Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Spangler, Stanley E. Force and accommodation in world politics/by Stanley E. Spangler . p. cm. "June 1991." Includes bibliographical references and index. l. United States-Foreign relations-Soviet Union. 2. Soviet Union-Foreign relations--United States. 3. United States-Foreign relations-1945- . 4. Soviet Union-Foreign relations-1945- . 5. Pacific settlement of international disputes. I. Title. E183.8 .S65S627 1991 327 .73047--dc 20 91-17932 CIP DISCLAIMER This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts . The views expressed in this publication are those ofthe author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department ofDefense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared forpublic release. For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents US Government Printing Office Washington, DC 20402 ii To My Mother andFather John Haroldand WinifredSpangler THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix PREFACE . xi INTRODUCTION . xiii Notes . xx Part 1 Factors Inhibiting Accommodative Diplomacy since World War II 1 Bargaining with Threats and Incentives: The Nature of Positive Diplomacy . 3 2 Kerman, Containment, and Carrots . 23 3 Historical Analogies, the Containment Paradigm, and the Role of Inducements . 47 4 Other Impediments to Conciliation: Rhetoric, Politics, and Personality . 67 5 Global Change and Superpower Cooperation . 101 v Chapter Page Part 2 Case Studies 6 Quemoy Crisis of 1958 . 143 7 Berlin Crisis of 1958--59 . 193 8 Berlin Crisis of 1961 . 221 9 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War . 251 Part 3 Summary 10 Sticks, Carrots, and Positive Diplomacy: A Review . .293 11 Some Final Thoughts on Force and Accommodation . 337 INDEX . .349 Foreword As we near the beginning of a new century the international system and relations between nations are undergoing far-reaching and fundamental changes. While many conservative observers object to assertions that the cold war is over, there can be little doubt that the conflictual relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has changed enormously in the past few years. While no one can predict what form the relationship will take in years ahead, nor what will eventually come out of the Gorbachev revolution in the USSR, it now seems obvious that things are unlikely to return to the glacial and highly threatening bilateral confrontation of the four decades that followed World War II. All these changes do not mean that conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is a thing of the past. It certainly does not mean that military force will become a virtual nonplayer in the relations between nations . What it does mean, at least in the judgment of the author of this study, is that a host of factors- political, economic, social, and environmental-havecombined in this nuclear age to make many of the past practices of the superpowers irrelevant, counterproductive, or both. As a result, both the superpowers, as well as many other nations, are currently fumbling about, seeking some new system under which their foreign relations can be more profitably conducted. Dr Spangler develops amodel or conceptual approach to foreign policy that he calls "positive diplomacy," which is to him a preferable method of integrating force and diplomacy in this very complicated and increasingly dangerous world. Although he makes no claim that this approach is scientific or exact, it is his considered judgment that the world would be a far safer and more pleasantplace ifpolicymakers handled their international relations with this or a similar policy-making_;~ramework in nthTd, THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK About the Author Stanley E. Spangler is a Secretary ofthe Navy senior fellow and professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He has also served as a senior research fellow at the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; as special assistant to the dean and international program adviser at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; as executive director of the World Affairs Council of Boston; as director of the Office of Public and International Affairs at the University of North Carolina; as an associate regional director for the Foreign Policy Association; and as a program officer for the Asia Foundation. He is a past president of the National Council of World Affairs Organizations; a member ofthe Editorial Advisory Committee of the Foreign Policy Association; and a former commissioner on the US National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). A graduate of the University of Montana, Dr Spangler received his master's degree in political science from Columbia University and his doctorate from the University of North Carolina. He is currently working on two other books on US foreign policy; one on the changing nature of deterrence and the other on the Sino-American rapprochement. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Preface With economic pressures, demographic changes, and the acknowledged futility of nuclear war steadily eroding the perceived utility of traditional military force, nations are looking with new favor on many of the conciliatory tools that were used so effectively during the classical diplomacy of the nineteenth century (negotiation, bargaining, the use of inducements)-in short, a diplomacy emphasizing cooperation and accommodation. Mikhail Gorbachev, in spite of his enormous domestic difficulties, has clearly recognized the value of such an approach and has managed to score impressive public relations victories and thereby vastly improve the Soviet Union's image around the world. Force will still be an important player in international politics, especially at lower levels of conflict. An important objective for the United States, then, should be to overcome its traditional inhibitions about conciliatory approaches (especially strong since World War II) and to integrate a new and imaginative accommodative diplomacy with a force structure that is sensible, low profile, but fully sufficient to handle our security needs. We must recognize that it is no longer possible for nations to ensure their own security by superior military force alone; this only increases the level of insecurity for all. Therefore, while the world moves slowly toward some new security arrangement-eventually perhaps some form of world government-it behooves both superpowers to emphasize a cooperative style of diplomacy. The major purpose of this book is to point out that for a variety ofreasons, conciliatory approaches-accommodative measures- have too often been avoided by the United States and, ifused, have too often been undervalued in comparison to military force. To point this up, we have developed a very rough model or conceptual approach to integrating force and diplomacy-in short, a diplomacy emphasizing cooperation and accommodation-in our relations with other nations. Although we make no claim that this approach is a perfect one, we believe that there can be no real safety for any nations until policymakers handle their international relations within this or a similar framework. Many people deserve thanks for assistance on this book, though none of them bear any responsibility for its defects. Foremost among those who have contributed is Hugh Richardson, my chief editor and a key member of the Air University Press staff. Hugh spent many hours helping me to clarify my thoughts and making my syntax more readable, and I am most grateful to him for his fine work. His colleagues at AU Press, Tom Mackin and John Jordan, also read certain sections and made some useful suggestions . Several other people read various parts of the book and made helpful suggestions, including Maj Earl Tilford, Jr., USAF, Retired, and Lt Col Ted Reule, USAF, Retired. Students in my course at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, also made helpful comments on a number of ideas incorporated in the book. I am also particularly grateful to the production staff of Air University Press, headed by Dorothy McCluskie, for all their assistance in typing and technical editing, plus the many other chores that went into developing several drafts of the book. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the very important contribution of my wife, Addie, whose love and support (and occasional barbed remark about completing it) were instrumental in seeing me through to the end. Introduction Whether to be firm and tough toward an adversary, in order to deter him, but at the risk ofprovoking his anger or fear and heightened conflict, or to conciliate him in the hope of reducing sources of conflict, but at the risk of strengthening him and causing him to miscalculate one's own resolve, is a perennial and central dilemma ofinternational relations. -Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing Conflict among Nations Essentially this is a book dealing with the management of international conflict through the use of bargaining, specifically bargaining with coercion and conciliation-in short, the use of both "sticks" and "carrots" to achieve political objectives. Clearly the subject-the use of force and accommodation to achieve political ends-is a topic that has been analyzed over the years by a host of observers, ranging from Niccold Machiavelli to John F. Kennedy. Whether called "deterrence," "coercive diplomacy," "armed diplomacy," "gunboat diplomacy," or whatever, we are interested in how limited force is employed, along with accommodative measures, to influence an adversary and convince him to follow a desired course of action without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.' Note that the primary goal is to influence or persuade the adversary to adopt a course of action satisfactory to you; defeating him militarily is not the objective.