Osce Conflict Management in Central Asia Fighting Windmills Like Don Quixote

security and human rights 27 (2016) 479-497

brill.com/shrs osce Conflict Management in Central Asia Fighting Windmills like Don Quixote

Pál Dunay Professor of nato and European Security Issues, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

Abstract

Conflicts and their management in Central Asia have never been prioritised by the osce although five states of the region are among its participating states. This has been due to that unlike in some other parts of the post-Soviet space most of the conflicts did not threaten with military escalation, and the intensity of strategic rivalry is less noticeable in this distant part of the osce area than closer to the heart of E urope. The fact Russia is not a direct party to the conflicts in Central Asia also reduces the interests of many participating states. There was one high intensity conflict in the region, the Tajik civil war that came too early for the osce. Lower intensity conflicts, ranging from border skirmishes, disputes about access to water, violation of rights of national minority groups, rigged elections are monitored and their resolutions are facilitated by the organisation. Some of them, like the 2010 Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict had such short shelf-life internationally that no consensus-based inter-governmental organisation could have effectively intervened into it. The osce has been successful in conflict management when the party or parties also wanted to break the stale-mate that the Organization could facilitate. Domestic change in some Central Asian states is essential for advancing the osces cooperative security approach.

Keywords

Central Asia – high intensity conflict – low intensity conflict – civil war – Conflict Prevention Centre – High Commissioner on National Minorities – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan

* The views expressed in this article are the authors’.

480 Dunay

Introduction

This article looks at the limited role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) in conflict prevention and conflict management in Central Asia. To achieve this, the article will provide (1) an introduc- tory overview of the key security issues within and across the 5 Central Asian States; (2) an analysis of the potential role that osce institutions could play in the region and within individual countries given the nature of the conflict drivers within and among the 5 so called -stan; (3) an analysis of the limited role the osce played in 4 high and low intensity conflicts, highlighting the key challenges the Organization faced with reference to local political agendas and its own institutional limitations; and (4) identifying key characteristics defin- ing the relationship between the osce and Central Asian participating States, drawing on lessons learned from the osce conflict management experience in the region. osce engagement in conflict settlement is rather dependent on the will of the concerned parties. Hence the Organization limited mediating engagement in some, but not all, conflict contexts. In fact the osce had to stay out of the conflict in Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 due to the Russian veto to continue the field presence in Georgia. The same is true for Crimea, where the Russian Federation has taken a clear stance by declaring: “for Crimea, we believe the issue has been closed for good. This is a historical decision of the people living on the peninsula and Russia will never discuss the issue with anyone”.1 Under such conditions, it is understandable that the osce as a consensus-based organisation has little to do but stay out of certain conflicts. In Central Asia it is the character of the conflicts that may prevent the osce from getting involved. Either, they are enduring low intensity conflicts where it is difficult to determine when and under what conditions one should get involved, or the conflict flares up for such a short period of time leaving no time for the osce to become engaged. Beyond the sovereignty based reluctance of some national leaders, it is a matter of the level of persuasion the osce can exercise as a mediating institution. In fact, the means available to the osce, socialisation but practically no conditionality, does not allow it to present a strong alternative compared to some powerful actors, including States and other international agencies.

1 Joint Press Conference with President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras, 27 May 2016. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52024 Last accessed on 22 May 2017.

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 481

1 Central Asia Today and an Overview of the Security Issues

Central Asia is traditionally identified with 5 former republics of the Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, some individuals add Afghanistan to the region so that it does not fall between the Greater Middle East and South Asia. Understandably, this is done in order to associate Central Asia with a neighbour that is internationally better known than any of the 5 States mentioned above and also to provide understanding that the region is adjacent to a major source of insecurity. This could help attract attention and readiness to support and assist the 5 Central Asian States. There is also a “flight from Central Asia”, people leave if they can while it sometimes is identified with backwardness and underdevelopment. The daughter of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev clearly stated: “Geo- graphically, Kazakhstan borders on Central Asia, but it is not a Central Asian country. Ours is a Eurasian State strongly influenced by [European] and West- ern values. Contrary to what certain politicians and journalists assert, we are not another -stan. Saudi Arabia is not our historical landmark: we look to Nor- way, South Korea, and Singapore”.2 The President of the second richest Central Asian State (in terms of per capita gdp) Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimu- hamedov presented his country as having a dual Caspian and Central Asian identity.3 Internationally, Central Asia has a dual identity: as a region of 5 post-Soviet States each being a participating State of the osce, they have some alleged European identity, while they geographically lay behind the Ural mountains and belong to the Asian Group of States in the United Nations. The world tends to forget about the region given that the two main reasons why Central Asia mattered after the collapse of the Soviet Union or later have largely lost their importance. The 2 reasons were as follows: (1) the richness of natural resources and energy bearers; and (2) since 2001, being in close vicinity to Afghanistan. Central Asia, unlike other parts of the former Soviet Union, such as the Caucasus and Ukraine, is not infamous for its conflicts. However, this does

2 Dariga Nazarbayeva, Spetsifika i Perspektivy Politicheskovo Razvitiya Kazakhstana [Pecu- liarity and Prospects of Kazakhstan’s Political Development], 3 December 2003, (emphasis added) http://www.imp.kz/Lists/articles/DispForm.aspx?ID=766 Last accessed on 27 November 2010. 3 Speech by President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov at the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2009. www.turkmenistan.ru/ en/node/8396.html (Last accessed on 22 December 2016.)

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482 Dunay not mean that the environment is free of them it only means they are less visible and attract less attention than others in the former Soviet Union. This may be attributed to various factors. It would be simplistic to attribute it to distance. Central Asia is land-locked and quite distant from the West, which continues to have major influence on strategic prioritisation among regions. Short of holding the attention of the leading powers of the world, and the lack of a potential rivalry, conflicts have remained relegated to the backburner in Central Asia. The world can easily live with Central Asian instability and security risks. Central Asia is an interesting laboratory where various layers of security problems coexist. Although I am of the view that most security problems in the region have internal root causes, it is clear that inter-state, transnational and human security problems coexist. There are inter-state rivalries, including territorial disputes; security problems associated with terrorism; and human security problems, in particular due to the deprivation of individuals’ basic human rights and oppression.4 The problems are exacerbated by the volatility of inter-state relations and the eventual rivalry for leadership that corrodes mutual trust. Hence, whenever there is a security problem there are spill-over effects that stem from the distrust underlying the inter-state relations. However, the great game that characterised the region in the 19th century, in light of the circumstances mentioned above, appears to have come to an end. The West has concluded that Central Asia is simply a “bridge too far” and it is not worth to engage in a geopolitical rivalry with countries much better positioned in the region. In sum, the “great game” of the 19th century may well become “a negative great game” or rather “a little game” in the 21st century where the question is reformulated and asked: which country, if any, is ready to become involved in Central Asian affairs? The conclusion can preliminarily be drawn that Central Asia is left to China and Russia. This means that the Cen- tral Asian countries will be exposed to the strongest external influence by two states that will live happily with their current regimes and will not interfere in order to change it in Central Asia. Much attention has been paid to the potential inter-state conflicts in Cen- tral Asia. There are usually two aspects to it: the eventual spill-over effect of

4 There is a large body of literature on the human rights situation in Central Asia. For a suc- cinct overview see Central Asia: Worsening Rights Record. Human Rights Watch, 29 January 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/central-asia-worsening-rights-record.

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 483 the conflict in Afghanistan and the disagreements and unresolved problems among some Central Asian States. However, there is clear evidence from the history of a quarter of a century that it is not inter-state conflicts that present the primary source of disagreements. It is much more domestic developments and their internationalisation that present major challenges. Weak statehood, the inability of some Central Asian States to provide for internal security and basic services to their population combined with corruption, inexperienced governance and oppression, are all tangible sources of potential and existing grievances. Furthermore, the language and rhetoric used by leaders is sometimes unusual to say the least.5 This latter factor may give the impression that discords are far more severe than is really the case, which in turn could raise the level of concern internationally. Domestic developments, such as weak state capacity and institutions, shortcomings within government, disrespect for human rights and poor domestic security are, in some cases, intertwined with identity-building in the region. Building national identity both means identifying who the Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Tajiks or Uzbeks, for example, are and also who they are not. The latter may result in exclusion. The fact that the population in Central Asia is mixed and a large number of national minorities live in as well as outside of the region also contributes to potential problems. All of the internal factors described above also contribute to cross-border issues, like border demarcation, access to water, inter-ethnic tensions, cross border transnational threats, including terrorism and organised crime generally and drug trade specifically. It is within this backdrop, that we aim to assess the osce’s role in the region, which, as this article will show, does not fit into the traditional definition of mediating a conflict, but rather can be characterised by limited attempts of conflict management and prevention of escalation in various cases.

5 It is appropriate to illustrate this point with a quote from then Foreign Minister, Vladimir Norov, of Uzbekistan when he spoke at the Astana osce Summit meeting in December 2010. The Foreign Minister challenged the osce on its conflict resolution role in June 2010 when a large number of ethnic Uzbeks sought refuge in Uzbekistan and also appealed to the Kyrgyz leadership: “It should be recognized that, unfortunately, the osce and its structures practically didn’t play any positive role in preventing and neutralizing the bloody events in June this year in the south of Kyrgyzstan … unless there is not going to be put a full stop and the concrete perpetrators of the June tragedy in the south of Kyrgyzstan are not found, it is difficult to assert that this tragedy will not take place again.” Head of Uzbekistan Delegation Vladimir Norov speaks at the osce Summit. UzReport, 3 December 2010. http://mir.uzreport. uz/news_e_82675.html Last accessed on 22 May 2017.

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484 Dunay

2 The Unused Potential of the osce in Central Asia

The osce plays a special role in Central Asian States for various reasons. First, this is a region that is not extensively integrated in various regional organisations. Only three out of five States in the region are members of the Collec- tive Security Treaty Organization (csto), four are participants in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sco), and two are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU). The region’s membership is not even full in the Com- monwealth of Independent States (cis). In sum, the osce is largely without a rival in Central Asia as a regional actor with broad membership. Second, the States of the region started to develop their independent statehood and international relations from scratch upon independence in 1991. Hence even with the best intention they would have needed support from an organisation focused on cooperative security, like the osce. Third, none of the States had experience in democratic politics upon joining the Organization. Hence, an institution that prides itself to be an organisation of cooperative security that aims to assist its members in state-building and one that acts on the basis of a very broad concept of security must be the perfect venue to address the problems and shortcomings its participating States face. There are four factors that make Central Asia special on the osce agenda. First, States of the region have a concentration of various problems and shortcomings and in many cases weakly developed state capacity to address them. Moreover, it seems to be the conviction of rulers in Central Asia that strong statehood is identical with repression. None of them are well-functioning de- mocracies, and the majority is not a democracy by any account. Second, States of the region are not interested in a so-called western perspective (none of them belong to the eu’s so-called eastern partnership, none of them consider the prospect of nato membership, none of them are members of the Council of Europe) and for various reasons western institutions show limited interest in them and do not put the States of the region on their list of priorities. Most of them are not even particularly active in those programmes to which they belong like Partnership for Peace. Consequently, the osce does not face a lot of competition when addressing the region, which provides it with a unique opportunity to stand out as a contributor to managing conflicts in Central Asia. Third, although some regional institutions in the post-Soviet space, like the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (csto) also may have a role in conflict management, they have been either limited by the lack of consensus among their ranks or insisted upon non-interference in the domestic affairs of their Member States in ac- cordance with their foundational documents. As a fourth element, last, but

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 485 not least, there are no high intensity conflicts in this region that would directly involve the Russian Federation. Therefore, the region is not seen by the West “through Russian eyes” and hence such a factor does not spark western interest in blocking Russia’s influence in the region. In sum, the osce has a unique opportunity to address conflicts in Central Asia, be they domestic with or without spill-over to another country or intersate. The osce is free to cross the boundaries of domestic jurisdiction and address matters which belong exclusively to the so-called domestic affairs of its participating States. However, the reluctance of some participating States with reference to sovereignty and non-interference as well as the consensus principle of the Organization severely constrain the well-established right of the osce to address matters that belong to domestic jurisdiction. The difficulty in analysing the conflict management role of the osce stems from the diversity of the Organization’s activities based on its comprehen- sive security concept. The activities of the osce, in broad terms, are fully focused on different phases of the conflict management cycle. Up until recently, when the osce established the Special Monitoring Mission (smm) in Ukraine, the focus of the Organization has mainly been on conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building. In this sense, the osce has not been adequately equipped and prepared to address conflicts in their high intensity phase. Most of its institutions, and not only the Conflict Prevention Centre (cpc) that is dedicated to address conflicts, are there to contribute to one phase or the other of conflict management. It suffices to mention the High Commissioner on National Minorities (hcnm), the Office of Democratic In- stitutions and Human Rights (odihr) and the Representative of Freedom of the Media (fom) that all address potential conflict sources with the view to prevent further escalation. It is worth paying attention to the assumption that lies behind their activities. It stems from the idea that democracy based on free and fair elections, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights, including minority rights, provides the maximum stability and security for respective populations. However, as an organisation, which is not particularly well-endowed with resources (small budget, few permanent international staff, not a career organisation), the osce faces constraints in its activities. It is for this reason that the osce faces difficulties in managing high-intensity conflicts where it has to rely on the leadership of other institutions. Despite the difficulties, the osce has had a number of attempts at managing high intensity conflicts, albeit not always successfully. The following chapter will look at this experience in four different settings and will highlight the challenges the osce faced vis-à-vis the nature of the conflicts as well as its own institutional limitations.

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486 Dunay

3 High Intensity Conflicts6 and the Attempts of the osce to Address Them

The Limited Role of osce Field Presence – The Tajikistan Case: Central Asia, unlike the Caucasus area, did not face many military conflicts. The first that im- mediately followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the civil war in Tajikistan that lasted for approximately 5 years. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce) was not and could not be prepared for such a contingency. The Organization faced four long years of war in Yugoslavia and a not less tragic war in Tajikistan, rather distant from Europe. In reaction to the high intensity contingency, the csce established its first field presence in Central Asia in 1994. However, it is difficult to contemplate the benefits of field presence beyond the reporting activity that has helped a very large number of participating States. It must not be forgotten that the majority of osce participating States still do not have diplomatic representation in Dushanbe and at the time in which the civil war was raging on, there were even fewer participating States present. Conflict management has certainly been successful to the extent that the civil war has not returned to the country in twenty years, having concluded in 1997. This is certainly reassuring to the population. Dual Role of the Chairperson-in-Office – Kyrgyzstan’s Case: Another high intensity conflict occurred under very different conditions. Kyrgyzstan, the most democratic State in Central Asia, went through two irregular regime chang es. The so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005 happened without any loss of life and did not cause lasting instability. During this time the osce facilitated the de- parture of President Akayev. However, the change in April 2010 resulted in more than 80 casualties in front of the Presidential seat, the so-called Bishkek White House. Many more casualties in the range of a few hundred followed due to the spill-over of the conflict to the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, and then for a short period of time also to Uzbekistan. The conflict in the south where the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities collided was clearly identified as an ethnic conflict. Already the break-out of violence indicated the volatility of the relationship between the two ethnic communities. The direct igniting factor of the violent clashes was the spreading of the rumour that a person of Uzbek ethnicity raped a Kyrgyz student in a university dormitory. Whether the conflict was underlined by the policy of discrimination carried out by the ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in which the Uzbek population lost a

6 There are various definitions of high intensity conflict dependent upon the number of casualties and the duration of the conflict. For options see http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/ definitions.

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 487 number of social and economical opportunities during his presidency has been analyzed extensively. Even more broadly it was raised, whether the return of ethno-nationalism that replaced the attempt to introduce civic nationalism by the country’s first president Askar Akayev played a role in it. This can also be argued.7 The acting president of Kyrgyzstan at the time, Roza Otunbayeva, tried her best to rely on the support of inter-governmental organisations, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (csto) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sco). Neither was particularly successful as both institutions were hiding behind their non-interference based legal foundation. However, the osce had every reason to be involved and it wason various levels. The fact that Kazakhstan, a neighbour country that has close relations with Kyrgyzstan and also had some leverage in the country, held the osce chairmanship at the time and was able to facilitate the osce’s involvement. In addition to this, the osce had full-fledged field presence in Kyrgyzstan. How the chairmanship and the mission acted in those months tells a lot about the expectations of the osce in other high intensity conflicts. The Kazakh President invited President Bakiyev “for talks” to Kazakhstan. When the latter agreed to give up power on the condition that his personal safety was guaranteed, he was provided assistance to leave Kyrgyzstan and move to Belarus where Mr. Bakiyev has been living since. It is worth noting that although Kazakhstan facilitated this exchange under its osce chairmanship, it could have also organised the negotiation in its national capacity, just like it had done five years earlier with the previous Kyrgyz president. Kazakhstan’s record has remained mixed nevertheless. While Kyrgyzstan’s new leadership had difficulties to establish itself, Kazakhstan played a double role. On the one hand, its public discourse announced consistently that Astana “trusts the wis- dom of the Kyrgyz leadership”. It is most probable that the language behind closed doors was different. However, what Astana did was not very helpful for three particular reasons. First, right after the 7 April 2010 events in Bishkek, the Kazakhs closed the border and did not reopen it until 20 May 2010. Whether there was a need to keep the border closed for such a long period of time remains unclear, particularly since President Nazarbayev and Roza Otunbayeva, then acting Prime Minister, later President, allegedly already agreed in a tele- phone conversation held on 4 May 2010 to reopen the border.8 The closure was

7 See Babak Rezvani, Understanding and Explaining the Kyrgyz-Uzbek Interethnic Conflict in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Anthropology of the Middle East, vol. 8, no. 2, Winter 2013, p. 73. 8 For more details on the matter see my article on the record of the osce Chairmanship of Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan’s Unique osce Chairmanship in 2010. In: Institute for Peace

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488 Dunay particularly unhelpful, since most of Kyrgyzstan’s northbound exports usually pass through Kazakhstan. Furthermore, it exacerbated the humanitarian situation by shutting out both Kyrgyz workers and migrant traders from the Kazakh market. Second, President Nazarbayev was not ready to receive Otunbayeva until she was actually sworn into office. If nowhere else, here Astana’s two roles definitely collided. While reservations of this kind are normally respected in international diplomacy, the refusal was certainly inappropriate coming from the State that held the osce Chairmanship and was tasked with contributing to mitigating the internal conflict. Third, Kazakhstan later made an extra- budgetary contribution to help with Kyrgyzstan’s recovery.9 The osce was involved in the crisis to the extent possible in 2010. Both as the chairmanship country and through the osce mission in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan followed the matter very closely. Consequently, and as was illustrated above, the record of Kazakhstan to address the conflict in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan is assessed very differently by various countries. Aborted Attempts of the osce to deal with Inter-Ethnic Strife in Kyrgyzstan: The next conflict arose with the outbreak of ethnic clashes in June 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan. The “ethnic cleansing” killed around 470 people, three- quarters of them were of Uzbek ethnicity. As a consequence, approximately 400,000 people fled towards the Uzbek border in June 2010, and 100,000 of them eventually made it to Uzbekistan. They were overwhelmingly, though not exclusively, of Uzbek ethnicity. The leadership of Uzbekistan ordered the border to be opened, and 3 days later the flow of asylum seekers reversed. The conflict was not resolved, and the osce’s attempt to establish a small, 52 members Police Advisory Group under osce auspices was effectively blocked by local forces. The fact that the local mayor and his deputy in Osh could have such a decisive impact upon a national and international matter, said a lot about power relations inside Kyrgyzstan and even more about the capacity of the osce Chairmanship to manage the crisis and to contribute to post-conflict reconciliation.

Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/ifsh (ed.), osce Yearbook 2011. (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2012), pp. 49–63. 9 For a full account on the external support to recovery in Kyrgyzstan following the conflict of April-June 2010 see Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, The World Bank, The Kyrgyz Republic: Joint Economic Assessment – Reconciliation, Recovery and Reconstruction. 21 July 2010, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/072110.pdf and also Richard Weitz, Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan Economic Relations Make Progress. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15 Nov. 2013, vol. 10, issue 206 https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan- kyrgyzstan-economic-relations-make-progress/ Last accessed 3 January 2017.

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 489

It is noteworthy to mention how the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents have very different recollections of how the osce managed the crisis. According to Islam Karimov “the Organization failed to prevent the conflict”, whereas, according to President Nazarbayev, “Kazakhstan has tried to use all available osce instruments to prevent the escalation of the conflict”.10 Interestingly, the two statements are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Kazakhstan (together with some other States) did try to prevent the conflict from escalation and spillover. Although this did not succeed, one has to bear in mind the difficulties in effectively addressing a crisis that was evolving rapidly and with a certain degree of unpredictability. The inter-ethnic clashes reached a level that resulted in a massive population movement, so rapidly that no diplomatic means could be used. This, however, indicated that the osce has difficulty in effectively inter- vening in a fast-evolving acute crisis and Kazakhstan`s engagement was not at fault. As to the osce field presence in Bishkek during the crisis, it did what it could and it remained fairly limited in its impact. Namely, it tried to mitigate, medi- ate and at some crucial points even facilitate the solution.11 Its reports have indicated that it was left with fairly little room for maneuver. Its reports may have contributed to the knowledge of those participating States that did not have diplomatic representation in Kyrgyzstan. Overall, it has highlighted the importance of permanent presence in the field in such turbulent times. The short time span of the flaring up of the conflict also made reliance on the osce presence on the ground necessary. However, it has also indicated that permanent presence may limit the need and readiness to “parachute diplomacy”.12 The Temporary Nature of the Conflicts in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and the osce`s Inability to React to them in Time: The other violent conflicts in Cen- tral Asia were also time-limited, leaving the osce with practically no choice to get involved in time before conflict deescalation. Some of them resulted in

10 Both cited by Erica Marat, osce Summit Highlights Disagreements between Astana and Tashkent, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2 December 2010. http://www.jamestown.org/ programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37235&tx_ttnews[backPid]=27&cHash=8cd 4c7e593 Last accessed 3 January 2017. 11 For an insightful account see Azamat Temirkulov, Domestic Developments in Kyrgyzstan in Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (ed.), osce Yearbook 2012 (Baden- Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2013) pp. 95–107. 12 It is memorable that in an earlier phase of the osce’s evolution some ranking politicians appeared in conflict zones to mitigate the problem. In many cases they did a good job. For example, former Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky went to Albania in the spring of 1997 to prevent the escalation of violence and state collapse. However, the knowledge of the local circumstances of short-term visitors and mediators was not always up-to-date.

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490 Dunay stern diplomatic exchanges at the osce fora and had long term repercussions. The so-called Andijon massacre in May 2005 in Uzbekistan resulted in con- demnation by the Slovenian chairmanship13 on the osce’s behalf, followed by a reaction from the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.14 He argued that the Chairperson-in-Office could not condemn the brutality of the Uzbek leadership on behalf of all the participating States as, among others, the Russian Federation disagreed with it and also pointed to alleged terrorist involvement in the events. This reflects the delicate situation the country holding the osce chairmanship finds itself in during times of crises, as more often than not it is impossible to achieve consensus among the participating States. On the 20th anniversary of its independence on 16 December 2011, Kazakh- stan, by far the best governed state in Central Asia, joined those Central Asian States that had felt compelled to use force in certain domestic contingencies. Namely, for the first time Kazakhstan also faced a high intensity conflict in which security forces fired at miners that had been demonstrating for months due to reduced salaries. Rather than relying on non-lethal means of ending the demonstration, the authorities used disproportionate force that left 16 dead and 64 wounded. Thereafter, the Kazakh authorities arrested various activists and sentenced them in showcased trials. At first, the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the osce briefed the Permanent Council at its next session.15 It attributed the situation to the violators of public order. The Permanent Rep- resentative of the us gave measured response at the meeting.16 The eu, un- usually, formulated its opinion somewhat stronger.17 Later, the osce faced the situation at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in October 2012,

13 Statement by the osce Chairperson-in-Office, Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, on the situation in Uzbekistan, Ljubljana, 20 May 2005. www.osce.org/cio/46437 Last accessed on 3 January 2017. 14 Factbox: Andijon Timeline. Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, 20 September 2005. www .rferl.org/a/1061536.html Last accessed 3 January 2017. See also Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the osce, Statement by Mr. Alexey N. Borodavkin, Permanent Rep- resentative of the Russian Federation at the Meeting of the osce Permanent Council, 19 May 2005, pc.del/404/05. Ambassador Borodavkin strongly condemned the “name and shame” policy of the West and emphasized the importance of cooperation in the organization. 15 See Statement by H.E. Ambassador Kairat Abrakhmanov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the osce at the 895th (special) meeting of the osce Per- manent Council on the situation in the Mangistau Region (west Kazakhstan) 22 Decem- ber 2011. pc.del/1220/11. 16 United States Mission to the osce, Response to the Kazakhstan Permanent Representa- tive Ambassador Abdrakhmanov on Events in Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan 22 December 2011, pc.del/1212/11. 17 eu statement on the events in western Kazakhstan, 22 December 2011, pc.del/1216/11.

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 491 where the matter was raised. However, other participating States remained mute on it.18 It was noticeable that the osce did not want to address the highly divisive matter of Kazakhstan, a participating State that had held the osce Chairmanship in 2010 and was widely regarded as an example in Central Asia. This in a way could be due to successful Kazakh diplomacy within the osce. Similarly, when violence broke out in the very south of Tajikistan, in Khorog, or in the Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Region, the matter was addressed by the three main actors in the osce. Whereas the us and the eu expressed their concerns about the violence and loss of life and later their reservations about the continuous blocking of information, the Russian Federation empha- sised its hope that the Tajik authorities could gain control over the situation.19 Again, the osce served as a whistleblower in this situation and demonstrated the concerns of its participating States. There is not much else the osce could do under such conditions. If we sum up the experiences of the osce in high intensity violent conflicts one can conclude that the Organization could get involved, to a limited extent, in cases where there is a conflict spanning over a longer period of time. In cases where events evolved very rapidly, the osce’s role has remained limited to ret- roactive commentaries at the diplomatic fora of the Organization rather than serving as a whistleblower. An international organisation like the osce based on consensus, with small and not particularly strong institutions, and with the power concentrated in the chairmanship, which rotates on an annual basis, will always face difficulties to address fast evolving situations.

4 osce Conflict Management in a Low Intensity Conflict Environment

Whereas it is fairly easy to critically reflect on the role of the osce in the acute high intensity conflicts, it is far more difficult to measure its contribution in a low intensity conflict environment. The situation is further complicated by the broad variety of the activities of the osce in the five Central Asian States.

18 See Levi Gabriel, Zhanaozen: Worker organisation and repression. https://peopleand- nature.wordpress.com/kazakh-oil-workers/zhanaozen-worker-organisation-and-repres sion/ Last accessed 28 December 2016. 19 See United States Mission to the osce, Statement on Tajikistan, 26 July 2012, pc.del/770/12 and 6 September 2012, pc.del/806/12; European Union, osce Permanent Council Nr 922 and 923, Vienna, 26 July and 6 September 2012, eu Statement on Tajikistan, pc.del/ 774/12 and pc.del/815/12 Delegation of the Russian Federation, Statement by Mr. Andrey Kelin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the 922nd Meeting of the osce Permanent Council Regarding Developments in Tajikistan, 26 July 2012, pc.del/776/12.

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By the late 1990s, the Organization had gradually built a field presence in every country within the region. It had faced an environment where both the intentions of the regimes and the state capacity varied significantly. Further- more, some of the Central Asian States, since their independence 25 years ago, have demonstrated that there are both domestic and inter-state tensions in the region. It is rather obvious that except for closed and somewhat enigmatic Turkmenistan, no Central Asian State remained immune from high intensity conflict. The high intensity conflicts remained time limited, unlike the lower intensity conflicts that have been around for a long period of time dating back to the beginning of the last quarter of a century. Although due to their intercon- nections it is difficult to keep domestic and inter-State conflicts apart, there is a reason to arbitrarily do so. Despite the significant differences, the five Central Asian States still have considerable commonalities that connect them. Most importantly, each Central Asian State needs help and support in its political and socio-economic development. The osce as an organisation of cooperative security has been facing a complex dilemma. Namely, on the one hand, its function is to contribute to the development of those participating States that are lagging behind in meeting the osce requirements. On the other hand, the osce must assist in fostering the respect for the Organization’s shared values, principles and norms. What shall the osce do when the two objectives are not congruent: when a participating State is systematically violating the norms and principles of the osce, yet needs assistance in its political development by enhancing good governance, modernising its security structures, and organis- ing free and fair elections? There is experience that when the osce arrives, the Organization or its local representatives may alienate the authorities of the host country if the former is represented too forcefully. Consequently, it is an extremely delicate balance the institutions and heads of missions have to find between the two. Even with the best intentions, it can be difficult to establish good relations with the host country, since participating States may have interests that contradict the prevailing discourse within the osce or it could be due to the host State’s perceived alienation. In light of their interests, the Central Asian States have reacted in various ways to these challenges. The osce, understandably, is of the view that it is doing a fair amount to address low intensity conflicts. It indeed does. However, there are a number of challenges when it comes to measuring its contribution. It is rather difficult to assess the role of conflict prevention when it is successful. Furthermore, it is “ahistorical” to raise the question what would have happened without the involvement of the osce in the management of a conflict. Also, the osce, simi- lar to several other international organisations, is more process rather than

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 493 outcome oriented. It holds meetings, seminars, provides expertise to conflict affected participating States, is present in the field (as long as the host State consents), and reports on situations. However, its means are limited and oc- casionally insufficiently concentrated. This renders the self-assessment on the part of the osce not fully reflecting its actual role to foster principles, values and norms enshrined in the most important csce/osce documents.

5 Conclusion: Ambivalent Relationship between the osce and the Central Asian States: Key Characteristics and Key Challenges

Twenty years of the osce presence with full-fledged missions in Central Asia has witnessed the establishment of complex relationships with host States. On the one hand, it made it possible for the osce to monitor the developments in the countries from a closer distance on the other the history of the osce field presence in Central Asia has demonstrated mutual socialisation. While most Central Asian States have only nominally taken up the Organization’s values and greater “neoliberal world order”, the osce in turn has also been socialised and perceived by most governments, the (rudimentary) civil society and population simultaneously as an adversary, a benefactor, and an industry (as a small but not insignificant foreign aid dispenser). The osce has recognised its limits and has often given the impression that it was more engaged in the process of its actions than in the outcome. Despite the ambivalent relationship between the osce and its Central Asian participating States, and despite the challenges the Organization has faced in dealing with both high and low intensity conflicts in the region, there are some key characteristics that are common across the States:

1. States want to stay in the osce and accept osce principles: No State has broken ties with the osce, but has rather retained some level of cooperation with it.20 This has demonstrated that the Central Asian countries appreciate the importance and the legitimacy the Organization provides. The five countries have not comprehensively and openly contested the principles and values of the Organization. This would have been contrary to the elementary rules of diplomacy. All the more they have been con- scious of the fact that some principles can be used to their own benefit. Namely, the respect for sovereignty and the respect for international

20 Unlike Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, which terminated osce presence on their terrritory in that sequence.

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borders, are principles enshrined in the Decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act, and are certainly to the advantage of the Central Asian States. They tend to act to protect their own systems and do not want to exchange views with their neighbours concerning State borders. Those borders have been demarcated on the basis of the so-called uti possidetis principle upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is correct to conclude that reference to the right to self-determination and human rights would not be to the advantage of most of the Central Asian States. Hence, the regular reference to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, if applied with reference to each and every principle of the so-called decalogue, is inconclusive. Those States that arbitrarily create a hierarchy among the ten principles make an attempt to circle a square. However, they have already been paying a price for this as some countries have taken notice and have reacted by referring to the right to self-determination in order to legitimise their actions. 2. Reduction of the osce role: Beyond values and principles, it is a reflection of the carefully measured reservations of the Central Asian States with respect to the osce that none of them have fully terminated the osce presence on their territory. Instead, they have reduced the full-fledged missions to the osce programme coordinator’s offices. It is the crucial difference between the two that the programme coordinators can only carry out projects that have been approved by the host State’s authorities. Hence, it provides a partial regaining of sovereignty while retaining field presence on its territory. The process has been completed in Kazak- shtan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and more recently during 2017 also in K yrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It was ambiguously announced by then Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov that the reduction of the status from full-fledged mission to programme coordinator’s office was not the end of the road, i.e. complete termination of field presence may occur in the future. 3. osce need for Central Asian States: Bearing in mind the problems the Central Asian States have been facing and the osce’s constant preoccu- pation with those countries, it is not only the osce that provides some limited legitimacy to the regimes that rule Central Asia but also the latter provide legitimacy to the Organization. It is for that reason that there is a balance between the positions of the parties. The osce does not want to lose Central Asia as it is an area where it can demonstrate some of the important activities it carries out and also where it does not face any major European/Euro-Atlantic rival for influence, unlike in the so-called eastern partnership countries.

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4. Demand for participatory approach: The osce may offer a rich variety of its conflict prevention and management tools, ranging from diplomacy in the field to fostering democratisation, through election monitoring, supporting the free media, and respect for human rights. However, the position of then Kazakh Foreign Minister Idrissov gave ample demonstration of the dissatisfaction of his country, similarly to other Central Asian States, summarised as follows: “the Organization should work with the governments of Participating States, not on them”.21 5. The osce spreads too thinly: The activities of the osce, beyond certain commonalities stemming from the shared values, principles and generally the activities of the Organization, is tailored to meet the needs of the individual participating States. This has both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, optimally this results in addressing the primary needs of the participating State. On the other, however, it means that the activities of the osce are scattered, which contributes to lack of focus and low visibility. 6. States seek a non-political role for the osce: The Central Asian States are ready to retain the osce on their territory as long as it acts more like an aid organisation rather than a living reminder of the commitments the States of the region have undertaken upon joining the Organization. This view was reconfirmed more recently at the Astana osce summit in December 2010. The Central Asian participating States, to varying ex- tents, try to divert the attention of the Organization away from matters such as human rights, which would cause them to appear in a bad light. This results in a certain “dislike” in Central Asia for the osce to address human rights. This is partly due to the approach the osce often takes with a focus on individual cases, casuistically and often with less differ- entiation than necessary, be it the arrest of journalists, brutality against human rights activists or abuse of state authority to remove opposition personalities from the political scene.22

21 Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan H.E. Erlan A. Idrissov at the plenary session of the osce Council of Foreign Ministers, 9 December 2016. (Emphasis in the original.) www.mfa.kz/index.php/en/minister-s-blog/17-minister- s-blog/7917-statement-by-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-h- e-erlan-a-idrissov-at-the-plenary-session-of-the-osce-council-of-foreign-ministers Last accessed 3 January 2017. 22 It is suffice to mention the case of Toronto University Ph. D. student, Mr Alexander Sodiqov who was accused of spying and charged with high treason in 2014 in his native Tajikistan. The matter was raised a few times by various osce delegations, with the lead taken by the United States. Following 36 days of arrest, Mr Sodiqov was released although

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7. National vs. transboundary focus: It is a challenge that the field presence of the osce addresses issues of every participating State nationally while many problems are transboundary, if not regional. Some missions have noticed this problem and tried to cross over the national boundaries in issues like water management, rectification of borders and settling border disputes. However, their role has to remain limited due to their man- date and national sensitivities. Thus, it remains the role of missions to feed information into the osce system (participating States and institutions) and hope that the right processes are established on a different level.

6 Main Challenges and the Way Ahead

The osce has been present in Central Asia for more than 20 years. It has been facing the challenges that those States have presented due to their specific development patterns, including a lack of independent statehood and full- fledged democracy until recently. The Tsarist and Soviet civilisational experience modernised Central Asia while the States of the region have remained without a point of reference to go back to as far as good governance is concerned. The osce has made attempts to contribute to the development of the Central Asian countries and overcome this political handicap. However, it has faced a number of objective difficulties as well as the resistance of post-Soviet authoritarian leaders in most Central Asian States. It is impossible to conclude whether the osce has played a contributing role to mitigate the conflicts in the five participating States and between them generally, and if in the affirmative, to what extent. This would require an an- swer to a largely ahistorical question on how Central Asia would have developed without the involvement of the osce (and other players, both States and international institutions). In fact, the osce tried to foster gradual change in various areas. It has been successful to some extent in those participating States, which have built authoritarian rather than dictatorial regimes. In those States, which have retained dictatorial regimes based on personality cult,

not allowed to leave his country. Finally, and another 50 days later, due to unceasing international pressure among others at osce fora and the absurdity of the charges against him, Mr Sodiqov was permitted to return to Canada to continue to pursue his studies. See the Case of Alexander Sodiqov as delivered by u.s. Ambassador Daniel B. Baer to the Permanent Council, Vienna, 24 July 2014. https://osce.usmission.gov/case-of-alexander- sodiqov/ Last accessed 3 January 2017.

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OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 497 the osce continues to “look into the future” and act in a way to allow future generations to have a perspective at the opportune moment. The individual Central Asian participating States have demonstrated their strength and established influence over the osce. It has been their main objective to avoid deep involvement by the osce in their realm of sovereignty, and have, as such, attempted to retain and if possible expand the area in which the osce cannot be present. A number of like-minded extra-regional participating States, certainly including the Russian Federation supported them in their effort. As the osce did not want to lose Central Asia, it was constantly seeking compromises. This has resulted in the erosion of its influence to some extent, however retained some ambiguity as far as its presence and thus, its impact. This has been most clearly demonstrated by the reduction and status change of the osce field presence in Central Asia. The osce has played a limited role in the few acute conflicts that emerged at a rapid pace where state authorities addressed them before international institutions could launch their activities. An internally divided osce does not facilitate its role in a region that is hesitant, if not outright reluctant, to welcome it. Stability has gained priority over change and process over outcome. It is possible to be highly critical of this in the name of some illusions about the role of poorly endowed, consensus based inter-governmental organisations such as the osce. However, such a defeatist attitude does not contribute to continuing the fighting of windmills as Don Quixote did and as the osce often does. Stability in Central Asia has been partly due to oppression, and partly to the handing out of economic benefits, primarily in those States that have enriched themselves from the export of natural resources and energy bearers. In two countries of the region the tragic human consequences of earlier civil wars, internal strife and stalemated revolutions have prevented people from “rocking the boat” again. Stability in the two poorest Central Asian States, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is partly due to this. However, sources of conflict have not been eliminated, causing continuous volatility and unpredictability in Central Asia.

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