Dual Mandates, Patronage, and Partisanship in the French Third Republic Alexandra Cirone⇤ Abstract How does simultaneously holding two elected offices a↵ect individual incentives for party investment in a new democracy? In this paper, I show that a pro-democratic institution initially designed to connect local and national politics – cumul des mandats,ortheabilitytoholdbothalocalandnational elected office – had negative e↵ects on the development of the nascent party system in France. Using a microlevel dataset of electoral outcomes, roll-call votes, and politician characteristics from the Third Republic (1870-1940), I show that holding a local office gave national legislators access to an external political network and patronage opportunities that served as a substitute for the benefits a party would typically provide. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that legislators with a dual mandate were less likely to invest in early party institutions, as measured by partisan voting and support of key legislative reforms that strengthen parties. Yet I also establish that such negative e↵ects can be mitigated with specific institutional changes that give selective incentives to parties. This paper’s contribution is to estimate the causal e↵ect of multiple office-holding on partisan outcomes, as well as present original results using a clear and precise measure of party investment. ⇤London School of Economics and Columbia University. Email:
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[email protected]. I thank John Huber, Sylvain Brouard, Andy Eggers, Nikhar Gaikwad, Simon Hix, Francesca Refsum Jenisius, Isabela Mares, Pavithra Suryanarayan, Janne Tukiainen, Stephane Wolton, Daniel Ziblatt, as well as seminar participants from NEWEPS, the Historical Working Group, CES Workshop on Comparative Historical Research in Europe, LSE, Oxford, and Columbia.