Huget-Dissertation FINAL 4-28-20
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MORAL STATUS: A POLITICAL APPROACH A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy By Hailey E. Huget, M.A. Washington, D.C. February 14, 2020 Copyright 2020 by Hailey E. Huget All Rights Reserved ii For Matt, my husband; Allen, my dog; and Georgetown Alliance of Graduate Employees, my union for teaching me everything I know about cooperation iii MORAL STATUS: A POLITICAL APPROACH Hailey E. Huget, M.A. Advisor: Margaret Little, PhD Abstract In this dissertation I develop a political approach to the subject of moral status. While much of the moral status literature focuses on questions of individual morality—like whether I may permissibly eat meat for dinner or hunt animals for sport—my approach focuses upon a set of largely neglected moral status questions that arise within the realm of institutional morality. For example: are domesticated animals entitled to the social provision of food, water, shelter, and healthcare? What about human beings with severe cognitive disabilities, or who are in irreversible comas? Should we allocate resources to protect non-human animals from crime and natural disasters, as we do for human beings? To answer these questions, I develop an account of which creatures can make moral claims upon social and political institutions to protection and provision. iv Acknowledgments If much of this dissertation is about acting collectively, it is fitting that this project was completed with the help, guidance, and support of many different individuals acting together. Throughout the writing process I was grateful for the support and camaraderie of a community of graduate employees at Georgetown. Within the Philosophy department, I would like to thank fellow graduate employees Michael Barnes, Daniel Threet, Deidre Nelms, Jason Farr, Gerald Taylor, Keyvan Shafiei, Katherine Ward, Clark Donley, Quentin Fisher, and so many others for helping me think through various aspects of this project. I am also grateful to Philosophy department graduates from years above me, including Francisco Gallegos, Nabina Liebow, Anne Jeffrey, Jake Earl, Colin Hickey, and Marcus Hedahl. I am particularly grateful to Karen Rice for being my ‘dissertation accountability partner’ for the past year. Karen’s unwavering support and partnership made the work of completing the dissertation much less isolating and was instrumental in making this project a reality. I am also grateful to many graduate employees who I had the pleasure of getting to know outside of the Philosophy department who worked with me to organize our union, Georgetown Alliance of Graduate Employees. Our work together was the highlight of my experience at Georgetown; it also shaped much of this dissertation, as well as my broader philosophical worldview. Each committee member for this dissertation has made invaluable contributions, without which the project would not have come together. Their guidance and feedback during the dissertation process and during graduate school coursework shaped the philosopher I am today. I am grateful to Maggie Little, my advisor, for teaching me to think of everyday experiences and on-the-ground realities as sources of rich philosophical insight. I am grateful to Alisa Carse for her extremely detailed and constructive written feedback, which always invited me to ‘go deeper’ and confront the most substantive issues and questions. I am indebted to v Mark Murphy for holding me to the highest of standards and for always urging me to focus on advancing and centering my own positive view, rather than on poking holes in others’ arguments. All of your feedback and guidance has made this a more interesting and cohesive project than it otherwise would have been. I am extremely thankful for the financial support of Wellesley College’s Horton- Hollowell fellowship, which enabled me to complete the dissertation without also having teaching obligations. The freedom to focus exclusively on finishing the dissertation was invaluable to me and, without that freedom, I doubt this project would have come together at all. I want to thank my family for their support throughout this long process. I would not be the scholar I am today without having learned so much from all of you. Whatever writing abilities I have today came from my mom, who spent much of my childhood teaching me to value good writing and offering her own writing as a model to aspire to. Dad taught me to value good arguments and to always work to see all sides of a question or debate; these skills made me into a much better philosopher. And Hannah, my sister, has always been a role model to me. The empathy, compassion, and patience she brings to her work every day is truly inspirational. To say that I am grateful to my partner, Matthew Shields, would be an understatement. During all of the toughest parts of this project, he was there with me, providing both a sounding board for philosophical ideas and much-needed moral support. Whenever I was stuck on something, he always had just the right thing to say—a question or a comment that helped me refocus on core issues and move forward productively. My transition from being a philosopher to a union organizer would also not have been possible without Matt’s encouragement and willingness to make countless small sacrifices for us, like cooking dinner vi while I stayed on campus late at organizing meetings and many more things. Matt, your brilliance as a philosopher and integrity as a human being are unparalleled. I’m so lucky that you are my partner. vii Table of Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: A Political Approach: What and Why .................................................................................... 5 I. Moral status: What is it? Why should we care? ........................................................................................ 6 II. The political and the moral ........................................................................................................................... 16 III. The need for a political approach to moral status .................................................................................... 24 Chapter 2: Secure Rights and the Moral Community ........................................................................... 30 I. Political entitlements: Secure and provisional rights ............................................................................. 30 II. Political duties .................................................................................................................................................. 43 III. Secure rights versus successful enforcement of negative rights .......................................................... 48 IV. The moral community ..................................................................................................................................... 50 V. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 59 Chapter 3: Baseline Moral Status and Elevated Political Status ........................................................ 61 I. Distinguishing baseline moral status and elevated political status ..................................................... 61 II. Perceptual agency is plausibly sufficient for baseline moral status ..................................................... 74 III. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 83 Chapter 4: Relational Approaches to Elevated Political Status .......................................................... 85 I. Why relations? ................................................................................................................................................. 86 II. Assistance relationalism ................................................................................................................................. 88 III. Hooley’s social membership view ................................................................................................................ 94 IV. Valentini’s associative view ......................................................................................................................... 101 V. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 105 Chapter 5: The Capacity to Cooperate ................................................................................................... 107 I. Activity (X): Type 1 or Type 2 cooperation ............................................................................................ 107 II. Conditions (Y): Within the existing approximation of the moral community ............................... 121 III. Properties (Z): Propositional Agency or Perceptual Agency+ and the ability to comply with expectations of social membership ...................................................................................................................... 132 IV. Moral relevance .............................................................................................................................................