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TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 The Wall of century ago: Georg Brandes’ travelling in Poland 9 Against legends and myths. Stanisław Brzozowski and his psychoanalysis of the Polish soul 39 Construction of the Self in Polish culture – a neglected context of Polish Modernism 59 Czesław Miłosz and his ambiguous Modernity 73 Catching up with Witold Gombrowicz: between Modernity and Post-Modernity 115 Freedom from… or freedom to…? On the idea of freedom in the writings of Witold Gombrowicz 139 Conclusions. The Polish intelligentsia and Modernity: the search for new paradigms 169 Introduction In the long history of Polish culture, periods of openness toward Europe frequently intertwined with times of xenophobia and inwardness. Streams of ideas, values, philosophical thoughts and aesthetic trends ran constantly from France, Italy, German)' and England, leaving traces on Polish architecture, art, economy, politics, literature and philosophy. Sometimes the stream ran back to Europe, or even to the East — (Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania) -bringing Polish ideas, original Polish strands, reflections, symbols and images to other Europeans. During the past two centuries the cultural communication between Poland and Western Europe was affected by the ideas of Modernity. In different waves, the ideas produced by the Enlightenment and Romanticism, by Positivism, by Modernism and Avant-garde influenced Polish mentality and lifestyle, changed the Poles' aesthetic taste, and altered their conception of democracy, politics and the economy. There was a chain of Westernizers in Polish culture, philosophy and politics; a string of modernizers who worked for the idea of the modern Poland; who attempted to graft new values onto the Polish mentality. The acceptance of these new ideas was never slavish; it always occurred in an atmosphere of questioning and dialog, through creative transformation and assimilation. In the present book I focus on the main strands of responses to those modernizing efforts in Polish culture in the 20th century. The Slavica Lundensia 25 (2010) Krzysztof Stala choice of period is not accidental: the transformation process leading to the 'Europeanization' of Polish mentality was intensified in the last decades of the 19th century and continued through the following century. It starts with the Positivist movement that aimed at reorienting Polish mentality from the post-Romantic, nationalist position toward a more pragmatic, rationalist and even scientific direction, and ends in the recent debates on attitudes toward Europe on the eve of Polish EU-membership, in 2004. The encounter with, and reception of, Modernity ran somewhat differently in East Central Europe, including Poland, when compared with the West and North. To begin with, the pace of changes was different. While in England, Scandinavia, or France the civilizatory changes initiated by the Enlightenment had gradually incorporated still new areas of life and embraced ever-broader segments of society, in Poland, in Hungary or in Bohemia the changes came rapidly and collided with the premodern, traditional social structure. There are numerous ways of explaining that condition: e.g. no middle class, lack of political sovereignty in the form of a national state, lack of the Protestant ethics of enterprise and responsibility. One point, however, remains obvious: the civilizatory transformations in that area occurred at an accelerated pace, leaving no time for changes of mentality. People there did not have time enough to get used to new lifestyles and systems of values. For that reason the first intellectual debates on Modernity did not appear in Central European countries until the end of the nineteenth century: the first serious responses to the challenges of Modernity; the first mature attempts to become familiar with and grasp that new phenomenon of modern civilization. The next difference consisted in the 'insular character' of modernizing processes in the region. Modernity developed relatively quickly in the big cities: in Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Warsaw and Vilnius. Mass culture, industrialization, democratization and individualization of choices: all these processes were expressions of catching up to the Western standards of life. The provinces, however, remained nearly untouched by these processes. In the books of Czesław Miłosz, who was devoted to his 'land of childhood', that is today's 2 Introduction Lithuania, one can clearly observe the deep contrast between the premodern countryside of his early youth submerged in old-fashioned lifestyles, and the modern cities — in his case Vilnius and Warsaw, with their 20л-сепшгу atmosphere: cars, factories, films, mass culture, emancipation, all apparently very similar to Western centres. And last but not least, the most significant difference: in the 20th century Central Europe experienced the darkest face of Modernity, in the form of totalitarianism and war. Small Central European countries and their citizens thus associate Modernity not only with democracy, tolerance and emancipation. For them Modernity also means 'the iron cage' of totalitarianisms; it means Hider's tanks and Zyklon В in Auschwitz. It was epitomized by coercive secularization and coercive industrialization (in the form of five-year plans) that resulted in people being uprooted from their local traditions in the name of proletarian revolution and progress. Ambivalent attitudes toward Modernity were deeper and more tragic here, especially when compared to those experienced by the citizens of Western Europe. Here, Modernity was much more a forced form of life: forced by the invader, alien power, or the party functionary. That imminent alienation toward Modernity acted as an obstruction in recognizing its positive sides, and often distorted its perception. That is why the Central European responses to Modernity, despite certain similarities, differed in most cases from their Western counterparts. In some recent diagnoses of Modernism, a new concept of 'Modernity with the feeling of loss' has been launched, as opposed to the optimistic, progressive understanding of the term. It seems that 'the feeling of loss' does dominate the discourse of Central European intellectuals, for whom Modernity often appeared tangled in ambivalence. That 'feeling of loss' makes these intellectuals very cautious apologists of Modernity. The citizens of small countries are truly aware of the fragility of existing forms of life; they are attentive to new civilizatory risks. And that is why, in their longing for a modern Poland, Hungary or Slovakia, a great deal of scepticism is discernible. In the affirmative cult for Modernity they see a threat to local identities, already jeopardized by the totalitarian ideologies and praxes. Are these identities about to be devoured by global uni- 3 Krzysztof Stala versalism, represented nowadays by modern capitalism and postmodern culture? In the post- modern projects the local elites often see their self-destructive, undermining forces. That explains why the deconstruction of Eurocentrism, that self-critical attitude of some European intellectuals (Foucault, Derrida), had almost no response there. From the viewpoint of the Central European intellectual, that kind of criticism is suicidal, and leads to destruction of sound grounds of our civilization, To him, defending the West, and not its deconstruction, remained the only possibility for moral survival in the midst of totalitarianisms. It was the steady belief in Western norms and values that enabled him to preserve his dignity and hope for a better future. It was definitely the feeling of belonging to Western civilization, and not the shining promises of Modernity, that constituted the main horizon for Polish intellectuals in their search for a new Polish culture; a new Pole. The numerous breaks in continuity were the greatest challenge for that culture. Crises have occurred in other cultures, too, but in Poland the state of crisis was practically a permanent experience throughout the past 200 years. The lack of continuity in political life has often been compensated by efforts to keep the culture alive. Keeping it alive meant maintaining its ties to Europe, to the West. These ties were epitomized by an affirmative attitude: recognition of common European values, the Judaeo-Christian tradition, Humanism, Classicism. That was the reason why the Polish intelligentsia, in its role as mediators between the West and Polish culture, had a tendency to soften the radical discourses of Modernity. The reception of Nietzsche, whose intellectual hammer broke apart the Judaeo-Christian tradition and its legitimacy in the European heritage, was rather insignificant in Poland and did not initiate any lasting intellectual debates. Marxism did not play any significant role, either, at least until 1945. Only for a few did it constitute a new revelation, remaining a rather marginal discourse. Nevertheless, Modernity as a new life-world, or as a challenge, in the 20th century, evidently became part of the Western discourse and moved into its center. Liberalism, socialism, urbanization and industrialization, autonomy of the self, science and technology, uni- 4 Introduction versalism and globalization: all these processes were transmitted to Poland during the 20th century and demanded some kind of response, critical reflection, and 'domestication'. The idea of change, of transforming the Polish mentality, has preoccupied Polish intellectuals since the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. From the Positivists1