NIKOLAUS OVERTOOM

WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

CONSIDERING THE FAILURES OF THE PARTHIANS AGAINST THE INVASIONS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN TRIBAL CONFEDERATIONS IN THE 120S BCE

SUMMARY When the Parthians rebelled against the in the middle third century BCE, seizing a large section of northeastern , they inherited the challenging responsibility of monitoring the extensive frontier between the Iranian plateau and the Central Asian steppe. Although initially able to maintain working relations with various tribal confederations in the region, with the final collapse of the Bactrian kingdom in the 130s BCE, the ever-wide- ning eastern frontier of the Parthian state became increasingly unstable, and in the 120s BCE nomadic warriors devastated the vulnerable eastern territories of the Parthian state, temporarily eliminating Parthian control of the Iranian plateau. This article is a conside- ration of the failures of the Parthians to meet and overcome the obstacles they faced along their eastern frontier in the 120s BCE and a reevaluation of the causes and consequences of the events. It concludes that western distractions and the mismanagement of eastern affairs by the Arsacids turned a minor dispute into one of the most costly and difficult struggles in Parthian history. Key-words: history; Parthians; Seleucids; ; nomads; frontiers.

RÉSUMÉ Lorsque, au milieu du IIIe siècle av. J.-C., les Parthes se rebellèrent contre l’État séleucide en s’emparant d’une grande partie du nord-est de l’Iran, ils héritèrent de la tâche difficile de surveiller la vaste frontière séparant le plateau Iranien de la steppe d’Asie centrale. Bien qu’au début des relations de coopération avec les diverses confédérations tribales dans la région aient pu être maintenues, avec l’effondrement final du royaume bactrien dans les années 130, la frontière orientale de l’État parthe, toujours plus ouverte, est devenue plus instable et, dans les années 120, des guerriers nomades ont dévasté les territoires orientaux vulnérables de l’Etat parthe, éliminant temporairement le contrôle que celui-ci exerçait sur le plateau iranien. Cet article examine la faillite des Parthes pour affronter et surmonter les obstacles rencontrés le long de leur frontière orientale dans les années 120 et réévalue les causes et les conséquences des évènements. Il conclut que les problèmes à résoudre à l’ouest et la mauvaise gestion des affaires de l’est par les Arsacides ont transformé un conflit mineur en l’une des luttes les plus couteuses et les plus difficiles de l’histoire parthe. Mots-clés : histoire ; Parthes ; Séleucides ; Asie centrale ; nomades ; frontières.

77 STUDIA IRANICA 48, 2019, pp. 77-111 78 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019

After Arsaces I established the Parthian state in northeastern Iran in the 240s BCE, its existence within the Iranian plateau remained precarious and continually challenged by aggressive and highly militarized neighbors.1 For over a century, the Parthians’ main rivals were the Seleucids in the west and the Bactrians in the east; however, the international environment shifted drastically by the 120s BCE.2 In the west the Seleucids launched two major invasions of the Parthian state in the 130s BCE that failed utterly.3 The death of Antiochus VII in 129 BCE at the hands of the Parthians and the subsequent destruction or capture of much of the royal was the most decisive defeat in the history of the Seleucid Empire, the consequences of which far outstripped those of Magnesia.4 It was a disaster from which the Seleucid state never recovered. Meanwhile, in the east continual dynastic conflicts and an ongoing rivalry with the Indo-Greek Kingdom gradually turned the attention of the Bactrian kings away from their precarious northern and western borders, and Bactria became increasingly vulnerable to nomadic and Parthian aggression in this chaotic environment.5 The recurrent deterioration of the Bactrian state also coincided with growing hardships and instability on the Central Asian steppe. In the 170s-160s BCE a nomadic tribal confederation from modern day Xinjiang in northwestern China known as the lost a series of conflicts with a neighboring tribe, the Hsiung-nu, and were forced to migrate to the southwest.6 In so doing they displaced another tribal confederation known as the , who also chose to migrate to the southwest, descending

1 See Overtoom 2016a.; Id. 2019a. 2 Ibid.; Overtoom 2016d; Id. 2017b. 3 For the failed invasion of Demetrius II, see Justin 36.1.5, 38.9.2; Justin Prol. 35-6; Appian Syr. 11.67; Jos. Ant. 13.186, 218-9; I Maccabees 14.2-3; Diod. 33.28.1; Eus. Chron. (Smith ed.): 255. For the failed invasion of Antiochus VII, see Justin 38.10.1- 6; Diod. 34/35.15-17; Jos. Ant. 13.253-4, 271; Appian Syr. 11.68; Athen. 10.53; Hieron. Chron. 163.1; Orosius 5.10.8; Moses 2.2; Eus. Chron. (Smith ed.): 255; I Maccabees 15.3, V Maccabees 21.19, 21-4; Sebeos in Thomson 1978: 364-5. 4 Note Taylor 2013, p. 157; Overtoom 2016b; Id. 2016d. 5 For the successes of the Indo-Greek kings in India and their rivalry with the Bactrian kings, see Grainger 2013, pp. 71-76. Note also Narain 1957; Holt 1999, p. 135; Lerner 2015, pp. 309-311. The Indo-Greek king conducted widespread conquests within India, even reaching Pataliputra. Strabo 11.11.1; Justin Prol. 41. 6 See Mair 2014, pp. 8-15, 23-26, 29, 90, 144, 161-163; Daryaee 2015, p. 288. For the culture of Xinjiang, see Yong & Binghua 1999. For the Hsiung-nu, see Yü 1990; Ishjamts 1999; Yong & Yutang 1999; Di Cosmo 2004, Chapter 5. For recent reconstructions of Yuezhi history, see Enoki, Koshelenko & Haidary 1994; Id. 1999; Benjamin 2007; Lerner 2015, p. 311-318. The Han emperor Wudi later tried to make an alliance with the Yuezhi to defeat the Hsiung-nu. See Tao 2007, pp. 91-92. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 79 into Sogdiana.7 The Saka, seeking security and recognizing the vulnerability of the Bactrians, began to put mounting pressure on the northern frontier of Bactria, and by the end of the 130s BCE, the Saka and Yuezhi had overrun what remained of the Kingdom of Bactria.8 The Parthians and Bactrians had forged working relations with nume- rous tribal groups for generations, even recruiting them into their armies.9 Yet, since the reign of Mithridates I (ca. 165/164-132 BCE) the eastern frontier of the Parthian state had become increasingly unstable, and in the 120s BCE belligerent warrior bands poured into the vulnerable eastern territories of the Parthian state and devastated these regions.10 The Parthians’ struggle against the Central Asian tribal confederations was one of the most costly and difficult in their history. Two Parthian kings died in the conflict, destabilizing Parthian hegemony throughout the Hellenistic Middle East. Within a few years of their greatest victory, the Parthians found themselves beleaguered and nearly broken, temporarily losing control of the Iranian plateau.11

I. THE MERCENARY REBELLION OF THE SAKA The extensive efforts of Mithridates I in the 140s BCE to secure a much- expanded and vulnerable eastern frontier and the subsequent collapse of the Kingdom of Bactria foreshadowed a major crisis for the Parthian state.12

7 See Mair 2014, pp. 17-18, 20, 144. For the Saka, see esp. Puri 1999; Harmatta 1999; Callieri 2016. 8 Mukherjee 1969; Grainger 2013, pp. 58-59. Some scholars point to the sudden abandonment of the prosperous town, Ai Khanum, in this period as an indication of Bactria’s collapse in the face of growing nomadic incursions. For the debate, see esp. Holt 2012, pp. 97, 99-112, 124-130, 132-133, 136, 138-143, 148, 154, 156, 164-167, 176-181, 183, 185-193, 195-196, 200, 206, 217, 219. Note also Grainger 2013, pp. 59- 62; Lerner 2015, pp. 308-313; Olbrycht 2016b. For a recent reconstruction of life at Ai Khanum, see Lecuyot 2007. Note also Bernard 1985; Rapin 1992; Bernard 2008. Some scholars argue that the last Greek king of Bactria, Heliokles I (ca. 125-190 BCE), ruled over the city of Baktra as a tributary vassal of the Yuezhi, who did not forcefully annex the region until the mid-first century BCE. See Cribb 2005, pp. 212- 214; Lerner 2010; Id. 2015, p. 313. 9 Debevoise 1938, p. 36; Wolski 1965; Bivar 1983, p. 38; Wolski 1996; Gaslain 2005; Assar 2005, p. 47; Id. 2006c, p. 111; Mairs 2013; Dąbrowa 2016. See Strabo 11.8.8; Justin 42.1.2. 10 For the recently revised chronology of Mithridates’ reign, see Assar 2005, pp. 41-45; Id. 2006a; Id. 2006b, pp. 88-98; Id. 2011, p. 117. Note also Grainger 2013, p. 72. 11 For recent reconstructions of the image of the Parthians, see Lerouge-Cohen 2007; Id. 2009; Id. 2010; Id. 2013; Id. 2017. For the Parthians in Iran, note Pigulevskaja 1963; Wolski 1991; Id. 1993; Callieri 2007; Callieri & Chaverdi 2013; Boucharlat 2014. 12 From 147-141 BCE Mithridates worked diligently to consolidate and secure the expanded frontiers of the Parthian state, also perhaps subduing tribes in southeastern 80 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019

Perhaps by the early 130s BCE, the Saka confederation had advanced into what is modern day Turkmenistan and soon after began to impinge upon the Parthians’ frontier.13 Soon after Phraates II’s decisive victory over Antiochus VII in late 129 BCE, conflict between the Saka and the Parthians erupted. To help overcome the major invasion of Antiochus VII, which had penetrated and , Phraates II hired a large band of Saka mercenaries; however, this relationship quickly soured.14 Justin states, For the [that is, the Saka], having been induced, by the offer of reward (mercede), to assist the Parthians against Antiochus king of , and not having arrived till the war was ended, were disappointed of the expected reward (mercede), and reproached with having brought their aid too late; and when, in discontent at having made so long a march in vain, they demanded that either some payment (stipendium) for their trouble, or another enemy to attack, should be assigned them, being offended at the haughty reply (superbo responso) which they received, they began to ravage the country of the Parthians.15

Phraates’ decision to hire a large group of nomadic mercenaries to fight the Seleucids is a good example of the shortsighted, haphazard strategic policy of the Arsacids.16 Phraates had no long-term plans when it came to hiring the Saka warriors and allowing them to penetrate the Iranian plateau. Rather, Phraates initially viewed these mercenaries as a possible solution to an immediate problem that eventually had major unintended consequences. Before the first century BCE, the size of the Parthian field army remained quite limited, and Phraates II’s use of mercenaries and prisoners of war to bolster his army in the early 120s BCE clearly demonstrates his

Iran and southwestern Pakistan while he was in the east. Note Orosius 5.4.18; Diod. 33.18; Strabo 15.2.11. Orosius claims that Mithridates’ kingdom stretched from the Hydaspes River in Media to the Indus River. Orosius 5.4.18. The Hydaspes River that Orosius mentions is the river identified by Virgil in Media. See Virg. Geog. 4.211. See also Bivar 1983, p. 35; Wolski 1980; Assar 2011, p. 117. For the argument that the Parthian Kingdom eventually reached the mouth of the Indus River in Sind, see Daffinà 1967, p. 41-43. 13 Bivar 1983, p. 36. It is unlikely that “the Saca mercenaries hired for the war against Antiochus were probably an advanced group of this eastern horde.” Debevoise 1938, p. 35. The Saka would have been well established in the region by the 120s BCE. See Bernard 1999, p. 103; Koshelenko & Pilipko 1999, p. 132; Mair 2014, p. 29; Callieri 2016. 14 Debevoise 1938, p. 36; Bivar 1983, p. 38; Assar 2005, p. 47; Id. 2006b, p. 111. 15 Justin 42.1.2. 16 Note Overtoom 2016a; Id. 2016c; Id. 2016d; Id. 2017a; Id. 2017b. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 81 desperate need for more soldiers.17 Recently, some scholars have argued that the potential military power of the Parthian state became immense and matched the military might of imperial Rome; however, there was a consi- derable difference between the potential strength and the actual active force of the Parthian military, especially in the second century BCE.18 M. J. Olbrycht’s conclusion that the Parthian military eventually had a defensive capability of 300,000 soldiers and an offensive capability of 150,000 soldiers appears highly optimistic, and it reflects the potential capabilities of the entire Parthian state at the height of its imperial power.19 The figure 20,000-50,000 soldiers for active combat duty is far more reliable for the second century BCE.20 Meanwhile, the Central Asian tribal confe- derations, such as the Saka and Yuezhi, had immense military resources. Although likely exaggerated, contemporary Chinese sources put the military strength of these confederations between 80,000-200,000 trained bowmen.21 In fact, the Chinese envoy Zhang Qian viewed the Yuezhi as far more powerful than the Parthians and recommended that the Han dynasty try to gain the loyalty of the Yuezhi through bribes.22 As more nomadic peoples advanced south toward Bactria, the potential threat their warriors posed to the Parthians’ eastern frontier expanded considerably, and therefore, Mithri- dates I and Phraates tried to foster working relationships with these new tribes, which helps explain how Phraates was able to hire a large force of Saka mercenaries on such short notice.23 Before late 129 BCE, Phraates II was unable to overcome Antiochus VII’s large army, and therefore, as the Seleucids threatened to invade eastern , Phraates hired a large band of Saka warriors to supplement his army. With these new soldiers, Phraates could hope to harass and distract Antiochus if he marched into Parthia, creating a possible opportunity to counterattack the Seleucids decisively before the war truly was lost. Thus, a coordinated campaign with the Saka mercenaries in 128 BCE was Phraates’ latest plan to defeat the Seleucids’ invasion. The fact that the mobile Saka

17 Note Justin 42.1.4. 18 Sheldon 2010, p. 3; Olbrycht 2016a. 19 Olbrycht 2016a, pp. 326-329. 20 Id., p. 295. 21 See Mair 2014, pp. 22-23, 159, 161, 168, 170, 178, 646. 22 See Id., p. 31. For the longstanding concerns of the Chinese for their northern and western frontiers against the threat of nomadic incursions, see Barfield 1989, Di Cosmo 2004; Tao 2007. 23 The argument that Phraates was absent from when Antiochus VII attacked because the Saka invaded in 130 BCE is dubious and unsupported by evidence. Tarn 1932, p. 581ff.; Debevoise 1938, pp. 35-36. Phraates was near . Shayegan 2011, p. 128. 82 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019 army did not arrive until after Antiochus’ sudden defeat in late 129 BCE demonstrates that Phraates did not hire them until late in the campaign, likely when the Parthians lost control of Media. Justin’s account offers interesting insight into Phraates II’s negotiations with the Saka. Phraates offered the Saka the reward of spoils if they agreed to fight for the Parthians but clearly did not agree to pay them. Further, Phraates only enlisted the Saka to fight the Seleucids; however, the Saka clearly had not limited their agreement with Phraates strictly to the war against Antiochus VII. This eventually created major tension between the Parthians and the Saka when Phraates defeated Antiochus because Phraates’ hurried and desperate negotiations with the Saka in 129 BCE left conside- rable ambiguity in their agreement. For Phraates, his sudden defeat of Antiochus had nullified his prior agreement with the Saka and made their further employment unnecessary; however, for the Saka, Phraates still owed them military spoils as a reward for their agreed upon service. This explains why the Saka asked for either a buyout of the agreement or another enemy to attack after Antiochus’ defeat. Justin claims that Phraates’ haughty response offended the Saka and encouraged them to ravage the Iranian plateau; however, there is more to Phraates’ response than stereotypical Parthian arrogance.24 Both the Saka and Phraates II here engaged in what modern International Relations theorists call “compellence diplomacy.”25 Although ancient peoples frequently tried to use compellence diplomacy as “a less directly violent means of interstate coercion,” it often took the form of abrasive ultimatums that often created further tension and resentment between ancient peoples and made violence more likely.26 In these negotiations the Saka used the threat of force to demand payment or assignment to a new conflict. Phraates unsurprisingly refused them, likely demanded their immediate return to the Central Asian steppe, and prepared for war.

24 The Greeks and Romans viewed the Parthians as a mixture between the Scythians and Persians. Thus, for the Romans the Parthians were fiercer than the Persians were, but they too suffered from eastern despotism and duplicity. See esp. Isaac 2006, Chapters 4, 5 and 8. Note also Overtoom 2011; Id. 2012; Gregoratti 2015, pp. 203-204; Over- toom 2016c; Id. 2017a; Id. 2017b. 25 Eckstein 2006, p. 60; Id. 2012, p. 14. For the modern impact of compellence diplomacy, see Ferrar 1981, pp. 194-200; Questor 1988, pp. 704-706; Mercer 1993, pp. 166-167; Stevenson 1997, pp. 134-135. 26 Eckstein 2006, p. 60. See also Strauss 1991, p. 203; Lebow 1991, pp. 144-145. The prevalence of compellence diplomacy is not limited to the ancient world. For the applicability of compellence diplomacy to Confucian China under the Song Dynasty (960-1279 CE) and the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 CE), see Wang 2011, p. 162. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 83

Phraates II responded harshly to the demands of the Saka in part because he felt they were breaking their original agreement, which for him only concerned the defeat of Antiochus VII, and in part because he found the demands of the Saka unacceptable. Yet Phraates’ equally harsh response offended the Saka, who believed Phraates had reneged on his promise of spoils. After these negotiations ended unsuccessfully, the Saka began to ravage the Iranian plateau extensively. The Saka felt they had a right to acquire loot as a reward for their original pact with Phraates, and his refusal of their demands made the Parthians their enemy. This new understanding of the separate intentions of Phraates and the Saka in their negotiations helps explain why the mercenaries, “content with their victory, and with having laid waste Parthia, returned home” after their decisive victory over Phraates in 127 BCE.27 Unlike subsequent nomadic invasions in the 120s BCE, these warriors were not attacking the Parthians to gain territory; they were settling the debt they felt the Parthians owed them. The Saka mercenaries began to devastate the vulnerable lands of the Iranian plateau early in 128 BCE, and they used their mobility to ravage huge swaths of the without much resistance, raiding perhaps as far west as Mesopotamia.28 Phraates II also had reason to feel betrayed after negotiations with the Saka devolved into violence, and he became determined to retaliate against them immediately. Phraates could not allow the Saka to destabilize his eastern territories and challenge his authority for fear of losing control of his fragile empire. He wanted to act swiftly to stamp out the threat of the Saka before opposition to the Parthians spread, and therefore, he placed one of his generals, a ruthless commander named Himerus, in charge of the western territories and marched east to crush the rebels.29 Yet news of the mercenary rebellion in the east spread quickly and helped encourage an uprising in southern Mesopotamia in late summer 128 BCE. For the first time in their history, the Parthians faced the difficulties of a two-front war.

27 Justin 42.2.1. 28 John of Antioch states, “While the Scythians were overrunning Mesopotamia at this time and devastating the kingdom of Arsaces, the Parthian [king] himself fell in the war and his successor had to pay tribute to the Scythians.” See Mariev 2008, Fragment 97, pp. 108-109. Note also Bivar 1983, p. 38; Koshelenko & Pilipko 1999, p. 132; Assar 2005, p. 48. Debevoise (1938, p. 36) found this doubtful. 29 Justin 42.1.3. 84 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019

II. DISTURBANCES IN THE WEST After destroying Antiochus VII’s invasion but before the rebellion of the Saka, Phraates II briefly considered undertaking the Parthians’ first invasion of Syria; however, geopolitical instability in Mesopotamia was a major factor obstructing Phraates’ desire to intervene militarily in the lands of the eastern Mediterranean.30 Antiochus’ invasion had devastated the region and called Parthian authority into question. Numerous cities had violently revolted against their Seleucid garrisons in late 129 BCE, and the difficult task of reorganizing these communities and managing thousands of prisoners of war fell to the Parthians.31 Although the rebellious communities in Babylonia had worked with the Parthians to overthrow Seleucid power, returning these volatile communities to Parthian hegemony early in 128 BCE was not a simple task.32 Phraates conducted tense negotiations with Seleucia, and in fact, the Parthians’ relationship with Seleucia became so difficult that they founded a new, fortified imperial capital named Ctesiphon across from Seleucia on the Tigris River to undermine Seleucia’s standing in the region.33 Phraates also had to navigate a strained relationship with , which he tried to control by appointing the harsh disciplinarian Himerus as viceroy over the region.34 Meanwhile, the sudden conflict in the east against the Saka helped encourage an even more chaotic geopolitical situation in Mesopotamia as , the ruler of in southern Mesopotamia, decided to declare his autonomy in direct opposition to Parthian hegemony in late summer 128 BCE.35 The sudden collapse of the Parthians’ eastern frontier earlier that year had forced Phraates II to march into the Iranian plateau with

30 Justin 38.9.10-10.1, 42.1.1; Diod. 34/35.18. 31 Justin 38.10.8; Diod. 34/35.15. Shayegan and Assar assume most of the captured Seleucid soldiers were executed. Shayegan 2003 [2007], p. 92; Assar 2006b, p. 112. 32 The Parthians regained control of Babylonia no later than April/May 128 BCE. Assar 2006b, p. 105. For the Parthians in Babylonia, note Dąbrowa 1998; Id. 2005; Id. 2005 [2006]; Id. 2006; Id. 2006-2007 [2008]; Id. 2008 [2009]; Id. 2011; Clancier 2012; Id. 2014. 33 Diod. 34/35.19; Pliny NH 6.30.122; Strabo 16.1.16. Ctesiphon became a major imperial residence, administrative center, and trade hub. See Kröger 2011. Diodorus might refer to a later incident in ca. 124 BCE during Artabanus’ reign. Assar 2006b, p. 124. 34 Diod. 34/35.21; Justin 42.1.3; Justin Prol. 42; Athen. 11.15b-c. Similar to the wide- ranging command Mithridates I gave his brother Bagasis, Phraates perhaps entrusted Himerus with command over the western territories. Justin states that Phraates left Himerus “to take care of his kingdom.” Thus, while Phraates campaigned in the east, Himerus was to maintain Parthian authority in the west. For the Parthians’ division of their kingdom into upper and lower regions, note Pliny NH 6.29. 35 Assar 2006b, pp. 105-107. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 85 the main Parthian army; and therefore, Phraates’ representative, Himerus, was left to lead an unsuccessful expedition against Characene in late 128 BCE.36 Himerus not only bungled his invasion of Characene, but also, he completely mismanaged the situation in Babylonia by abusing its inha- bitants.37 In spring 127 BCE, Hyspaosines seized his opportunity to invade and occupy Babylonia, where he began to destroy symbols of Parthian imperial rule and mint royal coinage.38 The sudden collapse of the Parthians’ eastern frontier and Hyspaosines’ rapid success in Babylonia also helped encourage further rebellions against the Parthians in southern Iran at in 127 BCE.39 Thus, the Parthians’ western and eastern frontiers were in major crisis in the early 120s BCE as several rivals challenged the hegemony of the Parthian state. This forced Phraates to split his army, sending a large force under his general, , from Media to reclaim Babylonia in autumn 127 BCE.40 By late 127 BCE, the Parthians had stemmed the tide of Hyspaosines’ aggression; however, Mesopotamia remained vulnerable to threats from Characene, Elymais, and Arab tribes. It was not until 125 BCE that Chara- cene once again began offering tribute to the Parthians, with Hyspaosines accepting Parthian suzerainty; however, even this did not end hostilities between the two rivals as the following year the Parthians decided to install their own governor over Characene.41 Meanwhile, the Elymaeans continued to rebel against Parthian authority, forcing the Parthians to conduct another major expedition into Elymais to capture in 124 BCE.42 The Parthians struggled greatly to stabilize their western frontier throughout the 120s BCE, and the simultaneous collapse of their eastern frontier made this task all the more difficult. Despite their resounding victory over Antiochus VII in 129 BCE, the Parthians found themselves beset by enemies on all sides. The instability of their empire called the power of the Parthians into question and

36 Justin 42.1.1; Justin Prol. 42. 37 Diod. 34/35.21; Justin 42.1.3; Justin Prol. 42; Athen. 11.15b-c. 38 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -125A; Potts 2002, p. 359; Assar 2006b, p. 108; Shayegan 2011, pp. 110-111, 151, 157. 39 Dąbrowa 2004 [2005]; Assar 2004-2005; Id. 2006b, p. 108; Shayegan 2011, p. 111, 118; Dąbrowa 2014. 40 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -126A; Assar 2006b, pp. 108-112; Shayegan 2011, pp. 110- 111, 151, 157. Shayegan (ibid., p. 114) places Timarchus’ success in Artabanus’ reign. However, this assumes that Phraates had already conducted his eastern campaign and died. It is highly unlikely that Characene would have risked another invasion of Babylonia in early 126 BCE without the failure of Phraates’ expedition in late 127 BCE. 41 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -124B; Shayegan 2011, pp. 112-114, 168. 42 Shayegan 2011, p. 116-119. Note also Strabo 16.1.18. 86 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019 encouraged further aggression from their highly militarized neighbors. Throughout much of the 120s BCE, military distractions in the west ham- strung the Parthians’ military capabilities in the east, resulting in almost total ruin for the Parthian state.

III. PHRAATES II’S WAR AGAINST THE SAKA Phraates II’s primary focus in 128-127 BCE was retribution against the Saka, and therefore, he prioritized reclaiming the ravaged lands of the Iranian plateau. Although Phraates’ campaign against the Saka was successful initially, it ended in utter disaster, and one of the major problems he faced during the campaign was a shortfall of soldiers.43 Phraates could no longer rely on mercenaries from the Central Asian steppe to supplement his forces, and therefore, he decided to enlist Antiochus VII’s captured Greek and Macedonian soldiers into his army. Justin records, “Phraates himself, meanwhile, took with him to the war a body of Greeks, who had been made prisoners in the war against Antiochus, and whom he had treated with great pride and severity, not reflecting that captivity had not lessened their hostile feelings, and that the indignity of the outrages which they had suffered must have exasperated them.”44 Again, Justin here exaggerates the stereotypical cruelty and arrogance of the Parthians; however, Phraates clearly hoped to utilize a large force of Greek and Macedonian soldiers trained in the Mace- donian style of war to supplement the mobile Parthian army for the first and only time in its history. Most of Antiochus VII’s grand royal army had perished in the uprisings and during the Parthian counterattack of late 129 BCE; however, many thousands of men also became prisoners.45 For example, the forces Antio- chus kept with him in Media deserted him to save their lives, and in fact, the pool of Greek and Macedonian captives was large enough eventually to betray and destroy Phraates II and his Parthian troops.46 Yet G. R. F. Assar recently suggested that only a small group of Greek mercenaries defected to the Parthians “because to maintain a large hostile force in an empire con- stantly at war with different foes would have been ill-advised and reckless.”47 Certainly, Phraates’ decision to enlist captured Greeks and Macedonians

43 Note Assar 2006b, p. 112. Sampson’s portrayal of Phraates as a weak leader is unfair. Sampson 2015, pp. 47-49. 44 Justin 42.1.4. 45 Diod. 34/35.17.1; Jos. Ant. 13.253; Orosius 5.10.8; Moses 2.2; Sebeos in Thomson 1978, pp. 364-365. 46 Justin 38.10.10, 42.1.5. 47 Assar 2006b, p. 112. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 87 into his army was risky; however, I find Assar’s conclusion here too conser- vative. A force of 10,000 Parthians captured a Roman force of similar size during Crassus’ failed Carrhae campaign, and the Parthians incorporated these men into garrisons along their eastern frontier.48 It is reasonable to argue that Phraates captured at least several thousand Greek and Macedonian soldiers that he later enlisted into his army. Although enlisting these men indeed turned out to be ill-advised and reckless, Phraates II had several understandable and pressing reasons for trying to control and utilize these men to his benefit. First, he needed more soldiers. After the rebellion of the Saka mercenaries in early 128 BCE, and especially after Hyspaosines’ rebellion in Mesopotamia later that year, Phraates needed a larger military to secure his western and eastern frontiers. The well trained and equipped Greek and Macedonian captives were a wel- come recruitment pool. Second, many of Antiochus VII’s men had deserted their king, including several of Antiochus’ leading officers, to serve the Parthians. Although Phraates misjudged their reliability, he at least initially could have hoped to use his control over the captured Seleucid high com- mand to influence the Greek and Macedonian troops.49 Third, Phraates planned to deploy these soldiers along his eastern frontier. Phraates did not send these Greek and Macedonian soldiers to fight in Babylonia against Hyspaosines because he knew this theater of war was too close to their homes in Syria. By sending these men to fight deep within the Iranian pla- teau, Phraates hoped to use their fear of an unfamiliar place and an unfami- liar foe to help maintain their allegiance.50 Fourth, once Phraates defeated the Saka he could use the Greek and Macedonian soldiers to garrison and protect his eastern frontier far from their former homes and any hope of return to Syria.51 Finally, once Phraates secured his eastern frontier he could always hope to use his Greek and Macedonian captives as a bargaining chip in later negotiations with the Seleucids.52

48 Plut. Crass. 31.7; Pliny NH 6.18.47; Solinus 48.3; Dio 40.27.4. These Romans married native woman and perhaps served to protect Parthia’s eastern frontier. Hor. Od. 3.5.5-8; Vell. Pat. 2.82.5; Florus 2.20.4. See Plinval 1948, pp. 491-495; Pigulevskaja 1963; Wolski 1965, pp. 103-115; Frumkin 1970, p. 146. For the argument that some of these Romans became soldiers in the east, see Dubs 1975; Ferguson 1978, pp. 599-601; Dauge 1981. 49 Justin 38.10.10; Diod. 34/35.16; 17.2. 50 Note Debevoise 1938, p. 37; Bivar 1983, p. 38. 51 the Great had established a similar precedence, installing Greek garrisons in Bactria. Holt 1999, p. 24; Lerner 2015, p. 306. The Parthians later followed a similar policy with Crassus’ captured soldiers after Carrhae. See above. 52 The Parthians later utilized Crassus’ captured soldiers in their negotiations with the Romans. Overtoom 2016c; Id. 2017a. 88 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019

Ultimately, the rebellion of the Saka mercenaries and their devastation of the Iranian plateau forced Phraates II to make another shortsighted, haphazard decision to counter an immediate threat. Phraates’ decision to enlist foreign captives, who had already deserted their former king, was reckless but necessary. In fact, the haphazardness of Phraates’ decision is borne out in the lack of integration that we find between his Parthian and Greek and Macedonian troops during the subsequent campaign. Phraates made no efforts to reform the Parthian military along more traditional Helle- nistic models when he incorporated these Greek and Macedonian soldiers.53 Phraates simply viewed these Greek and Macedonian recruits as a means to an end, which helps explain the tense relationship between the two sides recorded by Justin. Unfortunately, little detail of Phraates II’s campaign against the Saka survives; however, a general outline of it is possible. By spring 128 BCE, negotiations between Phraates and the Saka had ended, and the Saka began to ravage Parthia, Hyrcania, and perhaps Media.54 These events encouraged Phraates to begin enlisting Greek and Macedonian captives in Babylonia as soldiers to bolster his forces, and by summer he had appointed Himerus as his viceroy in Mesopotamia and moved the main Parthian army into Media to secure the region.55 Assar argues that Phraates likely was campaigning in northern Iran by late summer because he did not return to Mesopotamia to suppress Hyspaosines’ rebellion at this time; however, there is an alternative explanation that considers the unstable situation in Media and the threat of the Saka.56 If Phraates lived until ca. October/November 127 BCE as Assar convin- cingly argues, then he campaigned against the Saka for almost two years but fought only one major engagement.57 This lack of conflict over such a long period appears odd unless we consider that Phraates likely did not actively campaign against the Saka mercenaries in northern Iran until early 127 BCE because he needed time to organize his expedition before the onset of winter

53 The Parthians did not adopt the equipment and methods of the Seleucids as Colledge claims. Colledge 1967, p. 65. See also Overtoom 2017b. 54 Justin 42.1.2. See John of Antioch in Mariev 2008, Fragment 97, pp. 108-109. I disagree with Assar’s suggestion that the Saka advanced as far as Mesopotamia after Phraates’ death. Assar 2005, p. 48. Although John of Antiochus’ account is ambi- guous, Justin clearly states that the Saka returned home after their defeat of Phraates. 55 Diod. 34/35.21; Justin 42.1.3-4; Justin Prol. 42; Athen. 11.15b-c. 56 Assar 2006b, p. 108. 57 Id., pp. 109-112; Id. 2011, p. 119. See Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -126B, no. -125A; Justin 42.1.5. Note also Debevoise 1938, p. 37; Bivar 1983, p. 38; Assar 2005, p. 47; Valverde 2017. Unfortunately, the incorrect traditional date of Phraates’ death in 128 BCE remains in use. Lerner 2015, p. 312. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 89 in 128 BCE. Thus, Phraates likely spent most of the latter half of 128 BCE consolidating his control over Media after the considerable damages of recent invasions and organizing his army after incorporating more captive Greek and Macedonian troops.58 Although the success of the Saka in the east and Phraates II’s movement away from Babylonia helped encourage Hyspaosines to rebel in summer 128 BCE, the regional challenge of Characene in southern Mesopotamia could not replace the extensive threat of the Saka to the eastern territories of the empire. Even after Himerus’ series of failures in Mesopotamia, Phraates chose to delegate the responsibility of ending the conflict with Hyspaosines to his generals, Timarchus and Indupanē.59 Phraates recognized that the collapse of his eastern frontier demanded his full attention in 128-127 BCE. Early in 127 BCE, Phraates II likely began his reoccupation of northern Iran and his pursuit of the Saka. There is no indication that Phraates reinforced Himerus after his failed invasion of Characene late in 128 BCE. Yet when Hyspaosines invaded and occupied Babylonia in spring and summer 127 BCE, Phraates could no longer overlook the threat of Chara- cene to the security of his western frontier. He decided to split his army and send Timarchus with a large force from Media to reclaim Babylonia by autumn.60 Yet rather than wait for the return of Timarchus, Phraates decided to continue his pursuit of the Saka with a much-reduced force toward Margiana in modern eastern Turkmenistan. Phraates II initially conducted a successful campaign against the Saka in 127 BCE. Phraates possibly drove the Saka back as far as the Murghāb River before news arrived of the deteriorating situation in Babylonia.61 The aggressiveness of Phraates’ pursuit of the Saka indicates that he planned to outmaneuver and overwhelm the Saka, forcing a major engagement before the Saka reached the wide-open steppe of Central Asia.62 He hoped to reclaim the immense spoils the rebellious mercenaries had seized, punish

58 Although Phraates captured Greek and Macedonian soldiers as he entered Mesopo- tamia, a large portion of Antiochus’ army also had wintered in Media before deserting. Justin 38.10.8-9. Thus, I agree with Shayegan’s conclusion that the mutinous civitates mentioned by Justin were the cities in Babylonia; however, I maintain that part of the Seleucid army, including Antiochus, billeted in Media. Shayegan 2011, pp. 135-136. In fact, the Seleucid garrisons in Media did not face the violent uprisings in Babylonia, and therefore, they would have been healthier and more substantial. Phraates would have needed time to organize these various forces. 59 Sachs &Hunger 1996, no. -126A; Assar 2006b, p. 109. 60 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -126A, no. -125A. 61 Assar 2005, p. 47; Id. 2006b, p. 112; Id. 2011, p. 119. Note Sellwood 1995, pp. 98- 101; Dąbrowa 2006, p. 38. 62 For Parthian strategy, see Overtoom 2017b. Note also Olbrycht 1998; Id. 2016a. 90 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019 their treachery, and annihilate the threat they posed to his frontier though their destruction. Meanwhile, the Saka, laden with loot from their raids, initially wanted to avoid a major confrontation with Phraates’ concentrated army before they could return to the Central Asian steppe. The Saka under- stood that they were vulnerable and isolated deep within the Iranian plateau, and they sought the safety and protection of the steppe, where reinforce- ments were available.63 This helps explain why the Saka did little to stop Phraates’ reoccupation of his eastern territories before autumn 127 BCE when the course of the campaign changed drastically. Although the Greek and Macedonian recruits obeyed Phraates II throughout most of 127 BCE, they played a pivotal role in his ultimate des- truction when they betrayed him in battle.64 Justin states that the Parthians and Greek and Macedonians in Phraates’ army had a tense relationship that ended in violence; however, we must consider why the Saka finally attacked in autumn 127 BCE and why the Greek and Macedonians suddenly betrayed Phraates. The answer lies in large part in Phraates’ decision to split his army in summer 127 BCE and continue his advance eastward that autumn. Before Timarchus departed with a large force to reclaim Babylonia in summer 127 BCE, Phraates II’s Parthian soldiers were numerous enough to ensure the complicity of the outnumbered Greek and Macedonians within the army; however, by autumn the composition of Phraates’ army was quite different. Phraates understood that he could not send the Greek and Mace- donians back to Mesopotamia, and therefore, he decided to retain the foreign conscripts in the east and send Timarchus to the west with a large contingent of Parthian soldiers. Suddenly, the Greeks and Macedonians represented a much larger portion of Phraates’ army in the east, and despite the inherent danger of trusting this large body of foreign soldiers, Phraates thought he could successfully maintain a productive relationship with them. Yet Phraates made a major miscalculation when he decided to continue his aggressive pursuit of the Saka into Margiana without Timarchus’ soldiers in late 127 BCE. Phraates II’s prior success that year had made him overly confident in his ability to control the Greeks and Macedonians and in the unwillingness of the Saka to join battle. Phraates’ eclectic army was atypical and not well suited to accomplish the traditional strategies and tactics of the Parthians’ unique mode of warfare, especially against the mobile cavalry-based army of the Saka.65 Phraates had no advantage of speed or maneuverability during

63 Justin 42.2.1. Note Assar 2006b, p. 112. 64 Justin 42.1.5. 65 Overtoom 2017b. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 91 the campaign, which helps explain the lack of engagements earlier in 127 BCE despite the aggressiveness of the Parthians’ advance. Phraates’ slower army could not force an engagement against the more mobile Saka, and his superior numbers meant that the Saka initially were uninterested in attacking the Parthian army. However, when Phraates eliminated his numerical advantage and isolated his reduced force in autumn 127 BCE, he provided his enemies with an opportunity to destroy him.66 As the reduced Parthian army advanced through Margiana, the Saka almost immediately recognized the Parthians’ vulnerability and counterattacked. Justin’s description of the climactic battle is interesting because it under- scores the lack of integration within Phraates II’s vulnerable army and provides further evidence of the Parthians trying to implement their tradi- tional tactical approach to warfare despite their reliance on a large body of Greek and Macedonian infantry. Justin records, “Therefore as they saw the Parthians’ battle line giving ground (inclinatam Parthorum aciem vidissent), the [Greek and Macedonian] soldiers went over to the enemy [that is, the Saka], and executed that revenge for their captivity, which they had long desired, by a sanguinary destruction of the Parthian army and of king Phraates himself.”67 Although Justin would have us believe that hatred of Parthian cruelty and arrogance motivated the Greek and Macedonian defectors, self-preservation was a more pressing concern.68 Phraates and his men found themselves caught off-guard by a faster, more maneuverable enemy as they moved through Margiana in late autumn. The Greeks and Macedonians had seen a similar disaster befall Antiochus VII two years prior, and they once again favored desertion over destruction.69 Although it is possible that the Greeks and Macedonians served in the Parthian army reluctantly, there were two more important factors that encou- raged their desertion in this battle, namely their sudden fear of the Saka and their misunderstanding of Parthian tactics. This was the first major engage- ment of the campaign, and the Parthians and Greek and Macedonians did not work well together on the field of battle. The abrupt aggression of the Saka surprised Phraates II and forced his less mobile army into a defensive position. Meanwhile, the unexpected arrival of thousands of hostile warriors rattled the resolve of the Greek and Macedonians, who had little reason to die fighting for the Parthians. Yet Justin’s explanation of how the battle unfolded is key to our greater appreciation of these events.

66 Note Assar 2006b, p. 112. 67 Justin 42.1.5. 68 Id. 42.1.4. 69 Id. 38.10.9-10; Diod. 34/35.16-17.1-2. 92 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019

The Parthians often utilized speed and misdirection tactically to outmaneuver and overcome their enemies, and therefore, I would like to interpret Justin’s negative portrayal of the Parthians in a more constructive light. When Justin states that the Parthians began the battle by “giving ground,” he in fact identifies the Parthians implementing their traditional feigned retreat to deceive the enemy.70 If the Parthian cavalry was trying simply to flee the battle, the ability of the less mobile Greek and Macedonian infantry to take part in the slaughter of Phraates II and his men is peculiar. Moreover, Justin clearly states that the Greeks and Macedonians worked with the Saka to destroy the Parthians, which would not have been possible without some sort of coordination. Thus, it appears Justin severely condenses a major battle that had five distinct phases. In the first phase of the battle, the Saka suddenly arrived to attack the unprepared Parthian army. After realizing his precarious position, Phraates II hoped to outmaneuver the Saka in the second phase of the battle by implementing a feigned retreat with his Parthian cavalry. The Greek and Macedonian infantry did not take part in this action and, instead, likely was meant to maintain a strong defensive position. It is possible Phraates hoped to draw in the Saka toward the Greek and Macedonian infantry before wheeling around with his cavalry and smashing the Saka between two hostile forces; however, Phraates in his haste did not clearly express his full intentions to the Greeks and Macedonians, whom he wrongly assumed would loyally hold their position. In the third phase of the battle, the Greeks and Macedonians began to turn on the Parthians out of fear, confusion, and anger. These men had little understanding of or appreciation for the Parthians’ asymmetric tactics, and therefore, Phraates’ feigned retreat appeared to be a legitimate rout and betrayal. It looked as though Phraates planned to abandon the Greeks and Macedonians to the enemy, and this immediate sense of terror and treachery is a far more satisfactory explana- tion of the Greeks’ and Macedonians’ enthusiasm to seek violent reprisals against the Parthians in the battle than Justin’s stereotypical explanation of continuous Parthian cruelty and arrogance. If Phraates II had decided to flee the battle, it would have been impos- sible for the Greek and Macedonian infantry to attack and annihilate the Parthian cavalry. Instead, Phraates, realizing his mistake, likely called off the cavalry maneuver to try to restore order amongst the riotous Greeks and Macedonians in the fourth phase of the battle. However, Phraates was unsuc- cessful, and the Greeks and Macedonians violently fell upon the bewildered Parthian cavalry. In the final phase of the battle, the approaching Saka

70 For Parthian tactics, see Overtoom 2017b. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 93 recognized and exploited the violent defection of the Greeks and Macedo- nians by utilizing their mobility to hem in the Parthians and help destroy Phraates and his men.71

IV. THE AFTERMATH OF PHRAATES II’S DEATH The death of Phraates II in battle severely damaged the power and prestige of the Parthians within the Hellenistic Middle East, encouraging other nomadic warriors to invade the Iranian plateau and further resistance to Parthian hegemony in Characene and Elymais. In particular, the destruction of thousands of Parthian horsemen made the empire vulnerable. Recruitment shortfalls had already been a major issue during Phraates’ reign, forcing him to hire mercenaries and enlist captives. The limitations of the Parthian military in the 120s BCE also hamstrung Phraates’ immediate successors and made their war on two fronts a near impossible challenge to overcome. In late 127, the Parthians’ hegemony over the Iranian plateau was in jeopardy as they tried to recover from Phraates II’s death and widespread disturbances along their western and eastern frontiers. Traditionally scho- lars, following Justin 42.2.1-2, have assumed Phraates’ uncle, Artabanus, became the next king and immediately went to war with the Central Asian tribal confederations.72 Yet Babylonian cuneiform records and numismatic evidence illustrates that between the reigns of Phraates (132-127 BCE) and Mithridates II (121-91 BCE), two men named Artabanus possibly reigned.73 G. R. F. Assar’s reconstruction adds an elderly, short-reigning king, identified as Arsaces VIII (late 127 - late 126 BCE), to the succession, and Assar originally argued that this Arsaces VIII was another of Phraates II’s uncles, the experienced Bagasis.74 Although Bagasis would have been quite old by late 127 BCE, the rapid deterioration of the Parthian Empire in the early 120s BCE helps explain the possible appointment of Bagasis as king. Bagasis had been a successful general and administrator for decades, and his elder brother, Mithridates I, had trusted him with command over Media

71 It is unclear what happened to the Greek and Macedonian troops after the battle; how- ever, Rawlinson’s unsubstantiated claim that they “fought their way across Asia and rejoined their own countrymen” appears dubious. Rawlinson 1885 (2002), p. 61. It is likely some fought as mercenaries for the Saka, while others settled into various Greek cities in Margiana and Bactria. Assar 2006b, p. 127 n. 123; Olbrycht 2010b, pp. 146- 147; Assar 2011, p. 120. 72 Scholars generally have placed Artabanus’ reign in 128-124. See Wroth 1903, pp. xxiv, 20-21, pl. V, no. 1-8; Sellwood 1980, pp. 56-62; Id. 1983, p. 283; Shore 1993, pp. 97-99, no. 57-65; Shayegan 2011, p. 114; Grianger 2016, p. 115. 73 See Assar 2005; Id. 2006c; Id. 2011. 74 For Bagasis as king, see Assar 2005, p. 47; Id. 2006c, pp. 112-116; Valverde 2017. 94 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019 starting in the 140s BCE.75 Moreover, Mithridates also had entrusted Bagasis with the difficult task of preparing the defense of Babylonia in the face of Demetrius II’s anabasis, and Bagasis had been vital to the defeat of the Seleucids in that campaign.76 Finally, Bagasis had been fundamentally important to maintaining stability within the empire from ca. 138-132 BCE as Mithridates succumbed to illness.77 However, there are a few glaring problems with the Bagasis reconstruc- tion. First, the literary evidence works against the identification of Bagasis as king because there is no record of it. Second, Bagasis’ son later appears as a commander-in-chief in the western territories under his cousin Mithri- dates II in 120 BCE.78 If Bagasis became Arsaces VIII, that would mean that after his death his son was passed over in the line of succession. Although sons did not always succeed their fathers in the Arsacid dynasty, it seems highly peculiar that a well-positioned and accomplished adult son of the former king was passed over without mention or issue in 126 BCE. Finally, Bagasis does not appear to have served under his nephew, Phraates II, who favored generals such as Indates, Timarchus, Himerus, and Indupanē. This either indicates that Bagasis had retired from service after Mithridates I’s death, or it more likely suggests that Bagasis also died in ca. 132 BCE.79 In fact, the sudden death of Bagasis around the time of Mithridates’ death helps explain the initially strong position of Rīnnu, the primary wife of Mithri- dates, at court when Phraates became king as a young adult.80 Perhaps because of these difficulties with the Bagasis reconstruction, Assar recently has favored a new explanation that Justin “correctly identified the successor of Phraates II with his paternal uncle, Artabanos II (late 127- late 126 BC), but conflated the latter’s reign with that of the next king who was probably also called Artabanos.”81 Although this new reconstruction remains mostly hypothetical, it appears plausible. An Artabanus clearly reigned for several years in the 120s BCE and died at the hands of the Central Asian invaders.82 Yet this man cannot be the short-reigning Arsaces VIII,

75 Justin 41.6.6-7. See Assar 2005, p. 48; Shayegan 2011, pp. 72-73. 76 Note Dąbrowa 1999 [2000]. 77 Assar 2011, p. 117. 78 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -119A2+B1, no. -119C; Del Monte 1997, pp. 147-148. 79 Interestingly, public sacrifice was made in Babylon in ca. 132 for the lives of Mithri- dates and Bagasis. This perhaps indicates that the health of both men was failing at this time. Finkel & van der Spek 2017b, Babylonian Chronicles of the Hellenistic Period, 18C. 80 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -131D; Assar 2005, pp. 45-47; Id. 2006c, p. 98; Id. 2011, p. 118. 81 Assar 2006c, pp. 112-116. 82 Justin 42.2.2. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 95 who struck the S18.1 tetradrachms at Seleucia that portray an older, fully bearded man.83 Moreover, the portrait on a handful of rare drachms from Ecbatana bear a close resemblance to the issuer of the S18.1 tetradrachms, identifying the issuer as the “Son of a Divine Father” and perhaps linking Arsaces VIII to Phriapatius as one of his younger sons.84 Although Justin states that Phriapatius left behind two sons, Phraates I and Mithridates I, he meant that Phriapatius only had two adult sons upon his death in ca. 170 BCE.85 It is clear from the cuneiform and numismatic evidence that Phria- patius had younger sons, namely Bagasis and perhaps Arsaces VIII, and Assar’s conclusion that Justin likely conflated the reigns of Arsaces VIII and Arsaces IX because the two kings shared the same name is worth conside- ration.86 In this reconstruction, Arsaces VIII likely was Artabanus (presu- mably I or II), the youngest uncle of Phraates II (Arsaces VII) and the youngest son of Phriapatius (Arsaces III).87 Moreover, the Artabanus (Arsa- ces IX) we later find fighting the Tochari in Justin likely was Arsaces VIII’s son and the elder brother of Mithridates II (Arsaces X or XI).88 Although the eastern frontier remained in jeopardy in late 127 BCE, the victorious Saka returned to Central Asia with their spoils.89 John of Antioch

83 Assar 2005, pp. 47-48; Id. 2006c, pp. 112-116; Id. 2011, p. 119. Compare Id. 2001a, pp. 20, 25-26, 41; Id. 2001b, pp. 17-22. 84 Id. 2006c, pp. 115-116; Id. 2011, p. 119. 85 Justin 41.5.9. 86 See esp. Del Monte 1997, pp. 55-57; Assar 2005, p. 48 no. 118, 52; Id. 2006, p. 89, 140; Olbrycht 2010a, p. 239; Assar 2011, p. 117, 119; Shayegan 2011, pp. 72-73. 87 For the traditional numbering system that identified Arsaces II as Artabanus I and the later Artabanus as Artabanus II, see Foy-Vaillant 1725, p. 16; Lewis 1728, pp. 17-23; Lindsay 1852, pp. 4-6, 133-135; Rawlinson 1873, p. 54; Gardner 1877, pp. 4-5, 26- 27; von Gutschmid 1888, p. 36 n. 4, 81; Justi 1895, p. 31, 412; Allotte de la Fuӱe 1904, pp. 320-322; Minns 1915, p. 40 and n. 58; Sykes 1915;, pp. 336-337; Tarn 1930, p. 119 and n. 4; Id. 1932, pp. 575-576; Debevoise 1938, p. 16; Kahrstedt 1950, p. 11 n. 1; Colledge 1967, pp. 27-28; Bivar 1983, p. 31; Frye 1983, pp. 209-210; Lukonin 1983, p. 687f.; Sherwin-White & Kuhrt 1993, p. 198; Assar 2008, pp. 1-7; Id. 2009a, pp. 119-134; Id. 2011, p. 114. For an alternative numbering system that removes the association of Arsaces II with the name Artabanus I and therefore names Artabanus, who ruled ca. 126-122, Artabanus I, see Wolski 1962, p. 138ff.; Schmitt 1964, p. 62 nn. 2, 63; Le Rider 1965, p. 313ff.; Bengston 1969, p. 417; Altheim & Stiehl 1970, p. 445ff.; Volkmann 1972, pp. 533-534; Lerner 1999, pp. 26-28; Assar 2005a. 88 Artabanus’ later coinage (S20, S22.1-2, S22.4) bore the epithet “Brother-loving.” Assar 2011, p. 119. Justin records that Mithridates II succeeded his father because he conflated the reigns of Mithridates’ father and brother. Justin 42.2.1-3. The Babylonian Astronomical Diaries also indicate that Artabanus was Mithridates II’s brother. Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -118A. Compare van der Spek 2001, pp. 453-454; Olbrycht 2010b, pp. 150-151; Assar 2011, p. 119. Shayegan’s conclusion that the evidence is contradictory is unconvincing. Shayegan 2011, p. 114 n. 309. 89 Justin 42.2.1. 96 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019 mentions that Phraates II’s successor “had to pay tribute to the Scythians.”90 John, like Justin, perhaps conflates the reigns of Artabanus the father and Artabanus the son, making it possible that Arsaces VIII decided to pay off the Saka in the immediate aftermath of Phraates’ death to help encourage them to leave the Iranian plateau. This policy satisfied the Saka because they finally had received their merces and stipendium from the Parthians, and it temporarily stabilized the war in the east and allowed the much-reduced Parthian army to concentrate on the renewed geopolitical crisis in the west.91 With the withdrawal of the Saka, the immediate threat to the Parthians by early 126 BCE was the ongoing rebellions of Characene and Elymais. Moreover, when news of Phraates’ death reached Mesopotamia, Hyspao- sines began to ravage Babylonia once again in early 126 BCE.92 Arsaces VIII could not ignore these new disturbances, and therefore, he focused on reclaiming and stabilizing Mesopotamia by defeating Characene.93 Yet after overcoming Hyspaosines, Arsaces VIII disappears from the record by late 126 BCE. Since Arsaces VIII would have been an older man, it is possible that he died of old age or that the challenges of a major command compli- cated his health and facilitated his sudden death, at which point his eldest son, Artabanus (presumably II or III), became Arsaces IX.94

V. THE DEATH OF A SECOND PARTHIAN KING IN BATTLE Arsaces VIII’s successful reoccupation of Babylonia in 126 BCE was an important step in the Parthians’ efforts to reestablish their hegemony over their western frontier; however, his sudden death after a brief reign again jeopardized the stability of the empire.95 Although his treaty with the Saka temporarily saved the eastern territories from further destruction, he had not been able to restore Parthian authority throughout much of the Iranian plateau before he died. The new king, Artabanus, needed to secure both frontiers of the empire, and from his base in Media, he began reoccupying the ravaged eastern territories in 126/125 BCE.

90 See Mariev 2008, Fragment 97, pp. 108-109. 91 Justin 42.1.2. 92 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -125A; Assar 2006c, p. 115; Shayegan 2011, pp. 111-112. 93 To commemorate his victory, Arsaces VIII overstruck Hyspaosines’ tetradrachm from Seleucia (S18.1). Assar 2005, pp. 47-48; Id. 2006c, p. 115; Id. 2011, p. 119. For the mint-towns of the Parthian Empire, see Sellwood 1972; Gregoratti 2012a; Rezakhani 2013. 94 Assar 2011, p. 119. 95 For example, raided Babylonia throughout the 120s. Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -125A, no. -124A, no. -123A, no. -123C, no. -122A, no. -122D. Note Assar 2006c, p. 125. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 97

Recently, Assar suggested that Arsaces VIII did not control most of the Iranian mints during his brief reign because the Saka seized the Iranian plateau after Phraates II’s death.96 Yet the brevity of Arsaces VIII’s reign and the devastation of the eastern territories because of the Saka’s prior raids satisfactorily explains his lack of eastern issues. He could not have invaded Babylonia if the Saka were threatening Media in 126 BCE. Instead, his policy of finally paying off the Saka mercenaries so that they would return to the Central Asian steppe temporarily relieved the eastern territories of the empire, eventually allowing the Iranian mints to recover under his son.97 This explains how the new king, Artabanus, began minting issues in the east early in his reign without a major campaign.98 With the eastern territories tentatively under his control, Artabanus seemingly turned to resolve the lingering disturbances in the west. He appears to have returned to Babylonia and forced Characene to offer tribute in 125 BCE when Hyspaosines likely submitted to Parthian suzerainty to save his rule and protect his realm.99 Artabanus probably also prepared a major invasion of Elymais that allowed him to capture territory and decisi- vely defeat the Elymaeans under the rebel leader, Pittit, in 124 BCE.100 While in Elymais, the Parthians sacked wealthy temples in retribution for the Elymaeans’ rebellion. Strabo records, In later times the king of Parthia, though warned by what had happened to Antiochus [III], hearing that the temples in that country contained great wealth, and seeing that the inhabitants were disobedient subjects, made an invasion with a great force, and took both the temple of Athena and that of , the latter called Azara, and carried off treasures valued at ten thousand talents. And Seleuceia near the Hedyphon River [in southern Elymais], a large city, was also taken.101

The Parthians not only gained vast amounts of much-needed wealth in Elymais, but also, they appear to have annexed the region at this time and ruled over it directly for a generation until a vassal eventually reemerged

96 Assar 2005, p. 48; Id. 2006c, pp. 115-116. 97 See Mariev 2008, Fragment 97, pp. 108-109. 98 Note Assar 2006c, pp. 117-122. 99 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -124B; Shayegan 2011, pp. 112-114. Hyspaosines soon after died in summer 124 at the age of eighty-five. Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -123; Lucian Macr. 16. 100 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -124B. Pittit could be the Pitthides mentioned by Diodorus, which would mean Artabanus punished Seleucia instead of Phraates II. Diod. 34/35.19. Note Assar 2006c, pp. 117-120, 123-126; Id. 2011, p. 119. 101 Strabo 16.1.18. 98 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019 around the beginning of the tumultuous Parthian “Dark Age” period (91-55 BCE).102 M. R. Shayegan, following the arguments of G. Le Rider, maintains that Mithridates II, not Artabanus, was king in 125 BCE and that Mithridates conducted the campaign against Pittit, arguing that Artabanus could not have fought in Elymais at this time because he died fighting the Guti in the east.103 However, Shayegan does not consider the successive reigns of Arsaces VIII and Arsaces IX. Arsaces VIII clearly did not fight the Guti before his death in 126 BCE, and if his son, Artabanus, in fact fought the Guti, this campaign would have occurred in 122 BCE.104 The ascension date of Mithridates is not definitive in the literary records, and therefore, numismatic evidence is key. Le Rider used tetrdrachms of Artabanus from Seleucia (S21.1-4) and a dichalkoi of Mithridates (S23.4) to contend that Mithridates became king between 125/124 BCE and 122/121 BCE.105 Meanwhile, Shayegan argues that two undated issues of tetradrachms by Mithridates belong to his early reign, sometime around 125/124 BCE, and assumes that Artabanus died after he issued his tetradrachms at Seleucia in 125/124 BCE.106 However, it appears that Artabanus in fact issued at Susa commemorating his vic- tory there in 124 BCE, as well as in the east at Ecbatana, Rhagae, and Mar- giane during his later campaign against the Central Asian tribal confede- rations.107 Therefore, it appears Artabanus, not Mithridates, conquered

102 Assar 2006b, p. 141; Shayegan 2011, p. 118. Note also Alram 1986, pp. 143-144. For the Parthian “Dark Age” and the debate over its chronology and coinage, see esp. Assar 2009b. Note also Simonetta 1953-1957, pp. 111-121; Id. 1966, pp. 15-40; Sellwood 1976, pp. 2-25; Mørkholm 1980, pp. 33-47; Simonetta 2001, pp. 69-108; Assar 2006c, pp. 55-96. 103 Shayegan 2011, p. 114 n. 309. See also Le Rider 1965, p. 386. Note Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -118A. 104 The slain “Artabana” mentioned in the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries cannot be Mithridates II’s father; however, despite Olbrycht objections it could be Mithridates’ brother. Olbrycht 2010b, pp. 150-151. Numismatic evidence illustrates that Artabanus reigned until 122 BCE, see Assar 2005, p. 49; Id. 2006b, pp. 128-129; Id. 2011, p. 119. For the Guti, see Zadok 1985, pp. 143-144; Del Monte 1997, p. 4 n. 12, 150 n. 12. 105 Le Rider 1965, p. 386. 106 Shayegan argues that a younger looking Mithridates on the undated coins (S23.1-2) means that these coins should precede the dichalkoi of Mithridates (S23.4). Shayegan 2011, p. 114 n. 309. However, we should not assume that these coins depict Mithri- dates. Assar argues convincingly that “the sudden and pronounced facial disparity between the obverse portraits of the S23.1-2 large silver on the one hand and those of S23.4 bronze and S24 coinage on the other is unparalleled in the Parthian series.” He concludes that these disparities indicate that “a prince other than Mithridates II issued the S23.1-2 tetradrachms. He may well have been son of Artabanus.” Assar 2005, p. 50; Id. 2006b, pp. 129-134; Id. 2011, p. 120. Contra Olbrycht 2010b, pp. 144-146. 107 Specifically, S18.2, S20.3, S20.4-5, S22.4. See Assar 2005, p. 49; Id. 2006b, pp. 116- 129. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 99

Elymais, subdued Characene, and kept Arab raids in check in 125/124 BCE.108 Arsaces VIII’s treaty with the Saka in winter 127/126 BCE bought the Parthians precious time to secure their western frontier; however, the Iranian plateau remained immensely vulnerable to further incursions. Although his son, Artabanus, established tentative control over the eastern territories in 126/125 BCE, Artabanus had made no major show of force in the east to secure the eastern frontier permanently or deter aggression from other tribes in the region. One of these tribes, the Tochari, who perhaps were a branch of the approaching Yuezhi, had occupied parts of Bactria and in 123 BCE invaded Parthia.109 Artabanus likely was in Media when news arrived of the Tochari invasion, and he immediately set out to face this new threat.110 Artabanus also appears to have implemented an aggressive strategy to overwhelm the marauding Tochari, initially reversing their penetration of the Iranian plateau in 123/122 BCE and temporarily restoring control over Parthia and Margiana. As Artabanus advanced eastward, he minted coins to mark his success and advertise his authority; however, similar to his late cousin, Phraates II, Artabanus’ eastern campaign came to an abrupt and disastrous end.111 Justin records, “Artabanus, making war upon the Tocharii, received a wound in the arm, of which he immediately died.”112 It is possible Artabanus also acted too aggressively in the east against a mobile enemy, exposing his army to a devastating counterattack as he reached the frontier of the Central Asian steppe. Phraates II had lost a sizable portion of the Parthian military in his defeat at the hands of the Saka in late 127 BCE, leaving his successors a much- reduced force to command in the middle and late 120s BCE. Although Artabanus must have made efforts to enlist new recruits into his army, he

108 Assar 2005, p. 48; Id. 2006b, pp. 118-127; Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -124B. See also van der Spek 2001, pp. 451-453. 109 Strabo 11.8.2; Justin 42.2.2; Id. Prol. 41. Tarn rejected that the Tochari had reached Parthia by this point. Tarn 1930, pp. 115-116. However, Tarn’s conclusions are unconvincing. See Debevoise 1938, pp. 37-38; Bivar 1983, p. 39; Olbrycht 2012b; Rtveladze 2011, p. 150. For the Tochari, see Enoki, Koshelenko & Haidary 1999; Piankov 2010; Mair 2014, p. 17, 19. 110 Assar 2005, p. 49; Id. 2006c, pp. 126-127. 111 Most notably Artabanus minted a series of silver drachms in Rhagae and Margiane (S20.4, S20.5-6, S22.4). Assar 2006c, p. 127. Assar suggests that these coins included the epithet “Philhellene” because Artabanus wanted to ensure the support of Greek settlers in the region, especially the Greeks and Macedonians who had defected from Phraates’ army and settled in the region. Id., p. 127 n. 123. Note also Loginov & Nikitin 1996, p. 40; Nikitin 1998, pp. 14-15. 112 Justin 42.2.2. 100 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019 could not have replenished the entire Parthian military in only three years. Moreover, even though the invasion of the Tochari demanded a strong retai- lation, Artabanus would have been forced to leave strong garrisons in Meso- potamia and Media to maintain his authority in the west. In fact, following his departure to the east, violence once again gripped Babylonia as local powers, perceiving the vulnerability of the Parthians, renewed their chal- lenge to Parthian hegemony within the region.113 Thus, Artabanus pursued the Tochari with a limited force that became increasingly vulnerable and isolated as he reached Margiana, and when the Tochari counterattacked, they defeated the Parthians and mortally wounded Artabanus in autumn 122 BCE.114 The sudden absence of Parthian issued drachms from Iranian mints over the next few years indicates that Parthian authority in the east nearly evapo- rated following Artabanus’ defeat and death.115 Unlike the previous Saka invasion, the Tochari did not return to the Central Asian steppe. Instead, they began to occupy the Iranian plateau, filling the power void left by the deci- sive defeats of Phraates II and Artabanus. Parthian power and prestige conti- nued to plummet as the eastern frontier collapsed even further. The 120s BCE was a decade of drastic reversals for the Parthian state. The Parthians began the decade celebrating the greatest victory in their history with the destruction of Antiochus VII and his army, and by the end of the decade, the empire was in severe crisis, and the survival of the Parthian state was in jeopardy. It would take the great Mithridates II several years of difficult and determined campaigning to stabilize the frontiers and finally reestablish the Parthians as the dominant force within the Iranian plateau.116

Nikolaus OVERTOOM Clinical Assistant Professor in Ancient History Washington State University Wilson-Short Hall 301 Pullman, Washington 99163 U.S.A.

113 Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -122D. 114 It is likely that the Guti aided the Tochari in the defeat of Artabanus. Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -118A. Note Assar 2005, p. 51; Id. 2006b, pp. 128-129; Id. 2011, p. 119; Shayegan 2011, p. 114 n. 309. Contra Olbrycht 2010b, p. 150. 115 Assar 2005, p. 50. 116 For Mithridates’ difficult campaign to reclaim the east, see Justin 42.2.3-5; Sachs & Hunger 1996, no. -118A. Note also Assar 2005, p. 52; Id. 2006c, p. 139; Olbrycht 2010b, pp. 150-155; Assar 2011, p. 120; Shayegan 2011, p. 242; Overtoom 2016d; Id. 2019b. C O N S I D E R I N G T H E F A I L U R E S O F T H E P A R T H I A N S 101 Table 1 : Genealogical table of the early Arsacids (© N. Overtoom, 2018). (© N. Overtoom, Arsacids of early the table 1 : Genealogical Table 102 N. O V E R T O O M StIr 48, 2019

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