Department of Informatics and Media

Master’s Programme in Social Sciences,

Digital Media and Society specialization

Two-year Master’s Thesis

Alternative media in Diving into the pool of ’ attitudes

Student: Avgustina Zaimi Supervisor: Johan Lindell

May 2021

Abstract

This thesis aimed at examining, in the middle of an intense sociopolitical crisis in the Greek landscape, how young users of alternative media in Greece reflect on traditional media, how they view alternative media and how they use them in order to mobilize, engage politically and acquire types of oppositional knowledge. In-depth interviews on Greek millennials indicated a cognitive-driven relationship to mainstream media while a generic tendency towards alternative media was noticed, however, accompanied by a critical stance. Political participation was present on both offline and online versions, with an apparent inclination to online types through e-petitions and expressive forms of action, such as content sharing and posts on social media. Oppositional types of knowledge were identified through the millennials’ responses, though, with a presence of reservedness and critique. The shift towards alternative media depicted the emergence of a concrete digital familiarization of Greek millennials who seriously engage to sociopolitical issues and at the same time preserve their doubts as far as credibility or objectivity of news is concerned. Future research could be conducted focusing on the content analysis of alternative media news platforms. Therefore, micro-organizational aspects, such as agenda-setting and news production along with ethical lines that are followed, would enrich the picture of alternative media landscape in Greece and maybe provide the motivation to examine the aforementioned conditions in other media systems, as well.

Acknowledgements

Having completed this precious journey, I would like to, first and foremost, thank all the professors and coordinators of Uppsala University who shared their knowledge with utter devotion and zeal. A special thank you to my supervisor, Johan Lindell, who was supportive with his excellent and always on point feedback. A sweet thanks to all the friends who were there for me, especially during days that were even darker than my dark circles. Lastly, the biggest thank you to my parents who always believed in me when I didn’t myself.

Contents ...... 0 1.Introduction ...... 1 1.1. A general idea- subject of the thesis-research questions ...... 1 1.2. Structure of the thesis ...... 3 2.The Greek media system: Mistrust in a flawed media system ...... 4 2.1. The polarized pluralist media system ...... 4 2.1.1. The rope of ‘rousfeti’ ...... 5 2.1.2. Media ownership ...... 6 2.1.3. Media control ...... 7 2.2. A wave of crisis ...... 9 2.3. Issues of trust ...... 12 2.3.1. Trust in Greek traditional media ...... 13 2.4. Alternative media as a ‘rhizome’ ...... 14 3.Previous research ...... 16 3.1. The importance of internet media for alternative voices ...... 16 3.2. Factors of media trust ...... 17 3.3. Participation and oppositional knowledge ...... 19 3.4. Millennials, digital media use, political engagement and field contribution ...... 21 4. Theoretical framework ...... 23 4.1. Alternative media ...... 23 4.1.1. Alternative media through classic sociological theories ...... 23 4.1.2. Defining alternative media ...... 24 4.1.3. Digital alternative media ...... 26 4.2. Political participation ...... 28 4.2.1. Conceptualizing political participation ...... 28 4.2.2. E-participation ...... 30 4.3. Oppositional knowledge ...... 31 4.3.1. Counterdiscourses ...... 32 4.3.2. The conceptualization of oppositional knowledge ...... 33 5.Methods ...... 35 5.1. Qualitative research method...... 35 5.2.1. Epistemological assumptions ...... 36 5.3. Research design ...... 37

5.3.1. In-depth interviews ...... 37 5.3.2. Sample and demographics ...... 38 5.3.3. Interview practicalities ...... 39 5.3.4. Interview questions ...... 40 5.4 Data analysis ...... 41 5.4.1. Qualitative content analysis and coding ...... 41 5.4.2. Issues of credibility ...... 42 5.5. Ethical considerations ...... 42 6.Results and analysis ...... 44 6.1. Reflections on mainstream media by millennials ...... 44 6.1.1. Thoughts and trust by millennials on mainstream media ...... 44 6.1.2. Consumption of mainstream media by millennials ...... 47 6.2. Views of millennials on Greek alternative media ...... 48 6.2.1. Reflections on representatives of Greek alternative media ...... 48 6.2.2. Opinions and trust of millennials on Greek alternative media ...... 52 6.3. Political participation of millennials through Greek alternative media ...... 56 6.4. Oppositional knowledge through Greek alternative media ...... 59 7.Conclusions, limitations and future research ...... 64 REFERENCES ...... 67 Appendix ...... 77

1.Introduction

1.1. A general idea- subject of the thesis-research questions

In a middle of a pandemic which had already brought unprecedented changes in people’s lives especially during 2020, the Greek society was also going under an intense sociopolitical crisis. Emotions of despair, agony, and real curiosity were prevailing about when the strict measurements of an ostensibly endless lockdown would come to an end. On top of that, the last weeks of March 2021 were characterized by extraordinary police brutality towards citizens. However, what made the situation worse was not just the actions, but also the representation of them by mainstream media. It was the 7th of March when the ΣΚΑΙ (SKAI) channel published a report concerning assaults towards police officers by 30 random people in the district of Nea Smyrni in . At the same time and while mainstream media overflowed their agendas with this reporting and within that particular frame, it was alternative media of ‘Press Project’ which released audiovisual content, depicting that in reality, the ones who were assaulting people, were the police officers. Two days later, and while the atmosphere in the Greek capital was still intense, a video was again released by alternative media platforms, such as ‘Press Project’ and ‘Imerodromos.gr’ showing various police officers shouting ‘Let’s go kill them’ (meaning citizens) while mainstream media tampered with the evidence and instead the phrase was represented as ‘They are going to kill him’ in an attempt to mean that citizens are going to kill an officer and not the opposite. A related incident with audiovisual interferences by mainstream media took place in 11th of March, concerning a video captured by a journalist during a violent university evacuation in . The video was broadcasted in the news of SKAI channel without the sound while at the same time the reporters alleged that the person who was capturing the moment was a police officer. However, alternative media such as ‘Press Project’ had already shared the authentic content, including the sound where the audience could hear that the journalist was begging not to hurt him. The next day, on the 12th of March 2021 in his speech in front of the parliament, the Greek prime minister stated that ‘Social media are bad for democracy’. These were some of the few incidents which took place in the Greek society in spring 2021, and the list could go on. Going back just a few years, someone can easily notice that based on the research of ‘Pew Corporation’ in spring 20171,

1 Retrieved from: https://www.efsyn.gr/tehnes/media/136869_sto-nadir-i-axiopistia-ton-ellinikon-mme

1 among 38 countries, Greece’s scored the lowest place in all variables of trust.2 The following years of 2018 and 2019 did not really differ as far as trust is concerned.3 Considering the aforementioned incidents, the lowest places are not very shocking.

On the contrary, alternative media in Greece are conceptualized differently. As argued by Dahlgren, Sparks (1992) and Fiske (1992) alternative news differ from the mainstream ones not only in the selection of the events that are sought to be reported, but also the way that the selection is made, subsequently repressing against the system’s corruption. This kind of counterhegemonic alternative practice is formed and carefully preserved from the least micro- level of producers until the macro-level, society (Holt et al., 2019). In that way, citizen engage themselves politically within a specific frame of oppositional discourse, a mediated counterpower space towards mainstream media and state hegemony. The subsequent corollary is a formation of alternative, heterogenous voices and a partially differentiated political knowledge, due to the fact that in this case, citizens are opposed to the existent practices of mass media. Therefore, the knowledge that is triggered is oppositional, referring to ‘knowledge about facts and concepts that form critical attitudes towards the dominant power’ (Lee, 2015, p.321). Considering the previous events and the media crisis that has emerged, the aim of this thesis is to examine how young users of alternative media in Greece reflect on traditional media, how they view alternative media and how they use them in order to mobilize and engage politically.

Taking into account the aforementioned analysis, the scope of the specific study is expressed in four research questions:

1. How do young users of alternative media in Greece reflect on mainstream media practices?

2. How do young Greek users of alternative media view alternative media?

2 The variables are 4: Impartiality (18%), news about governmental leaders (25%), precision (22%) and cover of important events (42%) in contrast to Tanzania’s 83%, 89%, 93% and 92%, respectively. Link for more info here: https://www.efsyn.gr/tehnes/media/136869_sto-nadir-i-axiopistia-ton-ellinikon-mme 3 Check surveys such as the ‘Digital News Report’ of Reuters Institute (2018) or Kalogeropoulos, Suiter, Udris & Eisenegger (2019). Access here: https://www.dianeosis.org/2019/06/digital-news-report-2019/ Kalogeropoulos, A., Suiter, J., Udris, L., & Eisenegger, M. (2019). News media trust and news consumption: Factors related to trust in news in 35 countries. International Journal of Communication, 13, 22

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3. What are the ways that young participate politically through alternative media?

4. What are the forms of oppositional knowledge that are gained by young Greeks through the consumption of alternative media?

1.2. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided in seven chapters. The first one is the introductory one, in which the depiction of the latest events in the Greek sociopolitical landscape, the scope of the thesis and the research questions are sought to be presented. The second chapter will analyze the Greek media system in a historical perspective along with its special traits, in order to assimilate adequately why alternative media emerged and developed in a ‘rhizomatic’ perspective. The third one will present previous research concerning issues of trust and political stances, such as political participation and oppositional knowledge, in order to relate them to the scope of the current thesis, along with studies on millennials and a meta-analysis in order to be led to the field contribution by the current thesis. In addition, the fourth section will elaborate on theoretical models, such as alternative media, political participation, and oppositional knowledge, in order for a sufficient understanding of the subject to be formed. The fifth section will introduce the research procedure and the methods that were followed, while the sixth one will present the results and analysis of it. Lastly, in the seventh chapter conclusion will be raised, along with limitations and future research proposals.

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2.The Greek media system: Mistrust in a flawed media system

In this chapter the Greek media landscape is sought to be analyzed in a historical perspective. In that way, a complete depiction of the mainstream media status will be provided, in order for the emergence of alternative media to be sufficiently conceptualized. For that reason, in the first part the notion of the polarized pluralist model is analyzed along with its respective features. In addition, the critical period of crisis (mainly from 2008 and onwards) in relation to media is sought to be touched upon, while the third part will elaborate on issues of media trust. Lastly, the fourth section will shortly stress the emergence of alternative media in the Greek landscape through the notion of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s ‘rhizome’ in order to explicate the way that they are framed in Greek society.

2.1. The polarized pluralist media system

In order to assimilate adequately how the alternative media emerged, it is of considerable significance to examine Greece’s media system, which belongs to the polarized pluralist or Mediterranean model. As it has been contended, ‘the media in the Mediterranean countries are relatively strongly politicized, and political parallelism is relatively high’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.98). Therefore, the specific model which concerns various countries, such as Italy, Spain or Portugal, shares a number of characteristics which become the differentiating point from the rest of the central, western, and northern Europe (Papathanassopoulos, 2007), such as political parallelism, politicization of the media system and the role of the Church in media (Hallin and Mancini, 2012). Countries like the previous ones, have been through authoritarian regimes, with democratic institutions having been established quite late in the modern history.

However, the situation did not really change through the transition of Greece’s regime to democracy. It is important to take into account not only the factor of time, but also the alterations of social and political structures. Consequently, the media ground could not develop independently because Greece’s economic conditions and cultural characteristics, influenced its progress and formed a specific sociopolitical sphere (Gallimore 1983, Hiebert, Ungurait and Bohn 1982). Also, as Hallin and Mancini argue (2004), ‘the late, uneven and conflictual development of liberal institutions in Southern Europe is fundamental to understanding the development of the media in this region’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.128). Because not only

4 did the regime of authoritarianism lead to isolation, but it also contributed to the image that was built in the context of the European ground (Papatheodorou and Manchin, 2003). What happened next, though, is not – as it was previously mentioned- ideal. The fall of the regime did not become the spot of instant prosperity, nor media detached themselves from the old practices, and despite efforts towards politico-economic modernization, patronage channels continue to boost their own webs in Mediterranean cultures throughout official and state power (Kenny, 1968). Consequently, mainstream media, as a place ‘where a shared agenda is set, the distribution of opinion is mapped, and the decision-making process is legitimized’ (Tsfati and Peri, 2006, p.168) were established within the Greek landscape as a bearer of socio-politically interest-driven practices. Undoubtedly the situation has been definitely impacting people’s media trust and consumption habits, by the time that and adherence to old practices are omnipresent in many ways. The next parts explicate basic traits of the structure and function of the Greek media system.

2.1.1. The rope of ‘rousfeti’

‘Rousfeti’ in Greek stands for clientelism. Clientelist relationships exist to some degree in all modern societies (Legg, 1975). In Greece, rousfeti is usually practiced basically within the political environment, with politicians promising public recruitments as an exchange for the votes that they win. 4 As a result, the market is also characterized by relations of pure interest and unworthiness. As a consequence, ‘under the table’ deals were made with people who were not necessarily capable of receiving the specific vocation. However, the specific tactic is not just present on the grounds of politics, but lies on the channels of media, as well. Thus, clientelism became an unavoidable part of politics, economics, media, and other aspects of social lifestyle, giving the impression that only if you have the ‘proper people’ by your side, shall you achieve your goals.

4Another frequent environment where ‘rousfeti’ flourishes is the army, with people being positioned to the place of their preference after the agency of a person in power.

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2.1.2. Media ownership

Before proceeding to the analysis of media ownership status in Greece, it is of considerable significance to briefly mention the representative tv channels, newspapers and stations which belong to the Greek mainstream media sphere. To begin with, as far as tv channels are concerned, the ground is ‘controlled’ mainly by the privatized ‘Ant1’, ‘SKAI’, ‘STAR’, ‘ALPHA’ and ‘Open’ which are sought to be further discussed later in the chapter. ‘ERT’ is the representative state-owned channel which does not really follow the ‘line’ of the aforementioned channels, and that is going to be figured out in the forthcoming chapters. Newspapers such as ‘’, ‘’, ‘’ and ‘’ are the main newspapers which form the Greek mainstream Press ground. It can be said that radio stations are slightly more independent, even though respective stations from tv channels are present, such as ‘SKAI FM’ or ‘ALPHA FM’. Magazines are also quite independent from the sphere of the mainstream, following their own agenda. However, the general picture reveals a strongly structured mainstream media sphere, which is built on highly politicized foundations, privatizations and is preserved by respective norms.

It is known that in Greece a significant part of the Greek tv channel belongs to businessmen, shipowners, and other distinguished people of socioeconomic and -subsequently- political prestige. To begin with, the tv channels and radio stations of ‘Alpha’ and ‘Star’ belong 100% to the family of Vardinogiannis. Vardis Vardinogiannis is a billionaire businessman, with a main activity in shipping and oil industry. Furthermore, the owner of the ‘ΣΚΑΪ’ (SKAI) channel and respective radio is -since the start- Giannis Alafouzos, a Greek businessman and shipowner. On the other hand, the Greek tv landscape welcomed a new channel, that of ‘OPEN’, owned by Ivan Savvidis, a Russian Georgian and businessman who is according to sources one of the wealthiest men in Russia, and also a previous member of the Russian parliament. Last but not least, the channel of ‘Ant1’, founded by Minos Kyriakou and now administrated by his son, Theodore. Minos was a Greek media and shipping owner, while at the same time he was involved in the oil trading and airplane industry. It is worth mentioning that all TV stations do not have permanent licenses for their transmission, but just temporary ones which are renewed by the respective government. It was , the left-wing party who created a political campaign against the aforementioned practices with the hope that the media landscape would become less oligarchic, but the attempts broke down.

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The structure is, therefore, stronger than it seems to be and as Papathanassopoulos (1999) has aptly supported: ‘Greek media owners want to have the upper hand in order to put pressure on politicians because of the huge financial interests... This pressure is useful when fighting for government contracts, very important due to the structure of Greek economy’ (p.399). Furthermore, all public systems are at some point subject to political influence (Etzioni-Halevy, 1987), and it is a subsequent phenomenon especially in the Greek media landscape if someone takes into account the absolute ownership of various media by businessmen who will -apparently- get engaged in politics for the sake of their interests. A generic consequence of this media market or -so to speak- industrialization of the media landscape encouraged -respectively- the development of media control, not only in the content of news, but also in the practice of the journalistic profession. It is important, then, to keep in mind that people who trust and consume Greek mainstream media are from that moment receivers of framed news based on the media ‘company’s’ interests. Nonetheless, someone would say that journalists could simply remain unbiased within their profession’s practices, so that people would read, hear, and watch objective news as much as possible. In the following chapter the reason why the previous expectation cannot be fulfilled is analyzed.

2.1.3. Media control

Traits of media control are omnipresent and tied to political parallelism, and as Hallin and Mancini (2004) state about countries of the southern Europe, the media are highly politicized and dependent on the parties. Hanitzsch (2011) also argues that the growing significance of economic and technological imperatives has led to a situation where the autonomy of journalists is challenged by external forces. This does also occur in the Greek media system, for example the press, with newspapers representing specific political orientations, based on their interests. Such a close connection between the press and party politics has given rise to an ethos far removed from principles such as ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’ that guided journalistic practices elsewhere (Papatheodorou and Manchin, 2003). In theory, Greek journalists believe that journalism should be neutral, objective, and independent from political and social powers, performing a watchdog function (Papathanassopoulos, 2001), but is there a real chance of this happening? Things are apparently not bright when interests are pulling the strings and national newspapers remain mostly under the control of distinguished families with exclusive action

7 and ties to specific political leaders. 5 In other words, while neutrality or objectivity is supposed to refer to political pluralism and fairplay, in daily practice political neutrality is (or is forced to be) abandoned for the political position of their news organization (Konstantinidou, 1992). Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) aptly argue that in Greece the news but also the judgements of editorials are in accord with announcements of the government and its policies.

It is of considerable significance to underline that when asked whether journalists act freely in their professional environment nowadays or the opposite, 7.9% of Greek journalists said they exercise their profession freely, 65.7% stated that they were subject to intervention, and 24.3% that they censored themselves (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002). It is undoubtedly a complex and sensitive subject to express an opinion on whether someone can easily become a part of the censored 24.3%, as it is questionable whether a Greek journalist can stand above ownership influences, since his or her views can hardly be independent from his or her paper’s ‘line’ (Komninou, 1996). Moreover, newspapers have sought to promote, at times with fanatic zeal, political party practices and discourses that have often had little relevance to actual issues emerging in the social sphere (Papatheodorou and Manchin, 2003). Characteristically, based on the ‘Digital News Report’ of the Reuters Institute, which was published in 2019, it is only 32% of the Greeks which stated that the news that are presented through the mass media are of public interest.6 But this is not a random fact. As, it was previously mentioned, economically powerful people with interests in shipping, telecommunication, and oil industries control media, and a long tradition of using them as a way of pressure on politicians continues (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002). A representative example of the press sector is that of ‘Lambrakis Press Group S.A’ which is literally a media company. Administered by Christos Lambrakis, the specific press group has played a noticeable role in the Greek media landscape, and politics, mainly through the publishments of the right-wing ‘To Vima’ and ‘Ta Nea’ newspapers.7

The monopolist status in the press ground encourages once more the service of distinguished interests and the attempts of covering up powerful people’s possible improper -so to speak-

5 Up until the early 1980s, four such families controlled over 50 percent of the newspaper market (Leandros, 1992)

6The diagram of the research depicts the results in an interesting comparison to Finland, which was the country with the highest levels of traditional media trust in 2019. Link here: https://www.dianeosis.org/2019/06/digital-news-report-2019/

7 The company also owns the radio station ‘Vima FM’ and Cosmopolitan, Vita and MarieClaire magazines.

8 actions. Therefore, the selectivity as far as the news is concerned is not an unexpected nor a shocking phenomenon, when considering that the relative people/organizations/political party ‘need to be protected’. Whether or not, it was just 39% of the Greek sample in the Digital News Report of 2019 which believed that traditional media do practice critique towards politicians and businessmen.8 In any case, Greek journalism has always represented and defended the interests of the parties to which is linked, confirming the point of Herbert Altschull (1997, p.259) that ‘the content of the news media inevitably reflects the interests of those who pay the bills’. (see also Papathanassopoulos, 2001).

2.2. A wave of crisis

The landscape of traditional media which had been established in the context of a concrete and not easily altered polarised motive (mainly referring from 2008 and onwards) was characterised by a wave of multifaceted upheavals, with Greece entering a period of severe economic crisis, and consequent politics of austerity. The country was, at that time, led by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement ‘PASOK’ and ‘New Democracy’, which were the two main electoral magnates of the country until 2015, when the left-wing ‘SYRIZA’ of , was inaugurated as the government of the country. All of the previous governments came across various financial straits, and soon the financial crisis became a crisis of multiple levels (Ferra, 2016). The media landscape, as a space which was inextricably linked to the political environment, came into a phase of constant disturbances, as well.

The first peak of those disturbances was reached through the events of ‘December 2008’. It was 6th of December 2008 when a police officer shot Alexis Grigoropoulos, a 15-year-old boy in Exarcheia district in Athens. What followed were massive demonstrations of youngsters and activists who overflowed the roads of Athens. Meanwhile, a significant cyber-landscape which contributed to the unity and information spread of the activists was ‘Athens Indymedia’, a grassroot media organization. In contradiction to alternative media, mainstream ones were constantly attempting to blur the lines and equivocate 9. Possibly the inadequate and selective presentation of news by mainstream media gave rise to ‘Indymedia’s role in uncovering the

8 In comparison to Finland’s 51% Link here: https://www.dianeosis.org/2019/06/digital-news-report-2019/ 9 It is surprising the fact that even 9 years after the incident, tv channel ‘SKAI’ presented the murder of Alexis as ‘death’.

9 details of that shooting and also helping demonstrators mobilise and communicate in the riots that followed’ (Baboulias, 2013).10 Undoubtedly, people’s mobilizations brought many corollaries in their life, altered the way that media represented the news (Galis and Neumayer, 2016) and at the same time revealed all the pathogenies that the Greek state was suffering from.

However, Alexi’s case was just one of the many. Another worth mentioning event which reflected the intense control of the media system in Greece was the shutdown of the (only) state-owned broadcaster ‘ERT’ (ΕΡΤ) in 2013 by the conservative parties of PASOK and New Democracy. It is important, though, to recall the conditions of corruption and profit-oriented political tactics that were taking place between the state and the media. ‘ERT’ was there as a politically neutral force of communication, and therefore automatically an ‘enemy’ of the privatized media market.

The shutdown of the channel incited the dudgeon of people not only nationally, with the belgian tv channel ‘Tele Bruxelles’ broadcasting the logo of ERT along with the word ‘solidarite’ (solidarity), in contradiction to the government’s spokesperson who characteristically stated that ERT was the ‘shelter of garbage’.11. ‘The overall picture is that private economic interests have achieved significant control over the public sphere in Greece under politically privileged and economically unhealthy terms’ (Nikolaidis, 2019). 12 The channel actually reopened in 2015 by the government of Alexis Tsipras, but in any case, ‘the abrupt closure of the public broadcaster ERT in 2013 further damaged pluralism in Greek journalism, for ERT was the only broadcaster – in a market dominated by unlicensed commercial channels – with a legal obligation to provide objective, unbiased news’ (Iosifidis and Boucas, 2015, p.2), and this is sought to be stressed in the following part, as well.

On a broader level of political perspective, the Greek landscape revealed a highly homogenized media content, which consequently led to neoliberal practices but also a constant attack by the

10 The government even proceeded to shutting down the website in 2013.

11 At the same time, though, the media debt had risen up to more than 24 million euros of unpaid taxes during the periods of 2011 to 2014, according to Nikolaidis (2019). 12This is not the first time a medium was shut down without concrete explanations. It was March 2001 when 70 radio stations were shut down in Athens. The government claimed the transmitters were interfering with operations at the new airport, which was scheduled to open on March 29, 2001 (Sims, 2003) but the reasons reflected once again interests of distinguished and powerful radio stations. Sims, J. R. (2003). Politicians and media owners in Greek radio: Pluralism as diaplokí. Journal of Radio Studies, 10(2), 202-215.

10 left-wing and movements. Representative examples of this were ‘the newspapers To Vima and Kathimerini, central and right positioned respectively, which both share a distinctly ideological narrative that depoliticises the crisis by neutralizing its systemic character’ (Nikolaidis, 2019). However, the mutual accusations from one party to another did not have an end. Greece’s economic status was characterized by a constant drawdown and by summer of 2015 the prime minister of SYRIZA Alexis Tsipras declared the actualization of a referendum on the 5th of July, so that the Greek citizens would decide whether the country should accept the bailout conditions given by the European Commission. The atmosphere was already intense and became even more through the news cover by mainstream media. Characteristically, the previous ones were accused of practicing the tactic of fearmongering and also of bias in favor of the vote ‘yes’. Such a stand and intimidation is a logical outcome if someone considers the current shift towards the formation of a strong political elite supported by neoliberal basements and apparently tied to various economic activities in Europe.

The privatized mainstream media could not be absent, let alone silent. One of the most representative tactics of bias on behalf of the mainstream media was the time that each of the channels devoted to the decision of ‘yes’ (‘we stay in Europe’) and ‘no’ (We do not accept the measures’). Characteristically, Nikolaidis reports that ‘in two well-known Facebook posts that went viral, content analysis of revealed the striking imbalance of coverage of the rallies for the no and the yes votes; the coverage strongly favored the latter’ (Nikolaidis, 2019, see also Petropoulos, 2015). Characteristically and according to alfavita.gr website, the channels of ‘SKAI’, ‘MEGA’ (which had been shut down due to bankruptcy and reopened by the businessman Vagelis Marinakis in 2019), ‘ANT1’, ‘ALPHA’ and ‘STAR’ spared not more than 5 minutes in total about the demonstration in favor of the ‘no’ answer. In contrast, 42 minutes were devoted in favor of the ‘yes’. The difference was made only by the state-owned ‘ERT’ which devoted the same amount of time (4 and a half minutes) for each side. The previous stand did not pass unnoticed. Thus, nine journalists of the private tv channels were referred to the disciplinary board by the Athenian union of journalists and were given punishments.

As Nikolaidis has also argued, ‘although mainstream Greek journalism sustained and reproduced the hegemonic neoliberal agenda’ (Nikolaidis, 2019, see also Doudaki 2015 and Mylonas, 2014), at the same time a countertendency was slowly flourishing: the emergence of a multilevel alternative media system, which was mainly active online. Therefore, alternative media in the Greek landscape were formed under the light of anti-austerity groups -given the

11 sociopolitical and economic conditions-, connected communities, independent websites but also digital radio stations. ‘As a whole, this field represents key features of citizen journalism and includes an active tradition of open publishing’ (Nikolaidis, 2019). ‘A long-standing challenge for alternative media is to assemble a common ground, working together across differences, to enhance their capacity of challenging hegemony’ (Vatikiotis and Milioni, 2019, p.4221), which is what in a generic perspective was attempted in the media landscape of Greece, from 2008 and onwards.

2.3. Issues of trust

At this point, it is of great significance to stress the issue of trust as far as the mainstream media is concerned. Trust is necessary both socially and individually (Delhey & Newton, 2003). Mass media, as the ‘fourth’ power, are preserved in an environment where traits of control rule the system, based always on political and economic interests. Furthermore, the emergence of alternative media has significantly changed the way that journalism is perceived and, on many occasions has even made professional journalists question their own actions within the fuzzy boundaries between what has been called ‘citizen journalism’ and professional journalism (Deuze, 2007; Carlson and Lewis, 2015).

However, taking into account the aforementioned analysis about the current situation of the Greek media landscape, it is significant to touch upon the issue of trust on traditional media first and foremost, in order to acquire the adequate background and proceed to research on alternative ones. Trust as a subject of extended research does not have an agreed definition. However, as noted by Kiousis (2001) and Kohring and Matthes (2007) in the literature, the terms trust and credibility can be used interchangeably and findings in relation to news media specifically and media generally may be also entwined (Fisher, 2016). Research has been also conducted concerning trust on media credibility13, source credibility14 and message credibility in order for a distinction to be formed. On the other hand, the aforementioned distinctions may lack a variety of spectrums (Sundar, 2015) however in this study the term will acquire the meaning of credibility of news deriving from the respective media. Therefore, the sources

13 An interesting survey was conducted by Roper Organization (1969, 1975) on behalf of the US Television Information Office (Fisher, 2016) 14 A relative research was conducted this time by Yale Communication Research Programme m (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951) in their attempt to underline the role of individual communicators.

12 which were collected conceptualize trust with the same way, meaning that the questions related to trust concern the credibility of news that derive from alternative media platforms, in an attempt to underline how media themselves affect the specific variable.

2.3.1. Trust in Greek traditional media

The annual research conducted by the ‘Digital News Report’ of the Reuters Institute in 2018 and spread to 37 countries indicated that the trust level on Greek traditional media was very low. Based on the survey, it was just the 26% of the questioned sample which stated that ‘they trust the news most of the times’ (Dianeosis, 2018), positioning the country in the lowest place between the scores of the 37 countries, with an exception of south Korea.15 In an attempt to give an ostensive depiction of the trust on tv channels and newspapers, the sample in a rank from 0 to 10 (0= not trust5.49, respectively trust) showed a trust of 5.99 on ‘Kathimerini’ newspaper and of 5.73 on the newspaper ‘To Vima’, while the trust on the tv channels ‘Alpha’ and ‘SKAI’ was 5.86 and 5.49 ,respectively (Dianeosis, 2018).

It is apparent that the level of trust is low in all the aforementioned media, and it would be interesting to slightly recall some of the events that shook the Greek population that year. It is on the 23rd of July where a massive fire breaks out in Mati, a district of , leaving behind 100 deaths but also outbreaks and attacks by the privatized media against the left-wing government. Another event was the shocking and public murder of Zak Kostopoulos in the neighborhood of Exarcheia in Athens by a businessman and police officers. For a long time, the mass media were claiming that the man was a drug addict and attempted to harm and rob, but eventually the toxicological examinations proved them wrong. Both of these examples are just a personal line of thought concerning the way that media reacted during critical circumstances and maybe a justification of why the trust level of mainstream media scored a low percentage that year. Furthermore, in the context of the same survey the following year of 2019 some extra interesting variables were added. For instance, it was just 32% of the sample which stated that traditional media cover issues that are of public interest, while only 9% supports that the media do not cover the news in a very negative hue (Dianeosis, 2019). These findings depict the discomfort of Greek citizens towards the elitist and neoliberal structure of

15 In the first place come both Finland and Portugal, with a percentage of 62%.

13 mass media, and- if I want to take the thought a step further- a possible urge to change their ‘media diet’ habits by turning their attention to alternative media outlets.

2.4. Alternative media as a ‘rhizome’

The Internet has, as ‘in so many sectors, revolutionized the way journalism gets done, altering the processes of newsgathering, storage, editing, and distribution’ (Zelizer, 2009, p.150). This means that the landscape of media production is on a path of constant rearrangements, with anyone capable of creating content instead of just consuming it. As far as the Greek landscape is concerned, within the severe conditions of economic crisis and the consequent low trust of the Greek people on mainstream media, grassroots organizations and self-organized groups of the media landscape were starting to form new journalistic models, which consisted the main Greek landscape of alternative media (Nikolaidis, 2019). Therefore, it is understood that in the context of organizational principles (Greek) alternative media followed the normatives of collective organization (Sandoval and Fuchs, 2010) without being supported by political actors or owned by businesspeople while at the same time they were characterized by non-commercial financing structures. Their economic independence implied respectively the presence of criticism not only towards the governments and its flaws, but also towards capitalism. Prominent examples are ‘Efimerida Syntakton’, ‘Εφημερίδα Συντακτών’ (EfSyn) which is also available online, ‘Indymedia’ and the ‘Press Project’. The new wave of differentiated practices and alternative methods can be adequately explicated through Deleuze’s and Guattari’s ‘rhizome’ metaphor.16 In botanology or dendrology, a rhizome is a customized plant which is able to send out roots from its nodes. At the same motive, alternative media in Greece appeared as a form of multifaceted roots which emerged in favor of a real pluralism which lacked for decades. The rhizomatic approach was also studied and analyzed by Carpentier, who aptly stated that if we examine alternative media as a rhizome, then the connection of “different types of organizations, social movements and struggles” (Carpentier, 2016, p.5) in the context of civil society is formed. On a broader level, Milioni (2012) supports that alternative media in Greece are those particular media which aim at ‘privileging the powerless and the marginal

16The notion of ‘rhizome’ derives from the Greek word ‘rhiza’, which means ‘root’.

14 and offering a perspective from below’ (Harcup, 2012, p.77). This aspect reflects an important impact of alternative media, which is sought to be stressed later in the text.

However, what is also important at this moment, is to acknowledge the limitation of what is meant in this case by ‘alternative’ or counterhegemonic character. For example, the exploitation of digital platforms by the Nazi and -now declared as a criminal organization- party (Kompatsiaris and Mylonas, 2015) is not going to be a part of the current research, due to the fact that the main ground of alternative media is covered by grassroots syndicalism and left-wing organizations (Nikolaidis, 2019), and therefore the extreme right perspective of alternativeness is sought to be excluded. Extreme right’s ‘fight ‘against corruption was composed of neonazi practices, which doesn’t really reflect the desired conceptualization of the ‘rhizome’ in this thesis. ‘A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and social struggles’ (Deleuze and Guattari,1987, p.7), and these connections are built mainly within the environment of the left as far as Greece’s media landscape is concerned. Consequently, having shortly explicated the emergence of alternative media in Greece, the following chapter will touch upon previous research that have been completed on alternative media in the context of trust and political stances.

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3.Previous research

Alternative media, due to their emergence during the last decades, have become a subject of research on a multidisciplinary level. John Downing speaks of alternative media as radical media (Sandoval and Fuchs, 2010) that ‘express an alternative vision to hegemonic politics, priorities, and perspectives’ (Downing, 2001, p.5). Therefore, it is exactly that multifaceted vision which breeds the necessity to touch upon a variety of spectrums in order for an adequate depiction of alternative media to sink in. In essence, the specific chapter is divided in four main parts. In the first one, previous research will be utilized in order to underline -first and foremost- the essence of alternative and mainstream media in the context of news consumption and the attitudes of the citizens. The second section will stress out factors of media trust, while the third one will touch upon issues of participation and oppositional knowledge. Lastly, the fourth part will touch upon a meta-analysis on digital media use, young engagement, and the field contribution of the thesis.

3.1. The importance of internet media for alternative voices

The media tends to set a reference point for its consumers and organizes everyday events into a discernible idea or storyline (Entman, 2007) and therefore it is of great significance to delve into the specific ground in order to assimilate the differentiating points between alternative and mainstream ones. The examination of media trust is sought to be done based on the credibility of the media itself and for that reason the following studies concern the importance of internet media as bearers of predetermined values.

To begin with, an interesting study which was conducted by Gainous, Abbott and Wagner in 2018 concerned traditional and internet media in Malaysia and the way that trust is affected by the medium. The researchers refer to alternative media as internet media, due to the fact that in the specific country the Internet’s role is important, creating a new space for dissident information to be disseminated but also for political organization to challenge the status quo (Gainous et al. 2015 and Howard, 2011).

Thus, trust in the medium became the hot spot of the issue and also defined citizens’ stances between pro-democratic inclinations and the opposite. For this research, the authors conducted

16 a survey 17 whose results show that Malaysia’s citizens who trust alternative media will be most likely related to inclination to protest, in contradiction to those who trust traditional ones. Also, the authors contend that consumption is intertwined with the notion of trust, meaning that citizens who consume alternative media will possibly trust them and have a specific stance towards protest and democracy. In this case, what is sought to be explicated is that ‘the influence of any communication platform is affected by the environment in which it operates’ (Gainous, et al., 2019, p.402) and the fact that it was digital alternative media which created an environment of protest inclinations in contradiction to mainstream media that supported the state’s (semi-authoritarian) regime. Thence, ‘in closed, and even semi-authoritarian, states such as Malaysia, the Internet (including social media) is often the only place for opposition- centered media to thrive’ (Gainous et al., 2019, p.401).

Here the Internet creates a new space for counterpower information to be distributed so that political emergent structures can fight against sociopolitical inequalities (Gainous et al. 2015, Howard 2011). It can possibly, then, be implied that alternative media in countries of excessive media control, such as Malaysia, are valued due to their ground of free expression Therefore, the medium is, indeed, a message as McLuhan (1964) argues and values that are attributed to it are highly connected to the ideological stances of each side of media.

3.2. Factors of media trust

In this section, media trust factors are sought to be stressed in the context of previous research. In essence, the goal was to achieve firstly a general presentation of what affects trust, and more specifically what applies to young people, considering that the thesis concerns Greek millennials.

‘Recently, trust in news has been in the midst of a public discussion about democracy in many countries’ (Kalogeropoulos, Suiter, Udris and Eisenegger, 2019, p.3674). But what affects trust on media? Having conducted a research study in the US, Lee (2010) supports that trust in government is a factor of considerable significance when it comes to people’s trust on media. Consequently, ‘political ideology, partisanship, and trust in government affect media trust’ (Lee, 2010, p.8). On the other hand, those who sympathize with political groups, social protests

17 1 The data and replication code are available on the Political Behavior Dataverse page https://dataverse. harvard.edu/dataverse/polbehavior ((Gainous, Abbott and Wagner, 2019).

17 or public affairs tend to perceive media as being unfair or even hostile (Fernandez-Planells, 2015).18

Another similar finding on an international scope is that of Tsfati and Ariely (2014) whose survey -between 44 countries19- shows that ‘levels of political interest, interpersonal trust and exposure to television news and newspapers are positively correlated with trust in media, while education and exposure to news on the Internet are negatively associated’ (Tsfati and Ariely, 2014, p.760), meaning that frequent exposure to specific media, lead to trust or mistrust on them. It is important, though, to stress that ‘when other motivations are present, trust in the media becomes less relevant’ (Capella & Tsfati, 2005, p. 254), arguing that the willingness to be motivated and understand the world is something which exceeds the factor of trust on media. Therefore, someone who mistrusts media may still consume them in order to acquire a ‘cognitive orientation’ (Levy, 1977).

Demographic factors such as age and gender have been also studied, but the results are considerably divergent. The most relative research through which Greek young audiences have been studied in relation to media trust factors is that of Macek, Mackova, Pavlopoulos, Kalmus, Elavsky and Serek (2018). Specifically, among the three countries under research20,they found that trust in alternative media is substantially affected by age only in the case of Greek millennials, where the odds for trust increase especially for the young adults (age 18 to 25).

Nevertheless, a relativist landscape of trust by Greek millennials on alternative media is still present and probably attributed to the fact that ‘alternative media is still quite a new and culturally unstable phenomenon; and that young people do not have fully crystallized understandings of it’ (Macek et al., 2018, p.351). Nonetheless, ‘the existent status of professional media distrust may indicate that Greek millennials do not only oppose to the first ones, but also utilize the latter ones for the broadening of their agenda’ (Macek et al., 2018, p.351).

19 However, Greece is not included in the list of the surveyed countries. 20 Czech Republic, Estonia, and Greece

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3.3. Participation and oppositional knowledge

The previous section referred to factors as far as media trust is concerned, indicating that regardless of the relativist context, age or political stances play a significant role and while the field of political communication research has broadly dealt with the mainstream or social media environment21, in this case the previous research ought to concern the sphere of digital alternative media.

To begin with, the first notion which is sought to be stressed is political participation. This type of participation; because of the internet emergence; has been formed through an altered environment of both online and offline versions, as Gibson and Cantijoch (2013) support. In addition, Hirzalla and Van Zoonen (2011) have also showed that the digitalized grounds have created the model of e-participation’. In essence, ‘the new type of e-participation research derives from the assumption that online activities form a new type of participatory engagement and proceeded to testing their mobilizing effects at the individual level’ (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013, p.701, see also Bimber 2001, Hooghe, Marien, and Quintelier, 2010). Therefore, Gibson’s and Cantijoch’s (2013) research became an adequate explication of how digital environments can host types of e-participation and how people can utilize digital media for the purpose of political participation.

Gibson’s and Cantijoch’s research was conducted through a survey on the U.K population, designed to measure both offline and online political participation and including 13 e-political activities. The results depicted the existence of a multidimensional structure of participation, with specific modes which attribute to offline and online activity. The authors categorize the activity based on participation and passive engagement. For example, variables such as e- voting, signing an e-petition or donating online belong to the list of participatory online activity, while reading online newspapers or forwarding political content are listed on the passive engagement category, according to the authors. In that way, there was an attempt to discover the hidden layers of e-participation in the context of digital alternative media, noticing that the specific literature involved mainly social media for the purpose of e-participation identification. The attempt to connect e-participation with alternative media consumption possibly brings to surface the fact that various forms of communication, such as civic

19 journalism, can renew the links between individuals and their community or reveal alternative forms of participation (McLeod, Scheufele and Moy, 1999).

Another research on political participation in relation to alternative media was conducted in the United States between December 2013 and March 2014 by Ardevol-Abreu, Hooker and Gil de Zuniga (2018). Based on the survey, results showed that ‘trust in alternative media predict a tendency to create news’ (Abreu et al., 2018, p.611) and respectively that ‘news production is a possible indicator of both online and offline participation’ (Abreu et al., 2018, p.611). The variables that were utilized are considerably similar to the aforementioned distinctions of modes (online-offline participation). For example, for the measurement of the offline participation, questions such as ‘donations to political organizations’ or ‘protest- demonstrations’ were utilized, whereas for the online one, questions such as ‘creation of online petition’ or ‘online volunteering’ were used. In essence, their research is a representative example of the positive impact that citizen news production has on political participation, both online and offline (Ardevol-Abreu et al., 2018). Relative to the aforementioned study is also that of Shen, Xia and Skoric (2020), who attempted to measure the acquisition of political information and online participation through alternative media in Hong Kong. Questions such as ‘reading an online alternative newspaper’ or ‘posting about organizational matters’ were used for the previous purposes, respectively, with the findings supporting both of the hypotheses. Consequently, acquisition of political information from alternative media leads to online and offline social movement participation (Shen et al.,2020).22

Additionally, oppositional knowledge, as a significant spectrum in this thesis, has to be stressed in the context of the previous research. The main one is that of Lee (2015) who attempted to show that internet alternative media consumption relates positively to oppositional knowledge which is mainly the formation of concepts that come to oppose to traditional and corrupted politics of the media but also the system. Furthermore, according to the author, oppositional knowledge also mediates the impact of Internet alternative media on support for a planned civil disobedience campaign and general protest participation (Lee, 2015), which certainly relates to modes of political participation. Nonetheless, political participation becomes quite fluid when referring to millennials. Therefore, studies specifically on them are sought to be presented

22 It is surprising the fact that roughly 75 million Americans (approximately 37% of adults) went online to get political information during the election season, with 20 million estimated to have gone online daily to monitor political developments up through Election Day (Rainie, Cornfield, & Horrigan, 2005).

20 in order for an adequate depiction of their political stance to be created and the field contribution to be explicated.

3.4. Millennials, digital media use, political engagement and field contribution

Millennials have been usually represented as indifferent to politics (see Buckingham, 2008), distanced from any societal issues. However, generations like that of millennials but also the future ones have significantly embedded digital media and networks in their everyday life. As a result, the Internet has not only offered scopes of entertainment as it is usually forwarded, but also alternative and digital ways of political participation (Bakker and de Vreese, 2011). Quintelier and Vissers (2008) have argued that online news consumption positively relates to political participation among young people. Additionally, Verba and Brady (as it was aforementioned) have stressed the emergence of forms of political participation within the digital environment and this is a fact that concerns young people significantly. Political activities like visiting political blogs, ‘followings’ on social media and other networks, participation on forums, searches of political information and electronic petitions are actions that have been heavenly noticed on younger people (Bakker and de Vreese, 2011) implying the presence of what was previously stressed as ‘e-participation’.

Alternative and Internet news media in general have also influenced millennials’ political orientation and engagement, and as Caprini (2004) notes, ‘as one of several socializing agents, the media provide much of the ‘raw material’ that make up social and political beliefs, attitudes, and schema’ (p. 408). Given the fact that the Internet creates a space of polyphony and heterogenous voices, ‘many young people now claim to receive most of the political news and information from online sources’ (Briggs, 2016, p.95) in an attempt to share ideas and communicate with people of aligned political positions. and As Cucoato and Waetcher argue, there should be no exaggeration of the power potential of the web for engaging the millennials in politics, because from their (millennials’) point of view, the Internet is a tool in order to show their political aspirations.

As far as the relationship between online and offline political participation is concerned, Hardy and Scheufele (2005) support a parallelism, meaning that if young people are engaged offline politically, then online participation is possible to appear. Online political participation is, therefore, certainly undertaken by young people, but it also depends on how much they participate politically offline (Briggs, 2016). Nevertheless, ‘with participatory approaches

21 growing in community, non-government, and even corporate sectors, millennials have tended to turn away from government-led initiatives toward other public spaces and actors’ (Pruitt, 2017, p.510), creating a voice of opposition towards what seems to be interest-driven and corrupted. In that way and according to Collin (2015), young people in their attempt to be taken politically seriously engage with online sites that are not ‘controlled’ by governmental policies. Public spaces and initiatives seem to be an alternative and widely chosen path through which young people support their views against elitism and traditional politics (Collin, 2015).

An interesting meta-analysis has been conducted by Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) and it is a summary of 106 surveys about digital media use, millennials, and engagement in political life. Young people are being considerably shaped and influenced by technology, sometimes in ways that dramatic changes in their attitudes and behaviors can be seen (Boulianne and Theocharis, 2018), so being at a stage where the level of political engagement and action is ductile, findings like these are possible to ‘foreshadow’ how technology shape them politically, not only in the present, but in older ages as well (Jenkins et al., 2016). A significant point of the meta-analysis contends that there is a strong relationship between forms of online and offline engagements, and this may attribute to the fact that young people have been open to new and alternative types of participation in political life (Lee et al., 2013). Overall, Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) argue that digital media have a positive role to play in civic life, with online activities serving ‘as a gateway’ (p.123).

The specific research is of considerable significance because it estimates the effects of digital media on millennials in particular. The previous research did also underline significant spectrums which concern the scope of this thesis. However, there is a common ground which at the same time works as a research gap in the specific study, and that is the fact that most of the previous research have been examined through quantitative data collection and respective analyses. Specifically, while there is a variety of qualitative studies on young people and news consumption (Lindell and Sartoretto,2018; Buckingham,2000), there is still a gap in qualitative studies on millennials and in relation to alternative media, especially in countries outside the US or Europe. Consequently, what is sought to be achieved in this case, is to reflect on young Greek citizens through in-depth interviews. In this way, valuable information which is usually lost through statistical correlations is sought to be retrieved, in order to reveal the untold parts of interviews.

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4. Theoretical framework

4.1. Alternative media

Alternative media are one of the main notions of this thesis. It is therefore significant to proceed to a thorough analysis in order to become as adequate as possible for the purposes of the thesis. The first section stresses alternative media in the context of classic sociological theories, while the second one provides an attempt of definition based on contemporary theoretical frameworks in order to assimilate the way that alternative media were touched upon throughout time by different theoretical perspectives. Lastly, the third section lies on digital alternative media and their emancipatory character in society.

4.1.1. Alternative media through classic sociological theories

Alternative media regardless of their loose character are conceptually linked to various traditional theoretical models. For example, marxist and critical commentators have argued that the mass media play a strategic role in reinforcing dominant social norms and values that legitimize the social system (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982) and at the same time that alternative media may be considered as offering radical, anti-capitalist relations of production often coupled to projects of ideological disturbance and rupture (Atton, 2002; 2001). However, this ‘alternative space’ is not one-faceted. Instead, it may concern heterogenous spaces, for example art, literary media but also electronic forms of communication and at this point, maybe Foucault’s insurrection of the subjugated knowledge as a form of truth/knowledge hidden by the system (Foucault, 1980) can be stressed in order to underline what is aspired through different perspectives of alternative media.23

The different voices that are able to reveal the previous knowledge are directly connected to the final product of their actions, a ‘heteroglossic text’ as Buckingham and Sefton-Green (1996) have aptly argued, which in essence is a text consisting of different ‘languages’ that give the space of reaction against the ‘mainstream’ as ‘native informants’ (Spivak, 1988). In addition, the Frankfurt School seems to have also supported the idea of alternative press

23 For more, check here: https://theoria.art-zoo.com/a-lecture-michel-foucault/ which is a transcript by a lecture of Foucault in Paris, 1976 about the ‘subjugated knowledge’.

23 through Adorno’s argument that the culture industry is built in a way that media cannot be challenged nor utilized by oppositional forces. Also, in ‘The Dialectic of Enlightenment’, Horkheimer and Adorno oppose to mass media culture by arguing that the power of consumer’s imagination and spontaneity are not ‘allowed’ to get used, because the products themselves already provide the messages (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1997). In essence, they assert that the current culture industry restricts people to criticise and think for the sake of the reigning order. This probably makes someone recall Althusser’s (1970) ‘ideological state apparatuses’ theory, through which the State creates repressive mechanisms in order to rule and control all classes. In a few words, and as Hall put it in his attempt to enhance Althusser’s previous conceptualization, it requires cultural institutions such as the media, trade unions, political parties, etc., which are not directly linked with production as such, but which have the crucial function of "cultivating" labour of a certain moral and cultural kind-that which the modern capitalist mode of production requires (Hall,1985).

On the other hand, in an attempt to oppose to the context of mainstream media, Enzensberger (1976) argued that the emancipatory media are characterized by an interaction between the content providers and the audiences, a concern about societal issues and a production which may refer to everyone and not elites or distinguished people, while Williams (1980) supported that a model of alternative voices is the one which includes different forms of production, organization, and interrelations between actors of the media. At this point, based on the aforementioned theories, alternative media have acquired the role of a possible redeemer which allows people to raise their stances, even if they have dissimilar ideological perspectives. Therefore, considering of what Kellner (1997) also argued and partially opposing to what Horkheimer and Adorno supported, media may indeed be a force of the current capitalist society, which can either enhance the current dominant relations, or provide a space of change and democratization.

4.1.2. Defining alternative media

Having stressed various traditional theories on media and the perspectives on alternative ones, it is crucial to proceed to a definition of what the latter ones are. Alternative media have been existing in society’s various corners for decades. ‘If you have blogged, vlogged, or moblogged, read a fanzine of a new band- online or in print, admired a piece of colorful graffiti on a grim

24 urban or subway train, taken a picture on your mobile at a demonstration or street event and sent it to friends, been interviewed on a student radio station, or contributed to a student newspaper, then you had an encounter of some kind with alternative media’ (Dowmunt, Coyer and Fountain, 2007, p.1). Throughout the twentieth century small presses, alternative and underground newspapers met difficulties when it came to divergent points of view and cultural choices and their successes did not last for long (Lievrouw, 2011; 2013; 2014) mainly due to their lack of economic power against the capitalized media markets. Even so and given the aforementioned statements, how can alternative media be defined?

The apparent looseness in defining terms in this field has led some critics to argue that there can be no meaningful definition of the term ‘alternative media’ (Abel, 1997), but it is of great significance to pass through some interesting conceptualizations that have been attempted. For example, O’Sullivan (1994) introduced the notion of ‘radical’ change as a main goal of the ‘alternative’ media, meaning that they ‘avowedly reject or challenge established and institutionalized politics, in the sense that they all advocate change in society, or at least a critical reassessment of traditional values’ (O’Sullivan, 1994, p.205). In that sense, alternative media are positioned within a democratized frame as far as the process of production is concerned, with a commitment to innovate and alter the existent practices. It is important to bear in mind that many alternative media scholars point out that alternative media differ from mainstream media in regard to their organization principles, arguing that participatory, collective organization, horizontal structures, and non-commercial financing characterize alternative media (Sandoval and Fuchs, 2010).

Through these alternative motives it can be said that new organizational patterns are formed in such a way that practices that were once prevailing do not have any power. These new practices and the general transcendence from plain content consumption to content production and provision has created a model of ‘community media’ (Atton, 2001), in the sense that participation plays a vital role with anyone becoming part of a united voice.24 ‘Powerful groups and individuals have privileged and routine entry into the news itself and to the manner and the means of its production’ (Glasgow University Media Group, 1980, p.114). Therefore, alternative media become the means of equal access and action based on the community’s rules. As Atton contends, ‘this means developing media to encourage and normalize such access,

24 An interesting analysis on community alternative media in the early 1970 in Britain can be read in Atton’s article ‘Approaching Alternative Media: Theory and Methodology’ (2001).

25 where working people, sexual minorities, trade unions, protest groups – people of low status’ (Atton, 2002, p.11) which possibly echoes Foucault’s subjugated knowledge (Atton, 2002; 2001). Atton’s position is therefore conceptualized in a sociological context.

It can be argued that alternative media can be defined as counterpower media which are opposed to the capitalist mainstream media not only in perspectives of production, but also of organizational principles. Therefore, the aforementioned media become a powerful tool with the discourse they ‘bear’ (Milioni, 2012), because they ‘seek to redress [. . .] an imbalance of media power in mainstream media, which results in the marginalisation (at worst, the demonisation) of certain social and cultural groups and movements’ (Atton, 2007, p.18). Combining in a sense the aforementioned arguments, the aim of alternative media is to change towards a more equitable social, cultural and economic whole in which the individual is not reduced to an object or a person who just consumes but is able to find fulfillment as a total human being (Traber,1985), especially when hegemonic mainstream media become the source of societal oppression. That oppression and disgruntlement was sought to be shown, as it was previously stated, through small presses and other types of alternative activities. Lack of resources, though, led many of them to cultural margins.

4.1.3. Digital alternative media

The marginalization of alternative media would considerably become milder, especially after the emancipation of the web 2.0. Over the last three decades, the proliferation and convergence of networked media and information technologies have helped generate a renaissance of new genres and modes of communication and have redefined people’s engagement with media (Lievrouw, 2011). Castells in his ‘network society’ theory argues that the internet frees users to construct their own information sets, limiting the role of plain editors of news (Castells, 2011). The emerging information and communication technologies (ICTs) have shown that communities are formed not only in geographically defined spaces, but also in cyberspace (Lievrouw, 2011).

Therefore, Atton’s ‘community media’ model transcends to an online/virtual version, which forms a decentralized space of action. Sometimes it is precisely the essence of community and unity itself, according to Castells, where he characteristically describes the community as a self-defined network of interactive communication organized around a shared interest or

26 purpose, although sometimes communication becomes the goal (Castells, 1996). In other words, alternative media are oriented towards a community, regardless of its exact nature, for example defined geographically, spatially, or otherwise (Bailey et. al., 2008) and although there have been attempts by mainstream media to create an audience of participation (Livingstone and Lunt 1994, Mc Nair et. al., 2003 and Carpentier, 2003), alternative media have succeeded more in participation provision, both online and offline (Girard 1992; Downing et. al., 2001 and Rodriguez, 2001). Therefore, ‘alternative media can be seen as dispersed specialized places that are tailored to particular groups, and that engender social integration by serving particular rather than collective needs’ (Tsfati and Peri, 2006, p.168). On the contrary, mainstream media are defined ‘as communication channels that target the largest possible share of the public’ (Tsfati and Peri, 2006, p.168), establishing norms and precepts that are supposed to be followed due to the mainstream media ‘legitimization’. Nonetheless, even though Dahlgren (2009) has argued about the adaptation to cyber-spaces by mainstream media, it is digital alternative media which are more present through their formed communities and critical stances towards the news (Dahlgren, 2009).

The network established by the Independent Media Centres - Indymedia (www.indymedia.org) - is the most extensive and well-known of the online alternative news services (Palton and Deuze, 2003) and the basic model on which it is based is fundamentally different from and incompatible with profit-based corporate news organizations (Dahlgren, 2009). Other representative examples of digital alternative news organizations are Wikinews.org and Mediachannel.org. As far as the Greek alternative media landscape is concerned, Athens Indymedia and Press Project are two of the main alternative news organizations, both with a considerable dose of criticism towards mainstream media and the state’s issues.

Ramonet (2011) in his book ‘The explosion of journalism’ talks about the ideal emergence of a ‘fifth25 power’ (p.73), whose role would be the criticism of state and media corruption. That power, according to Ramonet, derives from the internet and its possibilities to reduce the oppression and marginalization of the social class. Taking that argument a step further, digital alternative media may be that fifth power that comes to oppose inequalities of all aspects. For example, Wikileaks, a citizen news organization platform founded by Julian Assange in 2006 is another example of non-professional writers who opposed to practices of mainstream media

25 Also check his book ‘Le cinquieme pouvoir’, Le Monde diplomatique, October 2003

27 and journalism.26 In a few words, digital alternative media have provided a considerable ground of participation of the cyber community, with the capability of expression. Participatory media approaches stress that democratic media potentials can be realized by opening up access to media production (Sandoval and Fuchs, 2010) and that is what defines the digitalization of alternative media and why it differs from mainstream media, even if the latter ones attempt to virtualize their presence, if not hybridize it. Participation, though, is a broad notion which concerns various spectrums, and one of them is the political, which is directly linked to media.

4.2. Political participation

The issue of political participation has received a great deal of attention in recent years from academics, journalists, and politicians across most liberal democracies (Li and Marsh, 2008), characterized by multidimensionality and continuous expansion (Van Deth, 2014). Media among other factors provide the space in which people collect political information and subsequently form a respective political identity. Theoretical explanations highlight both the media’s direct role in providing citizens with information about the political process as well as its indirect role in fostering attitudes and resources, such as political knowledge and trust (Corrigall-Brown et al, 2014). It was Alexis de Tocqueville (1988) who noted that “Only a newspaper can put the same thought at the same time before a thousand readers” (p.517). However, in the twenty-first century, a similar claim holds true for television, radio, and the Internet, which provide information to millions of viewers and listeners across the globe (Leeson, 2008). Actually, the more that the internet takes off, the more speculation and hot air arises concerning its political consequences (Norris and Jones, 1998). Therefore, political participation is sought to be defined and analyzed in order to respectively examine in which ways alternative media rouse that kind of engagement.

4.2.1. Conceptualizing political participation

Huntington and Nelson (1976) have argued that ‘the concept of political participation is nothing more than an umbrella concept which accommodates very different forms of action constituting

26 In Ramonet’s book ‘L’explosion du journalisme. Des médias de masse à la masse de médias’ (2011) there are interesting cases concerning Wikileaks and the way that mass media and the state reacted (pages 110-144).

28 differentiated phenomena, and for which it is necessary to look for explanations of different nature’ (p.14). Brady (1997) utilized a quite broad definition of what political participation is, by stressing it as ‘any activity of ordinary citizens with the aim of influencing the political outcomes’ (p.737). However, as much abstract and loose a concept it may be, there is a definition whose view has been held by most large participation studies to date (Teorell et. al., 2007), and that is of Verba and Nie (1972) who argued that ‘political participation concentrates on activities aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take’ (Verba and Nie, 1972, p.2, quoted in Van Deth et al., 2007, p.335).

In essence, political participation is conceptualized as a behavior designed to affect the choice of governmental personnel and/or policies (Conge, 1988). Nevertheless, returning to what Verba and Nie argued, it is significant to mention that they excluded passive forms, civil disobedience and political violence, efforts to change or maintain the structure of government, behavior outside the sphere of government, behavior mobilized by the government, and unintended political outcomes (Conge,1988). For that reason, and in order for civil disobedience and political violence to be included as forms of political participation, authors such as Barnes and Kaase (1979) proceeded to the extension of the concept, from the simple factor of Verba’s and Nie’s voting to a wider range of extrainstitutional forms of political action such as strikes and demonstrations (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013). In a few words, they attempted to further the theory by explicating the notion of ‘protest potential’.27

Taking a step even further, theorists such as Bean (1991), Parry, Moyser and Day (1992) ‘lowered’ the level into non-mainstream behavioral styles, from marching or boycotting products to more radical and violent actions. Undoubtedly the issue can follow an unlimited path of categorization, with various non-institutional political behaviors being included in the schema. At the same time, it is logical that oppositional stances have and will continue to be raised. For example, the range of ‘passive involvement’, such as attending a ceremony or activity, keeping up with politics through attention to news or discussion of them has been a spot of arguments on whether it is a form of political participation or not. At the same time, ‘expressive’ forms of participation, such as verbal and nonverbal speech, sending letters to

27 Conge (1988) for the term of ‘protest potential’ uses the definition stressed by Barnes, Kaase et al.: "the individual propensity to engage in unconventional forms of political behavior as a means of political redress, namely . . . the use of such tactics as petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, rent or tax strikes, unofficial industrial strikes, occupation of buildings, blocking of traffic, damage to property, and personal violence’’(p.242).

29 newspapers or attending a political rally (Boyle, 2006, Scheufele 2001, Stanyer 2005) are conceptualized as ‘softer’ forms of political engagement. On the other hand, Hamlin, and Jennings (2011) have settled a stricter use of the term, referring to the previous acts as forms of political behavior rather than participation. It is significant, though, to mention that ‘political’ is not a monofaceted concept and, as Mouffe argued, ‘the political cannot be restricted to a certain type of institution or envisaged as constituting a specific sphere or level of society...it must be conceived as a dimension that is inherent to every human society and that determined our ontological condition’ (Mouffe, 1997, p.3).

Therefore, the respective participation concerns different parts of societal life and also different activities. That is probably why the concept remains quite broad. Nonetheless, taking into account traditional models like that of ‘public sphere’28 (Habermas,1974), political participation has undoubtedly become a tool of public opinion establishment (Carpentier, 2011). Hence, accepting Habermas’ thesis that the advent of the mass media brought along a “re-feudalization” of the public sphere (Serra et al., 2014), some authors (Dahlgren and Sparks, 1997) saw the internet as a bearer of a new public space (Ferry and Wolton, 1998), which eventually allows the emergence of a ‘virtual democracy’ (Scheer, 1994) and alternative new ways of living (Dertouzos, 1997). On the other side, and according to Putnam, the media — particularly TV but also the Internet — have helped decrease stocks of social capital, and the willingness among citizens to engage in political activities (Christensen, 2011). Nevertheless, the attention to internet’s role as far as the evolution of political participation’s conceptualization has been minimal (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013), probably because most of the relative studies were conducted before the ‘eruption’ of the digital era

4.2.2. E-participation

The emergence of the web 2.0 brought up problematizations about whether political participation can be contextualized independently within the virtual space. Theorists such as Schlozman, Brandy and Verba leave a ground for further discussions about types of political engagement as a factor of political behavior through the web. In fact, in a recent work, Schlozman and his colleagues refers to the political activity within network sites or blogs as

28 Habermas’s first definition of the public sphere: “By the ‘public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens” (Habermas, 1974)

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‘participatory forms’ that differ from mainstream types of offline activity (Schlozman, Verba and Brandy, 2012). Thus, it would not be illogical to support that alternative media as a part of the network society may trigger forms of political participation. As scholars engaged in the study of social movements or alternative media have shown (Fenton and Berrasi,2011), it has been argued that discourses and various practices of communication are significant for the creation of political groups (Atton, 2002; Downing, 2001). Studies (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier, 2010) which have an explicit approach, usually begin with a reference to ‘Internet participation’ which ‘they treat as a unidimensional mode of engagement that fits within the wider spectrum of the new and extrainstitutional modes of political engagement that have emerged over the past two decades, such as boycotting and petition signing’ (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013, p.703), while other approaches have proceeded to the identification of other actions, such as e-mailing a politician or donating money in order to examine the effects on offline behavior (Anduiza, Gallego and Cantijoch, 2010 et al.).

Nevertheless, factors which somehow constitute a mix between offline and online political participation have been identified by Hirzalla and Van Zoonen (2011), for example the forward of an e-mail, e-petitions, and the general engagement online, which create a form of ‘internet- expressive’ participation, similar to the ‘low-soft’ versions of offline participation. However, it is argued that online expressive activity is arguably more influential and public than its offline counterpart (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013). Maybe the authors support the previous statement due to the unlimited time-space of the web and the possibilities of interconnectivity. Digital media are undoubtedly an important part of people’s social activity, and even though they do not introduce utter new forms of political participation, Krueger’s work has showed that they enhance specific behaviours that constitute actions of such participation. Hestres (2013) also argues about ‘how Internet has also become a critical conduit of freedom of expression, particularly in democratic societies… and this relationship seems especially strong among young people (p.1266).

4.3. Oppositional knowledge

‘Oppositional knowledge is knowledge about facts and concepts that are instrumental in the formation of critical attitudes toward dominant power and generating support for or actual participation in oppositional actions’ (Lee, 2015, p.318). Oppositional knowledge does not rely

31 exclusively on alternative media. Mainstream media have also become a provider of critical coverage and related discourses. However, as Harlow and Johnson (2011) have also argued, mainstream media coverage does not meet the level of alternative media counterpower. In another media system (like the liberal) the relationship of mainstream media with the citizens would become more idealized, with the media enhancing the voice of the oppressed. However, in the context of the pluralist polarized system, oppositional knowledge is emitted through alternative media news (Lee, 2015). In the following section, an analysis of the ‘counterdiscourses’ notion is sought to be firstly given, in order to take into account the channels through which oppositional knowledge is formed. In addition, a definition of oppositional knowledge will be provided, based on Lee’s theoretical model, along with the types of it.

4.3.1. Counterdiscourses

Oppositional or counter discourses are social responses to cultural and political obstacles (Coy, Woehrle and Maney, 2008), and in order to change the dominant discourses of policy, an organized movement is needed, according to the previous authors, to provide the citizen with altered ways of participation in writing and talking. In that way, discourses produced by united people will come out to make sense of the world. That also means that the road to social change includes the public engagement in the processes of discourses (Muhlhausler and Peace, 2006). As Mouffe (1997) has argued, the current political locus is a subject which lies between the interface of social actors and counterdiscourses of alternative media.

Subsequently, alternative media become spaces where people create communities which aim at fighting against corruption. Counterdiscourses are in this case the main tool in order for valid interpretations of sociopolitical inequalities to be provided. Those interpretations are present even more in the web space, where online groups and movements constitute perhaps what is most interesting now about oppositional, subcultural activities at work within the context of the Internet (Kahn and Kellner, 2005). Fuchs (2010) has also argued about the content provision by alternative media and the conflictual landscape between the state-owned and hierarchical mainstream media and the independent, nondominant discourses of alternative ones. Oppositional discourses bring up oppositional minds, and internet alternative media use can lead to the acquisition of oppositional knowledge instead of more traditional forms of typical political knowledge (Lee, 2015). As Coy, Woehrle and Maney (2008) argued, ‘it is in

32 the discourse about what should be the normative framework for organising society that the process of persuasion takes place’ (p.5).

4.3.2. The conceptualization of oppositional knowledge

Alternative media provide citizens with an alternative mindset that leads to the fact that an oppositional power is created. Conceptually, oppositional knowledge, as it was previously stressed, refers to knowledge about facts and concepts that are instrumental in the formation of critical attitudes toward dominant power and generating support for or actual participation in oppositional actions (Lee, 2015). Specific types of knowledge, concerning information about scandals and other social issues can come together and form critical attitudes. This is probably why most of the authoritarian states29 censor practices of the media to put aside information that would cause attitudes which challenge their legitimacy (Stockmann, 2013). Therefore, many states try to stave off the creation of oppositional knowledge, the ‘articulated social and cultural criticism which are coupled with alternative viewpoints’ (Coy, Woehrle and Maney, 2009, p.5).

According to Coy’s, Woehrle’s and Maney’s (2008) theoretical approach, oppositional knowledge is differentiated into four sub-types, with two concerning ‘what is’ and the other two ‘what could be’. In particular:

The first category is the ‘counter-informative’ one, whose aim is to present the story that has not yet been told, the missing from the picture part. For example, proving through specific evidence that a state does not fully practice democracy as it should, is a counter-informative kind of knowledge. Therefore, this opposing type of view becomes the provider of how information is presented selectively and what additional information should be used in order for an adequate representation of what is really happening in society’s practices to be created.

The second type is the critical-interpretive one, which considers the information presented as accurate, but at the same time questions its significance on a moral or social perspective. Questions about why something is published or what the purpose of the publishment is implies

29 And not only formally authoritarian ones.

33 nonmainstream interpretations in comparison to what is sought to be forwarded by the ‘power- holder’ mainstream media.

The third type is the radical-envisioning one. In essence, this type works as an imaginary compass of what would happen if everything worked out with the (alternative) practices that are suggested. In a few words, this approach paints a new picture that accounts for the knowledge and understanding exposed by counter-informative and critical-interpretive oppositional knowledge (Coy et al., 2008). An example is the encouragement of people to think about the significance of real democracy and which practices can bring it to life.

Lastly, the fourth type is the transformative one. Through the transformative type of oppositional knowledge, alternatives that are envisioned become reality through specific tactics. For instance, transformative oppositional knowledge about democracy created by the peace movement organizations included a range of recommended activities such as participating in electronic lobbying, signing e-petitions or joining street protests (Coy et al., 2008), which subtly remind ways of e-participation.

The aforementioned types of oppositional knowledge do not stand independently, though. To the contrary, they build up on each other and combine their different spectrums in order to create and forward the image of the alternative ideology that is idealized.

To conclude, and as Birdwell and Bani (2014) argue, today young people are the real ‘digital natives’ who consume alternative forms of news production within the web channels. These forms of digital democracy (Webb, 2015) host the perspectives for political participation without any strict distinction between the offline and online world. The Internet is mostly seen as an extension of possibilities for political engagement, while becoming not only a way of communication, but also an environment for activism as well (Eliasoph, 2013). Thus, the Internet, its alternative viewpoints, and the space it provides for action, enhance the emergence of critique against what seems to be unfair, corrupted, and hegemonic. Oppositional forms of knowledge are formed through digital vehicles and it is of great significance to investigate in- depth how these channels provide the ground for participation and creation of oppositional thinking. The next section attempts to explicate why qualitative, among the vast majority of quantitative research in the field, is the most suitable way to acquire a thorough knowledge of the aforementioned goals.

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5.Methods

In this section the aim is to provide an adequate explication of the methodological approach and the relative aspects. In the first part, the research questions are resumed. In the second one the approach of qualitative research is analyzed along with its epistemological assumptions. The third part touches upon the research design issue, whereas the fourth one stresses the method of data analysis along with issues of credibility. Lastly, the fifth section concerns ethical considerations.

5.1. Qualitative research method

It has been argued that qualitative research is ‘anything but a monolith, a solid set of research practices carved out of the same theoretical and epistemological matter’ (Cardano, 2020, p.26). The heterogeneity of qualitative research leads to a multidimensionality which in turn provides the differentiating point and at the same time ‘views suspiciously the border that separates it from the land of quantitative research, is an archipelago made up of distinct islands’ (Cardano, 2020, p.27).

In other words, qualitative research provides answers to questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’. It also enriches the researcher with data through ‘real life behavior, enabling research participants to speak for themselves’ (Kuper, Reeves and Levinson, 2008, pp.404-405). A way of approaching that ‘real life behavior’ lies on in-depth interviews, which were also utilized in this thesis for the research goals. As mentioned before, previous research on millennials media consumption through qualitative methods is limited, if not absent. Thus, by conducting a research which abstains from strict numbers and statistical representations, there is an opportunity to delve into what is usually ‘thrown away’, to examine the ‘in between’ area of personal experience and views, the ‘depth’ instead of the highly used ‘breath’ (Sayer, 1992). Qualitative interviews are undoubtedly a way of not only ‘dry’ informative retrieval, but also a practice which leads to a deeper analysis and discussion of social phenomena. Hence, by conducting interviews, more concrete perspectives of future research could also emerge.

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5.2.1. Epistemological assumptions

It is important to underline that all research methods, including those of qualitative perspectives are led by epistemological assumptions. Epistemology30 in general, concerns what can be considered as scientifically acceptable knowledge in each discipline (Bryman, 2004) The acceptability of knowledge within the fields of social science has been a significant issue, due to their fluid and human-centric character. Therefore, epistemological assumptions contribute to the formation of questions stressed on what can (and should) be regarded as acceptable knowledge in relative disciplines (Bahari, 2010). In this case, the epistemological assumptions are central to the notion of interpretivism, which in turn is associated with phenomenological views.

Interpretivism was subtly supported by Kant31, arguing that the world can become known through human interpretations instead of plain observations. From that perspective, knowledge can be formed through practices of understandings and reflections of the phenomena under research. In essence, interpretivism takes into account not only the significance of the participants but also the researcher’s role to interpretate and conceptualize the landscape under examination. ‘This is due to the fact that interpretivists researchers play a role as social actors where they could interpret their everyday social roles in accordance with the meaning given to these roles and interpret the social roles of others in accordance with our own set of meanings’ (Saunders et al., 2007, p.106). In addition, interpretivists view that the facts and values are not different, and findings are influenced by the researcher’s perspectives and values (Bahari, 2010).

Directly linked to the concept of interpretivism, ‘phenomenology as an epistemological assumption concerns how researchers view social phenomena as socially constructed and is mainly related with creating meanings and obtaining insights into those phenomena’. (Bahari, 2010, p.22). ‘Phenomenology is best understood as a radical, anti-traditional style of philosophizing, which emphasizes the attempt to get to the truth of matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experiencer’ (Moran, 2002, p.4). Experience as

30 From the Greek words ‘episteme’- ‘επιστήμη’ (knowledge) and ‘logos’- ‘λόγος’ (discourse) 31 See mainly Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (1781)

36 well as consciousness of the research is needed, in order to reach the upper goal: the creation of conditions for objective study of topics which are usually regarded as subjective.32

In essence, the provision of what qualitative approaches and epistemological assumptions are, describe the methodological plan and aims of this thesis. Therefore, having been interested in the subjective experience of the participants, the aim in this case is the attempt to describe and interpret personal assessments and reflections of the participants on mainstream and alternative media, in order to raise relative conclusions which answer the research questions. The next section of research design will come to provide an analysis about the way through which the participant’s reflections were gathered.

5.3. Research design

Having analysed aspects of qualitative research, this section aims at stressing the research design of the thesis. In-depth interview choice is sought to be justified along with the sample collection method. In addition, interview practicalities are touched upon while in the last part the interview questions are subjoined.

5.3.1. In-depth interviews

Following the aforementioned qualitative approach, the collection of data was conducted through semi-structured in-depth interviews. Important ethnographers such as Malinowski argued about the importance of having a conversation with people in order to understand what their views are. Furthermore, Kvale (1996) in what he calls ‘traveler metaphor’ argues that knowledge is not given but is created and negotiated (Legard, Keegan and Ward, 2003), meaning that the interviewer acquires an active role in leading the conversation and forming interpretations.33 Therefore, having from the beginning the goal of filling the gaps that derive from quantitative research methods, in-depth interviews were sought to function as a way of reaching it.

32 For more, you can also check on Husserl’s ‘Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology’ (1913) 33 That is probably a basic explanation of why in-depth interviews differ from normal conversations (for more check Legard’s, Keegan’s and Ward’s ‘In-depth interviews’, 2003)

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5.3.2. Sample and demographics

Before touching upon the procedure of interviews, there is the necessity of defining the sample of the thesis. In this case, the main goal is to examine how young users of alternative media in Greece feel about traditional media, how they view alternative media and how they use them in order to mobilize and engage politically. For that reason, a convenience/purposive sampling method was utilized. In a few words, that means the respondents were selected because they shared characteristics that were necessary for the specific research goals (see Acharya, Prakash et al., 2013). Thus, the factors which determined the specific method of sample selection were basically three. First of all, the 15 participants that were collected had to be Greek34, in order to be as much familiar as possible with the Greek media. Secondly, all participants should be consumers of digital alternative media. In a different scenario where simple random sampling was applied, there would be a possibility of coming across participants who do not consume alternative media at all, leading to the abrupt end of the interview and the inability to answer all the research questions. Thirdly, all participants belonged to the generation of ‘millennials’ and there is a basic reason to justify the specific choice. In specific, millennials which are children born between the late 80s and 90s have been labelled the ‘Internet Generation’, because they were the first generation to grow up in a reality where the Internet was present (Buckingham, 2007). This means that the Internet and the various media associated with it have become more popular among young people (Hao, Wen and George, 2014). Consequently, news consumption through digital media is more frequent among young people than older ages. For that reason, Greek millennials were chosen so that the examination of alternative media would lie on users who are undoubtedly more familiar with the previous ones. In particular, the final age category that was formed through the sample collection was between 21 to 30. Demographic characteristics (see Appendix Table 1) such as gender were not considered for the purpose of sample collection. However, factors such as occupation and political ideology were considered later in the analysis section.

The way that the sample was approached and chosen concerns mainly friendships. More specifically, some of the participants were chosen because it was known that the ‘line’ they

34 Without excluding immigrants who have been established in Greece or Greek people who have immigrated in other countries.

38 follow politically does not support the overall mainstream/right ‘wing’. A considerable hint which enhanced the specific choices were posts on social media deriving from alternative media sources. Therefore, by the time the first participants were approached, suggestions for other potential interviewees were made by them35. Therefore, the procedure of selection was indeed purposive with a specific background, but at the same time following a ‘snowball’ tactic in order to preserve the factor of randomness. In general, most of the participants are residents of Athens (Greece), a fact which subsequently contributed to a ‘richer’ material, due to the fact that Athens has been (and was always) the epicenter of sociopolitical tumults in Greece. Their background also enhances the aforementioned material, as there is a sample of high academic level, along with political interest and engagement, based on the results. Furthermore, their familiarization with digital media completes a circle of qualifications which affects the findings in a positive way. In essence, having Greek young participants who live in the heart of Greece, are academically and politically engaged and at the same time are confirming their relationship with the digital world, the research questions were there to promise answers deriving from people who are aware of not only mainstream media and their representations, but also of the other side, which are alternative news outlets. Therefore, research questions concerning political participation and oppositional knowledge would be answered by people who do not see things in a one-sided way while at the same time take into account the significant factor of digital media in their stance towards society.

5.3.3. Interview practicalities

As far as the interviewing is concerned, face to face meetings were firstly planned with each of the participants. However, the COVID-19 pandemic did not allow the realization of the plan, so 14 out of 15 the interviews were conducted through videocalls, whereas one of them was taken interpersonally. Each interview was booked at a time that worked for both of the researcher (me) and the participant. Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. In the beginning of the videocall, each participant was informed about the confidentiality of the interview and was asked for his/her consent to audio-record the content only for the purposes of the thesis. After that, a few questions about the demographics were asked, along with a brief conversation so that a sufficient comfortability between the researcher and the interviewee

35 After having explained the basic requirements for the selection.

39 would be created. It can be said that all interviews flowed calmly, without considerable misunderstandings. However, internet connection problems would sometimes create noises, which would of course be solved through the repetition of sentences until everything was adequately communicated. At this point, it is significant to mention that the language of communication was decided to be Greek. ‘A crucial feature of language is its capacity to present descriptions, explanations, and evaluations of almost infinite variety about any aspect of the world, including itself’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p.126). For that reason, there was the choice to speak Greek in order for the participants to express their thoughts and beliefs in their native language. Consequently, all the interviews were translated in English.

5.3.4. Interview questions

The 16 in total interview questions were formed and fixed (see Appendix) based on the four research questions of the thesis and each of them partially answered to at least one research question, without excluding the possibility of answering more than one at the same time (for example r.q.2 and r.q.4). To begin with, the first research question stresses reflections of the respondents on mainstream media. Thus, questions about practices of mainstream media, especially relating to the last events of police brutality and their representation on the news, were stressed, in order to retrieve discussions about the respondents’ consumption and trust behaviors. The second research question that lies on alternative media views by Greek millennials is sought to be examined through questions of specific outlets in the first place in order for a specific depiction of their preferences to be formed. On a second level, questions about the contribution of alternative media in Greek society were made in order to conceptualize the views of the young respondents on alternative media. The third research question concerning their political participation through alternative media was the most direct through a question which asked about possible political engagements triggered by alternative media outlets. Lastly, the fourth question referring to oppositional knowledge types, was sought to be answered by questions that involved scenarios of possible alternative media emergence within the society, their contribution to the fixation of it through critique and the possible actions that could be taken in order to achieve the realization of an ‘alternative’ society.

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5.4 Data analysis

The data that were retrieved from the aforementioned questions were respectively analyzed in order to proceed to answering the research questions. In essence, this section will present the methodological approach of qualitative content analysis which was utilized along with its specific characteristics.

5.4.1. Qualitative content analysis and coding

The method utilized for the data analysis in the specific research was the qualitative content analysis. Qualitative content analysis may be a little known and poorly understood but widely used form of social work research (Drisko and Maschi, 2015). Mayring (2010) a German psychologist who firstly utilized the term in 1983 supported that qualitative content analysis is a set of techniques for the analysis of texts of various kinds presenting not only plain content but also ideas that can be found in the texts. In other words and as Sandelowski (2000) argues that ‘qualitative content analysis moves farther into the domain of interpretation than quantitative content analysis in that there is an effort to understand not only the manifest (e.g., frequencies and means), but also the latent content of data’ (p.338).36 It comprises descriptions close to the texts along with interpretations which are still close to the experiences of the participants (Graneheim et al., 2017). During the analysis of the data, the researcher usually distinguishes the coded content into specific categories in order to present themes based on the research aims. The process of creating the frame of coding may be inductive, deductive, or mixed (inductive and deductive).

The coding procedure in the specific analysis followed the deductive approach. In deductive coding or else called ‘concept-driven’ approach (Schreier, 2012), ‘prior empirical research and theory are employed to derive some categories’ (Drisko and Maschi, 2015, p.21). The literature is according to Mayring (2000) an important factor in the development of categories for it provides not only main, but also subcategories. In this way, the material of literature creates coding definitions as well. Subsequently, after the coding procedure of the data, the researcher

36 There is an interesting analysis of Kracauer (1952) on why qualitative and quantitative approaches of analysis overlap and not cancel each other. For more, see ‘The challenge of qualitative content analysis’.

41 can proceed to comparisons between the coding frame and the data. At this point, issues of credibility in the context of qualitative analysis rise.

5.4.2. Issues of credibility

It is quite supported that qualitative research lacks scientific justification of the methods that are adopted in contradiction to those of quantitative which can be explicated in a more concrete way. As a result, issues of reliability and validity as terms applicable mostly on quantitative research rise because, if qualitative methods are inherently different from quantitative methods in terms of philosophical positions and purpose, then alterative frameworks/terminology for establishing rigor are appropriate (Noble and Smith, 2015). Consequently, Lincoln’s and Guba’s criteria are sought to be stressed in order to form a more suitable to qualitative media representation of rigor. The first one is truth value which corresponds to what in quantitative research appears as validity. ‘Truth value’ acknowledges that there are more than one ‘reality’ exist, however a clear and accurate presentation of the participants can be achieved. ‘Reliability’ is replaced by the terms of ‘consistency’ and ‘neutrality’, where the researcher provides a transparent description during the whole research analysis. Lastly, ‘applicability’ in contrast to quantitative ‘generalizability’ aims at the application of the research results to other scientific contexts. In the specific thesis, there were various strategies followed for the insurance of credibility. To begin with, possible biases such as in the sampling method were acknowledged, as it was previously stressed. Furthermore, a clear demonstration of the data in relation to rich descriptions of the participants was sought to be included. Lastly, clarity was also demonstrated as far as the thought processes in data analysis and relative interpretations is concerned. Nevertheless, it is of wide acceptance that there is no consensus about the standards by which a researcher should be judged when conducting qualitative research (Noble and Smith, 2015) and that is probably the cost of conducting a research on people’s subjective view, but there are ethical ones that must be maintained throughout the whole research project.

5.5. Ethical considerations

When conducting social research, it is of great significance to preserve specific ethical standards. To begin with, participants were given a description of the project, including the aims and objectives (Broom, 2006) in order to have a clear view of the research scope. In

42 addition, it was important that the process of getting consent concerned the reason that the participant was involved in the specific research. In that way, consent and confidentiality were secured between the researcher and the interviewee. Ethical considerations were also present during the dissemination of data. In particular, the identity of the participants, including personal information like name or surname were not presented, preserving issues. Also, being ethical when representing the collected data was an important challenge. Therefore, making sure that the participants’ depictions would be represented precisely along with the subsequent limitations of the research, were two goals that were fulfilled. Lastly, ethical considerations in relation to oppositional knowledge discussions were not under risk.

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6.Results and analysis

6.1. Reflections on mainstream media by millennials

The first part of the results aim at answering the first research question, which concerns the way that young users of alternative media in Greece reflect on mainstream media. The results along with the analysis lie on two main thematics. In the first one, thoughts about mainstream media practices along with the interviewee’s trust on them are sought to be stressed and analysed, whereas in the second one the analysis concentrates on consumption habits.

6.1.1. Thoughts and trust by millennials on mainstream media

On a first level and before proceeding to the actual results analysis of thoughts and trust on mainstream media, it is significant to mention that emotional outbreaks were expressed on a broad level by the respondents. Therefore, it seemed quite interesting to subtly delve into that part.

In essence, there is an apparent disgruntlement about the Greek dominant media by the millennials interviews in this study. The latest events which were stressed in the introduction, such as those in Nea Smyrni and their consequent (mis)representation on media, not only aroused the respondents to express their intense feelings, but also foreshadowed their criticism on how they work.

‘From what I saw through social media, it was a total zero, like nothing happened and that makes me really disappointed of how they portray the news...I feel like these media underestimate my intelligence, it just makes me mad.’ (B, female, 27).

‘Every time I watched the news with my family, I felt even more embarrassed with what mainstream media were presenting’. (L, male, 27).

It can be supported that the general impressions of the interviewees were not really in favor of mainstream media. Mainstream media are depicted as government-led media which are controlled by powerful owners who are directly connected to politics and utilize tactics of misrepresentation or even concealment of news for the sake of economic and political interests. The polarized pluralist system (see Hallin and Mancini, 2004 and Papathanassopoulos, 2002) comes back on stage through multiple references of media ownership prevalence, which

44 reflects not only the existence of intense influence of politics on media (Etzioni-Halevy, 1987) but also the generic structure of Greek economy in relation to the specific landscape (Papathanassopoulos, 1999).

‘Every mainstream media is sold and its logical by the time that the government boosts them economically. So, they are either going to hide what is not of their interest or misrepresent what is happening which is even worse’. (B, female, 27).

‘Mainstream media function in favour of the governmental systems and their media owners. They function as a repressive tool against citizen’s expression while the state allows them to. Citizens are also presented as incapable of having critical opinion.’ (F, female, 28).

‘It has to do with the structure of public sphere in the greek landscape. The last government along with the pandemic have brought extra economic boosts to mainstream media. This means that mainstream media are even more controlled’. (K, male, 30).

Media control as another main trait of the aforementioned media system is underlined not only by people who plainly come across mainstream media, but also by those whose profession belongs to the journalistic field.

Accordingly, the respondents confirm what Manchin and Papatheodorou (2003) argued about how objectivity was being challenged within the journalistic field. Respectively and while Greek journalists believe that journalism should be neutral (Papathanassopoulos, 2001), economic imperatives (Hanitzsch, 2011) in this case seem to still lead to a situation where journalists’ autonomy is questioned and replaced by editorials which accord with the ‘lines’ of the media owners (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002).

‘Most of them represent twisted truths. When police officers are publicly shouting ‘we will kill them’ and channels misrepresent it as ‘they will kill our police officer’, then partiality is prevalent. Journalists do their part as they have been told.’ (G, female, 25).

‘As a journalist who works in a mainstream media channel, I can tell you that before publishing anything I should have the consent of the powerful chairmen. Free speech is not existent while expressing through any form, editorial or reportage.’ (A, female, 27).

On a general scale, the interviewees did not really show trust in mainstream media. As shown by previous research (Kalogeropoulos et. al, 2018 and Dianeosis, 2019) concerning the Greek media landscape, trust on mainstream media has been significantly low especially during the

45 last years and the results of these interviews confirm this fact as far as the millennials is concerned.

Therefore, it seems that the last events which took place in Greece such as the police brutality in the districts of Nea Smyrni and Exarcheia not only invited intense societal challenges but also triggered once more the citizen’s existent dissatisfaction about mainstream media. Among the expression of mistrust towards mainstream media, an indication of what affects it is present. In particular, the respondents depict a general mistrust towards the government as well, which in turn confirms that political ideology affects the trust on traditional media (Lee, 2010). The millennials seem to conceptualize media in the context of governmental imperatives which apparently leads them to criticism towards the previous ones.

‘I don’t trust them because they don’t even try to be just a bit objective. It’s really funny how they try to fool us... They are clearly attached to media owners; they don’t act as watchdogs. I can’t trust them.’ (B, female, 27).

‘I don’t trust them at all, because I know that they are directly related to the government and I can’t really say good words for our government.’ (C, female 30).

However, on a more particular scale there is also a ground of critical thinking towards mainstream media was also noticed to have been formed, excluding scenarios of plain excoriation.

Specifically, it can be argued that apart from being fully judgemental and negatively disposed towards mainstream, another side exists and that is the compromising and understanding one. Particularly, it was mainly respondents related to fields of media and journalism who expressed not only their doubts but also the acknowledgement that ‘being fake’ all the time is not a possible scenario and option for mainstream media. Total rejection seems to not be a step taken by people who are clearly engaged to journalism and its practices, but instead it is avoided and replaced by personal research and critical thinking. This fact can probably justify the consumption habits of the respondents which are sought to be put in the following section.

‘I used to not trust them, but now I partially do because I have the ability to criticize what I see, so the fact that I trust them doesn’t mean I blindly do it.’ (M, male, 24).

I don’t support cancel culture, so partially I trust them, but I wait for the validation of every news or I do my own research. Not every journalist of mainstream media is corrupted, I have personally noticed a good journalist.’ (K, male, 30).

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6.1.2. Consumption of mainstream media by millennials

Base on the responses that were retrieved, consumption is a habit which is not necessarily affected by mistrust on media according to the interviewees’ responses in this study. The millennials may have supported a considerably critical stance towards practices of mainstream media, but that does not imply reactions of total renunciation. From the specific results and as Tsfati and Capella (2005), argue, people may not trust mainstream media but still chose to consume them because of their need to understand how the world is formed. Thus, mainstream media consumption becomes a way to achieve what Levy (1977) called ‘cognitive orientation’ which is in fact the motivation of going beyond trust factors and concentrating on what knowledge someone can gain through mainstream media, in this case. The road towards the acquisition of that knowledge may be either enhanced or influenced by the imperative of someone’s profession37, by plain self-disposition of someone to opt for mainstream media news or their encounter with mainstream media news critique on other media, such as the alternative ones.

‘I follow them because mainstream media are a form of depiction of social reality. So, I want to read what exists there. They are also related to my field (I am a journalist) so I do follow them.’ (K, male, 30).

‘I don’t trust them, but I will watch what mainstream say in order to know what they support. I can, therefore, compare between them and other sources of news. It’s more general, you understand how the agenda is formed, so mainstream media mainly provide the ‘public atmosphere’ depiction.’ (A, female, 27).

I try to follow them all so I can understand and compare between other media, but they are not my source of information. I usually have a look just to comment what they say while having the filter of critique.’ (E, female, 25).

However, I may also come across some of their news through social media or other sources of media which criticize the way that mainstream media present specific news, so I don’t necessarily switch on the television’. (N, male, 30).

In any case, it can be supported that the majority of young people interviewed for this study are not really fond of mainstream media, however it was not unexpected. Emotional outbursts

37 In this case journalists or media master students

47 were widely noticed throughout the interviews which maybe indicates that the general atmosphere within the media landscape is still blurry and sensitive. Their opinions about mass media practices confirm on a large scale the existent depiction of what a polarized pluralist media system looks like. Trust is generally absent without being implied that the millennials proceed to abrupt rejections of mainstream media. Political ideology and mistrust on the government seem to be significant factors of why the interviewees have acquired the specific stance towards mainstream media. Nevertheless, they corroborate the aforementioned stance through their consumption habits, even if they just serve perspectives of plain cognition of ‘the other side’ or comparison to other sources of news media.

6.2. Views of millennials on Greek alternative media

Moving to the second research question, these ‘other sources’, known as alternative media, were also sought to be examined and analyzed through reflections of the respondents. The first section of the results and analysis stresses reflections on representative examples of alternative media which were chosen as a reference point. The second section is devoted to the interviewees’ thoughts about alternative media and their practices, whereas in the last one trust is sought to be discussed through relative answers that were retrieved.

6.2.1. Reflections on representatives of Greek alternative media

First of all, views on alternative media were sought to be examined through reflections on specific media platforms. Among many of them, the ‘Press Project’, ‘Athens Indymedia’ and ‘Efimerida Syntakton’ (EfSyn) were chosen as reference points in order to subtly depict how the millennials conceptualize each of them. Consequently, a brief comparative analysis aimed at representing the main differentiating points between the platforms in order to become familiar with millennials’ preferences on alternative media.

An overall preference for the Press Project news platform was expressed through the interviewees. Grassroots organizational structure was a motivation for the respondents to consume the specific platform which is known for its rich environment as far as the participants/writers is concerned. Polyphony within the platform was another factor which was stressed as a motivation to consume it. The ‘different paths’ host the ground for a heteroglossic

48 text (Buckingham and Sefton-Green, 1996) to be created, forwarded, and preserved not only from the native informants (Spivak, 1988) but also from the informed ‘digital natives’ (Birdwell and Bani, 2014).

‘I like Press Project; I think many voices exist simultaneously. They function as a community through donations of people, and the whole grassroots action makes it more independent. There is a functional polyphony, so the representation of news is fuller.’ (B, female, 27, leftist).

They stood properly towards the latest events38. They also use humour in their critique and it’s interesting. They have evidence; there is an explanation for anything, and that explanation is given in a more objective and impartial way.’ (J, male, 26, leftist→ left).

The social class which is ‘understood’ by the specific platform bring back what Ramonet (2011) claimed about the Internet capabilities and its power to abate the pressure that is put on the citizens in societies. At the same time, the platform was said to support social movements which in turn brought together and supported people of the ‘same struggles’ (Carpentier, 2016).

It is a decent platform because I think they understand the social class and its struggles, supporting the #metoo39 movement and the feminist one. Sometimes they have intensively politicized, making them more subjective which is why I do personal research’. (C, female, 27, anarchist).

However, a from time-to-time politicized speech of the platform is a phenomenon which affects the news perception by millennials, even if their political ideology leans to the left. The Greek alternative media landscape may have rooted on syndicalism and left-wing organizations (Nikolaidis, 2019) but that does not imply that young consumers are fond of being exposed to such politically oriented news.

‘Sometimes they may be a bit more…they make very obvious that they are, which maybe becomes the reason of being more subjective. That’s why I also try to put my critical thinking when I read some of their articles.’ (E, female,25, leftist).

On the other hand, ‘Athens Indymedia’ seems to quite differ based on what the young respondents. Most of the interviewees’ responses depict that ‘Athens Indymedia’ does not

38 Meaning mainly the events in Nea Smyrni and the following police brutality. 39 A worldwide social movement against sexual abuse and gender violence.

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‘possess’ the same space as ‘Press Project’. Apart from the interviewees who were not really aware of the platform (or knew it but did not use it at all), other respondents who consumed it had as a prominent reference point the usefulness of it for ‘calling’ information40 and anti- reporting.

‘I am not aware of the platform to be honest. I have partially checked it in the past, but I can’t express any opinion based on that, I don’t feel much confidence to do it’. (H, female, 22, leftist).

‘I will mainly open it when I want to get informed about a ‘calling’ (I mean demonstrations), something really specific. It’s not a systematic consumption. I use it to get informed about whether they have adducted any comrades, for example. (A, female, 27, leftist).

At the same time, views on its journalistic practices were highly expressed, with implications of being impulsive without in-detail checking on news and articles. Athens Indymedia may have been the representative example of the alternative media rhizomatic emergence with significant contribution and fast publishments during critical sociopolitical periods of Greek society41 providing indeed the missing perspective ‘from below’ (Harcup, 2003) but it seems that the organizational perspectives have altered. The publishments are claimed to not be up to date and fast and most importantly extremist way of thinking and expression are not what the millennials look for when they want to get informed, and these are arguments which have been made by many young respondents.

‘It was the representative example of anti-reporting, but it is not widely supported anymore. Furthermore, they don’t post that often, maybe because they don’t get boosted economically. I also have my doubts because they do not emit journalistic practices.’ (D, female, 25, leftist).

In a few words, we can talk about ‘extreme’ groups with specific ideology and ‘extreme’ speech without any considerable ‘checking’ and that impulsiveness makes them suppressive. So, I will once more have my own research.’ (K, male, 30, centrist).

The last platform into question concerned the ‘EfSyn’ (Efimerida Syntakton) and results are interesting. The young respondents seem to be prone to consuming ‘EfSyn’. In general, they believe that the platform (but also the newspaper edition) provides objective news on a wide

40 Meaning information about protests and/or demonstrations. 41 Such as the protests of 2008 after the shooting of the 15-year-old Alexis by a police officer.

50 level, while the fast pace creates an atmosphere of immediate response to the incidents in Greek society. The organizational structure is a factor which is once again taken into account by the millennials.

‘It is closer to me in comparison to Indymedia. It is EfSyn, Press Project and Indymedia on a row, from the strongest to the weakest. I can say that I trust it. There is a grassroot structure which I appreciate.’ (A, female, 27, leftist).

‘Another good fact is that they publish on a fast pace, especially with the incidents in Athens this spring. They also represent the news in a fuller way compared to what ‘SKAI’, for example, would present on the news.’ (B, female, 27, leftist).

However, there is once again a disgruntlement as far as the political ideology of ‘EfSyn’ with the respondents supporting that it becomes patent and as a result hosts a ground of absolutism. Therefore, intense politicization of the platform, even when combined with grassroots perspectives, created once again 42an alloy of impressions. In particular, there were views which supported that objectivity gets lower in these cases, while other argued that news would even adopt a shadow of futility and pessimism. This reflection subtly brings to surface what has been called ‘miserabilism of the left’ (Pantazopoulos, 2019) in an attempt to describe a wave of expression connected to despair and victimization of a specific social group by leftists whose suffering exists because of the corrupted system.43 However, the completely ‘anti- system’ and ‘it’s their fault’ mentality seems to not prevent the young interviewees from consuming the specific news outlet.

‘It is usually on my feed, but I think the specific one is intensively left-wing, and they want you to know it at any cost. So, I am also critical towards their posts and try to do my own research.’ (E, female, 25, leftist).

‘Fortunately you can still find opinion articles which do not present the left as the best party. Nevertheless, there are times when they express an absolutism which in turn creates an atmosphere where everything seems meaningless and condemned.’ (H, female, 22, leftist).

42 As also noticed in the discussion for the ‘Press Project’. 43 Pantazopoulos’ analysis of miserabilism incorporates what Taguieff (2016) argued about the new wave of national populism. For more, check ‘The revolt against the elites; or the new populist wave: An interview’ (Taguieff, 2016).

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‘It looks like there cannot be hope and it is a bit annoying sometimes because they seem to always blame the ‘others’, but overall it is on my feed and I believe they are objective on an adequate level.’ (G, female, 25, leftist).

According to the analysis, there is a considerable differentiation among the three platforms. It seems that the three platforms, even though they all belong to the alternative media environment, do not function under the same ideological umbrella. In a few words, it can be argued that the respondents turn to the ‘Press Project’ as a first option. Respectively, ‘EfSyn’ seems to also be a trustworthy news media according to the interviewees, with Indymedia being the last choice. The respondents are more skeptical towards Indymedia, arguing that the platform operates in a more impulsive and old-fashioned way. Back in the period of 2008 and onwards, it managed not only to unite activists and social groups in general (Baboulias, 2013) but also act through fast paced news against misrepresentations of mass media. However, it seems that nowadays the millennials, which was also the platform’s main audience back then44, does not consume that intensively the platform due to its slow feeds and ‘extremist’ character. On the other hand, the ‘Press Project’ along with ‘EfSyn’ are closer to the millennials’ preferrations due to the platforms’ more ‘grounded’ practices. Consequently, the particular examination and comparison of the platforms provides information of the millennials’ consumption preferences within the same media environment. This background creates the space in order to delve more into the respondents’ thoughts about alternative media and the trust that they show on them.

6.2.2. Opinions and trust of millennials on Greek alternative media

Having acquired an in-depth glance at the respondent’s views on specific alternative media, a sufficient background has been created so that thoughts about alternative media, along with their contribution to society can be provided. In addition, discussions relating to millennials’ trust on alternative media are sought to be analyzed in order to form a fuller view of their reflections.

Their thoughts and opinions lie on the contribution of alternative media to Greek society and the differences between the previous media and mainstream ones. In a general sense, the

44 See, for example, the demonstrations of the millennials after the shooting of Alexis in December, 2008 or the social movement of the Greek version of ‘Indignados’ in spring of 2011.

52 millennials seem to support the activity of alternative media. Grassroots perspectives provide, as it was previously supported, a ground of interaction between the content providers and the audience, leaving distinguished people and elites on the side (Enzensberger, 1976). Greek alternative media utilize their polyphonic power in order to stand next to marginalized people and react for those who have been oppressed. Alternative media, then, become a tool of oppression, where radical changes are sought to be accomplished through the enhancement of the social class (O’Sullivan,1994).

‘The place where I can really read about the Greek reality is alternative media. They provide real news through grassroots organization. Also, the fact that they share content as evidence for every event they comment, depicts their efforts for validity.’ (A, female, 27, leftist).

‘I believe that within the old-fashioned Greek society, alternative media give a fuller depiction of what is happening. Apart from this, alternative media work as a tool of repression, criticizing socio-political inequalities in contradiction to the government-led mainstream media.’ (E, female, 25, leftist).

‘Alternative media journalists are more independent; therefore they can provide more easily the truth in every news. They also unite people, for example through the events of Nea Smyrni where people protested against police brutality.’ (N, male, 30, leftist).

The independence of alternative media content providers lies not only on the fact that they are not privatized/owned, but also on the fact that they grow within the Internet environment. As previously researched by Gainous, Abbott and Wagner (2018) in the case of Malaysia, the Internet creates a space for dissident information to flourish in order for the status quo to be challenged (Gainous et al., 2015 and Howard, 2011) and the hegemonic powers to be fought (Kellner, 1997). Therefore, impartiality is a value, according to the results, which characterizes alternative media, becoming what Ramonet (2011) called the ‘fifth power’ of the contemporary era.

‘I acknowledged that polyphony was missing from our society and that is what they tried to fix. The Internet has created something special. Alternative media journalists are more independent; they are not economically owned or controlled by someone’. (C, female, 30, anarchist).

An interesting point was, additionally, expressed as far as the agenda setting is concerned. Specifically, alternative media are depicted as media who have created a closer to the public’s

53 interests news agenda, in contradiction to what mainstream media present. It seems that the enhancement of the marginalized does not just concern people but lies on broader perspectives. It is the fight by alternative media for the abolition of the capitalist system (Couldry, 2003) which in this case is conceptualized and preserved within the agenda setting and the selection of news.

‘It is about economic interests which differentiates alternative from mainstream media. That is why you see more partiality on the latter ones. Also, alternative media devote time on important issues in contrast to what mainstream media do.’ (I, female, 21, leftist).

‘Many topics of mainstream media news are of no public interest. In contrast, alternative media include countries in social or political trouble. ‘Press Project’ recently published reportages in Moria45 when everyone else had forgotten its existence.’ (M, male, 24, anarchist- communist).

In addition, trust seems to be met more on alternative media platforms in contrast to mainstream ones. Political ideology as previously examined (Lee, 2010) is apparently a factor which affects the trust of millennials in this case, as well. The respondents’ political orientation leans to the ‘left’, with some few exceptions of more radical stances, however the overall political core is leftist. Furthermore and linked to political ideology, distrust in government appears as a determinant factor in media distrust (Lee, 2010) but also alternative media trust. Mainstream media and their prevalent paternalistic traits lead to an informative alienation of the millennials. It is also possible that the overall education on the Internet and alternative media in specific affects negatively trust in mainstream media, as it has been previously researched (Tsfati and Ariely, 2014).

‘I trust alternative media more than mainstream ones and apparently political ideology is an important factor which affects this relationship. Mainstream media are in general the government’s servers, so you know that they are going to be partial.’

‘Conversely, alternative media ethics are stronger than of professional journalists who work under the pressure of rules and control. Whoever is freer and more independent can be trusted more.’

45 Refugee camp in Greece.

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However, the aforementioned spectrums do not lead to blind trust. Critical stands towards both alternative and mainstream media are present through various responses which depict a two- way skepticism. Millennials may be familiar with the usage of Internet media due to their ‘generational privilege’ and mainstream media alienation, but that doesn’t imply that they blindly trust the first ones. Intense politicization seems to not be something millennials appreciate, even if they mainly embrace ideologies of the left.

‘However, it is not that I will trust everything that alternative media say, but I will understand where they come from. The issue remains the same. We should be critical to anything we read.’

‘Alternative media are sometimes intensively politicized and that is not good, either. Being on the other side of the governmental party does not secure a total truth. Therefore, I am critical towards both sides even if I am a leftist’.

To sum up, it can be understood that even though the ground of Greek alternative media is prevailingly leftist, there are considerable differentiations among the relative news platforms which affect the trust of the interviewees. In essence, the millennials, having been asked about three (seemingly) similar alternative media platforms, ‘Press Project’, ‘Athens Indymedia’ and ‘EfSyn’, have a higher preference for ‘Press Project’ in comparison to the other two. The ‘Press Project’ is presented to be the most politically neutral platform which attempts to depict the truth though objectivity. Consequently and according to the responses, trust may be generally affected by political orientation and identity on the one side (Lee, 2010); with the majority of respondents following the leftist ideology; but on the other side be discouraged by the overpoliticization of alternative media. Thus, it could be supported that the rearrangements along with the unstable conditions within the alternative media environment (Macek et al., 2018) and their identity shifts46 may affect the consumption and trust habits of the millennials. As a result, the millennials’ agenda broadening becomes an alloy of ‘digital information’ (through trust and consumption of alternative media) and Levy’s ‘cognitive orientation’ (through mainly the plain consumption of mainstream media news). Nonetheless, alternative media may be trusted more than mainstream media, but that does not mean that millennials trust blindly. Alternative media are indeed an informative ‘gateway’ (see also Boulianne and

46 For example ‘Athens Indymedia’ shift from a more approachable in the beginning (according to the respondents) platform to something more extremist.

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Theocharis, 2020) for the millennials without being implied that everything is credible and gullibly consumed or trusted.

6.3. Political participation of millennials through Greek alternative media

Having acquired knowledge about the millennials’ reflections on mainstream and alternative media, the latter ones in relation to political participation are sought to be analyzed in the context of the third research question. The following section of analysis concerns offline and online forms of political participations which are motivated by the consumption of alternative media. For once more, the millennials preserves a relative balance, this time between the digital and the ‘real’ world, showing that political participation can be met through offline and online environments for the Greek millennials.

In analyzing the transcripts, there is an evident interrelation between offline and online political participation on young users of alternative media. Utilizing the extended version of Barnes and Kaase on political participation along with the subsequent extrainstitutional forms of action, the protest potential (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013) is prevalent in this case. Participation to protests was mainly motivated either through personal action, or ‘callings’ by a friendly environment which had been informed by alternative media news. On a broader thought, this could maybe imply that interpersonal trust can not only positively affect trust on media (Tsfati and Ariely, 2014) but also the inclination to protest.

‘Alternative media have been a great boost to be honest. It is Indymedia for example when I want to get informed about a protest that is going to take place in Athens or wherever I may be.’ (A, female, 27, leftist).

‘Also, when the evacuation of the university of Thessaloniki took place, it was the ‘Press Project’ that represented what really happened, and it was because of them that I went to the protests the next day.’ (F, female, 30, leftist).

‘In general, the reason I went to the protests derived from the anger I had through video contents I watched on alternative media. However, I have also been to protests after having been called out by friends that I trust.’ (J, male, 26, centrist→left).

However, it is also noticed that the rise of the Internet has created an alternative environment of online and offline versions (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013) and the current interviews depict

56 an interesting stance towards the online forms of participation. That contemporary model of participation is what Hirzalla and Van Zoonen (2011) have called ‘e-participation’. As it is presented, e-petitions have been a main online form of action for many respondents who apparently aspire to bring change to whatever dissatisfies them. The electronic petition along with the visiting of the political blogs, such as that of the prime minister and the consequent ‘angry’ reaction, are moves that not only witness millennials’ activity on politics (Bakker and de Vreese, 2011) but also a shift towards a differentiated conceptualization of what could actually be perceived as political participation.

Furthermore, it can be argued that alternative media consumption leads to personal action towards bearers of power, such as mainstream media. Receiving most of the information and news from online sources (Briggs, 2016), the millennials respectively show their disgruntlement to the high-powered based on their internet consumption, which in this case derived from alternative media.

‘However, an action has been taken through the Internet, as well. Especially during the period of the covid pandemic, e-petitions have been a thing for me, and I believe they are promising as a united move of dissatisfaction.’ (E, female, 25, leftist).

‘Nonetheless, personal efforts are also important when talking about digital action. I had actually sent a message to SKAI channel after the events in the evacuation of the university in Thessaloniki, asking why they shared a misrepresented video content’. (L, male, 27, leftist).

In addition, expressive forms of online political participation were noticed with many respondents sharing content (articles, reportages etc) of alternative media to their social media accounts. The content is also said to be forwarded to family or friendship members which do not share the same political ideology. Therefore, alternative media news are consumed by young people in an attempt to not necessarily share ideas with people of aligned political positions (Briggs, 2016), but mainly to connect and understand the unknown perspective and political mindset. In this case, it could be said that Levy’s ‘cognitive orientation’ acquires a politicized context.

‘Alternative media kept on giving a clear depiction of what was happening, contributing to a corollary of angry reactions at the prime minister’s posts on Facebook where I also participated.’ (C, female, 30, anarchist).

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‘It has also happened to do my own research based on alternative media news, and post something I wrote about a case that was interesting to me, such as data journalism.’ (G, female, 25, leftist).

‘I share content especially to family members and friends who do not share a similar political ideology. Those contents that are shared may come from ‘EfSyn’, ‘Rosa Progressive’47 ‘Press Project’ and other media like the previous ones48’. (N, male, 30, leftist).

However, a general skepticism is once more observed, especially concerning the procedure before the sharing of an article or personal opinion through posts. The millennials seem to be critical before proceeding to expose themselves digitally, even through expressive-passive forms of e-participations. Validity remains a main standard for news, and personal research and checking is still an important step that is taken.

Nevertheless, when sharing content or expressing any opinion publicly, I’m trying to remain critical even towards alternative media. I try not to share based on emotions, so I read and reread every content. The high and stable standard is validity.’ (K, male, 30, centrist).

It is clear that political participation is present on both the offline and online environment, with a subtle inclination to the latter one. The COVID-19 pandemic may have influenced the aforementioned online activity due to the restrictions that have been put during this year 49. However, and as Hestres (2013) argues, the Internet has become a significant place of freedom and expression in democratic societies, especially for young people. Online political participation may not be independent from the offline forms; however it is of general admittance that the concept of political participation is just an ‘umbrella’ which accommodates different forms of action (Huntington and Nelson, 1976).

Therefore, new technologies bring up new possibilities. Young people, frequently presented as indifferent towards politics (see Buckingham, 2008) are in this case people who will not only utilize digital media in order to participate, but they will carefully conduct research before proceeding to any form of e-participation, even if it concerns a plain expressive action. It is also important to comment that the sample of interviewees are people interested in politics and of high education, which undoubtedly enhances their critical and personal research stances

47 Alternative (leftist) media. 48 TVXS, ‘Documento’, ‘Imerodromos’ and ‘Kouti Pandoras’ were also stressed. 49 Greece has been through 3 strict lockdowns since last March 2020.

58 towards any news consumption. This fact leads to the realization that young people have been and they will probably continue to be open to alternative types of political participation (Lee et al., 2013) through rigorous acquisition of political information from alternative media (Shen et al., 2020). Political information leads to a respective knowledge, and if the information specifically derives from alternative media sources, then the knowledge adopts oppositional shadows. Those were sought to be examined and analyzed in the fourth research question.

6.4. Oppositional knowledge through Greek alternative media

Moving on to the fourth research question, oppositional knowledge as knowledge of concepts significant for the formation of critical attitudes against dominant power (Lee, 2015) was examined in order to find out whether the young respondents have developed types of oppositional knowledge (see Coy et al., 2008) through their consumption of alternative media.

The interviews show that oppositional knowledge is triggered by the consumption of alternative media and supported by modes of political participation (Lee, 2015). As far as the first type of political knowledge which concerns ‘missing parts’ of the story due to selective news representations, it can be said that an intense counter-informative knowledge can be noticed through the responses of the millennials. Thoughts about how mainstream media do not present the whole picture of events, reveal a conviction that the current sociopolitical state is under crisis.

‘Flaws of mainstream media and the government have been fairly depicted by alternative media. Alternative media are critical, and they should be, even by using humour. You can easily see how corrupted the (capitalist) system is, mainstream media as well.’ (Ι, female, 21, leftist).

The concept of democracy is even stressed through the reference of the prime minister’s statements about social media. As it is argued, democracy, according to the millennials, is something which has lost its meaning. Also, the selective representation and systemic interests have created, according to the young respondents, a simulation of democracy which does not correspond to what should instead exist.

‘Democracy is a word much heard, but we have kinda lost its real meaning. We know that democracy now is in danger and social class knows this and its ironically in the name of

59 democracy that anti-democratic rules are being implied on Greek society’. (B, female, 27, leftist).

The second type of oppositional knowledge under examination is the critical-interpretive which refers to the evaluation of news as far as public interest is concerned. Specifically, this type is subtly argued by the interviewed millennials mainly when they were asked about mainstream media practices. At this part, they seem to stress issues of social perceptiveness. In essence, there is a viewpoint which criticizes mainstream media agenda setting by stressing that there are topics presented by them which are not of any significant public interest, such as news of political diplomacy. Therefore, it is not surprising the fact that only 32% of Greek respondents of the ‘Digital News Report’ in 2019 stated that mass media news are of public interest, possibly confirming that mainstream media discourse have often little relevance to actual issues that emerge in the social sphere (Papatheodorou and Manchin, 2003).

‘Something that is missing from the 21:00 news is going to be told through a nice reportage of 600 words by alternative media. I also believe mainstream media don’t always provide news which are useful or interesting to the public.’ (A, female, 27, leftist).

Moving forward, the interesting point is that, even though it was partially expected for the respondents to have acquired intense radical-envisioning knowledge, the millennials seem to be quite skeptical. The third type of knowledge, which brings to life idealized images of society, is not that present, considering that it directly paints a new picture that accounts for the knowledge and understanding exposed by counter-informative and critical-interpretive oppositional knowledge (Coy et al., 2008). The radical type implies the existence of, so to say, idealized sociopolitical conditions through the prevalence of alternative media.

On a theoretical level, alternative media seem to indeed be more ‘idealized’ as far as their practices in concerned, but in practice the situation quite alters. More specifically, the young respondents basically underline two problematics. Firstly, in a scenario of alternative media gaining high influence, people of older ages would probably come across technological difficulties. Thus, digital divide issues50 rise through a possible emergence of alternative media, with people of (mainly) older ages being incapable not only of gaining access to digital media, but also of handling them.

50 See also Oosterlaken’s ‘Design for development: A capability approach. (2009) ‘.

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‘I believe that having alternative media would create a phenomenically optimistic scene. They have showed that they can provide the missing point, but I don’t think it would necessarily be better if the first ones were on top of everything.’ (H, female, 22, leftist).

I think mainstream media audience consists of people between 40-75 years old. It is difficult to transfer them to something alternative, even if that means they would just consume alternative in order to have the view of the ‘other side.’

The second problematic is the risk of alternative media becoming corrupted and losing their special position and power within society. Acquiring influence implies, based on the millennials’ reflections, a shift of power relationships. Maybe this critical stance of the millennials supports that the most important task for alternative media is to plainly preserve a balance between economic interests and political goals (Comedia, 1984) and keep functioning as they still do, alternatively.

‘If alternative media became more powerful, they would probably become mainstream as well. Stronger influence comes with economic boost, and if that boost happens by a media owner’s money, then alternative media would follow motives of power relationships.’ (D, female, 25, leftist).

‘Alternative media should work on themselves in order to preserve their status. It is not like the vaccine; it is not something that is done once and for all. Practice is needed along with critical and action from us.’ (O, male, 25, leftist).

A variety of responses even depict millennials ‘bringing’ digital media close to parents and/or grandparents, in an attempt to familiarize older generations with alternative forms of media and information sources in general. Consequently, aspirations stemming from techno- deterministic perspectives are expressed and believed to be achieved not only by alternative media themselves, but also through citizens’ actions.

‘I have personally showed my parents news from alternative media outlets and they got really problematized by the fact that tv channels did not show the real content of what was happening. Maybe we could also help them.’ (I, female, 21, leftist).

Proceeding to the last section, the fourth type of oppositional knowledge (Coy et al., 2008) is the transformative and refers to the tactics that are needed to be followed for the envisioning of an alternative reality. This type is quite present through arguments about protests, e-petitions

61 and digital activities in general. Protests are first and foremost stressed as a significant tool of showing social dissatisfaction, with the most prominent example those of Nea Smyrni.

‘In general we should get up and protest and if we can link that to alternative media, then these platforms should provide relative information for callings, petitions, and other actions of showing that something goes wrong and should be fixed.’

‘That action could, first of all, be a protest. Protests in Greece can achieve things. I’m just going to remind you of the protests in Nea Smyrni. People just gathered, regardless of their political ideology and expressed their dissatisfaction towards the state’s mechanisms’.

However, it seems that the digital sphere acquires most of the attention overall. Digital media have become not only a way of communication, but also an environment of activism (Eliasoph, 2013) motivating them to participate politically. Therefore, e-petitions and expressive digital participation (Hirzalla and van Zoonen, 2011) such as sharing content and forwarding information are argued to be more effective not only for individual engagement purposes, but also digital community formations. This stance towards digital media possibly implies that this online expressive activity is more influential and public than its offline counterpart (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013) for the acquisition of transformative oppositional knowledge.

‘The digital world creates unity. So, I think people could form digital communities which can act as oppressive forces through e-petitions, sharing content and more news information in general. Information is precious and people can be heard through the Internet’. (G, female, 25, leftist).

Nonetheless, it is quite supported that people should be aware of their real intentions and motivations of their digital activity, in order for the aggregate of digital political engagement to be consistent and not ephemeral. In order for this to be prevented, more news consumption from alternative media outlets is also proposed as a helpful path for condemning the ‘wrong texts’ and bringing the subjugated knowledge (Foucault, 1980) to surface.

‘Nonetheless, this digital activity should have a generic scope and not just plain manifestation of dissatisfaction, because then there is a possibility of coming across digital demonstrations which stem from idiosyncratic egoism or the fear to ‘not be left out’. (K, male, 30, centrist).

Concluding, it seems that the road to social change also includes the public’s engagement in the processes of discourses (Muhlhausler and Peace, 2006). In other words, and as Mouffe (1997) argues, the current political locus is a subject which lies between the interface of social

62 actors and counterdiscourses of alternative media and those actors are expected to be constantly informed by different news sources but at the same time to be alert and utilize their critical capabilities.

‘The information has to be checked by us, and why not reread before we post, share or anything related to digital activism.’

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7.Conclusions, limitations and future research

Concluding, it is evident that the interviewed millennials are not that engaged to mainstream media, expressing a general disgruntlement towards them which especially stems from the last events that took place in the Greek society in spring, 2021. This fact is not surprising, though, considering the fact that the respondents turned significantly to alternative media. Nonetheless, mistrust of mainstream media did not entail the respective abstention from consumption as it has been previously studied (Tsfati and Ariely, 2014) with the respondents following ‘cognitive orientation’ tactics (Levy, 1977). On the other hand, alternative media may indeed be a source where dissident information is disseminated for the challenge of the status quo (Gainous et al., 2015 and Howard, 2011), but it seems that a relative balance is preferred as far as alternative media politicization is concerned. Also, political ideology may be a factor for trust (Lee, 2010) in alternative media, as this refers to a vast majority of leftist respondents, but that does not entail blind trust and consumption behaviors. A balance is sought to be kept on both mainstream and alternative media sides, where the young consumers acknowledge the perspectives of each media, respectively utilize them and consequently leading them to an alloy of cognitive orientation and selective digital information.

The aforementioned stance of the millennials also leads to an interrelation between offline and online forms of political participation. Specifically, while offline forms like protests are still widely supported by the interviewees, a shift towards e-participation (Hirzalla and van Zoonen, 2011) seems to have emerged, confirming what previous studies (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013) have contended. E-petitions, visits to political pages but also more expressive forms such as content sharing haven been stressed by the respondents as forms of action. Therefore, it can be argued that digital media have altered the conceptualization of political participation which in fact has become an ‘umbrella’, covering different forms of actions (Huntington and Nelson, 1976). It is, thus, alternative initiatives which once more motivate young people to seriously engage themselves politically against traditional politics (Collin, 2015). This political information acquired through alternative media indicates a formation of oppositional knowledge. Specifically, counter-informative knowledge (Coy et al., 2008) is widely met, with the millennials acknowledging the dysfunctional spectrums of mainstream media and the system in general. As a result, critical-interpretive (Coy et al., 2008) knowledge is also visible through the critique of mainstream media agenda setting. Surprisingly, radical-envisioning (Coy et al., 2008) knowledge is not considerably noticed. This shows that the millennials may

64 be aware of Greek alternative media being an important tool of critique towards mainstream news (Dahlgren, 2009) through grassroots journalism (Nikolaidis, 2019) but do not necessarily hold utopic hopes in case of a possible alternative media takeoff in the Greek society. Nonetheless, transformative knowledge (Coy et al., 2008) spotted through the responses depicts a willingness for change which can be seen through protests but mainly, according to the interviewed millennials, through digital media activity.

What can be mainly argued is that the millennials do not seem to verify what has been widely thought for a long time. Allegations that the millennials are politically indifferent (see Buckingham, 2008) do not really stand. To the contrary, young consumers of alternative media not only take advantage of their ‘digital’ familiarization in order to understand the world, but also act and form counterpower knowledge as a way of reacting against inequalities and corruption. Undoubtedly, the participants’ high academic and political level affects the aforementioned findings, however it can be admitted that the picture is not as stiff as it is usually shown.

It is clear that these findings spawned from qualitative research and more specifically in-depth interviews. In a field where quantitative research is prevalent, this study is sought to become a differentiating spot by spoiling the row of statistical correlations and replacing them by deep thoughts and free associations which maybe disclose aspects that are usually turned down and thrown away. In essence, the limitation of conducting a qualitative research and relating it to the vast majority of quantitative previous studies is at the same time the gap that was sought to be covered, if not utterly closed. In any case, the findings may contribute to the creation of new research perspectives which are based on qualitative methods.

Future research could be possibly conducted focusing on the content analysis of alternative media, in order to delve into the micro-organizational aspects, such as the agenda setting. The goal would be the knowledge acquisition of alternative media news production and the line that they ‘follow’ ethically, something which has not been answered by this thesis. This research could concern not only polarized pluralist systems, but also other media systems such as the liberal which is met in Great Britain or the United States (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The evident fact is that alternative media have become such an integral part of every society that it is questionable whether media systems can preserve their structure and remain inviolate to changes. The prevalent dipole of the Internet and mainstream media is maybe the indication that consumption, political participation and counterpower knowledge are not necessarily

65 bounded by countries of overpoliticization and strong media markets, but also by countries whose system follows more liberalistic lines. Hence, apart from the purposes of future research, the aforementioned critique may possibly function as food for thought when contemplating the future of media systems.

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Appendix

Interview questions

1.Following the last events that took place in Athens, what is your opinion about Greek mainstream media and journalism?

2.What are your thoughts on how mainstream media and journalism work?

3.Which mainstream media do you follow?

4.Would you say that you trust those media?

5. What is your opinion about Press Project?

6. What is your opinion about Athens Indymedia?

7. What is your opinion about EfSyn?

8. Would you say that you trust alternative media (more than mainstream ones)?

9. What do you think alternative media offer in Greek society?

10.Why do you consume alternative media?

11. What are the differences between the mainstream and alternative media news in your opinion?

12. How do you think people could act against socio-political inequalities in Greece?

13. Have Greek alternative media triggered you to take political stands and/or actions within or outside the Web??

14. In your opinion, how would things be if alternative media had a bigger influence/voice on Greek society (especially nowadays)?

15.Would you say that alternative media give you information about current flaws in government/ system and mainstream media?

16.Would you say that alternative media provide views on what an alternative (and maybe ideal) social order would look like?

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Table 1. Demographics

Participants Gender Age Occupation Political Ideology A Female 27 Journalist Leftist B Female 27 Master student Leftist C Female 30 Psychologist Anarchist D Female 25 Private Employee Leftist E Female 25 Lawyer Leftist F Female 28 Philologist Leftist

G Female 25 Master student Leftist H Female 22 Bachelor student Leftist I Female 21 Bachelor student Leftist J Male 26 Bachelor student Centrist→ Left K Male 30 Journalist (PhD Centrist student) L Male 27 Professor of Leftist intern. relations M Male 24 Master student Anarchist- Communist N Male 30 Chef Leftist

O Male 25 Psychologist Leftist

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