MO, July 21, 1900, p.3. 838 “Big Ovation for Hoar,” Springfield Republican, Springfield, MA, October 19, 1900, p.3. 839 Thomas Foster to Root, October 31, 1900, Elihu Root papers, Box 9. 840 Morris St. P. Thomas to William J. Bryan, July 7, 1900, William J. Bryan papers, Box 24. 236 eyes on partisan gains in the election year. And a declaration of war would “give encouragement to the idea that the administration is in the interest of militarism and imperialism,” and “divert attention from the currency question” that he viewed as a weak point for the Democrats.841 Senator Hale held the same view. “If we are drawn into another war with the assumption that it is with British influence, we shall be very much hurt.”842

For other anti-imperialists, their efforts carried the seed for a future movement. As Everett

V. Abbot wrote to Carl Schurz, “we must not blind our eyes to the long-drawn tediousness and delays of the struggle before us, and above all we must not think that the result of the next election will be decisive or even that it will profoundly affect the situation.” What comforted anti-imperialists was that “whatever the people may think now, the issue of imperialism will not be suppressed. On the contrary for years to come it will disturb their comfortable dreams.”843 Similarly, on the night before the election, Carl Schurz admitted to Charles Francis

Adams Jr. that he participated in the Bryan campaign for “educational purposes,” knowing that

Bryan had little chance of success.844 In his reply to this letter, while disagreeing with anti- imperialists’ obsession with imperialism at the expense of other issues, Adams observed that

“in the case of our Republic, time, and sustained effort, are of the essence of the solution of every considerable problem…as respects Imperialism, I believe the country has got to go through its experience, and get its lesson.”845

Looking to the future, anti-imperialists stuck to their message even after the election. On

December 5, 1900, Congressman Samuel W. McCall (R-MA) rose on the House floor and

841 Secretary Long to Mrs. John D. Long, July 17, 1900, John Davis Long papers, Vol.83, p.400. 842 Senator Hale to Secretary Long, July 19, 1900, John Davis Long papers, Box 56. 843 Everett V. Abbot to Carl Schurz, October 5, 1900, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 69. 844 Carl Schurz to Charles Francis Adams Jr., November 5, 1900, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 69. 845 Charles Francis Adams to Carl Schurz, November 7, 1900, Carl Schurz papers, Reel 69. 237 argued for maintaining just a coaling station in the Philippines. Referring to the China Relief

Expedition, he stated that “the attention of our 65,000 men seems to have been so thoroughly engrossed with the internal affairs of those islands that it was only after a considerable time and most painful efforts that a few thousand men were available for the movement in China.”846

On February 27, 1901, Senator Bacon accused Congress of meekly standing by while the war and negotiation with China were unfolding.847 As late as 1904, in a July 4 speech in Tammany

Hall, New York, Boutwell still charged that “in President McKinley’s Administration we entered upon the territory of China by an army of invasion…and advanced to and took possession of the capital of the Chinese Empire…After considerable delay and after many outrages had been perpetrated by the allied forces and when it was apparent that the covert purpose of seizing portions of the Chinese Empire could not be realized the armies withdrew.”848

Apart from possibly influencing the outcome of the 1900 Presidential Election, the China

Relief Expedition also helped shape the ensuing campaign in the Philippines as well as

American debates over war in that archipelago. In preparation for his new assignment as the military commander in the Philippines, General Chaffee had conversations with officers who had served in the archipelago, and got the impression that “the average Filipino’s heart appears to be of a dark hue.” He reflected that “as a nation we have not had to deal with people of this character, except perhaps as found among our North American Indian population.” His interaction with “personas thoroughly acquainted with the Oriental character” in China only

846 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, December 5, 1900, p.77. 847 56 Congress, 2nd session, Congressional Record, February 27, 1901, pp.3116-7. 848 “The Crime of Imperialism in America,” in George S. Boutwell papers II, 1853-1905, Massachusetts Historical Society. 238 enhanced these racist stereotypes:

Murder is almost a natural instinct with the Asiatic, who respects only the power of might,

backed up by a tangible display of strength. Human life all over the East is cheap. One life

more or less does not matter, and it is only the fear of prompt, immediate and unfailing

punishment that holds the population in check. Let that fear be dissipated even for the

shortest and robbers, bandits and murders abound, often banded together by certain ties of

secret bondage.849

Clearly the Boxer Uprising contributed to the prejudices that General Chaffee projected onto Filipinos. Admittedly, by underlining these traits, General Chaffee might seek to oppose the establishment of the civil government in the Philippines that would roll back the military authority. These words still illuminated his perception of people in Asia. A conversation with

Japanese officers about their experiences in Taiwan, an island Japan took from China after the

Sino-Japanese War, further illuminated the difficult task ahead. As General Chaffee wrote, “it has taken a great deal of killing and a long time to put the devil underneath [in Taiwan]. I fear the case is not so very different for our government in the Philippines.”850

In the Philippines, General Chaffee would command a large American army, including his old units in China. These regiments maintained many veterans of the China Relief Expedition.

As mentioned above, the Fourteenth Infantry and elements of the Sixth Cavalry had been redeployed to the Philippines back in November, 1900. There Lieutenant Rhodes and his unit

849 Chaffee to Root, April 16, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Box 15, Manuscript Division, The Library of Congress. 850 Carter, The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee, p.240. 239 devoted a lot of their time to dealing with sniping, patrolling roads, surprising Filipino insurgents’ strongholds, capturing rebels as well as hidden arms, and burning down cuartels.

Such work closely resembled duty in China. The main difference was one of intensity, as U.S. troops in the Philippines engaged in waterboarding to attain information.851 The rest of the

American forces withdrew from China in early June, 1901, and joined the fight in the

Philippines.

Among these veterans of the China Relief Expedition was Company C, Ninth Infantry.

On the morning of September 28, 1901, when most of them were having breakfast without their weapons, Filipinos who they held for labor suddenly rioted and attacked the whole company. Only about 29 of the 75 American servicemen escaped the scene. Lieutenant Edward

Bumpus was killed in his room in the officers’ quarters. His body was then mutilated.852

In retaliation for the massacre, and in an attempt to exterminate insurgents on Samar Island,

American forces soon embarked on expeditions on the island. Among them was a marine contingent commanded by Major Waller. He issued an order to subordinates that “the whole country between the points named must be cleared of the treacherous enemy, and the expeditions, in a way, are to be punitive.” Major Waller concluded this order by stating that

“we have also to avenge our late comrades in North China, the murdered men of the Ninth U.S.

Infantry.”853 This demonstrates that the shared experience of fighting in China mattered to him.

851 “Diary of the Philippines Insurrection,” in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Charles D. Rhodes, Diary Note of a Soldier. 852 Captain Bookmiller to Adjutant General, Department of the Visayas, October 1, 1901, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1902, vol.9 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pp.626-7; General Order, No.22, October 11, 1901, in ibid., p.630. 853 Waller’s order, October 23, 1901, in Court Martial of Major Littleton W. T. Waller, RG 153, Entry 15, Case No.30313. 240

During the expedition, they found some equipment and “many relics” of the Ninth Infantry.854

This could only further enflame their desire for revenge. Lacking rations on one of the marches and after growing suspicious of native porters’ behaviors, Major Waller ordered eleven of them shot without trial. This led to his court martial.

During his court martial, Major Waller brought up precedents established in China in his defense. First, he claimed expert knowledge of the laws of war through extensive service, especially during the China Relief Expedition. As he put it, “I have been twenty-three years in the service; I have served with almost every army in the world; and I know the laws of war.”

Later, Major Waller went into specifies by comparing the Chinese Boxers to Filipino insurgents in their treatment of the dead. “In the campaign in North China in 1900 the Chinese mutilated our dead and such few prisoners as they captured they tortured to death.” Such a phenomenon paved the way for the ensuing allied retaliation that closely resembled what he did in the

Philippines:

Whenever a “boxer” or fanatic was captured either in the European concessions or outside,

he was brought in and executed without referring the matter to the Commander-in-Chief.

This was true with every nation represented in the Allied Forces…as no protest was made

I have every right to believe that they were approved as far as our forces were concerned.855

854 Waller to the Brigadier General Commanding First District, October 31, 1901, in Annual Reports of the War Department, 1902, vol.9, p.439; Waller to the Adjutant General, Sixth Brigade, November 12, 1901, in ibid., p.441. 855 Court Martial of Major Littleton W. T. Waller, RG 153, Entry 15, Case No.30313. For a overview of the Waller court martial case, see Christopher Thomas Dean, “Atrocity on Trial: The Court-Martial of Littleton Waller,” MA thesis, Arizona State University, 2009. 241

Reports of the Samar campaign sparked a new wave of debates about American actions in the Philippines. Anti-imperialist senators pointed their fingers at the high kill/wounded ratio as well as harsh orders outlawing neutrality and treating all Filipinos as the enemy unless he or she proved their loyalty by inflicting harm to the insurgents. They also frowned upon the latitude that subordinate officers enjoyed in persecuting the war by any means they deemed fit, including abandoning the rules of civilized warfare and executing a prisoner of war chosen by lot in places where insurgents murdered unarmed American soldiers or friendly Filipinos.856

In the midst of a speech on these points, Senator Joseph Lafayette Rawlins (D-UT) highlighted

General Chaffee’s instructions to General Robert P. Hughes in the aftermath of the Balangiga massacre. It included the following phrases:

it is necessary that we be stern and inflexible…There is one thing necessary, and that is the

wholesome fear by these people of the Army, and that every hostile motion of any

inhabitant toward the troops will be quickly and severely punished…

I have all the time thought that we do not appreciate the fact that we are dealing with a

class of people whose character is deceitful, who are absolutely hostile to the white race,

and who regard life as of little value, and, finally, who will not submit to our control until

absolutely defeated and whipped into such a condition.857

The connection with the China Relief Expedition again came to light in this case. General

856 57 Congress, 1st session, Congressional Record, April 24, 1902, pp.4616-21. 857 Ibid., p.4618. 242

Chaffee’s instruction resonated with his previously mentioned assessment of the “Oriental character” while he was in China. In fact, after reading other similar stern orders from General

J. Franklin Bell, Senator Rawlins suspected that they might come from General Chaffee “who received his education in savagery and in cruelty and in barbarity over in China.” He then elaborated on how allied forces “took little children and brained them upon posts, threw them into rivers, and slaughtered and persecuted without mercy and without limit helpless women.”

As Senator Rawlins saw it, it was after General Chaffee “who had received that training” replaced General MacArthur that “this diabolical programme seems to have been adopted and carried out in all its hideousness and rigor.”858

Republican senators spared no efforts in rebutting these allegations by underlining the U.S. army’s shining record, including in China. Senator Lodge elaborated on General Chaffee’s service record, pointing out that “the entire world bore witness to the conduct of the American troops in that campaign.” His examples included General Chaffee’s declaration of his intention to lead the American forces to Beijing amidst the allied debate over whether to wait for the arrival of German troops, his report on the maintenance of strict U.S. military discipline in

China, and his protest against the German removal of the Chinese observatory.859 Senator

Joseph R. Burton (R-KS) highlighted the successful relief of the besieged internationals in

Beijing, which was “one of the brightest pages in the history of modern warfare.” General

Chaffee’s patriotic service to the country guaranteed that “the warfare that we have been carrying on in suppressing this insurrection has not been attended with any more cruelty than

858 Ibid., p.4622. 859 57 Congress, 1st session, Congressional Record, May 5, 1902, pp.5033-4. 243 was absolutely necessary.”860 Senator Joseph B. Foraker (R-OH) echoed Senator Lodge’s thoughts by decrying those accusations as “an assault upon the character, as a man and a soldier, of General Chaffee” and the U.S. army at large.861 Even Democratic Senator Bacon recognized

General Chaffee’s admirable performance in China when “other armies and the officers of other armies disgraced civilization by the rioting and the looting and the massacring of the

Chinese people.” Senator Albert J. Beveridge (R-IN) took this opportunity to add that Senator

Bacon disagreed with Senator Rawlins on the issue that “General Chaffee was schooled in savagery in China.”862

Far away from Congress, diverging receptions of Major Waller also revealed different perceptions by the public of war in the Philippines and China. In a letter to Moorfield Storey,

Herbert Welsh elaborated on packages Waller sent home. The lady providing the information indicated that it required ten wagons to load and consisted of “valuable furs, silks, bronzes, jewels.” If this was true, “doubtless the Chinese minister would be justified in making a demand on our government for its restitution.” Ironically, the people in Norfolk “are about to give him a reception and to present him with a sword, considering that he had been persecuted by the government in putting him on trial.”863

The transnational nature of the China Relief Expedition caused further ripples in the

American armed forces as a whole. Officers reflected upon how the American armed forces could benefit from serving side by side with other troops. Observing other forces in China opened up General Chaffee to a better understanding of U.S. servicemen’s standing in the world.

860 57 Congress, 1st session, Congressional Record, May 8, 1902, p.5153. 861 57 Congress, 1st session, Congressional Record, May 12, 1902, p.5299. 862 57 Congress, 1st session, Congressional Record, May 20, 1902, p.5678. 863 Herbert Welsh to Moorfield Storey, May 1902, Moorfield Storey papers, Box 1, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 244

“We are the most slouchy soldiers in the world. We may believe that we can fight without much form or getting the heels together with frequency, but all the same, every prescribed form and motion is an aid to discipline, and should be insisted on everywhere. Of this I am convinced more than ever before in my life by my observations here.”864 Soon after arriving in the

Philippines, General Chaffee issued an order on maintaining neatness of dress. The Evening

News suspected that this originated from his experience in China, and advocated increasing the number of military attaches abroad in order to better observe other forces.865

General Chaffee was not alone in sensing the urgent need for reform after his experience in China. According to the Army and Navy Journal, after reviewing U.S. forces in the

Philippines, the Army Inspector General Joseph C. Breckinridge would proceed to China and

“especially examine into the management and discipline of the foreign remnant of the allied armies, with a view to getting information which will prove useful to our War Department.”

The author surmised that this move resulted from reports drafted by officers while in China showing that America’s army “does not compare favorably with the armies of Europe in matters pertaining to clothing, discipline and such details.”866

U.S. officers also used their experience in China to advocate for reforms on specific topics.

Organizing native troops in the Philippines was one example. Captain Rhodes wrote on the topic in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States. While expressing his pride in the amazement of other troops over how comprehensive American supplies were in China, he recognized the great expense such arrangement incurred, and pointed to Japanese

864 Chaffee to Root, April 16, 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Box 15, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 865 “Military Comparison,” The Evening News, San Jose, CA, August 19, 1901, p.4. 866 “Our Present Army,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.1188. 245 forces in China, whose simple ration consisting of rice and fish resulted in a streamlined supply system and smooth movement. In Captain Rhodes’ mind, feeding on the identical ration,

Filipino troops could replicate the excellent Japanese marches in China. What’s more, his observation of British Indian troops’ efficiency in China further enhanced Captain Rhodes’ confidence about native forces, even though the perceived flaws in the Filipino character rendered their recruitment and organization be a gradual process. As he saw it, different races in British Indian troops, like the Punjabs, Sikhs, Bengalis, and Beluchistans, mingled with each other well in China. The United States could accomplish the same feat in the Philippines.867

The experience gained in China even made its way into various professional platforms of the U.S. armed forces. On July 30 and 31, Captain McCalla lectured on “Some Lessons from the Naval Campaign of June, 1900, in Northern China” at the Naval War College.868 In 1903,

Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant General of the army, chose Reports on Military

Operations in South Africa and China as one of the two books on the China Relief Expedition for West Point cadets who wished to build their own collection of military readings.869 The

October 1905 issue of Journal of the United States Infantry Association reprinted Major Muir’s report on Japanese troops in the China Relief Expedition.870

Apart from sparking further enthusiasm for reforms in the American armed forces, the impression of other forces formed in China also influenced the American perception of different nations around the world. After the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, although the United States remained neutral in this conflict, American newspapers overwhelmingly

867 Captain Rhodes, “The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, Vol. 30, No. 115, January, 1902, pp. 4, 7-9, 18. 868 “Various Naval Items,” Army and Navy Journal, vol.38, p.1190. 869 Journal of the United States Cavalry Association, vol.14, No.49, July, 1903, pp.150, 153. 870 Journal of the United States Infantry Association, Vol.2, No.2, 1905, pp.187-96. 246 preferred Japan to Russia. Part of their argument stemmed from these two countries’ performance in the China Relief Expedition. They reiterated the story of four hundred Russians retreating from the attack and thus leaving Major Waller’s smaller marine detachment to combat overwhelming Chinese forces alone on the way to Tianjin, the Russian attempt to occupy Beijing by itself despite the allied agreement on a joint attack, and the congregation around the city gate that blocked the advance of American troops. Other examples included a high-ranking Russian officer plowing his wagon into the American column.871

American servicemen from the China Relief Expedition added their voices to the newspaper coverage on this topic. Most of the stories mentioned above originated from official reports and Colonel Daggett’s 1903 book America in the China Relief Expedition. Other servicemen recounted their experience with the Russians and Japanese to reporters. Brigadier

General Wint stated that “we found no officers in China better equipped for their work than the officers of Japan. The troops were well provided with all that was necessary for the Chinese campaign, and in the fighting the soldiers of Japan did most effective work.”872 Colonel E. D.

Dravo recalled that in the Battle of Tianjin, the Japanese troops scaled the city wall “before the

Russians had done anything at all.” Consequently, he predicted that “there is no chance for

Russia. She will be driven out of Manchuria.”873

As discussed previously, American servicemen in the China Relief Expedition had mixed feelings about German troops. On the one hand, some detested the German plunder and arrogance. On the other hand, some still had acquittance with them either for social occasions

871 “Russia’s Record in Boxer War”, Lexington Herald, Lexington, KY, June 20, 1905, p.6. 872 “General Wint Discusses Oriental Soldier.” 873 “Permanent Defeat of Russia’s Forces?”, Baltimore American, Baltimore, MD, January 3, 1905, p.4. 247 or out of respect for their professional qualities. Some of these relationships continued into the postwar years. On September 30, 1905, Lieutenant H. W. Boehm of the German army visited

Miles City, Montana during his tour of the United States to meet Captain Anderson, his old acquittance in the China Relief Expedition.874

No matter which group Dr. Seaman belonged to, his trip to the German East Africa filled him with disgust. He viewed German activities there as “licensed murder, plunder, tyranny and crime,” and hoped to invoke a voice of protest “like that of St. Paul’s at Ephesus, or of

Savonarola’s at Florence” that would force Germany to change course. Admittedly, like many of his contemporaries, Dr. Seaman harbored racism towards Africans. According to him, the natives had “lived in equal happiness and contentment” with monkeys “since the Almighty first put them on earth.” And “he sings and dances with all the gusto of the American ‘coon,’ his distant progeny.” Yet Dr. Seaman believed that “nations who invade foreign territory…and who by trickery or might conquer its peoples, assume a heavy responsibility to the world and to civilization for which they should be held strictly accountable.” As a result, he denounced the

Germans for conscripting them into chained gangs for unpaid taxes, and violently suppressing revolts by natives “in whom the love of liberty and freedom still remained.” As a German officer admitted, those who survived the onslaught “were on the verge of starvation owing to the destruction of their villages and their supplies.” Dr. Seaman even argued that the German regime in East Africa “often exceeds in cruelties the most inhuman treatment accorded the negro in the South when slavery was a recognized institution.”

These scenes reminded him of the China Relief Expedition. As Dr. Seaman stated, “to any

874 “German Army Officer Visits in Montana,” The Anaconda Standard, Anaconda, MT, October 1, 1905, p.3. 248 one who witnessed or was present in the Boxer campaign in China in 1900 the narrative of similar butcheries is neither startling nor unexpected.” He accused German troops of launching numerous punitive expeditions into the countryside for murder and looting, even though “there was no more fight left in the Chinese Army than in a warren of rabbits.” Through these actions,

German troops “were then well drilled in the methods followed in Africa.” Any soldier who dared to expose these brutalities received punishment. Dr. Seaman suspected that this practice would repeat itself in Africa. While fascinated with the native troops at the time of the China

Relief Expedition, Dr. Seaman now lambasted Germany for organizing such units, as many of the natives “were cannibals” from other colonies like New Guinea, Somaliland or Kamarun.

He also indicated that the natives’ inability to withstand the sheer German force rendered it unnecessary to fan the “Black Peril,” a term reminiscent of the Yellow Peril that Kaiser Wilhelm

II promoted to justify his taking of the Bay of Jiaozhou.875

The outbreak of World War One presented Dr. Seaman with another chance to observe

German atrocities at close quarters. He paid visits to Belgium and France as Vice-President of the Peace and Arbitration League of the United States, and detailed German atrocities in

Belgium, such as shooting non-combatants and Red Cross personnel, burning villages, sacking churches, and the use of Zeppelin bombing, in a cablegram to President Wilson. In an article published in The Independent, he accused German troops of “repeating the tactics of the Boxer wars, when Chinese villages were burnt and their inhabitants murdered, when the ransom demanded by punitive expeditions was not paid.”876

875 “Poor Bleeding Africa,” May 30, 1906, in Louis Livingston Seaman collection, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign library; “Cruelties in Africa,” Dallas Morning News, Dallas, TX, August 5, 1906, p.4. 876 Seaman, “The Zeppelin Attack on Antwerp,” The Independent; September 7, 1914, p.339. 249

After returning to the United States, Dr. Seaman continued to expose the ongoing German atrocities in Europe. In a public speech in a church, he elaborated on the conscription of Belgian laborers for work in Germany. He then connected this practice with Bismarck’s remarks in the

Franco-Prussian War of 1870: “leave to the peoples who you conquer, naught but their eyes with which to see, and to weep.” Dr. Seaman also mentioned Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Hun speech, the “crimes of murder, rape and looting that would shame the record of Attila” in China, and the execution of native leaders under their wives and children’s watch in German Africa. Near the end of his speech, he implored the United States to intervene, since “the predatory aggression of the Hun will not cease at the three mile limit, and in our deplorable state of helplessness, a state that resembles that of China, we not only invite war, but also defeat and vassalage.”877

More and more American veterans of the China Relief Expedition voiced their impression of German forces after the United States officially entered the First World War. James P.

Drouillard of the Ninth Infantry charged that “what the Germans have been doing in Belgium,

Northern France and in Serbia is simply a continuation of the policy which they followed in the Boxer trouble.”878 C. A. Pinard of the Sixth Cavalry vividly remembered the eighteen

Chinese heads that German troops hung from the telegraph wires by their respective queues.

Frank L. Gransbury of the navy claimed to have seen “wells literally filled with the bodies of slain Chinese women and children” after German units passed.879

In contrast to these negative portrayals of German troops, when two nations fought

877 Seaman, The Crucifixion of Belgium (New York: Church of St. John the Evangelist, 1916). 878 “’Kultur’ Evident in 1900,” The Kansas City Star, Kansas City, MO, November 23, 1917, p.10B. 879 “Slain Girls, Babes Tossed in Wells,” Albuquerque Morning Journal, Albuquerque, NM, March 25, 1918, p.6. 250 alongside each other, it was natural to highlight historical bonds that drew them together rather than divisions that set them apart. Back in the China Relief Expedition, an officer of the Royal

Welsh Fusiliers addressed the Battle of Bunker Hill in a hilarious tone: “It is not only that you killed our officers there, but---much harder to forgive---you killed our regimental goat!”880 The

China Relief Expedition later became the new knot that tied them together. On landing in

England as the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in early June, 1917, General

Pershing greeted a welcoming party that included a company of Royal Welsh Fusiliers. He referred to the unit’s service alongside American troops in the China Relief Expedition, while, to Captain Palmer’s dismay, failing to mention their participation in the Battle of Bunker

Hill.881 After the fierce battle in the Meuniere woods as part of the Second Battle of the Marne,

French General De Goutte, a veteran of the China Relief Expedition, spoke highly of the U.S. battle performance to reporters. He also recalled that during his time in China, he had “seen something of the American officers who are now in France.”882

Apart from these perceptions of other nations that U.S. servicemen fought alongside in

China, the impression of China and its people stood out as another area of expertise that these veterans claimed and promulgated. Upon landing in Dalny, Manchuria during the Russo-

Japanese War, Captain John J. Pershing observed “the extraordinary willingness, even eagerness, of the Chinese to serve invaders of their land.” In his memoir, he also mentioned that “in China proper, British, French, German, American, and Japanese armies, whenever and wherever they had landed, had always employed Chinese in large numbers to assist them as

880 Frank Leslie’s Weekly, New York, April 6, 1901, p.332. 881 The Papers of John McAuley Palmer, Box 18, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 882 “Yanks are Strong in Violent Battle,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, August 3, 1918, p.2. 251 laborers and informers.” What’s more, “our own troops have found paper flags with Chinese characters reading, in effect, ‘Loyal subjects of the Emperor of America.’” Although Captain

Pershing did not specify which operation he was referring to here, it resonated with the situation in the China Relief Expedition. Given that he had known General Chaffee since 1886 during their time in the Sixth Cavalry and served in the General Staff with Chaffee as the Chief of

Staff in 1904, it was quite likely that Captain Pershing got this information from General

Chaffee.883

Experience gained in the China Relief Expedition became particularly useful when the

American army again deployed troops to Northern China in early 1912. In the aftermath of the

1911 revolution that ousted the ruling Manchu dynasty, the U.S. government invoked its right to station troops to protect communication lines in Northern China, a clause in the Boxer

Protocol of 1901. It sent in the Fifteenth Infantry, a unit that participated in the later part of the

China Relief Expedition. One year later, Palmer, now a Captain, had to leave his job with the

Army General Staff and join the garrison because Congress passed a law requiring officers to spend a certain amount of time with their units in each six-year time span. Others nicknamed officers sharing Captain Palmer’s fate “Manchus,” comparing their exile from Washington D.C. to the collapsing Manchu dynasty in China. Despite that, Captain Palmer spoke well of this second trip to China, partly thanks to the service his Chinese servants provided. He also took his company on a practice march, following the same route that he took in the China Relief

Expedition.884

883 John J. Pershing, My Life Before the World War, 1860-1917 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), pp.56, 214, 223-4. 884 The Papers of John McAuley Palmer, Box 18, the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 252

Veterans of the China Relief Expedition also presented their impression of China and its people to the general public. As the commander of the campaign, General Chaffee assumed this role multiple times. In a speech after returning to the United States from the Philippines, he spoke highly of the Chinese people. According to him, “the Chinamen at home in his own country, under conditions which do not carry with them fear for his personal safety, is industrious, frugal and peaceful, patient, honest and kindly. He appears to be the finest farmer in the world, utilizing every square foot of ground and allowing nothing to go to waste.”885

Although here General Chaffee still hinted at the distinction between the Chinese in China and those in the United States, his positive portrayal of the Chinese was significant amidst the general American animosity to them. In another speech, General Chaffee stated that he “did not meet a single intelligent Chinaman who expressed a desire to embrace the Christian religion.

The masses are against Christianity.”886 This bleak assessment of the prospect of religious conversion in China stood in sharp contrast to missionaries’ usual rosy reports.

Besides General Chaffee, other veterans of the China Relief Expedition conveyed their impression of China and its people to the general public from time to time. In late 1901,

Lieutenant Colonel Dickman told a party of friends about his experience in China. With the exception of the possibility of turning the Beijing walls into an excellent driveway, a point that obviously stemmed from his diary, he largely painted China in a negative light. He claimed that

“there is no Chinese laundry or soap in Beijing,” clearly obscuring the work of Chinese laundrymen discussed earlier. He also claimed that Chinese laborers insisted on getting paid in

885 “Our Soldiers the Bravest,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, December 21, 1902, p.9. 886 “Want No New Religion,” The Morning Oregonian, Portland, OR, March 21, 1903, p.6. 253 cash every day, hinting at their greed for money.887

Others offered more generous assessments of China and the Chinese in their speeches. In a January 10, 1907 speech before the Military Service Institution on Governor’s Island, New

York, Colonel Heistand defended Chinese laborers. He assured the audience that “the

Chinaman is no more willing to work for nine cents an hour than is any other man. All he wants is a fair show and he will take his chance in competition with the rest of the world.” Accordingly, he advocated for employing Chinese laborers to dig the Panama Canal, and even went so far as to state, “I believe in keeping out all aliens that are of the undesirable class, but I do not believe that Chinese to whom no objection can be raised save that of race, should be barred.”

As he saw it, “extremely cordial relations existed” between China and the United States when the American forces withdrew, yet “a small amount of people, un-American in spirit and feeling but nevertheless American through naturalization laws should have been able to undo the splendid work accomplished during the military occupation.” Combined with the mention of agitators who “endeavor to divide the American people into classes,” Colonel Heistand’s remarks targeted activists like Daniel De Leon who were born abroad yet contributed to the labor and socialist movement in the United States.888

Perhaps no servicemen could beat Captain Charles Evans Kilbourne in presenting images of China and its people to the general public. Producing a couple of books on army boys’ adventures abroad, he chose the China Relief Expedition as the first one in the series. As

Captain Kilbourne stated in his introduction, “in the Orient, during the opening years of this century, many an American found opportunity for stirring adventure which over thirty years of

887 “China and Chinese,” Trenton Evening Times, Trenton, NJ, December 27, 1901, p.10. 888 “Veteran Champions The Cause of China,” San Jose Daily Mercury, San Jose, CA, January 11, 1907, p.5. 254 peace had denied him at home.” Framing these bloody wars as adventures to his young readers,

Captain Kilbourne reinforced many contemporary racial stereotypes. As Brian Rouleau rightly points out, An Army Boy in Pekin underlined the Yellow Peril manifest in the Chinese torture of captured internationals, especially women. This demonstrates that for many U.S. servicemen, old notions died hard. Yet I would argue that Captain Kilbourne’s representation of the Chinese was more nuanced than Rouleau acknowledges. For instance, American servicemen notice that the Chinese somehow managed to grow corns on alkali lands. In addition, a Chinese man and his family, saved by Americans from other troops’ plunder in Tianjin, later rescued an American serviceman from a Boxer’s den and dressed his wounds.889 Such depiction of the creative and grateful Chinese presented other facets of the Chinese to the American people.

Like Captain Kilbourne, Dr. Seaman portrayed a complex China. In a speech on modern

China and College athletics in the U.S. delivered at Cornell University around 1901, he largely depicted a China loath to engage in athletic activities. According to Dr. Seaman, there “anything appertaining to the strenuous life is looked upon by the aristocratic and literary classes as degrading.” This reference to the “strenuous life,” advocated by masculine U.S. figures like

Theodore Roosevelt, highlighted Chinese weakness. Dr. Seaman offered as example, among others, Chinese employing servants’ help in smoking pipes, and women’s bandaged feet. This resonated with Western fixations with opium and bound feet as symbols of Chinese backwardness. At the same time, however, he indicated that once China is thoroughly aroused by the urge towards self-strengthening, “the Son of Confucius is still in the great race of

889 Rouleau, “Childhood’s Imperial Imagination,” pp.498-9; Charles Evans Kilbourne, An Army Boy in Pekin (Philadelphia: The Penn Publishing Company, 1912), pp.6, 75-7, 119, 258. 255 civilization, and he is there to stay.”890

In an article published in 1913 calling for the recognition of the Chinese Republic established after the 1911 revolution, Dr. Seaman elaborated on his point about China’s potential. “They possess qualities of industry, economy, temperance and tranquility, unsurpassed by any nation on earth. With these qualities they are in the great race of the survival of the fittest to stay.” Unlike some believers of Social Darwinism viewing the Chinese as inferior and doomed to go extinct, he emphasized their strong resilience. The Boxer movement partly contributed to this view. As Dr. Seaman characterized it, “that uprising was one of the most splendid exhibitions of patriotism witnessed in modern times.”891

Just like servicemen, many female nurses continued their transnational journey after the

China Relief Expedition. Nearly all of them went to the Philippines after U.S. forces withdrew from China, and at least one of them, Alice Kemmer, took care of the wounded during the

Russo-Japanese War.892 Another nurse, Emily Friton, went on to serve in the Ancon hospital in the Panama Canal zone. She also contributed to the depiction of China to a larger audience back home. As she stated, “there are many things that one would wish altered in that country,” such as the sanitary arrangements, narrow streets, and women’s low status. Yet “there is much that the white races might imitate.” Her examples were the Beijing residents’ not treating foreigners with tricks or rudeness and their obedience to laws and edicts.893 These images formed a strong contrast to the prevailing vision of the “shifty” and lawless Chinese.

890 Seaman, “On Modern China (and College Athletics in the U.S.), Louis Livingston Seaman collection, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign library. 891 Seaman, “A Plea for Fair Play and the Recognition of the Chinese Republic,” in The Journal of Race Development, vol.3, January 1913, pp.286-301. 892 “Red Cross Party off for Japan,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA, March 5, 1904, p.6. 893 “Says Chinese are a Lovable People,” Duluth News Tribune, Duluth, MN, August 12, 1909, p.6. 256

Last but not least, the China Relief Expedition enhanced the rationale for U.S. foreign intervention without Congressional authorization of force. Before this expedition, American presidents had deployed marines to Latin America and Korea upon occasion to protect U.S. interests.894 The China Relief Expedition presented a new precedent and justification for such actions. As the former New York City Police Commissioner, Roosevelt often made comparisons between the army and the police force. In response to anti-imperialists’ charge of militarism, he stated that “the regular army is not merely as numerous, relatively [sic] to the whole population, as is the New York police force relatively [sic] to the population of New

York; and it is literally as absurd to predicate militarism or imperialism on the size of the army, as it would be to see in the number of policemen a menace to personal liberty.”895 Naturally, he also used the police metaphor to characterize American actions in China. As he stated at the

Home Market Club dinner in Boston on April 30, 1901, “we have simply performed our part in a bit of international police duty…whoever feels we were not justified in what we did ought logically to object to all exercise of the police power at home.”896

This precedent reemerged in later situations when the U.S. government contemplated intervening in foreign lands. The Diplomatic Corps pondered an intervention into the Mexican

Revolution following the 1900 precedent. In August 1915, the Wilson administration demanded the “immediate relief of the food situation in Mexico City and maintenance of railroad and telegraphic communication between Vera Cruz and Mexico City.” Otherwise the

894 Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama (New York: Macmillan, 1990); Gordon H. Chang, “Whose ‘Barbarism’? Whose ‘Treachery’? Race and Civilization in the Unknown United States-Korean War of 1871,” Journal of American History, 89:4 (Mar., 2003), pp.1331-65; Maurer, The Empire Trap. 895 Detroit Speech, September 6, 1900, Theodore Roosevelt papers, Reel 417. 896 “The Home Market Club,” Springfield Republican, Springfield, MA, May 1, 1901, p.12. 257

United States would take actions along with other American nations. Secretary of State Robert

Lansing defended the proposed action and argued that it would not constitute an act of war.

The China Relief Expedition became his example.897 During a press conference on June 29,

1950, when pressed by reporters about whether the United States was at war, President Harry

S. Truman elaborated on the situation, and stated that “the members of the United Nations are going to the relief of the Korean Republic to suppress a bandit raid on the Republic of Korea.”

When this reporter characterized it as “a police action under the United Nations,” Truman handily agreed.898 This “police action” would soon escalate into a three-year war involving the PLA troops. Chinese authorities claimed they were mere volunteers rather than official forces, while the United States downplayed the issue to avoid an all-out war with China. To those who remembered the China Relief Expedition half-a-century previous, the state of the

Korean War was remarkably familiar.

897 “U.S. Gov’t Changes Mexican Policy?” Columbus Ledger, Columbus, GA, March 8, 1915, p.1; “Wilson Seeking Aid of South America,” The Idaho Statesman, Boise, IA, August 4, 1915, p.2. 898 https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=806. Retrieved December 13, 2018. 258

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VITA

Xiangyun Xu

I obtained my BA and MA from the Department of History, Peking University before coming to the Pennsylvania State University to pursue PhD study. During my study here, I major in the Nineteenth Century United States history, with modern Europe and China as my secondary fields. My dissertation combines input from these three fields, and receives travel grants from the Department of History and the Center for Global Studies at Penn State, the

Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, and the Massachusetts Historical

Society for the archival researches. In addition, I also conducted researches at the British

National Archives and British Library to enhance the transnational nature of the dissertation.

The resulting works got admitted into a couple of graduate conferences as well as the

Association for Asian Studies annual conference. Meanwhile, I wrote a dozen of articles to introduce the American history and politics to the general audience in China.