security and human rights 27 (2016) 479-497 brill.com/shrs osce Conflict Management in Central Asia Fighting Windmills like Don Quixote Pál Dunay Professor of nato and European Security Issues, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany Abstract Conflicts and their management in Central Asia have never been prioritised by the osce although five states of the region are among its participating states. This has been due to that unlike in some other parts of the post-Soviet space most of the con- flicts did not threaten with military escalation, and the intensity of strategic rivalry is less noticeable in this distant part of the osce area than closer to the heart of E urope. The fact Russia is not a direct party to the conflicts in Central Asia also reduces the interests of many participating states. There was one high intensity conflict in the re- gion, the Tajik civil war that came too early for the osce. Lower intensity conflicts, ranging from border skirmishes, disputes about access to water, violation of rights of national minority groups, rigged elections are monitored and their resolutions are fa- cilitated by the organisation. Some of them, like the 2010 Kyrgyz-Uzbek conflict had such short shelf-life internationally that no consensus-based inter-governmental organisation could have effectively intervened into it. The osce has been successful in conflict management when the party or parties also wanted to break the stale-mate that the Organization could facilitate. Domestic change in some Central Asian states is essential for advancing the osces cooperative security approach. Keywords Central Asia – high intensity conflict – low intensity conflict – civil war – Conflict Prevention Centre – High Commissioner on National Minorities – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan * The views expressed in this article are the authors’. © nhc, 2017 | doi 10.1163/18750230-02703002 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 08:33:46PM via free access <UN> 480 Dunay Introduction This article looks at the limited role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) in conflict prevention and conflict manage- ment in Central Asia. To achieve this, the article will provide (1) an introduc- tory overview of the key security issues within and across the 5 Central Asian States; (2) an analysis of the potential role that osce institutions could play in the region and within individual countries given the nature of the conflict drivers within and among the 5 so called -stan; (3) an analysis of the limited role the osce played in 4 high and low intensity conflicts, highlighting the key challenges the Organization faced with reference to local political agendas and its own institutional limitations; and (4) identifying key characteristics defin- ing the relationship between the osce and Central Asian participating States, drawing on lessons learned from the osce conflict management experience in the region. osce engagement in conflict settlement is rather dependent on the will of the concerned parties. Hence the Organization limited mediating engage- ment in some, but not all, conflict contexts. In fact the osce had to stay out of the conflict in Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 due to the Russian veto to continue the field presence in Georgia. The same is true for Crimea, where the Russian Federation has taken a clear stance by declaring: “for Crimea, we believe the issue has been closed for good. This is a historical decision of the people living on the peninsula and Russia will never discuss the issue with anyone”.1 Under such conditions, it is understandable that the osce as a consensus-based organisation has little to do but stay out of certain con- flicts. In Central Asia it is the character of the conflicts that may prevent the osce from getting involved. Either, they are enduring low intensity conflicts where it is difficult to determine when and under what conditions one should get involved, or the conflict flares up for such a short period of time leaving no time for the osce to become engaged. Beyond the sovereignty based reluctance of some national leaders, it is a matter of the level of persuasion the osce can exercise as a mediating institu- tion. In fact, the means available to the osce, socialisation but practically no conditionality, does not allow it to present a strong alternative compared to some powerful actors, including States and other international agencies. 1 Joint Press Conference with President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras, 27 May 2016. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52024 Last accessed on 22 May 2017. security and humanDownloaded rights from 27 Brill.com10/02/2021 (2016) 479-497 08:33:46PM via free access <UN> OSCE Conflict Management in Central Asia 481 1 Central Asia Today and an Overview of the Security Issues Central Asia is traditionally identified with 5 former republics of the Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, some individuals add Afghanistan to the region so that it does not fall between the Greater Middle East and South Asia. Understandably, this is done in order to associate Central Asia with a neighbour that is internationally better known than any of the 5 States mentioned above and also to provide understanding that the region is adjacent to a major source of insecurity. This could help attract attention and readiness to support and assist the 5 Central Asian States. There is also a “flight from Central Asia”, people leave if they can while it sometimes is identified with backwardness and underdevelopment. The daughter of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev clearly stated: “Geo- graphically, Kazakhstan borders on Central Asia, but it is not a Central Asian country. Ours is a Eurasian State strongly influenced by [European] and West- ern values. Contrary to what certain politicians and journalists assert, we are not another -stan. Saudi Arabia is not our historical landmark: we look to Nor- way, South Korea, and Singapore”.2 The President of the second richest Central Asian State (in terms of per capita gdp) Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimu- hamedov presented his country as having a dual Caspian and Central Asian identity.3 Internationally, Central Asia has a dual identity: as a region of 5 post-Soviet States each being a participating State of the osce, they have some alleged European identity, while they geographically lay behind the Ural mountains and belong to the Asian Group of States in the United Nations. The world tends to forget about the region given that the two main reasons why Central Asia mattered after the collapse of the Soviet Union or later have largely lost their importance. The 2 reasons were as follows: (1) the richness of natural resources and energy bearers; and (2) since 2001, being in close vicinity to Afghanistan. Central Asia, unlike other parts of the former Soviet Union, such as the Caucasus and Ukraine, is not infamous for its conflicts. However, this does 2 Dariga Nazarbayeva, Spetsifika i Perspektivy Politicheskovo Razvitiya Kazakhstana [Pecu- liarity and Prospects of Kazakhstan’s Political Development], 3 December 2003, (emphasis added) http://www.imp.kz/Lists/articles/DispForm.aspx?ID=766 Last accessed on 27 November 2010. 3 Speech by President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov at the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2009. www.turkmenistan.ru/ en/node/8396.html (Last accessed on 22 December 2016.) security and human rights 27 (2016) 479-497 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 08:33:46PM via free access <UN> 482 Dunay not mean that the environment is free of them it only means they are less visible and attract less attention than others in the former Soviet Union. This may be attributed to various factors. It would be simplistic to attribute it to distance. Central Asia is land-locked and quite distant from the West, which continues to have major influence on strategic prioritisation among regions. Short of holding the attention of the leading powers of the world, and the lack of a potential rivalry, conflicts have remained relegated to the backburner in Central Asia. The world can easily live with Central Asian instability and security risks. Central Asia is an interesting laboratory where various layers of security problems coexist. Although I am of the view that most security problems in the region have internal root causes, it is clear that inter-state, transnational and human security problems coexist. There are inter-state rivalries, includ- ing territorial disputes; security problems associated with terrorism; and hu- man security problems, in particular due to the deprivation of individuals’ basic human rights and oppression.4 The problems are exacerbated by the volatility of inter-state relations and the eventual rivalry for leadership that corrodes mutual trust. Hence, whenever there is a security problem there are spill-over effects that stem from the distrust underlying the inter-state relations. However, the great game that characterised the region in the 19th century, in light of the circumstances mentioned above, appears to have come to an end. The West has concluded that Central Asia is simply a “bridge too far” and it is not worth to engage in a geopolitical rivalry with countries much better positioned in the region. In sum, the “great game” of the 19th century may well become “a negative great game” or rather “a little game” in the 21st century where the question is reformulated and asked: which country, if any, is ready to become involved in Central Asian affairs? The conclusion can preliminarily be drawn that Central Asia is left to China and Russia. This means that the Cen- tral Asian countries will be exposed to the strongest external influence by two states that will live happily with their current regimes and will not interfere in order to change it in Central Asia.