DOCSLIB.ORG

TECHNICAL REPORT Drug-Related Deaths and Mortality in Europe Update from the EMCDDA Expert Network

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

TECHNICAL REPORT Drug-related deaths and mortality in Europe Update from the EMCDDA expert network May 2021 I Legal notice This publication of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is protected by copyright. The EMCDDA accepts no responsibility or liability for any consequences arising from the use of the data contained in this document. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the EMCDDA’s partners, any EU Member State or any agency orinstitution of the European Union. PDF ISBN 978-92-9497-605-5 doi: 10.2810/777564 TD-02-21-591-EN-N Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021 © European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2021 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Recommended citation: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2021), Drug-related deaths and mortality in Europe: update from the EMCDDA expert network, Technical report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. About this report This report provides an update on drug-related deaths in Europe based primarily on presentations and discussions held at the 2019 meeting of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) expert network on drug-related deaths. The meeting brought together experts and representatives from over 40 countries and provided a platform for discussing new trends in and analyses of drug-induced deaths in Europe and beyond and responses to them. About the EMCDDA The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is the central source and confirmed authority on drug-related issues in Europe. For over 25 years, it has been collecting, analysing and disseminating scientifically sound information on drugs and drug addiction and their consequences, providing its audiences with an evidence-based picture of the drug phenomenon at European level. The EMCDDA’s publications are a prime source of information for a wide range of audiences including policymakers and their advisors; professionals and researchers working in the drugs field; and, more broadly, the media and general public. Based in Lisbon, the EMCDDA is one of the decentralised agencies of the European Union. Praça Europa 1, Cais do Sodré, 1249-289 Lisbon, Portugal Tel. +351 211210200 [email protected] I www.emcdda.europa.eu twitter.com/emcdda I facebook.com/emcdda Acknowledgements The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is grateful to the members of the drug-related deaths network for their collaboration on this publication and for their work in this area throughout the year, and also to the external participants in the expert meeting on drug-related deaths. The national experts on drug-related deaths for Europe are Judith Anzenberger, Peter Blanckaert, Vasil Atanasov, Marijan Erceg, Katerina Liveri, Blanka Nechanská, Claudia Ranneries, Gleb Denissov, Pirkko Kriikku, Anne-Claire Brisacier, Axel Heinemann, Chara Spiliopoulou, Anna Péterfi, Suzi Lyons, Roberta Crialesi, Linda Veisberga, Lina Jurgelaitiene, Michel Yegles, Kathleen England, Guus Cruts, Thomas Clausen, Janusz Sierosławski, Małgorzata Dalmata, Mário João Dias, Maria dos Anjos Campos, Madalina Martis, Jozef Šidlo, Mateja Jandl, Begona Brime Beteta, Mimmi Eriksson Tinghög, Bülent Şam and Martin White. The national experts from the Instrument for Pre- Accession Assistance countries and Switzerland are Zana Bruçi, Aleksandar Stankov, Avdi Smajljaj, Naim Muja, Ivana Čurović, Dalibor Nedić, Miroslav Milić, Verena Maag and Andrea Oestreich. The invited external experts are Amanda Roxburgh, Christopher Jones, Elina Kotovirta, Kari Grasaasen, Andrew McAuley and Sabrina Molinaro. Statement regarding the United Kingdom This report covers a reference period until 2019. The United Kingdom had left the European Union as of 1 February 2020. Unless stated otherwise, for the purpose of this report, the term ‘Member States’ includes the United Kingdom. EMCDDA authors: Isabelle Giraudon, Federica Mathis, Dagmar Hedrich, Julian Vicente and André Noor Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 3 Introduction to and aim of this report ...................................................................................... 5 Overdose deaths in Europe: an overview ............................................................................... 7 Demographic characteristics of drug-related fatalities in Europe ...................................... 9 Heroin-related deaths in selected European countries ................................................... 11 Cocaine-related deaths in selected European countries ................................................ 17 Special focus: a European overview of deaths related to new psychoactive substances ...... 20 Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues ................................................................................... 25 Etizolam: concern around new benzodiazepines in Scotland ......................................... 25 Responding to drug-related deaths ...................................................................................... 27 Drug consumption rooms ............................................................................................... 28 Take-home naloxone programmes ................................................................................ 29 References .......................................................................................................................... 31 TECHNICAL REPORT | Drug-related deaths and mortality in Europe: update from the EMCDDA expert network At a glance: a summary of key points Overdose deaths: a very high burden of preventable premature deaths • Over 8 300 deaths involving one or more illicit drugs were reported in 2018 in the European Union. This estimate rises to over 9 200 deaths when Norway and Turkey are included. Men account for three quarters of drug-induced deaths. Most of the deaths were very premature, affecting people in their thirties and forties. Multiple drug toxicity is implicated in most cases. Opioids: the main driver of fatal overdoses in Europe • Opioids, often heroin, or opioid substitution treatment medicines, such as methadone and buprenorphine, are involved in 80-90 % of drug-related deaths overall, although differences between countries exist. • Deaths associated with fentanyl and its analogues might be underestimated in some countries. Fentanyl-related deaths decreased markedly in Estonia and Sweden in 2018. New psychoactive substances: stimulants and benzodiazepines involved in many deaths • Most new psychoactive substance-related deaths are reported in the United Kingdom and in Turkey (where synthetic cannabinoids largely dominate). Fake and diverted medicines and new benzodiazepines are involved in an increasing proportion of drug-related deaths. Highlights and concerns • When information on post-mortem investigation is available it shows that the proportion of drug- related deaths involving ‘other opioids’ is increasing in some countries, while the proportion involving heroin is decreasing. • Cocaine was reported to be involved in an increasing number of deaths in 2018, mainly associated with heroin or other opioids. • Mortality rates due to overdose are higher in Scotland than in the rest of the United Kingdom or in other European countries or the United States. Most deaths in Scotland are related to heroin, other opioids and benzodiazepines (etizolam in particular was implicated in more than half of the deaths in 2018). Implications for public health and for monitoring • There are still major limitations and gaps in the monitoring of drug-related deaths. Special mortality registers are a key source of information, in particular on polydrug use patterns and on prescription opioids and other medicines implicated in deaths. • Further triangulation of drug-related deaths and other opioid indicators is needed to consolidate estimates of the number of deaths. Responding to drug-related deaths • While the coverage and diversity of responses to drug-related deaths vary between and within countries, drug consumption rooms and take-home naloxone programmes expanded across Europe in 2019. The evidence base for their effectiveness is growing. However, more research is needed on the population impact of these and other responses. Introduction to and aim of this report This report provides an update on drug-related deaths in Europe (EMCDDA, 2019a, 2019b). It is primarily based on presentations and discussions held at the annual 2-day meeting of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) expert network on drug-related deaths in Lisbon on 21 and 22 October 2019 (EMCDDA, 2019b). The meeting brought together experts and representatives from over 40 countries and provided a platform 5 TECHNICAL REPORT | Drug-related deaths and mortality in Europe: update from the EMCDDA expert network for discussing new trends in and analyses of drug-induced deaths in Europe and beyond and responses to them. Drug-related mortality is a complex phenomenon. The EMCDDA has defined a drug-related death and mortality (DRD) epidemiological indicator, which has two complementary components: (i) national, population-based statistics on deaths directly attributable to the use of drugs (drug-induced deaths, also known as poisonings or overdoses); and (ii) estimations of the overall and cause-specific mortality
Recommended publications
  • Poland by Piotr Arak, Andrzej Bobiński

    Poland by Piotr Arak, Andrzej Bobiński

    Poland by Piotr Arak, Andrzej Bobiński Capital: Warsaw Population: 38 million GNI/capita, PPP: $25,930 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 National Democratic 3.25 3.50 3.25 3.25 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 Governance Electoral Process 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 Civil Society 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.75 Independent Media 2.25 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 3.00 Local Democratic 1.75 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.50 1.50 1.50 Governance Judicial Framework 3.25 2.50 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 and Independence Corruption 3.00 2.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 Democracy Score 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 2.14 2.18 2.18 2.21 2.32 2.57 NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest.
  • Where the Law Ends

    Where the Law Ends

    ideaForum Where the law ends The collapse of the rule of law in Poland – and what to do “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.” (Article 47, EU Charter on Fundamental Rights) Berlin – Warsaw 29 May 2018 ii Executive Summary No member state of the EU has ever gone as far in subjugating its courts to executive control as the current Polish government has done. The Polish case is a test whether it is possible to create a Soviet-style justice system, where the control of courts, prosecutors and judges lies with the executive and a single party, in an EU member state. In December 2017 the Commission proposed to the EU Council to determine that there was “a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law.” It warned that in Poland the constitutionality of laws “can no longer be verified and guaranteed by an independent constitutional tribunal.” It expressed “grave concerns” over the lack of independent courts. In March 2018 an Irish High Court judge noted a “deliberate, calculated and provocative legislative dismantling by Poland of the independence of the judiciary, a key component of the rule of law.” She argued, in an extradition case involving a Polish suspect, that “the rule of law in Poland has been systematically damaged by the cumulative impact of all the legislative changes that have taken place over the last two years.” Things are about to get even worse.
  • Poland 2017 International Religious Freedom Report

    Poland 2017 International Religious Freedom Report

    POLAND 2017 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary The constitution provides for freedom of religion and states that religion is a personal choice, and all churches and religious organizations have equal rights. An agreement with the Holy See determines relations with the Roman Catholic Church and grants it privileges not accorded to other religious groups. Statutes adopted because of agreements between the government and other churches and religious organizations determine relations with those groups. The criminal code prohibits public speech offensive to religious sentiment. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed an appeal that, if successful, would have led to the deregistering of the Union of Progressive Jewish Communities in Poland. The government made a final determination on 60 communal property restitution cases involving claims by religious communities during the year, out of approximately 3,600 outstanding. The leader of the governing Law and Justice Party (PiS) met with Jewish groups after they wrote to him expressing concerns over growing anti-Semitism. Parliament asked the interior minister to respond after Muslim groups wrote to the speaker of the lower house asking him to protect the Muslim minority. The interior minister ordered an investigation after Holocaust survivor groups discovered that a 1999 video of naked people laughing and playing tag in a concentration camp gas chamber had been filmed in the former Nazi Stutthof concentration camp. PiS members made statements against Muslim migrants, and one party parliamentarian tweeted an anti-Semitic comment. The PiS leader denounced anti-Semitism, and President Andrzej Duda said the country had a duty to speak out about the extermination of its Jewish population by the Nazis during WWII.
  • A Study on Structural Reform in Poland 2013-2018

    A Study on Structural Reform in Poland 2013-2018

    A STUDY ON STRUCTURAL REFORM IN POLAND 2013-2018 Written by: Anna Dzienis, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, World Economy Research Institute Arkadiusz Michał Kowalski, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, World Economy Research Institute Marek Lachowicz, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, World Economy Research Institute Marta Mackiewicz, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, World Economy Research Institute Tomasz M. Napiórkowski, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, World Economy Research Institute Marzenna Anna Weresa, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, World Economy Research Institute 2018 EUROPEAN COMMISSION EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs Directorate A — Competitiveness and European Semester Unit A.2 — European Semester and Member States’ Competitiveness Contact: Tomas Brännström E-mail: [email protected] European Commission B-1049 Brussels 2 A Study on Structural Reform in Poland 2013–2018 A STUDY ON STRUCTURAL REFORM IN POLAND 2013–2018 Final Report (30 November 2018) Study carried out within the Framework Service Contract 'Studies in the Area of European Competitiveness' (ENTR/300/PP/2013/FC-WIFO) World Economy Research Institute (WERI), Collegium of World Economy SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Poland Warsaw, December 2018 1 A Study on Structural Reform in Poland 2013–2018 Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).
  • A Primer on the Government and Politics of Poland

    A Primer on the Government and Politics of Poland

    European Journal of Business and Management www.iiste.org ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) Vol.12, No.5, 2020 A Primer on the Government and Politics of Poland Richard J. Hunter, Jr. Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University 400 South Orange Avenue, South Orange, N.J., U.S.A E-mail [email protected] The research is supported by the Institute for International Business, Seton Hall University Abstract Poland engaged in a “self-limiting” revolution in 1989 in which it began a process of changing both its economic and its political systems. In this context, governmental and party politics came to the forefront in efforts to effect real change in society as the “closed” communist system came to an abrupt end. This paper is a study of governmental structures and party politics in Poland as they relate to these changes. It discusses the Polish legislative, presidential (executive), and judicial systems and the current political configurations operating within Poland. The author offers commentary on what the future may hold for politics in a nation still struggling to define its role in the European Union in light of its most recent past. Keywords: Government; Sejm; Politics; Law and Justice; Civic Platform DOI: 10.7176/EJBM/12-5-01 Publication date: February 29 th 2020 Part I – Governmental Structure 1. Introduction Over these past thirty-five years, I have joined with several of my colleagues at Seton Hall University and elsewhere to write about various aspects of Polish economics, taxation, society, finance, and politics. [See Appendix I for full chronological bibliographic references.] Part I of this primer will focus on the governmental structure of Poland.
  • September 2017 1 Periodical Postageperiodical Paid at Boston, New York

    September 2017 1 Periodical Postageperiodical Paid at Boston, New York

    HELPFUL BOOKS ON POLISH GENEALOGYPOLISH AMERICAN — PAGE 15JOURNAL • SEPTEMBER 2017 www.polamjournal.com 1 PERIODICAL POSTAGE PAID AT BOSTON, NEW YORK NEW BOSTON, AT PAID PERIODICAL POSTAGE POLISH AMERICAN OFFICES AND ADDITIONAL ENTRY DEDICATED TO THE PROMOTION AND CONTINUANCE OF POLISH AMERICAN CULTURE JOURNAL SWIMWEaR dESIgNER MaRIa dOBRZaNSKa ESTABLISHED 1911 SEPTEMBER 2017 • VOL. 106, NO. 9 • $2.00 www.polamjournal.com REEVES PAGE 10 RAISING THE ROOF AT HOLY ROSARY • POPE FRANCIS RECEIVES “ORDER OF SMILE” • “DIDDY’S” BLACK MADONNA WARSAW DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR • KF GRANTS FOR POLES • A POLISH PILLAR RISES IN MINNEAPOLIS BEKSIŃSKI EXHIBIT IS A MUST-SEE • PSAA: 100 AND GOING STRONG! • BABCIA’S FAVORITE AUTUMN SOUPS Newsmark Dancing on Air Manufacturing Council Folded POlaNd WElCOMES U.S. SaNCTIONS agaINST Following Resignations RUSSIa. Warsaw has welcomed President Donald WASHINGTON, D.C. — Trump’s decision to sign into law tougher new sanctions Following the departure of against Russia, which are in Poland’s “strategic interest,” AFL-CIO President Richard the Polish foreign ministry has said. Trumka and several business The new laws hit crucial sectors of the Russian econ- leaders, President Trump an- omy, including weapons sales and energy exports, and nounced the dissolution of require Trump to consult with Congress before lifting or his American Manufacturing easing sanctions. Council, along with another The new sanctions against Russia could also hit com- separate initiative, the Strate- panies invested in the Nord Stream II project, a planned gic and Policy Forum. gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, circumventing Trumka resigned from Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states.
  • The Emergence of a European Project. Three Summits for the Three Seas Initiative

    The Emergence of a European Project. Three Summits for the Three Seas Initiative

    The emergence of a European project. Three Summits for the Three Seas Initiative. 2018 1 2 The emergence of a European project Three Summits for the Three Seas Initiative Abstract by relying on the geo-economic potential and momentum generated in strategic terms by the eastward enlargement of the This paper intends to present the origins and backdrop of the European Union and NATO. While both entities sought to offer Three Seas Initiative (further to be named 3SI), the ground their new members a fast track into the European and Euro- covered since the First Summit in Dubrovnik in August 2016, Atlantic community, there were fewer incentives to address the the accomplishments of the Warsaw Summit in July 2017 issues of intra-regional cooperation and joint progress. That is and the prospects of the forthcoming Summit to be held in where the 3SI can prove to be instrumental by complementing Bucharest in September 2018. the already well-developed integration of ‘Old Europe’ with the regional integrative endeavours of the 3SI states. The 3SI is just at the beginning of an ongoing effort on the long road that lies ahead. It might appear to be a novel format for Based on a consolidated conceptual design and the advancement regional consolidation, but it actually emerges from a venerable of concrete projects, the Third 3SI Summit in Bucharest later line of various relevant experiences in political cooperation. this year should mark a new stage in the further development The heritage of past history serves both as a cautionary tale and strengthening of the European idea for the benefit of the about the pitfalls of (sub)regional fragmentation and as a participating states and, equally, other actors that share the guide for a common future.

  • PUBLICOPINION Solid and Professional 1/2018

    POLISH PUBLICOPINION Solid and Professional 1/2018 ISSN 2083-1714 CONTENTS Reactions to triggering of Article 7 of TEU against Poland Reactions to triggering of Article 7 of TEU against On December 20, 2017, the European Commission decided to launch Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union against Poland and asked the Council of the EU to Poland declare the existence of a clear risk of a serious violation of European values in Poland. At the same time, the Commission issued the fourth recommendation First evaluations on the rule of law, in which it called on the Polish authorities to amend the laws of the government reforming the judiciary and "restore the independence and legitimacy of the of Mateusz Morawiecki Constitutional Tribunal." The activities of the EU institutions aimed at protecting the rule of law in Poland Evaluation of Andrzej have aroused public controversy from the beginning. Triggering Article 7 of the TEU, like the previous actions of the European Commission and the European Duda's presidency Parliament, is received ambiguously. The European Commission's request to in the middle of the term declare the existence of a clear risk of a serious violation of European values in Poland is slightly more often perceived critically than approved. Over two-fifths Subjective well-being of respondents (43%) believe that triggering Article 7 of the TEU is unjustified, in 2017 while 38% are convinced of the legitimacy of this step. In the opinion of nearly half of Poles (46%) the decision of the European Commission results from aversion to the Law and Justice (PiS) and the current authorities of our country.
  • Report on Xenophobia, Radical Nationalism and Expressions of Hatred in 2017 – Poland

    Report on Xenophobia, Radical Nationalism and Expressions of Hatred in 2017 – Poland

    Katarzyna du Vall PhD Candidate Institute of European Studies, Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland REPORT ON XENOPHOBIA, RADICAL NATIONALISM AND EXPRESSIONS OF HATRED IN 2017 – POLAND 1. Changes in legislation (positive and negative) which affected the interests of minorities during the monitored period It is estimated that national minorities represent around 1% of the society.1 National and ethnic minorities in Poland are protected under several legal acts. The most important are as follows: - Art. 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 19972: 1. The Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture. 2. National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to establish educational and cultural institutions, institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolution of matters connected with their cultural identity. - The Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethic Minorities and on the Regional Languages (consolidated act of 5 April 2017) - The Electoral Code of 5 January 2011 - The Act of 7 September 1991 on Educational System According to art. 31(3) of the Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethic Minorities and on the Regional Languages a report on the situation of national and ethnic minorities should be publish 1 A. Malicka, „Status prawny mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce – ustawa o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz języku regionalnym” [in:] „Aktualne problemy ochrony wolności i praw mniejszości w Polsce i na świecie”, J.
  • Populist Discourse in the Polish Media

    Populist Discourse in the Polish Media

    Populist Discourse in the Polish Media Edited by Agnieszka Stępińska Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań Faculty of Political Science and Journalism Poznań 2020 Editor: Agnieszka Stępińska Faculty of Political Science and Journalism Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland The publication is funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher of the Republic of Poland as a part of the National Programme for the Development of the Humanities in 2016-2019. Grant no. 0131/NPRH4/H2b/83/2016. NARODOWY PROGRAM ROZWOJU HUMANISTYKI Reviews by Delia Balaban (Chapters 1-10) and Samuel Bennett (Chapter 7, 9-10) Translation by Michał Biela Cover design by Bartosz Stępiński Copyright©: The Editor and The Authors (2020) Open Access: All chapters are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The publication is available online at: http://populizm.amu.edu.pl/publikacje ISBN 978-83-65817-87-7 (printed version) ISBN 978-83-65817-89-1 (electronic version) The publisher: Adam Mickiewicz University Faculty of Political Science and Journalism Address: Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego 5, 61-614 Poznań, Poland Computer composition – „MRS”, 60-408 Poznań, ul. P. Zołotowa 23, tel. 605087690 Printing and binding – Zakład Graficzny UAM, 61-712 Poznań, ul. H. Wieniawskiego 1 Contents List of Tables .......................................................... V List of Figures ......................................................... VI List of Graphs ......................................................... VII 1. Theoretical Background and Methods of the Study on Populist Discourse in the Media ....................................................... 1 Agnieszka Stępińska, Marta Wrześniewska-Pietrzak, and Jacek Wyszyński PART I Populism in Print Press . 23 2. Who Covers Populism? Types of Populism in Print Media Outlets . 25 Kinga Adamczewska and Agnieszka Stępińska 3.
  • Where the Law Ends

    Where the Law Ends

    ideaForum Where the law ends The collapse of the rule of law in Poland – and what to do “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.” (Article 47, EU Charter on Fundamental Rights) Berlin – Warsaw 29 May 2018 ii Executive Summary No member state of the EU has ever gone as far in subjugating its courts to executive control as the current Polish government has done. The Polish case is a test whether it is possible to create a Soviet-style justice system, where the control of courts, prosecutors and judges lies with the executive and a single party, in an EU member state. In December 2017 the Commission proposed to the EU Council to determine that there was “a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law.” It warned that in Poland the constitutionality of laws “can no longer be verified and guaranteed by an independent constitutional tribunal.” It expressed “grave concerns” over the lack of independent courts. In March 2018 an Irish High Court judge noted a “deliberate, calculated and provocative legislative dismantling by Poland of the independence of the judiciary, a key component of the rule of law.” She argued, in an extradition case involving a Polish suspect, that “the rule of law in Poland has been systematically damaged by the cumulative impact of all the legislative changes that have taken place over the last two years.” Things are about to get even worse.
  • 8. Populism and Social Media. Analysis of the Political Communication Activities of Paweł Kukiz and Citizen Social Media Users During the 2015 Electoral Campaigns

    8. Populism and Social Media. Analysis of the Political Communication Activities of Paweł Kukiz and Citizen Social Media Users During the 2015 Electoral Campaigns

    8. Populism and Social Media. Analysis of the Political Communication Activities of Paweł Kukiz and Citizen Social Media Users During the 2015 Electoral Campaigns Jakub Jakubowski and Kinga Adamczewska Introduction Hybrid media systems with increasingly interlinked new and traditional media (Chadwick, 2013; Kübler and Kriesi, 2017) have created new possibilities in politi- cal communication. Thanks to these systems, political actors are now able to choose between various channels of communication, with social media being most effective in providing unfiltered access to the general public and potential voters (Golbeck, Grimers, and Rogers, 2010; Jacobs and Spierings, 2016). In this sense, social media have become an ideal channel for populist communication (Ernst et al., 2017). Their appeal is increased by the widespread perception that they are free from the influence of professional journalists (i.e. ‘media elite’) and are thus much closer to citizens (‘the people’). Social media are generally seen as giving citizens greater opportunities to express their opinions and influence the information agenda. In contrast to research focused on social media interactions between specific political actors and other social media users (i.e. reactions to statements posted by a political actor on his/her Facebook or Twitter profile), this chapter analyzes popu- list political communication from two different perspectives: that of the political actor and that of citizen users. In the first perspective, we will concentrate on mes- sages constructed and disseminated by a political actor on social media, aiming to identify the elements of populist discourse in the Facebook posts of Paweł Kukiz, a Polish populist politician. The second perspective will concern the statements of social media users who may also use populist discourse; here, we will analyze their posts concerning various Polish politicians, including Paweł Kukiz.