Kent Academic Repository Full text document (pdf) Citation for published version Pabst, Adrian (2016) Is Liberal Democracy Sliding into 'Democratic Despotism'? The Political Quarterly, 87 (1). pp. 91-95. ISSN 1467-923X. DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12209 Link to record in KAR https://kar.kent.ac.uk/51548/ Document Version Publisher pdf Copyright & reuse Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. Versions of research The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record. Enquiries For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: [email protected] If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html The Political Quarterly Is Liberal Democracy Sliding into ‘Democratic Despotism’? ADRIAN PABST Abstract Post-democracy and cognate concepts suggest that the postwar period of democratisation has given way to a concentration of power in the hands of small groups that are unrepresen- tative and unaccountable, as exemplified by the rise of multinational corporations and their influence on democratic politics. This article goes further to argue that this does not fully capture the triple threat facing liberal democracy: first, the rise of a new oligarchy that strengthens executive power at the expense of parliament and people; second, the resurgence of populism and demagogy linked to a backlash against technocratic rule and procedural politics; third, the emergence of anarchy associated with the atomisation of society and a weakening of social ties and civic bonds. In consequence, liberal democracy risks sliding into a form of ‘democratic despotism’ that maintains the illusion of free choice while instilling a sense of ‘voluntary servitude’ as conceptualised by Tocqueville. Keywords: liberal democracy, oligarchy, demagogy, anarchy, ‘mixed government’ ated with the atomisation of society and a Introduction weakening of social ties and civic bonds. In SINCE the advent of neoliberalism in the late consequence, liberal democracy risks sliding 1970s, Western democracies have witnessed into a form of ‘democratic despotism’ that a decline in popular political participation maintains the illusion of free choice while and the growing influence of multinational instilling a sense of ‘voluntary servitude’ as corporations. Theorists such as Colin Crouch, conceptualised by Tocqueville. Sheldon Wolin and Peter Mair conceptualise The argument is not that democracy is this development in terms of ‘post-democ- becoming the same as dictatorship, but racy’, the spectre of ‘inverted totalitarianism’ rather that liberal democracy mutates into or the ‘hollowing out’ of democratic politics.1 novel forms of illiberal authoritarianism. A Connecting these concepts is the argument new oligarchy seeks to centralise power, con- that the postwar period of democratisation centrate wealth and manipulate public opin- has given way to a concentration of power ion by using media spin, closing down in the hands of small groups that are unrep- debate and ironing out plurality. Their aim resentative and unaccountable, as exempli- is to entrench a system to which there is fied by the nexus between global firms and supposedly no alternative. Thus the process national governments. whereby democratic rule becomes debased This article contends that the thesis of and even ‘despotic’ encompasses a series of post-democracy does not fully capture the mutations within democracy itself. Among triple threat facing liberal democracy: first, others, these include elected representatives the rise of a new oligarchy that strengthens and governments that act as an interested, executive power at the expense of parliament self-serving party; a corporate capture of the and people; second, the resurgence of pop- state; a collective demobilisation of the citi- ulism and demagogy linked to a backlash zenry; a cult of abstract equality; and empty against technocratic rule and procedural pol- freedom and the conceit that the West’s itics; third, the emergence of anarchy associ- democratic system is the only valid model. © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 1 democratic reasons renders increasingly diffi- A new oligarchy? cult the active representation of the manifest Established liberal democracies as diverse as consensual ‘general will’ of the people as a the USA, the UK, Italy and France are cur- whole. rently characterised by a crisis of representa- The rise of a new oligarchy is not confined tion. Public trust in political institutions is to ruling parties but extends to the entire falling sharply, especially in mainstream executive. Liberal democracy is characterised political parties that have morphed from by the exponential growth of executive legis- mass movements into small elite-dominated lation (often rubber-stamped by a parliamen- organisations (as Dommett discusses else- tary majority beholden to executive writ) where in this issue). Faced with insurgent and the growing power of the judiciary rela- populist movements, party establishments tive to the legislature. Moreover, a new are perceived to defend their own self- supranational class of judges seems unable interest and the interests of their donors to resist the temptation either to aggrandise rather than their voters. The collapse in party its jurisdictional power or to assist the execu- membership, coupled with a long-term tive in imposing uniform laws. And where decline in voter turnout, suggests that the action of judges provides a check on between elections, popular influence on gov- inflated governmental power, it can unwit- erning elites is minimal.2 Moreover, growing tingly foster a litigious culture that privileges numbers of elected representatives are the powerful and wealthy while undermin- professional politicians from ever narrower ing equal access to justice. socio-economic backgrounds who are seen as The lack of accountability and popular neither connecting with ordinary voters, nor participation is compounded by a process of governing in the interest of the majority, nor ‘self-corruption’ whereby an elected execu- addressing the long-term needs of society. tive claims the legitimate authority to exceed This suggests a drift of liberal democracy its own mandate in the face of circumstances toward effective oligarchy, which is manifest which could not be anticipated by that man- in the tendency of democratic representatives date and which the electorate cannot vote to compose an interested party in itself. Typi- on. Recent examples include counter-terrorist cally, political parties in government tend to legislation after 9/11 and the bailout of both act on issues that concern their own factional banks and states. In each case governments support, or else issues that concern the fac- act predominantly in the interest of small tional support of their opponents, which they groups, such as the security services, institu- may address in order to outflank them. But tional investors and global bond markets. governing parties prove relatively impotent Arguably, this represents an oligarchic when it comes to matters that affect the defence of the bases of oligarchic control— whole of national or international society, whether an emergency response to a threat such as the migration crisis, environmental or an opportunity to extend power (or both degradation, poverty, infrastructural invest- at once). Either way, liberal democracy is ment or reforming cartel capitalism. This is compatible with an oligarchy that goes well because, even though the neglect of such beyond the power of global firms—the focus issues is detrimental to each and every one, of the post-democracy thesis. they are rarely the most immediate and press- This oligarchy takes the form of ‘old elites’ ing concern of powerful groups with a vested and ‘new classes’.3 The former include politi- interest. Individually and collectively, citizens cal dynasties and captains of industry, while are therefore subject to ‘the tyranny of small the latter encompass networks such as the choices’, as when we opt to shop in a chain ‘tech oligarchy’ in Silicon Valley, the advo- store for convenience or cheapness, even cates of ‘capitalist philanthropy’ and an though we do not really desire to lose corner array of technocrats in governments—includ- shops and suffer the consequent decline of ing a new managerial armada of accountants local prosperity, solidarity and community and auditors. Both ‘old elites’ and ‘new that this often entails. Paradoxically, the classes’ use the procedures of representative sustaining of a balance of oligarchic interests democracy to increase their power, wealth by representative government for ostensibly and social status. In this process, an unrepre- 2ADRIAN P ABST The Political Quarterly © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015