DOCSLIB.ORG

Force and Accommodation in World Politics/By Stanley E

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Force and Accommodation in World Politics/By Stanley E Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Spangler, Stanley E. Force and accommodation in world politics/by Stanley E. Spangler . p. cm. "June 1991." Includes bibliographical references and index. l. United States-Foreign relations-Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union-Foreign relations--United States. 3. United States-Foreign relations-1945- . 4. Soviet Union-Foreign relations-1945- . 5. Pacific settlement of international disputes. I. Title. E183.8 .S65S627 1991 327 .73047--dc 20 91-17932 CIP DISCLAIMER This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts . The views expressed in this publication are those ofthe author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department ofDefense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared forpublic release. For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents US Government Printing Office Washington, DC 20402 ii To My Mother andFather John Haroldand WinifredSpangler THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix PREFACE . xi INTRODUCTION . xiii Notes . xx Part 1 Factors Inhibiting Accommodative Diplomacy since World War II 1 Bargaining with Threats and Incentives: The Nature of Positive Diplomacy . 3 2 Kerman, Containment, and Carrots . 23 3 Historical Analogies, the Containment Paradigm, and the Role of Inducements . 47 4 Other Impediments to Conciliation: Rhetoric, Politics, and Personality . 67 5 Global Change and Superpower Cooperation . 101 v Chapter Page Part 2 Case Studies 6 Quemoy Crisis of 1958 . 143 7 Berlin Crisis of 1958--59 . 193 8 Berlin Crisis of 1961 . 221 9 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War . 251 Part 3 Summary 10 Sticks, Carrots, and Positive Diplomacy: A Review . .293 11 Some Final Thoughts on Force and Accommodation . 337 INDEX . .349 Foreword As we near the beginning of a new century the international system and relations between nations are undergoing far-reaching and fundamental changes. While many conservative observers object to assertions that the cold war is over, there can be little doubt that the conflictual relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has changed enormously in the past few years. While no one can predict what form the relationship will take in years ahead, nor what will eventually come out of the Gorbachev revolution in the USSR, it now seems obvious that things are unlikely to return to the glacial and highly threatening bilateral confrontation of the four decades that followed World War II. All these changes do not mean that conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is a thing of the past. It certainly does not mean that military force will become a virtual nonplayer in the relations between nations . What it does mean, at least in the judgment of the author of this study, is that a host of factors- political, economic, social, and environmental-havecombined in this nuclear age to make many of the past practices of the superpowers irrelevant, counterproductive, or both. As a result, both the superpowers, as well as many other nations, are currently fumbling about, seeking some new system under which their foreign relations can be more profitably conducted. Dr Spangler develops amodel or conceptual approach to foreign policy that he calls "positive diplomacy," which is to him a preferable method of integrating force and diplomacy in this very complicated and increasingly dangerous world. Although he makes no claim that this approach is scientific or exact, it is his considered judgment that the world would be a far safer and more pleasantplace ifpolicymakers handled their international relations with this or a similar policy-making_;~ramework in nthTd, THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK About the Author Stanley E. Spangler is a Secretary ofthe Navy senior fellow and professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He has also served as a senior research fellow at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; as special assistant to the dean and international program adviser at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; as executive director of the World Affairs Council of Boston; as director of the Office of Public and International Affairs at the University of North Carolina; as an associate regional director for the Foreign Policy Association; and as a program officer for the Asia Foundation. He is a past president of the National Council of World Affairs Organizations; a member ofthe Editorial Advisory Committee of the Foreign Policy Association; and a former commissioner on the US National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). A graduate of the University of Montana, Dr Spangler received his master's degree in political science from Columbia University and his doctorate from the University of North Carolina. He is currently working on two other books on US foreign policy; one on the changing nature of deterrence and the other on the Sino-American rapprochement. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Preface With economic pressures, demographic changes, and the acknowledged futility of nuclear war steadily eroding the perceived utility of traditional military force, nations are looking with new favor on many of the conciliatory tools that were used so effectively during the classical diplomacy of the nineteenth century (negotiation, bargaining, the use of inducements)-in short, a diplomacy emphasizing cooperation and accommodation. Mikhail Gorbachev, in spite of his enormous domestic difficulties, has clearly recognized the value of such an approach and has managed to score impressive public relations victories and thereby vastly improve the Soviet Union's image around the world. Force will still be an important player in international politics, especially at lower levels of conflict. An important objective for the United States, then, should be to overcome its traditional inhibitions about conciliatory approaches (especially strong since World War II) and to integrate a new and imaginative accommodative diplomacy with a force structure that is sensible, low profile, but fully sufficient to handle our security needs. We must recognize that it is no longer possible for nations to ensure their own security by superior military force alone; this only increases the level of insecurity for all. Therefore, while the world moves slowly toward some new security arrangement-eventually perhaps some form of world government-it behooves both superpowers to emphasize a cooperative style of diplomacy. The major purpose of this book is to point out that for a variety ofreasons, conciliatory approaches-accommodative measures- have too often been avoided by the United States and, ifused, have too often been undervalued in comparison to military force. To point this up, we have developed a very rough model or conceptual approach to integrating force and diplomacy-in short, a diplomacy emphasizing cooperation and accommodation-in our relations with other nations. Although we make no claim that this approach is a perfect one, we believe that there can be no real safety for any nations until policymakers handle their international relations within this or a similar framework. Many people deserve thanks for assistance on this book, though none of them bear any responsibility for its defects. Foremost among those who have contributed is Hugh Richardson, my chief editor and a key member of the Air University Press staff. Hugh spent many hours helping me to clarify my thoughts and making my syntax more readable, and I am most grateful to him for his fine work. His colleagues at AU Press, Tom Mackin and John Jordan, also read certain sections and made some useful suggestions . Several other people read various parts of the book and made helpful suggestions, including Maj Earl Tilford, Jr., USAF, Retired, and Lt Col Ted Reule, USAF, Retired. Students in my course at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, also made helpful comments on a number of ideas incorporated in the book. I am also particularly grateful to the production staff of Air University Press, headed by Dorothy McCluskie, for all their assistance in typing and technical editing, plus the many other chores that went into developing several drafts of the book. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the very important contribution of my wife, Addie, whose love and support (and occasional barbed remark about completing it) were instrumental in seeing me through to the end. Introduction Whether to be firm and tough toward an adversary, in order to deter him, but at the risk ofprovoking his anger or fear and heightened conflict, or to conciliate him in the hope of reducing sources of conflict, but at the risk of strengthening him and causing him to miscalculate one's own resolve, is a perennial and central dilemma ofinternational relations. -Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing Conflict among Nations Essentially this is a book dealing with the management of international conflict through the use of bargaining, specifically bargaining with coercion and conciliation-in short, the use of both "sticks" and "carrots" to achieve political objectives. Clearly the subject-the use of force and accommodation to achieve political ends-is a topic that has been analyzed over the years by a host of observers, ranging from Niccold Machiavelli to John F. Kennedy. Whether called "deterrence," "coercive diplomacy," "armed diplomacy," "gunboat diplomacy," or whatever, we are interested in how limited force is employed, along with accommodative measures, to influence an adversary and convince him to follow a desired course of action without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.' Note that the primary goal is to influence or persuade the adversary to adopt a course of action satisfactory to you; defeating him militarily is not the objective.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil Mcelroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961
    Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of MassiveSEPTEMBER Retaliation 2012 Evolution of the Secretary OF Defense IN THE ERA OF Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961 Special Study 3 Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961 Cover Photos: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, Thomas Gates, Jr. Source: Official DoD Photo Library, used with permission. Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Evolution of the Secretary OF Defense IN THE ERA OF Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961 Special Study 3 Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense September 2012 ii iii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Contents Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Historical Office of the Office of Foreword..........................................vii the Secretary of Defense, Larsen Consulting Group, or any other agency of the Federal Government. Executive Summary...................................ix Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.
    [Show full text]
  • Interview with VALERY IVANOVICH BOLDIN Present at the Talk Was
    Interview with VALERY IVANOVICH BOLDIN Present at the talk was Oleg Dmitrievich Baklanov This interview was conducted on February 24, 1999, in Moscow by Oleg Igorevich Skvortsov, project director, An Oral History of the Cold War, Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Publication, citation, or general dissemination without the express written consent of the authors is prohibited. O.S. I propose that we start our talk with the following topic: How would you evaluate the domestic situation in the Soviet Union and its standing in the world by the mid-1980s? Were the problems that Gorbachev and his team faced indeed fatal, and did these problems create an irresolvable situation from which there was no escape? Many of those who were close to Gorbachev often express completely opposite opinions on this matter and sometimes even contradict themselves. For example, Chernyaev says in one place that the crisis of the Soviet system was irreversible, yet in another place he writes that the crisis was not critical. Could the Soviet system have been reformed? And even after having declared the ideology bankrupt, could we have preserved the fundamental geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union? Did we have sufficient resources for extricating ourselves from the situation that had come into being by the mid-1980s? In other words, could we have won back what we had lost? V.B. The economic situation on the eve of Gorbachev’s coming to power was somewhat exacerbated by the fact that inflation began to exceed the normal boundaries. Boldin Interview Page 2 of 39 The first thing that happened as a result was that the population started buying up food supplies in large quantities, and, secondly, deposited huge amounts of money into their savings accounts.
    [Show full text]
  • Index to the US Department of State Documents Collection, 2010
    Description of document: Index to the US Department of State Documents Collection, 2010 Requested date: 13-May-2010 Released date: 03-December-2010 Posted date: 09-May-2011 Source of document: Freedom of Information Act Officer Office of Information Programs and Services A/GIS/IPS/RL US Department of State Washington, D. C. 20522-8100 Fax: 202-261-8579 Notes: This index lists documents the State Department has released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) The number in the right-most column on the released pages indicates the number of microfiche sheets available for each topic/request The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.
    [Show full text]
  • US-Soviet Summit November-December 1987
    Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: Ermarth, Fritz W.: Files Folder Title: US-Soviet Summit November 1987 - December 1987 (5) Box: RAC Box 1 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name ERMATH, FRITZ: FILES Withdrawer MID 4/19/2013 File Folder US - SOVIET SUMMIT: NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1987 (5) FOIA F02-073/5 Box Number RAC BOX 1 COLLINS 85 ID Doc Type Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 157588 MEMO ROBERT RISCASSI TO GRANT GREEN 2 11/20/1987 Bl RE SUMMIT 157589 MEMO FRANK CARLUCCI TO THE PRESIDENT 5 11/20/1987 B 1 RE SCOPE PAPER 157590 SCOPE PAPER RE KEY ISSUES FOR THE SUMMIT 7 ND Bl 157591 MEMO FRITZ ERMARTH TO FRANK CARLUCCI 1 11/19/1987 Bl RE SCOPE PAPER 157592 MEMO WILLIAM MATZ TO GRANT GREEN RE 3 11/23/1987 B 1 SUMMIT (W/ATTACHMENTS) The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act• (5 U.S.C. 552(b)J B-1 Natlonal aecurlty claaalfled Information [(b)(1) of the FOIAJ B-2 Releaae would dlacloae Internal personnel rulea and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIAJ B-3 Releaae would
    [Show full text]
  • Interview with Ted Sorensen, President Kennedy's Speechwriter by Sherry and Jenny Thompson, February 2010
    Sorensen interview with Jenny and Sherry February 2010 Q. Your relationship to Thompson and his to Kennedy When John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1960, one of the reasons he ran was because at the height of the Cold War he was fearful that the Eisenhower/Dulles foreign policy of massive retaliation might only lead to nuclear war. Your father, Llewellyn Thompson, who had been US ambassador in Moscow during those late 50’s years was I’m quite certain a career a foreign service officer who was appointed I’m not sure what his title was counselor or maybe Ambassador at Large in the State Department. When CMC broke, (and more details in my new book called Councilor: Life at the Edge of History) on Oct. 16 the first of 13 memorable days of 1962. Historians still call them the 13 most dangerous days in the history of mankind. Because a misstep a wrong move could have started a war which would have turned very quickly into a nuclear exchange. And if the first step were Soviets firing tactical nuclear weapons, The United States, would have responded at least with tactical nuclear weapons and once both sides were on that nuclear escalator, they would have moved up to strategic weapons and then to all-out warfare, and the scientists say that the explosion of so many large nuclear weapons in both eastern Europe and in North America would have produced, in addition to the bombardment of 100s of thousands and millions of people in both countries, would have resulted in radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and in time of every dimension of our planet and would be speed via wind and water and even soil to the far reaches of the planet until that planet was uninhabitable: no plant life, no animal life, no human life, and we you and I would not be talking right now.
    [Show full text]
  • Dartmouth Conf Program
    The Dartmouth Conference: The First 50 Years 1960—2010 Reminiscing on the Dartmouth Conference by Yevgeny Primakov T THE PEAK OF THE COLD WAR, and facilitating conditions conducive to A the Dartmouth Conference was one of economic interaction. the few diversions from the spirit of hostility The significance of the Dartmouth Confer- available to Soviet and American intellectuals, ence relates to the fact that throughout the who were keen, and able, to explore peace- cold war, no formal Soviet-American contact making initiatives. In fact, the Dartmouth had been consistently maintained, and that participants reported to huge gap was bridged by Moscow and Washington these meetings. on the progress of their The composition of discussion and, from participants was a pri- time to time, were even mary factor in the success instructed to “test the of those meetings, and it water” regarding ideas took some time before the put forward by their gov- negotiating teams were ernments. The Dartmouth shaped the right way. At meetings were also used first, in the early 1970s, to unfetter actions under- the teams had been led taken by the two countries by professionally quali- from a propagandist connotation and present fied citizens. From the Soviet Union, political them in a more genuine perspective. But the experts and researchers working for the Insti- crucial mission for these meetings was to tute of World Economy and International establish areas of concurring interests and to Relations and the Institute of U.S. and Cana- attempt to outline mutually acceptable solutions dian Studies, organizations closely linked to to the most acute problems: nuclear weapons Soviet policymaking circles, played key roles.
    [Show full text]
  • This Year's Presidential Prop8id! CONTENTS
    It's What's Inside That Counts RIPON MARCH, 1973 Vol. IX No.5 ONE DOLLAR This Year's Presidential Prop8ID! CONTENTS Politics: People .. 18 Commentary Duly Noted: Politics ... 25 Free Speech and the Pentagon ... .. .. 4 Duly Noted: Books ................ ......... 28 Editorial Board Member James. Manahan :e­ Six Presidents, Too Many Wars; God Save This views the past wisdom of Sen. RIchard M .. NIX­ Honorable Court: The Supreme Court Crisis; on as it affects the cases of A. Ernest FItzge­ The Creative Interface: Private Enterprise and rald and Gordon Ru1e, both of whom are fired the Urban Crisis; The Running of Richard Nix­ Pentagon employees. on; So Help Me God; The Police and The Com­ munity; Men Behind Bars; Do the Poor Want to Work? A Social Psychological Study of The Case for Libertarianism 6 Work Orientations; and The Bosses. Mark Frazier contributing editor of Reason magazine and New England coordinator for the Libertarian Party, explains why libe:allsm .and Letters conservatism are passe and why libertanan­ 30 ism is where it is at. 14a Eliot Street 31 Getting College Republicans Out of the Closet 8 Last month, the FORUM printed the first in a series of articles about what the GOP shou1d be doing to broaden its base. Former RNC staff- er J. Brian Smith criticized the Young Voters Book Review for the President for ignoring college students. YVP national college director George Gordon has a few comments about what YVP did on The Politics of Principle ................ 22 campus and what the GOP ought to be doing John McCIaughry, the one-time obscure Ver­ in the future.
    [Show full text]
  • Breakthrough Emerging New Thinking EDITORS - in - CHIEF Anatoly Gromyko • Martin Hellman
    Breakthrough Emerging New Thinking EDITORS - IN - CHIEF Anatoly Gromyko • Martin Hellman EXECUTIVE EDITORS Craig Barnes • Alexander Nikitin SENIOR EDITORS Donald Fitton • Sergei Kapitza Elena Loshchenkova • William McGlashan Andrei Melville • Harold Sandler ONLINE EDITOR Olivia Simantob Breakthrough Emerging New Thinking Soviet and Western Scholars Issue a Challenge to Build a World Beyond War Walker and Company 720 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10019 Breakthrough/Poriv Copyright © 1988 by Beyond War Foundation A note about the online version of Breakthrough: the publisher grants permission for any or all of the book to be used for non-profit, educational purposes only. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocyping, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in the United States of America in 1988 by the Walker Publishing Company, Inc. Published simultaneousely in Canada by Thomas Allen & Son, Canada, Limited, Markham, Ontario. Published online in 2001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Title Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking Includes references. 1. Nuclear arms control. 2. Security, International. 3. International relations. I. Gromyko, Anatolii Andreevich. II. Hellman, Martin E. JX 1974.7.B678 1988 327.1-74 87-23009 Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking ISBN 0-8027-1026-3 ISBN 0-8027-1015-8 Printed in the United States of America 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Published simultaneousely in the Soviet Union by Progress Publishing Company, Moscow. Dedication To our children and grandchildren Contents Acknowledgements x Preface: A Messgae to the Scientific Community xi Sergei P.
    [Show full text]
  • 1961–1963 First Supplement
    THE JOHN F. KENNEDY NATIONAL SECURITY FILES USSRUSSR ANDAND EASTERNEASTERN EUROPE:EUROPE: NATIONAL SECURITY FILES, 1961–1963 FIRST SUPPLEMENT A UPA Collection from National Security Files General Editor George C. Herring The John F. Kennedy National Security Files, 1961–1963 USSR and Eastern Europe First Supplement Microfilmed from the Holdings of The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts Project Coordinator Robert E. Lester Guide compiled by Nicholas P. Cunningham A UPA Collection from 7500 Old Georgetown Road • Bethesda, MD 20814-6126 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The John F. Kennedy national security files, 1961–1963. USSR and Eastern Europe. First supplement [microform] / project coordinator, Robert E. Lester. microfilm reels ; 35 mm. — (National security files) “Microfilmed from the holdings of the John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.” Accompanied by a printed guide compiled by Nicholas P. Cunningham. ISBN 1-55655-876-7 1. United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union—Sources. 2. Soviet Union—Foreign relations—United States—Sources. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1961–1963— Sources. 4. National security—United States—History—Sources. 5. Soviet Union— Foreign relations—1953–1975—Sources. 6. Europe, Eastern—Foreign relations—1945– 1989. I. Lester, Robert. II. Cunningham, Nicholas P. III. University Publications of America (Firm) IV. Title. V. Series. E183.8.S65 327.73047'0'09'046—dc22 2005044440 CIP Copyright © 2006 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. ISBN 1-55655-876-7.
    [Show full text]
  • Papers of ADOLF A. SERLE, 1912-1974
    Papers of ADOLF A. SERLE, 1912-1974 Accession Numbers: Ms. 74-11 , Ms . 74-14, Ms . 75- 9, Ms . 83-11 , The papers were presented to the Library by Mrs. Adolf A. Serle in 1973, 1974, a nd 1982. Mrs. Be rle 's copyrigh t interest in these papers has been do­ nated to the' Un ited States Government. However, Mrs. Serle and Travis S. Jacobs published an edited version of Adolf A. Berle 's diary under the title Navigating the Rapids 1918-1971: From the Papers of Adolf A. Serle. Copy­ right to tha t part of the diary published in Navig a ting the Rapids, which amoun ts to approximately 20 percent of the total di ary fi le, has been retained by the publishe r Harcourt Srace Jovanovich, Inc. Researchers who wish to re­ produce or quote from copyrighted portio ns of the diary must. obta in permission from the publisher. Quantity: 98 linear feet (196,000 pages) Restrictions: These papers conta in documents restricted in accordance w ith Executive Order 12356, and material that might be used to e mba rrass, harass, or injure living persons has been c losed. Rela ted Material: Transcript of the interview with Adolf A. Serle conducted by the C olumbia Oral History Project. Permission to c ite or quote must be obtained from Mrs. Adolf A. Serle. Electros tptic copies of correspondence between Fletcher Warren and A. A. Serle from the Warren Papers in East Texas State Unive r­ si t y Library at Commerce, Texas 75428. I ADOLF A.
    [Show full text]
  • Barry Goldwater a Team of Amateurs and the Rise of Conservatism Nicholas D'angelo Union College - Schenectady, NY
    Union College Union | Digital Works Honors Theses Student Work 6-2014 In Reckless Pursuit: Barry Goldwater A Team of Amateurs and the Rise of Conservatism Nicholas D'Angelo Union College - Schenectady, NY Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses Part of the American Politics Commons, Political History Commons, and the President/ Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation D'Angelo, Nicholas, "In Reckless Pursuit: Barry Goldwater A Team of Amateurs and the Rise of Conservatism" (2014). Honors Theses. 508. https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/508 This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Union | Digital Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Union | Digital Works. For more information, please contact [email protected]. In Reckless Pursuit: Barry Goldwater, A Team of Amateurs and the Rise of Conservatism By Nicholas J. D’Angelo ***** Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in the Department of History UNION COLLEGE June 2014 In Reckless Pursuit | i ABSTRACT D’ANGELO, NICHOLAS J. In Reckless Pursuit: Barry Goldwater, A Team of Amateurs and the Rise of Conservatism Department of History, Union College, June 2014 ADVISOR: Andrew J. Morris, Ph.D. Before 1964, Barry Goldwater had never lost an election. In fact, despite being the underdog in both of his U.S. Senate elections in Arizona, in 1952 and 1958, he defied the odds and won. His keen ability for organization, fundraising and strategy was so widely respected that his Republican colleagues appointed the freshman senator to chair their campaign committee in 1955, with conservatives and liberals alike requesting his aid during contentious elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet-Third World Relations : " the Economic Bind "
    FINAL REPORT T O NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS : " THE ECONOMIC BIND " AUTHOR : Elizabeth K . Valkenie r CONTRACTOR : The Trustees of Columbia University in the Cit y of New Yor k PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Robert L . Belkna p COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 624- 2 The work leading to this report was supported in whole or i n part from funds provided by the National Council for Sovie t and East European Research . Summary SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS : THE ECONOMIC BIN D Elizabeth Kridl Valkenie r This report examines the strains and binds that have recentl y appeared in Soviet-Third World economic relations . Their sources ar e p ricipally three : (a) the failure of the USSR to become a viabl e trade partner and an adequate aid donor ; (b) the emergent discre panc y between Soviet economic interests and di plomatic goals ; (c) th e Soviet ado p tion of a far less hostile attitude toward capitalis t institutions in the development process and toward the Western rol e in the world economy . New p erc e p tions on these three issues have no t as yet produced any startling departures in Soviet policy . Never- theless, they produce ambiguities and dilemmas that weaken the Sovie t posture and operations in the Third World . During most of the post-Stalin ex pansion into the Third Worl d there had been a congruence between economic activities, politica l objectives and Marxist theory -- all being aimed at undermining, i f not liquidating, the Western presence .
    [Show full text]