134th Bergedorf Round Table The Black Sea Between the EU and Russia: Security, Energy, Democracy June 23–25, 2006, Odessa

CONTENTs

Picture Documentation 1 Protocol Participants 20 Summary 21 Welcome 23

I. Where Does the Black Sea Region Belong ? 24 1. Is There a Black Sea Identity ? 24 2. Does the Black Sea Belong to Europe ? 30

II. Challenges in the Region 33 1. Energy 33 2. Frozen Conflicts 36 3. Kosovo as a Precedent ? 41 4. Organized Crime 46

III. Russia, the US and NATO 48 1. Russia 48 2. USA 55 3. NATO Enlargement 57

IV. Regional Cooperation 60 1. Is There a Need for More Regional Cooperation ? 60 2. Frameworks: BSEC, GUAM, CDC 61

V. What Role Should the EU Play ? 67 1. A Mare Nostrum of the EU ? 67 2. The EU’s Interests in the Region 68 3. Can the EU States Agree on a Common Policy ? 71

Annex VI. Activities and Options of the EU 74 1. The EU’s Activities: an Overview 74 Participants 106 2. Involvement in Conflict Resolution 76 Recommended Literature 112 3. Further EU Enlargement ? 79 Maps 114 4. Bilateral Cooperation 84 Glossary 116 5. Reinvigorating the ENP ? 86 Index 126 6. Should the EU Support Regional Cooperation ? 90 Previous Round Tables 131 7. Does the EU Need an Integrated Approach ? 91 The Körber Foundation 143 8. Cooperation with BSEC ? 96 Imprint 144 9. Sectoral Cooperation 101 Initiator Dr. Jörg Himmelreich, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund Dr. Kurt A. Körber of the United States, Berlin Dr. Ivan Krastev, Chairman, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia CHair Victor Likachev, Senior Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation, Volker Rühe, Kiev Minister of Defense (ret.) of the Federal Republic VLR I Dr. Hans-Dieter Lucas, of Germany, Hamburg Head, Central-, Southeastern- and Eastern Europe, ­Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Federal Chancellery, Berlin Speakers Hugues Mingarelli, Director for Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, Gernot Erler, MdB, European Commission, Brussels Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Sofia Moreira de Sousa, Dr. Konstantin Gabashvili, MP, Political Advisor to the EUSR for South Caucasus, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, ­General Secretariat of the EU, Brussels ­Parliament of Georgia, Tbilisi Valeriu Ostalep, Dr. Charles King, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Chairman of the Faculty, Associate Professor and holder ­Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chisinau of Ion Ratiu Chair of Romanian Studies, School of For- Dr. Thomas Paulsen, eign Service, Georgetown University, Washington D. C. Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table, Borys Tarasyuk, Körber Foundation Berlin Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kiev Ruprecht Polenz, MdB, Mihael-Răzvan Ungureanu, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Bucharest German Bundestag, Berlin Yaşar Yakiş, Alexander Rahr, Chairman of the EU Commission, Turkish Parliament, Program Director, Körber Center Russia/CIS, German Ankara Council on Foreign Relation (DGAP), Berlin Ambassador Dietmar Stüdemann, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to participants Ukraine, Kiev Michael Thumann, Dr. Leila Alieva, Foreign Editor, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg Acting Chair, Center for National and International Dr. Dmitri Trenin, Studies, Baku Deputy Director for Foreign and Security Policy, Ambassador Dr. Norbert Baas, ­Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow Special Envoy for Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Dr. Klaus Wehmeier, ­Caucasus, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board, Rt. Hon. Stephen Byers, MP, Körber Foundation, Hamburg Member, United Kingdom Parliament, London Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Secretary General, BSEC PERMIS, Istanbul Berlin Nicolaos Couniniotis, Christian Wriedt, Director General for Economic Affairs, Ministry of Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, ­Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, Athens Hamburg Judy Dempsey, Dr. Gottfried Zeitz, Central and Eastern Europe Correspondent Europe, Office of President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin International Herald Tribune, Berlin

20 SUMMARY

I. Is there a Black Sea Region and Where Does It Belong ? Does the Black Sea region have a specific identity or is there, unlike in the Baltic states, no estab- lished identity, do neighboring states know little about each other, and does each state pursue essentially its own interests (pp. 24–26)? Some participants main- tained that the “Black Sea region” is a politically-motivated construct (pp. 26–27). However, it was agreed that regional ties — interrupted during the Cold War — are again gaining in importance (pp. 27–29). Where does the region belong ? Historically, the region was sometimes com- pletely European and other times cut off from Europe. Georgians and Ukrainians called their countries profoundly European. Participants from Azerbaijan said the West had to support their country to exploit its European potential (pp. 30–32). Rus- sia, it was said, represents a competing pole of attraction to the EU (pp. 53–54).

II. Challenges for the Region: Because of the Black Sea region’s importance as an energy corridor, stability in the region is a key interest of the EU. Regional rep- resentatives said that diversification of energy sources and transfer routes would benefit producers, transit states, and consumers equally (pp. 33–35). It was pointed out that the BTC Pipeline and its connection to the Central Asian pipeline network meant that Russia’s pipeline monopoly had been broken. Some called this con- frontation with Russia problematic (pp. 35–36). Also, it was said that, because the Caspian reserves were limited, the region could become sustainably important only if Iran supplies energy to the West (p. 34). The frozen conflicts, hotbeds of instability and organized crime, threaten Europe’s security (pp. 36–38). Their resolution, it was said, is possible only through comprehensive democratization — elections without democratic society and rule of law exacerbate separatist tendencies (pp. 38–39). While some emphasized that the key to resolving the conflicts lay in Moscow, others pointed out the respon- sibilites of other states and the necessity of integrating Russia into multilateral peacemaking approaches (pp. 39–40). The separatist, de facto regimes regard possible independence for Kosovo as a precedent, with Russia cautiously supporting this argument. Representatives of EU states warned against making that connection, but regional participants said that the de facto regimes would do just that regardless of whether the West likes it or not (pp. 41–44). The possibility also exists that Russia might use its veto in the UN Security Council on the Kosovo question to support independence e. g. for Abkhazia (p. 44). One participant said that functioning states had emerged in the

21 frozen conflict regions. If democratic standards were to be implemented there, negotiations about independence should be conducted (pp. 44–45).

III. Russia, the United States, and NATO Enlargement: Regional representatives accused Russia of failing to recognize the independence of former Soviet repub- lics. Others appealed for understanding that Russia sees NATO enlargement as a threat. One must persuade Moscow that politics in the region could create win- win situations, some said (pp. 48–53, 57–58). Whether Turkish-Russian relations could pose a potential alternative for Turkey to EU membership was the object of discussion (pp. 54–55). The aggressive policies of the USA, said regional partici- pants, threaten equilibrium. Others pointed out the esteem in which the US is held and its importance for conflict resolution in the region (pp. 55–56).

IV. Regional Cooperation: Demands for more regional cooperation met with objections: regional cooperation was called a favorite EU myth (pp. 60–61, 90–91). Of all regional organizations, BSEC was commended for including all states bordering the Black Sea, including Russia. Some doubted, however, whether there was actually a common interest among BSEC states in regional cooperation. GUAM, it was said, represented a serious security interest among its member states. The SCO was also discussed. Does Russia consider GUAM and CDC overtly anti-Rus- sian alliances (pp. 61–66) ?

V. What Role Should the EU Play ? Participants said it was unthinkable that the Black Sea could become an EU lake in the foreseeable future (pp. 67–68). However, in the interest of its own stability, security, and energy security, the EU should make a lasting commitment to the region (pp. 68–70). But can the EU agree on a common policy for the region (pp. 71–73) ?

VI. Activities and Options of the EU: Besides discussing individual EU activities (pp. 74–79), the conference considered a possible enlargement prospect for the Black Sea region (pp. 79–84) and the question of whether a new conception of the ENP would be worthwhile or simply whitewash a refusal to commit substan- tial resources or make concessions (pp. 86–90). EU support for regional coopera- tion was a subject of dispute (pp. 90–91). Should the EU develop a comprehensive strategy for the region (pp. 91–96) ? And should BSEC become an institutional partner of the EU (pp. 96–101) ?

22 PROTOCOL

Welcome

Welcome to Odessa, a city full of historic sites and marvelous ar- von Weizsäcker chitecture. Being full of old culture but also of new problems, the city mirrors the Black Sea region with its history of ancient em- pires and its great potential, but also with its troubled past and equally disturbing present. Will the Black Sea become a zone of decline and conflicts or rather of prosperity and mutual understanding ? Will it be separat- ing people with different religious, ethnic or linguistic backgrounds, or will it be a zone of fruitful interaction for all littoral states ? This question is of utmost importance for the European Union, which will stretch to the littoral of the Black Sea after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007: only security, democracy, prosperity and a secured flow of energy in the Black Sea region can assure stability for the EU. Volker Rühe, former German Minister of Defense, will moderate our discus- sion.

The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ oral contributions.

23 I. Where Does the Black Sea Region Belong ?

Rühe Our first question is: Where does the Black Sea region belong ? During the Cold War regional identity was defined by whether one belonged to the West or to the Eastern bloc. When I took part in a Bergedorf Round Table in Moscow as a young Member of Parliament in 1984, the Black Sea was dominated by the Soviet Union and its allies Romania and Bulgaria, with Turkey as the only Western ally. Today, identity is the sole responsibility of the Black Sea’s littoral states and people. Where does the region see itself ? Which regional identity is predominant ? Or is the Black Sea not a region at all, lacking a common identity or even the potential for developing one ? And if there is an identity, then where does the region belong geopolitically, economically and culturally ? To Europe, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Balkans, the post-Soviet or the post-Ottoman space ? Unlike for Poland or Hungary, this has still not been decided more than 15 years after the fall of Communism. Is the region not ready to decide yet where it belongs ? Or must we seize the chance to forge an identity while we can still influence developments ?

1. Is There a Black Sea Identity ?

Tarasyuk Is there a Black Sea identity ? Asked where he belongs, an Oddessavite will answer People in the region see themselves that Kiev might be the capital of Ukraine, but “our city Odessa is our life”. The as belonging to the Black Sea same holds true for the people’s relationship to the Black Sea. They see themselves as fundamentally belonging to the Black Sea region.

Erler I must confess, I am at a loss as to what defines the Black Sea region, where its borders lie and whether any of the existing fora for regional cooperation coincide with these borders. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation, BSEC, includes all six littoral countries (Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), four countries from South-Eastern Europe (Greece, Albania, Serbia and Moldova) and two members in the Southern Caucasus (Azerbaijan and Armenia). A second regional alliance, GUAM, includes only four countries with Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbeijan and Moldo- va — Azerbeijan, which does not border on the Black Sea, is a member while the littoral states Turkey, Russia, Romania and Bulgaria are not among them. The Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), initiated by Ukraine and Georgia in 2005, in its turn has nine members from the Black, Baltic and Caspian Seas, holds sum- mits including the Baltic Republics called “Baltic Sea and Black Sea Summit” (May

Where Does the Black Sea Region Belong ? 24 Unlike for the Baltic Sea, there never has been a common name for the whole region.

King

2006) and claims to unite all of the democratic forces from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus; finally we recently had the Black Sea Forum organised by Bucharest attended by other countries again. I conclude from this that being a littoral state of the Black Sea or not is ir- relevant for being included in any of the existing Black Sea formats. So I would like to ask the historian: Does history legitimize any of these formats’ definitions, Mr. King ? Is there a Black Sea region with a distinguishable identity and more or less clear borders ? Or does each definition merely reflect specific political and economic needs ?

The Black Sea region does not have an identity, it did not have one for a long time King and it will not have one for generations to come. Unlike for the Baltic Sea, for No, the region has no identy example, there has never been a common name for the whole region. A common identity around the term “Balticum” grew throughout history. Here in the Black Sea region, well into the 19th century, each group of people in the region had a dif- ferent name for the sea in their respective languages. It was called “Inhospitable Sea”, “Great Sea” or simply Pontus, “The Sea”. Only during the last two centuries the term “Black Sea” became predominant Just when the term “Black Sea” became in all littoral states. But at that time the nation state became the guiding principle ­predominant, national identities took the in the region, diminishing the importance of the Black Sea as a defining principle. lead over the identity as “coast people” Ethnically defined nations as reference points were not common here until 1800. The loyalty of the people belonged to their city, village, religious group, or even to the mountains, as opposed to the coast. But during the 19th century, the region imported the idea of putting things into national boxes and creating sharp-edged national identities. At that time, the hinterland conquered the port cities which tend to be unruly places with mixed identities and a cosmopolitan spirit. There is no national capital located on the Black Sea today: Bucharest conquered Constanta, Kiev conquered Odessa, Ankara conquered Istanbul and Trabzon, and Tbilisi became more important than Batumi. The nation states were formed by getting away from the Black Sea.

On Bulgaria’s 120 km coastline many houses have no windows facing the Black Krastev Sea. That is a metaphor of the hinterland mistrusting the coastline with its cosmo- politan port cities. In the 1920s and 1930s most of the Bulgarian refugees expelled from Yugoslav Macedonia after the First World War were forced to settle on the coast by the national government to end the coastline’s individualism.

25 Is There a Black Sea Identity? The Black Sea identity is a thought currently fashionable in the international community, not a real entity with a serious history.

Krastev

King Today all Black Sea states struggle with the legacy of two centuries of forgetting about their respective neighbors. Ukrainians, Georgians and Turks would not de- fine themselves as “Black Sea People”. Odessavites might distinguish themselves as “coast people” from their compatriots in the hinterland — but I do not see a Black Sea identity. There are few European regions in which school children know less about their neighbors than around the Black Sea: Romanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Turkish pupils have far more knowledge about the history, culture and language of France, Germany and the United States than about their own neighbors. Now we are, I hope, at the beginning of a learning period — EU citizens will learn about the Black Sea region while the region’s people will learn about their own neighbors.

Ostalep Most people in the region indeed know much too little about their neighbors. Un- People in the region know nothing fortunately, many of them do not even speak to one another — think of Armenia about their neighbors and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia, and Russia and Georgia.

Gabashvili We speak to the Russians a lot — but those are rather unpleasant and unproductive conversations.

Rühe Sometimes regions are constructed by major actors or by the international com- munity for the sake of achieving certain political goals. Is that the case in the Black Sea ?

Krastev The Black Sea identity is a thought currently fashionable in the international com- munity, not a real entity with a serious history. Bulgaria was invited to all kinds of Balkan Conferences as a Balkan country some years ago. Now the Bulgarians are supposed to participate in countless Black Sea conferences to develop a Black Sea identity — I wonder what will be next. The Black Sea as a region is clearly a policy fiction, the only question is whether it is a useful fiction or not. I strongly doubt its usefulness. The Black Sea as a regional partner for the EU would compete territorially with Russia’s concept of a Near Abroad.

Trenin Political regions are constructed to assert certain political goals. The Black Sea was Regional identities are constructed first defined with BSEC, the goal being to foster cooperation between the coun- to achieve political goals tries emerging from the Soviet Union’s collapse and the other states of the region.

Where Does the Black Sea Region Belong ? 26 Now we have arrived in the post-post Cold War period. Today, the West wants to define a Black Sea region either as a tool for pushing the Euro-Atlantic integration of states like Georgia or Ukraine — which would be the American approach — or for managing those who are not yet seen fit for integration — which would be the EU approach.

Like the Caspian Sea region or the Caucasus region, the idea of a Black Sea region Alieva is a very provisional thing. In two years, a new geographical focus might have emerged. Regions are often created artificially by the great powers according to their interests. Peter Faber from the National War College, Washington D. C., called this process the “packaging of regions” (Peter R. Faber: Thinking About Geography: Some Competing Geopolitical Models for the 21st Century, in: Research Paper, Academic Research Branch — NATO Defense College, Rome — No. 15 — February 2005). Most of the time, though, regions emerge from common interests. Shared interests between states create regional cohesion as long as they prevail. In the post-Soviet space the quest for security is the overarching common interest that has motivated most serious attempts at regional cooperation like e. g. GUAM. In the early 1990s Azerbaijan’s first non-communist President Abulfaz Elchibey proposed an alliance with Ukraine and Georgia to lead the country through the post-Soviet turmoil. Trade relations and other connections of course help create a common identity, but the first step to my mind is often something different — common security interests.

Let me propose an alternative approach. Regions are not about identities. They King are all about connections. Connections define the degree to which different coun- Regions are not about identities, tries form a region — politically, strategically and economically. In centuries past, but about connections people in the Black Sea region were fundamentally connected. It would not have been unusual to have a relative or a trading partner on the other side of the sea. Personal connections were not inhibited by state boundaries. Many connections have been severed during the last two centuries. Air travel is a good indicator. To- day, a flight from Odessa to Trabzon probably requires a stop at a major hubs like Frankfurt or Moscow. Direct connections would be a signal of emerging Black Sea regionalism. Looking out to the sea, not to the hinterland, should again become a respectable way of living one’s life.

27 Is There a Black Sea Identity? The elites best able to form transnational alliances in the region are the heads of organized crime syndicates.

Ostalep

Ostalep Today, the region’s citizens need to have a visa for traveling to neighboring coun- tries — that is a good indicator of how little exchange is taking place. The elites best able to overcome national borders and form transnational alli- ances in the region are the heads of organized crime syndicates. Last month I was in Odessa with Minister Tarasyuk’s deputy to discuss the work of EUBAM, the Eu- ropean Union Border Assistance mission. We learned that the network organizing the smuggling accross the Moldovan-Ukrainian border is composed of Ukrainians, Moldovans and Transnistrians. Communication is easy when it comes to mutual financial interests.

Yakiş Two decades ago, it was impossible to fly from Odessa to Trabzon — now it is pos- Connections are developing again sible to fly there not only from Odessa, but from Sochi, Novorossisk and many other coastal cities. I am very optimistic that the connections within the region will continue to increase. If economic and infrastructure projects as envisaged e. g. by BSEC become a reality and the economy is freed from national restrictions, an interlinked web of connections may lead to the evolution of a Black Sea identity. That identity will not be transnational or supranational and it will not be an identity separat- ing the coast from its capitals, but some kind of Black Sea consciousness will develop.

Gabashvili Until 1990 the Black Sea was only a buffer zone between Turkey and the Soviet Union and of no economic interest. The Black Sea was a “Dead Sea” at the time because there was no contact and no traffic. That is why today the ferry connec- tions are totally insufficient — we had to build them up from nothing. But I hope we will see some new life blossoming soon.

Chrysanthopoulos Historically, trade has always unified the people around the Black Sea, whereas Trade has always unified, politics has divided them. Since ancient times, trade routes have traversed the politics has divided the region region. The northern route went from the Far East and India via the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea to ancient Sinope (now Sinop in Turkey), the first Greek colony on the Black Sea coast. From there it went further west into Europe. Later on, dur- ing the 19th and 20th centuries, trade along the coastline flourished, dominated by Greek and Jewish networks. Thanks to private initiative and entrepreneurship, trade was a unifying and stabilizing factor. National politics created instability and division.

Where Does the Black Sea Region Belong ? 28 As long as trade relations dominate, politics cannot keep people separated. But Yakiş whenever in history politics dominated, differences grew. Capitals distant from the coastline put their political considerations over the interest of people on the coast that depend on cooperation: When the Ottoman Empire was on good terms with the Russian Empire, the Black Sea was a sea of cooperation; in times of con- flict it became a sea of separation. During the Cold War, political conflicts virtu- ally cut of Turkey from the Soviet-dominated Northern coastline. Only when the Soviet Empire fell apart did relations begin to flourish again.

The Black Sea is the least developed region in the European neighborhood as Ungureanu far as cooperation on a regional scale is concerned. Other than the Baltic or the Mediterranean it is tied to a long history of hegemonical aspirations, division and conflict but has experienced only an extremely short period of regional coopera- tion. For almost a millennium, until well into the 20th century, foreign empires struggled to make the Black Sea their mare nostrum: First the Byzantines, then the Ottomans, and finally the Russians. During the Cold War it was a boundary between two blocs. The Soviets tried to wipe out regional memories of the White opposition against the October Revolution, Turkey wanted to develop its ties with South-Western Europe, but regional cooperation was inexistent even as an idea. Now to shape a common future for the region, we have to reshape its common memory as well.

I welcome the concept of a Black Sea region because it puts the South Caucasus Alieva into the same bag with Ukraine, Bulgaria and Turkey instead of with Central The concept of the Black Sea region binds Asia — which often happened earlier on. So at least in the perception of the Euro- the South Caucasus closer to Europe pean policy makers we are moving closer to Europe and the West, which is where we belong.

So if there is something like a Black Sea region, Ms. Alieva sees it as a part of the Rühe West or of Europe. What would your assessment be, Mr. Tarasyuk ?

29 Is There a Black Sea Identity? During two days walking around on the streets of Odessa I heard Ukrainian spoken only once. Russian culture is an important part of the city’s identity.

Trenin

2. Does the Black Sea Belong to Europe ?

Tarasyuk Asked where his city lies, an Odessavite would not hesitate to answer: “In Europe, The Black Sea belongs to Europe obviously”. I believe it is obvious that the Black Sea in its entirety belongs to Eu- rope. But for many decades, Europe has neglected its south-eastern border region, mostly due to Europe’s division in the Cold War.

Trenin Allow me to state the fact that during two days of walking around on the streets of this overwhelmingly beautiful city Odessa — like St. Petersburg in a better cli- mate — I heard Ukrainian being spoken only once. Russian culture is an important part of the city’s identity, to say the least.

King Mr. Tarasyuk argued eloquently in favor of the Black Sea’s European identity and The region’s relationship to vocation. I suggest, though, to imagine the relationship rather as a wave. Some- Europe developed in waves times the region was fundamentally a part of Europe in a way barely conceivable today, and sometimes it was at the periphery or even considered an antithesis to European identity. At the end of the 13th century Marco Polo traversed the Black Sea region on his way to China. But in his famous account, “Le divisament dou monde” (“The Description of the World”), he devotes only about four sentences to his travel from Trebizond (now Trabzon in Turkey) to Constantinople (now Istanbul). “I am not going to describe this to you, dear reader,” he writes, “because everyone who reads this will know what is to be found there”. An educated Florentine, Venetian, Roman or Pisan in 1300 would have been familiar with the Black Sea and its lit- toral states. They also would have eaten food, drunk wine and worn clothes that had been produced or traded in the region. A detailed account would have bored Europeans at the time. A few centuries later, between 1600 and 1800, it was difficult for most Europe- ans to even remember such close connections. As Europe discovered the new mari- time routes to the Far East, the Black Sea became notorious for both backwardness and the plague. Odessa, for example, was a dusty Tartar village at the time. Its port was just a harbor, regularly harassed by dangerous north-eastern winds. By the 1830s, however, Odessa was a major trade center with a quarantine fa- cility (to prevent the spread of the plague). In the 1860s Mark Twain visited Odessa and found it to be as European as any other city that he had visited throughout the Old World.

Where Does the Black Sea Region Belong ? 30 By 1900, a mix of European, Russian and Jewish elements formed the city’s vibrant culture. Over the last one and a half centuries, the Black Sea has become a more and more fundamentally European space; and in the years to come with Bul- garia’s and Romania’s EU accession, the Black Sea will — at least partly — become a European sea again. By the way, close relations between the Black Sea’s littoral countries and Europe during the last two centuries did not always and only yield positive results. Importing the idea of the nation-state as a major political entity from 19th century Europe had a not so beneficial effect.

Thanks to modern communication technology, intellectuals from the Black Sea Alieva region sometimes have closer contact with intellectuals in New York or in Paris than they do with their compatriots. Samuel Huntington based his theory about the clash of cultures on the premise that cultural identities are more or less stable, but they are not. At the same time, there are of course cultural aspects that make you feel closer to the inhabitants of one country than to those of another. When I came to Ukraine for the first time, I felt like being in the Caucasus because the mentality and temper are so similar to Azerbeijan. When I lived in Rome, a group of Russian- looking people caught my attention and I asked them in Russian who they were. They were Ukrainians, and when they realized I was from Azerbaijan they imme- diately switched to Ukrainian. Why did they assume that I understood Ukrainian ? It must be a result of the perception of closeness and of the fact that Azerbeijan supported Ukraine in difficult periods and vice versa. In contrast to the Baltic, the Black Sea is much more of a bordering region The Black Sea is a border region with mixed legacies. To be more precise, in many countries there is a contra- with mixed legacies diction between geography — remoteness from Western Europe — and identity — potential for complete Europeanization. Even in the remotest villages of the Cau- casus, people have strong European identities. Some date back to feudal times — as in Georgia — whereas some only emerged during the period of industrial capital- ism, as in Azerbaijan. During the Soviet era, though, contradicting influences prevailed. Therefore the region needs help to develop its European potential, help that The region needs help to develop can only come from the EU and the US. It is for the West to decide where the Black its European potential Sea belongs, by either committing itself to fostering institution building and thus tying the region to Europe or restricting itself to exploiting its economic potential and thus risking estrangement from Europe among the region’s peoples.

31 Does the Black Sea Belong to Europe? Gabashvili Where does the Black Sea region belong ? The answer depends on where its coun- tries want to belong. Georgia belongs to Europe and to the Western world because, first, we definitely are not an Asian country and second, many centuries ago we were already a part of Europe sharing the same religion and the same values. Ordinary people will give you the same answer. Georgia shares not only mythical figures, like Jason and the Argonauts, with Europe, but also historical figures like Marco Polo. Between 1999 and 2001, David Lordkipanidze, Head of the Georgian State Museum, unearthed skulls and tools near the Georgian town of Dmanisi. Soon these remnants became know as “the first Europeans”, because they are the earliest Homo erectus remains discovered outside of Africa. They are shown in a large exhibition at the Rheinische Landesmuseum in Bonn this year.

Yakiş Whether we want it or not, our identity is also defined from outside. After the reflection period following the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands, the EU will at some point in time define its borders. We will see to what extent the Black Sea falls within these borders.

Rühe Whatever identity may finally be created here, it has do thrive in the region itself and cannot be imported from abroad. The term ‘Black Sea’ does not yet have the same weight as the term ‘Baltic Sea’ and in this sense the adjective ‘black’ might inadvertently signify problems of perception which have to be overcome. This is a European sea that still needs to be discovered by many Europeans.

Where Does the Black Sea Region Belong ? 32 II. Challenges in the Region

Let us now turn to the challenges that make the region a focus of political interest: Rühe energy supply and security, two major focal points of Western policy, both depend on a stable Black Sea region.

1. Energy

The Black Sea is becoming one of Europe’s major transport and energy transfer Tarasyuk corridors. It has a huge potential for being a transfer region for Central Asian resources to Europe. Ukraine is working closely with other countries of the re- gion — like Azerbaijan and Georgia — to establish such routes. In the 2005/06 Ukrainian-Russian gas dispute, it became clear that commonly accepted principles for consumers, producers and transfer countries are vital and that a guaranteed energy supply should not be endangered by diplomatic power games.

The whole world craves energy these days. Western countries and the Asian play- Ungureanu ers alike know that resources are limited and that energy transit routes can be interrupted — as became clear when in January 2006 Russia cut off supplies to Ukraine and thus created gas shortages in EU countries, too. We need internationally accepted rules regarding the exploitation and trans- fer of resources. Exploiting shortages and violating rules may yield benefits in the short run, but in the long run everybody would benefit from rule of law in the area of energy. Our main goal must be diversification, not only of sources but also of transfer We need diversification of routes. We need to create a market with several players, all of them subject to the energy sources and transit routes same rules. Unilateral dependency generates unbalanced power and abuses — that is a natural law not only in the field of energy. Diversification is the only way to prevent the use of energy as an instrument of unilateral foreign policy. Europe needs the Black Sea to diversify its transit routes to the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, Iran and maybe, one day, Iraq. There are two major projects on their way: The Nabucco pipeline could one day deliver Iranian gas to European markets, crossing Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria, while the Pan-Euro- pean oil pipeline would connect the Romanian harbor of Constanta to Trieste in Italy. These projects need Europe’s financial and political support.

33 Energy Without Iran as a supplier the significance of the Black Sea region as an energy hub will diminish.

Thumann

Gabashvili During the last few years the energy market has seen an increasing demand for diversified energy supply. Europe, wanting to reduce its dependence on Russia and China, is looking for new energy suppliers beside the Middle East. Increasing di- versity in oil supply has improved the oil sector performance all over the world. Today, the Caspian and the Central Asian region is one of the most important energy suppliers in the world. For example, energy resources from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Usbekistan are exported to China and Europe. Asian state- owned oil and gas companies invest in the region. Before 1990, energy transfer was completely controlled by the Soviet state. But those days are over. Georgia, for example is currently involved in three exist- ing pipeline projects. The first is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. At the outset of the project, many people had doubts as to whether this pipeline would ever be completed because of its costs. Now, with the first oiltankers already on their way, President Saakashvili, alongside the Presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, has attended the official opening ceremony in Baku on May 25. The second is the South Caucasus Pipeline, designed to transport gas from the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Turkish border. When operating at full capacity, it is envisaged that the pipeline will export up to 16 billion m3 a year. Third, is the Western Route Oil Export Pipeline which runs west from the Sangachal terminal to the Supsa terminal in Georgia. In addition to these existing pipelines, a second generation investment plan is currently under consideration. For Georgia, the fees for energy transit are a major source of national income. At the same time, our role as a transit country makes us more important for Eu- rope and thus enhances our contacts with the EU, something which was until now privy to the more developed countries on the western shore of the Black Sea.

Thumann As a hub for oil and gas transit the Black Sea region is of great importance. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Blue Stream pipeline already exist and there are more projects as for example the Odessa-Brody pipeline, the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline or the Nabucco pipeline. Tankers from Georgia and Russia transport oil from the eastern to the western shores of the Black Sea. The Black Sea has no energy resources But the Black Sea itself is deprived of energy resources and depends totally itself — it can only thrive as transit region on foreign resources. The Caspian reserves are significant but not comparable to those of the Persian Gulf. That is why the enormous investments for future projects underlining the importance of the region as an energy hub can only be justified when Iran joins the group of suppliers. Unfortunately the relations

Challenges in the Region 34 between Iran and the West are very difficult at the moment and it cannot be excluded that the West will lose access to Iran’s resources because of the conflict about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Whatever the development will be — an Iranian- Chinese or Iranian-Russian rapprochement is not out of the question if Iran is at- tacked by the West –, without Iran as a supplier the significance of the Black Sea region as an energy hub will diminish.

Energy security is one of the main reasons for the surging efforts to integrate Himmelreich the Black Sea region into the Euro-Atlantic structures. At least since the Russian- Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006 energy security has become a key question to foreign and security policy. This counts especially for Germany where for a long time only the environmental and business but not the security and foreign policy aspects of energy policy were broadly discussed. For the coming decades, the peaceful passage to a world of increasing needs of China, India, Europe and the US to import fossil energies will be perhaps the most important challenge. This challenge will fundamentally influence international policy. Because of their importance for the European energy supplies, the EU has a great interest in stabilizing Ukraine and the Black Sea region. 80 % of the gas sup- plies from Russia to the EU pass through Ukraine.

The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine, evolved into a serious conflict be- Rahr tween the EU and Russia and brought the energy alliance with Russia into ques- The dream of some Western politicians tion for the first time. At the same time, the opening of the BTC pipeline and the of bringing Central Asian oil to the West upcoming connection of the Kazakh pipeline system to the BTC pipeline effectu- by circumventing Russia has come true ate a double break of the Russian pipeline monopoly, a milestone in the diversi- fication of energy flows from the east to the west. The dream of some Western political forces, especially the United States, of bringing Central Asian oil to the West by circumventing Russia has become true. Let me also draw your attention to another development: Moscow’s mayor Yury Lushkov recently predicted that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will become a new gas OPEC which will force the West to play according to rules which were established not in the West but east of the Black Sea.

The idea of a gas OPEC is worrying, but at least as disturbing is the Polish proposal Stüdemann of an energy NATO. Such an alliance would exclude and thus antagonize the major suppliers. This would be very much against the consumer countries’ own

35 Energy interests. What we need to do instead is develop a joint concept with producers, transit countries and consumers. The EU must be more active in creating a com- mon European energy policy — what the Commission is currently doing is just a first step. I would welcome an initiative of the German EU presidency in that regard.

Moreira de Sousa To develop a common European energy policy you do not have to convince Brus- sels but the 25 capitals of the Member States.

Mingarelli Concerning energy, the last Council has produced clear results: first the EU has to intensify the dialogue with producers, transit countries and especially Russia. The Commission has the mandate to draft a contractual energy agreement with Russia. Second, with the Baku Initiative the EU aims at enhancing energy coop- eration between the European Union and countries of the Black Sea, the Caspian basin and their neighbours. The Baku initiative helps the countries of the region to integrate their energy markets, and in a second step the EU will provide fund- ing to integrate these markets into the EU market. In addition we will fund energy saving and efficiency programmes in the Black Sea basin.

Alieva The region’s importance as an energy hub has not only beneficial effects for us: Western powers do not tackle the frozen The major international actors have no interest in changing the situation regard- conflicts for fear of endangering pipelines ing some of the frozen conflicts because of their energy interests. The status quo is worth keeping because it does not prevent the oil flow.

2. Frozen Conflicts

Rühe The frozen conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnis- tria are one of the major challenges for European security and their solution is high on the agenda. Let us analyze the current situation and develop ideas on how to get closer to solving these conflicts.

Tarasyuk Aggressive separatism is one of the major problems of the region. The frozen Regional powers and the EU should conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria and do more to solve the frozen conflicts cross-border criminality are closely connected. That should not only worry gov- ernments in the region, but the EU as well. Both should increase their acitivities to solve the conflicts.

Challenges in the Region 36 The frozen conflicts represent the greatest ­political challenge in the Black Sea region.

Ungureanu

In Transnistria, the internationally unrecognized, Russian-backed local gov- ernment is unwilling to give up its years-long attempt to achieve independence from Moldova. Recently, with assistance from the EU and US, the Transnistrian negotiation process has made some progress. Hopefully this will lead to a solution which takes into account the interests of all players involved.

You all know how crucial territorial integrity is for countries like Georgia and Ostalep Moldova. Aggressive separatism and its support by other countries should be a matter of great concern not only for the affected countries, but also for the EU.

The frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Osse- Ungureanu tia represent the greatest political challenge in the Black Sea region. Trafficking of The separatist regions are mutually weapons, human beings and goods threaten not only regional but also European ­reinforcing pockets of instability and Euro-Atlantic security, and the risk of armed conflicts is a potential danger to European energy security. If the frozen conflicts get out of control and spill over, the damage to the region and its neighbors will be huge. Even though some forces in Russia may see the frozen conflicts as political games, they will cause serious harm to everybody in the region in the long run, including Russia as a major player in the Black Sea. These separatist regions form an arch of mutually reinforcing pockets of insta- bility, entities interrelated like communicating vessels. United by their common origin from legacies of the Soviet past, their common goal of secession and often a special relationship to Moscow, the separatist region’s de facto governments organize meetings and try to support each other and lend each other legitimacy. Within the frozen conflict areas, instability, insecurity, undemocratic struc- tures and poverty mutually reinforce each other. Political and economic elites disrespect the law, citizens belonging to other ethnic groups or with foreign citi- zenship feel stronger bonds to foreign governments than than to the central gov- ernment of their state, which leads to extremely polarized societies. Therefore younger generations learn to hate the rule of law and governmental institutions and grow up without memories of peaceful cohabitation. Even when the frozen conflicts get solved, integrating these people into democratic and law-abiding societies will be an Herculean task. Each frozen conflict represents a particular accumulation of history, culture, geography and economy and a mix of conflicting interests and constraints: A sin- gle, uniform solution is highly unlikely.

37 Frozen Conflicts If we establish a democratic and market-based framework the autocratic de-facto regimes will crumble.

Ungureanu

One thing they have in common, though, is that international assistance is needed to solve them. Not only the EU and the US, but also the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe with their long-standing experience and well-developed le- gitimacy, which they have acquired during 10 –15 years of activity as peacekeepers, supervisors or mediators in the frozen conflicts, are indispensable for achieving a sustainable solution. The enlargement discussion of both NATO and the EU has created a more positive atmosphere: Nowadays, the Black Sea region gets much more attention than before and in that context frozen conflicts become the object of numerous conferences and much more active involvment of the EU and the US; Transnistria being the most blatant example. I hope that most foreign actors no longer base their policies on the assumption that there is simply no solution for the frozen conflicts. Only modernization and democratisation The frozen conflicts can only be solved in the context of regional moderniza- can solve the frozen conflicts … tion and democratization. We have no sufficient strategies yet for dealing with poverty and the lack of democratic institutions, we need more investment in education and a firm commitment to market economy. What does democratization have to do with the frozen conflicts ? Democracy means, according to any good political theory book, a non-violent political and social life, a commitment of every citizen to act according to common basic rules, the recognition of law as the only basis for settling disputes and taking action. Free and fair elections are just one, albeit important, element of democratization. If we establish a democratic and market-based framework that ensures the rule of law and peaceful coexistence, the autocratic de facto regimes will crumble and people will be able to develop their prosperity within functioning structures and civil society will blossom.

Alieva Regimes with a lack of democracy lack the stability to take the risk of changing the status quo and tackle the frozen conflicts. The failure of the negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is the proof.

Byers I agree that the resolution of the frozen conflicts will come through democracy. But that means it will take time. We need to be aware that while new democracies in the region have installed the mechanics of democracy, the political process in these countries is still volatile and not sufficiently based on the internalization of democratic values throughout the country. The way coalitions are formed, the

Challenges in the Region 38 While the frozen conflicts are distinct from each other, they have one thing in common: the key to their solution lies in Moscow.

Tarasyuk

time it takes to form them and their occasional lack of stability is just one aspect I would like to mention. Nobody knows better than Europeans how much time it takes to create flourishing democratic societies — most of our mature democracies went through bloody periods.

At the moment, establishing isolated democratic mechanisms would not lead to Ungureanu a solution to the frozen conflicts. Just the contrary; elections would legitimize … but immediate elections without the separatists and their criminal regimes. In Transnistria for instance, elections ­democratic structure and rule of law would only serve Igor Smirnoff and his bunch of cronies. Democratization is the would strengthen the separatists key to solving these conflicts, but it must be comprehensive and based on a thor- ough democratization of society, thus it has to come via the international com- munity and will probably have to be imposed.

As to the frozen conflicts, the problem is very simple: Russia is not able to ac- Gabashvili cept the loss of political and economic influence in former Soviet Republics like Moscow is responsible Ukraine or Georgia. These countries implemented real democratic change and for the frozen conflicts turned to the West. Russia is trying to institutionalize the conflict with Georgia over Abkhasia and South Ossetia to keep them weak, disintegrated, dependent and prevent them from joining the Euro-Atlantic structures. Some say Georgia should be more cautious when confronting Russia. But we are unwilling to remain under Russian influence because we are now a souver- eign state, and we are unwilling to accept permanent violations of our territorial integrity. Also we are no longer willing to negotiate with Russia under conditions where we are bullied; we must conduct our negotiations transparently and be- tween equal partners.

While the frozen conflicts are distinct from each other, they have one thing in Tarasyuk common: the key to their solution lies in Moscow.

We all agree that the keys to the frozen conflicts lie in Moscow. But during the six Ungureanu months I represented Romania as Chairman in the Office of the Council of Europe, Most actors fail to contribute to my friend and counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repeatedly the resolution of the frozen conflicts told me that we need additional keys that are held in Kiev and Chisinau. He has a because they mistrust each other point, too. At the moment, not only the Russians but most of the actors involved are so suspicious of the other side’s intentions that they refuse to act transpar- ently and honestly. We need to get the international community involved even

39 Frozen Conflicts Kosovo’s independence could lead to a spread of the cancer of separatism all over Europe.

Tarasyuk

more to make sure that the way to solutions can no longer be camouflaged with diplomatic tricks built on mutual distrust.

Erler The claim that the key to solving the frozen conflicts lies in Moscow reminds me of an old German anecdote: Coming home from the pub, Hans sees that his friend Franz is frantically searching for something under a street lantern. “Franz, what are you looking for ?” “My keys ! I lost them at my doorstep !” “Then why are you looking for them under this lantern ?” “Because at my doorsteps there is complete darkness, I can not see anything at all.” No use in looking for a key in the place you wish it was instead of where it really is: The international community has decided to tackle the frozen conflicts with a multilateral approach in which Russia participates. Russia is part of the 5 + 2 process, of the Minsk Process etc.; we may not weaken the multilateral approach by stressing that the key lies in Moscow.

Mingarelli The European Union has been intensifying the political dialogue with Russia over The EU raises the frozen conflicts the frozen conflicts. There has not been one single EU-Russia summit or foreign in each meeting with Moscow minister meeting where we have not raised the frozen conflicts.

Trenin I believe that addressing the ‘frozen conflicts’ in cooperation with Moscow could create a badly needed success story for EU-Russian collaboration. In Transnistria the European Union has become increasingly involved. Russia, the EU and the other parties to the negotiations have not united their efforts, but they could and they should. When I visited Transnistria recently, I was amazed how ‘frozen’ the conflict is and how intense the communications across the dividing lines are. Progress is possible, but neither Russia nor the EU can achieve it alone.

Mingarelli Let me summarize some EU contributions to solving the frozen conflicts: In Tran- snistria the EU is deeply involved through policy and assistance activities. It has an observer status in the 5 + 2 negotiations, and it has sucessfully set up the Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) which helps Moldova control its customs territory. We are planning confidence-buildingmeasures, e. g. a seminar with the Transnis- trian business community in Odessa which will discuss how Transnistria as a part of Moldova could profit from a normal relationship with the EU. In South Ossetia, the EU is a member of the Joint Control Committee and was the most important donor at the recent donor conference in Brussels. We fund a number

Challenges in the Region 40 We must find an adequate solution for the unique situation in Kosovo without getting entangled in precedence and linkage games.

Polenz

of rehabilitation activities and confidencebuilding-measures and will initiate a mas- sive rehabilitation programme as soon as there is a political breakthrough. Two years ago the EU nominated Peter Semneby as special representative for the South Caucasus who has been deeply involved in the negotiations and has backed the efforts of the OECD and the UN.

Today, some of the conflict settlement fora are running at high speed. Even Baas though that has not led to any far-reaching results, it has created a momentum of pragmatism, which is gradually spilling over to the conflict parties. At least their representatives can talk about what is feasible. The fact that the conflict parties are living with an attentive and sizeable international machinery above their heads, makes some of them believe the inter- national community can settle everything. We should try to separate more clearly the competences of the international community from those of the conflict par- ties. What can and should each of them do ? At the moment, there is a temptation for one to hide behind the other.

3. Kosovo as a Precedent ?

Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated recently that Kosovo’s potential in- Rühe dependence might influence the developments in the frozen conflict regions Could the independence of Kosovo because the de facto regimes might try to use it as a precedent. Is that a real encourage separatist tendencies ? threat ? I see a special danger for Abkhazia which has more structural potential for surviving independently than Transnistria or South Ossetia. And if the de facto regimes are looking for a precedent, should that affect the Western policy for Kosovo ?

Kosovo’s indepence could lead to a spread of the cancer of separatism all over Eu- Tarasyuk rope. If the Kosovarians get their own independent state, that would not only be a most welcome precedence for separatists in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh but might also breathe new life into separatist tendencies in the Balkans and even countries like, e. g., Spain.

Of course we must be careful that the decision on Kosovo’s status does not encour- Polenz age separatist tendencies in the Black Sea region, the Balkans, Spain or, if you will, Bavaria.

41 Kosovo as a Precedent? Seriously, Europe is very aware of potential repercussions of the decision on Kosovo. Russia, which used to be opposed to Kosovo independence to prevent set- ting a precedent for Chechnya, now wants to use Kosovo as a precedent for the pro-Russian de facto regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ukraine should not fall into this trap, and neither should the EU. We need to find a sustainable solution for Kosovo soon because otherwise the region will fall victim to violence and insecurity. Let me be very frank, everybody knows that Belgrade will never again govern Pristina. Kosovo’s independence has nothing So what we have to do is find an adequate solution for the unique situation to do with the frozen conflicts in Kosovo without getting entangled in precedence and linkage games. The idea is conditional independence. The process is on a good path under the guidance of the UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari. He might have to impose a status solution but it will be an adequate solution and it will not predestine what happens with the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region.

Tarasyuk Unfortunately, the separatists in Transnistria and South Ossetia do not care about Unfortunately, the separatist de facto the EU’s opinion that conditional independence for Kosovo has no implications regimes see it as a precedence for their so-called countries. They are preparing for the day when Kosovo becomes independent. At a recent meeting, the three “leaders” of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia sent a clear message that they see Kosovo as a precedent for taking action.

Erler So what should the West do in Kosovo ?

Tarasyuk Serbia presented a formula that stops short of full independence for Kosovo. If the EU enforced independence, might lead to the downfall of the current Serbian government and might lead to the re-emergence of Serbian nationalism. The West should therefore carefully consider the formula proposed by Serbia. Also it might be useful to postpone the decision about Kosovo for one or two years to create a window of opportunity for de-escalating the situation in the frozen conflict regions.

von Weizsäcker Each of the conflicts, Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia must be dealt with by its own merits. Of course, even inside the Western Balkans, some people fear repercussions of the Kosovo solution. Many claimed that neighboring Republika

Challenges in the Region 42 Srpska would claim independence if Kosovo becomes independent, but these fears have now been largely alleviated. We cannot allow the separatists in the Black Sea or in the Basque County or Catalonia to be an alibi for abandoning Kosovo. As to the Serbian government, they are not acting as constructively as you described. No leading politician in Belgrade accepts anything that comes close to independence for Kosovo.

Even frozen conflicts are conflicts and thus dangerous and harmful, so if you can Krastev solve one of them you should go ahead. The conflicts must be solved …

As long as human beings are not being killed, it is better to keep a conflict “frozen” Chrysanthopoulos than to implement a solution which might result in further deaths. … but not at the risk of new bloodshed

The Kosovo conflict and the frozen conflicts in our region are different matters Ungureanu which should be dealt with separately. Yesterday I discussed the Kosovo conflict in Belgrade with the Serbian President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica. A compromise in Kosovo seems to be within reach, whereas in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, all our efforts appear to have been in vain up to now. We are knocking on closed doors, and although there is somebody home, the doors will not open. In Kosovo, a solution is conceivable — you might not like it very much but at least it would be a solution.

Accepting a linkage between Kosovo and other unsolved conflicts would get you Krastev trapped in a vicious circle: No problem could ever be solved because its solution could have negative implications elsewhere. Recent political developments offer a unique opportunity to change the unsustainable status quo in Kosovo. First, Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted in 1999 as basis for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), referred only to the territo- rial integrity of the no longer existing Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Second, an independent Kosovo would have a perspective within the EU framework. This is not about independence, but about EU-directed independence. We must not let the opportunity pass that we have today.

Kosovo is very different from Transnistria, South Ossetia and the other frozen Lucas conflicts. Only in Kosovo was there a massive NATO military operation and sev-

43 Kosovo as a Precedent? You know what effect it had in former ­Yugoslavia when borders were challenged and you do not want that surge of violence and ethnic cleansing repeated in this region.

Trenin

eral years of de facto UN administration. In Kosovo, the international community has been involved nearly right from the beginning — and it is now responsible for settling the conflict.

Krastev Concerning the involvement of the international community in Kosovo and the Kosovo is different because of NATO’s role high degree of responsibility NATO took with the air strikes, Kosovo cannot be compared to any of the frozen conflict regions.

Gabashvili You cannot compare Kosovo to Abkhazia. Kosovo’s independence is the punish- ment for Serbia’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. In Abkhazia, the situation was differ- ent because Georgians were expelled and the Abkhazians did the cleansing.

Byers When we decided to send troops into Kosovo, I was a member of the UK cabinet. Nobody within the EU or NATO saw any link at that time between Kosovo and the frozen conflicts.

Rühe While we need a sustainable solution for Kosovo, we have to be aware that other secessionist movements will try to make use of the situation and must make very clear why Kosovo is different from all the other conflicts.

Dempsey There is chance of getting a Security Council resolution on Kosovo without Russia. And Russia is drawing, albeit carefully and always prepared to change its course again, a connection between Kosovo and the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea area. Do you not believe that Russia will try to get something substantial in return for its agreement in the Security Council, and is it impossible that some might be willing to, so to speak, trade Abkhazia ?

Rühe This is why we need to have really good arguments and point out what differenti- ates Kosovo from the other conflicts.

Trenin Russia will not block a decision on the status of Kosovo if Belgrade supports it. We must be extremely careful, though, that this decision does not have repercussions throughout the post-Soviet space. You all know what effect it had in former Yugo- slavia when borders were challenged and you do not want that surge of violence and ethnic cleansing to repeat itself in this region.

Challenges in the Region 44 Today, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria are functioning societies and functioning states at various levels.

King

The Kosovo case ought to be linked absolutely to the cases of the frozen conflicts. King In Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations have not succeeded because If the separatist regions our starting point is always the final status. In Kosovo we went by the rule “stand- implement democratic standards, ards before status” which means talking about functionality, democratisation, dis- why not recognize them ? armament, the return of refugees and human rights before talking about the final status. If the de-facto governments in the frozen conflict regions would accept the comprehensive application of these standards, which up to now they have not been willing to, I see no reason why the international community should not deal with them. After all, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have managed to change their gov- ernment in rather free and fair elections. Neither Azerbaijan, nor Georgia, nor Moldova have managed to do that.

In Kosovo we did not go by the rule “standards before status” but “status and Krastev standards”. Maybe standards before status is the way to solve the frozen conflicts, but we should not draw a direct parallel with Kosovo.

The Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations failed because our starting point was the so- Alieva lution of the territorial question. We have to look at the Caucasus from a higher perspective: a Caucasus where borders become provisional.

We have to be careful about using the term “frozen conflicts”. The conflicts are King only frozen in the sense that there has not been significant violence since the early mid-1990s, but in other respects these regions do in fact change and evolve: Today, Abkhasia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria are function- ing societies and functioning states at various levels. They are unrecognised coun- tries whose de facto independence has created a certain sense of separateness. What to do with them, where do they belong and how can the international community accommodate itself to this reality on the ground ? In the frozen conflict regions, no one can figure out why life would be any People in the frozen conflict regions better in a place called Moldova, Azerbaijan or Georgia. Of course, from the per- do not see why life in Georgia spective of the individuals, life in Suchumi or Tiraspol is not as good as life in or Moldova would be better Tbilisi or Baku, but compared to life in regional cities of Georgia or Azerbaijan, it looks rather better. Whether we like it or not, the functionality of these de facto regions and societies will not go away.

45 Kosovo as a Precedent? Criminals that want to bring prostitutes, arms, drugs or contraband onto the streets of London, Berlin or Hamburg have their route of choice, and that is the Black Sea region.

Byers

Erler Mr. King, you may be right that the frozen conflict regions are to a certain extent functioning — albeit unrecognised — states. But we should not be content with that and decide to do nothing, because each of these frozen conflicts can become a hot conflict within a very short time. That holds true especially for Nagorno-Kara- bakh: the Azeri government is buying weapons with the aid of the new revenues from the energy sector instead of resolving the conflict. The West bears respon- sibility to contribute to the resolution of these conflicts within a multilateral approach.

Gabashvili The term “frozen conflicts” is misleading, not because these are functioning states We see an increasing militarization but because the frozenness of the conflicts is no longer there. Today we see an of the frozen conflict regions increasing militarization and increasing Russian active influence.

Trenin At the end of this year, NATO will decide on Ukraine’s membership perspective. If a Membership Action Plan passes, it will be seen as a guarantee for Ukraine’s accession, because it has led to membership in every single case up to now. This perspective might cause a surge of separatist tendencies. Be careful not to add Crimea to the list of separatist conflicts in the region.

Rühe As some of you have said, the frozen conflict regions are hubs for trafficking and organized crime. Let us analyze the problem of organized crime — which directly threatens the European Union — in more detail.

4. Organized Crime

Ostalep The EU does not see the Black Sea as safe enough to alleviate the visa regime for The region is a hub for trafficking its citizens — for good reasons: trafficking of human beings, organized crime and and organized crime drug smuggling are a well-known fact here.

Byers Eighteen months ago, Tony Blair asked me to investigate the roots of domestic Turkey and Russia are not sufficiently crime in the UK and continental Europe. The message I got from the police and cooperative in the fight against trafficking security services was clear: Criminals that want to bring prostitutes, arms, drugs or contraband onto the streets of London, Berlin or Hamburg have their route of choice, and that is the Black Sea region. Unfortunately, the countries bordering the Black Sea, in particular Turkey and Russia, are not very prepared to allow the EU effective action for closing down these routes.

Challenges in the Region 46 The Black Sea is an important transit area for trafficking: drugs, arms, fissile Mingarelli materials and human beings. To fight these threats, the EU has been developing major cooperation programmes over the last five years, e. g. the Central Asian Drug Action Programme (CADAP) and the Border Management Program in Cen- tral Asia (BOMCA).

47 Organized Crime III. Russia, the US and NATO

Rühe Let us now assess the role of two major players in the region, one of them a lit- toral state and a former hegemon of the Black Sea, the other one the world’s only remaining superpower with important interests in the region. I would like to start with Russia before turning to the United States. And before we analyze Moscow’s policy in the Black Sea, we should take a closer look at how its foreign policy is developing in general.

1. Russia

Trenin In the 1990s, Russia found itself in the uncomfortable position of Pluto in the Western orbit; today it has decided to go on its own trajectory and build its own planetary system. Russia is on its own and has learned to deal with it. That fact is here to stay and has major implications for the Black Sea region. Russia’s policymakers believe that Back in the 1990s, Russia was forced to accommodate the changes in the in- nobody wants a strong Russia ternational environment, which was seen as a geopolitical defeat. But from that it has learned important lessons: Cooperation is not for free — it is achieved through competition and rivalry. You have to work for it, and, if necessary, fight for it. Rus- sia has rediscovered its deeply rooted sense that, in order to be taken seriously, it has to fight its way through. And it realized that no foreign power, major or minor, welcomes a strong Russia. The minor ones fear an overbearing neighbor, the major powers a competitor to be reckoned with. Today’s Russia is self confident, Against this background, a new Russia has emerged. Today’s Russia is self­ nationalistic, inclined to unilateralism, confident, nationalistic, inclined to unilateralism, proactive and smart. First, Rus- proactive and smart sia today has an extremely confident leadership. Look at their biographies: the current political elite is a very successful group of individuals. Russia is at its most confident today since the 1970s when the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity and the SALT I treaty and was finally recognized as a superpower while the United States suffered a humiliating defeat in Vietnam. Second, Russia is catching up with the other countries from the former Soviet Union in becoming nationalistic. Today, national interests and national egotism are a major driving force of Rus- sian policy. Third, current Russian policy is noticeably reminiscent of America’s unilateralist policy of the early 2000s because Russia wants to be a great power and is willing to fight for it. When Russia claims to be an energy great power, “great” is a crucial part of the notion than “energy”. Fourth, Russia left its phase of reactive policy behind in favor of a proactive one. Instead of asking, what are the others doing to us, they are now asking, what can we do to the others ? Fifth,

Russia, the US and NATO 48 Russia was Pluto in the Western orbit, today it has decided to go on its own trajectory and build its own planetary system.

Trenin

Russian policy is becoming and will become more sophisticated. The government is learning from its blunders during the Ukrainian election of 2004 and the gas crisis at the beginning of this year. But let me end on a more conciliatory note: the joy about Ukraine’s victory in the Soccer World Cup today unites Ukrainians and Russians, so some congratula- tions are in order.

Mr. Trenin, Russia is not without friends. As with any other country Russia has Likhachev opponents, but like any other country Russia also has many friends. Listening to the conversation at this table I cannot help but be sure that all those assembled here are friends or at least partners interested in a close cooperation with Russia. I was very glad to hear, though, that Russian diplomacy is becoming increas- ingly sophisticated. Thank you very much for this flattering compliment.

A strong Russia in the sense of a modern, attractive country with good relations Rühe to its neighbors is very much wanted by the EU. The EU wants a strong and modern Russia

Allow me to clearify: First, I was not presenting my own views but analysing what Trenin I believe are the views of important actors in the current Russian leadership. Sec- ond, such an analysis often oversimplifies a bit to make things clearer, and this is what I did deliberately — but with no intention whatsoever to offend anybody. Of course Russia is not friendless. But there are many people in the current Russian leadership who have acknowledged that Western countries are not in- clined to love or thank Russia for peacefully dissolving the Soviet Union in 1991. Instead, they see themselves in a world of realpolitik, which is a tougher world than the one Gorbachev or Yeltsin saw.

Russia and the world have both changed: Russia has experienced Ukraine’s Orange Krastev Revolution as a trauma almost comparable to what 9/11 was for the US, and has started to adopt a much more active foreign policy based on its income from soar- ing oil prices and on a generally much more assertive attitude.

Russia seeks neither enlargement through annexation nor integration with the Trenin Euro-Atlantic community. In the 21st century, sheer size does not define a nation’s Russia seeks neither enlargement nor greatness. Russia’s strength lies in itself. The smaller former republics can be lifted ­integration, its strength lies in itself to a new level of modernization and Europeanization through integration with

49 Russia With GUAM and CDC we are offering Russia a hand of cooperation and friendship; it is now up to Russia to accept it.

Tarasyuk

the EU, but there is no elevator in the Euro-Atlantic community that could lift Russia. Russia needs to and is prepared to go its own thorny path to modernization alone. The smaller republics of the former Soviet Union seek integration and want to belong; Russia wants to be.

Gabashvili One of renowned German-American psychologist Erich Fromm’s major works is titled “To Have or to Be”. While this region’s smaller countries want to be, Russia wants to have.

Rühe Mr. Tarasyuk, which role does Russia play in the Black Sea and how do the other littoral states see their relations to Russia ?

Tarasyuk With regard to energy security or frozen conflicts, much depends on Russia. The Russian Federation is warmly welcomed to cooperate within the existing formats like BSEC, or the newer ones like GUAM and CDC. We are offering Russia a hand of cooperation and friendship; it is now up to Russia to accept it.

Gabashvili GUAM is not designed as an alliance against Russia but has a very concrete com- GUAM is not directed against Russia ponent of cultivating better relations with Moscow.

Trenin You invite Russia to take part in GUAM and CDC. But Russia will only engage on a platform which the Russian leadership will consider fair — and I doubt that a platform set up by others with the support of the US is the right formula. Russia’s predominant interest is to promote linkages among the littoral states of which they are one, not to see these states integrated into networks created from the outside.

Erler It seems a bit euphemistic to me to call GUAM and the CDC as a means for Ukraine Ukraine and Georgia want to lead the and Georgia to extend a hand of friendship and cooperation to Russia. Obviously both reshaping of the region after CIS has failed organizations have a political raison d’être, which is to compete with Russia in re- shaping the post-Soviet space. Russia has failed in that regard. Neither the CIS (Com- monwealth of Independent States) nor the envisaged Single Economic Space were attractive enough to become a stable structure. Now Ukraine and Georgia are trying to fill the resulting political vacuum. Currently, they are leading the reorganization of the region. Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko reinvigorated GUAM and initiated CDC, and they invited US Vice President Dick Cheney to the CDC Summit in May 2005 in Vilnius where he provoked Russia with his aggressive speech.

Russia, the US and NATO 50 It seems a bit euphemistic to call GUAM and the CDC a means to extend a hand of friendship to Russia. Their raison d’être is to compete with Russia in reshaping the post-Soviet space.

Erler

On the other hand, one must acknowledge that Russia has failed to successfully take the lead for a comprehensive and widely accepted framework of regional inte- gration in the Black Sea region for 15 years. A strong Russia has had its chance, so to speak, now the governments of the region are trying to find different leadership.

Russia never wanted to reshape the post Soviet space with the CIS as you suggest. Trenin The CIS, as Ukrainian President Kravchuk once put it, was a tool for dissolving the CIS was created to organise the civilised former Soviet Union and forming new states out of the former republics. It should ­dissolvement of the Soviet Union — be praised for this marvelous achievement, not blamed for failing to do things it and has been a tremendous success was never intended for. Today, Russia has moved on. The CIS no longer plays an important role in the political considerations of Russia’s foreign policy elite.

True, former Ukrainian President Kravchuk called the CIS a mechanism of civi- Tarasyuk lized divorce, but Russia tried to lead the CIS for many years. Moscow would have liked to dominate and it was the newly independent states’ relentless strive for true independence that allowed them to become political subjects instead of objects of Russian policy. Ukraine, for example, has pursued an independent foreign policy and played an active role in reshaping the post-Soviet space. This often displeased Russia, as did the creation of GUAM as a competing multilateral framework.

CIS never really worked and is going to be dissolved soon. Its demise might lead Gabashvili to exploitation by transferring the political component of CIS to, e. g., BSEC and thus give BSEC more punch. As to Georgia’s allegedly too aggressive stance concerning Russia: Of course Russia is an important partner for us and we are in no way interested in cutting all ties to this big neighbor.

Russia is playing a major role and must be part of any regional approach to make Ungureanu success possible.

Russia holds the key to solving the frozen conflicts and to energy security but Byers instead of using the key they exert pressure on the international stage with their pivotal role. Russia is ready to use energy as a political tool. The West must use the next G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, and the German chairmanship of the G-8 next year, as an opportunity to reach an understanding with Russia on this issue.

51 Russia The EU must create an atmosphere of cooperation with Russia, which requires convincing Moscow that we can create win-win situations.

Polenz

We need to engage Russia — Russian concern Our general policy must be to engage Russia, which in its turn requires ana- about NATO enlargment is understandable lyzing why at the moment Russia is not interested as much as we would like it to be in performing a constructive role. The first reason, to my mind, is that Russia feels threatened by possible NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia. The US would feel much the same way if a Russian-led military alliance were to extend to Mexico, Canada and Cuba. It is up to the West to build confidence and take Russian concerns seriously. Only then might Russia feel safe enough to give away what is in fact bargaining power on the international stage.

Trenin Just like the new Russia openly pursues its interests around the world, it does so Russia openly pursues its interests particularly in the Black Sea as its direct neighborhood. in the Black Sea region It was a miracle without historical precedent that Russia as an imperial power simply waved its empire off by allowing the Soviet Republics to become independ- ent. To assess how painful this process was one just needs to recall that Russians have called Ukraine “Little Russia” since the 17th century. Do not expect a similar miracle to happen again. Not that Russia would try to undo the breakaway of the Ex-Soviet Republics. But a top priority is to derail or at least delay NATO’s expan- sion. Russia refuses to give up Sevastopol earlier than 2017 (when the 1997 lease agreement ends) because the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory prevents Ukraine from becoming a member of NATO. This is just one example for how far Russia will go to prevent its neighbors in the Black Sea region from attaching themselves quickly and permanently to the West.

Byers At the moment, Russia feels that international politics is a zero-sum game and that finally they are powerful enough not to have to engage in international consulta- tions and multilateral meetings used to lure them into disadvantageous deals. We need to put much more energy into demonstrating to the Russian government that it indeed has convergent interests with the West in certain areas, that win- win situations are possible and that it is in the Russian interest to create and make use of such win-win situations. If Russia, which at present undeniably has a very strong hand, does not play her cards for fear of compromising her position, her will might be increasingly devalued when other players join the game, including the Islamic world and an increasingly powerful China.

Polenz The central challenge for the EU in the Black Sea is to create an atmosphere of cooperation with Russia, which requires convinc Moscow that we can create win-

Russia, the US and NATO 52 The EU and the US underestimate that the Russian Federation constitutes a very serious competing pole of attraction.

Krastev

win situations. As long as Russia sees politics in the region as a zero-sum game its objective will be to preserve its zone of influence and keep out the US. Thus, while the EU puts an emphasis on transforming its partner states by promoting modernisation, democracy, human rights, rule of law etc., Russia does not care very much how countries govern themselves. It is interested solely in keeping the respective nation within its sphere of influence. Conflicts of interest with Russia are a real danger. The Orange Revolution The EU’s energy projects are mainly about has demonstrated that. And if we assess the EU’s interests in the region, there is circumventing Russia as a transit country sufficient potential for conflict: Regarding energy the EU’s projects are mainly about creating pipelines to Western Europe that circumvent Russia. Regarding NATO, taking in Ukraine or Georgia would directly contradict Russia’s perceived interests — let me just mention the Black Sea Fleet. Even though we must not give Russia a veto right concerning EU and NATO policy in the region, we must put more effort into explaining our policy to Mos- cow, act transparently and make clear that we take Russian concerns seriously.

The EU and the US underestimate Russia’s attraction on the other states of the Krastev region. The Russian Federation constitutes a very serious competing pole of at- traction. Even if the door to EU membership was open — which it is not — not as many people as you think would want to enter. The last World Bank report shows that the former Communist bloc is, at least in economic terms, split into two regions. One is very much oriented towards the EU — the new member states and the Balkans — but the other, consisting of the former Soviet republics minus the Baltic States, is in the Russian economic sphere of influence. Recently, Rus- sia has been receiving more guest workers than most EU countries. It will be an important challenge for the EU to negotiate its common neighborhood with the Russian Federation in such a way that the political independence of the countries concerned will be assured.

If Russia supported the development of our societies by fostering cultural life, if it Alieva supported the role of Russian as lingua franca in the post Soviet-space, people here Generous cultural policy could improve might actually begin to see their big neighbor much more positively. ­Russia’s picture in the region

Today Russia might not attract the governments of the former countries of the Trenin Soviet Union, but it attracts their citizens. They move to Russia, work to our mu- tual benefit and send remittances back to their home countries, strengthening

53 Russia their respective economies. Also, as far as cultural contributions are concerned, I suggest you do not entirely deny Russia the praise it deserves for what it has accomplished. Whenever I travel to Baku, or to Odessa, I am proud of Russia’s historical contribution to this vast region.

Tarasyuk You are are legitimately proud of Russia’s contribution to the modernization of former Soviet Republics. But on the other hand, these countries have contributed immensely to Russia’s wealth. Ukrainian experts played an important role in help- ing Russia explore resources in Siberia, and workers from all the former Soviet Republics gave their labor — sometimes their lives — for Russia’s well-being.

Byers As to Russia’s role as a competing pole of attraction, the relationship of Russia and Will Turkey develop its relation to Russia Turkey is of particular interest to me. It has the potential to become a very, very as an alternative to EU integration ? significant partnership. It is not impossible that in the context of prospectively difficult negotiations for EU accession, Turkey will use her closer relationship with Moscow as a bargaining chip. The EU is not the only institution that can create regional frameworks. The possibility of new strategic alliances within the region which could change the whole political dynamic is a very real one.

Yakiş Turkey regards its relations with Russia as very important and is prepared to de- velop them in a mutually beneficial way quite independently of membership negotiations with the EU. We do not consider these two sets of relations as being exclusive alternatives to each other or as bargaining assets in an elaborate tripar- tite diplomacy. It would be unwise and indeed unethical for a country to engage in something that would look like blackmail. We will not do that. Both relations are important and to some extent complementary. The closer our relations with Russia, the more the EU will value a Turkish membership. And the closer our rela- tions with the EU, the more Russia will appreciate its relation with Turkey.

Trenin Russia is increasingly looking south. Historically, Moscow focussed on Constan- A “Southern Dimension” is being added as tinople for centuries, but during many decades of the Soviet era the South was a strong asset to Russia’s foreign policy not a priority. It is becoming more important again. The first reason is the re- gion’s importance as a transit corridor for energy. Second, Russia’s relations with Southern partners are blossoming, starting with Turkey. After so many wars and so much hostility, this partnership is today among the best Russia has. Also, the

Russia, the US and NATO 54 The United States’ vigorous pursuit of its interests threatens to make the Black Sea a region of conflict again.

Yakiş

relations with Greece have been given a huge boost in the last 15 years. And, after an impasse following long years of over-engagement during the Cold War, Mos- cow is also returning to the Middle Eastern diplomatic stage. Essentially, a whole “Southern Dimension” is being added as a strong asset to Russia’s foreign policy.

2. USA

Russia’s role is an object of conflicting views, as we have seen — is the perception Rühe of the United States more positive ? The US has been very active in the region for quite a while — let me just mention their support for the creation of GUAM and their instrumental role in making the BTC pipeline possible. Today, one of Wash- ington’s most controversial projects is a potential NATO enlargement.

Today, the United States’ vigorous pursuit of its interests threatens to make the Yakiş Black Sea a region of conflict again. It endangers a precarious balance of power that has helped end quarrels and violence dominating the region for centuries. In 1936, the Montreux convention restored Turkish authority — at Turkey’s request — over the Turkish Straits and allowed their remilitarization. For decades, the Black Sea region has survived very well with that regulation — it served the littoral countries well enough, only the US could be interested in changing anything. For selfish interests, though, the United States risk the well-being of the whole region.

The role of the US in the Black Sea area might indeed have negative effects because Chrysanthopoulos they do not know the area as we do. Turkey and Russia have a long history and a long-standing experience with the region; the EU not only through Greece but also through the accession of Romania and Bulgaria has acquired considerable expertise. Those are the players that know how to deal with the region.

Mr. Yakiş and Mr. Chrysantopulos share Russia’s objections to the United States’ Polenz becoming a player in the region. On the other hand, NATO member states like Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey perceive the US role much more positively, and the same goes for Georgia. I personally doubt, for example, that the conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh can be solved without American assistance.

The US agenda for the Black Sea region deserves more attention because it might Rahr have a stronger impact than Brussels’ ideas — it may eventually swallow up the

55 USA From the US perspective, we have a chance to replay history in a different way. An independent Ukraine and Georgia survive, Turkey is tied to Europe and Poland as a key ally of the US plays an important part in the region.

King

The US wants to expand NATO into the whole EU agenda. Expanding NATO into the Caucasus clearly is an attempt to cre- Caucasus to create an alternative platform ate an alternative platform for the fight against terrorism in case the US loses its for the fight against terrorism allies in Central Asia. We should try to think through the impact of this strategy on the region.

King Let me explain what to my mind guides US policy in the region and why that approach is not received very favorably by the Europeans. To highlight the differ- ences between the American and the EU approach I would not say that Europeans are from Venus and Americans are from Mars, but that they are guided by differ- ent perceptions. Let me explain it in historical analogies that might also guide, even if only implicitly, policy makers in America and Europe. Europe’s policy in the Black Sea region seems to be based on a perception ana- log to what the region was like in the 1880s: The Ottoman Empire’s retreat from the Western Balkans was in full swing, Serbia and Montenegro were independent countries, Romania became independent and Bulgaria autonomous. Europe was becoming dependent on Russian grain shipped via Odessa and on oil produced in Baku. Because of its economic vulnerability, Europe needed strong economic ties to the Black Sea region. A rapprochement between the European powers and Rus- sia took place after several decades of humiliation of imperial Russia by England and France — most recently in the Crimean War. Europe sees the situation today similary. The US, by contrast, feels it has a unique opportunity to use a situation similar to the 1920s to replay history with a happy ending instead of the catastrophes of the 20th century. In the early 1920s the region had been fundamentally reshaped by the First World War. Modern Turkey was on the rise after the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, revolutionary Russia became powerful but a problematic one, Europe was aimless in its foreign policy because of its focus on domestic problems, and Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan experienced a brief period of independence. From the US perspective, we have a chance to replay the history of the 1920s in a different way: an independent Ukraine and Georgia survive, Turkey is tied to Europe instead of dismissed, and Poland as a key ally of the United States plays an important role in the region.

Rühe If you allow me to add one detail: To my mind there is one crucial difference to the the 1880s and 1920s: today the EU is present as a major player. Is the US suf- ficiently aware of that ?

Russia, the US and NATO 56 We must make it clear to Russia that NATO enlargement is not about uniting the region against a common enemy. von Weizsäcker

3. NATO Enlargement

The US is one of the most important promoters of NATO enlargement in the Rühe region. Which impacts does NATO’s policy have on the development of the Black Sea ?

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the West seized the chance to integrate some Tarasyuk of the littoral states. In the Black Sea, the two major political phenomena of our In the Black Sea, the two major political time — the enlargement of NATO and the EU — are taking place simultaneously. ­phenomena of our time — NATO and EU Romania and Bulgaria are already members of NATO and will soon join the Eu- enlargement — are taking place simultaneously ropean Union, while Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, has recently started negotiations with the EU. As you know, Georgia is aiming at NATO membership and the new Ukrainian coalition government has just decided to seek NATO mem- bership pending the results of the all-Ukrainian referendum.

If Ukraine acceedes to NATO, every trait of triumphalism needs to be carefully Chrysanthopoulos avoided in order not to provoke Russia. On the other hand, NATO has been present in the Black Sea ever since the accession of Turkey in 1952, and in 1999 NATO’s presence was consolidated with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO had lost its enemy. Nothing is as awkward von Weizsäcker for a defence alliance as losing its enemy. Suddenly nobody knew the reason why NATO existed. The war in Kosovo did not resolve this problem even though it was the first example of what NATO could be asides from a defence alliance. Today, NATO no longer needs an enemy but should aim to foster stability in the whole world as a political alliance. Therefore we have to think about enlarge- ment in the Black Sea region. At the same time we need to avoid even the faintest impression that NATO is looking for a new enemy when it takes up certain coun- tries and leaves out others. We must make it clear especially to Russia that NATO enlargement is not about uniting the region against a common enemy.

NATO enlargement is becoming a very important issue in the region, and conflicts Rahr may be inevitable. We all have to think very clearly about how not to spoil the rela- Russia will not give in to NATO’s enlargement tionship with Russia which has been built in the past 15 years, if NATO expansion into the Black Sea as willingly as to the Caucasus should really become a reality. Can we really expect that Russia it did to its expansion into the Baltic will give in to NATO’s enlargement into the Black Sea area as willingly and void

57 NATO Enlargement We should be careful not to push NATO’s enlargement forward too quickly in a time when the EU cannot take up new members. NATO is not just a military organization; it also stands for specific values.

Rühe

of conflict as it did when NATO expanded into the Baltic Sea ? It is highly unlikely that Moscow would abandon its naval base in Sevastopol without any resistance, thereby locking its valued Black Sea Fleet into the Sea of Azov.

Polenz Inviting Ukraine or Georgia to join NATO would be perceived by Moscow as a direct violation of their interests, and not without good reasons. The concern for Russia’s Black Sea fleet is very understandable and makes Ukraine’s accession dif- ferent from, e. g., the accession of the Baltic states. We must take Russia’s concerns seriously and make our policy transparent — even though we can of course not let Russia decide who joins NATO and who does not.

Yakiş Any warship, not to mention entire fleets, deployed to the Black Sea endanger the precarious balance of power enshrined in the Montreux convention and is likely to lead to an escalation of maritime power play and thus to destabilization.

Stüdemann Concerning Ukraine’s possible NATO membership, much depends on the atti- tude of the USA. Washington has signalised it would back Ukraine’s member- ship if Ukraine re-opens its gas deal with Moscow. That seems to me a very easy- ­going attitude in a problematic situation: confrontation with Russia is damaging for everybody. We need stability, not confrontation. Every state in the world, especially every European state, has the right to intensify its relations with NATO — which applies to Ukraine as well as to Russia. This is how the argument should go.

Rühe Regarding EU and NATO expansion, we should be careful not to push NATO’s enlargement forward too quickly in a time when the EU cannot take up new members. During the last fifteen years, both processes advanced in Eastern Eu- rope in parallel and were mutually dependent with good reason. NATO is not just a military organization; it also stands for specific values. This perspective may become lost if we push too forcefully and prematurely for the military integration of the Black Sea countries while there is no imminent chance of EU accession and, consequentially, the democratic transformation of these countries is lagging behind. Military structures can be adapted to NATO standards in no time, and the problems posed by outdated military hardware are rather just of a technical nature. But we do not want to integrate tanks; we want to integrate people and not just those people who are driving the tanks.

Russia, the US and NATO 58 NATO is one possibility to stabilize the region. Even though it will not solve the Himmelreich frozen conflicts, NATO could help countries like Georgia or Ukraine to design a NATO can teach Georgia and Ukrain how transparent, reliable and effective defense policy. NATO and Russia could improve to design a modern defence policy … their relations too, e. g. in the NATO-Russia council. We should offer this opportu- nity to Russia — if it wants to use it, good, if not — that is their choice. Even more important than NATO are the integration instruments that the … and the EU’s integration instruments EU can offer beyond a membership prospective, like a revised ENP and a further are even more important developed ESDP; to offer these EU tools to the countries of the region, however, requires a strong common political will and pursuit of all the 25, soon 27, EU member-states to support this integration.

In 2004 NATO launched two projects in Azerbaijan. In September a multinational Alieva military exercise in Baku was planned with the participation of Armenian offic- ers and in November a NATO Parliamentary Assembly seminar took place in Baku with the participation of Armenian deputies. This led the Azeri government to a dilemma. Certainly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has to be resolved and our relations to Armenia have to be improved. But until today Armenia occupies 20 % of the Azeri territory. If the Azeri government had allowed the Armenian officers to participate in the exercise, the Azeri people would not have understood. Like everyone else we have our sensivities. I cannot understand why the NATO exer- cise and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly seminar could not have been stayed somewhere else.

59 NATO Enlargement IV. Regional Cooperation

Rühe Having analyzed the challenges of the Black Sea region and two of its major play- ers, let us now turn to which political frameworks could help to tackle the existing challenges. To which extent should the countries of the region themselves initiate frameworks for cooperation ?

1. Is There a Need for More Regional Cooperation ?

Ostalep In contrast to the Balkans the Black Sea region neither speaks with one voice Does the Black Sea need more nor has a common goal. Thanks to European and American financial support, regional cooperation ? the Western Balkan states have the Stability Pact and follow the common goal of NATO and EU membership. They recognize that speaking to each other and mutually supporting each other is the only way. Unfortunately, our region has still yet to realize this. Only once we have dealt with our security problems like organized crime on a regional level will we be able to approach the EU as a serious actor.

Chrysanthopoulos As trade has always unified the region while politics has divided it, we have to bring the economy back into the foreground. Infrastructure plays a key role, that is why Greece submitted — and BSEC supported — an ambitious roadbuilding project, the “Road of the Argonauts”. Named after the mythological heroes who accompanied Jason on his search for the Golden Fleece in Colchis (an ancient region now part of Georgia), this road will connect Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Turkey. Trucks, traders and tourists will move more easily from one coastal area to the other.

Krastev According to many economists, what drives the economy today are large cities and urban areas: Global cities like London matter much more than England itself. Martin Wolf from the Financial Times developed this thought in “National Wealth on City Life’s coattails” (FT, May 2, 2006). In the Black Sea region, port cities like Odessa and Varna will be the potential driving force for economic progress — de- spite the current economic weakness of the Ukraine and Bulgaria. One has to think beyond trade: Tourism generates much more money than trade in some coastal cities. Think, for example, of Dubai’s success story in the United Arab Emirates.

Himmelreich Looking at the potential of the region for integration, one is struck by parallels to German history. Germany used to be split up into various principalities, king-

Regional Cooperation 60 doms and dukedoms for centuries until the “white revolutionary” Bismarck fi- Economic cooperation should lay nally achieved the unification all these territories in the German Empire finally in the foundation for forging closer ties 1870/71. That was only the final step of a longer process by a pragmatic functional between different entities integration of important areas of state governance. Friedrich List’s “Deutscher Zollverein” was a starting point; as a tariff union founded in 1833 it had laid into force, in 1834, the foundations by creating an economic union. Economic links can allow cooperation among entities with a very different cultural history. The same principle of pragmatic functional integration is the rationale behind the success story of the EU integration: it started with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and during the following EU integration process other areas were included step-by-step — always with the final objective of a political union in mind.

2. Frameworks: BSEC, GUAM, CDC

Let us now turn to the existing formats for regional cooperation. There is no lack Rühe of competition: BSEC, GUAM and CDC are just some of the most current acronyms when it comes to who wants to unify the Black Sea countries. I would like to ask Borys Tarasyuk to give us an overview of the formats we are dealing with.

Regional frameworks have emerged or grown increasingly important in recent Tarasyuk years. The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM, the Regional frameworks have emerged or grown Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), and the Black Sea Economic Coopera- increasingly important in recent years tion (BSEC) aim at stability, cooperation and the implementation of European values and standards. In May 2006, GUAM (an acronym of its members, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbai- jan and Moldova) became a full-fledged regional organization. The first official GUAM summit took place in Kiev, which is the location of the organization’s headquarters. GUAM’s main goals are democratization, conflict settlement and economic development. GUAM was started with support of the US in October 1997 at the margins of the Council of Europe Summit in Strasbourg by the presidents of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In the Yalta charter, signed by the presidents in 2001, GUUAM (during Usbekistans membership 1999 –2005) grew in institutional importance by setting up annual meetings of the heads of state of the members as its supreme body, the Council of Foreign Ministers as its execu- tive body, and a Committee of National Coordinators as its working body. After

61 Frameworks: BSEC, GUAM, CDC Usbekistan left GUUAM in 2005, Ukraine played an important role in revitalising GUAM as a forum for democracy, stability and economic development. Hopefully, the parliaments of all four members’ states will ratify the GUAM charter to bring it into force this fall. The Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) is another example of successful regional cooperation. In August 2005 Ukraine’s President Yushchenko and Geor- gia’s President Saakashvili initiated the process with the Borjomi Declaration, which envisions a “powerful instrument for removing the remaining divisions in the Baltic-Black Sea region, human rights violations, and any type of confronta- tion, or frozen conflict”. For the first time in history, such an initiative embraces the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea regions. Its members today are Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine, among the numerous observers are the EU and the OSCE. We have already had meet- ings in Kiev (December 2005), Tbilisi (March 2006) and Vilnius (May 2006), and at the beginning of this month there was another meeting in Bucharest. It is a very dynamic process, which will be further accelerated this fall in Tbilisi, when the parliamentary dimension of this format will be addressed. It is very promising in terms of establishing security through confidence building, and, as I said before, the CDC is not aimed against anyone, but directed towards common goals like prosperity and stability. This also holds true for the oldest of the recently established regional organi­ zations, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), a process started in June 1992 with the Bosporus Statement. Eleven countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbai- jan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) expressed their commitment to reach peace, stability and prosperity via multi- lateral policy. BSEC covers a region with 350 million people and the second largest oil and natural gas resources after the Persian Gulf.

Rühe I would like to invite you to elaborate a little bit on the different frameworks. What are their respective strengths and weaknesses ?

Chrysanthopoulos BSEC is the only inclusive format for cooperation and the best working body of BSEC is the only inclusive format and cooperation in the Black Sea region, especially since it has now embarked on a the best working body in the region process to make itself a practical, effective and project-oriented organisation and leave behind a certain tendency of producing too many declarations and too little concrete results.

Regional Cooperation 62 BSEC is the only political organisation uniting all littoral states including Russia and Turkey. GUAM and the CDC have been created by specific littoral states to pursue a common agenda.

Baas

One project is the ring highway called ‘The Road of the Argonauts,’ a 7.100 km artery circling the whole Black Sea. Connected to the European highway system it would foster trade by facilitating overland transport of goods and improve tour- ism infrastructure. By fostering economic development it could also contribute to political stability. The ‘Road of the Argonauts’ would also connect the European road network to that of Asia and vice versa.

BSEC is the only political organisation uniting all the littoral states around the Baas Black Sea including Russia and Turkey. GUAM and the CDC have been created by some littoral states to pursue a broader common agenda. BSEC has one big advantage. With its economic focus it makes use of the Only BSEC brings the port cities’ whole regional potential including the port cities’ cosmopolitan spirit. At the ­cosmopolitan potential together with same time it brings together the capitals, which in some cases may be less cosmo- the capitals’ geopolitical focus politan, but are in charge of the decisive geopolitical directions of their countries’ policies. We need to find a political vision bringing together the wider agenda of the international community with the more Black Sea-centered view of the lit- toral states. BSEC might create a good basis for that.

BSEC can be a very important forum because it is inclusive: The Black Sea is Thumann very dependent on decisions taken elsewhere: NATO and EU enlargement and the relations between the Western players and Russia determine the fate of the region to a large extent. There is a real danger of the Black Sea region becom- ing hostage to disagreements between outside players. Just think of the visit of US Vice President Cheney to Europe where he spoke about NATO expansion, think of the estrangement between the old allies US and Turkey because of the Kurdish question and the disagreement about establishing a Northern front for the Iraq invasion, or finally about the energy and enlargement dispute between Russia and the EU. We need to find a forum where we can discuss these issues with all countries involved. Up to now, the only inclusive forum I see would be BSEC.

BSEC has to deal with bilateral conflicts among its member states that prevent Ostalep them from cooperating, e. g. Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia, and Russia and Georgia. We cannot make use of the potential for political cooperation before we overcome these political deadlocks.

63 Frameworks: BSEC, GUAM, CDC BSEC is a political fiction, and an especially uninspiring one.

Krastev

Chrysanthopoulos Actually, just that is more a strength or an untold success story of BSEC than a problem: BSEC is a forum where states that rarely speak to each other — such as Armenia and Azerbaijan — can cooperate in practical ways. Sometimes this frame- work provides an opportunity for private consultations on the sidelines.

Ungureanu As to BSEC, it still remains to be seen what its next concrete steps will be. Russia’s role will become clearer during the Russian Federation’s chairmanship beginning in May 2006. We cannot help but acknowledge that BSEC has been facing some serious problems and shortcomings for quite a while. On the other hand, it is the only existing inclusive institutionalized form of cooperation that could initiate or implement regional projects. All other formats are dialogs or groups of selected countries.

Krastev Does it really make sense for twelve completely divergent countries to come to- BSEC came into being in a specific gether and cook up the concept of a Black Sea region ? As I said, I believe that historical context, but that does not regions are political fictions; and to my mind BSEC is an especially uninspiring make it a functional organisation one. BSEC came into being in a specific historical context because of a specific political constellation, but that legacy does not make it a functional organisation. Just give me one incentive why Albania should care ! Or take my home country: during the past 15 years I have not heard a single Bulgarian politician of any importance discussing BSEC. They send diplomats to conferences, yes, but it was never an issue in political debates.

Gabashvili GUAM is an important vehicle for probably the most crucial process in the region: democratisation. Our countries must overcome the heritage of 70 or 80 years of undemocratic life. Also, GUAM can unite the voices of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbeijan when appealing to the international community to put the frozen conflicts on the international agenda. Finally, in the future GUAM may make some very concrete contributions, e. g. organizing peacekeeping forces or facilitating energy transfer by harmonizing standards, tarriffs etc.

Alieva Whatever framework of regional cooperation we are talking about, these organi- sations should start to offer effective mechanisms for conflict resolution. I think GUAM has actually set a good example by agreeing upon the core principles of ter-

Regional Cooperation 64 ritorial integrity, respect for sovereignty and human rights. These are principles also found within the conditionality parameter set by the EU for accession can- didates. A regional organisation open to all those subscribing to these principles could have a beneficial and stabilizing impact.

A central goal of GUAM is to protect the infrastructure for energy transfer. How Rahr exactly will the member states cooperate within their security network to protect pipelines ? And how does Ankara react to such a GUAM policy directly concerning pipelines on Turkish territory ?

Since I am no longer holding a cabinet position, I cannot speak on the behalf of the Yakiş Turkish government. However, my perception is that Ankara favours initiatives for cooperation coming form the region over those imported or imposed from abroad. Since GUAM is truly a regional initiative, Turkey has no objections against it. But as far as the protection of pipelines is concerned, I cannot imagine how a multilateral organization might be of much help in this field. Every country must safeguard pipelines within its own borders but cannot do anything beyond its border.

As to the relation between GUAM and BSEC, fortunately, all members of GUAM are Chrysanthopoulos members of BSEC, so we are in a position to avoid any duplications. At a recent GUAM meeting I was asked to explain BSEC’s official position GUAM should address only security issues towards GUAM. I told the four presidents present at the meeting that fortunately and leave economic cooperation to BSEC all their countries also belong to BSEC; they know exactly what BSEC does and can thus prevent duplication. My understanding is that GUAM will mainly address security issues which BSEC does not cover so far.

Let us look not only at BSEC and GUAM or at how the West is trying to reshape the Rahr Black Sea region, but also at a new multilateral actor: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The organization, founded in 2001, has six members (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and four observers (Mongolia, Pakistan, India and Iran). A few months ago, it adopted its own security agenda and Russia and China are working on a new concept of Eurasia. Russia and China working together in such a way is a new and very important phenomenon, and if Yuri Lushkov’s prediction of SCO becoming a new gas OPEC turns out to be true, the West will certainly not be able to ignore that new entity.

65 Frameworks: BSEC, GUAM, CDC We may witness a new division of the post-Soviet space between a pro-Western GUAM structure and a pro-Eastern Shanghai Cooperation Organization sphere.

Rahr

We might witness a new division of the post-Soviet space between a pro-West- ern GUAM structure and a pro-Eastern Shanghai Cooperation Organization sphere. But there is still time to avoid new rivalries. Germany, which will preside over the EU in the first half of 2007, could take the lead in formulating a more cooperative European Security and Defense Policy towards the post-Soviet space.

Himmelreich In the future we will no longer be confronted with the familiar formations of West Today there are too many players for one or versus East or USA versus Russia. There are too many players with competing in- two fixed blocs to dominate foreign policy terests for one or two fixed blocs to dominate foreign policy. New formats like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization contribute to the dynamics of the situation. Today Russia uses its energy reserves to exert political pressure, China subordi- nates its foreign and security goals to its energy needs, and the United States try to assure the free global access to oil. In conflict with Iran, China is cooperating with the West to some extent because it knows that only the United States are able to guarantee free access to energy resources. Iran, the second largest owner of global oil and gas reserves has all the potential to become an important energy power. Turkey’s decisive strategic role for the Western energy security seems to be entirely underestimated.

Regional Cooperation 66 V. What Role Should the EU Play ?

Let us now analyze the European future of the Black Sea region. Before we go Rühe into the details of EU policy, let me start with a provocative question: Will the Black Sea become a European mare nostrum ? Yasir Yakiş from the European Union Harmonisation Commission in the Turkish parliament in Ankara, what is your opinion ?

1. A Mare Nostrum of the EU ?

I cannot predict whether the Black Sea will become a mare nostrum of the EU, but Yakiş I know that it is and will remain mare mia. I was born on the Black Sea coast and learned to swim before I could walk. The Black Sea is my sea and if the others cannot share, I will keep it for myself.

My reply to the question of whether the Black Sea will become a European mare Couniniotis nostrum is absolutely negative: First we as Greeks dislike this specific term. It The Black Sea must remain open was used by Mussolini before the Second World War as a slogan to euphemize for the collaboration of everybody his expansionist schemes towards the Balkans and the Aegean Sea. Second, and more important we believe that the Black Sea is a sea open for collaboration of everybody, not a closed club for some countries. Out of respect for the people of the region, no foreign power should seek to integrate the region through an octroi — neither Russia, the United States nor the European Union. The Black Sea region belongs to over two dozen different ethnic groups and nationalities which are dispersed among the several countries of the region. National minorities often play important roles, and at the same time the respective ethnic groups’ entitlement to specific territories is a bone of contention in many ways.

The briefest possible answer to the question of whether the Black Sea will become Erler a European mare nostrum in the future, would be a plain ‘No’. The Black Sea was The times of empires that make a mare nostrum during three historical periods: the time of the Byzantine Em- the Black Sea a mare nostrum are over pire, the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Empire. But the times of empires have passed, and this makes a mare nostrum status very unlikely. The Black Sea will have to constrict itself to being Mr. Yakiş’ mare mia instead of anybody’s mare nostrum — which is not bad after all. Instead, the Black Sea will remain a political patchwork of various vectors, options and relations.

67 A Mare Nostrum of the EU ? All defining issues of the 21st century happen to be particularly relevant here — national identity challenged by globalization, migration and refugee movements, oil and energy supply, democratic ­values in a changing world, and the rise of Islam.

Byers

Trenin If Russians hear the notion mare nostrum applied to the Black Sea, they believe that “nostrum” refers to the littoral states, not to an EU lake. The Black Sea is a European mare nostrum, though, in the sense that it is a European sea, not an EU sea. Recently, people have become accustomed to say ‘Europe’ when they mean the European Union. Of course, the enlargement proc- ess begets and keeps alive the perception of the EU successively integrating all European countries. But the EU will not cover the whole of Europe within the foreseeable future. This notion of Europe distinct from the EU should be preserved as an analytical and political tool: it correctly links Russia to the EU in a way dif- ferent from many other partner countries.

2. The EU’s Interests in the Region

Rühe Now let us move to a more concrete level: What policy should the EU pursue in the Why should the EU care for the region ? Black Sea ? My first question would be: Why should the EU care for the region ?

Byers The Black Sea region draws a great deal of its political importance from two cir- cumstances: First, all defining issues of the 21st century happen to be particularly relevant here — national identity challenged by globalization, migration and refu- gee movements, oil and energy supply, democratic values in a changing world, and the rise of Islam.

Yakiş The main challenge is not the rise of Islam in the Black Sea region — Turkey is a secular state with a Muslim population, and none of the other littoral states is a Muslim country. It is the growing importance of the Caspian energy resources for the West that attracts the big players.

Byers Second, the region raises the fundamental questions which the EU is facing: How far do Europe’s boundaries extend ? And: How should the EU be structured in the coming decades ? The Black Sea is strategically important Today, the EU, Russia and the United States all see the region as strategically for the EU, Russia and the United States important and pursue major interests here. While Europe wants to stabilize its neighborhood by offering membership or close cooperation, Russia uses energy resources to exert influence, whereas the United States pushes for the expansion of NATO to secure energy supplies, ensure the infrastructure for their War on Terror and deal with the rise of Islam.

What Role Should the EU Play ? 68 This competition between the EU, Russia and the US must not only be taken into account when developing European initiatives. The major players’ actions also make it increasingly hard for the countries of the Black Sea region itself to determine their own fate. I hope that they will have a chance to decide on their own if they want the Black Sea to be be a bridge or a divide between regions, cultures and religions.

Should the Black Sea be a focus for EU policy ? First of all, we welcome the increasing Erler interest for the region expressed in a number of conferences. The Black Sea is im- Its importance for energy portant for the EU because, first, it has a great potential for enhancing its economi- supply and security … cal well being through intensified cooperation among the BSEC countries, second it has a potential for increased trade with other regions, third, it is an important transit route for energy supplies, and finally it is a crucial important security chal- lenge for the EU because of its lack of efficient border control and its being an origin for organised crime and trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings.

In the first fifteen years after the demise of the Soviet Union the Black Sea region Rahr was not seen as a political entity at all. It lay on the outskirts of Europe because the consolidation of European happened in the Baltic Sea and Mediterranean regional cooperation. In the 1990s the EU made a first cautious attempt to formulate an Eastern policy with its the Northern Dimension. Now the situation has changed dramatically and brought the Black Sea into … as well as the coloured revolutions and the limelight of world politics. Two coloured revolutions — in Georgia and in the activities of several players bring the Ukraine — led to a massive transfer of Western influence to the region. The EU region into the limelight of world politics has begun serious attempts at solving the frozen conflicts for the first time — es- pecially Transnistria with the help of Ukraine. GUAM is manifesting itself as a serious political entity and an instrument of mutual support for joining NATO and the EU. On the other hand, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria are forming a mini-entente to fight for their sovereignty.

For the EU the Black Sea region is an area of growing strategic importance for its Mingarelli own security.

The doubts sometimes raised within the EU about whether the Black Sea should Tarasyuk be a priority remind me of discussions ten years ago about the Caspian Sea. A high- ranking expert from the US administration said at that time that America had no

69 The EU’s Interests in the Region Every country wants to be a bridge and it never works.

Dempsey

interests in the Caspian region. He could not have been more wrong, as the last decade proved. The Caspian Sea became, next to the Persian Gulf, the world’s most important source of oil and gas. During the first half of the 21st century, the Black Sea will become similarly important because of its transit routes. As a region which unites Muslims and Christians religiously and culturally and bridging Europe and Asia, the Black Sea has served as a crossroads since an- cient times. Because the Black Sea geographically divides Europe and Asia some see the region as a suburb of Europe, but geopolitically it will inescapably become a full-fledged part of the United Europe. Its importance as an energy corridor alone suffices to more or less force the EU to take care of it.

Yakiş Like the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea throughout its history sometimes sepa- The Black Sea links East and rated and sometimes linked its coastlines, creating both conflicts and cooperation. West, North and South While the Mediterranean links only North and South, in the Black Sea East meets West and North meets South at the same time.

Dempsey Mr. Tarasyuk and Mr. Yakiş have stressed the Black Sea’s potential to become a The idea of a bridge function is more of bridge for the European Union. To be frank, every country wants to be a bridge a rhetorical construct than a real entity and it never works. When Austria started its EU negotiations, it promised to be the Union’s bridge to the East. Now Croatia wants to be a bridge and so do the Turks. Romania’s and Bulgaria’s claim to establish a new bridge to the East puts them in a long line of potential bridge builders and I doubt if their project will be more palpable and useful than its predecessors that turned out to be rhetorical constructs rather than real entities. The bridge function is a myth.

Couniniotis As a Greek, I am familiar with the word “myth” but still beg to differ with Ms. Countries or regions can be bridges Dempsey concerning its application to countries acting as bridges. That is not a due to their cultural ties myth at all, but a vivid reality. Greece for instance, was able to foster regional coop- eration in the Western Balkans and help to stabilize Albania. This was not wishful thinking guided by myths, but realistic consideration based on cultural ties.

Alieva It would be in the European Union’s interest not to restrict itself to realpolitik and the exploitation of the region’s resources but to promote European identity in the Black Sea. Pure realpolitik could backfire for the West Pure realpolitik could backfire for the West and increase security and energy security risks. What distinguishes the EU from Russia and the US is certainly not

What Role Should the EU Play ? 70 If the EU bases its relationship to the region on spreading democratic values that will strengthen Europe’s postion, contribute immensely to European security and entice ­Moscow to act more constructively.

Alieva

its interest in resources. Energy has tied us to most players ever since the so-called Contracts of the Century between the Azerbaijani government and various West- ern energy companies were signed in 1994. The European Union’s specific asset are its multilateral approach, its support for civil society and democratization and its focus on values. Values especially is an asset which the EU should display much more assertively. If the EU views the Black Sea countries merely as a source of raw materials and ignores the democracy agenda people will turn away angrily despite their European identity. If the EU, on the other hand, bases its relationship to these countries on spreading democratic values in an open dialogue and on offering support for the development of the economy and of civil society, that will have three positive outcomes. First, it would strengthen Europe’s position in the region and give it a competi- tive advantage among the region’s peoples. Second, helping the region to develop political systems and societies compatible with European standards would in the long run contribute immensely to security in the European neighborhood. Third, it would demonstrate to Russia that unlike in Soviet times it must compete with other players and thus entice Moscow to make attractive offers and act more constructively. Russia might choose to no longer stir the frozen conflicts or might even consider contributing actively to their solution, and it might finally decide to make use of the huge potential for positive cultural influence it has in the region — which would also enhance European security. If neither Europe nor Russia show an interest in supporting our development, do not underestimate the capacity of the local actors to develop independent foreign policies. Let me add another aspect. We mainly talk about the value of the EU for the re- gion, ignoring that the Black Sea countries have a lot to offer to the European Union, too. Azerbeijan, for example, has a fascinating and unique history simmering with ideas of modernity, democratization and multiethnic encounters during the 19th cen- tury. This atmosphere is beautifully captured, for example, in the 1937 novel Ali and Nino by Kurban Said. This tradition still waits to be discovered by most Europeans.

3. Can the EU States Agree on a Common Policy ?

So if the EU should become more active in the region for several reasons, let me Rühe ask a rather fundamental question: is the Union at all capable to develop a com-

71 Can the EU States Agree on a Common Policy? German Ostpolitik played an important role in the early 1970s for the Western alliance’s Eastern policy — nowadays I would like to see our Polish friends take over a similar role in the EU. Poland would do good to shed its “anti-Russian genes”.

von Weizsäcker

mon foreign policy ? There have been encouraging developments recently, but also setbacks.

Dempsey I doubt very much if a common EU approach is within reach. The member states 27 EU member states will not be able to are not even able of defining a common Russia policy and prefer to deal with agree on an effective Black Sea policy the Kremlin on a bilateral basis. How should 27 member states with largely di- verging interests, which they have neither defined properly nor coordinated on a basic level, be able to act jointly in an effective way in the Black Sea re- gion ? Let me just mention as an aside that effective Black Sea policy would also demand from the EU a very close and skillful coordination with Russia and the US.

Rahr The European Union has changed: the old West, e. g. Germany or France has The European Union’s new members bring sometimes problems to understand to which extent the new member states have visions towards Eastern Europe into the EU brought visions towards Eastern Europe into the EU. These new members are now formulating the EU foreign policy towards the Eastern regions, the post-Soviet space. And they are doing it skillfully, resolutely and sometimes quite in conflict with the interests of the old Western EU member states.

von Weizsäcker Does the EU have a common foreign policy for the Black Sea region ? Up to now we do not even have a common energy policy. On the other hand, there have been promising steps like the EU’s support for the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Quite rightly, Mr. Rahr mentioned how important the EU’s new member states from Central Europe are for formulating an Eastern policy. German Ostpoli- tik played an important role in the early 1970s for the Western alliance’s Eastern policy — nowadays I would like to see our Polish friends take over a similar role in the EU. I only recently attended a meeting where the Polish Prime Minister acknowledged that his country had a vital part to play as far as the EU’s policy vis-à-vis Russia is concerned and that it would do good to shed its “anti-Russian genes”. All EU member states must understand that we have entered a phase in history where Russia is no longer anybody’s enemy in spite of differences over, e. g., energy, that are a normal aspect of international relations. As much as I would like us in the West to learn from Poland when Russia is concerned, I am just as much eager to see the EU benefit from Romania’s and Bulgaria’s experiences in the Black Sea region. Only that will allow the EU to become a serious player here in the league of Russia and the US.

What Role Should the EU Play ? 72 As soon as the EU accession of Bulgaria and ­Romania is completed, they will be increasingly active on behalf of the Black Sea region. The EU will make valuable contributions to the region during the coming years.

Erler

It is very unlikely that Germany would allow for example Poland with its ex- Byers tremely complicated relationship to Russia to lead the EU’s foreign policy towards Russia.

Poland should not take the lead, but it can play an important role in forging a von Weizsäcker consistent Russia policy for the EU.

Since the EU’s enlargement of May 2004, its new East European members have Mingarelli used their regional experience and knowledge to greatly help the EU shape its Since the 2004 enlargement the new member policy towards the Black Sea region. Without their input, the EU would not have states have greatly helped the EU shape been able and willing to play such a constructive role regarding the Transnistrian its policy towards the Black Sea region conflict by setting up the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) and as an observer in the 5 + 2 talks in Transnistria. Poland and other Central European countries were also instrumental in shaping the EU’s current agenda towards Belarus.

As soon as the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania is completed, they will be Erler increasingly active on behalf of the Black Sea region. Just bear in mind how Poland and Lithuania, very shortly after their joining EU, helped find a solution for the Orange Revolution crisis. For that reason I am optimistic that the EU will make valuable contributions to the region during the coming years.

Allow me to add a more fundamental caveat: most EU members — I am not only Byers talking about Great Britain — are prepared to pool sovereignty only to a limited The reluctance of the member states against degree. Neither Germany nor France are willing to subsume relations with Russia pooling their sovereignty will always to implement a common European Union foreign policy. limit the coherence of EU foreign policy Also, there are other fora for some important EU member states to coordinate their Eastern or Russia policy. Germany, for instance, will surely use its G-8 chair- manship next year to take the lead on energy issues with Russia.

I know that Great Britain is reluctant whenever it senses that it should transfer von Weizsäcker sovereignty to Brussels. Allow me in that context to say that Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s bizarre rhetoric has had one good effect, which is to cajole Britain into a coordinated diplomatic effort with its EU partners vis à vis Iran. I hope very much that such fruitful coordination will spread to other fields of foreign policy in the not-too-distant future. Do not stay away too long !

73 Can the EU States Agree on a Common Policy? VI. Activities and Options of the EU

1. The EU’s Activities: an Overview

Rühe How should the EU develop its relations with the Black Sea region ? There is a plethora of options at hand: enlargement, strengthening the ENP, strengthen- ing regional cooperation, developing a partnership with one or several regional frameworks, furthering sectoral cooperation, just to name a few.

Erler How is the Black Sea linked to the EU and how will these links develop ? Taking into account our limited success to define the region earlier on, I will base my presentation on a pragmatic definition of the region according to BSEC’s member states: twelve countries among them six littoral states and six nations more or less close to the Black Sea. Among BSEC’s members are three EU countries: Greece and — joining in 2007 — Bulgaria and Romania. Albania, Serbia, and Turkey have clear but long- term EU perspectives. Albania’s and Serbia’s perspectives will be developed on the basis of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP); Turkey started its negotia- tions in October but will need at minimum a decade to conclude them success- fully. Ukraine and Moldova are partners of the ENP, the three Southern Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are negotiating their Action Plans. Finally, Russia as the EU’s strategic partner has organized its relations to the EU with the Four Common Spaces, EU-Russia summits twice a year, and a variety of other formats of cooperation. The EU’s relationship with the region The relationship of the Black Sea with the EU is not fixed but a rather dy- is a dynamic work in progress namic work in progress — from the accession of Bulgaria and Romania over a step-by-step approach inside the SAP regarding Balkan countries to increasing activities of the EU within the framework of the ENP. Another example for the EU’s dynamic relationship with the region is Moldova. The EU has negotiated an Action Plan; it acts as observer in the 5 + 2 on Transnistria, it has opened a representation and it has named Jacobovits de Szeged as its Special Representa- tive for Moldova. In addition to that, the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) provides technical assistance to improve border control between Tran- snistria and Ukraine. All these initiatives were launched recently, with Germany playing an important role. The list of activities and formats dynamically regulat- ing and developing the EU’s relations to Ukraine would be even longer and more impressive.

Activities and Options of the EU 74 While the EU might have no common policy towards the Black Sea, it is deeply involved through bilateral relations, its enlargement policy and the bilateral relations of its member states with the Black Sea countries.

Mingarelli

Ms. Moreira de Sousa and Mr. Mingarelli, representatives from the region often Rühe criticise the EU for not being sufficiently active in the region. Are these com- plaints justified ?

Demanding a stronger EU commitment to the Black Sea region is nice and easy, Moreira de Sousa but sober analysis might find the complaint wanting in substance. Those frustrating at little commitment are invited to examine the following Demanding a stronger EU commitment basic facts: in 1997 the Council stated that the EU has a major interest in foster- to the Black Sea region is nice and easy — ing prosperity and stability in the Black Sea region. Greece as a member of BSEC but unfounded is an EU member state, Bulgaria and Romania as littoral states will soon join the EU, and Turkey is negotiating accession as well. We have PCAs (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements) with Russia, Moldova and Ukraine, developing now “Four Spaces” with Russia, ENP Action Plans with Moldova and Ukraine and Action Plans negotiations with the South Caucasus countries, we are involved in conflict resolution and have two EU Special Representatives — Peter Semneby as EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged as EU Spe- cial Representative for Moldova. We have implemented numerous extensive — and expensive — sector-based cooperation projects like the Baku Process aiming at the integration of regional energy markets and their ultimate integration with the EU energy market, TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) or the DABLAS (Danube and Black Sea) Task Force — and I could go on for quite a while if I were not standing between you and the coffee break. The tendency to demand more activities from the EU by those unwilling or incapable of making more serious contributions themselves would be amusing if the challenges here were not rather serious and tackling them successfully would not demand a constructive approach of all actors involved instead from grandstanding reproaches to Brussels.

While the EU might have no common policy towards the Black Sea, it is deeply Mingarelli involved through bilateral relations with the countries in the region, its enlarge- The EU is active … ment policy and finally the bilateral relations of its member states with the Black Sea countries. Enlargement: Romania and Bulgaria will join the EU in a few months’ time … through enlargement … and Turkey has started membership negotiations. Bilateral relations: The EU and Russia have adopted the roadmaps for their … the ENP and the Four Spaces … Four Common Spaces in May 2005 covering almost all sectors of economic, politi-

75 The EU’s Activities: an Overview cal and social life. Within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, we have already concluded Action Plans with Ukraine and Moldova and are about to complete them with the three states of the South Caucasus. As to an EU strategy for the region: The EU first outlined its interests in multi- lateral relations in a 1997 Commission communication on regional cooperation in the Black Sea area. That provided the basis for several important regional coopera- tion programs in areas including transport, energy, and the environment. … conflict resolution … The EU has increased its involvement in conflict resolution in the region considerably over the last three years — as an observer in the 5 + 2 negotiations on Transnistria, with the European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), the appoint- ment of Special Representatives, among others. … anti-trafficking programs … The Black Sea is an important transit area for trafficking: drugs, arms, fissile materials and human beings. To fight these threats, the EU has been developing over the last five years major cooperation programmes, e. g. the Central Asian Drug Action Programme (CADAP) and the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA). … and improving energy infrastructure Concerning energy, the last council has produced clear results: first the EU has to intensify the dialogue with producers, transit countries and especially Russia. The Commission has the mandate to draft a contractual energy agree- ment with Russia. Second, with the Baku Initiative the EU aims at enhancing energy cooperation between the European Union and countries of the Black Sea, the Caspian Basin and their neighbours. The Baku initiative helps the countries of the region to integrate their energy markets, and in a second step the EU will provide funding to integrate these markets in the EU market. In addition we will fund energy saving and efficiency programs in the Black Sea basin.

2. Involvement in Conflict Resolution

Rühe Could you elaborate a little bit more on what the EU does to resolve the conflicts in the region ?

Mingarelli In Transnistria the EU is deeply involved through policy and assistance activities. It has an observer status in the 5 + 2 negotiations, and it has successfully set up the Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) which helps Moldova control its customs territory. We are planning confidence-building-measures, e. g. a seminar with the

Activities and Options of the EU 76 We make quite a lot out of our currently available resources. Unless these resources are substantially increased, additional activities can only be ­implemented at the expense of existing ones. Which priorities should we change, then ?

Moreira de Sousa

Transnistrian business community in Odessa which will discuss how Transnistria as a part of Moldova could profit from a normal relationship to the EU. In South Ossetia, as I said, the EU is a member of the Joint Control Commit- tee and was the most important donor at the recent donor conference in Brussels. We fund a number of rehabilitation activities and confidence-building measures and will initiate a massive rehabilitation program as soon as there is a political breakthrough. Two years ago the EU nominated Peter Semneby as Special Representative for the South Caucasus. He has been deeply involved in the negotiations and has backed the efforts of the OECD and the UN. In addition we have been intensifying the political dialogue with Russia over the frozen conflicts. There has not been one single EU-Russia summit or foreign minister meeting where we have not raised the frozen conflicts.

Regarding the EU’s activities in the Black Sea within the framework of the Com- Moreira de Sousa mon Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) I would like to shed light on two limiting factors — the contributions of our partner countries and the resources available within the EU. What I want to demonstrate is that we actually make quite a lot out of our currently available resources. Unless these are substantially increased, those demanding additional activities should be aware that new commitments can only be implemented at the expense of existing ones, and that constructive requests should always make clear, too, which priorities the EU could abolish to make possible what one is demanding. First, many partner countries in the region expect a lot while not making very Our partner countries sometimes want substantial contributions: Brussels, we have a frozen conflict or a melting or a hot us to solve their conflicts without making one, could you please come over and resolve it for us ? Please develop a diplomatic sufficient contributions themselves initiative, then talk to the Russians, the Americans and all of the other actors and get it over and done with, thank you. You want us to contribute by developing our own initiatives or offering concessions ? If the EU does not help on these and other issues, then it shows a lack of serious commitment towards important neighbours ! I might be exaggerating, but we often feel that countries expect a certain supply of conflict resolution services from us without consulting us on their strategic deci- sions beforehand or keeping us informed about their bilateral policies and agree- ments. It is rather difficult to help partners that do not help you to help them. The limited CFSP budgets make our tasks something akin to the miracle of the The limited CFSP resources make our tasks fish and the bread. To finance all special programs we rely on specific member akin to the miracle of the fish and bread

77 Involvement in Conflict Resolution states sharing the costs. As their funding is temporarily limited, we can plan only a few months ahead for certain missions. Our mission in Moldova, for example, is scheduled to end on 28th of February 2007. What is coming after that will depend on the commitment of our member states. The ‘EU Themis Rule of Law’ mission to Georgia where we EU magistrates supported legal reforms in the country was designed fo twelve months and then extended six more months follow-up, but this did not fully produce the results expected by both the EU and Georgia, mainly due to a lack of internatl follow-up. The host country is also expected to do its share. The EU would have been delighted to continue the work and fully exploit the potential of the program, but good intentions are of no use when you do not have matching resources (human and financial) or when you do not see a clear commitment from the partner countries in following up the work done. Also in Georgia, the EUSR has a team of 16 people assisting Georgian authorities on border issues. If you look at the number of people deployed to our missions in the Black Sea region, you will have to admit that we are talking about quite a humble EU presence. Why is that so ? Because most of the staff is detached from Member States and thus depending on their willingness to committ resources. Finally, the need to take decisions on CFSP unanimously, present Brussels with the difficult task of getting all Member States on board and taking the blame for the EU’s alleged inactivity if only one Member State refuses to agree. It is not easy to get consensus on political priorities out of twenty-five Member States. Let me repeat, I would very much like to take a list of suggestions back to Brus- sels of what the EU should do and where it should take the necessary resources from. Be assured, if you tell me which program is needed and which one we shall terminate to free financial means, I will pass the message on and the Council and the Commission are prepared to listen. It is not very useful for us, though, to be simply expected to do more without additional means. Politics is about setting priorities. Which priorities should we change, then ?

Erler I observed a tendency to count more and more on EU assistance when I was re- cently involved in evaluating the status of the ‘frozen conflicts’ and especially the resolutions which have been adopted in this context. Requests for EU presence not only concern our growing involvement in negotiations but also a participa- tion in peacekeeping missions. It seems that some actors rely on the EU without even considering other options. That also provides a chance for the EU. There seems to be a demand for increased CFSP — the Union must take a principal de-

Activities and Options of the EU 78 cision on whether it wants to provide the resources necessary for fulfilling this demand.

EUBAM is one example of a proactive and very successful contribution of the EU Tarasyuk in tackling the challenges of the region. It should be a model for what the Union is doing here.

We welcome the EU’s engagement for conflict resolution in our region. Let me Gabashvili just propose one concrete step. Recently, the leaders of the de facto regimes of Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia convened in Sukhumi and signed an agreement on creating new ‘peacekeeping’ troops. If the EU unambiguously criti- cizes such dangerous steps and explains its position in bilaterals with the Russians Moscow would probably agree.

3. Further EU Enlargement ?

Let me turn to a question that goes right to the heart of European integration. One Rühe of the EU’s most successful instruments is enlargement. Mr. Yakiş, which Black Which Black Sea states will join the EU soon ? Sea littoral states will join the Union in the near future ?

If you are asking me to assess whether “all Black Sea states will become EU mem- Yakiş bers in the near future ?” and if “near future” refers to the next ten years, my answer is, “Of course not”. The admission will not be decided on until the EU has solved its constitutional crisis, and even after the solution I do not foresee an immediate and general deci- sion to take in all Black Sea countries. The EU reflection period after the French and Dutch referenda is still ongoing, and the Union needs time to decide which document it needs, a full-blown con- stitution or another document, and what exactly it should contain. Even though I do not expect this document to contain a specific reference to the Black Sea states, it is a precondition for further enlargement, because the EU needs to re- adjust its governing principles to be able to function with 30 or more member states. Future experience will show whether the EU must limit the number of its member countries according to a fixed scheme. I doubt it, though. The EU’s found- ing fathers avoided a strict approach to enlargement. Instead they pragmatically

79 Further EU Enlargement? The EU should keep open the membership ­perspective for all Black Sea countries. ­Otherwise their willingness to implement reforms to adapt to EU standards may fade and they may focus on other priorities.

Yakiş

decided according to the circumstances. The EU will probably shun blanket deci- sions regarding further enlargement, too. The EU will decide on negotiations with I therefore believe that the EU will decide on negotiations with the Black the Black Sea countries individually Sea states individually. These countries have different internal dynamics; possibly even a different political will to join the European Union. Bearing this in mind, the EU already differentiates between the beneficiary countries by negotiating tailor-made models and Action Plans. Under these circumstances it is not realistic to set a strict calendar for the admis- sion of Black Sea countries and it is highly unlikely to impossible that the EU will start negotiations with all of them soon enough to take them in by 2016 or even 2020. This goes especially for Russia as a major littoral state — does anyone among you see the Russian Federation joining the EU within the next 10, 15 or 20 years, if at all ? Having said this, let me underline that the EU should keep open the member- ship perspective for all Black Sea countries. Otherwise their willingness to imple- ment reforms to adapt to EU standards may fade and they may focus on other priorities. The EU should not close the door for eventual accession, if and when the conditions warrant it. Maintaining flexibility concerning future enlargement, in my opinion, constitutes one of the strengths of the EU. Membership of the Black Sea countries will materialise when and only when both sides believe that membership would be beneficial.

Erler Will all Black Sea nations become EU members in the near future ? No, and not in the far future either. Nonetheless, we are prepared to provide all the states of the Black Sea region with a specific link to the European Union.

Mingarelli I do not think that the we should base EU policy for the near future on potential It would be unrealistic to expect that any enlargement. Principally, the door remains open for all countries on the European further country will be given a membership continent according to the EU treaty. But politically it would be unrealistic to base perspective in the next three to five years our work on the assumption that in the next three to five years any additional countries will be given a membership perspective.

Himmelreich While ‘soft security’ problems in the region — organized crime, terrorism, traf- ficking of arms, drugs and people, directly affect the interests of the EU, it cannot dispense its established antidote — a membership perspective. Russia as a major power in the region is not even interested in becoming a member. We must there- fore devise alternative tools.

Activities and Options of the EU 80 In the light of history, the Black Sea’s countries’ demand for EU membership has its legitimacy. The people living here were part of the European tragedy and now they justifiedly desire to become part of Europe’s success story.

Rühe

As to EU membership of the littoral states, it is certainly an option. I am not talk- Couniniotis ing about the near future, though, and Russia is a special case. Also, there is no automatism of an application necessarily leading to membership. The EU does not owe anything to anybody and applicant countries have to do their homework in fulfilling the standards of the acquis communautaire.

Even if the European Union were not active in the Black Sea region — and it is very Rühe active — it would exert enormous influence solely through its magnetism espe- cially for young people. I have seen this magnetism at work in Kharkiv in Eastern Ukraine, in Pskov in Russia, and in Kaliningrad, only to name a few. I believe it is crucial that the EU make use of this potential. Some people seem to miss the good old days when the European Community consisted of only six states. For them, the first mistake was the seventh member, not to mention all the others that came afterwards. But it would be foolish to insist, as some fellow Germans do, that Asia begins at the eastern part of Istanbul. Just because the Romans called it Asia Minor does not make it Asia. Ms. Alieva said it: Azeris think of themselves as Europeans. Today, more people are ready to accept that Europe stretches quite far. It seems nobody wants to call Turkey a part of Asia because everybody agrees that the Black Sea is a European sea, even if not a mare nostrum for the EU. We must use this terrific opportunity to promote stability, welfare and de- mocracy in our neighborhood instead of dedicating precious time to petty worries about overstretching the EU. Of course immediate enlargement is not an option, but we must have the courage to keep the enlargement perspective open. In light of history, the Black Sea countries’ demand for EU membership has its legitimacy. The people living here were part of the European tragedy and now they justifiedly desire to become part of Europe’s success story. This is not just a question of money but of where this region belongs to. Yalta is history — the division of Europe is over. The option of a closed door simply does not exist. It depends on us to what degree we are ready to accept that fact and how creative we are. If you want to talk about polical expediency: the Black Sea states are there to stay. When we talk about costs of integration, we should also take into account that the costs of shutting the door will probably be considerably higher.

I believe that it would be dramatically wrong to close off the Black Sea region Byers from further European integration. Istanbul’s Naval Museum shows the remnants

81 Further EU Enlargement? It would be dramatically wrong of a chain from the 8th century that at times of conflict used to be put across the to close off the Black Sea region from Golden Horn to block access to the Black Sea, or to prevent an escape out into the further European integration Mediterranean. I hope that in the 21st century we are not going to repeat what happened in the 8th century when the Black Sea was sometimes closed off in a very literal sense. There are no objective limits to integration. It is basically a political decision how big we want to be. I believe that we should opt for enlargement. That will be possible because during the next ten to fifteen years, the EU itself will not remain the same. After this period of reflection is over, the Union will have to change and develop. So when the question of Turkey’s or Ukraine’s membership becomes acute, the EU will differ significantly from the one we have today. So which one do we want to see in 2020 ? The EU as a free market without The strategic decision to be made is: Are we heading towards an ever closer deepened political integration political integration, which will make enlargement much more difficult ? Or will would make enlargement easier we go back to the EU’s founding principles which were to create a free trade area and a single market for which the member states are prepared to pool sovereignty, but in a limited way ? That would create a political environment in which acces- sion of Black Sea states becomes more likely.

Rühe Turning the EU into a free trade area to facilitate further enlargements would be Giving up political integration too big a price. The EU has evolved tremendously in the course of half a century, would be too big a price but even at the time of its inception it was already more than a free trade zone. The Union’s attraction, the fascination it inspires in the Ukraine or Georgia, is not due only to its economic accomplishments. It is also the idea of a real union of states where, as opposed to empires in the old sense, nations big and small meet and speak to each other on an equal footing. Sticking to the idea of a polical union does not mean, though, that we cannot organize the EU in new ways, using variable geometries, different speeds and whatever political creativity and imagination brings to our mind.

Gabashvili As to Georgian EU accession, we do not in any way see it as a short-term process leading to the desired result within a decade. Even though we are a thoroughly European country and have made our EU ambitions very clear, we are aware of the internal problems of the European Union and we can wait. We implement our democratisation process, our developing a civil society and our economic reforms for their own sake, not for the sake of and dependent on joining the EU.

Activities and Options of the EU 82 If the Black Sea’s countries’ EU aspirations fail, they are not without alternatives. They existed and cooperated before the EU came into being and they will continue to do so. But neither they nor the EU will then explore their full potential.

Yakiş

As Chairman of the Yalta European Strategy (YES), a network to support Ukraine’s Byers Western orientation, I welcome Ukraine’s course to seek EU membership. Be as- sured that while you have a long and hard road ahead of you, you have many friends in the European Union that will support you. I also applaud the commit- ment to meet the requirements of the WTO because even though that, too, is a difficult objective, it is an important step towards a free trade agreement with the EU, and thus a stepping stone towards EU membership.

As to Ukraine, I strongly question the stability of the new government. However, Rahr the EU should do everything to use each window of opportunity to bind Ukraine The EU should do everything to bind closer to the West. Ukraine closer to the West

If the EU decides not to integrate Turkey, Ukraine or Georgia, what will happen Rühe then ?

Regarding possible alternatives to EU integration: Joining the EU is a cherished Yakiş target for almost all Black Sea countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future. I am convinced that EU membership is the best solution, both for the EU and for the countries in the region. As you know, though, neither the region’s countries nor my preferences are sufficient because, after all, the EU will decide. But what will happen if the EU declines ? It is impossible to predict which alternatives the region’s countries will choose. The situation is like in a game of chess game, where, after a few moves, one and a half million possibilities arise. I will not embark on that hypothetical exercise. Let me just name some of the relevant factors that are impossible to foresee: the balance of power in the world, Iran’s nuclear program and its foreign policy, the development in Iraq, Russia’s internal situation and policy in the region and the course of China and India. I hope you agree with me that predictions would be more or less groundless So what can we say about the factors determining the Black Sea countries’ policy in case of a rejection by the European Union ? One thing is for sure: if these countries’ EU aspirations fail, they are not without alternatives. The Black Sea states existed and cooperated before the EU came into being, and they will continue to do so regardless of their multilateral fate. They have what it takes to be self-sufficient and to cooperate beneficially. Most of them are self-sufficient in agriculture. Regarding energy, they not only control the routes of oil and gas from

83 Further EU Enlargement? Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region, the most economical route for the Middle Eastern oil and gas to the EU also goes through the Black Sea. So the Black Sea countries will, in the unfortunate case of being rejected by the EU, have plenty of opportunities for developing their countries. I believe that they will act according to their national interests at the time, taking into account the current circumstances. But neither they nor the EU will then be able to ex- plore their full potential.

Couniniotis What if the EU rejects the region’s countries’ applications for membership ? Even Every country is free to adopt European though I do not believe that one and a half million options are available for the ­values and standards regardless Black Sea countries as Mr. Yakiş has suggested, alternatives to full-fledged mem- of a membership perspective bership do certainly exist. These need not be anti-European. It is not necessary to belong to a club in order to follow its rules. Every state in the region is free to adopt EU models and values and a European way of life regardless of member- ship.

4. Bilateral Cooperation

Rühe Apart from membership, the EU offers many other instruments of integration: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Action Plans within the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Four Common Spaces with Russia, among others. I suggest we explore how these instruments are applied to the region and what their respective potential is.

Yakiş Currently, ENP in the Black Sea region covers only Ukraine and Moldova with individual Action Plans while the negotiations with Belarus are suspended and Azerbaijan’s, Georgia’s, and Armenia’s Action Plans are in the making — currently they have only Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. At the same time, the EU is developing a common approach to the Southern Caucasus countries and has appointed a common Special Representative, other than in the case of Bela- rus, Ukraine and Moldova. Finally, again another model: the Russian Federation has been designated as a strategic partner of the EU and cooperation is imple- mented through the Four Common Spaces. ENP should be strengthened and ex- tended to the remaining countries of the region bearing in mind their specific outlook.

Activities and Options of the EU 84 Russians these days are primarily interested in bilateral cooperation on concrete, business related issues.

Trenin

I have to correct you here, Mr. Yakiş, because the five Black Sea countries you men- Mingarelli tioned are actually treated on an equal footing. It is clear, though, that each will have a tailor-made action plan, because each has a different level of development and different aspirations as regard their ultimate relationship with the EU. As to Russia, we will, first, have to develop the Four Common Spaces and ne- With sufficient political will and financial gotiate a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to replace the existent one means, the EU can move towards economic (running out in 2007). The negotiation could start under the Finnish presidency integration with Russia and take place mainly under the German presidency. With sufficient political will and financial means, we can move gradually towards an economic integration with the EU internal market. The framework is already there. I am sure that we can raise our bilateral relationship to a new qualitative level.

We are entering a defining stage of Russia’s relations with the EU because the Trenin existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement expiring in 2007 will be re- ­negotiated. My anticipation is that the follow-up will include broad agreements of a general nature and a few pragmatic sectoral agreements reflecting Russia’s evolution towards a modernization compatible with EU standards. Russians these days are primarily interested in bilateral cooperation on concrete, business related issues. When they talk about energy cooperation, for example, they want concrete projects for the exploration of energy resources, when they talk about transporta- tion they mean pipelines, and so on. Security will also be an important part of the new agreement. Addressing the frozen conflicts would provide the opportunity to create a visible success in close cooperation.

On February 10th 2006, at the initiative of Open Society Institute Azerbaijan, Azeri Alieva civil society representatives announced the creation of a “Public National Com- The EU applies double mittee on Integration to Europe” to establish cooperation between civil society standards to Azerbeijan institutions, state agencies and the Commission for monitoring the negotiation and implementation process of the ENP Action Plan. This was a clear signal to the West that the Azeri society aims to integrate to the West. Unfortunately the ne- gotiations were stalled because the European Union refused to insert Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity in the Action Plan. The EU applies double standards and treats Azeris differently from Georgians and Moldovans. I do not know if it is because of our different religion, our different culture or the Armenian influence in Europe but it definitely weakens the ability of the EU to act as a non partisan broker. This is not what we expect from the EU.

85 Bilateral Cooperation A relaunch of the ENP is necessary because political majorities for further enlargement seem highly unlikely and we must avoid frustration among neighboring states whose ambitions are rejected.

Erler

Mingarelli The Action Plan with Azerbaijan has been delayed for two reasons. First: in viola- tion of the EU’s policy with regard to Northern Cyprus, Azerbaijan has allowed one commercial flight and refuses to commit itself unequivocally to ruling out any further flights. This has been considered unacceptable by the 25 EU member states. Second: from the beginning of the negotiations it had been agreed that the Action Plan would not discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. However, five months after the start of the negotiations, the Azeri government asked for a clear refer- ence to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. In reaction, the EU proposed to refer to both territorial integrity and self-determination, two basic principles of the Helsinki final act. This proposal was not accepted by the Azeri government.

Yakiş Even though Turkey has been operating commercial flights to Northern Cyprus for a long time, the EU conducts negotiations with Turkey. When it delays its ne- gotiations with Azerbaijan at the same time, this is, if you ask me, the application of double standards.

5. Reinvigorating the ENP ?

Rühe It has become clear from our discussion that the European Neighbourhood Policy is a central instrument for institutionalizing the EU’s relations with the Black Sea countries. Germany, which will take over the EU presidency in the first half of 2007, is preparing an initiative concerning the ENP. Gernot Erler, State Minister at the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, could you tell us more about these plans ?

Erler Five BSEC countries are partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy. We se- riously think about making a relaunch of the ENP a priority of Germany’s EU presidency in 2007. I cannot go into specifics as the discussion process is ongoing. Suffice is to say that the general idea is to make ENP more attractive as a valuable format in its own right for neighboring countries instead of only a second class substitute for rejected or postponed accession candidates. Why is that necessary ? Because political majorities for further enlargement seem highly unlikely at this time and we must avoid frustration among neighbor- ing states whose ambitions are rejected. The EU finds itself amidst a multi-layered crisis resulting from the failed constitution referenda, budget problems which have been resolved only superficially and an increasingly controversial enlarge- ment process. These problems are interlinked and reflect a profound scepticism

Activities and Options of the EU 86 towards further EU enlargement. The political climate in this regard has changed not so much on the part of the governments or in the EU Commission, but within the societies of the 25 member states and also, very explicitly, in the European Parliament. Even though for Germany the EU enlargement process has not come to an end, we have to take into account the changing political atmosphere. A re- newed ENP is the way to go. A relaunch of the ENP is a promising way to avoid a failure of the whole inte- A relaunch of the ENP is a promising way gration process and frustration in aspiring countries. This priority setting for the to avoid frustration in aspiring countries EU policy in the first half of next year can make a difference for the countries of the Black Sea region.

Mr. Erler, you announce that the upcoming German presidency wants to reinvig- Mingarelli orate the ENP because up to now the ENP has generated mainly frustration in our The ENP causes frustration not because partner states. Commission officials are discussing with our German colleagues of a lack of concepts but because it lacks their ideas on how to put flesh on the ENP. political will and financial means True, there is frustration. It frustrates our neighbors because it lacks means and also political will from the EU side. Let me give you a concrete example: What do our partner countries in Eastern Europe want from the ENP ? Very simply, they ask us to deliver on three areas: First, movement of people: our Eastern European partners tell us that they feel humiliated by the current visa procedures to travel to the EU. Since they know our domestic political situation and realistically assess their own deficiencies re- garding border security, they do not ask for a visa-free regime. What they want is a facilitation for certain categories of people. Second, opening our markets by removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Third, getting involved seriously in conflict resolution, e. g. by deploying EU peacekeepers. We shy away from doing this because we are unwilling to take the risks entailed in the deployment of EU peacekeepers to Transnistria or of border guards to South Ossetia. ENP was launched with the promise to share everything with our neighbors except membership. If we are unwilling, though, to allow an eased movement of goods and people or to commit serious resources and political capital to solving conflicts in these countries, their complaint that they do not get what was envis- aged when ENP was launched is to a certain extent understandable. Therefore, I very much welcome the German initiative to reinvigorate the There is no lack of imagination ENP, and we EU bureaucrats will be at your disposal. There is no lack of imagina- among EU bureaucrats

87 Reinvigorating the ENP? It is not a question of new formulas and mechanisms but of means and political will. Are we ready to pay the cost to really help our neighbors improve their living standards and their security ?

Mingarelli

tion on our part for new multilateral frameworks in the Black Sea, for example, in the field of energy. Why not repeat what worked in the Balkans, why not ex- tend the South-East Energy Community to Moldova, Ukraine and even the South Caucasus ? If you cut to the chase, though, it is not a question of new formulas and mechanisms but of means and political will. Are we ready to pay the cost to really help our neighbors improve their living standards and their security ? If we look at our budget and human resources confined to the task, the answer is very clearly no. I doubt if a new concept can change anything substantial without committing serious additional resources, and the negotiations about the new Financial Per- spective (2007–2013) show that this is not going to happen. So, if we develop new concepts without providing more resources, we should at least avoid to again raise false expectations with promising announcements; all hat and no cattle.

Gabashvili Mr. Mingarelli, I completely share your assessment.

Moreira de Sousa We welcome the expansion and improvement of the ENP. Let me just add a small note of caution from my rather practical perspective. We have not fully imple- mented the ENP yet. Some partner countries state that they want to get out of the ENP — they cannot sell it to their people because they do not get the visa and trade agreements and implicit accession perspective initially promised. I am therefore slightly sceptical about how enthusiastic our partner countries will be when we introduce a new concept instead of delivering what we had promised to deliver within the framework of the first concept. Maybe getting yet another comprehen- sive framework of relations with the EU that postpones, maybe indefinitely, their ultimate goal of membership is not what they most yearn for ?

Byers I strongly support Mr. Erler’s statement about reinvigorating the ENP approach. We need not allocate immense resources to Mr. Mingarelli rightly pointed out that a substantial Neighbourhood Policy must ENP: making it a platform for discussing cover the free movement of people, economic integration and conflict resolution. real steps towards integration would suffice I do not think that renewing the ENP makes sense only if we are willing to put immense resources or make huge concessions to our partner countries. It would suffice to make ENP a serious platform for discussing these issues. It will be crucial for the countries in the Black Sea that have no direct membership perspective to have a tangible demonstration that Europe recognises their position and is pre- pared to take positive and concrete steps to make a difference.

Activities and Options of the EU 88 We have not fully implemented the ENP yet. Some partner countries want to get out — they cannot sell it to their people. Will our partner countries enthusiastically welcome a new concept?

Moreira de Sousa

The ENP is of course the first political instrument that comes to mind when al- Himmelreich ternatives to enlargement are considered. It must be redesigned, though, to be an effective tool of spreading stability in the Black Sea region. First, the ENP contained an implicit accession perspective until now, but membership is not going to happen for the region’s countries in the near future. Second, the ENP remains mainly a bilateral tool to address the specific needs and problems of singular countries. Now we need an instrument to tackle the chal- lenges of a region. In a nutshell, the new ENP should stimulate regional coopera- tion without providing any kind of membership perspective.

Relaunching ENP is a promising idea, but I believe the Neighbourhood Policy Rühe must contain some kind of membership perspective if we want it to work. If The ENP must contain a membership the new programme is perceived as a substitute for EU membership, it will in ­perspective to work effectively many instances, be a waste of money. The new ENP has to be a tool to buy time to increase acceptance within the European Union and to find solutions for our financial predicaments. Membership is the strongest tool we have and we should not give it away.

I am grateful for the support for our initiative concerning a renewal of the ENP Erler programme. At the same time, we should recognize and keep in mind the every- day problems of the European institutions and the lack of resources. Whatever political decisions will be made about visa problems, economic integration and the security aspects, we will always have to find the right balance between the limited means available to subsidize these programmes and the benefits their implementation might yield for the EU member states.

ENP is implemented by state actors, thereby empowering these people instead Alieva of civil society. It is the representatives of civil society, though, that might be- ENP is implemented through state actors, come the harbingers of real reforms and democratization in our countries. In thereby neglecting civil society Azerbaijan, for example, the oil boom has created an over-mighty state appa- ratus defined not so much by fundamental political principles but by energy interests. It simply does not share our goal of turning the country into a vi- able part of the European community. I doubt if these people are the best partners for the formulation and implementation of the respective EU Action Plans.

89 Reinvigorating the ENP? Regional cooperation is a myth. Europeans love to think it exists but it does not.

Dempsey

Couniniotis An improvement of the ENP would certainly be beneficial. But ENP is about Action Plans for separate countries, not about regional cooperation. We need a regional approach.

6. Should the EU Support Regional Cooperation ?

Rühe Encouraging regional cooperation within its neighborhood is a favorite strategy of the EU. How far can that approach take us in the Black Sea region ?

Dempsey Europe tends to see regional cooperation as a panacea for its partner countries and those interested in good relations to the EU regularly claim that they have understood the importance of cooperating on a regional level. So my next state- ment might make me unpopular: Regional cooperation does not work — look Regional cooperation is a myth. Europeans love to think it exists, but it does at the Visegrád countries or the Balkans not. Let me just give you a few examples. The Visegrád countries rarely talk to each other — an attempt at coordination after the Russian-Ukrainian energy crisis quickly fell apart. The Baltic states have very different perceptions of what their interests are and do not cooperate on important issues. In the Balkans, the EU has been pushing very hard and investing a lot of resources in regional cooperation, and what do we have: Serbia and Montenegro breaks up, Kosovo is on the road to independence, and Slovenia has a completely different idea of cooperation than its neighbors.

Himmelreich Regional cooperation is not a myth — the EU itself is the best example of how The EU is a prime example tremendously successful this model can work. Integration in the areas of trade, of regional cooperation services, labor market and education, driven by purely rational arguments is an extremely useful tool for stabilizing previously instable regions.

Lucas One example for successful cooperation frameworks could be the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). Established in 1992, CBSS initiates flexible and highly output-oriented projects in various fields: removal of economic barriers to trade and investment, improvement of nuclear and radiation safety, and confidence- building through the promotion of democracy and human rights. The historic blueprint of integration, the European Community likewise con- centrated on specific projects and issues like infrastructure and tariffs in its forma- tive years in the 1950s and 1960s. It thus created what Jean Monnet labeled in his

Activities and Options of the EU 90 memoirs as “La Solidarité de Fait” (Acting solidarity): Cooperation does not start with solidarity, but solidarity comes with cooperation. There are at least two important lessons to be learned: regional cooperation works if it is inclusive and addresses the practical problems of the region. To ignite cooperation in the Black Sea region, one should start with concrete projects and then move on, staying away from overly-ambitious political projects. Eventually, the resulting integration will lay a solid basis for solving the political problems of the region, too.

Regardless of what certain EU officials have in mind concerning regional coopera- Dempsey tion, neither the countries of the Western Balkans, nor those from the Black Sea Often the EU’s partner countries region or the Caucasus, want to be treated as regional blocs. They want bilateral prefer bilateral relations relations and negotiations with the EU. The Union should stop overemphasizing this particular aspect of its regional policy by rewarding unwanted cooperation. Remember that even the members of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), negotiated bilaterally with the EU about their accession.

Fostering regional cooperation is very convincing as an idea, but without the po- Moreira de Sousa litical will of the countries concerned to cooperate our initiatives might not be met with the enthusiasm we might wish. When devising such initiatives, I suggest to realistically assess what the target countries will do when the EU throws money and ideas at them and then requests them to jointly administer the projects. We should only try to initiate regional cooperation if there is an objective additional value to be gained and if we can hope to build on a sufficient political will within our partner countries.

7. Does the EU Need an Integrated Approach ?

With the Barcelona Process or the Northern Dimension the EU has developed in- Rühe tegrated approaches to certain regions within its neighborhood. Not only Romania Does the EU need an integrated is arguing that the Union now needs a Black Sea dimension. What could be gained approach to the region ? from creating such an approach ?

I believe that the EU and its member states are understanding more and more that Couniniotis it needs a common policy toward the region. The EU needs an integrated approach to the region, especially in light of the current energy crisis.

91 Does the EU Need an Integrated Approach? If we want a European future for the Black Sea region, we need an inclusive regional dimension of our relations with Brussels.

Ungureanu

Ungureanu The Black Sea region not only lacks conceptualization but suffers from an utter lack of knowledge. Up to now, the countries in the region have not yet presented themselves with their weaknesses and strengths e. g. in Brussels. We need a regional approach If we want a European future for the Black Sea region, we need an inclusive that includes Russia regional dimension of our relations with Brussels. At the moment, the individual countries have individual relations with the EU that are tailor-made for them spe- cifically, but we do not have an institutionalized cooperation between the EU and the Black Sea as a region. Such a cooperation must be inclusive regarding Russia. Like it or not, the Russian Federation as a major player must be a part of any ap- proach that has a chance to succeed.

Baas Building on the German initiative from February 2005 and the initiative of our Greek friends the EU should start to develop a Black Sea strategy.

Lucas We have only just started to develop a concept for the Black Sea region. When developing it, we should draw on the experiences with former successful coopera- tion frameworks.

Gabashvili Is there a European policy for the Black Sea region ? On the one hand, there are many bilateral meetings between European countries and Black Sea countries and there are many EU projects in the region. But on the other hand there is for example no clear and transparent European policy for the Caucasus.

Moreira de Sousa As to an EU strategy for the Black Sea, it sounds like a promising idea to have another comprehensive integrated concept. Let me just suggest we answer three questions before we decide to allocate resources to creating such a framework: What will be the added value First, what can our partners gain from such an approach ? Because if they of organising the EU’s relations are not convinced they will be better off than they are now, why should they trough a regional umbrella ? take an active part ? We have not yet spelled out actually which added value we are prepared to offer to make them interested in channelling their relations to the EU through that new framework. There are some big littoral states that al- ready have a comprehensive and distinguished framework for their relations to the EU. Those excluded from a new Black Sea Second, which geographical area exactly do you want the strategy to cover ? As format will be offended far as I can remember, in our extensive discussion about identity and borders of the Black Sea region nobody has yet come up with a convincing definition. This is

Activities and Options of the EU 92 Is developing an umbrella for the existing relation- ships of the EU with the region’s countries or drafting a new design the best service that ­Brussels’ civil servants can render people in the region and the EU’s citizens who pay them ?

Moreira de Sousa

not a purely academic problem. If we offer selected neighboring countries in the Black Sea region a special treatment, others will be offended. Third, allow me to shed doubt on the common assumption that a strategy is always a great thing in and for itself. No doubt experts, advisors, policy planning staffs and some politicians throughout the world live on creating and fulfilling a demand for comprehensive strategies and new fora, often for regions that have allegedly not yet been properly addressed. But is developing an umbrella for the existing relationships of the EU with the region’s countries or even drafting a completely new design for the Black Sea really the best service that Brussels’ civil servants can render people in the region and the EU’s citizens who pay them ? Ms. Dempsey rightly pointed out that most countries in the region like to deal with the EU bilaterally, we do this extensively and with good success. When certain issues require it, we use multilateral approaches, e. g. regarding relations between the EU and the three South Caucasus countries or regarding EUBAM where Moldova and Ukraine are involved. I have not understood yet, though, the inherent necessity to discuss as many issues concerned as possible on an EU-to- Black Sea basis instead of using sector-based cooperation and a mix of bilateral and multilateral approaches according to the subject at hand. Of course we can draft a new strategy, of course we can create regional fora and develop a completely new framework for all our political relations and instru- ments concerning the region. But I suggest we do it only when those new entities offer a concrete added value to what we already have. Otherwise we might run the risk of only producing declarations and institutions, which some say Brussels already does too much. By the way, those criticising the EU’s lack of strategies often at the same time decry the Union’s alleged affluence of declarations and institutions.

If the EU defined the Black Sea as a region and developed a partnership with that Krastev new entity it would antagonize Russia in an irresponsible way. Whenever you de- A Black Sea umbrella of the EU fine a region, you define its borders and you make some countries part of it while would risk offending Russia you exclude others. The political delicacy of deciding who belongs became very clear in the Balkans. But at least in the Balkans there was no pole of attraction competing with the EU’s attempt to remake the region. In the Black Sea, Russia is present with its competing approach of “Near Abroad”. An EU policy for the Black Sea would give the impression of aiming at luring away countries from Russia’s near abroad or by making Russia an ordinary partner among others in a region

93 Does the EU Need an Integrated Approach? The challenges for the region are so great and touch Europe’s interests in such a fundamental way that the EU needs to go beyond Action Plans and a plethora of individual projects.

Stüdemann

where it clearly sees itself as a dominating force. The Black Sea region as an EU partner without Russia is an offensive and unrealistic idea, but Russia pursuing its relations with the EU as part of a Black Sea regional framework does not seem feasible or even desirable either. I recommend to stick with the European Neighbourhood Policy and its Action Plans instead of creating yet another regional approach that needs to be concep- tualised almost from scratch and challenges Russia. At least the ENP is more or less well conceptualised and its relationship to Russia has already been defined by giving Russia a special role in making it a strategic partner within the framework of the Four Common Spaces.

Stüdemann The challenges for the region are so great and touch Europe’s interests in such a fundamental way that the EU needs to go beyond Action Plans and a plethora of individual projects. It is very clear from our discussion that the Black Sea region might become the playground for a new Great Game between Russia, the US and the EU about energy and security. While the littoral countries are trying to build their institu- tions, form their identities and fight for their values, the major powers have already changed into competition mode. In Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula, regional nation building is already intermingling with global power politics and the role of NATO causes serious conflicts. If the EU wants to pursue its interests and play a constructive role, action plans and sectoral cooperation, useful as they are, are insufficient. The Union needs to find a forum where the interests of the major players EU, Russia and US can be put on the table and discussed in an open manner. Not that Russia under its present leadership were prepared for modernization (which would make it a real partner for the EU), but Russia is a major player who knows that her interests are touched here. I need not elaborate on why the US with its very active policy must be engaged in an open and fruitful dialogue. Analyzing and discussing the broader picture will also help to define and implement the interests of the littoral states of the Black Sea and prevent them becoming mere objects of a power struggle between Russia and the West.

Mingarelli Should we create a political framework for the existing assistance programs to make clear in an integrated approach what the EU expects from the Black Sea ? We have two basic options: To expand the existing sectoral cooperation pro-

Activities and Options of the EU 94 grams developed over the last five to ten years or create an integrated regional approach, e. g. through cooperation with BSEC. A regional approach must meet two conditions: First, it must be inclusive, A regional approach must be inclusive because dealing with the region without Russia would be a futile exercise. Second, and must concentrate on the we have to concentrate on the common interests of all participating states. On member states’ common interests certain issues we will not reach an agreement and will thus be unable to formulate a common policy. All member states will be on board regarding the fight against drug trafficking, but when it comes to spreading democracy, there might be dif- fering views as to where and how exactly it should be done. Once the EU member states have identified common interests, they can for- mulate common objectives. On that basis, we can set up the appropriate institu- tional architecture. There is now a plethora of organisations in the region– BSEC, GUAM, CDC and several others. I am not sure about how useful it would be for the EU to establish a cooperation with all of them. To my mind, it would be preferable to have a simple institutional architecture with one or maximally two regional organizations as the partner. With this partner, we can formulate, implement and fund contrete projects.

In the Northern Dimension the EU has integrated Russia into a successful regional Erler cooperation programme. This could be the role model for enhanced regional co- The Northern Dimension of the EU could be operation around the Black Sea. a model for the Black Sea region

The EU’s Black Sea strategy should draw on the experiences from, but not be an ex- Baas act reproduction in substance and institutionally of, the EU’s Northern Dimension. The Black Sea region is bigger and more complex than the Baltic Sea, especially because of the geopolitical implications. Creativity is needed !

Many cite the EU’s Northern Dimension as a successful example of regional coop- Mingarelli eration and true, we have been successful in engaging Russia in a discussion about how to alleviate the ecological damages in the Baltic.

Some advocate the concept of a ‘Black Sea Dimension’ of the EU. It’s questionable Himmelreich whether the ‘Northern Dimension’ can be repeated here in any meaningful way, The Northern Dimension because the Northern Dimension’s members all belong to the EU except for Rus- can not be repeated here sia, so it is a forum for engaging Russia. Of the six Black Sea littoral states, only Romania and Bulgaria will be EU members in the foreseeable future.

95 Does the EU Need an Integrated Approach? I suggest a Stability Pact à la carte for the Black Sea region. It should offer its member countries a forum to cooperate on ­concrete projects but avoid falling into the trap of unanimity/veto that bedevils BSEC.

Himmelreich

Erler The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the Stability Association Process (SAP) covering the Balkans are further examples of how the EU can foster regional cooperation.

Himmelreich I suggest creating something like a Stability Pact à la carte for the Black Sea region. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is a perfect model for what we need here for three reasons. First, apart from the EU, it is supported by countries such as Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the US which have no direct geographical con- nections with the region but simply think that backing a stabilization process in this region is worthwhile. Second, it maintains three ‘tables’ — on economy, secu- rity and democracy –, i.e. exactly the challenges relevant for the Black Sea region. Third, the Stability Pact is supported by the IFC, EBRD, the World Bank and other international financial organizations — just what we need in the region. This new Stability Pact should be à la carte, offering its member countries a forum to cooperate on concrete projects but avoid falling into the trap of unanim- ity/veto that bedevils BSEC.

Alieva Michael Emerson from the Centre for European Policy Studies proposed in 2001 a Stability Pact for the Caucasus. In 1998 when the European perspectives of in- tegration seemed to be quite bad, I would not have supported this idea. But then the EU started to develop its relations to the Caucasus. Today Mr. Emerson’s idea seems to be very interesting and promising.

8. Cooperation with BSEC ?

Rühe The oldest regional framework and the only one including all littoral states is the BSEC is the only inclusive organisation and Black Sea Economic Cooperation, BSEC. Among those favoring an integrated EU the best body of cooperation in the Black Sea approach through a partnership with a regional organisation, BSEC is a leading candidate for being a partner. What is the potential of an EU/BSEC cooperation ?

Chrysanthopoulos BSEC as the only inclusive format for cooperation and the best working body of cooperation in the Black Sea region is the logical partner of the European Union. We have made an offer and are waiting for the answer. In BSEC’s Chisinau Declara- tion of October 2005 the 12 member states decided to offer enhanced cooperation to the EU. Greece was mandated by BSEC to start consultations with the EU, ex- ploring prospects for a closer partnership and for the eventual formulation of an

Activities and Options of the EU 96 BSEC is the logical partner of the European Union. We have made an offer and are waiting for the answer.

Chrysantopoulos

appropriate regional ‘Dimension’ by the EU. Greece prepared a working paper and presented it in Brussels in January 2006 and we hoped for a statement by the last General Affairs Council of the EU that would acknowledge the Chisinau Declara- tion and instruct the EU Commission to update its Communication on “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea Area” dating back to November 1997. We looked forward to specific proposals from Brussels. But except for a few inconclusive meetings on the working group level nothing happened. We have not received any kind of reply. Since I became Secretary General of BSEC in May 2006, I have noticed a growing annoyance, even disappointment among our member states because of that. BSEC prefers to have closer ties to the EU rather than to any other entity BSEC wants the EU to be its privileged aspiring to have influence in the region. But it is difficult to keep up the mo- ­partner — but needs a reaction from mentum and maintain the consensus without a response from Brussels. It had Brussels to keep up the momentum not been easy for BSEC to acquire the Chisinau consensus in the first place. We therefore rather urgently need some kind of EU declaration at least promising future action — if immediate action is impossible — to keep our ranks closed and keep BSEC on an EU course. Given the fact that the 25 EU partners are all in favour of improved relations with the Black Sea region, I am optimistic that during the Finnish EU presidency in the second half of 2006 things will move forward.

Our choice for an integrated EU approach is to strengthen BSEC and its coop- Couniniotis eration with Brussels. Thus we could reinforce existing ties within the region We should strengthen the EU’s ties with and between the region and the EU instead of creating yet another new format. BSEC instead of creating a new format Ministerial meetings of the BSEC countries would be an ideal forum for setting priorities and developing projects for economic development and also addressing energy issues. You only have to think of the recent energy crisis between Russia and the Ukraine in order to realize how much the EU could benefit from the strengthening of a regional organization that includes Russia and from providing the framework for an integrated regional European policy. We also believe that the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be involved in this effort. Athens was the main advocate of the Chisinau Declaration concerning an intensified dialogue between the EU and BSEC. Consequentially, we were also mandated to start relevant talks with Brussels and to explore the possibilities of giving the relations an appropriate ‘dimension.’ Last January we presented our

97 Cooperation with BSEC? Is it prudent to create partnerships with new­players knowing in advance that they have nothing to deliver ? I suggest dealing with the Black Sea’s littoral states within the context of the ENP.

Krastev

proposal to the COEST group of the European Union and this month we had an opportunity to brief the EU member states again. Our proposals are welcomed warmly by the majority of the member states. However, there are some reserva- tions among a small number of EU countries. We like to look upon this not so much as a fundamental opposition against our proposals but as a problem of a merely technical nature. And we are encouraged by the fact that both Finland and Germany, the two countries scheduled to hold the EU presidency in the course of the next year, are very much in favour of our initiative.

Krastev In European politics we are living with more frameworks than we can bear, and BSEC is a prime example for that. Knowing the story of the Stability Pact in the Balkans, which was much better designed and politically much more powerful than BSEC, is it really prudent to keep on creating partnerships with new players and frameworks knowing very well in advance that they have nothing to deliver ? I suggest dealing with the Black Sea’s littoral states simply within the context of the ENP, or, if you need to have a regional approach for some reason, define a more useful region than the one covered by BSEC. Poland, for example, perceives Ukraine much more in the context of Eastern Europe than as part of an artificial conglomerate of Black Sea states.

Himmelreich I am not so sure about BSEC really being a functional organization. They have a ‘unanimous vote’-principle and each one of the very diverse member states with their often disparate interests can effectively veto any decision. That is a profound disadvantage if you want to address the complicated regional problems of the Black Sea region. Maybe BSEC is so far more a forum of discussion than a an ef- fective political actor.

Yakiş Should the EU strengthen its cooperation with BSEC ? Yes, it should, but with The EU should cooperate with BSEC, all due respect to my good friend Mr. Chrysanthopoulos, BSEC will never be a but BSEC can never be a substitute for substitute for an EU membership perspective within the foreseeable future, and a membership perspective BSEC cannot and should not substitute the ENP either. BSEC can and should be strengthened, however, and the EU should enhance its cooperation with BSEC to foster stability and economic well-being in the region. Strengthening BSEC — and cooperation with BSEC — should not be seen as an alternative to strengthening the ENP. Both concepts should be used complementarily.

Activities and Options of the EU 98 It will indeed be important to have regional organisations as strategic partners. Byers BSEC will no doubt be one of these partners.

To tackle, for example, the ‘soft security’ challenges in the Black Sea region, you Erler need a framework for concrete cooperation. I see no other institution but BSEC as a potential partner. The ENP with its individual action plans is of no use here. The German government very much appreciates Greece’s initiative for closer BSEC ties with the European Union, following up on a German initiative a year ago. BSEC is a good instrument for organising regional collaboration. Now we need concrete projects to make this cooperation work in a very practical manner, e. g. trans-border infrastructure projects or meetings of mayors of harbour cities to address problems of common concern. The EU can contribute experiences with numerous European regional initiatives.

Regarding partner institutions in the region, we must make a choice: Either Baas we wait until the EU policy is well-defined before we start talking to partners or we develop our policy while establishing at the same time contacts with ­organisations like BSEC or GUAM. The EU has not yet taken this principal deci- sion. BSEC is of course a potential partner because of its institutional framework BSEC is an attractive partner because and inclusiveness. The EU gives BSEC as the only political organisation uniting of its tradition and inclusiveness … all littoral states and its potential to make use of regional initiatives its best atten- tion. We are eager to learn more about for example, Ukraine’s plans and Russia’s approach to BSEC. At the same time we should take into account that there is a kind of ‘BSEC … but with regard to a certain fatigue’ noticeable in the capitals of some littoral states around the Black Sea. “BSEC fatigue” the EU should not Above all the Russian government has yet to decide whether it wants to contribute place all of its eggs in one basket proactively to BSEC. To be frank, in the future BSEC would need more impetus. The EU should therefore not put all of its eggs in one basket.

Let us seize the moment and ask Hugues Mingarelli from the European Commis- Rühe sion in Brussels to provide you with a response to the BSEC initiative from the EU right now. Mr. Mingarelli, what is the take of the European Union’s Commission on the requests for partnership coming from the region ? Does the reluctance to answer the BSEC request not speak for indifference towards the Black Sea ?

99 Cooperation with BSEC? Brussels has not answered BSEC’s request yet because we do not want to raise false expectations. If we joined BSEC we would be asked to fund projects. But the Financial Perspective until 2013 does not provide additional resources.

Mingarelli

Mingarelli Regarding BSEC’s request to strengthen its relations with the EU: we have been asked to join BSEC as an observer as a first step. Why has Brussels not answered yet ? Not because we want to ignore BSEC, or because we underestimate its im- portance. We know quite well that an EU approach towards the Black Sea cannot be developed without the most important regional organisation, the only one to include all littoral states and the only one to include Russia. We have not answered, because, once again, we do not want to raise false expectations. Every time the EU is invited to be a member or an observer in an international organisation, at the end of the first meeting, we are asked to fund projects. Every time we an- swer: “Where shall we take the money from ?“ If an EU representative joins the next BSEC meeting in Istanbul, he would be asked to financially support the five projects of common interest that BSEC has identified. But, sadly, the Financial Perspective until 2013 does not provide additional resources. This is why the Com- mission has not yet responded.

Baas No government has big additional financial resources to be funnelled into the We need to find alternative ways Black Sea region. The littoral countries should discuss alternative means of pri- of financing for BSEC vate financing and credit. ‘Community financing’ or credit financing could come from regional institutions such as the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in Thessaloniki or from international organizations like the World Bank or the IMF which sponsor their own salutary programmes — we should build a regional network for financing.

Couniniotis Regarding BSEC, we are not asking for additional resources from the Commission, but the use of existing institutions and resources, more effectively.

Moreira de Sousa I understand the urge some have for a renewed and clear declaration of confidence into BSEC from the side of the EU expressing commitment to enhanced relations. As an inclusive organisation of all Black Sea countries BSEC is of course a major ­interlocutor for the EU in the region. Regarding the need for a clear statement about the Union’s interest in cooperation, mind that we have Council conclusions from 1997 and a Presidency Declaration from 1998 recognizing BSEC’s impor- tance. Let me put it very bluntly: statements have been made for ten years now, I sug- gest we work on some specific projects before producing yet another declaration. How about we concentrate on practical targets and on whether BSEC can really

Activities and Options of the EU 100 The EU has been making statements about its interest in BSCE for 10 years now, I suggest we work on some specific projects before producing yet another declaration.

Moreira de Sousa

muster support for these projects from all its member states ? If that were so, it would be much easier for the EU to declare its willingness for cooperation — and more useful than another abstract declaration, too. I believe that a lot can be done on sectorial cooperation. But we must find out what exactly before abstractly com- mitting ourselves to comprehensive cooperation. This is why a response to the Greek initiative takes time. You will get an answer, but I believe that it is in the interest of all of us, EU and partner countries, that the EU is realistic in its assess- ment what can be achieved and which concrete actions are possible to take.

We should strenghten the work of BSEC, but we have to do that with concrete Erler projects that will bring a new quality to their activities.

9. Sectoral Cooperation

Apart from creating integrated approaches and developing comprehensive part- Rühe nerships, the EU has another option: simply strengthening those sectoral ap- proaches it has been developing and implementing for years. Mr. Mingarelli, I would like to ask you to give us a short overview of these activities.

Ambitious and efficient sectoral programs have been implemented in the Black Mingarelli Sea region. In the field of energy, INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) The EU has implemented ambitious was launched in the mid-90s (signing of the Umbrella Agreement in 1999) to ­programs for sectoral cooperation develop and improve infrastructure for an energy transit corridor between the in the Black Sea region Caspian Basin and Western Europe through the South Caucasus, Turkey and the Balkans. Financed mainly with TACIS’ Regional Cooperation Program means, it has been a success and we have to beef it up and to further expand it. The so-called Baku Process, launched in 2004 to integrate regional energy markets around the Caspian and the Black Seas and then progressively integrate them into the EU energy market, has also been a success. Regarding transportation, we should build on and expand what has been achiev- ed within the TRACECA program aimed at establishing a transport corridor between Central Asia and Western Europe through the Caucasus — the “new Silk Road”. In the environment sector we have set up a network of regional environment policy centres, one of which is situated in Tbilisi. Our aim is to align the environ- mental policies of the region to EU standards.

101 Sectoral Cooperation A fourth sector is of increasing importance: the ‘soft security’ threats. We have developed significant cooperation programs to combat the trafficking of human beings, drugs, and arms, to combat illegal immigration, and to combat organised crime. To this end, significant financial means have been mobilized, and with good success, mainly in Central Asia. I have already mentioned the Central Asian Drug Action Programme (CADAP) created in 2001 and the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) created in 2003, funded by the EU and im- plemented by UNDP. We need to expand theses programs.

Rühe Let me just summarize a few points in which I think a certain consensus has The Black Sea is a European sea emerged. It is my impression that we all see the Black Sea as a European sea, even though not as an EU sea. Europe will always be wider than the EU, irrespective of how far enlargement might go. Second, the demand from important countries in the region for EU member- ship is very strong and based on cultural identities as well as historical ties — and the justified wish to share the benefits of integration with other European coun- tries. Third, regarding the complex situation and complicated history of the region and the sensitivities of the players involved the Euro-Atlantic partners might add a certain element of caution to the decisiveness of their policy. We must steer a course that pursues a clear goal but at the same time puts an emphasis on being transparent, cooperative and attentive to the regional players’ concerns.

Byers Let me add a personal note. As a nine-year old schoolboy, I first heard the story of an old Italian who once tested the currents off Istanbul. He found that the surface water of the Bosporus flows from the Black Sea out to the Sea of Marmara and then out to the Mediterranean. But as he got deeper, he realized that there was a counter-flow from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. One might say that on the surface, there are some very simple solutions for the Black Sea region, but as soon as you go deeper, it gets far more complicated.

von Weizsäcker We have had the great chance of meeting in Odessa which is surrounded by the beauty of nature, has a deeply impressive culture, a long history full of very seri- ous chapters but also of a very impressive inclusiveness, an atmosphere of enrich- ing one another and learning from one another as opposed to notions of clashes of civilisations.

Activities and Options of the EU 102 Temporary disappointments are cumbersome and regrettable, but do not overshadow the tremendous success that the European Union is. In the Black Sea region there is reason for optimism, too. von Weizsäcker

The Round Table of Bergedorf exists in order to do exactly this, to learn from one another. Those of us coming from inside the European Union were here to enhance their knowledge about the Black Sea and those from the region came not only to present their views but also to find out what to expect from the EU. The vividness of our debate is a strong symptom for how successful we have been. We heard a lot about shortcomings concerning regional infrastructure, eco- nomic development and political progress, we heard expressions of scepticism about the role of Moscow and Washington, disappointment in the region about a lack of commitment on the side of the EU and criticism by the EU’s representa- tives about the region’s countries’ demanding too much and delivering too little. Nevertheless, I do look with a certain amount of confidence to the future. Having the privilege of being by far the oldest in this room and looking back on a long life gives me the opportunity to put things in a context which might not be so obvious to some of you. Things have come about of which we never dared to dream when we were young ! Who would have thought in 1946 or even 1966 that in 2006 we as representatives of a united Europe would be sitting in Odessa discussing the potential integration of Ukraine, Georgia or Turkey in a common space of peace and prosperity ? Who would have thought back then that those Germans that seemed to have failed in showing responsibility would play a benefi- cial and important role in making the European Union a success story ? Therefore I encourage you to see backlashes and temporal disappointments as what they are — cumbersome and regrettable, but not overshadowing the tremendous suc- cess that the European Union is. And, taking into account what has been achieved in Western and Central Europe, I believe it is justified to say that in the Black Sea, too, despite of all its rather history and serious current challenges, there is good reason for confidence. I thank you very much for your participation in this Bergedorf Round Table and I wish you all a safe journey. Those of you who have been in Odessa for the first time will, I am confident, not miss the chance to come back and take a closer look at this fascinating city and at the sea which will border the European Union from January 1, 2007.

103 Sectoral Cooperation

Annex Participants

Dr. Leila Alieva Rt. Hon. Stephen Byers, M. P. Born 1959 Born 1953 Founding Member and Acting Chair, Member, United Kingdom Parlia- National Committee on Azerbaijan’s ment, London; Member of Her Integration in Europe, Baku; Founder Majesty the Queen’s Privy Council; and Chair, Center for National and Chairman, Yalta European Strategy International Studies, Baku (Y. E. S.) Former positions: Director, Center for Strategic and Former positions: Secretary of State for Transport, Lo- International Studies, Baku; OSCE Observer, Presi- cal Government and the Regions, United Kingdom dential Elections in Georgia; Editor and National Government; Secretary of State for Trade and Indus- Coordinator, National Human Development Report, try; Chief Secretary to the Treasury; Minister of State Azerbaijan; Advisor to the President of EBRD and for School Standards. to BP, UNOCAL, STATOIL and AIOC; Fellow, NATO Pages: 38, 44, 46, 51, 52, 54, 68, 73, 81, 83, 88, 99, Defense College in Rome, SAIS — Johns Hopkins Uni- 102 versity, UC Berkeley, Woodrow Wilson Center for In- ternational Scholars, Harvard University. Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos Selected writings: Integrative Processes in the South Born 1946 Caucasus Region and their Security Implications Secretary General, Black Sea Eco- (2006). nomic Cooperation (BSEC), Per- Pages: 27, 29, 31, 36, 38, 45, 53, 59, 64, 70, 85, 89, 96 manent International Secretariat, Istanbul Ambassador Dr. Norbert Baas Former positions: Director General, Born 1947 Bilateral Economic Relations and Multilateral Eco- Special Envoy for Eastern Europe, nomic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Central Asia and Caucasus, Federal the Hellenic Republic, Athens; Director General, Foreign Office, Berlin European Union Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Former positions: Ambassador-at-large, Ambassador, Greek Embassies in Ottawa, Warsaw Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Head, and Yerevan; Alternate Director General, European Department for Central Europe, Federal Foreign Of- Union Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director, fice, Berlin; Ambassador, German Embassy, Tbilisi; Directorate for Justice, Home Affairs and Schengen, Political Department, German Embassy, Moscow; Representative of Greece to the K-4 Committee and Private Secretary, Office of State Minister Schaefer, to the Central Group of Schengen, Ministry of For- Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; German Embassy, eign Affairs. Baghdad; OSCE-Mission, Paris. Selected writings: Caucasus Chronicles: Nation-Build- Pages: 41, 63, 92, 95, 99, 100 ing and Diplomacy in Armenia, 1993 –1994 (2002). Pages: 28, 43, 55, 57, 60, 62, 64, 65, 96

106 Nicolaos Couniniotis Deputy Chairman, SPD Parliamentary Group, Ger- Born 1941 man Bundestag, Berlin. Director General for Economic Af- Selected writings: Russland kommt. Putins Staat — Der fairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kampf um Macht und Modernisierung (2005). the Hellenic Republic, Athens Pages: 24, 40, 42, 46, 50, 67, 69, 73, 74, 78, 80, 86, 89, Former positions: Ambassador, Greek 95, 96, 99, 101 Embassy, Stockholm; Representa- tive of Greece to the European Union Political and Dr. Konstantin Gabashvili, MP Security Committee; Permanent Representative of Born 1948 Greece to the Western European Union; Head, Turk- Chairman of the Committee of For- ish Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, eign Relations, Parliament of Geor- Athens; Consul General, Greek General Consulate, gia, Tbilisi Geneva; Deputy Permanent Representative, Greek Former positions: Ambassador, Geor- Permanent Representation at the U. N. gian Embassy to Germany and Po- Pages: 67, 70, 81, 84, 90, 91, 97, 100 land; Mayor of Tbilisi; Minister of Education of Geor- gia; Member of the Parliament of Georgia; Chair- Judy Dempsey man, Committee of Education and Science, Member, Born 1956 State Council; Deputy Minister of the Minister of Central and Eastern Europe Cor- Education; Deputy Dean and Professor, Depart­ respondent Europe, International ment of General Linguistics, Tbilisi State Univer- Herald Tribune, Berlin sity. Former positions: Diplomatic Cor- Pages: 26, 28, 32, 34, 39, 44, 46, 50, 51, 64, 79, 82, respondent, Financial Times (FT), 88, 92 Brussels; Correspondent, Financial Times, Jerusa- lem, Bonn and Vienna. Dr. Jörg Himmelreich Selected writings: ESDP, Five Years Later (2004). Born 1959 Pages: 44, 70, 72, 90, 91 Senior Transatlantic Fellow, Ger- man Marshall Fund of the United Gernot Erler, MdB States, Berlin Born 1944 Former positions: Transatlantic Fel- Minister of State, Federal Foreign low, German Marshall Fund of Office, Berlin; Member, Steering the United States, Washington D. C.; Senior Advi- Committee, Petersburg Dialogue; sor, Policy Planning Department, Federal Foreign President, South-Eastern Europe Office, Berlin; Assistant, DaimlerChrysler Board of Society (Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft), Management, Berlin; Director, Investment Banking Munich for Media and Communications, WestLB, London; Former positions: Coordinator, German-Russian Inter- Director, WestLB, Moscow; Head, Privatization of societal Cooperation, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; the Construction Industry, Federal German Trust

107 Agency; Junior Professor, Institute for Public Law, thor, forthcoming 2006); Shifting Obsessions. Three Free University of Berlin. Essays on Politics of Anti-Corruption (2004). Pages: 35, 59, 60, 66, 80, 89, 90, 95, 96, 98 Pages: 25, 26, 43, 44, 45, 49, 53, 60, 64, 93, 98

Dr. Charles King Victor Likhachev Born 1967 Senior Counsellor, Embassy of the Chairman of the Faculty, Associate Russian Federation, Kiev Professor and holder of Ion Ratiu Page: 49 Chair of Romanian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington D. C. Former positions: Research Fellow, New College, Ox- ford; Research Associate, International Institute for VLR I Dr. Hans-Dieter Lucas Strategic Studies, London. Born 1959 Selected writings: The Black Sea: A History (2004). Head, Central-, Southeastern- and Pages: 25, 26, 27, 30, 45, 56 Eastern Europe, Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Federal Chancellery, Dr. Ivan Krastev Berlin Born 1965 Former positions: Head Press and Chairman, Centre for Liberal Communications, German Embassy, Washington Strategies, Sofia; Executive Direc- D. C.; Chief Speech Writer of the Foreign Minister, tor, International Commission Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Head, Personal Office on the Balkans; Director, Open of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (ret.), Century Project of the Central Berlin; Political Division Baltic States, Federal For- European University, Budapest; Research Director, eign Office, Berlin; German Embassy, Moscow. Project “The Politics of Anti-Americanisms” coor- Pages: 43, 90, 92 dinated by the Central European University, Buda- pest; Editor in Chief, Bulgarian Edition of “Foreign Hugues Mingarelli Policy”. Born 1954 Former positions: Visiting Fellow, St. Antony’s College, Director for Eastern Europe, Cau- Oxford; Woodrow Wilson Center for International casus and Central Asia, DG RELEX, Scholars, Washington D. C.; Collegium Budapest; European Commission, Brussels Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin; WEU Institute for Secu- Former positions: Director, Euro- rity Studies, Paris; German Marshall Campus Fellow, pean Agency for Reconstruction Washington D. C.; Institute of Federalism, University (EU Assistance to Kosovo, Serbia Montenegro and of Fribourg, Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, FYROM), Thessalonica; Head of Unit, New Independ- and Remarque Institute, N Y U. ent States, DG RELEX, European Commission, Brus- Selected writings: The Anti-American Century, (co-au- sels; Principal Administrator and Country Officer for

108 Nigeria, DG DEV European Commission, Brussels; Ruprecht Polenz, MdB Administrator, Audit of Structural Funds and Euro- Born 1946 pean Development Fund, European Court of Audi- Chairman, Foreign Affairs Com- tors, Luxembourg. mittee, German Bundestag, Berlin; Pages: 36, 40, 47, 69, 73, 75, 76, 80, 85, 86, 87, 94, 95, Christian Democratic Union (CDU); 99, 100, 101 Rapporteur for Iran and Turkey, CDU/CSU-Parliamentary Group, Ger- Sofia Moreira de Sousa man Bundestag, Berlin Born 1973 Former positions: Head, TV Council, ZDF — German Political Advisor to the EUSR for Television; Secretary General, CDU, Berlin. South Caucasus, General Secretar- Selected writings: Eine faire Chance für die Türkei iat of the Council of the European (2004); Das faule Versprechen — Die Türkei gehört in Union, Brussels die EU (2003); Sicher nur mit Amerika: NATO, Ter- Former positions: Primary Council rorismus und eine neue Weltordnung (2002). Secretariat Negotiator European Neighbourhood Pages: 41, 52, 55, 58 Policy Action Plan EU-Ukraine and ENP Instrument; Political Advisor and Administrator responsible for Alexander G. Rahr EU relations with Ukraine, Northern Dimension and Born 1959 Black Sea policy; International Relations Officer at Program Director, Körber Center European Space Agency and Galileo Interim Support Russia/CIS, German Council on For- Structure, Brussels; Course Director, Justice, Home eign Relation (DGAP), Berlin Affairs and Human Rights, Academy of European Former positions: Senior Analyst, Re- Law, Trier. search Institute, Radio Free Europe/ Pages: 36, 75, 77, 88, 91, 92, 100 Radio Liberty, Munich; Project Manager, Federal In- stitute for East European and International Studies, Valeriu Ostalep Cologne; Member, Supervisory Board, Petersburg Born 1976 Dialogue, German Federal Cross of Merit Award. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Selected writings: Vladimir Putin. The German in the and European Integration, Ministry Kremlin (2000). of Foreign Affairs, Chisinau Pages: 35, 55, 57, 65, 69, 72, 83 Former positions: Director, National Office for the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe; National GUAM Coordinator; Head of Section, “Security Issues”, National Office for the Stability Pact, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; At- taché, General Directorate for European Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Pages: 26, 28, 37, 46, 60, 63

109 Volker Rühe and Luxemburg; Head, Mission of Ukraine to NATO, Born 1942 Brussels; Head, Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Af- Minister of Defense (ret.), Federal fais, Kiev; Head, Department of Political Analysis Republic of Germany, Hamburg; and Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiev; Member, Christian Democratic Un- Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of For- ion (CDU) eign Affairs, Kiev; Head, National Committee of Former positions: Chairman, Foreign Ukraine on Disarmament, Kiev; Head, State Inter- Affairs Committee, CDU, German Bundestag, Berlin; Departmental Commission on Ukraine’s Entering Secretary General, CDU-Faction, German Bundestag, European Council, Kiev. Berlin. Pages: 24, 30, 33, 36, 39, 41, 42, 50, 51, 54, 57, 61, Pages: 24, 26, 29, 32, 33, 36, 41, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 55, 69, 79 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 71, 74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91, 96, 99, 101, 102 Michael Thumann Born 1962 Ambassador Dietmar Stüdemann Foreign Editor, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg; Born 1941 Member, Advisory Council of the Ambassador of the Federal Repub- Kennan Institute, Washington, D. C. lic of Germany to Ukraine, Kiev Former positions: Bureau Chief, DIE Former positions: Head of Division ZEIT, Moscow; Correspondent for in the Political Affairs Department South East Europe, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg; Public Policy and in the Economic Affairs Depart- Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for ment, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; Head, Political Scholars, Washington D. C. Department, German Embassy, Moscow; Diplomatic Selected writings: Land ohne Unterleib in: Russland Services, German Delegation to the OSCE, Vienna; und der Kaukasus (2005). German Embassy Athens; Press Department, Ger- Pages: 34, 63 man Embassy, Moscow. Pages: 35, 58, 94 Dr. Dmitri Trenin Born 1955 Borys Tarasyuk Deputy Director for Foreign and Born 1949 Security Policy, Carnegie Moscow Minister of Foreign Affairs of Center, Moscow Ukraine, Kiev Former positions: Senior Research Former positions: Head, Narodny Fellow, Institute of Europe (Russian Rukh Party (NRU — Popular Move- Academy of Sciences), Moscow; Visiting Professor, ment) of Ukraine; Minister of Vrije Universiteit, Brussels; Senior Research Fellow, Foreign Affairs (1998–2000); Member, Council of NATO Defense College, Rome; Staff Member, USSR National Security and Defence of Ukraine, Ambas- Delegation to US-Soviet Nuclear & Space Arms Talks, sador, Ukrainian Embassies in Belgium, Netherlands Geneva; Senior Lecturer, The Military Institute,

110 Moscow; Liaison Officer, External Relations Branch, Selected writings: Was für eine Welt wollen wir ? (2005); Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. Drei Mal Stunde Null ? 1949–1969–1989 (2001); Vier Selected writings: Integration and Identity: Russia as Zeiten. Erinnerungen (1997); Richard von Weizsäcker a New West (2006); Russia’s Restless Frontier: The im Gespräch (1992); Von Deutschland nach Europa Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (co-author, (1991); Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter (1983). 2004); The Time of the South: Russia in Chechnya, Pages: 23, 42, 57, 72, 73, 102 Chechnya in Russia (co-author, 2002); The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics Yaşar Yakiş and Globalization (2001). Born 1938 Pages: 26, 30, 40, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, Chairman of the EU Commission, 68, 85 Turkish Parliament, Member of the Justice and Development Party Mihael-Răzvan Ungureanu (AKP). Born 1968 Former positions: Minister of For- Minister of Foreign Affairs of Roma- eign Affairs, 58th Government of the Republic of Tur- nia, Bucharest; Member, National key; Member of the European Convention to draft Liberal Party EU Constitution Senior Policy Adviser, Ministry of Former positions: Deputy coordina- Foreign Affairs, Ankara; Co-Founder, Justice and De- tor for the South-East European velopment Party (AKP); Permanent Representative of Cooperation Initiative (SECI), Vienna; State Secretary, the Republic of Turkey to the UN Office, Vienna; Un- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest; Director Gener- der Secretary for Economic Affairs, Ministry of For- al — Regional envoy of the Stability Pact for South-East- eign Affairs, Ankara; Ambassador of Turkey to Cairo ern Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest. and Riyadh Diplomatic Services, Turkish Embassies Pages: 29, 33, 37, 39, 43, 51, 64, 92 in Lagos, Rome, Damaskus, Antwerp. Pages: 28, 29, 32, 54, 55, 58, 65, 67, 68, 70, 79, 83, Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker 84, 86, 98 Born 1920 Fmr. President of the Federal Re- public of Germany (1984 –1994); fmr. Governing Mayor of West Berlin (1981–1984); fmr. Vice Presi- dent of the German Parliament (1969 –1981); fmr. Member of the Federal Executive Board of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); fmr. President of the German Lutheran Church Council; Laureate of the Heinrich Heine (1991) and Leo Baeck Awards (1994); Chairman of the Bergedorf Round Table of the Körber Foundation.

111 Recommended Literature

Abkhazia Today, International Crisis Group, Europe Bruno Coppieters / Robert Legvold (Hg.), Statehood Report No 176, 15 September 2006. and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, Cam- www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4377&l=1 bridge/Mass.: 2005. Nicloae Ecobescu, BSEC at Fifteen: Enhancing effective­ Abkhazia: Ways forward, International Crisis Group, ness through better performance and meaningful insti­ Europe Report No 179, 18 January 2007 tutional reform, ICBSS Policy Brief No. 2, September www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4619&l=1 2006.

Terry D. Adams et al., Europe’s Black Sea Dimension, The Future of Democracy in the Black Sea Area: Hearing Brussels: 2002. before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Sen- Neal Ascherson, Black Sea, London: 1995. ate, One Hundred Nineth [sic] Congress, first session, March 8, 2005, Washington D. C.: 2005 Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), Next Steps in forging a Euro­ http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea, Washington: 2006. cgi ?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:23171.pdf

Tunc Aybak (ed.), Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Thomas Gomart / Tatiana Kastueva-Jean, Russie.Nei. Cooperation and Conflict, London/New York: 2001. Visions 2006. Understanding Russia and the New Inde­ pendent States, Travaux et recherches de l’IFRI, 2006. Mustafa Aydin, Europe’s next Shore: The Black Sea Re­ gion after EU Enlargement, EU Institute for Security Grzegorz Gromadzki et al., Will the Orange Revolution Studies, Occasional Papers 53, Paris: June 2004. Bear Fruit ? EU-Ukraine Relations in 2005 and the Begin­ http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ53.pdf ning of 2006, Warsaw: 2005. http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/orange.pdf Iona Ban, The Black Sea Region and the European Neighourhood Policy, Budapest: 2006. Ayse Günes-Ayata et al. (eds.), Black Sea Politics : Po­ http://www.ceu.hu/cens/assets/files/black_sea litical Culture and Civil Society in an Unstable Region, London: 2005. Federico Bordonaro, Bulgaria, Romania and the Chang­ ing Structure of the Black Sea’s Geopolitics, Power and Shireen Hunter (ed.), Strategic Developments in Eura­ Interest News Report, May 20th 2005. sia after 11 September, Portland, Or.: 2004. http://www.pinr.com/report.php ?ac=view_report& report_id=302&language_id=1 Charles King, The Black Sea: A History, Oxford/New York: 2004. S. Celac / P. Manoli, Towards a New Model of Construc­ tive Regionalism in the Wider Black Sea Area, Journal Dov Lynch, Shared Neighbourhood or New Frontline ?: of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, The Crossroads in Moldova, IFRI, Paris: 2005. No. 2 (June 2006), pp. 193 –205. http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/lynch_anglais.pdf

112 Alexander Murinson, The Secessions of Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabagh: The Roots and Patterns of Develop­ ment of Post-Soviet Micro-Secessions in Transcaucasia, in: Central Asian Survey, 23 (March 2004) 1, pp. 5 –26.

Oleksandr Pavliuk / Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (eds.), The Black Sea Region: Cooperation and Security Building, Armonk, N. Y.: 2004.

David L. Phillips, Stability, Security, and Sovereignty in the Republic of Georgia: Rapid Response Conf lict Preven­ tion Assessment, New York: 2004. http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ Georgia.pdf

Eugene B. Rumer / Jeffrey Simon, Toward a Euro-At­ lantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region, Occasional Pa- per, April 2006, NDU. http://www.russiaprofile.org/index.wbp

Vladimir Socor, Publications under http://www.jamestown.org/edm/vlad.php?cat=wsi

S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell (ed.), The Baku- Tbilis-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, Wash- ington D. C./Uppsala: 2005. http://www.silkroadstudies.org/BTC_0.pdf

Dmitri Trenin, Russia Leaves the West, in: Foreign Af- fairs, July/August 2006. http://www.carnegie.ru/en/print/74440-print.htm

The Wider Black Sea Area: Region, Crosroads or Buffer, Turkish Policy Quarterly 5 (2006), Summer.

113 Countries in NATO and EU Countries in NATO and have opened accession talks with the EU Countries in Intensified Dialogue in NATO Countries with the Individual Partnership Action Plan Countries in the European Neighborhood Policy

Map from Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, Washington: 2006.

114 UNOMIG, Map No. 3837, Rev. 51, September 2006

115 Glossary

Abkhazia Since 1993 the UN has been supporting nego- One of the → frozen conflict regions of the Caucasus tiations toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict region, Abkhazia borders the Black Sea in → Georgia’s through a Special Representative to the UN Secre- northwest and has a population of about 250,000 in tary General (since August 2006 Jean Arnault) and a an area of 8,600 km2. Officially an autonomous re- Group of Friends of the Secretary General, to which gion within Georgia, it is a de facto state in itself representatives of the United States, Russia, Britain, with its own political and administrative structures. France, and Germany belong. Beginning in Geneva Its “capital” is Sukhumi. The “Republic of Abkhazia” in 1997, representatives of the Georgian government is not recognized internationally. The de jure govern- and the de facto Abkhaz regime have been negotiat- ment of the Province of Abkhazia, under the control ing within the framework of the so-called Coordina- of Georgia’s central government, is based in the Geor- tion Council. gian-controlled Kodori Valley in Upper Abkhazia. In recent years, Russia has gradually expanded In 1921 Abkhazia became a Union Republic and, its influence in Abkhazia. Many Abkhaz inhabitants in 1931, an Autonomous Republic within the Geor- have been issued Russian passports and rail links be- gian Soviet Socialist Republic. Encouraged by the So- tween Sukhumi and the Russian resort town of Sochi viet government in Moscow, Georgians settled in the have been reopened. When Raul Khajimba, the Rus- region to such an extent that the Abkhaz became a sian-supported candidate in the 2004 “presidential minority (17 % in 1989 in contrast to 60–65 % Abk- elections”, lost to Sergey Bagapsh, Russia imposed haz and 25–30 % Georgians at the beginning of the an embargo against Abkhaz mandarin oranges. The century). Tensions between ethnic Georgians and resulting crisis led to a deal being struck by the two the Abkhaz that had existed for decades intensified former rivals to run jointly — today they rule as “Pres- in the late 1980s. After Georgia declared independ- ident” Bagapsh and “Vice President” Khajimba. Geor- ence in 1991, Abkhazia declared its secession from gian leaders attribute Russian support for Abkhazia Georgia in 1992. Georgian troops occupied Abkhazia to the goals of destabilizing the region and obstruct- but the region’s pro-Russian secessionist movement ing NATO and eventual EU membership for Georgia. gradually regained control, supported by the self- After his election in 2004, Georgian President styled “Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Mikhail Saakashvili declared his intention to restore Caucasus” and, according to Georgian accounts, reg- the country’s territorial integrity and therefore re- ular Russian forces. The fighting ended after the se- integrate Abkhazia. In light of Russia’s aggressive cessionists took the capital Sukhumi. The war lasted rhetoric and support for the separatists, the Georgian over a year, led to war crimes, many thousands of government considers itself under time pressure. In deaths, and the displacing of about 240.000 ethnic June 2006 the Georgian parliament accepted a gov- Georgians. A ceasefire agreement signed in 1994 ernment proposal for a peace plan with Abkhazia called for the deployment of 1,800 Russian soldiers that calls for an autonomous Abkhaz entity within as a peacekeeping force of the Community of Inde- Georgia and would replace the Russian peacekeepers pendent States (CIS) who remain there today and with an UN force. In July 2006 Georgian forces ad- are, in turn, monitored by a UN observer mission vanced into the Kodori Valley, previously controlled (UNOMIG). by militia leader Emzar Kvitsiani and largely within

116 Abkaz territory, but which includes large numbers nia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, of ethic Georgians and Svans. After the Georgian Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine). Ser- central government had reestablished its authority bia-Montenegro joined in 2004; after the separation in the region it installed the Georgian Abkhaz gov- of Serbia and Montenegro only Serbia remained. ernment in exile there. In September 2006 Georgia Today the 12 member states, of which six border demanded a new format for the negotiations over the Black Sea (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Abkhazia: the EU should be included as an observer Turkey and Ukraine), represent 350 million people. at the negotiations within the Coordination Council As the sole regional organization the BSEC encom- supported by the Group of Friends. passes all Black Sea littoral states including Russia The Abkhaz separatists say they feel threatened (in contrast e. g. to → GUAM or the → CDC). Thir- by the Georgian army’s US-supported modernization teen states including The United States, Germany, and rearmament. The Abkhaz government claims to and France have observer status. After operating for have its own European vision for the breakaway re- some years as a series of conferences the BSEC ac- gion that would see Abkhazia as a bridge between quired an international legal identity in 1999 as an the EU, Russia, and Georgia. De facto President international regional institution under Article VIII Bagapsh has said that Abkhaz independence is non- of the UN Charter. The BSEC Permanent Secretariat negotiable. On October 18, 2006, the Abkhaz de was established in Istanbul in 1994. facto government appealed to Russia to recognize The organization’s goal is to promote regional the independence of Abkhazia. stability, and prosperity through multilateral coop- United States policy supports the re-integration eration in areas including energy, finance, trade, of Abkhazia into Georgia, has promised funding for agriculture, economic development, transport, law rebuilding infrastructure following a peaceful reso- enforcement, science, technology, and institution- lution of the conflict, and is helping modernize the building. Georgian army. Some observers believe some US Decision-making takes place at summit meet- actors now consider a strategy of cooperating to a ings and by the Council of Foreign Ministers, which certain extent with the Abkhaz “government” with are prepared and supported by the frequently assem- the purpose of strengthening pro-Western influ- bled Committee of Senior Officials. The presidency ences there and thereby weakening Russia’s sway in rotates semi-annually among the member states the region. The UN calls for a negotiated settlement (November 2006 — April 2007: Serbia), in which the legitimized by a referendum held after the expelled Chairman-in-Office works together with his suc- ethnic groups return. The EU is working toward a cessor and predecessor as a troika. The Permanent peaceful resolution of the conflict and has rejected Secretariat has executive and administrative powers. Georgian demands that an EU force replace the Rus- Subsidiary institutions of the BSEC include working sian peacekeepers. groups and the Project Development Fund. Associate bodies with their own budgets include the advisory BSEC — Black Sea Economic Cooperation Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic The BSEC was founded in 1992, primarily at the ini- Cooperation, the Business Council, the Black Sea tiative of Turkey, by eleven states in Istanbul (Alba- Trade and Development Bank, the International

117 Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), the BSEC’s think jomi Declaration, which called for a community of tank, and the Coordination Center for Exchange of democratic states in the Baltic, Caspian, and Black Statistical Data and Economic Information. Sea regions sharing the vision of European and Euro- The BSEC’s projects include a ring highway Atlantic integration. On December 2, 2005, repre- around the Black Sea (“Road of the Argonauts”) sentatives of Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, Lithuania, and development of Black Sea ferry connections. A Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Slovenia number of smaller projects are already being funded signed the group’s founding document, the “Kiev through the BSEC Project Development Fund. Mech- Declaration.” Delegations from Azerbaijan, the anisms have been established to fight dangers in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as well as ob- area of soft security (e. g. organized crime) but have servers from the United States, the EU, and the OSCE yet to be implemented. In energy cooperation the were also present. Two subsequent conferences have BSEC has issued papers but has not yet taken on a since taken place, in Tbilisi (March 2006) and Viln- concrete project. ius (May 2006). In Vilnius both President Valdas Ad- The BSEC is working toward closer ties with the amkus and Polish President Lech Kaczynski played World Bank and the European Union. In September host. Macedonia and Slovenia did not send repre- 2005, the BSEC Council in Moldava’s capital Chisi- sentatives. As a result, their current status — and the nau authorized Greece to explore, in consultation number of current members — remains unresolved. with EU representatives, possibilities of institutional Uncertainty also exists over the status of the Caspian cooperation with the European Union. region, identified during the CDC’s founding as a Critics say that, although it has built up a for- target region, but which, in contrast to the Baltic mal structure and convenes its bodies regularly, the and Black Sea regions, was not included in the logo BSEC has not yet established itself as a significant at the Vilnius conference. actor in the region. The organization has resolved The CDC is regarded as a collection of pro-West- to undertake comprehensive reforms in seeking a ern countries interested in association with NATO more effective, wide-ranging, and project-oriented and the EU, comparable to → GUAM and the BSF role in the region. (Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue). The www.bsec-organization.org CDC’s relations with Russia are the object of debate. According to Ukrainian President Yushchenko the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) CDC is not directed against any third countries, pur- The CDC is an international organization among sues exclusively positive goals, and remains open to states of the Black Sea and Baltic regions intended all. Senior Georgian official Georgi Arveladze, on to promote democracy, human rights, rule of law, the other hand, has described the CDC as an “axis of cooperation, and conflict resolution. It exists as an democratic countries that do not wish to remain in ongoing series of conferences, with neither institu- Russia’s orbit.” US Vice-President Dick Cheney was a tionalized structures nor an independent budget. guest speaker at the Vilnius meeting, accusing Rus- In August 2005, Ukrainian President Viktor sia of using its oil and gas reserves as “tools of intimi- Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikhail Saa- dation or blackmail” and promising U. S. support for kashvili signed a joint statement known as the Bor- all those countries seeking to join the EU and NATO.

118 The speech was strongly criticized by Russia, with from Abkhazia and Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian Kremlin adviser Gleb Pavlovsky calling the Since ceasefire agreements were reached in the CDC an antechamber to NATO. Russia has yet to ac- mid-1990s the frozen conflict regions, with the ex- cept invitations to participate at CDC conferences ception of Nagorno-Karabakh, all host international at the highest level. Senior Turkish representatives peacekeeping troops consisting largely of Russian have likewise declined invitations, sending lower- soldiers, who are in turn monitored by the OSCE level representatives instead. Analysts attribute Tur- or UN. Negotiations during the past 15 years have key’s conduct to the country’s primary interest in failed to resolve these conflicts and have repeatedly maintaining stability and the status quo, as well as been broken off. Regimes have developed in the re- its skepticism toward external actors in the region. gions that, although not internationally recognized, Turkish diplomats have warned against “organiza- display most hallmarks of governments and admin- tions with a discriminatory character.” Some CDC istrations. The de facto regimes of Abkhazia, South members, including Moldovan President Vladimir Ossetia, and Transnistria have formed the “Commu- Voronin, have demanded that the organization be nity for Democracy and the Rights of the Peoples” given an institutional structure. and meet regularly. These leaders also refer to efforts http://www.vilniusconference2006.lt/en/ toward independence for Kosovo as a possible legal precedent. While the West disputes that Kosovo and Frozen conflicts the frozen conflicts are comparable, the Kremlin The term “frozen conflict” is used to identify a series has said both Kosovo and the frozen conflicts are of separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet region that, matters concerning the question of whether the after a period of mass bloodshed in the early 1990s, right to self-determination or guaranteed territorial resulted in the establishment of internationally un- integrity should prevail. One cannot, Russia argues, recognized but de facto states. A belt of frozen con- set completely different priorities in different cases. flicts extends from Transnistria in eastern Moldova The international community must agree on univer- through → Abkhazia and → South Ossetia in Georgia sal principles that could serve as guidelines for all to → Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. these regions, the Russians say. When Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbai- jan declared their independence during the collapse Georgia of the Soviet Union early in the 1990s, ethnic groups Georgia (pop. 4.6 million in 2004) declared its inde- such as the Abkhaz and South Ossetians, who were pendence in 1991 shortly before the USSR’s collapse. concentrated in certain regions of these countries, In 1995 the country adopted a democratic constitu- declared their own independent states. These seces- tion following a referendum. Former Soviet Foreign sionist movements were generally supported by Rus- Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was Georgia’s presi- sia, which saw in them an opportunity to project dent from 1992 but was driven from office in the influence beyond its borders. In violent clashes and, non-violent “Rose Revolution” in 2003 in the wake in some cases, full-scale wars, people not belonging of alleged election fraud. In January 2004 Mikhail to the majority ethnic or linguistic group reclaim- Saakashvili, at the time the most important leader ing the territory were expelled, including Georgians of the opposition, was elected president. Saakash-

119 vili vowed to fight corruption, modernize the econ- crack down on smuggling over the Russian border omy, re-establish the country’s territorial integrity by increasing its military presence in the region. by recovering the breakaway areas of → Abkhazia, Russian-Georgian tensions worsened in 2006. In Ajaria, and → South Ossetia, and integrate Georgia the spring Russia imposed an embargo on Georgian with the West with perspectives for joining the EU wine and mineral water — two of the country’s most and NATO. important exports — on the grounds that the prod- Georgia has concluded a Partnership and Co- ucts did not meet health standards. In September operation Agreement with the EU, is a component 2006 the Georgian defense minister came under fire of the European Neighborhood Policy (Action Plans while flying over South Ossetia by helicopter, forc- with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbeijan adopted on ing an emergency landing. Late in September Geor- November 14, 2006), and is actively pursuing NATO gian police arrested four Russians on suspicion of membership. The government has introduced com- espionage. President Putin accused Georgia of “state prehensive economic reforms to create a market terrorism” and cut off all transport arteries and economy and minimise state restraints. postal communication with the country in October The country’s relations with its big neighbor 2006. The detained officers were later handed over Russia have deteriorated substantially in recent to the OSCE and flown back to Moscow without the years. During the early 1990s Russia supported sepa- embargo being lifted. Russia has expelled numer- ratist movements in the breakaway Georgian fro- ous Georgians living in Russia illegally and closed zen conflict regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. shops and casinos since October 2006. The incomes Moscow points out its constructive contributions to of ethnic Georgians in Russia are sent largely to rela- ensuring stability in the region and criticizes what tives in Georgia and constitute a substantial source it says is Georgian aggression and intransigence to- of revenue for the Georgian economy. Georgia has wards practical compromise proposals. Russia also criticized human rights violations in the course of accuses Georgia of negligence in repeatedly allowing the expulsions. Russia drastically raised the price for terrorist and extremist elements to cross the border exports of natural gas to Georgia, which has to pay into Russian territory. Georgia, in turn, says Moscow world market prices by now. supports the frozen conflict regimes and that the part its peacekeeping troops in the region play is nei- GUAM ther constructive nor unbiased. Russia, Tbilisi says, An international organization of four CIS states: is seeking to torpedo negotiations over the conflicts → Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, es- with the aim of permanently weakening Georgia’s tablished as a forum of security and economic co- territorial integrity so severely that it cannot join operation on the basis of shared democratic values. NATO, thereby safeguarding Russian influence in The members also seek to coordinate their policies the region. within major organizations such as the UN while Ajaria was reincorporated into Georgia in May supporting each others’ efforts at convergence with 2004, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain Euro-Atlantic structures. The name is an acronym of “frozen conflicts”. Shots were fired in the summer its members (during the 1999 –2005 membership of of 2004 in South Ossetia when Georgia attempted to Uzbekistan: GUUAM).

120 GUAM was founded on October 10, 1997 in Stras­ since September 2006. GUAM’s Parliamentary Assem- bourg during a summit meeting of the Council of bly was established in September 2004. Europe. The United States backed the new organi- More than 20 multilateral agreements have been zation, according to observers, as a means of cre- concluded within the framework of GUAM to date. ating a counterweight to Russia’s influence in the The organization has advanced proposals to resolve region. After a series of meetings the first summit the → frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region and was held on June 7, 2001, in Yalta. At the Kiev sum- fight organized crime. In May 2006 the Ukrainian mit of May 23, 2006, the heads of state signed a defense minister Gritsenko called on GUAM to pro- new statute to upgrade the group, under the name vide peacekeeping troops. In the field of economics a “GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic protocol toward the creation of a free trade zone has Development,” into a fully-fledged international or- been agreed. Securing and improving energy transfer ganization. GUAM has had observer status at the UN from Central Asia through the Caspian region to Eu- General Assembly since 2003. rope is also an important item on the GUAM agenda. The circle of members and observers has changed over time. Founded by Georgia, Azerbaijan, Montreux Convention Ukraine, and Moldova, the organization expanded Signed by Britain, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, in 1999 with the entry of Uzbekistan, which se- Romania, Turkey, the USSR, and Yugoslavia in 1936, ceded again in 2005 to pursue greater activity in the the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which it was the Turkish Straits was the international agreement a member since 2001. Current observers are Lithua- that gave Turkey control over the Bosporus and the nia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the United Dardanelles. It replaced the international commis- States. GUAM is open for accession by additional sion that controlled passage since the Convention states that share its goals and principles. of Lausanne (1923). The Montreux Convention re- GUAM is organized along three tiers according mains in effect today, regulating the rights of pas- to its charter. An annual summit among the member sage for merchant ships and war vessels. The straits states’ Heads of State is considered the organization’s are considered international waterways. Merchant supreme body. The executive body, the Council of ships enjoy unrestricted passage during peacetime. Foreign Ministers, meets semi-annually, and finally, Turkish authorities are authorized to check ships for there is the working body or Committee of National sanitary conditions, safety, and can charge tolls, but Coordinators. There are seven working groups on the cannot stop their passage. Warships from non-Black topics of energy; transport; trade and economic devel- Sea powers are allowed to remain in the Black Sea opment; information technology and telecommunica- for no longer than 21 days. tion; culture, science, and education; tourism; and the After Russia gained control of the northern fight against terrorism, organized crime, and drug Black Sea coast during the 18th century, the Euro- trafficking. Decisions are reached through consensus. pean powers sought to regulate maritime access to The GUAM Information Office in Kiev functions as the the Black Sea in their own interest through diplo- group’s secretariat. Former Georgian Foreign Minis- macy. The Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi, signed between ter Valeri Chechelashvili has been Secretary General Ottoman Turkey and Russia in 1833 after Russia’s vic-

121 tory in the Russo-Turkish War, included a secret arti- cal structures. Since 1997 its “president” has been cle under which Turkey would close the Dardanelles Arkadi Ghoukasian. Azerbaijan and Turkey have im- to all non-Russian ships in time of war. In 1841 the posed an economic embargo on the region. five European powers and Turkey signed the London During the Soviet period Nagorno-Karabach was Straits Convention, which closed the straits to all an autonomous oblast within the Soviet Socialist Re- non-Turkish warships during peacetime. Only after public of Azerbaijan. Tensions between ethnic Arme- World War I did the victorious Entente restrict Turk- nians and Azeris, which had already existed since ish sovereignty in the treaties of Sèvres (1920) and the end of World War I (1923 94 % Armenians, 1988 Lausanne (1923), demilitarize the straits, and permit 75 % Armenians and 23 % Azeris), intensified from free passage for all warships. Soon the new Turk- the late 1980s as Armenian separatists began de- ish Republic sought a revision of the treaties. Given manding independence for Nagorno-Karabakh from the growing prospect of war, Britain and the Soviet Azerbaijan. Several hundred people were killed in Union were particularly willing to compromise. The shooting, demonstrations, and pogroms. When Azer­ Convention of Montreux (after the Swiss city where baijan declared independence from the Soviet Union it was signed) took effect on July 20, 1936. in 1991, a majority in Nagorno-Karabakh voted in a The Turkish inspection rights laid down in the referendum in favor of secession from Azerbaijan. convention were intended to safeguard residents This led the to armed strife the following year dur- along the straits from sickness and disease. Today ing which the separatists, supported by regular Ar- the biggest dangers to the straits, in some places menian troops, occupied large areas of the region only 660 meters wide, and the 18 million inhabit- and expelled the Azeris there; some 700,000 Azeris ants of the Istanbul metropolitan area, are oil tanker fled from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh while accidents. Recently the United States has urged Tur- about 400,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan. key to open up the Black Sea as a base for anti-terror- A ceasefire was reached in 1994 through Rus- ism operations. Turkey points out that the request sian mediation that still holds today. Inofficially would put the region’s precarious balance of power supported by some 10,000 Armenian troops, some in jeopardy and that the Convention of Lausanne is 8,500 soldiers still hold about 14 % of Azeri territory. an essential element of Turkish sovereignty. West- Since 1992 the Minsk Group of the OSCE consist- ern proponents of a revision argue that unilateral ing of the conflict parties and eleven other states control of the straits is outdated and should be re- (Austria, Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, placed by a multilateral regime. Romania, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States) has been working toward a resolution for the Nagorny-Karabach conflict. The negotiations have not produced any Nagorno-Karabakh is a → “frozen conflict” region noteworthy results and the conflict parties have yet in the southeastern Minor Caucasus with a popu- to issue any joint document that goes beyond the lation of 145,000 (95 % ethnic Armenians, less than terms reached in the ceasefire agreement. 1 % Azeris). Its “capital” is Stepanakert. Formally part of Azerbaijan, the entity, officially recognized only Organization of the Black Sea Economic Coopera- by Armenia. is a de facto state with its own politi- tion BSEC → BSEC

122 South Ossetia under OSCE monitoring. Fighting again flared up in The → frozen conflict region of South Ossetia (pop. 2004, followed by another ceasefire. appx. 70,000) lies in northern → Georgia. Formally After being elected Georgian president in 2004, part of the Georgian province of Shida Kartli, it is Mikhail Saakashvili vowed to restore Georgia’s ter- the self-proclaimed, internationally unrecognized ritorial integrity, meaning among else the reincor- state of the “Republic of South Ossetia” where poration of South Ossetia (called the “Tskhinvali Re- ethnic Ossetians constitute appx. two-thirds of the gion” by the Georgian government). In January 2005 population. Its “capital” is Tskhinvali. While the de Saakashvili presented a Georgian vision for resolving facto government under “President” Eduard Kokoity the South Ossetian conflict in a speech to the Parlia- and “Prime Minister” Yuri Morozov controls areas mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Stras- inhabited mainly by Ossetians, the Georgian central bourg. In October that year, Prime Minister Zurab government in Tbilisi maintains authority in those Noghaideli proposed an action plan at the OSCE Per- parts with an ethnic Georgian majority. manent Council that was supported by the United Russia has widespread influence in the region. States and OSCE but which the South Ossetian de Most South Ossetians hold Russian passports, the facto government rejected. In July 2006 the Georgian currency is the Russian ruble, and “government” parliament called for the withdrawal of Russian peace- employees are apparently paid by Moscow. Georgia keepers from South Ossetia, to be replaced by a force claims many representatives of the South Ossetian assembled by the international community. Tensions administration came from the Russian bureaucracy. mounted in September 2006 when the Georgian de- Kokoity, who was elected in 2001 and maintains fense minister’s helicopter overflying South Ossetia close ties with the de facto government of → Ab- was fired at. In a South Ossetian referendum held khazia, has declared the region’s unification with on November 12, 2006, 99 % of the population voted the Russian Republic of North Ossetia as his objec- in favor of independence, according to the de facto tive. government. In a concurrent presidential election, During the Soviet era South Ossetia was an 96 % approved self-proclaimed President Kokoity for autonomous oblast within the Georgian SSR in a second term. The referendum was criticized and which more ethnic Georgians than Ossetians lived. dismissed by the Council of Europe. The pro-Geor- Tensions between the two communities worsened gian alternative government has held a counter-ref- in 1989 when the “South Ossetian Popular Front,” erendum and an “alternative” election where Dmitri fearing Georgian domination, demanded unifica- Sanakoev was elected “President”. tion with North Ossetia. After Georgia’s independ- Talks to resolve the conflict are conducted within ence in 1991, Georgian was declared the country’s the framework of the Joint Control Commission, in sole administrative language. That same year vio- which Georgian, South Ossetian, and Russian repre- lence broke out with casualties on both sides. Some sentatives negotiate trilaterally under OSCE supervi- 60,000–100,000 people fled to Georgia or North sion. In September 2006 Georgia demanded the for- Ossetia. A ceasefire reached in 1992 under Russian mat be changed to bilateral Georgian-South Ossetian pressure is maintained by a joint peacekeeping force talks under OSCE patronage and including Russia, of 2000 Russians, North Ossetians, and Georgians the EU, and the United States as mediators.

123 The United States is calling for a “peaceful solu- Out of Trannistrian territory, pro-Russian pa- tion within the internationally recognized borders of triotic organization (“Provyv”) seek to organize all Georgia” and has promised South Ossetia $ 2 million pro-Russian groups in the frozen conflict regions to in reconstruction aid. An OSCE donor conference in push back the EU’s and NATO’s influence. June 2006 raised some € 10 million in pledges to help Western observers call Transnistria one of the rebuild South Ossetia’s infrastructure and economy. most important centers for smuggling and organ- ized crime in the European neighborhood. Transnistria Settlement talks between Moldova and the de One of the → frozen conflict regions of the Black facto Transnistrian government have been ongoing Sea region, Transnistria (pop. 550,000, ~ 32 % Molda- with some lapses since 1992, and under OSCE auspices was, 29 % Ukrainians, 30 % Russians) lies within the since 1993. Since 1995 the negotiations have been tak- borders of Moldova east of the Dniester River. Al- ing place in the format of a five-party mediation proc- though not recognized by any country, Transnistria ess, with Molova and Transnistria negotiating and is a de facto state with a “President,” Igor Smirnov Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE mediating. In addition (re-elected on December 10, 2006 in elections that to the five parties, the EU and United States joined the were not recognized internationally), its own struc- process as observers in autumn 2005 (5 + 2 Format). tures, and the “capital” Tiraspol. In March 2005 Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged was ap- After Moldova declared independence from the pointed EU Special Representative for Moldova. Until Soviet Union in 1990, Transnistria, led by Smirnov, a now the talks failed to produce durable results — nei- former factory director backed by Russian-speaking ther the “Kiev Document” which called for the re- Ukrainians and Russians, declared its independence integration of Transnistria on a federal basis, nor the from Moldova. A limited war with Moldova broke “Kozak Plan,” devised by senior Kremlin official and out in 1992 in which the separatists consolidated Putin confidante Dmitri Kozak found acceptance on control over most of the territory, aided by substan- both sides. Since Moldova and Ukraine re-introduced tial Russian forces. A 1992 agreement between Rus- a common border regime in March 2006 the Tran- sia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania created a demil- snistrian side has refused to return to the negotiating itarized zone and established a peacekeeping force table and the negotiations had to be broken off. In consisting of Moldovan, Transnistrian, and Russian October 2006 they resumed once in a 5 + 1 format, troops. An additional 1,100 Russian soldiers continue i. e. with the mediators speaking with the separated to be stationed at a former Soviet military base there. Moldovan and Transnistrian sides. The Transnistrian Even though Russia had agreed to withdraw its sol- and the Russian side see the common border regime diers and ammunition until the end of 2002 at the as an attempt to implement an economic blockade OSCE summit in Istanbul, the withdrawal has not of Transnistria. According to the new border regime, been completed yet. Since spring 2004 neither mate- Transnistrian companies which want to export their rial nor troops have been withdrawn. Russia claims goods have to be registered in the Moldovan capital that the atmosphere is not sufficiently positive for Chisinau to receive customs documents. As of late a withdrawal or that the Transnistrian side prevents 2006, more than 260 companies — almost all Tran- her from withdrawing the soldiers. snistrian companies exporting goods — have done so.

124 Russia supports the Transnistrian regime po- The High Representative of the Common EU Foreign litically and economically. Transnistria owes Russia and Security Policy, Javier Solana, has underscored more than one billion USD for gas imports. the non-negotiability of Moldovan territorial integ- Upon a joint request by the presidents of Moldova rity and is calling for a resumption of the 5 + 2 talks. and Ukraine in June 2005, the EU established the Eu- EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero- ropean Border Assistance Program (EUBAM) in De- Waldner is demanding the same while criticizing cember 2005 under Ferenc Banfi. With a budget of Russian support for the regime in Tiraspol. The Eu- € 20 million (through December 2007) it is charged ropean Parliament criticizes corruption, organized with assisting Moldovan and Ukrainian customs crime, the gray economy, and supression of NGOs, police in monitoring the Ukrainian-Moldovan (i. e. free media, and the ethnic Romanian population the Ukrainian-Transnistrian and Moldovan-Transnis- in Transnistria. It has called on Russia to recognize trian) border. Its official goal is to help support sta- Moldova’s territorial integrity, break off support for bility in the region by improving the border regime. the Transnistrian regime, and withdraw its troops The mission’s supporters hope it will help reduce il- from the territory. legal trans-border trafficking in weapons and drugs through Transnistria and thereby sever an economic lifeline for the regime in Tiraspol. The fact that no weapons smuggling has been detected is considered a success by the program’s supporters. Its opponents say it simply proves that allegations of weapons traf- ficking were baseless from the start. In a referendum on September 17, 2006, more than 90 % of the Transnistrian population voted in favor of independence from Moldova and accession to the Russian Federation, according to the Transnis- trian “government”. This was not the first referen- dum on independence in Transnistria but the first one to proclaim an association with Russia. Russia’s foreign minister called the vote free and fair and de- manded to take the “will of the people” into account. The EU and OSCE, on the other hand, dismissed it as illegitimate even before it was held because it violated Moldova’s territorial integrity and because under current authoritarian conditions a free refer- endum was impossible. No election monitors were dispatched and the results were not recognized. The United States demands a peaceful resolu- tion guaranteeing Moldova’s territorial integrity.

125 Index

Abkhazia (→ Glossary) 36–37, 41–45, 69, 79 - organized crime 28, 46, 60, 69, 80, 102 Aegean Sea 67 - regional cooperation 24, 27, 29, 60–62, 64, 66, Albania 24, 62, 64, 70, 74 69–70, 74, 76, 89–91, 95–96, 101 Ankara 25, 65, 67 - trafficking 37, 46–47, 69, 76, 80, 95, 102 Argonauts 32 - soft security 80, 99, 102 Armenia 24, 26, 56, 59, 62–64, 74, 84–85 Black Sea Trade and Development Bank Asia Minor 81 (BSTDB) 100 Athens 97 Bonn 32 Austria 33, 70 Border Management Programme in Central Asia Azerbaijan 24, 26–27, 31–34, 45, 56, 59, 61–64, 71, (BOMCA) 47, 76, 102 74, 84–86, 89 Bucharest 25, 62 Baku 34, 45, 54, 56, 59 Bulgaria 23–26, 29, 31, 33, 55–57, 60, 62, 64, 70, Balkans 24, 41–42, 53, 56, 60, 67, 70, 88, 90–91, 72–75, 96 93, 96, 98, 101 Brussels 36, 40, 73, 75, 77–78, 92–93, 97–100 Baltic Sea and Black Sea Summit (2006) 24 Byzantine Empire 29, 67 Baltic States 24, 53, 58, 90 Canada 52 Baltic Sea region 24–25, 29, 31–32, 58, 62, 69, 95 Caspian Sea region 24, 27–28, 33–34, 36, 62, Basque County 43 68–70, 76, 84, 101 Batumi 25 Catalonia 43 Bavaria 41 Caucasus 24–25, 27, 29, 31, 34, 41, 45, 56–57, Belarus 73, 84 74–77, 84, 88, 91–93, 96, 101 Belgrade 42–44 Central Asia 24, 29, 33–35, 56, 76, 84, 101–102 Berlin 46, 86 Central Asian Drug Action Programme Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) (→ Glossary) (CADAP) 47, 76, 102 24, 26, 28, 50–51, 60–65, 69, 74–75, 86, 95, 97–101 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 96 - Bosporus Declaration (1992) 62 Chechnya 42 - Chisinau Declaration (2005) 96–97 China 30, 34–35, 52, 65–66, 83 Black Sea Forum (2006) 25 Chisinau 39 Black Sea region Colchis 60 - definition 24–27, 32, 74, 92–93, 98 Cold War / Iron Curtain 24, 27, 29–30, 55, 57 - democratization 38–39, 53, 61–62, 71, 81, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 50–51 89–90, 95–96 Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) - energy hub / transit routes 33–36, 47, 53–54, (→ Glossary) 24, 50, 61–63, 95 69–70, 76, 101 - Borjomi Declaration (2005) 62 - history 23, 25–26, 28–29, 55–56, 60, 70–72, 81, - Vilnius Summit (2005) 62 102–103, Constanta 25, 33 - identity 24–28, 30–32, 68, 70–71, 92 Correspondence Eastern Europe and Central Asia - mare nostrum 29, 67–68, 81 (COEST) 98

126 Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 90 EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) 28, 40, Council of Europe 38–39, 61 73–74, 76, 79, 93 Crimea 46, 94 EU Rule of Law Mission (THEMIS) 78 Crimean War 56 EU-Russia summits 40, 74, 77 Croatia 70 Finland 98 Cuba 52 First World War 25–26 Czech Republic 91 Frankfurt 27 Danube Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS) 75 France 26, 32, 56, 72–73 Deutscher Zollverein 61 Frozen Conflicts (→ Glossary) 36–46, 50–51, 59, Dmanisi 32 62, 64, 69, 71, 77–78, 85 Dubai 60 - 5 + 2-Process 40, 73–74, 76 Energy Crisis, Russian-Ukrainian 90, 97 - Joint Control Committee 40, 77 Estonia 62 - Minsk-Process 40 European Bank for Reconstruction and G-8 73 Development (EBRD) 97 - St. Petersburg Summit (2006) 51 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 61 Georgia (→ Glossary) 24–27, 31–34, 37, 39, 44–45, European Investment Bank (EIB) 97 50–53, 55–64, 69, 74, 78, 82–85, 103 European Union (EU) - energy transfer 33–34 - Action Plans 74–76, 80, 84, 89–90, 94, 99 - European identity 26, 31–32 - Barcelona-Process 91 - NATO accession 57–59 - Baku-Process 36, 75–76, 101 Germany 26, 35, 60, 66, 72–74, 86–87, 98 - Commission 36, 76, 78, 85, 87, 97, 99–100 Great Britain 73 - Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) Great Game 94 77–78 Greece 24, 55, 60, 62, 70, 74–75, 97, 99 - energy security 35, 37, 50–51, 66, 70 GUAM / GUUAM (→ Glossary) 24, 27, 50–51, 55, - EU General Affairs Council (GAC) 97 61–66, 69, 95, 99 - European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 59, - Yalta Declaration (2001) 61 74–76, 84–90, 94, 98–99 Hamburg 46 - Four Common Spaces with Russia 74–75, Hungary 24, 33, 91 84–85, 94 India 28, 35, 65, 83 - German EU presidency (2007) 36, 85–87, 98 International Finance Corporation (IFC) 86 - regional membership perspectives 38, 53–54, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 100 57–60, 63, 68, 80–84, 87–89, 98, 102 Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe - Northern Dimension 69, 91, 95 ­(INOGATE) 101 - Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) Iran 33–35, 65–66, 73 75, 84–85 - nuclear program 35, 83 - Stability Association Process (SAP) 60, 96 Iraq 33, 63, 83 - value oriented policy 32, 71, 84, 91, 94 Islam 52, 68

127 Istanbul / Constantinople 25, 30, 54, 81, 100, 102 Odessa 24–28, 30, 40, 54, 56, 60, 77, 102–103 Italy 33 Open Society Institute Azerbaijan 85 Japan 96 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Kaliningrad 81 Europe (OSCE) 38, 62 Kazakhstan 34, 65 - Helsinki Final Act 86 Kharkiv 81 Pakistan 65 Kiev 24–25, 39, 61–62 Persian Gulf 34, 62, 70 Kosovo 41–45, 57, 90 Pipelines 33–36, 53, 55, 65, 85 - UN-Security Council Resolution 1244 43 - Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 34–35, 55 Kyrgyzstan 65 - Blue Stream 34 Latvia 62 - Burgas-Alexandroupolis 34 Lithuania 62, 73 - Nabucco 33–34 London 46, 60 - Odessa-Brody 34 Macedonia 25, 62 - Pan-European 33 Mediterranean Sea 29, 69–70, 82, 102 - South Caucasus 34 Mexico 52 - Western Route 34 Middle East 34, 55, 84 Poland 24, 56, 72–73, 91, 98 Moldova 24, 28, 37, 40, 45, 60–62, 64, 74–78, Pristina 42 84–85, 88, 93 Pskov 81 Mongolia 65 Public National Committee on Integration to Montenegro 56, 90 Europe 85 Montreux Convention (→ Glossary) 55, 58 Republika Srpska 43 Moscow 24, 27, 35, 37, 39–40, 48, 50–55, 58, 71, Road of the Argonauts 60, 63 79, 103 Romania 23–24, 33, 39, 55–57, 60, 62, 73–75, 91, Nagorno-Karabakh (→ Glossary) 36–38, 41, 45–46, 96 55, 59, 86 Rome 31 National War College, Washington D. C. 27 Russia / Soviet Union 24, 26, 28–29, 33–37, 39–40, New York 31 42, 44, 46, 48–60, 62–63, 65–67, 69, 71–77, Netherlands 32 80–81, 84–85, 92–97, 100 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - Black Sea Fleet 52–53, 58 (→ Glossary) 35, 38, 43, 46, 52–53, 55–60, 63, - energy politics 33–36, 48, 51–53, 63, 66, 68, 73, 68–69, 94 76, 97 - enlargement 38, 46, 55, 57–58, 60, 63 - Near Abroad 26, 93 - Membership Action Plan (MAP) 46 - post-Soviet space 24, 27, 44, 50–51, 53, 66, 72 - NATO-Russia council 59 - responsibility for frozen conflicts 37, 39–41, 44, Northern Cyprus 86 50, 77 Norway 96 - Single Economic Space 50 Novorossisk 28 Sangachal 34

128 Sea of Azov 58 - EU accession 54, 75, 82 Separatism 36–37, 39–43, 45–46 Turkmenistan 34 Serbia 24, 42–44, 56, 74, 90 Ukraine 24, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 39, 42, 46, 49–53, Sevastopol 52, 58, 94 56–62, 64, 69, 72, 74–76, 81–84, 88, 93, 97–99, Shah-Deniz-Field 34 103 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 35, - EU accession 82–83 65–66 - NATO accession 46, 57–58 Siberia 54 - Orange Revolution 49, 53, 72–73 Sinope / Sinop 28 - regional role 27, 33, 50–51, 62, 69, 83 Slovakia 91 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 60 Slovenia 62, 90 United States of America (USA) 31, 35, 37–38, Sochi 28 48–50, 52–58, 61, 63, 66, 69, 70, 72, 94, 96 South Ossetia (→ Glossary) 36–37, 39–43, 45, 69, - energy politics 35, 69–70, 94 77, 79, 87 - interest politics 48, 50, 53, 55–58, 63, 69 Spain 41 - participation in conflict resolution 37–38, 55, St. Petersburg 30, 51 60 Strasbourg 61 Uzbekistan 65 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) 48 United Nations (UN) 38, 41–44, 77 Sukhumi 79 - Security Council 44 Supsa 34 - UN Development Programme (UNDP) 102 Switzerland 96 Vietnam War 48 Tajikistan 65 Vilnius 50 Tbilisi 24, 45, 62, 102 Visegrád-Group 90–91 Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Varna 60 Independent States (TACIS) 101 Washington, D. C. 55, 58, 103 Terrorism 56, 68, 80 Western values 32, 38, 58, 61, 68, 71, 84, 94 - September 11th, 2001 49 World Bank 53, 96, 100 Thessaloniki 100 World Trade Organization (WTO) 83 Tiraspol 45 Yalta 81 Trabzon / Trebizond 25, 27–28, 30 Yalta European Strategy (YES) 83 Transnistria (→ Glossary) 28, 36–43, 45, 69, 73–74, Yugoslavia 25, 43–44 76–77, 79, 87 Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) 75, 101 Trieste 33 Turkey / Ottoman Empire 24, 26, 28–30, 33, 46, 54–57, 60, 62–63, 65–66, 68, 74–75, 81, 83, 86, 101, 103

129 Persons

Ahmadinejad, Mahmud 73 Ahtisaari, Martti 42 Bismarck, Otto von 61 Blair, Tony 46 Cheney, Dick 50, 63 Elchibey, Abulfaz 27 Emerson, Michael 96 Faber, Peter 27 Fromm, Erich 50 Gorbachev, Mikhail 49 Huntington, Samuel 31 Jacobovits de Szeged, Adriaan 74–75 Kostunica, Vojislav 43 Kravchuk, Leonid 51 Lavrov, Sergey 39 List, Friedrich 61 Lordkipadnize, David 32 Lushkow, Yuri 35, 65 Monnet, Jean 90 Polo, Marco 30, 32 Putin, Vladimir 41 Saakashvili, Mikheil 34, 50, 62 Said, Kurban 71 Semneby, Peter 41, 75, 77 Smirnoff, Igor 39 Tadic, Boris 43 Twain, Mark 30 Wolf, Martin 60 Yeltsin, Boris 49 Yushchenko, Viktor 50, 62

130 Previous Round Tables*

Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1961 1 Schwächen der industriellen Gesellschaft F. W. Schoberth H. B. Tolkmitt

2 Kulturkrise in der industriellen Gesellschaft Erik von Sivers Fritz Voigt

3 Glanz und Elend der Entwicklungshilfe Fritz Baade Günther Buch

4 Gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Osten Helmut Gollwitzer Eugen Kogon

1962 5 Die Fragwürdigkeit der Bildungspolitik Rüdiger Altmann Josef Müller-Marein

6 Die Erziehung zum Europäer Stéphane Hessel François Bondy

7 Die Bewältigung des Preis-Lohn-Problems Theodor Pütz Gottfried Bombach

8 Die Preis-Lohn-Dynamik in der BRD Hans-Constantin Paulssen Fritz Voigt

1963 9 Maschine — Denkmaschine — Staatsmaschine Pierre Bertaux Arnold Gehlen

10 Kybernetik als soziale Tatsache O. W. Haseloff Freiherr von Stackelberg

11 Westliche Gesellschaft und kommunistische Drohung Winfried Martini Th. Eschenburg

12 Wohin treibt die EWG ? U. W. Kitzinger, Eugen Kogon Roland Delcour

1964 13 Planung in der freien Marktwirtschaft Edgar Salin Gottfried Bombach

14 Wohin Deutschland in Europa ? Alfred Grosser, François Bondy Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg

15 Entwicklungshilfe — Mittel des Aufstiegs oder des Verfalls ? Walter Rau Edgar Salin E. F. Schumacher

16 Industrielle Gesellschaft — menschlich oder unmenschlich ? Raymond Aron Ralf Dahrendorf

1965 17 Vermögensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand Helmut Meinhold Eugen Kogon H. J. Wallraff

18 Hemmen Tabus die Demokratisierung ? Alexander Mitscherlich Hellmut Becker

19 Automatisierung — eine gesellschaftliche Herausforderung ? Gottfried Bombach Hans Wenke Günter Friedrichs Kurt Pentzlin

*A complete list of all participants since 1961 is available at www.bergedorf-round-table.org

131 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

20 Ein Dilemma der westlichen Demokratien Leo H. Klaassen Edgar Salin

1966 21 Die “unterentwickelten” hochindustrialisierten Gesellschaften Friedrich Heer Hellmut Becker

22 Muss unsere politische Maschinerie umkonstruiert werden ? Rüdiger Altmann Eugen Kogon Joseph Rovan

23 Wissenschaftliche Experten und politische Praxis — Das Helmut Schelsky Hellmut Becker Problem der Zusammenarbeit in der heutigen Demokratie Ulrich Lohmar

24 Ist der Weltfriede unvermeidlich ? Carl-Friedrich Frhr. Edgar Salin v. Weizsäcker

1967 25 Bedroht die Pressekonzentration die freie Meinungsbildung ? Helmut Arndt Hellmut Becker

26 Neue Wege zur Hochschulreform Ralf Dahrendorf Hellmut Becker

27 Beherrschen die Technokraten unsere heutige Gesellschaft ? Alfred Mozer Eugen Kogon

1968 28 Freiheit als Störfaktor in einer programmierten Gesellschaft Jeanne Hersch Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

29 Fördern die Bündnissysteme die Sicherheit Europas ? Wladimir Chwostow Alfred Grosser

30 Haben wir im entstehenden Europa eine Chance für Hans von der Groeben Hans Peter Ipsen die freie Marktwirtschaft ?

31 Mögliche und wünschbare Zukünfte Robert Jungk Hellmut Becker

1969 32 Die Biologie als technische Weltmacht Adolf Portmann Hoimar von Ditfurth

33 Verstärken oder verringern sich die Bedingungen Friedrich Hacker Eugen Kogon für Aggressivität ?

34 Welchen Spielraum hat die Entspannungspolitik ? Alfred Grosser Theo Sommer

1970 35 Zugänge zur Friedensforschung Carl-Friedrich Frhr. Karl Carstens v. Weizsäcker Richard Löwenthal

36 Europäische Sicherheit und Möglichkeit der Zusammenarbeit Alfred Grosser Nikolai E. Poljanow Leningrad Nikolai E. Poljanow

37 Demokratisierung der Demokratie ? Joseph Rovan D. Klaus von Bismarck

1971 Arbeitsgespräch : Aufgabenstellung und Verfahrensfragen — Franz Karasek einer internationalen Konferenz für Europäische Sicherheit

132 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

38 Infrastrukturreform als Innenpolitik Helmut Kohl D. Klaus von Bismarck

39 Globalsteuerung der Wirtschaft ? Gottfried Bombach Herbert Giersch

40 Der bevollmächtigte Mensch Dennis Gabor D. Klaus von Bismarck

1972 41 Sprache und Politik Hans Maier Hellmut Becker

Arbeitsgespräch : Demokratie und Nationalbewusstsein Richard Löwenthal François Bondy in der BRD

42 Das erweiterte Europa zwischen den Blöcken R. Dahrendorf Rudolf Kirchschläger Jean-Pierre Brunet Sir Con O’Neill

43 Wo bleiben die alten Menschen in der Leistungsgesellschaft ? Helge Pross D. Klaus von Bismarck

1973 44 Die “neue Mitte” : Schlagwort oder Strukturwandel ? Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker D. Klaus von Bismarck

45 Umsteuerung der Industriegesellschaft ? Hans-Jochen Vogel Gottfried Bombach Hugo Thiemann

46 Neutralität — Wert oder Unwert für die Rudolf Kirchschläger Olivier Reverdin Vienna europäische Sicherheit Gaston Thorn Jósef Czyrek

1974 47 Revolution der Gleichheit — Ende oder Beginn der Freiheit ? Ralf Dahrendorf D. Klaus von Bismarck

48 Rohstoff- und Energieverknappung H. B. G. Casimir Gottfried Bombach Manfred Schäfer

49 Entwicklungshilfe — eine Illusion ? Peter T. Bauer Max Thurn Karl-Heinz Sohn

1975 Arbeitsgespräch : Entspannungspolitik, wirtschaftliche Ralf Dahrendorf Kurt A. Körber Moscow und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit H. Ehrenberg Lew Tolkunow Theo Sommer C.-F. Frhr. v. Weizsäcker G. Arbatow O. Bogomolow Schalwa Sanakojew Georgij Shukow

50 Kooperation oder Konfrontation — Stürzt die Wirtschaft in Helmut Schmidt Gaston Thorn eine weltpolitische Krise ?

51 Welche Zukunft hat die parlamentarische Demokratie Gaston Thorn Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn westlicher Prägung ?

133 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

52 Ordnungspolitik oder Verteilungskampf ? Kurt H. Biedenkopf Theo Sommer

1976 53 Die Berufsgesellschaft und ihre Bildung Hans Maier Hellmut Becker

54 Nach der Wahl ’76 : Welchen Spielraum hat — Ralf Dahrendorf die deutsche Innenpolitik ?

55 Entspannungspolitik nach Helsinki G. Arbatow Ralf Dahrendorf Leonard H. Marks Theo Sommer Ryszard Wojna

1977 56 Ein anderer “Way of Life” E. F. Schumacher Hans K. Schneider Bonn

57 Europa und die Weltwirtschaft Claude Cheysson Gaston Thorn Luxemburg Herbert Giersch

58 Energiekrise — Europa im Belagerungszustand ? Guido Brunner Hans K. Schneider

1978 59 Terrorismus in der demokratischen Gesellschaft Walter Laqueur Ralf Dahrendorf

Arbeitsgespräch : Alternativenergien Joachim Gretz Werner H. Bloss

60 Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit als Dauerschicksal Volker Hauff Gottfried Bombach Gerhard Fels Erich Streissler

61 Wachstum und Lebenssinn — Alternative Rationalitäten ? Carl-Friedrich Ralf Dahrendorf Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

1979 62 UdSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland — wirtschaftliche Klaus von Dohnanyi K. A. Körber Moscow und politische Perspektiven in den 80er Jahren Alexander E. Bowin Boris A. Borrissow

63 Jugend und Gesellschaft Leopold Rosenmayr Hans Maier

Weltrezession 1980 ? Herbert Giersch Hans K. Schneider 64 Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen Karl Otto Pöhl

1980 65 Der Westen und der Nahe Osten Arnold Hottinger Udo Steinbach Hans A. Fischer-Barnicol H. Hobohm

66 Europas Sicherheit Christoph Bertram Theo Sommer W. R. Smyser

67 Voraussetzungen und Ziele der W. A. Matweew Karl Kaiser Entspannung in den 80er Jahren Stanley Hoffmann

134 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1981 68 Der Ausbau des Sozialstaates und R. Dahrendorf Armin Gutowski das Dilemma des Staatshaushaltes Anke Fuchs

69 Europe and America facing the crises of the 80’s R. Dahrendorf Karl Kaiser Washington Stanley Hoffmann

70 Was bleibt noch vom staatsbürgerlichen Grundkonsens ? Hans-Jochen Vogel Ralf Dahrendorf E. Noelle-Neumann

1982 71 Repräsentieren die Parteien unsere Gesellschaft ? Werner Remmers Hans Heigert Richard Löwenthal

72 Wirtschaftspolitik in der Krise ? Zur Situation in den J. Tobin Herbert Giersch Bonn Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritannien, Frankreich und der M. Feldstein ­Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sir Alec Cairncross A. A. Walters P. E. Uri P. Salin A. Gutowski H. Schulmann

1983 73 Ein Weg zur Erneuerung der Industriegesellschaft Präsident Gaston Thorn Ralf Dahrendorf Zurich

74 Die deutsche Frage — neu gestellt Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker Karl Kaiser Berlin

1984 75 Zukunft Europas : Probleme der politischen Horst Teltschik Karl Kaiser Moscow und militärischen Entspannung. Wadim W. Sagladin Juri Shukow

76 Ist die Spaltung Europas das letzte Wort ? Franz Kardinal König Luigi Vittorio Graf Rome Helmut Schmidt Ferraris

1985 77 Neue Strukturen für die soziale Sicherheit ? Helmut Meinhold Fides Krause-Brewer Ulf Fink Olaf Sund

78 10 Jahre Helsinki — die Herausforderung bleibt R. Burt Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn S. Tichwinskij M. Szürös L. V. Graf Ferraris M. Dobrosielski H. Teltschik

1986 79 Findet Europa wieder die Kraft, Jacques Delors Karl Kaiser Brussels eine Rolle in der Weltpolitik zu spielen ? Lord Carrington Helmut Schmidt

135 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

80 Bürger und res publica — die Zukunft der Verantwortung Hans Maier Ralf Dahrendorf

1987 81 Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion Volker Rühe Valentin Falin Moscow und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Wadim W. Sagladin Theo Sommer Egon Bahr

82 Die Modernität in der Industriegesellschaft — und danach ? Hermann Lübbe Luigi V. Ferraris Geneva

83 Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Vertrauensbildung M. Szürös Karl Kaiser Budapest Helmut Schmidt R. Bogdanow H. Sonnenfeldt

1988 84 Systemöffnende Kooperation ? W. Leonhard Jürgen Engert Berlin Perspektiven zwischen Ost und West Harry Maier

85 Die ökologische Wende — hat sie noch Chancen ? Frhr. v. Lersner Hans Maier Munich Alois Glück

86 Das gemeinsame europäische Haus — aus der Sicht der Wadim W. Sagladin Karl Kaiser Bonn Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Horst Teltschik

1989 87 Globale Umweltproblematik als gemeinsame Überlebensfrage W. Mundt Max Schmidt Dresden W. Haber

88 Auf dem Wege zu einem neuen Europa ? Perspektiven Lawrence Eagleburger Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn einer gemeinsamen westlichen Ostpolitik Sir Christopher Mallaby Horst Teltschik

89 Chancen für die europäische Kultur Valtr Komárek Hans Heigert Prague am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts Kurt Biedenkopf

1990 90 Wie geht es weiter mit den Deutschen in Europa ? Willy Brandt Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Dresden Manfred Stolpe Lothar Späth

91 Europa im Aufbruch — auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Frieden- Wadim W. Sagladin Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moscow sordnung Horst Teltschik

1991 92 Perestrojka : Kontinuität, Ende oder Wende ? W. Wladislawlew Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Moscow F. W. Christians

93 Nach dem “Sozialismus” : Wie geht es weiter Tadeusz Mazowiecki Hans Maier Berlin mit den neuen Demokratien in Europa ? Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

1992 94 Wege zur inneren Einheit Kurt Biedenkopf Brigitte Seebacher- Dresden Wolfgang Thierse Brandt

136 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

95 Welche Antworten gibt Europa auf Willy Brandt Karl Kaiser Paris die neuen Einwanderungswellen ? Jacques Delors

96 Zwischen Integration und nationaler Eigenständigkeit : Jim Hoagland Andreas Meyer-Landrut Tallinn wie findet Europa zusammen ? Dr. Krenzler Lennart Meri T. Örn B. Schmidbauer

97 Energiesicherheit für ganz Europa ? Hermann Krämer Andreas Meyer-Landrut Kiev W. Skljarow Helga Steeg Y. Rudenko

1993 98 Orientierungskrise in Politik und Gesellschaft ? Perspektiven Antje Vollmer Jürgen Engert Berlin der Demokratie Wolf Lepenies

99 Will the West survive the disintegration of the East ? Bill Bradley Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Ditchley W. F. van Eekelen Park H.-G. Poettering

100 Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale Gesellschaft ? Kurt Biedenkopf Dieter Grimm Dresden Albert O. Hirschman

1994 101 Russland und der Westen : Internationale Sicherheit und A. A. Kokoschin Andreas Meyer-Landrut St. Petersburg Reformpolitik Volker Rühe A. A. Sobtschak

102 Zukunftsfähigkeit von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lothar Späth Jürgen Engert Friedrichsroda Leo A. Nefiodow

1995 103 Die Verfassung Europas Jean-Claude Casanova Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Oxford Timothy Garton Ash Wolfgang Schäuble

104 Europa — aber wo liegen seine Grenzen ? Bronislaw Geremek Karl Kaiser Warsaw Anders Björck J. François-Poncet

105 Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag ? Horst Seehofer Hermann Korte Munich Barbara Riedmüller

1996 106 Europe and the Future of the Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi Michael Stürmer Jerusalem Middle East — an Agenda for Peace Hanan Bar-On Leonard Hausman Jean-Paul Jesse Helmut Schäfer

137 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

107 Medien — Macht — Politik Wolfgang Donsbach Thomas Kielinger Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem Theo Sommer

108 Was bewegt Russland ? Sergej Baburin Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moscow Sir Rodric Braithwaite

1997 109 At the crossroads of geo-politics — Ilter Türkmen Curt Gasteyger Istanbul Turkey in a changing political environment Morton Abramowitz Hans-Ulrich Klose

110 Wege aus der blockierten Gesellschaft André Leysen Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Berlin Jürgen Rüttgers

111 Wie ist Europa zu sichern ? Ulrich Cartellieri Michael Stürmer Amsterdam Sir Christopher Mallaby Wolfgang Ischinger Marten van Heuven Frits Bolkestein David P. Calleo Max Kohnstamm Elmar Brok

1998 112 Wachsende Ungleichheiten — neue Spaltungen ? Kurt Biedenkopf Barbara Riedmüller Leipzig Heinz Bude Wolfgang Huber

113 Energie und Geostrategie im kaspischen Raum Terry D. Adams Andreas Meyer-Landrut Baku Vafa Goulizade Paul Haseldonckx Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz

1999 114 Welche gesellschaftliche Wertigkeit hat der Sport ? Hans Lenk Hermann-Anders Korte Magdeburg Herbert Riehl-Heyse Jürgen Palm

115 Neue Dimensionen des Politischen ? Antonia Grunenberg Jutta Limbach Berlin ­Herausforderungen für die repräsentative Demokratie Sabine Leutheusser- Schnarrenberger

116 Russland in Europa : Zehn Jahre nach dem Kalten Krieg Wolfgang Ischinger Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moscow Oleg Morosow Ulrich Cartellieri Andrej A. Kokoschin

2000 117 Modell Deutschland : Henning Scherf Klaus v. Dohnanyi Berlin Reif für die Globalisierung ? Carl Christian v. Weizsäcker

138 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

118 Ein föderatives Europa ? Sylvie Goulard Rudolf von Thadden Berlin Klaus Hänsch Jerzy Kranz

119 China : Partner in der Weltwirtschaft Yang Qixian Mei Zhaorong Beijing Zheng Silin Karl Kaiser Wang Chunzheng Shen Jueren Zhu Min Shi Mingde Song Jian Konrad Seitz Horst Teltschik Martin Posth

2001 120 Verhandlungsdemokratie ? Politik des Möglichen — Dieter Grimm Robert Leicht Berlin Möglichkeiten der Politik Annette Fugmann-Heesing

121 The Baltic Sea — a Region of Prosperity and Stability ? Bertel Haarder Jaako Iloniemi Helsinki Artur J. Kuznetsov Alar J. Rudolf Olljum Hans Olsson Timo Summa Erkki Tuomioja Christoph Zöpel

122 Russia’s European Dimension — Sergej W. Jastrschembskij Moscow Sergej A. Karaganow

2002 123 The Future of Southeast Europe Andy Bearpark Martti Ahtisaari Belgrade Erhard Busek Erhard Busek Nebojša Čović Bozidar Djelić Alexandra Jovičević Herwig Kempf Gerald Knaus Wolfgang Petritsch Goran Svilanović

124 Contours of a “New World Order” ? Egon Bahr Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Berlin John L. Hirsch Peter W. Singer Paul W. Schroeder Georges-Henri Soutou Karsten D. Voigt Norbert Walter Samuel F. Wells Jr.

139 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

2003 125 Reinventing Europe — Hélène Ahrweiler Otto von der Gablentz Hamburg Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening Üstün Ergüder Monika Griefahn Yudhishthir Raj Isar Hywel Ceri Jones Karl Schlögel Gary Smith Gijs de Vries

126 The Future of Democracy — European Perspectives Henri de Bresson Roger de Weck Florence Andrea Manzella Gesine Schwan Larry Siedentop Gijs de Vries Helen Wallace

127 The Middle East and Western Values: A Dialog With Iran Gilles Kepel Christoph Bertram Isfahan Michael McFaul Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour Homayra Moshirzadeh Ahmad Nagheebzadeh Giandomenico Picco Johannes Reissner Hossein Salimi

2004 128 Power and Rules — Elements of a New World Order Paul Schroeder Christoph Bertram Wilton Park Dame Pauline Neville-Jones David Rieff Heather Grabbe Ghanim Alnajjar Michael Schaefer Avis Bohlen

129 Frontiers and Horizons of the EU — , Ian Boag Roger de Weck Lviv The New Neighbors Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova Gernot Erler Yaroslav Hrytsak Danuta Hübner Evgenii M. Kozhokin Wolfgang Schäuble Oleksandr O. Tschaly Jakub T. Wolski

2005 130 Forging a Just Global Order — Badria Al-Awadhi Theo Sommer Cairo Trade, Development, Political Strategies Mark Chingono Larry Diamond Rainer Forst Sheikh Ali Gom’a Amr Hamzawy Stefano Manservisi Norbert Walter

140 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

131 Russia and the West Elmar Brok Wolfgang Eichwede Berlin Vladimir Chizhov Vasili Likhachev Dmitri Rogozin Wolfgang Schäuble Manfred Stolpe

132 Stability in the Persian Gulf Ghassan Atiyyah Volker Perthes Dubai Robert Cooper Rami George Khouri Michael McFaul Hossein Mousavian Michael Schaefer

133 Reforms in the Middle East — Sadeq Al-Azm Theo Sommer Washington, How Can Europe and the US Contribute ? Khalil A. Al-Khalil D. C. Hisham Kassem Elaheh Koolaee Ernest May Ghassan Moukehiber Friedbert Pflüger Ruprecht Polenz Kurt Volker

141

The Bergedorf Round Table

Chairman Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Coordinator Dr. Klaus Wehmeier (Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board) Dr. Thomas Paulsen (Managing Director)

Program Manager Dr. Thomas Weihe

Conference Management Kristina Klein

Address Bergedorf Round Table Berlin Office of the Körber Foundation Neustädtische Kirchstraße 8 D -10117 Berlin Phone : +49 -30-20 62 67-60 Fax : +49 -30-20 62 67-67 E-mail : [email protected] www.bergedorf-round-table.org

Imprint

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http ://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

© edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2007

Editor Dr. Thomas Weihe Translations Dr. Thomas Weihe, Jonna Meyer-Spasche, Bernhard Müller-Härlin Pictures Marc Darchinger Design Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten | glcons.de Printed in Germany by Offizin Andersen Nexö Leipzig

ISBN 978-3-89684-363-0

All rights are reserved. These minutes may be reproduced upon request. www.edition-koerber-stiftung.de

The Bergedorf Protocols are also published in German. Both versions are available for download and research at www.bergedorf-round-table.org