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The Basis of Despotism Oriental Despotism—A Comparative Study of Total Power by Karl a Wittfogel

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The Basis of Despotism Oriental Despotism—A Comparative Study of Total Power by Karl a Wittfogel THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY November 2, 1957 Book Review The Basis of Despotism Oriental Despotism—A Comparative Study of Total Power by Karl A Wittfogel. Yale University Press, 1957. Pp XDC + 556. Price $7.50 or Ra 37.50. D D Kosambi THE contents of this Impressive, The author, so we are told, ex- settlements located on the coast of beautifully printed and well got perienced the despotism of absolute Thana, south of modern Bombay". up publication with its usual para­ total power at first hand in one of The Manigramam, the Shreni, or phernalia of current American scho­ Hitler's concentration camps. Yett the Vira-Vanunja trading caste In larship leave very much to be de­ there is no analysis of that parti­ India, and the gigantic and really sired. Perhaps the most extra­ cular experience. On pages 143 to powerful Hong merchants' organi­ ordinary feature of this book (and 149, we find that terror and torture sations in China are not allowed to many others like it) Is the pro- are prominent features of oriental disturb the reader's consciousness foundly meaningless terminology, despotism. "It was left to the The Arthaahustra Is quoted (with­ such as the following; hydraulic masters of the Communist appa­ out understanding) several times, civilization; agromanagerial society;' ratus state to reverse the humaniz­ but nothing whatever has been said agrobureaucratic and agrodespotic ing trend and to reintroduce the of the benign rule of Ashoka, just regimes. One can understand the systematic infliction of physical pain after the Arthashastra, Why this function of the fluid in the working for the purpose of extracting 'con­ sudden reversal of despotism in thai of a hydraulic press, a hydraulic lift, fessions' " (p 147). Was there no brief interval of not more than 50 or a hydraulic ram. How it operates torture worth the mention in any years, without any corresponding in a 'hydraulic' society—apart from of the Nazi judicial procedure and" change in Indian hydraulics? Why the fact that human life cannot 'confessions' obtained in Fascist is no mention made of the Chinese exist without water, and that water Italy and Germany, or for that travellers' emphatic account that is not uniformly distributed upon matter third degree methods employ­ under the Guptas (4-5th centuries) the earth's surface—Is not made ed elsewhere (including the 'benign' and Harsha (early 7th century) clear by all the pseudo-scientific rule of the British in India)? The penal legislation was extremely verbiage of the initial chapter. The reason for this rather lopsided em­ mild, labour was not dragooned and one clear statement is that hydrau­ phasis is very simple. The clear and no torture used in the examinations lic states sadly damage the rights imminent danger against which the of witnesses? In a study of 'Ori­ of private property—the ultimate book warns is that of Communism. ental despotism', why is it essential and unforgivable sin. 'Oriental Apparently, Communism is the most to omit periods when the rule struck despotism', as if it were plague or dangerous form of Oriental despot­ all observers as being singularly cholera, succeeded in Infecting ism and total power. Marx, even kindly and unoppressive not only in Rome without benefit of hydraulics. more Engels and Lenin, (so the form, but In fact? How does it The whole performance Is reminis­ author tells us) used all their in­ happen that the laws of the Koman cent of Lewis Carroll's Jabber- tellectual power to disguise the fact .Twelve Tables and the first A the wocky, the more surprising because that they were really introducing hian code were far more draconlc semantics Is so fashionable in the Oriental despotism into the West. thnn under such 'despots', if not USA. It is, therefore, not surprising that because of the right of private pro­ The word 'Oriental' Is sometimes the Chinese, in trying to introduce perty first showing its teeth and used as synonymous with 'Asiatic', Western civilization, mistakenly claws? though frequent references to Egypt, adopted the Soviet system which On page 141, we find the follow­ Mexico, and Peru show that the was really their own Oriental des­ ing: "Lenin defined the dictatorship geographic limits are not essential. potism imposed upon .Russia by of the proletariat—which he held to Nero and Caligula were certainly Lenin! Nehru's India seems (to the be the heart of the Soviet regime more powerful and more despotic author) naively ambivalent. This as 'a power not limited by any than any oriental despot; but neither means that the evil present in the laws'. Like other utterances of they nor Tiberius, with his unspeak­ communist danger has not suffi­ Lenin, this formula combines an able vice and cruelty appear In the ciently impressed itself upon the impressive half-truth with import­ book. Our present author goes so far Indian mind. ant fallacies." The half-truths and also as hydraulic-oriental despotism. The author has hardly considered fallacies derive only from Professor It was, apparently, Introduced by the monsoon worth mentioning as Wittfogel. Lenin was first defining Augustus in Rome, much in the fundamental in Indian 'hydraulic' dictatorship as such and not mere­ same way as smallpox was intro­ society; or, for that matter, caste— ly that of the proletariat. Dictator­ duced by the Spaniards Into Ameri­ which all foreigners from the clas­ ship is precisely rule not bounded ca, and syphilis by the Portuguese sical period to the present day seem by law; and this definition goes back into India. There is no discussion to regard as a peculiar and very im­ to the days of the Roman republic of one undisputably Oriental book portant feature of Indian society. when, In times of emergency, the which praised despots provided they Thana Is mentioned twice but only people and senate agreed to set up did not follow the wrong cult,, and because of a worthless fourth cen­ a dictator whose orders would be which gained tremendous autllority tury Nepali legend about its mer­ obeyed for a specified period without as well as circulation In the West chant guild. Sopara is, in the question as to their legality. Such —the Old Testament. author's geography, "one of several dictatorship cannot possibly be 1417 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY November 2, 1957 written off as Oriental infection of to deprive them. The Athenian lengths. Cicero's oration against the truly unhydraulle Roman mind. naval commander in the same war, Verres shows how a patrician could Similarly, on page 447: "The Themistocles, had similar designs strip a province unhindered. The Second Industrial Revolution, which at Athens, but escaped in time to case was won by the provincials, we are now experiencing, is per­ serve the Persian despot as provin­ without restitution of the loot or petuating the principle of a multi- cial governor, without any further punishment for Verres. That model centered society through large qualms about the loss of his ineff­ lover of liberty, Brutus, tanned bureaucratized complexes that mu­ able liberty. money to a tributary Asian king at. tually—and laterally—check each What is the tap-root of despotism? 48 per cent annually compound Interest. He asked Cicero to call other: most importantly( Big Gov­ Marx noted that the Asian states ernment, Big Business, Big Agri­ performed a considerable economic out thu nearest Roman army, to culture, and Big Labour, But the function In development and con­ collect payment on the debt. The destruction of one major nongovern­ trol of irrigation; but that the solid emperors, with their paid civil ser­ mental complex may bring about foundation of Asiatic despotism vice of freemen and slavey, at least the downfall of others. Under Fas­ was furnished by the passive, un­ restricted the robbery to loss in cism and National Socialism, the resisting stratum of producers In tolerable limits; they held the bal­ liquidation of Big Labour so streng­ the virtually self-contained, stag- ance of power between looter and thened Big Government that event­ nant villages, whose produce did not looted. The progressive deification ually Big Business and Big Agri­ become a commodity till It reached of the Roman emperors had its culture were also threatened. And the hands of the state. There is basis in the need to minimize the in Soviet Russia the liquidation of no esoteric doctrine here about hy­ use of force, always a costly pro­ Big Business and Big Agriculture draulics and 'statism'. It might be positi onf during expropriation. The quickly enabled Big Government suggested that the passive, unresist­ last remnants of Republican pret­ to subdue labour." This might ralfle ing stratum of Indian peasants in ence were dropped by the emperor a dangerous question: the respon­ Latin America has something to do. Diocletian because the structure of sibility of Big Business and Big with the constant resurgence of the state no longer corresponded to Agriculture in helping fascism sup­ tyrannical dictator-presidents like 'such fictions. The 'Roman' legions press Big Labour, The author hast­ TruJillo. If such a despot has any ha-d to be recruited primarily from ens to bypass it in a footnote: "Mos­ other prop, it Is neither the water barbarians near the frontiers. The cow's role in Hitler's rise to power supply, nor communist Instigation, Italian heartland whose free, small­ is a similarly neglected Issue". No but some foreign company capita­ holding, peasant citizenry had been' mention of Thyssen or Krupp; nor lized in the land of free enterprise eaten up by the latifundta of the of the unfailing Western support of and liberty for the stockholders. patricians could supply neither sol- diers nor officers.
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