Moshe Yaalon Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Strategic Affairs; Former IDF Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen

ISRAEL’S CRITICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS THE FOUNDATION FOR A VIABLE PEACE ISRAEL’S CRITICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR Updated Edition

While there has been significant public discussion about Palestinian demands in this diplomatic formula, there has been little in-depth analysis of Israel’s rights and requirements.

This study is intended to fill that vacuum, presenting a comprehensive assessment of Israel’s critical security requirements, particularly the need for defensible borders that was enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242 and endorsed by past U.S. administrations. The study also details the key elements of a demilitarized Palestinian state, as was proposed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shortly after taking office in 2009.

The vital importance for the defense of Israel of control of the airspace over the West Bank is also carefully considered, as are the risks to Israel of deploying international forces in the West Bank.

Historically, every peace accord the State of Israel has reached with its neighbors has been challenged by other Middle Eastern states across the region or by international terrorist organizations. Given that experience, the only peace that will last over time is a peace that Israel can defend. CENTRAL TEL AVIV AS SEEN FROM THE WEST BANK VILLAGE OF DEIR BALLUT

Introduction by DEFENSIBLE BORDERS Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Strategic Affairs; former IDF Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror Former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff; former National Former Head of the Research and Assessment Division, IDF Security Adviser Intelligence; former military secretary to the Minister of Defense. Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash Brig.-Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel Former Head of IDF Intelligence Former Head of the IDF Strategic Planning Division; former Head of the Negotiation Unit, Office of Prime Minister Dr. Dore Gold Ehud Olmert President, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; former Permanent Representative of Israel to the Dan Diker United Nations Secretary General, World Jewish Congress; Foreign Policy Fellow, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs ISRAEL’S CRITICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS THE FOUNDATION FOR A VIABLE PEACE

Edited by Dan Diker

Email: [email protected] www.jcpa.org

ISBN: 978-965-218-098-8

Production Director and Researcher: Adam Shay Publications Director: Mark Ami-El Associate Editors: Noah Pollak, Ruthie Blum Leibowitz Graphic Design: Studio Rami & Jaki

Preface: Israel’s Continuing Requirements for Defensible Borders in a Rapidly Changing Middle East Dr. Dore Gold 6

Introduction: Restoring a Security-First Peace Policy Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon 12

Defensible Borders to Secure Israel’s Future Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan 22

Key Principles of a Demilitarized Palestinian State Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash 34

The U.S. and “Defensible Borders”: How Washington Has Understood UN Security Council Resolution 242 and Israel’s Security Needs Dr. Dore Gold 50

Control of Territorial Airspace and the Electromagnetic Spectrum Brig.-Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel 70

The Risks of Foreign Peacekeeping Forces in the West Bank Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror 80

Israel’s Return to Security-Based Diplomacy Dan Diker 90

Appendix 1 - Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009 102 Appendix 2 - Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress, May 24, 2011 107

Maps 1. Israel within the 1949 Armistice Lines (pre-1967 Borders) 15 2. Israel’s Strategic Vulnerability from the West Bank 25 3. Israel’s Geographic and Topographic Vulnerabilities Opposite a Prospective Palestinian State 27 4. Israel's Defense Line: The Jordan Rift Valley with the Steep Eastern Slopes of the West Bank Mountain Ridge 29 5. Strategic Terrain Dominating Jerusalem: The Vulnerability of Jerusalem and the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv Highway 31 6. Rocket Threats to Israeli Population Centers from West Bank Terrain 39 7. Israel and the Middle East 41 8. Israel's Airspace Vulnerabilities: The Limited Time for Interdicting Hostile Aircraft 75

About the Authors 112

About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 114

Acknowledgments

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs expresses its profound thanks and appreciation to Miriam and Sheldon Adelson, Steven A. Stern, Alvin Dworman, Roy H. Stern, Nina Rosenwald, Ken and Nira Abramowitz, and James S. Tisch for their vision and generosity in making this monograph possible.

5 Preface: ISRAEL’S CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSIBLE BORDERS IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING MIDDLE EAST

President, Jerusalem Center Dr. Dore Gold for Public Affairs; former Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations

Israel is entering an extremely dangerous This diplomatic assault is being waged period in the years ahead. What little strategic on several fronts, most notably at the certainty Israel enjoyed in the past can no United Nations General Assembly, where longer be taken for granted. Instead, a rapidly the Palestinians are seeking support for changing Middle East is emerging in which establishing a state on the 1967 lines. But neighboring Arab regimes have either been also, several European Union states, including overthrown, or their grip on power has been Britain, France, and Germany, have proposed badly shaken by mass uprisings. The loss of that the Middle East Quartet (consisting of the predictability about threats emanating from U.S., Russia, the EU and the UN Secretariat) surrounding states is being caused by other adopt a similar position. This was confirmed reasons as well. To Israel’s east, for example, by British Foreign Secretary William Hague the ultimate direction of Iraq remains unclear; in March 2011 during an address at Chatham it would be an error to rule out Iraq coming House in London, where he reiterated these under the hegemony of Iran and thereby terms.1 In Washington, there have been both adopting the kind of adversarial posture public and private efforts to press President against Israel that previous Iraqi regimes Barack Obama to join the Europeans and issue assumed in decades past. his own blueprint for Israel’s future borders, based on the same territorial parameters.2 Yet precisely as these developments are underway, Israel is also confronting a new Obama stunned many Israelis on May 19, diplomatic assault that could well strip it 2011, when he declared in an address at of the territorial defenses in the West Bank the State Department that "the borders that have provided for its security for over of Israel and Palestine should be based on forty years. This applies particularly to its the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, formidable eastern barrier in the Jordan so that secure and recognized borders are Valley, which, if lost, would leave Israel eight established for both states." Three days later or nine miles wide and in a very precarious he clarified that Israelis and Palestinians would position against a broad spectrum of military need to negotiate a border "that is different challenges that are likely to emerge to its from the one that existed on June 4, 1967." east in the years ahead. These new demands Nevertheless, his explicit reference to the of Israel, which would be problematic 1967 lines appeared to diverge from past U.S. in any event, are being proposed at the positions on this issue. worst possible time; that is, precisely when large parts of the Middle East appear to be Indeed, traditional U.S. policy recognized that engulfed in flames. Israel is not expected to withdraw from all the 6 Preface Anti-government protesters celebrate in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt, Feb. 10, 2011.

Dore Gold 7 territories it captured in the 1967 Six-Day War. to the Israeli view that defensible borders This was enshrined in the language of UN were still very relevant for guaranteeing Security Council Resolution 242, which was Israel's future. the basis of successive peace treaties between Israel and the Arab states. This principle, in fact, had already been underscored by the The New Strategic Uncertainty main author of Resolution 242, the British ambassador to the UN in 1967, Lord Caradon, Across the Middle East who admitted on PBS: “We didn’t say there should be a withdrawal to the ‘67 line....We all For decades Israeli policy planning has been knew – the boundaries of ‘67 were not drawn predicated upon certain constants. The as permanent frontiers.”3 This key element calculus of the risks Israel could assume if it of Resolution 242 also appeared in repeated decided upon certain territorial concessions letters of assurance to Israel by U.S. secretaries was based on a keen awareness of the policies of state from Henry Kissinger to Warren being pursued by surrounding states. Since Christopher. In 1988, Secretary of State George 1979, Egypt has been formally at peace with Shultz reiterated: “Israel will never negotiate Israel. Though it has refused to progress from or return to the lines of partition or to towards a full normalization of relations, it has the 1967 borders.”4 adhered to the military clauses of its peace treaty which kept the Sinai Peninsula for the The April 14, 2004, presidential letter to Prime most part demilitarized. While Syria joined Minister Ariel Sharon also spoke explicitly the radical bloc in the Middle East led by Iran, about Israel’s right to “defensible borders” and waged a proxy war with Israel through and to Israel’s need to defend itself by itself. its support for terrorist organizations like This point implicitly acknowledged Israel’s Hizbullah and Hamas, it has not launched doctrine of self-reliance, by which the Israel offensive operations against Israel on the Defense Forces were to guarantee Israel’s Golan Heights since 1973. Jordan has formally survival, and not international troops or even been at peace with Israel since 1994 and has NATO. Two months later, the 2004 letter was been able to block efforts by terrorist groups confirmed by massive bipartisan majorities and hostile neighbors to incorporate it into in both the House of Representatives and the front line for future attacks against Israel. the Senate. Significantly, the letter also ruled out the notion that Israel would be expected Today these constants can no longer be to withdraw in the West Bank to the 1967 taken for granted as rebellions against central lines, which were only armistice lines and not governments have been spreading from internationally recognized borders. Yemen to Syria, as well as from Egypt to Bahrain. This wave of change will hopefully Speaking on May 24, 2011, before a joint lead in the long term to accountable and session of the U.S. Congress, Prime Minister democratic governments that will not be Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that Israel prone to military adventurism. But in the could not withdraw to the 1967 line: "Israel will short and medium term, the results of these not return to the indefensible lines of 1967." uprisings could be highly destabilizing and He laid out Israeli security needs beyond bring to power far more radical forces that those lines, stressing the importance of the could seek renewed conflict. Jordan Valley, in particular: "It is vital that Israel maintain a long-term military presence along Israel is not the only state concerned about the Jordan River." He also included "places how these developments will turn out. In fact, of critical strategic and national importance" on March 22, 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense in his list of Israeli requirements for a secure Robert Gates admitted in an interview in the peace. Immediately following his address, Washington Post: “I think we should be alert to Netanyahu was interviewed on Fox News the fact that outcomes are not predetermined by Sean Hannity and further amplified his and that it’s not necessarily the case that position, explaining that Israel was only nine everything has a happy ending....We are in miles wide in 1967. He added that there was dark territory and nobody knows what the "agreement between Israel and the U.S. that outcome will be.”5 Israel must have defensible borders. Because in our part of the world, there's a simple truth, What all this means is that just as Israel faces a peace you cannot defend is a peace that will complete strategic uncertainty with regard to not hold." Undoubtedly, the revolts that were the future of the Middle East, it is being asked transpiring across the Middle East contributed to acquiesce to unprecedented concessions

8 Preface that could put its very future at risk. A number Indeed, Jordanian Prime Minister Marouf of immediate questions arise. First, how Bakhit charged that the Jordanian Muslim can Israel be expected to sign agreements Brotherhood was taking orders from the that are predicated on it withdrawing from Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria.9 strategic territories like the Jordan Valley Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood provided when it cannot be certain if the governments the ideological underpinnings for the leading it negotiated with will even be there in the figures in global terrorism from Khalid Sheikh future? Look what happened in Egypt after Muhammad to Osama bin Laden. In the the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, where last few years, with the rise of leaders like senior political figures have said they will have Muhammad Badie in Egypt and Hammam to re-examine the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty Sayid in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood has of Peace. No one can provide a guarantee to come under a more extremist leadership, Israel that future peace agreements, based which still embraces hard-line doctrines on Israeli territorial withdrawals, will not be against the West and a commitment to overturned. Moreover, it is not at all clear that jihadism.10 Both the Egyptian and Jordanian the regimes ruling today in Syria, Jordan, or Muslim Brotherhood branches, like Hamas, Saudi Arabia will not be overthrown. attacked the U.S. for eliminating Bin Laden.”11

In the West Bank, the regime of Mahmoud Even if the Muslim Brotherhood does not take Abbas has remained in power largely due to power at this initial stage, it will undoubtedly the deployment of the Israel Defense Forces become part of future political coalitions that throughout the area and their counter- will move many neighboring countries into terrorist operations against Hamas and its a much more hostile stance against Israel allies. On May 4, 2011, Abbas reached a new and even one supportive of militant action reconciliation agreement with Hamas, but against the Jewish state. The hostility of the that has not removed the threat of an overall Muslim Brotherhood to Israel should not be Hamas takeover in the West Bank, like the underestimated. It is frequently forgotten 2007 Hamas coup that followed a period that Hamas, which regularly launches of Fatah-Hamas cooperation. Were Israel rocket attacks deliberately aimed at Israeli to pull out of the West Bank, under present population centers, is, according to its own circumstances, it could not depend on Abbas charter, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim remaining, regardless of what is happening to Brotherhood. Arab regimes today across the region. In short, the degree of strategic uncertainty for Israel, Muhammad Badie in late 2010 issued a weekly given current political trends around it, has message in which he plainly stated that the increased sharply. way forward on the Palestinian issue is not through negotiations, but rather returning to jihad and martyrdom (istishhad).12 It The Rising Profile of the Islamists should come then as no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood’s second-in-command and the Muslim Brotherhood announced in February 2011 that the movement will seek to cancel the peace treaty What makes this concern even more between Egypt and Israel.13 compelling is the fact that the strongest political forces today that are now vying for At a minimum, Muslim Brotherhood regimes power in the Arab world, and are seeking to can be expected to provide sanctuary to replace the current regimes there, are tied terrorist groups engaging in active conflict with to the Muslim Brotherhood network. This is Israel. The first Muslim Brotherhood regime, already evident in Egypt, where the Muslim under Sudanese leader Hassan Turabi, hosted Brotherhood had an extremely low profile both Hamas and al-Qaeda in the early 1990s. when President Mubarak was toppled, but since that time its role in Egyptian politics has Second, the present wave of anti-regime grown substantially.6 Even before the current rebellions is loosening control of the central wave of uprisings, Turkey became, after 2006, governments over large parts of several Arab a new center of Muslim Brotherhood activity, states. This has created a vacuum in many hosting its global network in high-profile areas, which is being filled by regional terrorist conferences in Istanbul.7 organizations like al-Qaeda and its affiliates, who seek to establish new sanctuaries beyond The Muslim Brotherhood stands out as one the reach of pro-Western Arab military of the main political forces behind the wave establishments. of protests that took place in Jordan, as well.8 Preface 9 This process is already evident in Yemen. But Undermining a Negotiated Peace it has become accentuated in Egypt, as well, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, where the To conclude, the pressures Israel faces at this Bedouin have drawn closer to Hamas and time to agree to a full withdrawal from the even al-Qaeda affiliates. They have engaged West Bank and to acquiesce to the loss of in a number of acts of sabotage against the defensible borders pose unacceptable risks for Egyptian gas pipeline that supplies both Israel the Jewish state. It also stands in contradiction and Jordan. During the Iraq War, al-Qaeda of to the international commitments that were Iraq sought to set up forward positions in the given to Israel in the past. These recognized Jordanian city of Irbid. The Jordanian security that Israel did not have to agree to a full forces overcame this challenge, but can Israel withdrawal from this territory. always be certain that this will be the case? Additionally, the 1993 Oslo Agreements Third, the undermining of the internal stability envisioned a negotiated solution to the of Sunni Arab states is occurring as Iran seeks Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Borders were to be to consolidate its regional hegemony in the decided by the parties themselves and not entire Middle East. While Iranian interests may be imposed by international coalitions or by be affected by the continuing rebellions in the unilateral acts. In fact, those commitments to Arab world, especially in Syria and Hizbullah- a negotiated solution of the conflict appeared controlled Lebanon, Tehran stands to be a explicitly in the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim major beneficiary of the current instability in Agreement. Notably, that agreement bears critical countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the signatures of President Bill Clinton and and Yemen. officials from the European Union and Russia, who acted as formal witnesses. For Israel, the biggest question is the future orientation of Iraq, where the Iranians have What is clear today is that the Palestinian been supporting a number of key Shiite 14 leadership under Mahmoud Abbas has no parties. Those Iraqi politicians who are interest in a negotiated solution to its conflict prepared to oppose Iranian encroachments 15 with Israel. It prefers to see the international have only done so with strong U.S. backing. community impose territorial terms that are But after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, to its advantage without having to formally what is to prevent Iraq from falling into declare an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iranian hands? For the last numbers of years, and without having to recognize the rights of Lebanese Hizbullah has also been active in the Jewish people to a nation-state of their Iraq, training Shiite militias, along with Iranian own. The idea that the Quartet would dictate Revolutionary Guards. As Iran’s regional to Israel the 1967 lines and set the stage for power grows, will Iraq still be oriented an imposed solution serves this Palestinian towards the U.S. or will it evolve into an interest, but not the interest of achieving real Iranian satellite and re-engage in the Arab- peace. European support for such initiatives Israeli conflict? Iraq is not far away from Israel; would contravene the very peace agreements it is roughly 210 miles from the Iraqi border to they signed in the past as witnesses. It the Jordan River. would set the stage for further Palestinian unilateralist initiatives at the UN in September It has not gone without notice that Saudi 2011 and deal a virtually fatal blow to any Arabia has reinforced its northern border negotiations. with Iraq, considering that it too cannot be certain what Baghdad’s future orientation Finally, it must be added that the people of will be. Israel, as well, cannot rule out Iraq, Israel have undergone a traumatic decade and under Iranian influence, re-engaging in the a half. For the most part, they passionately Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1948, 1967, and 1973, embraced the promise of the 1993 Oslo Iraq took part in the war effort along Israel’s Agreements and yet, instead of peace, they eastern front by consistently dispatching saw their cities attacked repeatedly by waves one-third of its ground forces; in 1991 of suicide bombers that left over 1,000 Israelis Baghdad launched missiles again Israeli dead. Israelis took further risks and supported cities. Regardless of the form it takes, if the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza rejuvenation of Israel’s eastern front is even a Strip in 2005, only to find that there was a remote possibility, how can Israel be expected five-fold increase in rocket fire against Israeli to fully withdraw to the 1967 lines and population centers in the year that followed. abandon its right to defensible borders? Longer-range rockets poured into Hamas- controlled Gaza, as Iran exploited the vacuum

10 Preface created by Israel’s withdrawal. The people 12. Muhammad al-Badi’ – Weekly Message, December of Israel have an inalienable right to security 23, 2010 (from the Muslim Brotherhood website in and to certainty that the mistakes of recent Arabic). The entire Umma [the Islamic people], years will not be repeated. The full withdrawal and not just the Palestinian Authority, is from the Gaza Strip must not be attempted being asked to return to true fundamental again in the West Bank, especially given what principles, that must guide the [handling of is happening today across the Middle East the] Palestinian problem, so that it won’t be region. For those reasons, Israel must not forgotten. Therefore, relating to negotiations, to recognition [of Israel], to reconciliation [with be asked to concede its right to defensible Israel], or establishing a Palestinian state in the borders. ‘67 borders as an axiom, is a big mistake, for the Land of Palestine is Arab and Islamic land, on which their holy sites [of the Muslims] are located. The Jihad for the return of this land is Notes an obligatory commandment incumbent on the entire Arab and Islamic nation....Palestine 1. Herb Keinon, “Hague Comes Out Against Interim will not be liberated by hopes and prayers, Agreement,” Jerusalem Post, March 30, 2011. but rather by Jihad and sacrifice, and we call 2. See, for example, Bernard Avishai, “Next, an Israeli- all Brothers in Palestine to return to national Palestinian Peace Plan,” New York Times, March unity, on the basis of resistance, for that is the 30, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/ only way to recover Palestine. Jihad is victory or opinion/30iht-edavishai30.html?_r=1&ref=global- martyrdom for Allah. home&pagewanted=print. (For the complete text in Arabic, see 3. British ambassador to the UN in 1967 Lord http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article. Caradon: “We didn’t say there should be a asp?ArtID=76669&SecID=213). withdrawal to the ‘67 line; we did not put the ‘the’ 13. Rashad al-Bayumi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s in, we did not say all the territories, deliberately. second-in-command, announced in an interview We all knew – that the boundaries of ‘67 were not with Japanese TV (and cited by al-Hayat, March drawn as permanent frontiers, they were a cease- 2, 2011) that the group would join a transitional fire line of a couple of decades earlier....We did government in order to cancel the peace treaty not say that the ‘67 boundaries must be forever; it between Egypt and Israel, as it “offends the Arabs’ would be insanity.” MacNeil-Lehrer Report, March dignity and destroys the interests of Egypt and 30, 1978. other Arab states.” 4. Richard Holbrooke, “The Principles of 14. Michael Gordon, “Meddling Neighbors Undercut Peacemaking,” Israel’s Right to Secure Boundaries: Iraq Stability,” New York Times, December 5, 2010. Four Decades Since UN Security Council Resolution Gordon refers to a WikiLeaks U.S. cable from 242” (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public November 13, 2009, according to which Iran was Affairs, 2009), p. 45. spending up to $200 million annually on political 5. David Ignatius, “Gates Underlines the Dangers in groups in Iraq. the Middle East,” Washington Post, March 22, 2011. 15. Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, “Stand with 6. Michael Slackman, “Islamist Group Is Rising Force Iraq,” Weekly Standard, April 18, 2011. in a New Egypt,” New York Times, March 24, 2011. 7. “Islam and the Arab Revolutions,” The Economist, April 2-8, 2011. See also, “Energized Muslim Brotherhood in Libya Eyes a Prize,” CNN, March 25, 2011. 8. Ranya Kadri and Isabel Kershner, “Protestors Rally into Night in Jordan,” New York Times, April 1, 2011. 9. Taylor Luck, “Gov’t, Islamists in ‘Dangerous Game,’” Jordan Times, April 1, 2011. 10. For a discussion about the more extremist trends in the Muslim Brotherhood, see Shadi Hamid, “A Radical Turn for the Muslim Brotherhood?” Brookings Institution, June 26, 2010; and Jonathan D. Halevi, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: In Their Own Words,” February 6, 2011, Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Hammam Sayid was known before his election as head of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to have made statements in support of Osama bin Laden; see al-Hawadeth, September 24, 2001. Regarding the harder line of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood under its new leader, see Nour Malas, “Brotherhood Raises Syrian Profile,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011. 11. Jonathan D. Halevy, “Who Else Is Condemning the U.S. for Killing Bin Laden?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs blog, May 5, 2011.

Preface 11 INTRODUCTION: RESTORING A SECURITY- FIRST PEACE POLICY

Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon Strategic Affairs; former IDF Chief of Staff

Israel’s vital security requirements and a experienced first-hand the dangers the Jewish conditional endorsement of a Palestinian state state faces on all fronts, particularly in Gaza were laid out by Prime Minister Benjamin and Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), and Netanyahu in his first major policy speech from groups and regimes sponsored by Iran. at Bar-Ilan University, just two months after he took office in April 2009. Though at first Throughout my military career, that included glance it may appear as though Netanyahu the Oslo “peace process” in the 1990s, I dealt articulated a major shift in Israel’s policy, the with Palestinian and radical Islamic terror as ideas he endorsed represent a restoration of an IDF officer in a variety of posts. I served as Israel’s traditional security-based approach to head of Military Intelligence, Deputy Chief achieving a lasting peace. This policy has been of Staff, and then as Chief of Staff of the IDF based on the government’s understanding during operations against the Palestinian of the strategic environment in the Middle Authority’s paramilitary forces, Fatah East and the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli militias, and Hamas forces in Gaza and Judea conflict. That is, since the beginning of the and Samaria from 2000 to 2005. The hard conflict, even before the founding of the state reality of these experiences taught me the and all the way through the Oslo Accords, the importance of confronting security threats, readiness of the Zionist leadership to reach ensuring the appropriate security protection an historic compromise has failed to convince systems, and not succumbing to wishful the Palestinians to forgo their commitment thinking about Israel’s enemies. Today, the to “armed struggle” and other forms of relative calm on Israel’s borders and in Judea opposition to the right of the Jewish people and Samaria should not be misinterpreted. to live peacefully in a nation-state of their own Notwithstanding security improvements in their historic home, the Land of Israel. by the Palestinian National Security Forces trained by Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton under the This background supports this urgently U.S.-backed security reform program, the IDF needed policy study, Israel’s Critical Security has been working around the clock to uproot Requirements for Defensible Borders: The the terror infrastructure in many Palestinian Foundation for a Viable Peace. Israel’s security areas, while Iranian-backed Hamas has requirements in any agreement with the rebuilt its military capabilities in Gaza, as has Palestinians are presented here by some Iran’s Hizbullah proxy throughout Lebanon. of Israel’s best military minds, who have It is with these considerations in mind that 12 Introduction Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin launched a marathon Knesset debate in September 1993 following the Oslo Peace Accord signed with PLO leader Yasser Arafat at the White House. Until his assassination in 1995, Rabin took a "security-first" approach, insisting on defensible borders for Israel and a demilitarized Palestinian entity that "would be less than a state."

Moshe Yaalon 13 Israel must approach the establishment of a leaders understood that these lines were prospective Palestinian state. indefensible.

This study is a corrective to the What Rabin envisioned for Judea and Samaria was something along the lines of the “Allon widely-held view that peace Plan,” originally drafted by Yigal Allon, Rabin’s former commander in the pre-state requires Israel to withdraw to Palmach, and former foreign minister under the perilous 1949 armistice Rabin. Drafted shortly after the Six-Day War, the Allon Plan called for Israel to retain lines. These lines would invite sovereignty in some of the territories it came war by denying the Jewish state to control in Judea and Samaria, but not to settle in areas with large Arab populations. strategic depth and topographical The plan delineated a security border protection. extending from the Jordan Valley up the steep eastern slopes of the Judea-Samaria This study is a corrective to the widely-held mountain ridge and retained sovereignty view in many international quarters and over Jerusalem as Israel’s united capital. The even in limited circles in Israel about the Allon Plan served as the security reference “need” and even the “inevitability” that peace point for Israeli governments from 1967 until requires Israel to withdraw to the perilous far into the 1990s. 1949 armistice lines (erroneously called the 1967 “borders”). These borders would not Rabin was very clear on the need to achieve peace – they would weaken Israel provide Palestinian autonomy, yet maintain and invite war by denying the Jewish state defensible borders for Israel. In his speech strategic depth and topographical protection before the Knesset on October 5, 1995, against Palestinian rocket and other on the ratification of the Israel-Palestinian attacks. The 1949 armistice lines enabled Interim Agreement – a month before he was Israel’s enemies to deploy and operate in assassinated – he stated: “We would like this dangerously close proximity to Israel’s main to be an entity which is less than a state, and population centers to such an extent that which will independently run the lives of the they constituted an existential threat to Israel. Palestinians under its authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which Brief Historical Context existed before the Six-Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 line.” In the same Israeli policy immediately following the Six- speech Rabin emphasized that "The security Day War in 1967, and up to the Oslo Accords border of the State of Israel will be located in in 1993, centered on finding a formula that the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of would enable Israel to avoid ruling over that term."1 He added that Jerusalem would the Palestinians, without returning to the remain Israel’s united capital. unstable pre-war ‘67 lines. It was on this basis that Israel did not annex Judea, Samaria and The erosion of the concept of defensible Gaza, yet at the same time did not speak of borders began in 2000 when Prime Minister a Palestinian state within those territories. In Ehud Barak went to the Camp David fact, nothing that Israel did or said in those summit with PA Chairman Yasser Arafat years – including at the 1978 Camp David and U.S. President Bill Clinton to negotiate Accords between Israeli Prime Minister an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Sensing that the Israeli public was ripe for Anwar Sadat, which called for “autonomy for substantial concessions in exchange for a the Palestinian people,” and later, in 1993, peace agreement, Barak decided to put when Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin entered the Palestinians to the test. He did this by into the Oslo Accords – constituted intent abandoning defensible borders and waiting or consent to establish a Palestinian state to see whether Arafat would accept Israel’s within the pre-war ‘67 lines. Those Israeli unprecedented peace offer, and if not,

14 Introduction Israel within the 1949 Armistice Lines (pre-1967 Borders)

“expose his true colors.” The result was the Day War. Instead, from that point on, Israel latter. was expected to live within the curtailed borders that Barak had proposed. Even However, in doing so, Israel paid a heavy price more far-reaching, the Palestinian leadership – one that it continues to pay today. Barak succeeded in establishing in the minds of inaugurated a new land-for-peace paradigm Western policymakers the idea that the “1967 that was not rooted in UN Security Council lines” – that is, the 1949 armistice lines – Resolution 242 of 1967, which had governed should be the new frame of reference for all all Arab-Israeli peace initiatives since the Six- future negotiations, as opposed to the notion

Moshe Yaalon 15 of “secure and recognized boundaries” which George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel had been unanimously approved by the UN Sharon in 2004, will ensure that Israel will be Security Council after the Six-Day War. able to defend itself in the future. In the aftermath of Arafat’s rejection of Ehud Barak’s peace offer, the Palestinian suicide bombing war that followed, Ariel Sharon’s The Implosion of the Land for Peace withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the Second Lebanon War, the failed Annapolis talks, Formula and its Consequences and the recent war in Gaza, the Netanyahu government is readopting the notion The idea of “land for peace” began a rapid that safeguarding Israel’s vital security deterioration during the Oslo years, in the requirements is the only path to a viable mid-1990s, when the territory that was and durable peace with our Palestinian placed under Palestinian control was used neighbors. This includes defensible borders, to create terrorist cadres for attacks against a demilitarized Palestinian entity, control of Israel – a phenomenon which culminated a unified airspace with Judea and Samaria, in the outbreak of the suicide-bombing war electromagnetic communications frequency commonly known as the Second (or Al-Aksa) security, and other guarantees. This marks Intifada. “Land for peace” was dealt another a shift away from the previously held blow when Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005 misperception that territorial withdrawals and was repaid with a Hamas takeover of the would make room for a peace deal, and territory and a dramatic escalation of rocket that such a deal would bring security. Prime attacks on Israeli cities. Minister Netanyahu is articulating a broad Israeli consensus that has been forged in the The lessons learned in both cases is that the trauma of recent events for a security-first Palestinians have adhered to their historical approach as the only avenue to real peace. narrative of armed struggle that denies Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish nation-state, regardless of signed agreements or unilateral The return to a security-first Israeli withdrawals. In short, the Palestinians approach is firmly rooted in have interpreted Israeli territorial withdrawals as signs of weakness and retreat that have Israel’s longstanding commitment energized their struggle to force additional to defend itself by itself. Israel has Israeli territorial concessions

never asked any foreign power to Rejecting the failed, concession-based endanger its troops in its defense. formulas of previous governments is not the only about-face in Israeli strategy that the Perhaps the most important element of a Netanyahu government has undertaken. viable security framework is the requirement Another element involves the expectations of that the Palestinians at all levels of society Palestinian society. Until now, the Palestinians inculcate in their people a culture of peace have only been asked for a “top-down” peace that forswears indoctrination and incitement process, throughout which their leaders have to violence and terror, and accepts the Jewish held meetings, shaken hands, attended peace people’s 3,300-year connection to the Land of conferences, and even signed agreements Israel and its right to live in Israel – the Jewish with Israeli leaders. But none of this was nation-state – in peace and security. supported from the “bottom-up.”

The return to a security-first approach When a peace process does not sprout from is firmly rooted in Israel’s longstanding the grassroots of a society, it is both pointless commitment to defend itself without reliance and useless. Indeed, until three-year-old on foreign forces. Israel has never asked any children in Ramallah stop being taught to foreign power to endanger its troops in its idolize “martyrs” who blow themselves up for defense. Israel’s insistence on defensible jihad against Israelis and Jews, ideas which borders, which was a central guarantee of are also broadcast on Palestinian television, the exchange of letters between President radio and the Internet, there will only be a

16 Introduction “peace process” in the imaginations of the grounds for attacks on Israel. This would Palestinian girls from self-deluded. pose a particularly serious threat due to the Islamic Jihad, which topography of the territory, which includes is financed and armed Had Israel’s experience with the Palestinians high ground from which even relatively by Iran’s Revolutionary been different – had Oslo led to peace instead primitive rockets – and even mortars – could Guards, carry toy guns in of suicide bombers; had disengagement led easily strike Ben-Gurion International Airport. a demonstration at the Palestinian Legislative to a flourishing society within Gaza rather Council in Gaza City than a launching site for Hamas rockets under the control of the and a destination for Iranian weapons – the Defensible Borders in the Age of Palestinian Authority, Israeli government’s considerations on how July 31, 2004. to reach a compromise on the borders of Rocket Terror a Palestinian state would be different. As the situation stands today, Israel’s security The debate over defensible borders is primarily depends on its retaining defensible borders. a debate about Judea and Samaria and the This means maintaining control over key calamities that would befall Israel should this areas of Judea and Samaria and certainly territory be captured by radical Fatah factions over an undivided Jerusalem. Any division of or, like Gaza, by Hamas. Maintaining defensible Israel’s capital city will invite sniper attacks, borders is primarily a strategy for ensuring that and mortar and rocket fire on the country’s such events never take place – and that if they capital from the surrounding high ground. do, Israel can respond swiftly to the threat. In the event that the Palestinians obtain full There are several specific threats that sovereignty in Judea and Samaria, those defensible borders can help prevent. The first areas – as Gaza before them – may be quickly is that of rockets. Today, Hamas possesses taken over by Hamas and become staging rockets with a range of more than 50

Moshe Yaalon 17 kilometers. If launched from the Judea-Samaria could end up being ruled by hostile forces, mountain ridge, these rockets could strike the such as one of the militant factions of Fatah center of Israel where more than 70 percent or its Hamas adversaries. The threat is not of the population resides. This is also why it is just theoretical, particularly in view of the crucial for Israel to control the strategically vital ongoing incitement and indoctrination to Jordan Valley. If it does not do so, the situation terror that takes place under the Palestinian along the Jordan border may become similar Authority. For the sake of Israeli and Jordanian to that of the Gaza-Egyptian border, where security – and indeed for the protection of weapons, terrorists and other forms of support moderate factions inside the Palestinian are easily smuggled to Hamas. Authority – it is vital that the Jordan border retain an Israeli security presence. The second major threat that defensible borders helps reduce are possible attempts by radical Islamic elements to destabilize Strategic Vulnerabilities Jordan or exploit its territory as a launching pad for terror attacks and military operations Israel’s situation prior to 1967 made it a against Israel via Palestinian territory. Israel’s “sitting duck” for enemy attack. Today, with peace treaty with the Hashemite Kingdom all the new weaponry and technological of Jordan is a cornerstone of Israel’s security, developments available to its enemies – making Jordan’s security of great importance and with Hamas located approximately 70 to Israel. km from Tel Aviv – for Israel to revert to having a 14-km waistline (the distance from For the sake of Israeli and Tulkarem to Netanya) would make it not only more vulnerable and inviting of attack, but Jordanian security - and indeed virtually indefensible. Israel must be able to prevent hostile military forces and terror for the protection of moderate groups emanating from within and via a factions inside the Palestinian prospective Palestinian state from attacking Israel’s narrow waistline, especially during Authority - it is vital that the a crisis that draws a large proportion of the Jordan border retain an Israeli IDF away from Israeli territory, such as into Lebanon or Syria. Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon security presence. Farkash, former head of IDF Intelligence, discusses these concerns at length in this If the IDF were withdrawn to the 1949 lines, study. the conquest of Judea and Samaria would become easier and therefore assume even It must be emphasized that there are many greater strategic value to Hamas and its unknowns when it comes to the future Iranian patron, which would surely pour new security of the Middle East and the stability resources into accomplishing this task. Much of the regimes bordering Israel. This will of this effort would concentrate on creating become an especially grave concern should terror networks and hospitable conditions for Iran achieve a nuclear weapons capability. arms smuggling on the Jordanian side of the Such a dramatic shift in the regional border. Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom balance of power could destabilize Sunni would thus both be threatened by the regimes or compel them to cut deals with attempt to develop a “Hamastan” in Judea their new masters in Tehran that would and Samaria. compel them to join Iran in support of terror organizations. The terror groups themselves Israel is prepared to negotiate the parameters will be emboldened by their new nuclear of demilitarized Palestinian statehood with patron and will speak about having acquired the present Fatah-led government in the a protective nuclear umbrella for their Palestinian Authority. But Israel must take into attacks. Meanwhile, Hizbullah and Hamas account the reality that such a government are acquiring weapons with increasing range would be fragile and that there would be a and lethality. significant possibility that a Palestinian state

18 Introduction These terror groups are already penetrating to meddle and attack: on top of the hope of land and sea barriers that had previously taking control of the territory would be the prevented states like Iran and Syria from prospect of seizing valuable stockpiles of transferring sophisticated weaponry. Israel weapons that could be used against Israel. must have robust borders in order to meet Moreover, in a militarized state, there would these possible challenges, including the be few reliable safeguards preventing the threat of non-conventional attack, which transfer or shared use of weapons between cannot be ruled out. Israel is not alone in legitimate Palestinian security forces and confronting these dangers, either currently terror groups and militias, which today and in or historically. The United States risked the past have had many shared members. nuclear war to prevent the Soviet Union from deploying nuclear missiles 90 miles from its It is thus unsafe and unwise to place our southern shore. hopes in the belief that future Israeli peace overtures and concessions will meet with Israel’s retaining control over its borders different results – at least not until Palestinian will make it more difficult for terror groups society reforms itself from within and to use the territory of Israel’s neighbors embraces peaceful coexistence. Since this as a staging area for attacks. This will not has not yet happened, Israel must insist on only enhance Israel’s security, but also the preventing the prospective Palestinian state stability of neighboring governments and from acquiring any arms or maintaining even distant Sunni regimes in the region. It is forces other than those necessary for internal in the interest of all these actors for Israel to Palestinian security and preventing terror maintain defensible borders. attacks on Israel.

But even a demilitarized Palestinian entity Demilitarization does not mean that Israel can afford to fully relinquish security control. In fact, as Prime Minister Netanyahu has said publicly on a This brings us to an additional necessary number of occasions, there will have to be condition for the establishment of a a permanent IDF presence controlling the Palestinian state: that it be demilitarized. border crossings, particularly on the eastern side of any future Palestinian state, as well as Israel’s past experience with peacemaking has the right of the IDF to enter the Palestinian been marked by failure and double-dealing. entity when warranted.2 When Yasser Arafat first passed through the Rafah crossing into the Gaza Strip in May 1994 as part of the “Gaza and Jericho First” agreement with Israel, he violated the Oslo Territorial Withdrawals Encourage Accords from the first moment of his return Israel’s Enemies by hiding prohibited weapons and a terrorist in his vehicle. From that moment to this As for further evacuations of Jewish day, the PA has established a track record of communities, similar to those of Gush Katif failure and bad faith that should make Israel in Gaza and northern Samaria in 2005, reluctant to accept its promises at face value. this, too, has to be considered in a broader The recent decline in Palestinian violence is context – even beyond immediate security not a generous response to Israeli gestures. concerns relating to the Palestinians. The Rather, greater calm has been accomplished fact is that the mere discussion of removing largely because of the construction of the Israeli settlements encourages jihadists across security barrier, ongoing IDF operations in the globe. Their stated aim, after all, is not to Judea and Samaria that keep terrorists on establish a Palestinian state but to “wipe Israel the run, the increased rivalry between Fatah off the map.” Radical Islamist groups, even and Hamas, and a growing realization that those whose ability to harm Israel is small, Palestinian terror doesn’t pay. nevertheless envision the destruction of the Jewish state in stages: first Gaza, then Judea A militarized Palestinian state would actually and Samaria, and after that, Tel Aviv. This is be a standing invitation for terrorist groups not mere semantics, but rather a strategic

Moshe Yaalon 19 objective. We have learned from bitter they are enough of a presence to become experience that territorial withdrawals do not a dangerous obstruction on the battlefield alleviate grievances; they indicate weakness when war breaks out. This has been a great and convince Israel’s enemies that victory is detriment to the IDF’s ability to carry out possible. crucial missions, since it has encountered friction with UNIFIL soldiers, rather than With this in mind, Israel’s counter-strategy focusing solely on engaging the enemy. must be based on strength. Instead of So as not to antagonize the terrorist groups projecting that it is a country in a constant they fear, even when UN forces have state of retreat, Israel must present itself as a intercepted weapons smugglers or uncovered country that stands up for itself and knows terrorist cells, the most they have done how to retaliate, so that its enemies will think is detain them temporarily, then release twice before attacking. them and return their weapons. There was even a case of EU monitors stationed at the Rafah crossing in Gaza who fled the area as The Danger of International Forces soon as the security situation there began to deteriorate even before Hamas’ violent In this policy study, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov takeover in June 2007. Amidror, former head of IDF intelligence assessment, adddresses the proposed It is for these reasons that Israel cannot and deployment of an international force as part should not agree to the presence of foreign of a peace agreement involving an Israeli troops on its soil or the soil of a prospective withdrawal from further territories. Here, too, demilitarized Palestinian state. Israel’s experience has been calamitous. This is not due to ill will on the part of such forces, Israel cannot and should not but rather to the impossibility of their task of preventing and combating hostile activities agree to the presence of foreign along Israel’s borders. troops on its soil or the soil

There are many reasons why international of a prospective demilitarized peacekeeping forces have such a prominent Palestinian state. track record of inefficacy. UNIFIL, to take but one example, operates under a Chapter 6 UN Another change in Israeli strategy that the mandate, which means that it cannot take Netanyahu government considers critical is an independent stance against Hizbullah; it combating the incessant delegitimization must receive permission from the Lebanese of Israel that has become a major feature government, in which Hizbullah is heavily of the strategy to weaken and destroy represented. International peacekeepers tend the Jewish state. The notoriously biased, not to be militarily equipped or organized misleading, and vicious UN-sanctioned to deal with the threats they face. Their Goldstone Report proves the dangers that bureaucratic incentives orient them toward Israel and other liberal democracies face cautious, risk-averse behavior – the exact when forced to combat terror, particularly in opposite of the motives that drive a nation- heavily populated areas such as Gaza, where state’s military forces. These incentives also terrorist forces can operate easily from among encourage the downplaying of threats and civilians. problems and an overestimation of the effectiveness of the peacekeeping forces. This is fine for the peacekeepers, but it endangers those whose lives hang in the balance of the Israel’s National and Historical peacekeepers’ competence. Rights

Peacekeepers are not strong or capable The final element that characterizes Israel’s enough to prevent terrorist groups, which current policy is the emphasis it places intentionally conceal their activities, from on the national and historic rights of the arming and organizing themselves – but Jewish people to the Land of Israel. Without

20 Introduction this component, arguments over security Notes and borders have no context. One of the central challenges Israel has to confront in 1. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ contending with Palestinian aggression is MFAArchive/1990_1999/1995/10/PM+Rabin+in+Knesset its successful “asymmetrical" battle in the +Ratification+of+Interim+Agree.htm. 2. “Netanyahu Demands Israeli Presence in West Bank,” international court of public opinion. This AP, Jerusalem Post, January 20, 2010. battlefield is characterized by the presence of a massive propaganda machine that attempts to convince the world of Israel’s illegitimacy and that advocates its diplomatic and economic isolation.

Israel, for its part, has been so preoccupied with peace, on the one hand, and security, on the other, that it has failed to remind itself and the world of the reason for its establishment in the first place – a reason other than the Holocaust. That Israel has been the Jewish homeland since time immemorial is not only clear from the yearning of Jews throughout history, expressed in the phrase repeated during Passover and as the last words said on Yom Kippur, “Next year in Jerusalem,” it is also substantiated by the ongoing archaeological discoveries proving the existence of Jewish national life in Israel going back more than three thousand years. It is further substantiated by the fact that there has always been a Jewish presence in Israel – sometimes smaller, sometimes larger, dwindling in the past because of persecution and expulsion – but always there. These facts are ignored or denied by the delegitimizers. Now is the time to put these axioms of Jewish rights and history at the forefront of the debate and use them as an integral part of Israel’s security strategy.

Moshe Yaalon 21 DEFENSIBLE BORDERS TO SECURE ISRAEL’S FUTURE

Former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff; Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan former National Security Advisor

Israel’s 1949 Armistice Lines Were As noted elsewhere in this policy study, Israel is a tiny country of about 10,000 square miles, Indefensible approximately the size of New Jersey in the United States or slightly smaller than Belgium. Israel’s fundamental right to “defensible Compounding Israel’s small size is the fact that borders” is grounded in the special legal 70 percent of its population and 80 percent of and strategic circumstances it faced in the its industrial capacity are concentrated in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, when the narrow coastal strip sandwiched between the West Bank and other territories were captured. Mediterranean Sea and the West Bank. The armistice line of 1949, from which Israel was attacked, had only been a military To make matters worse, the adjacent hills boundary between the Israeli and Jordanian of the West Bank topographically dominate armies, and not a permanent political border, the coastal plain, which is a relatively flat according to the 1949 Armistice Agreement and exposed area. This provides distinct itself. This provided the background for advantages to an attacker for observation, fire, UN Security Council Resolution 242 of and defense from an Israeli ground response. November 1967, which did not call on the And there are many targets located along Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw Israel’s coastal plain: Ben-Gurion International fully to that line. Instead, it concluded that Airport, the Trans-Israel Highway (Route 6) Israel would need “secure and recognized which runs north-south only tens of meters boundaries” which could be different from west of the West Bank, Israel’s National the indefensible pre-war lines. Prior to 1967, Water Carrier, and its high-voltage electric Israel’s waistline between its major coastal power lines. If the West Bank were to fall into cities and the Jordanian-occupied West Bank hostile hands, the resulting situation would was approximately eight miles wide at its pose a constant threat to Israel’s national narrowest point, and provided no strategic infrastructure. depth in case of invasion. For this reason, the architects of Israel’s Today, it is commonly misunderstood just national security doctrine from Yigal Allon how vulnerable Israel actually was then to Moshe Dayan to Yitzhak Rabin found and would become once again if it were compelling reasons to insist that it must not compelled to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. return to the vulnerable 1967 lines, which 22 Defensible Borders A commercial jetliner (circled) taking off from Ben-Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv as seen from adjacent Palestinian territory in the West Bank. A SA-7 shoulder fired missile or a Kassam rocket fired from this vantage point would stop all commercial aviation into and out of Israel.

Dore Gold 23 only appeared to invite aggression and battle, in the event Israel comes under attack. imperil Israel’s future rather than set the Should Israel lack this minimal battle space, stage for peace. These Israeli leaders sought then its deterrence posture will be weakened new boundaries that would allow Israel to and the propensity of regional armies to defend itself, by itself. Thus there emerged initiate a surprise attack will grow, in order to within the national security establishment achieve a decisive outcome against the IDF as a broad consensus that called these new rapidly as possible. lines “defensible borders” and urged that they be sought in any future negotiations.1 In These have been the main considerations for 2004, the U.S. provided Israel with a letter of defensible borders, given that conventional assurances recognizing its right to defensible Arab war coalitions formed in 1948, 1967, and borders; it was signed by President George 1973 that featured the deployment of Iraqi W. Bush and was backed by a bi-partisan expeditionary forces to Israel’s east. Since the majority in both houses of the U.S. Congress. end of the 1991 Gulf War and the advent of peace between Israel and Jordan, this danger has diminished in the near term. Yet no one The Threat of Conventional Attack can be certain how Iraq will evolve in the long term: perhaps it will become a new Arab democracy seeking peace with Israel – or it The logic behind Israel’s need for defensible might become a satellite state of Iran, seeking borders is based on four principal threats: to spread Iranian influence in the Arab world. conventional attack; terrorism; mortar and No one can be certain how the alliances and rocket fire (as well as ballistic missiles); and alignments of states in the Middle East will unconventional attacks. When it comes to evolve in the years ahead. Israel cannot plan conventional attack, in contrast to the armed its security around a snapshot of the current forces of the surrounding Arab states, the Middle Eastern political situation, but rather IDF is made up largely of reserve units that must take into account several possible need approximately 48 hours to completely scenarios for the evolution of the region. mobilize. The military formations of the Arab states are mostly active-duty units, with a It should be stressed that guaranteeing small role for reserves. Defensible borders will its security in the event of a massive provide the optimal topographical conditions conventional attack will remain critical for for Israel’s active-duty forces to withstand a Israel, since even today, in the age of missile ground assault by numerically superior forces proliferation, wars are ultimately decided while the mobilization of the reserves is by the movement of armies and not by the completed. employment of air strikes alone. Factually, the massive airpower employed by the The IDF is made up largely United States against Iraq in both 1991 and in 2003 did not bring Saddam Hussein’s of reserve units. Defensible regime to agree to the terms demanded by borders will provide the optimal the UN Security Council. Only the movement of coalition ground forces deep into Iraqi topographical conditions for territory ended the conflict. As long as Israel’s active-duty forces to ground forces remain the decisive element in determining the outcome of wars, then withstand a ground assault by the conditions affecting land warfare, like numerically superior enemy forces terrain, topography, and strategic depth, will continue to be vital elements of Israeli while the mobilization of the national security. Indeed, most of Israel’s neighbors still stress the role of heavy armor reserves is completed. in their order of battle, making land warfare a major component of the Middle East military Even after the mobilization of the reserves is balance of power.2 completed, defensible borders additionally provide the IDF with the necessary strategic

depth it requires for managing a defensive 0 10 Miles

0 10 Kms 24 Defensible Borders Israel’s Strategic Vulnerability from the West Bank

0 10 Miles

0 10 Kms 25 Uzi Dayan The Threat of Terrorism more difficult to locate, especially when they are embedded within a civilian population. Since its foundation, Israel has faced state- They can also be very numerous because of supported terrorism emanating from their low cost. If Israel wants to prevent their the entire Middle East region, and this deployment near strategically vulnerable consideration is especially relevant today. By sites, it must have control of the ground in its presence along the eastern perimeter of those areas and thereby deny hostile forces the West Bank in the Jordan Valley and the the ability to threaten its most vital facilities. Judean Desert, Israel has been able to prevent weapons smuggling and the infiltration of The more Israel’s geographic hostile forces. As a result, the West Bank has not become a battlefield for global jihadists, vulnerability increases, the more like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Indeed, it will face a greater threat from one of the most important preconditions of a successful counter-insurgency or counter- non-conventional attack by Middle terrorism strategy is isolating the area of Eastern military forces, as well as conflict in order to cut off any reinforcement of hostile forces with manpower and material. from non-conventional terrorism.

As we have seen in Gaza, the inability to prevent precisely this flow of weapons and The Non-Conventional Threat manpower has been the source of years of attacks, instability, and diplomatic problems. Defensible borders have continuing relevance in an era in which concern with non- conventional weapons in the Middle East The Threat of Rocket and Mortar Fire is on the rise, especially nuclear weapons. Israel is such a small country that in the Should terrorist forces in the West Bank event of war, it must disperse its population employ mortars or rockets, as they have in and defensive assets as widely as possible Gaza, Israel’s interior would be fully exposed. in order to reduce the enemy’s belief that it Given the fact that the West Bank virtually can achieve a decisive military advantage overlooks Israel’s main cities, sitting several by launching a first strike, without facing thousand feet above major population any retaliatory response from Israel. The centers such as Tel Aviv, it is critical to avert more Israel’s geographic vulnerability the introduction of mortars, rockets, and increases, the more it will face a greater threat surface-to-air missiles into the West Bank. This from non-conventional attack by Middle is not just a theoretical concern or based only Eastern military forces, as well as from non- on a worst-case analysis: Al-Qaeda launched conventional terrorism. This will become an SA-7 shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missile more pronounced should the accessibility of at an Israeli commercial airliner in Mombasa, terrorist groups to Israel be improved, as they Kenya, in 2002. Since then, Hamas has made acquire the ability to use nuclear terrorism in a determined effort to smuggle anti-aircraft the future. missiles into Gaza.

Short-range rockets pose a particular challenge for Israel, rendering the little The Jordan Valley: A Critical land that Israel possesses as a particularly Component of Defensible Borders important defensive barrier. Ironically, the powerful long-range rockets possessed by Since 1967, the Jordan Valley has been the neighboring states are less of a problem than most critical component in Israeli thinking short-range rockets would be in the West about defensible borders, largely because Bank. Long-range rockets are expensive and of its unique topographical features. The require large launching pads or vehicles that entire width of Israel and the West Bank are easily identifiable. Short-range rockets, together averages about 40 miles from the and even shorter-range mortars, are much Mediterranean to the Jordan River. The Jordan

26 Defensible Borders Israel’s Geographic and Topographic Vulnerabilities Opposite a Prospective Palestinian State

LEBANON

Haifa Approximately 40 Miles Jenin הקו הירוק Tulkarem Hadera Nablus

Netanya Kalkilya 9 Miles WEST Ra'anana Kfar Saba BANK Ramat HaSharon Kfar Qasem Rosh Haayin Giv'at Shmu'el Petah Tikva Giv'atayim El'ad Tel Aviv-Yafo Ramat Gan Kiryat Ono

Shoham Holon 6 Miles Bat Yam Rehovot Ben-Gurion International Beit Nehemia Airport Ben Shemen Lod Rishon LeTsiyon ISRAEL Modi'in Ramla Ness Tsiyona

Uzi Dayan 27 Rift Valley itself is only 6 to 9 miles wide. The the expectations of Israeli military intelligence Jordan River is roughly 1,300 feet below sea at that time. level, but it is adjacent to the extremely steep eastern slopes of the West Bank mountain ridge, which at its highest point reaches Why can’t Israel just rely on its 3,318 feet above sea level. Along its peaks military intelligence to warn of Israel has placed early-warning stations facing east. Thus the entire Jordan Rift Valley an imminent attack? In the 1973 constitutes a natural physical barrier against Yom Kippur War, the IDF believed it attack that averages between 3,000 to 4,600 feet.3 It is also an arid zone with relatively would receive timely intelligence, little Palestinian population. Finally, there which turned out to be an are only five east-west passes through which an attacking army can move, each of which enormous miscalculation. can be defended with relative ease, even by Israel’s small standing army. For this reason, One of the areas where intelligence warnings the Jordan Valley has been viewed as the can be faulty is the matter of anticipating the front line for Israel’s defense in an extremely political alignments of Middle Eastern states. uncertain Middle East. For example, Jordan has unquestionably emerged as a vital partner for peace with Given the Jordan Valley’s strategic importance Israel. Yet twice in its recent history, sudden for Israel’s defense, in recent decades the developments led to military escalation in the IDF has deployed brigade-level forces there region, which caused enormous pressure on that could be reinforced by reserve units in the Jordanian leadership to assume a more the event that a significant ground threat hostile posture toward Israel. In 1967, King emerges from the east. In the past, Israel pre- Hussein was the last leader to join the Arab positioned equipment in the Jordan Valley for war coalition against Israel and permit foreign these units. During its negotiations with the armies to enter his kingdom to join the war. Palestinians, Israel has also sought to preserve In the lead-up to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of the right to move its forces to the Jordan Kuwait, there was enormous pressure in Valley across strategic east-west roads. In Jordan to align the kingdom with Saddam many respects, the Israeli force in the Jordan Hussein; in 1989, Iraqi reconnaissance aircraft Valley would serve as a trip-wire to trigger a were given permission to enter Jordanian full reserve mobilization if it was attacked. It is airspace and photograph potential targets no wonder that former Prime Minister Yitzhak in Israel. Israel cannot abandon the Jordan Rabin asserted in his last Knesset address, Valley on the assumption that attacks from delivered in October 1995, that in any peace the east are no longer possible, or that IDF settlement Israel must retain the Jordan forces can be mobilized quickly enough to Valley “in the broadest meaning of that term.” counter them.

Why can’t Israel just rely on the capabilities Indeed, relying on timely reinforcement of its military intelligence to warn of an of Israel’s eastern front by reserve units imminent attack, so that Israel’s reserve forces is becoming increasingly hazardous. As can be mobilized in a timely fashion in order already noted, Israel’s neighbors benefit from to neutralize any potential land attack in having large, active-duty formations, with the future? And having made this decision, only a minor role for reserves. It is in their wouldn’t Israel no longer need to deploy interest to delay Israel’s reserve mobilization a forward force in the Jordan Valley? In the as long as possible and thus preserve their 1973 Yom Kippur War, the IDF maintained own advantageous force balance for a inadequate forces along the Egyptian and longer period of time. Missiles can even Syrian fronts, believing that it would receive disrupt the reserve mobilization altogether timely intelligence to reinforce them. This by targeting meeting points and reserve turned out to be an enormous miscalculation, equipment centers. Under such conditions, because the Egyptians and Syrians managed it can be expected that neighboring states to launch surprise attacks that ran counter to will use their large ballistic missile and long-

28 Defensible Borders Israel's Defense Line: The Jordan Rift Valley with the Steep Eastern Slopes of the West Bank Mountain Ridge

LEBANON Ba'al Hatzor 3318 feet ISRAEL above sea level JORDAN Ba'al Hatzor JORDAN RIF T VALLEY Ramallah

JORDAN RIVER Jericho Ma'ale Adumim W EST Dead Sea BANK 1368 feet below sea level

DEA D SEA

Uzi Dayan 29 range rocket inventories for exactly this to build up Palestinian forces. At the same purpose, to prevent the arrival of adequate time, the whole tunnel industry provides a reinforcements to any of Israel’s fronts, livelihood for thousands of Egyptians who including the Jordan Valley. have no interest in seeing the tunnels shut down. Some observers suggest that Israel could rely on airpower to neutralize any attacking The Jordan Valley is in many respects the army, which would obviate any need for Philadephi Corridor of the West Bank. an optimal defensive line. But in any likely While underground tunneling is not likely, battlefield Israel will face, the air force will the Jordan Valley is vastly longer than the have other high-priority missions before it Philadelphi Corridor and provides a diversity can engage in close air support. First, it will of opportunities for smuggling. If Israel is have to achieve air superiority by destroying proposing that any future Palestinian state the air defense systems of enemy states. remain demilitarized, to prevent it from Then it will need to suppress ballistic missile becoming another Iranian-backed stronghold launches aimed at Israeli cities. Thus, the like Gaza, then the only way to guarantee advent of ballistic missiles and rockets has that prohibited weaponry does not enter its increased the importance of terrain and territory is by Israel retaining control of the strategic depth for Israel, since its small Jordan Valley and physically blocking the standing army may have to fight for longer entry of illegal arms. periods of time without reinforcements from the reserve forces, whose timely arrival may Israeli control of the Jordan Valley also has be delayed or prevented by rocket fire. Israel’s important implications for Jordanian security. standing army may also have to operate for Should the IDF ever evacuate the Jordan a considerable period of time without major Valley, the main effort for the prevention assistance from the air force, which may be of smuggling will fall on the Jordanian busy elsewhere. Army. Once it is widely known that Israel is no longer present to seal off the West The critical importance of the Jordan Valley Bank from the east, it is likely that many for Israel’s security is evident from the regional terrorist groups will seek to exploit Israeli experience with Gaza. When Israel Israel’s new vulnerability and they will seek implemented the Oslo Agreements in Gaza in forward positions within Jordan. This will 1994, it established a security zone between markedly increase the security burden on the southern Gaza and Egyptian Sinai that was Jordanians, and could lead to dangerous new little more than 300 feet wide in several challenges for them. critical areas and came to be known as the “Philadelphi Corridor.” Palestinian groups exploited this narrow corridor and built If Israel were to withdraw from smuggling tunnels from the Egyptian half of the Jordan Valley, the area could the town of Rafah in Sinai into the Palestinian half of Rafah, under the Philadephi Corridor, in easily become a magnet for order to import rockets and other munitions regional terrorist groups seeking into Gaza. Israel fought the tunnels with limited success until 2005, when it withdrew to infiltrate the West Bank and join completely from Gaza – including from the Hamas’ war on Israel. Philadelphi Corridor. In fact, prior to the 2007 U.S.-led surge in After Israel relinquished the Philadelphi Iraq and the setbacks for Al-Qaeda in Anbar Corridor, the scale of weapons smuggling Province in western Iraq, Al-Qaeda had vastly increased and Gaza became a begun setting up offshoots in Jordanian launching pad for rockets of increasing range towns like Irbid which sought to recruit West and lethality aimed at Israeli population Bank Palestinians. If Israel were to withdraw centers. Hamas and other terrorist groups from the Jordan Valley, the area could easily expanded their smuggling efforts, importing become a magnet for regional terrorist weapons from Iran, Yemen, and Sudan. groups seeking to infiltrate the West Bank Hamas operatives could leave Gaza and fly and join Hamas’ war on Israel, whether the to Tehran, where they received training from terrorist operatives come from Al-Qaeda in the Revolutionary Guards before returning Iraq or Hizbullah in Lebanon.

30 Defensible Borders Strategic Terrain Dominating Jerusalem: The Vulnerability of Jerusalem and the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv Highway

Giv'at Ze'ev Nabi Samuil 2526 feet 2920 feet

Beit Iksa Mt. Scopus 2198 feet Giv'at Ze'ev 2710 feet Jerusalem Nabi Samuil approx. 2100 feet 1

Beit Iksa Ramallah Ma'ale Adumim 1476 feet 1949 Armistice Line Motsa Ilit 1 Jerusalem–Tel Aviv Highway Beit Zayit Ma'ale Adumim Jerusalem Abu Dis

Ramat Rachel

Approx. 4.5 Miles

1949 Armistice Line alWalaja Har Gilo

Har Gilo Beit Jala 3068 feet

Uzi Dayan 31 The attraction of the Jordan Valley as an open eroding any Israeli presence within Palestinian smuggling route may also lead to the buildup territory. In addition, any Israeli military of many terrorist groups inside the Jordanian presence would likely serve as a lighting-rod kingdom itself, which would undoubtedly in Palestinian domestic politics. undermine Jordanian security. The last time Jordan became an active base against Israel Furthermore, Israel’s security interests in the was in the late 1960s. In 1970, King Hussein Jordan Valley cannot be met by granting put an end to the vast terrorist infrastructure the area to the Palestinians and deploying created by the PLO in what became the foreign peacekeeping units in the area. (This Jordanian Civil War, because it threatened to issue is discussed more fully elsewhere in this topple his kingdom. study in “The Risks of Foreign Peacekeeping Forces in the West Bank” by Maj.-Gen. [res.] Yaakov Amidror.) Israel’s national security doctrine is rooted in the principle of self- Defensible Borders and Jerusalem reliance, and for good reasons. Israel has accepted international monitors to oversee Jerusalem is one area where Israel’s need implementation of past agreements, but it for defensible borders is acute. Prior to 1967, has always resisted proposals that involved Jerusalem was situated at the end of a narrow soldiers from other armies – including U.S. corridor that began on the Israeli coastal servicemen – risking their lives instead plain. Israel’s capital was surrounded on three of Israeli soldiers. Moreover, the Israeli sides, and near the western entrance to the experience with an international presence city, the corridor was only several miles wide. has been poor. UNIFIL in Lebanon has not Topographically, Jerusalem is surrounded by lived up to Israeli expectations in preventing dominating hills that control the access routes the re-armament of Hizbullah after the 2006 to the city. For example, the West Bank village Second Lebanon War. Equally, EU monitors of Beit Iksa is only a few hundred yards from abandoned their positions at the Rafah the main Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway, which crossing in 2006 when challenged by local could expose Israel’s main transportation insurgents from Gaza. artery connecting its two largest cities to potentially hostile rifle fire. In 1967, the Israel should seek to acquire Israeli Jordanian Army exploited the commanding sovereignty in areas of vital military terrain around Jerusalem to launch some importance in the West Bank, as part of a 9,000 artillery shells into the city’s Jewish territorial compromise, rather than settle neighborhoods. for extra-territorial security arrangements that simply will not last. This was the original After 1967, due to defensive considerations, intent of UN Security Council Resolution 242, Israel moved to establish permanent control which did not envision a complete Israeli of the hills dominating its capital, developing withdrawal from the West Bank, but rather the Givat Zeev settlement bloc to the north, the creation of new borders that would take the Gush Etzion bloc to the south, and the city into account Israel’s security needs and at of Maale Adumim to the east of Jerusalem. the same time assure that any future peace Maale Adumim is also located along one of agreement will endure. To provide Israel the most important strategic east-west roads with the minimal strategic depth it needs for moving Israeli reinforcements into the for its long-term survival, the Jordan Valley Jordan Valley in case of war. It is essential must become Israel’s eastern border, thereby that Israel retain control of these areas that helping to create truly defensible borders. dominate Jerusalem.

Alternative Security Arrangements? Notes

One idea raised in the past – and rejected 1. Yigal Allon, “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders,” by the Palestinians – has been to allow Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, no. 1 (October 1976). 2. Anthony Cordesman, Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era Israeli deployment in the Jordan Valley of Asymmetric Wars (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University and early-warning stations to be placed in Press, 2008), p. 26. territory under Palestinian sovereignty. Yet 3. The highest point of 4,600 feet is measured by the even if the Palestinians accepted such Israeli height differential between the Dead Sea, at 1,300 feet force dispositions, it is questionable how below sea level – the lowest point on Earth, and the apex of the West Bank mountain ridge which reaches a enduring they would be, since any Palestinian height of 3,300 feet above sea level at Baal Hatzor. government would have a strong interest in 32 Defensible Borders Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi views missile launchers, at the Paradise Hotel north of Mombasa used in a failed SA-7 shoulder fired missile attack by Al-Qaeda on an Israeli passenger jet on Nov. 29, 2002. The plane with 261 passengers and 10 crew members landed safely in Tel Aviv with no casualties, but 16 people were killed in a simultaneous suicide bombing on the Israeli- owned hotel

Uzi Dayan 33 KEY PRINCIPLES OF A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINIAN STATE

Former Head of IDF Intelligence Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash

Israel Has Sought Palestinian Despite numerous failed peace initiatives, military operations, and terror assaults by Demilitarization Since Oslo neighboring Arab countries, and in recent years by the Palestinian Authority, Israel The State of Israel’s requirement that a has again extended its hand in peace and prospective Palestinian state be demilitarized compromise, with Prime Minister Benjamin has been in effect since the 1993 Declaration Netanyahu’s recognition of a prospective of Principles (DOP), which served as the basis demilitarized Palestinian state. However, for the Oslo process and the establishment the Israeli public will not countenance living of the Palestinian Authority (PA). However, alongside a Palestinian entity that houses the term “demilitarization,” as it is commonly a terrorist infrastructure or hostile military understood (i.e., a limitation on war materials), forces. is too narrowly defined and does not sufficiently cover the full range of Israel’s security needs. The broader concept includes preventing the development of symmetrical Israel’s Strategic Vulnerability and asymmetrical military threats against Israel – including conventional warfare, Israel’s long-time insistence on the terrorism and guerilla warfare – from and demilitarization of any independent via the territory of the PA and a perspective Palestinian entity stems from strategic security Palestinian state. Demilitarization, then, is a threats that could easily arise both within a means to safeguarding Israel’s security, not an future Palestinian state and from a number of end in itself. hostile regional actors. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has suffered from several regional Since 1936 – even before the founding of the asymmetries in relation to its neighbors that state – and until the present time, Israel has restrict its capacity for self-defense. Israel’s pursued the path of territorial compromise. It population of 7.5 million lives in an area of has done so, despite great inherent security less than 10,000 square miles including the risks, in the hope of achieving peace, stability, disputed West Bank, while surrounded by Arab and prosperity for its citizens and good countries with a population of three hundred relations with its neighbors.1 million and territories 650 times larger than Israel. Israel’s main objective over the years has

34 Demilitarization Two rockets are launched at Israel from Gaza City, May 22, 2007. There was a massive increase in Palestinian rocket and mortar assaults against Israeli cities and towns after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 and in the aftermath of Hamas’ takeover there in June 2007.

Dore Gold 35 been to defend itself against hostile forces, Such a situation would pose an ongoing while its Arab and Palestinian neighbors have challenge for Israel, which would likely face maintained aggressive and hostile intentions, repeated assaults by terror squads attempting notwithstanding historic peace agreements to penetrate its border, or by high-trajectory with Egypt and Jordan. rockets launched into its heartland, as occurred following Israel’s withdrawal from Israel also lacks territorial contiguity with the territory. Hamas rocket attacks on Israeli “friendly” neighboring states that could towns and cities increased by more than provide transportation arteries to help protect 500 percent between 2005 and 2006.5 In the country’s vital defense and national all likelihood, then, a withdrawal from the security interests. West Bank would lead to repeated armed confrontations, making it extremely difficult All of these fundamental asymmetries have for Israelis to go about their daily lives, and led Israel’s military planners to develop a severely hindering the implementation of security concept that includes deterrence, peace agreements. early warning, and decisive force.2 Yet the country still has to contend with an intractable disadvantage – its severe lack of strategic Israel is likely to face two main depth. Israel, including the West Bank, is scenarios in the wake of the approximately 40 miles wide. establishment of a Palestinian This lack of strategic depth has exposed state: Either it becomes a base for Israel to potentially untenable situations in which the Israel Defense Forces is forced to terrorist attacks or a conduit for defend the country from within major cities, threats from further east. such as Safed, Nahariya and Kiryat Shmona in the north, or Ashkelon and Ashdod in In the second scenario, involving the entire the south. Such scenarios became concrete region, the threat to Israel would develop following Israel’s unilateral withdrawals from to the east of the Palestinian state, and Southern Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, Palestinian territory would be used as a which exposed its northern and southern base from which to attack Israel. Islamic population centers to thousands of short- radicalism would provide the context for and medium-range rockets, fired by Iranian this type of threat. The Iranian regime in proxies Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in 2010 is on the verge of acquiring nuclear Gaza. Both may now possess rockets capable capabilities and already possesses ballistic 3 of reaching Tel Aviv. missile capabilities that currently threaten Israel, its Arab neighbors, Russia and parts In the event of a peace agreement with the of Europe. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard PA, Israel may have to forfeit the minimal Corps that controls Iran’s most sensitive depth that is currently provided by the West weapons systems, including its nuclear Bank. program, provides a strategic umbrella for the radical groups it mobilizes as proxies across the Middle East, from radical Shiite militias in Security Challenges Ahead Iraq and Hizbullah in Lebanon to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Israel is likely to face two main scenarios in Bank.6 the wake of the establishment of a Palestinian state, and in light of prevailing trends in the Iran will continue to exploit its growing Middle East: nuclear capacity – and image as a soon-to-be nuclear power – to achieve its ambitions for In the first scenario, the Palestinian state-in- regional hegemony. The Iranian regime will formation would be a failed one, that serves also continue its concerted efforts to exert as a convenient base for the development of control in Iraq through the Shiite majority terrorist infrastructures, as transpired in Gaza there following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. following Israel’s 2005 unilateral withdrawal.4 The consolidation of a radical, Iran-led, Shiite

36 Demilitarization Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz, left; former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, center; and former Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer, right, review 50 tons of weaponry seized from the cargo ship Karine A that was captured by Israel and displayed at the Red Sea port of Eilat, January 6, 2002. The Karine A weapons ship was requisitioned by former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and illustrated the Iranian regime’s direct involvement in supporting the Palestinian Authority’s terrorism activity against Israel.

Aharon Ze’evi Farkash 37 axis that includes Iraq, Syria, and Hizbullah Though the Oslo agreements stipulated in Lebanon, in addition to ongoing Al- that the Palestinians would only Qaeda and Hamas activity, could result in a operate internal security forces such as destabilized Jordan.7 police, with no military characteristics whatsoever, Arafat and his Fatah This combination of hostile forces could pose commanders gave their national a conventional military threat emanating security apparatus all the trappings of from Israel’s eastern front. This threat could an army (i.e., organizational structure, materialize in the form of aerial attacks, operational functions, unit names, ranks, surface-to-surface missile strikes, the etc.), expanding it well beyond what deployment of military and/or paramilitary had been agreed upon. Hamas, too, forces, and/or the use of proxies – all via after taking control of Gaza, established the Palestinian state. (This would almost openly military frameworks, with regional certainly transpire if the Palestinian state brigades that were armed like military were co-opted by Hamas, together with forces and functioned as part of the other local Iranian-backed terror groups.) In movement’s military wing.9 such cases, Israel would be forced to contend with incessant attacks, and would have great Since 2005, Hamas’ continual use of terror difficulty creating a secure environment for its against Israel has been combined with citizens. more advanced military capabilities such as standard Grad rockets, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and other weapons, Lessons Learned from Failed all of which undermine the strategic balance. Stopping and preventing this is Agreements with the PA an essential principle of demilitarization that will require implementation and Israel’s ability to anticipate future threats enforcement. is largely rooted in lessons learned from past experience. Indeed, since 1993, when The terrorist onslaught against innocent the Israeli government and the Palestine Israeli citizens waged by the PA in the fall Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Oslo of 2000 (the Second Intifada) underscored Declaration of Principles that launched the Israel’s demand – and the PLO’s failure peace process, much has been learned from to comply with signed agreements – to subsequent events on the ground. These can prevent military and terrorist capabilities be summarized as follows: from developing in Palestinian-controlled areas. Since the time when the Oslo Accord and its 1995 interim agreement were Throughout the years since the signing of supposed to be implemented, the the Oslo Accords, terrorist organizations PLO failed to prevent terrorists from and PLO security forces have smuggled manufacturing and smuggling arms into arms and military manufacturing the Palestinian territories. Moreover, the expertise from Iran through Egypt into PLO, Fatah, and PA Chairman Yasser Arafat Gaza via the Philadelphi Corridor, and also financed, directed, and equipped even from Gaza into the West Bank (at some dozen competing security times even doing this through the use of organizations, providing nearly 60,000 Palestinians crossing into Israel to receive “security forces”8 with weapons – through medical treatment). Only Israeli control of local manufacturing and smuggling – that – and careful inspections at – the border were prohibited in those agreements. In crossings have prevented even more of fact, on July 1, 1994, on the very day that such arms and expertise from flowing into he entered Gaza from Egypt for the first the West Bank from Gaza.10 time in 27 years, Arafat not only smuggled in such weapons, but hid terror operatives Israel’s freedom of military operation in among his entourage. the West Bank, which enables the IDF to reach every place where prohibited arms

38 Demilitarization Rocket Threats to Israeli Population Centers from West Bank Terrain

Kiryat Shmona RANGES OF PALESTINIAN ROCKETS.

Qassam II, 9-13 km / 6-8 miles. 122 MM “Grad” Katyusha, 20.4 km/12.6 miles Nahariya Tsafed

Haifa

Nazareth

Afula Mediterranean Sea

Jenin

Netanya Tulkarem

Kfar Saba Qalqiliya

Tel Aviv Rantis Ben-Gurion Budrus International Airport

Ashdod Jerusalem

Ashkelon Bethlehem Kiryat Gat

Gaza Hebron

Rafah

Beer Sheva

39 are manufactured or hidden, has thus far must take into account past events in the prevented terrorists there from being able region, including the Syrian and Iraqi armies’ to manufacture rockets and launch them at attempts to take control of Jordan and use it Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. It has also enabled the as a base from which to attack Israel, without IDF to intercept suicide bombers before they the consent of the Hashemite Kingdom. The are able to carry out their deadly missions. PLO also attempted an overthrow of Jordan’s King Hussein. More recently, relentless efforts by the Iranian regime to create a radical Shiite Only Israel’s freedom of military axis involving Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon under operation in the West Bank has a developing nuclear umbrella, and to unite radical proxy forces under the command of thus far prevented terrorists there the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – while from manufacturing rockets and seeking to use Palestinian territory for access to Israel’s home front – are liable to pose a launching them at Jerusalem and concrete military threat to Israel from the east. Tel Aviv. Thus, any agreement between Israel and the Palestinians must guarantee that a Palestinian state will not allow the Confronting Terrorist and Military development of a terrorist entity – with Threats symmetrical and asymmetrical military capabilities – that could attack Israel at will. A threat exists when hostile intentions An agreement must also prohibit any terrorist join with aggressive capabilities. Israel has activity or deployment of foreign military learned from many years of confronting forces for the purpose of attacking Israel. It military campaigns and terrorism that it is must also include the strict demand that the virtually impossible to alter hostile intentions. Palestinians not develop significant military In fact, a major problem Israel faces in dealing capabilities under the auspices – or in the with a non-state actor such as the Palestinian territory – of a third party, nor sign military or Authority is that, unlike with state actors strategic pacts with Israel’s enemies or with such as Egypt or Jordan, classic principles those entities that do not recognize Israel’s of deterrence and punishment are far less existence.11 effective as there is no unified government that asserts control over people, weapons, and terrorist groups. This is illustrated by Understandings and Disagreements the split between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. Therefore, aggressive in Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations capabilities must be neutralized. This is why to Date Israel has maintained its uncompromising policy of disarming the terrorist Over the years, understandings have infrastructures within and along its borders. been reached regarding the purpose of Its relative success in dismantling terror the reformed Palestinian security forces infrastructure relies on high-quality, precise as envisioned by PA leader Mahmoud military intelligence and full freedom of Abbas, who has repeatedly insisted on “one operation, which includes the ability to enter authority, one law, and one weapon.”12 These Palestinian city-centers and villages to locate forces are tasked with internal policing and destroy bomb-producing laboratories, responsibilities, such as: establishing law and lathes for the manufacture of rockets and order; preventing terrorism and violence; other weapons, arms and ammunition dismantling terror infrastructures; disarming caches. Such is the way Israel deals with what armed groups; and securing borders to are defined as “asymmetrical” threats from prevent the smuggling of weapons and terrorist groups. infiltration of terrorists.

Regarding “symmetrical” threats, which However, despite (or perhaps because of) involve conventional military forces, Israel the security challenge Palestinian forces

40 Demilitarization have posed to Israel in the past – and could sides. This must include symmetry of state easily pose in the future – the heads of the recognition – a Palestinian state and a Jewish PLO and the PA have so far refused to agree state, educating for peace, maintaining a to a definition of demilitarization that would unified and responsible government, and characterize a Palestinian state. In fact, the PA ensuring peaceful state intentions. leadership in Ramallah has sought a definition that would defeat the whole principle of At the Camp David summit in 2000, initiated demilitarization.13 In discussions on the by President Clinton to determine the matter, PA representatives have said they parameters of a final-status agreement would agree to “limited arms” – for example, between Israel and the Palestinians, the not acquiring combat planes or tanks (known U.S. president tried to soften the term in military terms as heavy weaponry). But “demilitarization” by using a new word they claim the right to possess high-trajectory not recognized in international law – weapons (mortars), anti-tank missiles (RPGs), “nonmilitarization” – but the Palestinian side and armored vehicles equipped with machine did not agree to this either. guns. In other words, based on past experience, They have explained that they need these the gap between the two sides appears to weapons in order to be the dominant security be difficult to bridge with regard to defining force in their territory, with the ability to to what extent a Palestinian state should protect the central government. They have be limited in its military capabilities. Other also pointed to their right as a sovereign state key security-related issues on which there to maintain a military force, at least for self- remains disagreement include: defense, for securing borders from external threats, and for dismantling armed militias Special security arrangements for Israel in which pose an internal threat. the Jordan Valley (up to and including the Allon Road) to prevent arms smuggling Palestinian demands for symmetry in and terrorist infiltration (of the kind that security capabilites can only be addressed occurs in the Philadelphi Corridor along in the context of an overall agreement on the Egypt-Gaza border), and guarantees symmetrical trust-building between the to enable an Israeli operational response

Israel and the Middle East

Tehran Nicosia Syria Cyprus Iraq Beirut Lebanon MediterraneanMeditteranean Damascus Baghdad Sea Iran Israel West Bank Jerusalem Amman Gaza Jordan Kuwait Cairo P e r si a n Gulf Bahrain Egypt Saudi Arabia Qatar Abu Dhabi Doha Muscat Riyadh United Arab Emirates Oman

Mecca

Red Sea Sudan

Khartoum Yemen Indian Ocean Sana'a

Aharon Ze’evi Farkash 41 to a military threat from the east, so that Israel’s definition of any force that crosses the Jordan River and enters the Palestinian state will be demilitarization is that no security stopped before it reaches Israel’s central mountain ridge and its capital, Jerusalem. threat develop either within or by way of Palestinian territory. The continued strengthening of the

existing relationship between Jordan and Israel in line with their 1994 treaty of peace and its security appendix, and its The Military Dimension continued requirement that Jordan work to prevent all terrorist threats from the For Israel, demilitarization means that no eastern side of the border and to ensure Palestinian army or military capabilities which naval security in both the Red Sea and could constitute a threat will be established. the Dead Sea. The following precautions are required to ensure demilitarization: A unified airspace, controlled by Israel, to prevent aerial terrorism and aerial The maintaining of Palestinian police and military attacks on Israel. internal security frameworks – such as the 18 Control of the sea off the coast of Gaza, current U.S.-sponsored “Dayton forces" including the Gaza port, when built, to – not military ones or those with obvious prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza military characteristics. and attacks from the sea against Israel, in cooperation with Egypt as defined in the Only permitting Palestinian possession security appendix of the 1979 treaty of of weapons whose purpose is for internal peace with Israel.14 security and policing alone.

An absence of military alliances or The Principles of Israel’s Position on cooperation between Palestinian security Demilitarization forces and foreign armies. This includes no foreign military or other armed group in the Israel views the term “demilitarization” territory of the Palestinian state. as encompassing a wider definition than is normally accepted or spelled out in A commitment that no military forces of the international law, since the common Palestinian state will be kept outside of the term does not take into account the state, as such forces have the potential to changing nature of military conflicts and operate against Israel during emergencies threats. According to Israel’s definition, and other unforeseen situations. demilitarization is a means to an end: that no security threat – whether symmetrical, An absence of military infrastructures – asymmetrical, military, terrorist or one that such as defense industries – and prevention poses any other disruption to daily life in of the manufacturing of dual-use Israel – develop or come to fruition either components supposedly not intended for 15 within or by way of Palestinian territory. But military purposes. the context of demilitarization here is also unique, as it does not involve two countries Effective control, supervision, and with regular armies, but rather a Palestinian inspection of the security perimeter along state-in-the-making with a history of constant the borders and international border 16 terrorism against Israel. Therefore, Israel crossings, to prevent the smuggling of must insist on the prohibition of strategic prohibited arms and dual-use materials. balance-breaking weaponry under Palestinian control, and must demand broad limitations An effective apparatus for supervision and on the security capabilities of the prospective verification, which relies on international Palestian state, including the formation of a observers whose role it is to ensure regular army with planes, tanks, and other that the Palestinian side lives up to its 17 conventional heavy armor and weaponry. demilitarization commitments.

42 Demilitarization The Terrorism Dimension with regard to the abetting of extremists, Israeli soldiers unpack terrorist organizations, and armed rockets seized by groups, as well as attempts to disrupt Israeli authorities on No threats from or via the Palestinian state can the Palestinian government’s activities, the Francopf weapons be allowed to develop or materialize, and it ship near Cyprus structure, and ability to govern. is the duty of the Palestinian state to prevent and presented at the terrorist activities, as well as incitement and Israeli port of Ashdod, Prevention of incitement to terrorism indoctrination of its society to terrorism, November 4, 2009. Israeli and the building of a “culture of peace.” and the creation of terrorist infrastructures commandos seized This will entail forming joint structures the Francopf which inside its borders. The following security for preventing incitement; neutralizing reportedly carried 500 requirements would guarantee the absence of all channels of support for terrorist tons of weaponry from these types of threats: organizations (such as the transfer of Iran and was bound for funds to and activities conducted by the Hizbullah terror Engagement on the part of the Palestinian extremist associations disguised as organization in Lebanon. police and other security forces in organizations established to help the “ground- up” (rather than "top-down") needy); and eliminating school curricula activity. This includes safeguarding that encourage violence, martyrdom, law and order, preventing terrorism, and suicide. This will also require a dismantling terrorist infrastructures and commitment on the part of the Palestinian armed militias, and preventing arms state to prevent the delivery of hostile smuggling and terrorist infiltration.19 sermons in mosques and other religious and cultural institutions. Prevention of armed or ideological interference in the proper workings of Cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian state by radical extremists Palestinian security forces in military and opponents of peace, particularly intelligence-gathering and operations, Aharon Ze’evi Farkash 43 to obstruct terrorism and prevent the The Third Stage – Guaranteeing leverage for establishment of terrorist infrastructures implementing the agreements. The purpose inside the Palestinian state. of international and inter-Arab guarantees, apparatuses, and means of leverage is to The establishment of a supervision- ensure that the cost of the Palestinians’ and-verification apparatus tasked not living up to their commitments in the with monitoring and ensuring that the agreements is higher than what they would Palestinian side lives up to its commitment gain by violating them. to prevent terrorism and the formation of terrorist infrastructures. International Over the course of time, the level and intensity monitors can be incorporated into this of the security arrangements’ intrusion on effort to assist the Palestinian security the Palestinians can be reduced, according to forces to acquire the necessary internal their security performance. There is room for security capabilities, even to the extent phasing in the implementation arrangements of training Palestinian security forces in and, hence, lowering the profile of Israel’s operations in the field. security activity by reducing IDF presence in the territory of the Palestinian state.

The Implementation of Demilitarization The Obligations of a Palestinian State Achieving the strategic objective of preventing the development of threats to At the outset, responsibility will be placed Israel from a Palestinian state will require a on the Palestinian state for preventing the multi-stage process: emergence and materialization of threats against Israel, in the following framework: The First Stage – Demilitarization and security arrangements which limit the ability of the Limitations will be placed on arms and Palestinian state to form an army and limit their use by the Palestinian police and the weapons of the Palestinian security security forces. forces. In the initial stage, demilitarization takes on a broader definition, to include The order of forces and structure of units the prevention of terrorism and a ban on will be for the purpose of policing and terrorist infrastructures in the Palestinian internal security, not to correspond to state. These security arrangements must not military forces with military missions. hamper Israel’s ability to react in self-defense to potential threats posed by and emanating “Ground-up" security force-building from the Palestinian state. should expand on the current “Dayton forces” concept of U.S.- and Western- The Second Stage – Implementation trained internal security forces,20 but arrangements that rely on the involvement must prove more capable of actively of international monitors, preferably led fighting and preventing terrorism, terror by the U.S., who will oversee and ensure infrastructures, and terror-supporting that all clauses of the security agreements activity, without the current assistance of are met. Simultaneously, assistance will be the IDF that has been responsible for the provided to the Palestinian security forces in vast majority of anti-terror operations in executing tasks related to internal security, the West Bank.21 terror prevention, and dismantling of terror infrastructures. The use of monitors should in A “culture of peace” must be created by no way detract from Israel’s preserving of its enforcing the prohibition of incitement, own self-defense capabilities by means of such as educating school children to the IDF. armed struggle and suicide missions against Israel, and the preaching of armed

44 Demilitarization struggle against Israel in mosques and airspace requires consolidated control, with Members of the other venues in the Palestinian state. greater responsibility on Israel due to its higher Fatah-associated Al vulnerability to potential military and terror Aksa Martyrs Brigades The Palestinian state will be prohibited threats, and its need to identify and intercept seen during a march in from forging military alliances, unidentified and hostile planes before they the West Bank city of Nablus, November 19, cooperation, and joint exercises with enter Israeli skies. Within this framework, an 2009. foreign military forces, and from building apparatus will be established for cooperation Thousands of military units outside its borders. in civil aviation. Al Aksa Brigades militiamen still keep weapons A Unified Airspace Controlled Special Security Arrangements in in their homes by unwritten by Israel the Jordan Valley agreement with the Palestinian Israel must control a unified airspace in Special security arrangements are required in Authority. order to prevent hostile military action and the Jordan Valley in order to block terrorism, terrorist aerial activity from the skies over and prevent prohibited arms smuggling and a Palestinian state, or through it, aimed at terrorist infiltrations via the crossings and the the Jewish state. Limited time and space entire length of the eastern border. resources render it impossible to divide the airspace, the width of which is a mere 40 miles In the face of a possible military threat from between the Jordan River to the east and the the east, Israel must have the capability to stop Mediterranean Sea to the west. This unified foreign armies from crossing the Jordan River

Aharon Ze’evi Farkash 45 into the Palestinian state, and prevent a hostile In the second stage, structures will be foreign military takeover of the area or the required that reflect the lessons learned eastern slopes of the central mountain ridge. over the years, when the Palestinians did not adhere to previous bilateral agreements. In a situation whereby the prospective There will be a need for the involvement of a Palestinian state is in such close proximity third party for the inspection and verification to Israel, it will be necessary to guarantee of Palestinian implementation of security effective supervision over the international obligations, and for Israeli deterrence crossings to prevent the seepage of weaponry (through public exposure and taking and materials into the Jordan Valley and on to action) against Palestinian violations of the the Palestinian state. security arrangements. The structures for implementation should include: Additional Israeli Security Supervision and verification of demilitarization, based on international Requirements observers under American or other auspices, to be agreed upon by the Protection from attack from the high parties. ground overlooking aviation at Ben- Gurion International Airport via Israeli Proper supervision and inspection by control of strategically vulnerable areas, the IDF and other third-party monitors, in order to prevent the interception of not outside security forces, at the planes during take off and landing by international border crossings to prevent anti-aircraft missiles fired from Palestinian the smuggling of prohibited weapons territory. and dual-purpose materials, infiltrations of terrorists, and the transfer of funds and Supervision of the seas by the Israeli other forms of aid to terrorist groups in navy and cooperation with international the Palestinian state. regional frameworks to detain suspicious boats, prevent hostile activity and Supervision of the external envelope terrorism by sea, and block the smuggling along the borders of the Palestinian state of weaponry and prohibited materials to prevent the smuggling of prohibited into the Palestinian state. arms and materials, infiltrations of terrorists, and the crossing or infiltration Electromagnetic coordination for the of military and irregular forces hostile to prevention of mutual disruptions and Israel into the Palestinian state. jamming of Israeli military and civil 22 communications. In the third stage, international guarantees and means of leverage will be instated to spur It is preferable that Israel’s strategic the Palestinian side to meet its obligations sites and early-warning stations be in the agreement, and to provide Israel with located inside Israel. However, if Israeli guarantees in the event that the Palestinian intelligence capabilities would be harmed side violates the security arrangements. by doing so, these stations should be located in the West Bank to provide sufficient time to respond to military and terrorist threats from the east. Limitations on Arms

Special understandings and Israel and the Palestinians will need to arrangements which enable the formulate an agreed-upon list of permitted emergency deployment of IDF troops capabilities and arms with which the against military and irregular forces Palestinian security forces will be equipped infiltrating into the Palestinian state, in and which will be suited to their tasks. Based violation of the agreements. on Israel’s experience with the Military Addendum to the Peace Treaty with Egypt, and the Separation of Forces Agreement

46 Demilitarization Tons of weapons such as these, shown on Palestinian Television on February 2, 2007, are smuggled into Gaza through underground tunnels under the border separating Egyptian Sinai from Palestinian Gaza. Israeli security authorities warn that if the Jordan Valley is relinquished to the PA, weapons could be smuggled to the West Bank hilltops and fired at greater Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion International Airport, more than 2,000 feet below.

between Israel and Syria on the Golan commits will not be visible. This means Heights, Israel knows that it is crucial to that the demilitarization apparatuses and specify the capabilities and arms that are enforcement methods for the PA have to be permitted – not just those that are prohibited different from those that are in place with – because it is impossible to anticipate all Jordan and Egypt. It also means that it is future military technologies. In the event especially important to initiate substantive that the sides agree on detailing only those talks with the PA on the principle of building that are prohibited, a joint structure should security, police and regime-protection forces be created to examine the list and update it in place of military ones. according to shifting needs and capabilities. Contrary to the common Palestinian claim The principle of demilitarization is most that a peace agreement will bring security, crucial for maintaining security and peace, Israel has learned that a stable peace can and for building confidence between the only be based on safeguarding Israel’s vital PA and Israel. There are various methods for security requirements first. Any agreement enforcing it, some of which can be based on will require minimizing the elements that demilitarization agreements with Syria and could encourage hostile forces to challenge Egypt.23 Apparatuses to enforce it must be Israel with greater intensity. developed to combat activities not readily visible, such as all underground activity, Israel’s chief security aim in relation to the particularly the building of tunnels from the Palestinians is to prevent the development Sinai to Gaza and within the West Bank. of symmetrical or asymmetrical military threats, and to prevent terrorism and guerilla An understanding must be developed on warfare against it from within and by way of how, in the age of “standoff weaponry,” a Palestinian state. Addressing the possibility such a small area as the West Bank and of such threats in the framework of a bilateral Gaza can be demilitarized. In the absence agreement involves Israel’s taking controlled of an army, without tanks and armored security risks. vehicles, violations that the Palestinian side

Aharon Ze’evi Farkash 47 IDF presence on the ground. Witness the difference in Notes the level of threat to Israel from Gaza and Lebanon as opposed to the West Bank where the IDF is currently * The author expresses his deep appreciation to Brig.- present. Gen. Udi Dekel, former head of the Israel Defense 4 See Maj.-Gen. Yoav Galant, “The Strategic Challenge Forces Strategic Planning Division, in the preparation of Gaza,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 6, no. 28, Jerusalem of this article. Center for Public Affairs/Institute for Contemporary 1 The Palestinian national movement rejected Israeli Affairs, April 17, 2007, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/ peace offers in 1936, in 1947 with the UN partition Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&TMID=111&LNGID plan, in 1967 immediately following the Six-Day War =1&FID=283&PID=0&IID=1549. Former head of Israel’s with the “three no’s” at Khartoum (no negotiations, Southern Command Maj.-Gen. Yoav Galant assessed no recognition, no negotiations), and Palestinian the aftermath of the IDF withdrawal from Gaza, statehood offers in 2000 at Camp David and in 2008 as saying, “Disengagement from Gaza caused the terror part of the Annapolis peace process. organizations to turn to new terror methods such as 2 A. Deterrence – Creating a capability and projecting Kassam rockets, tunnels, and crossing over from Gaza it to the adversary/foe that Israel is a country with to Sinai and then into Israel’s Negev, as happened in developed military capabilities that can hit its enemies January 2007 with a Palestinian suicide bomber in hard and deprive them of any diplomatic achievements Eilat. Egypt’s Sinai Desert is three times larger than all by military means. The bombing of the Osirak reactor of Israel and global terror organizations and Palestinian in Iraq is an example of deterrence. The attack on terror organizations are able to carry out attacks the reactor in Syria – attributed by foreign sources from its territory. Cooperation among Hamas, Iran, to Israel – is another example of building a deterrent Hizbullah, and other global terror organizations creates capability. This is the reason why Iran fears an Israeli a knowledge base and enhances motivation, which attack. If deterrent power is weakened, it is extremely is helping Hamas. In Gaza, there is high motivation vital to know about the enemy and his capabilities and to hit Israel, and there are many people with military intentions. and operational experience, who are in contact with B. Early warning – For that reason, a vital need still Iran, and receive backing and know-how, ammunition, exists to build a strong intelligence system. This is the and explosives.” “All of the various factions in Gaza are reason why Israeli intelligence is such an important acquiring more terror infrastructure....Attacks along the component in the state’s security concept. It also security fence continue. They try to bypass the fence allows maintaining a small regular army that permits by digging tunnels. No one can detect a tunnel twenty the state to stick to a normal routine. meters under the ground. They are also trying to C. Decisive force – In the event that deterrence fails and infiltrate into Israel through the fence, without success, no warning is provided or warning is given about new but now they have the 200 km. border between Sinai enemy capabilities and intentions, then decisive force and Israel available to them. Islamic Jihad and the is required that transfers the fighting to the enemy’s Popular Resistance Committees are making great territory. For this very reason, Israel has a powerful efforts to infiltrate suicide bombers into Israel. Hamas air force, strong artillery, and a minimal regular force is not active right now, but it is ready to attack at a that can hold on until the reserve forces are mobilized. moment’s notice.” Then the entire army can be used to develop forward 5 During 2005, Israel absorbed 179 rocket strikes. Gaza depth and distance the front from the rear. disengagement was implemented in August 2005. The 3 These threats have underscored the requirement number of rocket strikes in 2006 shot up to 946 – a that Israel’s security doctrine focus on developing five-fold increase. See Dore Gold, “Israel’s War to Halt replacements for “strategic depth,” including the Palestinian Rocket Attacks,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 7, following: no. 34, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs / Institute for 1. Forward depth (transferring the fighting to the Contemporary Affairs, March 3, 2008, http://jcpa.org/ enemy’s territory and moving combat away from JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGI Israel’s strategic rear. D=1&TMID=111&FID=253&PID=0&IID=2049&TTL=Israel 2. Depth in the air and in space facilitated by ’s_War_to_Halt_Palestinian_Rocket_Attacks. Israel’s technological superiority in areas such as 6 Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, Iran’s Race for Regional communications, intelligence, and “stand-off” Supremacy: Strategic Implications for the Middle East, weaponry (anti-rocket and missile technology). Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008, p. 11, http:// 3. Maritime depth – The navy is a strategic arm of www.jcpa.org/text/iran2-june08.pdf. extremely high importance for obtaining depth. Naval 7 Dore Gold, “Al-Qaeda, Zarqawi, and Israel: Is There a New superiority is required to preserve the freedom of the Jihadi Threat Destabilizing the Eastern Front?” Jerusalem sea to and from Israel. Viewpoints, no. 538, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 4. Technological depth – This capability is obtained January 1, 2006. See also, Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, due to the intellectual capital of the State of Israel – the “The Second Lebanon War: From Territory to Ideology,” special capabilities of Israeli scientists and the relevant Iran’s Race for Regional Supremacy, p. 35. industries to develop responses in areas pertaining to 8 http://www.miftah.org/Display. precise strategic intelligence. cfm?DocId=10400&CategoryId=21. Israel has also developed special capabilities in 9 For examples, see Galant, “The Strategic Challenge of avionics, installed on advanced aircraft purchased in Gaza.” the United States, and “navionics” on navy craft, as well 10 The PA’s U.S.- and European-backed Presidential Guard as advanced systems on Israel’s Merkava tank. force in Gaza that was to have protected the Gaza While all these capabilities are very important, crossings under the control of PA leader Mahmoud they are not sufficient to carry out an asymmetric war Abbas and his Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan is and a war on terror. Therefore, on the basis of combat a good example of the type of security failure that must requirements, particularly against suicide terror since be prevented in any future agreement. The day that 2000, Israel has developed world-class capabilities Hamas took control over Gaza in June 2007, it dispersed based on the fusion of the most advanced sensors the Presidential Guard and appropriated all of its arms and sources (in combination with human intelligence and war materials – much of which was provided by the and investigations) that create an “intelligence bath” United States – and which ended up being used against to locate objectives and targets in real time. These Israel. capabilities have produced impressive results in a very 11 The military cooperation between the Islamic Republic short time frame. The bottom line is that Israel has of Iran and the PLO, as revealed in the Israeli capture of managed to contend in an impressive fashion with the Iranian “Karine A” weapons ship in 2002, is a good terror, to damage its capabilities and restore normal example of this type of dangerous military pact between life in the country. The preservation and development the Palestinians and a hostile sovereign entity such as of these capabilities are a condition to building a the Iranian regime. In 2002 PA Chairman Yasser Arafat, deterrent force for the war on terror and for asymmetric whose deputy at the time was current PA Chairman war as well. But it is clear that Israel is able to implement Mahmoud Abbas, requested 50 tons of weapons and these capabilities most efficiently in tandem with an ammunition from the IRGC leadership in Tehran. The

48 Demilitarization weapons ship was captured by Israeli naval commandoes The “Dayton forces” are considered by the U.S. in the Red Sea about 500 kilometers from Gaza. See “The to be a major success of Fayyad’s government. U.S. PLO Weapons Ship from Iran,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 1, enthusiasm over its early successes has resulted in the no. 15, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs / Institute for doubling of the force to nearly 3,500 troops and a near Contemporary Affairs, January 7 , 2002, http://www.jcpa. 70 percent increase in its 2009 budget to $130 million. org/art/brief1-15.htm. See “Speech by Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton” and “U.S. Plans 12 “Abbas: PLO Accepts Egyptian Plan for Palestinian Unity,” to Expand Program for Abbas’ Forces.” Maan Palestinian News Agency, October 27, 2008, http:// The IDF General Staff has also noted the positive www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=205902. contribution of the “Dayton forces” in preventing 13 This principle remains important. Even in the peace violence in the West Bank during Israel’s war agreement with Egypt, definitions were included against Hamas in Gaza in the beginning of 2009. on what war materials could be introduced into the However, Brig.-Gen. Michael Herzog, chief of staff Sinai and what were prohibited. But over the years, to Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, said in a developments occur, new systems are perfected, and 2009 presentation together with Gen. Dayton at the new capabilities are created that were inconceivable Washington Institute for Near East Policy that while thirty years ago. the PA security forces have improved significantly over 14 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20 the last year, they were still far from ready to assume to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-Egypt%20 full security responsibility in the West Bank. See Peace%20Treaty. “Speech by Brig.-Gen. Michael Herzog, The Middle East 15 The principle of demilitarization determines that Security Agenda, an Israeli Assessment,” Washington a Palestinian state will not have the capability of Institute for Near East Policy, May 7, 2009, http://www. operating combat aircraft, combat helicopters, or a washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/HerzogKeynote.pdf. missile capability that threatens Israel; it will not develop 21 Israel will have to be persuaded that there is an “balance-destroying” weaponry. This principle also effective apparatus on the Palestinian side to handle applies to preventing the development of intelligence the problems, and will have to examine whether and surveillance capabilities over current Israeli activity interdiction activities and prevention actually do take (in other words, the Palestinians should not develop place on the ground. Israel will have no recourse but to capabilities that are equal to Israel’s or that can damage transfer authority for performing these actions to the Israel’s broader ability for action) and the Palestinians Palestinians. This is the type of risk that Israel will have should not have a regular army. Problems resulting from to take from the outset of an agreement in view of the these limitations can be overcome through a regional lack of confidence between the parties. The parties will cooperation apparatus. have to build an apparatus that constantly examines 16 We are not dealing with a situation such as the transfer and ascertains that the Palestinians are doing what is of Hong Kong to the Chinese after 99 years, or U.S. permitted and are not developing substantial militarily withdrawal from the Panama Canal. If such was the or terror capabilities that can inflict serious damage situation, then we could discuss demilitarization in on Israel. Clearly the Palestinian side will always have stages where the Palestinians were given a sense of some capability, such as light arms, for which there independence and Israel was provided with a sense of must be sufficiently strong apparatuses controlling and security. supervising their use. These apparatuses will also have 17 Even vis-à-vis countries where relations of trust have to prevent the border with Jordan from turning into a existed for many years, demilitarized zones still smuggling conduit for war materials and the infiltration remain, and this applies a fortiori to the Palestinians, of terror elements, as occurs along the Philadelphi with whom Israel has a historical long-term enmity Corridor separating Egyptian Sinai from Palestinian- that cannot be solved in one day. Therefore, it is controlled Gaza. The prevention of smuggling and impermissible to rely purely on agreements and infiltration are key aspects of demilitarization. signatures on paper. Israel must insist on preventive 22 The future Palestinian state will be located measures on the ground. topographically in an area that dominates Israel’s 18 For a comprehensive overview of the role of the strategic and civil home front – a situation which could Palestinian National Security Forces that have been enable the disruption of all wireless communication trained and supervised by Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton activity. Thus, there has to be coordination, with a joint and with EU participation, see “Speech by Lt.-Gen. body for distributing frequencies (and ranges), and the Keith Dayton, U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel ability to immediately correct violations and enforce and the Palestinian National Authority,” Washington obligations. Since Israel will be the more vulnerable of Institute for Near East Policy, May 7, 2009, http://www. the two parties (topographically, technologically, and washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/DaytonKeynote. security-wise) – certainly as compared with its situation pdf. See also, “U.S. Plans to Expand Program for Abbas’ today – it will be Israel that must have priority in the Forces,” Reuters, April 27, 2009. distribution of frequencies and ranges, as well as in the 19 In establishing the boundaries for the demilitarization prevention of jamming and disturbances. of a prospective Palestinian state, a clear distinction 23 Enforcement of the principle of demilitarization vis-a- will need to be drawn between defining an army and vis Syria and Egypt was performed in the past by photo an internal police force for securing the government, reconnaissance flights by a third-party once every guaranteeing public security, and preventing crime three months that photographed 10 km. on both sides and smuggling. This would be similar to what the of the border. That same film was transferred both to U.S.-sponsored “Dayton forces” are currently doing in the Syrians and to the Israelis. In the case of Egypt, both the West Bank and what the international border patrol sides viewed a similar security film. Hence, it is clear to forces in Sinai are doing, notwithstanding violations of everyone who is violating the agreement and who is the agreement that have accumulated over time. not. This is one of the enforcement methods, but it is 20 Since 2005 following the armed takeover of Gaza by relevant only for activities that can be seen from the Hamas, the Palestinian Authority has consented to air. a U.S.-backed security reform process directed and In the Egyptian example of demilitarization, in line budgeted locally by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. with the 1979 Treaty of Peace, specific weapons are Fayyad has cooperated with the U.S. security reform prohibited at specific ranges. This is easier than in plan in line with the Quartet Roadmap to establish the Palestinian case, since in Sinai there is sufficient an independent force called the Palestinian National space for the implementation of force limitations. Security Forces – known as the “Dayton forces” on the For example, Egypt can introduce up to one Egyptian Palestinian street. Its ranks were vetted and trained division until line “A” which is 50 km. east of the Suez by U.S. security subcontractors in Jordan under the Canal. There is a line “B” and a line “C,” up to 3 km. from supervision of Gen. Keith Dayton. Under Fayyad’s the border, to which it is prohibited to introduce any supervision, the Palestinian National Security Forces sort of weapons. The agreement between Israel and have been mobilized to establish law and order in Egypt also regulates limitations on armaments within West Bank cities including Jenin, Nablus, Bethlehem, Sinai. The limitations are predicated on the category and Hebron. of war materials and the type of units and are divided according to geographic areas.

Aharon Ze’evi Farkash 49 THE U.S. AND “DEFENSIBLE BORDERS”: HOW WASHINGTON HAS UNDERSTOOD UN SECURITY COUNCIL 242 AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS

President, Dr. Dore Gold Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; former Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations U.S. Policy Does Not Seek Israel’s extent that the U.S. limits its demands of Israel through either presidential declarations Return to the 1967 Lines or statements of the secretary of state, then the Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs will The United States has historically backed have to settle for less in terms of any Israeli Israel’s view that UN Security Council withdrawal. U.S. declaratory policy, then, Resolution 242, adopted in the wake of the fundamentally affects whether Arab-Israeli Six-Day War on November 22, 1967, does differences can ultimately be bridged at the not require a full withdrawal to the 1949 negotiating table or whether they simply armistice lines (sometimes loosely called remain too far apart. the 1967 borders). Moreover, in addition to that interpretation, both Democratic and Second, there is a related dynamic. Republican administrations have argued that Historically, Arab diplomats have preferred Israel was entitled to “defensible borders.” to extract Israeli concessions through In other words, the American backing of international bodies, like the UN, or even defensible borders has been bipartisan, through the U.S., thereby limiting the direct right up to the latest rendition provided by concessions they must make to Israel. President George W. Bush in April 2004. And According to this scenario, the UN, with U.S. it has been rooted in America’s longstanding acquiescence, could set the terms of an Israeli support for the security of Israel, which withdrawal in the West Bank that Israel would has gone well beyond the various legal be pressured to fulfill with only minimal interpretations of UN resolutions. bilateral commitments provided by the Arab states. In fact, it was Egyptian President Anwar Why is the U.S. position so important to Sadat who used to say that the U.S. “holds 99 consider? First, while it is true that ultimately percent of the cards” in the peace process, Israel and the Palestinians themselves must before he signed the Israel-Egypt Treaty of decide on the location of borders as part of Peace in 1979. Therefore, if the Arab states any negotiation, the U.S. position on borders understand that the U.S. won’t just deliver directly affects the level of expectation of Israel according to their liking, then they will the Arab side regarding the depth of the be compelled to deal with Israel directly. Israeli concessions they can obtain. To the

50 U.S. Policy The United Nations Security Council in session, May 23, 2002.

Dore Gold 51 Confusion in Jerusalem about the This was especially true of the withdrawal clause in the resolution which called on Israeli U.S. Position armed forces to withdraw “from territories” and not “from all the territories” or “from Yet despite the critical importance of the territories” as the Soviet Union had America’s traditional support for Israel’s demanded. understanding of Resolution 242, historically there has been considerable confusion The exclusion of the definite article “the” in Jerusalem about this subject. All too from the withdrawal clause was not decided frequently, Israeli diplomats err in asserting by a low-level legal drafting team or even at that, according to the U.S., Israel must the ambassadorial level. And it was not an ultimately pull back to the 1967 lines, with oversight or a matter of petty legalism. The perhaps the addition that minor border decision was taken at the highest level of the modifications will be allowed. Those Israelis U.S. government and was the subject of direct who take this mistaken position about U.S. communications between the White House policy tend to conclude that Israel has no and the Kremlin. In fact, President Lyndon alternative but to accept this policy as a Baines Johnson himself decided that it was given, and thereby concede Israel’s right to important to stick to this phrasing, despite defensible borders. the pressure from the Soviet premier, Alexei

Kosygin, who sought to incorporate stricter Over time, successive U.S. additional language requiring a full Israeli withdrawal.1 administrations have issued explicit declarations rejecting The meaning of Resolution 242 was absolutely clear to those who were involved an Israeli pullback to the 1967 in this drafting process. Thus, Joseph P. lines and backing Israel’s right to Sisco, who would serve as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South defensible borders instead. Asian Affairs, commented on Resolution 242 during a Meet the Press interview some years However, a careful analysis of the later: “I was engaged in the negotiation for development of the U.S. position on months of that resolution. That resolution did Resolution 242 reveals that this “maximalist” not say ‘total withdrawal.’”2 This position was interpretation of U.S. policy is fundamentally fully coordinated with the British at the time. mistaken. In fact, successive U.S. Indeed, George Brown, who had served as administrations following the Six-Day War British foreign secretary in 1967 during Prime have demonstrated considerable flexibility Minister Harold Wilson’s Labour government, over the years regarding the extent of summarized Resolution 242 as follows: “The withdrawal that they expected of Israel. proposal said, ‘Israel will withdraw from True, sometimes the State Department territories that were occupied,’ not ‘from bureaucracy – especially diplomats in the the territories,’ which means Israel will not Near Eastern Affairs division that dealt with withdraw from all the territories.”3 the Arab world – adhered to a harder-line view of Israel’s requirements for withdrawal. But this issue was not decided at their level. Indeed, over time, successive administrations President Johnson: ’67 Line a would even go so far as to issue explicit Prescription for Renewed Hostilities declarations rejecting the requirement of full withdrawal and backing Israel’s right to President Johnson’s insistence on the territorial defensible borders instead. flexibility of Resolution 242 could be traced to statements he made on June 19, 1967, in the What was the source of America’s support for immediate wake of the Six-Day War. Johnson Israel? It is important to recall that Resolution declared that “an immediate return to the 242 was a joint product of both the British situation as it was on June 4,” before the ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, and the outbreak of hostilities, was “not a prescription U.S. ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg. for peace, but for renewed hostilities.” He 52 U.S. Policy President Lyndon B. Johnson, November 17, 1967. On November 22, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 242 that called on Israel to withdraw “from territories” to “secure and recognized boundaries.” Johnson refused to accept the demand of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that Israel withdraw from “all the territories” to the pre- war lines. Johnson said Israel needed “recognized boundaries” that provided “security against terror, destruction and war.”

stated that the old “truce lines” had been justified in retaining in order to permit a more “fragile and violated.” What was needed, in effective defense.” Johnson’s view, were “recognized boundaries” that would provide “security against terror, Wheeler responded with a memorandum destruction and war.”4 on June 29, 1967, which concluded: “From a strictly military point of view, Israel would There were several key figures who require the retention of some captured contributed to how senior officials in the Arab territory in order to provide militarily Johnson administration viewed the question defensible borders.” Specifically, regarding of Israeli security needs after the Six-Day the West Bank, the JCS suggested “a War. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara boundary along the commanding terrain asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of overlooking the Jordan River,” and considered Staff (JCS), General Earl Wheeler, what was taking this defense line up to the crest of the the “minimum territory” that Israel “might be mountain ridge.5 Dore Gold 53 There were other reasons why changing only two countries in the world recognized the previous 1949 armistice line might be Jordanian sovereignty in the West Bank considered for security reasons. Article II between 1948 and 1967: the United Kingdom of the Armistice Agreement clarified that it and Pakistan. Even the Arab states refused did not prejudice the rights of the parties or to recognize Jordan's claim to the territory. their future claims, since the agreement had In short, according to Schwebel, Israel’s been “dictated exclusively by military entitlement to changes in the pre-1967 lines considerations.” As a result, the old armistice did not arise because it had been vulnerable, line was not a recognized international but rather because it had been the victim of border. On May 31, 1967, the Jordanian aggression in 1967. ambassador to the UN made this very point to the UN Security Council just days before the Six-Day War. He stressed that the old armsitice In the international legal agreement “did not fix boundaries.”6 community there was an acute

Ambassador Goldberg would note sometime awareness that Jordan had later another aspect of the Johnson illegally invaded the West Bank in administration’s policy that was reflected in the language of its UN proposals: “Resolution 1948 and held it until 1967, when 242 in no way refers to Jerusalem, and this Israel captured the territory in a omission was deliberate.”7 The U.S. was not about to propose the restoration of the status war of self-defense. quo ante in Jerusalem either, even though successive U.S. administrations would at times criticize Israel’s construction practices President Richard Nixon: The in the eastern parts of Jerusalem that it had Israelis “Can’t Go Back” to the 1967 captured. Borders Within a number of years, U.S. diplomacy would reflect the idea that Israel was Rogers was soon replaced, in any case, by entitled to changes in the pre-1967 lines. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security At first, public expressions by the Nixon advisor, who significantly modified Rogers’ administration were indeed minimalist; position. Already in 1973, in subsequently Secretary of State William Rogers declared disclosed private conversations with Kissinger, in 1969 that there would be “insubstantial in reference to the 1967 lines Nixon admitted: alterations” to the 1967 lines. At the time, “You and I both know they [the Israelis] Rogers’ policy was severely criticized by can’t go back to the other borders.”8 This Stephen W. Schwebel, the Executive Director became evident in September 1975, under of the American Society of International Law, the Ford administration, during the Sinai who would become the Legal Advisor of II Disengagement Agreement. While the the U.S. Department of State and later serve agreement covered a second Israeli pullout on the International Court of Justice in The from the Sinai Peninsula, Israel’s prime minister Hague. Schwebel reminded Rogers of Israel’s at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, achieved a series legal rights in the West Bank in the American of understandings with the U.S. that covered Journal of International Law (64/344,1970) other fronts of the Arab-Israeli peace process. when he wrote: “Where the prior holder of For example, President Ford provided Prime territory had seized that territory unlawfully, Minister Rabin with a letter on the future of the the state which subsequently takes that Golan Heights that stated: territory in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder, better title.” The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will In the international legal community there give great weight to Israel’s position that was an acute awareness that Jordan had any peace agreement with Syria must be illegally invaded the West Bank in 1948 and predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan held it until 1967, when Israel captured the Heights.9 territory in a war of self-defense. Indeed, 54 U.S. Policy This carefully drafted language did not detail Minister Benjamin Netanyahu obtained the President Ronald Reagan, whether the U.S. would actually accept Israeli recommitment of the Clinton administration January 20, 1981. The sovereignty over parts of the Golan Heights to the Ford letter prior to the opening of 1982 Reagan plan called or just the continued presence of the Israel Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over Hebron in for Israel to retain defensible borders, while Defense Forces on the Golan plateau. In 1996. In other words, U.S. letters of assurance his secretary of state, were treated as durable commitments that either case, the Ford letter did not envision a George Shultz, stated full Israeli pullback to the 1967 lines or even lasted from one administration to the next, explicitly, “Israel will minor modifications of the 1967 border near according to U.S. diplomatic practice. never negotiate from the Sea of Galilee. or return to the 1967 borders.” President Reagan: I Can’t Ask Israel The Durability of Presidential to Return to the Pre-1967 Borders Commitments: The Case of the Ford It was the administration of President Ronald Letter Reagan that most forcefully articulated Israel’s right to defensible borders, just after The details of the Ford letter should not be President Jimmy Carter appeared to give viewed as a subject for academics doing only lukewarm support for the U.S.-Israel research into U.S. diplomatic history in an understandings of the Ford-Kissinger era. archive. It should be recalled that the U.S. Reagan himself stated in a September 1, 1982, explicitly renewed its commitment to the address that became known as the “Reagan Ford letter just before the 1991 Madrid Peace Plan”: “In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was Conference, when Secretary of State James barely ten miles wide at its narrowest point. Baker issued a letter of assurances to Prime The bulk of Israel’s population lived within Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Moreover, Prime artillery range of hostile armies. I am not Dore Gold 55 about to ask Israel to live that way again.” of the 1997 Hebron Protocol, Secretary of Reagan came up with a flexible formula for State Warren Christopher wrote a letter Israeli withdrawal: “The extent to which Israel of assurances to Prime Minister Benjamin should be asked to give up territory will be Netanyahu. In the Christopher letter, the heavily affected by the extent of the peace Clinton administration basically stated that and normalization.”10 Secretary of State it was not going to second-guess Israel George Shultz was even more explicit about about its security needs: “a hallmark of U.S. what this meant during a September 1988 policy remains our commitment to work address: “Israel will never negotiate from or cooperatively to seek to meet the security return to the 1967 borders.”11 needs that Israel identifies” (emphasis added). This meant that Israel would be the final What did Shultz mean by this statement? Was arbiter of its defense needs. Christopher he recognizing Israel’s right to retain large then added: “Finally, I would like to reiterate portions of the West Bank? A half-year earlier, our position that Israel is entitled to secure he demonstrated considerable diplomatic and defensible borders (emphasis added), creativity in considering alternatives to a full which should be directly negotiated and Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines. He even agreed with its neighbors.”14 proposed what was, in effect, a “functional compromise” in the West Bank, as opposed The 1997 Christopher letter was significant to a “territorial compromise.” Shultz was since it showed U.S. deference to Israel’s saying that the West Bank should be divided judgments concerning its security needs. between Israel and the Jordanians according During this period, Israel was to designate to different functions of government, and “specified security locations” as part of the not in terms of drawing new internal borders. redeployment of its troops under the Oslo In an address to the Council on Foreign Accords. Christopher stated separately that Relations in February 1988, he asserted: “the the designation of Israeli security locations meaning of sovereignty, the meaning of was an Israeli responsibility. These guarantees territory, is changing, and what any national contained an implicit assurance: that the government can control, or what any unit that U.S. was not going to second-guess Israeli thinks it has sovereignty or jurisdiction over a judgments about Israeli security needs. certain area can control, is shifting gears.”12 In summary, there is no basis to the argument In his memoirs, Shultz elaborated on his 1988 that the U.S. has traditionally demanded of address. He wrote that he had spoken to both Israel either a full withdrawal or a nearly full Israeli and Jordanian leaders in the spirit of his withdrawal from the territories it captured speech and argued that “who controls what... in the Six-Day War. This is particularly true would necessarily vary over such diverse of the West Bank and Gaza Strip where only functions as external security, maintenance armistice lines were drawn in 1949, reflecting of law and order, access to limited supplies where embattled armies had halted their of water, management of education, health, advance and no permanent international and other civic functions, and so forth.”13 The borders existed. The only development that net effect of this thinking was to protect altered this American stance in support Israel’s security interests and provide it with a of defensible borders in the past involved defensible border that would be substantially changes in the Israeli position to which the different from the 1967 lines. U.S. responded.

The Clinton Administration The Unofficial Clinton/Barak Reaffirms Defensible Borders Parameters Are Off the Table

U.S. support for defensible borders had On January 7, 2001, two weeks before clearly become bipartisan and continued into completing his second term in office, the 1990s, even as the Palestinians replaced President Clinton presented his own plan Jordan as the primary Arab claimant to the for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. West Bank. At the time of the completion The Clinton parameters were partly based

56 U.S. Policy President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, November 7, 1996. Christopher wrote to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: “A hallmark of U.S. policy remains our commitment to work cooperatively to seek to meet the security needs that Israel identifies.” The Christopher letter specified “defensible borders for Israel.”

on the proposals made by Israeli Prime “land swap” was not required by Resolution Minister Ehud Barak at the failed Camp 242, but was a new Israeli concession made David Summit of July 2000. during the Barak government that Clinton adopted; it should be noted for the record, In the territorial sphere, Clinton spoke however, that Maj.-Gen. (res.) Danny Yatom, about Israel annexing “settlement blocs” who served as the head of Barak’s foreign in the West Bank. However, he made this and defense staff, has argued that Barak annexation of territory by Israel conditional himself never offered these land swaps at upon a “land swap” taking place, according Camp David. to which Israel would concede territory under its sovereignty before 1967 in Additionally, under the Clinton parameters, exchange for any new West Bank land. This Israel was supposed to withdraw from

Dore Gold 57 the Jordan Valley (which Rabin sought to President Bush: It is Unrealistic to retain) and thereby relinquish defensible borders. Instead, Clinton proposed an Expect a Return to the Armistice “international presence” to replace the IDF. Lines of 1949 This particular component of the proposals severely compromised Israel’s doctrine The best proof that the U.S. had readopted of self-reliance in matters of defense and its traditional policy that Israel was entitled seemed to ignore Israel’s problematic to defensible borders came from the letter history with the UN and other international of assurances written by President Bush to forces in even more limited roles such as Prime Minister Sharon on April 14, 2004, peace monitoring. after Sharon’s presentation in Washington of Israel’s disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip. Bush wrote: “The United States IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel’s Mofaz severely criticized the security, including secure and defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Clinton parameters as a virtual Israel’s capability to deter and defend itself, disaster for Israel, conveying not by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.”15 Here, then, was an only just his own view but that implicit link suggested between the letter’s of the entire IDF General Staff. reference to defensible borders and Israel’s self-defense capabilities, by virtue of the fact Prior to their formal release, the Chief that they were coupled together in the very of Staff of the IDF, Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz, same sentence. severely criticized the Clinton parameters before the Israeli cabinet as a virtual Bush clearly did not envision Israel disaster for Israel: Yediot Ahronot reported withdrawing to the 1967 lines. Later in the on December 29, 2000, his judgment letter he stated: “In light of new realities on that: “The Clinton bridging proposal is the ground, including already existing major inconsistent with Israel’s security interests Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic and, if it will be accepted, it will threaten to expect that the outcome of final status the security of the state” (emphasis added). negotiations will be a full and complete Mofaz was not just voicing his own opinion, return to the armistice lines of 1949.” Bush but was actually conveying the view of the did not use the term “settlement blocs,” as entire IDF General Staff. In short, there were Clinton did, but appeared to be referring to real U.S.-Israel differences at the time over the same idea. Less than a year later, on March the requirements of Israeli self-defense. 27, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained on Israel Radio that “Israeli The Clinton parameters did not become population centers” referred to “the large official U.S. policy. After President George settlement blocs” in the West Bank.16 W. Bush came into office, U.S. officials informed the newly-elected Sharon More significantly, Bush did not make the government that the administration would retention of “Israeli population centers” in the not be bound by the Clinton parameters. West Bank contingent upon Israel agreeing Conversely, it was understood that the to land swaps, using territory under Israeli Sharon government would likewise not sovereignty from within the pre-1967 borders be bound by its predecessor’s proposals. as Clinton had proposed. In that sense, Bush Nevertheless, the ideas raised during restored the original terms of reference in the this period continue to hover over most peace process that had been contained in discussions in Washington policymaking Resolution 242 by confining Israel’s eastern circles about a solution to the Israel- territorial dispute to the West Bank, without Palestinian conflict, especially in think tanks involving any additional territorial exchanges. and research institutes. Bush’s recognition of Israel’s right to defensible borders was the most explicit

58 U.S. Policy expression of the U.S. stand on the subject, strongest form of inter-state commitment, President George W. Bush for the Bush letter endorsed clear-cut followed by an executive agreement (such and Israeli Prime Minister modifications of the pre-1967 lines. Moreover, as a Memorandum of Understanding Ariel Sharon at the White by linking the idea of defensible borders without congressional ratification). Still, an House, June 14, 2004. to Israel’s defensive capabilities, Bush was exchange of letters provides an international Sharon exchanged letters with Bush in which Israel making clear that a “defensible border” had commitment as well. Kurtzer himself committed to withdraw to improve Israel’s ability to provide for its reiterated this point on Israel’s Channel 10 from Gaza and the own security. True, a “secure boundary,” television: “Those commitments are very, very United States endorsed as mentioned in Resolution 242, included firm with respect to these Israeli population defensible borders for that interpretation as well. But it could also centers; our expectation is that Israel is not Israel. imply a boundary that was secured by U.S. going to be going back to the 1967 lines.” guarantees, NATO troops, or even other When asked if these “population centers” international forces. Bush’s letter did not were “settlement blocs,” he replied: “That’s contain this ambiguity, but rather specifically correct.”17 tied defensible borders to Israel’s ability to defend itself. Separately, Bush introduced the idea of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state, which On March 25, 2005, the U.S. ambassador has territorial implications. At a minimum, to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer, was quoted in the contiguity refers to creating an unobstructed Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot as saying that connection between all the West Bank there was no U.S.-Israel “understanding” over cities, so that a Palestinian could drive Israel’s retention of West Bank settlement from Jenin to Hebron. Palestinians might blocs. Kurtzer denied the Yediot report. construe American references to contiguity Yet the story raised the question of what as including a Palestinian-controlled kind of commitment the Bush letter exactly connection from the West Bank to the Gaza constituted. In U.S. practice, a treaty is the Strip, like the “safe passage” mentioned

Dore Gold 59 in the Oslo Accords. But this would entail Yet after Obama entered office, questions bifurcating Israel in two. In any case, there is emerged about the extent to which the no international legal right of states to have administration still supported the idea of a sovereign connection between parts that defensible borders. His national security are geographically separated: The U.S. has adviser, General James Jones, was known no sovereign territorial connection between to support the deployment of a NATO force Alaska and the State of Washington. Similarly, in the West Bank instead of the IDF.18 There there is no such sovereign connection was also some ambiguity over whether the between the parts of other geographically Obama administration felt it was legally separated states, like Oman. On February bound by the 2004 Bush letter. When asked 21, 2005, President Bush clarified that his on two successive days, on June 1 and on administration’s call for territorial contiguity June 2, 2009, whether the administration was referred specifically to the West Bank. committed to the letter, Robert Wood, the deputy spokesman of the U.S. Department In the last year of the Bush administration, of State, would only say in response that the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made far- administration wanted to see both parties reaching concessions in private discussions implement their Roadmap obligations. When with Palestinian Authority Chairman pressed yet again, he finally answered: “I’m Mahmoud Abbas. In many respects, Olmert’s giving you what I got.” In other words, Wood proposals of 2008 went well beyond what had no instructions to confirm whether the was expected of Israel in the Bush letter, but administration still supported the Bush letter. certainly did not cancel the commitments that had been made to Prime Minister It appeared that the Obama administration Sharon. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice preferred to avoid making a clear-cut monitored the Olmert-Abbas discussions statement on defensible borders. In closely, though ultimately they failed to November 2009 when the government produce an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Rice of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reported her impressions to the incoming announced its readiness to implement a administration of President-elect Barack 10-month settlement freeze in the West Bank, Obama. Nonetheless, as was the case after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a the Camp David and Taba talks in 2000, it was brief statement that summarized the Obama not suggested that Israel should be bound by administration policy on borders: the diplomatic record of a failed negotiation. We believe that through good-faith negotiations the parties can mutually The Obama Administration and agree on an outcome which ends the Defensible Borders conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state on the During the 2008 presidential campaign, then- 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Senator Barack Obama spoke at the annual Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure policy conference of the American Israel and recognized borders that reflects Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). He spoke subsequent developments and meets on June 4, 2008, about the establishment of Israeli security requirements.19 a Palestinian state “that is contiguous and cohesive.” But he also stipulated that “any Thus Secretary Clinton did not identify with agreement with the Palestinian people must either the Palestinian goal of a territorial preserve Israel’s identity as a Jewish state, settlement on the 1967 lines or the Israeli with secure, recognized and defensible goal of secure borders, but placed the borders.” While Obama subsequently U.S. in a middle position between the two modified the statement he made at AIPAC parties. This represented a shift from Bush’s on Jerusalem – watering down his original 2004 commitments, but did not amount to declaration that it must remain “undivided” a complete rejection of defensible borders – he did not change his remarks in any way either. about Israel’s right to defensible borders.

60 U.S. Policy Toward the fall of 2010, the Obama State Department which sought to produce Prime Minister Benjamin administration's policy on the 1967 lines a unified American policy on the popular Netanyahu and President further evolved when the U.S. sought to uprisings in the Arab world. The last part Barack Obama at the re-start Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as of Obama's speech dealt with Israel and White House during the Israel’s ten-month settlement freeze ended. the Palestinians, where he set forward his first official meeting The U.S. and Israel negotiated the terms of position that the "core issues" must be between the two leaders, May 18, 2009. a second freeze, at which time the Obama negotiated. He then clarified his view that administration tried to reach out to the negotiations should result in two states and Palestinians with positions that were intended that the borders of a Palestinian state should to pull them back to the negotiating table. At be with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, thereby that time, the U.S. offered Mahmoud Abbas precluding Israel retaining territory in the that the next round of negotiations would be Jordan Valley separating the Palestinian based on the 1967 lines. But this concession state from the Jordanians. Finally came the from Washington did not appear to alter bombshell for most Israelis: "We believe the the Palestinian position in any way. It did, borders of Israel and Palestine should be however, put into the American bureaucracy based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed a new position that the U.S. was considering swaps, so that secure and recognized borders but did not make public. are established for both states." Obama was the first U.S. president to use the explicit A dramatic change in the U.S. position reference to 1967. His qualifications about emerged on May 19, 2011, when President land swaps that might have been intended Obama delivered a major address at the to offset this new position were of limited

Dore Gold 61 value. After all, the Palestinians themselves Many questions remained. Why did President spoke only about land swaps of 1.9 percent, Obama decide to make these public making this a mechanism for only miniscule statements on the 1967 lines, even with all the modifications of the 1967 line. qualifications that he subsequently issued? If he wanted to trigger new peace negotiations, The day after his statement on the 1967 lines, then his timing was difficult to explain. After Obama met Prime Minister Netanyahu in all, Abbas and his Fatah movement had the White House as U.S.-Israel tensions rose. just tied their fate to Hamas by signing a Before leaving for Washington, Netanyahu's reconciliation agreement with the Palestinian office released a statement according to terrorist organization. Hamas had just which he expected to hear from President condemned the U.S. for killing Osama bin Obama "a reconfirmation of commitments to Laden and demonstrated that it was still Israel from 2004 that received wide support rigidly committed to its jihadi agenda and not in both houses of Congress.” This was a direct to peace. reference to the April 14, 2004, Bush letter which had said that the U.S. did not envision a At AIPAC, Obama explained the logic of what complete Israeli withdrawal in the West Bank he was doing. The Palestinians wanted to and that new demographic realities had to abandon negotiations, which meant that be taken into account. In the aftermath of the momentum would be building for unilaterally meeting, the administration issued a number declaring a Palestinian state or at least using of clarifications regarding the U.S. position. the UN to assist in winning support for its establishment. He stated that he needed Appearing on the BBC on May 20, Obama "leverage with the Palestinians, with the Arab stated that the basis of negotiations states, and with the international community," will involve "looking at the 1967 border, so he needed "a basis of negotiations" that recognizing that conditions on the ground held out "the prospect of success." Obama have changed, and that there are going to be then stated that he was starting a five-day swaps to accommodate the interests of both trip to Europe. In short, the shift in U.S. sides." He believed that any negotiation at policy, according to his explanation, was tied this point should begin with "a conversation to an upcoming American effort to head about territory and security." Finally, in off a unilateral declaration of Palestinian his address to AIPAC on May 22, Obama statehood. clarified further that his reference to the 1967 lines should not have been taken literally: Obama's clarifications ameliorated many "By definition it means that the parties Israeli concerns. Nonetheless, a gap appeared themselves – Israelis and Palestinians – will to have emerged between the new U.S. negotiate a border that is different than the position and Israel's insistence that at the one that existed on June 4, 1967 (emphasis end of any negotiating process it be left with added)." defensible borders.

In his AIPAC address, Obama added that the formula he had in mind "allows the parties Historically, the U.S. Has Not themselves to account for the changes that have taken place over the last forty-four Insisted on Full Israeli Withdrawal years, including the new demographic realities on the ground and the needs on both In conclusion, historically the U.S. has not sides." While he still insisted that the future insisted on a full Israeli withdrawal to the Palestinian state needed to have a common 1949 armistice lines from the territories that border with Jordan, he nonetheless added Israel captured in the Six-Day War. Yet it is still that: "Provisions must be robust enough to possible to ask what value these American prevent a resurgence of terrorism; to stop declarations have if they are made with the the infiltration of weapons; and to provide additional provision that the ultimate location effective border security." of Arab-Israeli borders must be decided by the parties themselves. This is particularly true of the 2004 Bush letter, which reiterates this point explicitly.

62 U.S. Policy Clearly the U.S. cannot impose the Bush letter Defensible borders entered the U.S. on Israel and the Palestinians if they refuse to diplomatic lexicon for Arab-Israeli accept its terms. The Bush letter only updates peacemaking over several administrations. and summarizes the U.S. view of the correct Today, Israel must provide further details interpretation of UN Resolution 242 in any about the territorial meaning of defensible future negotiations. Its importance emanates borders and seek to reach a more from four possible future considerations: specific understanding with the Obama administration regarding its commitment Traditionally, Israel has sought assurances to the durability of this longstanding from the U.S. prior to the formal opening component of American diplomacy in the of negotiations. This was Israeli practice Middle East. before the Geneva Peace Conference after the 1973 Yom Kippur War; it was also Israeli practice prior to the 1991 Madrid Notes Peace Conference. But the April 2003 Quartet “Roadmap” was silent on the 1. Premier Kosygin wrote to President Johnson on subject of Israel’s future borders and November 21, 1967, requesting that the UK draft resolution, that was to become Resolution 242, include those of the proposed Palestinian state. the word “the” before the word “territories.” Johnson The Bush letter protected Israel’s vital wrote back the same day refusing the Soviet request. interests prior to the beginning of any The Soviet deputy foreign minister, Kuznetsov, tried the same day in New York to insert the word “all,” but was future negotiations. It was tantamount to rebuffed. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1967- a diplomatic safety net for Israel. 1968, volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War 1967, http://www.stage.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/ xix/28070.htm In the future, if the U.S. and Israel are 2. Adnan Abu Odeh, Nabil Elaraby, Meir Rosenne, Dennis at a Camp David-like summit and the Ross, Eugene Rostow, and Vernon Turner, UN Security Palestinians ask U.S. officials to unveil Council Resolution 242: The Building Block of Peacemaking Washington's position on borders, then if (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), p. 88. the Bush letter is respected, those officials 3. See Meir Rosenne in ibid., p. 31. should still back its contents. 4. Speech by President Lyndon Johnson, June 19, 1967; http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/ lbjpeace.html The Bush commitments were intended 5. See http://www.defensibleborders.org/amidror.htm. For to last regardless of who was in power a complete text of the memorandum, JCSM-373-67, see in Washington. The Bush letter was Michael Widlandski, Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State? (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political greeted with overwhelming bipartisan Studies, 1990), pp. 148-152. congressional approval on June 23-24, 6. See Ambassador Yehuda Blum, “The Territorial Clauses 2004. The House of Representatives of Security Council Resolution 242,” in Israel's Rights to approved it by an overwhelming majority Secure Boundaries: Four Decades Since UN Security Council Resolution 242 (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public of 407 to 9, the Senate by 95 to 3. Both Affairs, 2009), p. 29. See also Arthur Lall, The UN and the Rep. Rahm Emanuel and Senator Hillary Middle East Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, Clinton voted for the Bush letter. 1968), pp. 22-24. 7. Arthur J. Goldberg, Letter to the Editor of The New York Times, March 5, 1980. In July 2009, the European Union's 8. Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign foreign policy chief recommended that Policy Crises (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 140. if Israel and the Palestinians do not 9. Letter from President Ford to Prime Minister Rabin, reach an agreement among themselves, September 1, 1975; http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ the UN Security Council should call for jsource/Peace/ford_rabin_letter.html the recognition of a Palestinian state. 10. Speech by President Ronald Reagan, September 1, 1982; http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/ He recommended that such a UN speeches/1982/90182d.htm resolution dictate the key final status 11. Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s address, issues, including borders and the status September 16, 1988; http://www.findarticles. com/p/ articles/mi_m1079/is_n2140_v88/ai_6876262 of Jerusalem. If an effort to impose the 12. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as 1967 lines on Israel by means of a UN Secretary of State (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, Security Council resolution were to move 1993), p. 1022. 13. Ibid., p. 1023. forward, the Bush commitments create an 14. Letter of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, expectation that the U.S. would move to January 17, 1997; http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/ veto such a resolution.20 go.asp?MFAH00qo0 Dore Gold 63 15. Exchange of letters between President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon, April 14, 2004; http://www.mfa. gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/ Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm 16. Aluf Benn, “PM: Understanding with U.S. About West Bank Settlement Blocs Holds Firm,” Ha’aretz, March 27, 2005. 17. http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish /mission/ amb/032505b.html 18. Aluf Benn, “Candidate for U.S. Security Adviser Wants NATO Force in West Bank,” Ha’aretz, November 23, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1039923. html 19. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, “Israel’s Announcement Regarding Settlements,” U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action, PRN: 2009/1175, http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2009a/11/132434.htm 20. “EU's Solana Calls for UN to Recognize Palestinian State,” July 12, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSLC616115. 21. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases 2004/04/20040414-3.html

64 U.S. Policy Appendix 1

UN Security Council Resolution 242 November 22, 1967

The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires 1. the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of ever y State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

UN Security Council Resolution 338 October 22, 1973

The Security Council,

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts;

3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Dore Gold 65 Appendix 2

Letter from U.S. President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon April 14, 200421

His Excellency Ariel Sharon Prime Minister of Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter setting out your disengagement plan.

The United States remains hopeful and determined to find a way forward toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. I remain committed to my June 24, 2002, vision of two states living side by side in peace and security as the key to peace, and to the roadmap as the route to get there.

We welcome the disengagement plan you have prepared, under which Israel would withdraw certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza, and withdraw certain military installations and settlements in the West Bank. These steps described in the plan will mark real progress toward realizing my June 24, 2002, vision, and make a real contribution towards peace. We also understand that, in this context, Israel believes it is important to bring new opportunities to the Negev and the Galilee. We are hopeful that steps pursuant to this plan, consistent with my vision, will remind all states and parties of their own obligations under the roadmap.

The United States appreciates the risks such an undertaking represents. I therefore want to reassure you on several points.

First, the United States remains committed to my vision and to its implementation as described in the roadmap. The United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan. Under the roadmap, Palestinians must undertake an immediate cessation of armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere, and all official Palestinian institutions must end incitement against Israel. The Palestinian leadership must act decisively against terror, including sustained, targeted, and effective operations to stop terrorism and dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. Palestinians must undertake a comprehensive and fundamental political reform that includes a strong parliamentary democracy and an empowered prime minister.

Second, there will be no security for Israelis or Palestinians until they and all states, in the region and beyond, join together to fight terrorism and dismantle terrorist organizations. The United States reiterates its steadfast commitment to Israel’s security, including secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel’s capability to deter and defend itself, by itself, against any threat or possible combination of threats.

Third, Israel will retain its right to defend itself against terrorism, including to take actions against terrorist organizations. The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt, and others in the international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by any other means. The United States understands that after Israel withdraws from Gaza and/or parts of the West Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements, existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue.

66 U.S. Policy The United States is strongly committed to Israel’s security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel.

As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.

I know that, as you state in your letter, you are aware that certain responsibilities face the State of Israel. Among these, your government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent, and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.

As you know, the United States supports the establishment of a Palestinian state that is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent, so that the Palestinian people can build their own future in accordance with my vision set forth in June 2002 and with the path set forth in the roadmap. The United States will join with others in the international community to foster the development of democratic political institutions and new leadership committed to those institutions, the reconstruction of civic institutions, the growth of a free and prosperous economy, and the building of capable security institutions dedicated to maintaining law and order and dismantling terrorist organizations.

A peace settlement negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians would be a great boon not only to those peoples but to the peoples of the entire region. Accordingly, the United States believes that all states in the region have special responsibilities: to support the building of the institutions of a Palestinian state; to fight terrorism, and cut off all forms of assistance to individuals and groups engaged in terrorism; and to begin now to move toward more normal relations with the State of Israel. These actions would be true contributions to building peace in the region.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have described a bold and historic initiative that can make an important contribution to peace. I commend your efforts and your courageous decision which I support. As a close friend and ally, the United States intends to work closely with you to help make it a success.

Sincerely,

George W. Bush

Dore Gold 67 Appendix 3

U.S. Senate and House of Representatives Approve Commitments to Israel in President Bush’s Letter of April 14, 2004

H. CON. RES. 460 CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas the United States is hopeful that a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be achieved;

Whereas the United States is strongly committed to the security of Israel and its well- being as a Jewish state;

Whereas Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has proposed an initiative intended to enhance the security of Israel and further the cause of peace in the Middle East;

Whereas President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Sharon have subsequently engaged in a dialogue with respect to this initiative;

Whereas President Bush, as part of that dialogue, expressed the support of the United States for Prime Minister Sharon's initiative in a letter dated April 14, 2004;

Whereas in the April 14, 2004, letter the President stated that in light of new realities on the ground in Israel, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, but realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities;

Whereas the President acknowledged that any agreed, just, fair, and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a permanent alternative and the settling of Palestinian refugees there rather than in Israel;

Whereas the principles expressed in President Bush's letter will enhance the security of Israel and advance the cause of peace in the Middle East;

Whereas there will be no security for Israelis or Palestinians until Israel and the Palestinians, and all countries in the region and throughout the world, join together to fight terrorism and dismantle terrorist organizations;

Whereas the United States remains committed to the security of Israel, including secure, recognized, and defensible borders, and to preserving and strengthening the capability of Israel to deter enemies and defend itself against any threat;

Whereas Israel has the right to defend itself against terrorism, including the right to take actions against terrorist organizations that threaten the citizens of Israel;

Whereas the President stated on June 24, 2002, his vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security and that vision can only be fully

68 U.S. Policy realized when terrorism is defeated, so that a new state may be created based on rule of law and respect for human rights; and

Whereas President Bush announced on March 14, 2003, that in order to promote a lasting peace, all Arab states must oppose terrorism, support the emergence of a peaceful and democratic Palestine, and state clearly that they will live in peace with Israel: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress –

(1) strongly endorses the principles articulated by President Bush in his letter dated April 14, 2004, to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon which will strengthen the security and well-being of the State of Israel; and

(2) supports continuing efforts with others in the international community to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat to the security of Israel.

Passed the House of Representatives, June 23, 2004. Passed the Senate, June 24, 2004.

Dore Gold 69 CONTROL OF TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE AND THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM

Former Head of the IDF Strategic Planning Brig.-Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel Division; former Head of the Negotiation Unit, Office of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert

Israel’s Vulnerability to Air Attack risk, in general, and at a great disadvantage in terms of its ability to prevent or respond During the Camp David Summit in the to attacks from the air, in particular. summer of 2000, American military experts raised the question of whether the Israeli Israel has a very narrow “waist” – the demand for control of a unified airspace over distance between the Jordan River and all the territory between the Mediterranean the Mediterranean Sea is approximately 40 Sea and the Jordan River was essential. nautical miles (approximately 70 km). This Among the justifications provided by Israeli means that a combat aircraft can fly across representatives was the danger of aerial the country in less than four minutes. A terrorism. The Israelis explained the need plane could penetrate the country via the to be prepared in the event of a suicide Jordan Valley and reach Jerusalem in less attack – carried out by a civilian aircraft than two minutes. laden with explosives – over a major Israeli urban center. One of the Americans present This aerial threat creates a great defense responded to this with disdain, asserting challenge for Israel. It takes at least three that the Israelis had a vivid imagination minutes for a scramble takeoff of an when it came to implausible threats, which interceptor aircraft that can identify such a they employed to justify exaggerated potential enemy penetration – and this is security demands. without factoring in the flight time from the airbase until the interceptor engages the A year later, on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda penetrating aircraft to identify it, or shoot it sent airliners plunging into the World Trade down if it is on a hostile mission. Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, causing the death of thousands In the event of an aerial attack aimed at of people and illustrating the importance of Jerusalem, the hostile plane must be shot creative thinking in assessing terrorist and down at least 10 nautical miles east of national-security threat scenarios. the city – not directly over it. Otherwise, both the plane and its munitions would Such thinking is especially crucial for Israel, crash into population centers, with dire whose geography puts it at high military consequences.

70 Airspace A jet airliner hijacked by Al-Qaeda terrorists about to plunge into the south tower of the World Trade Center, September 11, 2001, in the worst terror attack in U.S. history. The 9/11 attacks underscore the importance of Israeli control of a unified airspace above Israel and a prospective Palestinian state.

Dore Gold 71 All of the above explains why Israel suffers This substantial defense limitation, therefore, from insufficient time and space to respond does not allow for Israel’s complete and to and prevent an aerial attack on Jerusalem continuous protection from hostile air attacks. from the east, particularly if Israeli interceptor Thus, the deployment of missile batteries and planes are not free to act over the Jordan anti-aircraft weapons, while complementing Valley. aerial interception, cannot replace it.

The way the IDF tends to deal with this disadvantage today is to scramble In the past, prior to a planned Iraqi interceptors at unidentified targets while they mission to attack Israel’s nuclear are still over Jordanian airspace, to ensure that any encounter with a hostile plane will take research compound in Dimona, place immediately after it crosses the Jordan Jordan permitted Iraqi combat River line. This also takes precious time, since the aerial targets first have to be identified as planes to use its airspace to take hostile, friendly, or merely a civilian plane that aerial photographs of Israeli strayed from its flight path. territory. Scramble takeoffs of this type occur daily because it is impossible to obtain a precise True, peaceful relations exist today between aerial picture on a regular basis, despite ties Israel and Jordan, which include mutual and coordination between the military and respect for both countries’ territorial airspace, civilian air traffic control centers in Jordan and civilian air links, and coordination of the Israel. passage of planes through the international air corridor separating them. However, there Access to Israeli airspace from the is no guarantee that such coordination will Mediterranean Sea to the west is permitted continue in the future. In fact, in the past, only to planes that have identified themselves prior to a planned Iraqi mission to carry out and have been identified before they come an aerial attack on Israel’s nuclear research within 100 km of Israel. compound in Dimona, Jordan permitted Iraqi combat planes to use its airspace and to fly on a route parallel to the Israeli border in order to take aerial photographs of Israeli territory. The Role of Air Defenses In other words, despite the current relative calm, Israel cannot entrust its security to the Surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft goodwill of the Jordanians or the Palestinians weapons are not the solution to Israel’s air in the future. defense problem. Unlike interceptor planes – which are equipped with comprehensive identification capabilities including the possibility of visual identification – anti- Defending Ben-Gurion aircraft batteries cannot determine with International Airport certainty which aerial targets are hostile and need to be shot down. Anti-aircraft batteries Israel faces another great challenge in also involve shooting down hostile planes far defending Ben-Gurion Airport, both from from the target of their attack – over non- hostile fire at its runways, and from possible Israeli territory. attempts to shoot down civilian planes during takeoff or landing. Takeoff and landing Non-hostile aerial activity – both civilian and routes are influenced by the direction of the military – must also be taken into account. wind, which means that sometimes planes Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation must pass over Palestinian communities and in which ground-to-air missiles would be adjacent developed areas. Israel suffers from launched at the airspace of a neighboring a major topographical security disadvantage country without definite identification of because all international civil aviation could targets as hostile aircraft on a mission to be exposed to possible attack from hostile attack Israel. Palestinian elements using shoulder-launched

72 Airspace anti-aircraft missiles, fired from the West Bank Primary Israeli control over a unified An Israeli F-16 takes off mountain ridge that rises up to 3,000 feet airspace (an area whose width totals 40 on a mission to southern higher than Israel’s main airport and major nautical miles), which cannot be divided. Lebanon, July 16, 2006. coastal cities. The Israel Air Force must Freedom of operation for the Israel Air preserve full operational At the beginning of 2000, with the outbreak Force in the entire airspace west of the freedom and maintain the of the Palestinian terror war that came to Jordan River and the Dead Sea (and over a security arrangements required to protect civil be known as the Second Intifada, many possible Palestinian state). aviation, in general, and commercial airlines canceled their flights to Ben-Gurion International Israel. It may be expected that if Palestinian Elimination of potential aerial threats Airport, in particular. terrorists opened fire on Ben-Gurion Airport, from a Palestinian state towards Israel. For all foreign airlines would immediately halt example, Israel would lack the capability their flights, effectively isolating the country. to intercept a hostile plane taking off from the Atarot (Kalandia) airfield and This is why full security control of the airspace immediately crashing into Jerusalem. is absolutely necessary, though it is not sufficient. Equally crucial is Israeli security Restriction of foreign air traffic due to control on the ground in the areas closest to the crowded conditions of civilian and the airport (i.e., Beit Liqya, Harbata, and Beit military air traffic, which already impose Aryeh). restraints on the amount of training carried out by the Israel Air Force. The Israel Air Force must preserve full operational freedom in a unified airspace, and Establishing security arrangements maintain the security arrangements required to preclude the interception of planes to protect civil aviation, in general, and Ben- landing and taking off from Ben-Gurion Gurion Airport, in particular. International Airport.

To protect the country’s skies and to prevent The Palestinians see the control of the airspace terrorist attacks on its population centers and above their state as a symbol of sovereignty. on strategic and military targets, Israel must They also seek to establish an international insist on five fundamental requirements: airport linking the Palestinian state to other countries, serving as an international passageway for passengers and goods.

Udi Dekel 73 During previous rounds of negotiations The Palestinians would have the right with Israel, the Palestinians agreed to to operate civil aviation that meets the limitations on their military air capabilities, safety and security standards of the Israeli acknowledging that they have no need for Civil Aviation Administration, on the basis combat aircraft or attack helicopters and of international criteria. other offensive aerial weapons that could threaten Israel. Nevertheless, they demanded The Palestinian side would receive freedom of operation in the airspace above financial remuneration for the use of their state for planes and helicopters, civil its airspace, in accordance with what is aviation, and internal-security (policing). customary in international aviation.

The Palestinian position posits: Air traffic control will be undertaken by Israel. A prohibition on Israeli military activity in Palestinian airspace. A Palestinian air controller can be integrated into the Israeli civilian air The operation of airfields, and traffic control station, and will maintain maintaining a major aviation artery contact with Palestinian and foreign between the Palestinian state and the rest civilian aircraft operating in or traversing of the world. the airspace above the Palestinian state, subject to Israeli control. Permanent and institutionalized air links between the West Bank and Gaza via an The border between Israel and a air corridor over Israel. Palestinian state would need to reflect the security needs of Ben-Gurion Airport. In Reliance on international conventions addition, special security arrangements – primarily the Chicago Treaty – which are required to secure the flight paths to maintain that a state should exercise and from the airport. sovereignty in its territorial airspace.

What emerges is a considerable gap regarding the issues. Israel’s point of Palestinian Airports departure in any negotiations is its security needs, while the Palestinian interest involves The Palestinians have demanded control over sovereignty, honor, and economics. the Kalandia (Atarot) airfield in Jerusalem, to have it become the international airport To bridge this gap, arrangements must of the Palestinian state. They also intend be designed that protect Israel’s security to establish additional airports for internal requirements while agreeing to expressions Palestinian air traffic. Israel opposes handing of Palestinian sovereignty. Any arrangement over Atarot airfield to the Palestinians since a between the parties on the issue of territorial Palestinian airport adjacent to Israel’s capital airspace requires their agreement on the poses an unacceptable risk. following principles: The operation of a Palestinian airport in the A unified territorial airspace will need to West Bank would also entail substantial risks be preserved, with Israel assuming overall – both in terms of security and in terms of responsibility to enable it to deal with flight safety. Israel would lack the sufficient deviant situations, in light of the severe response time required to intercept a hostile time constraints Israel faces in responding plane on a mission to attack an Israeli to potential security threats. target. In addition, there is the danger of traffic overload in the international corridor By virtue of its sovereignty, a prospective between Israel and Jordan, and an overlap Palestinian state would need to grant of activity (circling) involving Ben-Gurion Israel prerogative in security control in Airport, Israeli military airports, and civilian Palestinian airspace. airports in the West Bank.

74 Airspace Israel's Airspace Vulnerabilities: The Limited Time for Interdicting Hostile Aircraft

LEBANON › In the event of an aerial attack on Israel, the hostile plane must be downed at least 10 miles from a city to avoid munitions striking heavily populated areas. Haifa › It takes approximately 3 minutes for an Israeli interceptor plane to identify an enemy aircraft. 4 minutes from the Jordan

River toHadera the Mediterranean Tulkarem Nablus

Netanya Kalkilya W EST BANK

Petah Tikva

Tel Aviv - Yafo

3 minutes

Rehovot

Ben-Gurion Airport runways Ashdod ISRAEL Modi'in

Udi Dekel 75 In the event that Israel is prepared to take be capable of monitoring sensitive aerial the security and safety risks associated with activity within Israel, information which the establishment of a Palestinian airport, could be passed on to parties hostile its establishment should meet the following to Israel.) In addition, electromagnetic strict conditions: coordination of radio frequencies will be required to prevent mutual jamming, Any airport must be located far from which could constitute a major hindrance Israeli population centers, preferably on to air safety. the Jordanian or Egyptian side of the border a prospective Palestinian state Finally, an agreement between the parties would share with its neighbors. Although would enable the opening of an international in the past, Israel had agreed to the flight path that traverses the shared airspace, operation of the Dahaniye airport on the facilitating transport to the east, with an Gaza-Egypt border, Israel cannot assume accepted “payment” to the Palestinian the same risk in the West Bank due to the side. Israel can consider opening such an proximity of this territory to Israel’s major aerial corridor if Israeli commercial planes coastal cities and its strategic interior. are permitted to use international flight Therefore, any Palestinian airport should paths that pass over Arab states. This would be located in Jordanian territory to ensure significantly shorten flights to India, China proper supervision of the passage of and the Far East. travelers and cargo into the PA. In other words, the Hashemite Kingdom’s superior security services would be responsible Control of the Electromagnetic for the security, inspection, and safety aspects of the endeavor. Spectrum

Landing approaches and take-off paths Similar to Israel’s vital security requirement must be located on the Egyptian and to control a unified airspace if a Palestinian Jordanian sides of the border, with Israeli state is established, the topographical authorization required for any entry into conditions and limited distance between the the unified airspace of Israel and the PA. population and communication centers of the two entities do not allow for division of The airport will be operated in the electromagnetic spectrum. Since it largely accordance with prevailing Israeli and occupies the central mountain ridge, the international criteria in the realm of Palestinian Authority enjoys a topographical security and safety. Should the airport be advantage – with its communication systems used for international flights, it will serve far less vulnerable to disruptions and as an international crossing and all the jamming than those of largely coastal Israel. A arrangements for international crossings small Palestinian transmitter station on Mount shall apply to it, including the capability Eival, near Nablus, for example, could jam to effectively inspect personal baggage virtually the entire communication system and merchandise, and to prevent the in Israeli areas broadcasting on the same smuggling of war materiel and illicit frequencies. goods. In addition, measures will be required to prevent the infiltration of This problem of disruption is not new to Israel, terrorist elements into the prospective which has suffered from a recurring problem Palestinian state, such as allowing Israeli of jammed civil aviation communication supervision – and even intervention – channels at Ben-Gurion Airport. At times it possibly with the involvement of a third has been necessary to close the airport to party. landings. Generally, these disruptions are caused by unlicensed local radio stations No equipment that could constitute broadcasting on the frequency ranges of a direct threat to Israel or abet parties the control tower. When they originate from hostile to Israel will be installed at the a radio station in the Palestinian territories, airport. (For example, airport radar might Israel demands that the PA halt the station’s activity. If the disturbances do not cease,

76 Airspace forces are dispatched to impound the Israel must guarantee that the An Israeli soldier in transmitter. the southern Lebanese Palestinians do not exploit their village of Maroun al-Ras, Since borders cannot stop the spread of July 29, 2006. When electromagnetic waves, the electromagnetic topographical advantage to block or IDF forces entered Lebanon during the spectrum cannot be divided. neutralize Israel’s communication Second Lebanon War in systems, or to gather intelligence 2006, they discovered In the framework of the interim accords advanced Iranian between Israel and the PA, a committee on their own behalf or on behalf of intelligence-gathering for electromagnetic coordination was systems, whose coverage established to allocate frequencies to both hostile states. extended deep into parties, and prevent mutual jamming and Israel. In light of this, disturbances. Indeed, throughout the world Israel’s interest is to preserve the normal Israel insists on retaining it is customary to maintain electromagnetic functioning of its public, private, and military overriding control of coordination between states in areas up communications systems. Equally crucial is the electromagnetic to 80 km from the border. This means the guaranteeing that the Palestinians do not spectrum. entire area between the Jordan River and exploit their topographical advantage to the Mediterranean Sea, including all of the block or neutralize Israel’s communication Palestinian areas. It is thus clear to both systems, or to gather intelligence on their parties that electromagnetic coordination own behalf or on behalf of hostile states. is required. The question remains, however, whether one of the parties will have This concern is well-founded. For example, overriding responsibility and the final say. when IDF forces entered Lebanon during the

Udi Dekel 77 Second Lebanon War in 2006, they discovered Preventing illegal broadcasts and ensuring advanced Iranian intelligence-gathering enforcement capability in supervision, systems whose coverage capability extended monitoring, and inspection in the deep into Israel. In light of this, Israel’s position Palestinian areas. is that it must retain overriding control of the electromagnetic spectrum, and there must be Creating a mutual apparatus to terminate an effective supervisory apparatus in place to disruptive broadcasts and to reach guarantee that its decisions are implemented. agreements on the continued operation The Palestinians, on the other hand, view of communications systems. this issue – as in the case of airspace – in the context of sovereignty. They demand Supervising the installation of antennas full independence in managing the and other equipment that could be electromagnetic spectrum and consider exploited for use by hostile parties. Israel’s demands to be excessive and their own to be based on international conventions. Due to its topographical and technological vulnerability and its security needs – and The way to bridge the gap between the in order to prevent damage to its existing parties is to establish a new joint committee communications capabilities – Israel must for electromagnetic coordination whose tasks have overriding prerogatives on this will be: committee.

Allocating frequencies on the The mutual lack of trust between the parties electromagnetic spectrum for use by the stems from contradictory interests, as well parties. as differences in how they approach the issue. Israel views the electromagnetic Guaranteeing Israel’s security needs, spectrum from the perspective of security and assuring the demilitarization of the and the maintenance of normal functioning Palestinian state’s military capabilities of communications systems, while the in the area of communications (for Palestinians are primarily concerned with example, by prohibiting jamming and demonstrating their sovereignty. In order disruption equipment). For this purpose, to overcome this divide, a third party can effective inspection at international be enlisted to supervise the honoring of border crossings is required to prevent agreements by both sides, and verify whether the introduction of equipment prohibited significant or deliberate harm has been done under the agreements. to the interests of either party.

Upholding the understandings between the parties about limitations on Palestinian military capabilities, which means limiting frequency ranges allocated for military use.

Imposing limitations on the operation of systems that damage the continuity and reliability of the communications of the other party. In this context, the Palestinians currently operate communications systems using antiquated technology that breaks into other frequencies and causes local communications disruptions.

78 Airspace Summary

The Palestinians repeatedly argue that they understand Israel’s security needs, but insist that peace will bring security. They therefore believe their own interests take precedence over Israel’s. Conversely, Israel views its security as a necessary condition for maintaining peace and stability, and cannot agree to proposals that would base its vital security needs solely on diplomatic agreements.

It is only through a mutual understanding of the other party’s needs – and by building an effective coordination apparatus to provide fitting solutions to demands on both sides – that a stable and viable agreement can be implemented. In light of the special time, space and topographical conditions of the area, it is not possible to divide the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum between Israel and a future Palestinian state. For both of these, unified solutions are required. In this context, the brunt of responsibility for making decisions and implementing them must be in the hands of one of the parties. Given Israel’s complex security needs, including the need to maintain stability and security following the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, overall responsibility must be in Israel’s hands. At the same time, the Palestinian need to exhibit elements of sovereignty in the realms of airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum should be respected. This can be accomplished through joint apparatuses for coordination, management, and problem-solving.

Udi Dekel 79 THE RISKS OF FOREIGN PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN THE WEST BANK

Former Head of the Research and Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror Assessment Division, IDF Intelligence; former military secretary to the Minister of Defense. He is currently National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu. This chapter was Israel’s Experience with withdrawal from Sinai was one of the main written prior to his developments that precipitated the outbreak appointment. International Peacekeepers of the Six-Day War. The history of UNEF’s betrayal of Israel, no matter how it might During the 1967 Six-Day War, I was a soldier have been legally justified by the UN, served serving in Battalion 202 of the Paratroopers as a formative event in shaping how Israelis Brigade of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). look today at proposals for them to rely on We entered the Gaza Strip from south of international forces for their security. Gaza City and on the first day of fighting, in the early afternoon, we were told not to open fire on a group that was due to arrive in an orderly fashion along the railway UNIFIL in Lebanon line. After about an hour a group of Indian soldiers with large Sikh turbans on their Later, as an intelligence officer in the heads approached. They marched between IDF Northern Command, along the front the railway lines in neat groups of four, rifles with Lebanon and Syria, I noticed that slung across their shoulders with the barrels UNIFIL, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, pointing downward, a clear sign that they did was completely ineffective. UNIFIL was not intend to use them. This was UNEF, the established in 1978 in accordance with United Nations Emergency Force, which had UN Security Council Resolution 425 in the retreated from the area just before hostilities aftermath of Operation Litani, an Israeli broke out. ground incursion into Lebanon in response to repeated terrorist attacks into northern UNEF had been installed at the end of Israel by the PLO. UNIFIL’s mandate was to the 1956 Sinai Campaign as a buffer force confirm Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, between Egypt and Israel after the Israeli restore international peace and security, and withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the help restore the authority of the Lebanese Gaza Strip. However, at the moment of truth, government in the area. just when the force was most needed to avert war, it evacuated in response to the request of But southern Lebanon quickly reverted to the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, being a terrorist stronghold from which to UN Secretary-General U Thant. The UNEF hostile forces fired upon Israel. UNIFIL did not

80 Foreign Peacekeepers The United Nations flag next to the Hizbullah flag in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel.

Dore Gold 81 prevent this from happening. What UNIFIL abducted three Israeli soldiers, while killing did do was interfere with IDF operations. others. All this transpired under the nose of a The UNIFIL deployment did not prevent UNIFIL position, from which the incident could the deterioration of the situation and the easily be observed. No UNIFIL roadblocks outbreak of the 1982 Lebanon War. Even were set up to intercept the Hizbullah vehicles after the war, the same problems with UNIFIL carrying the Israeli captives. remained, when the threat to Israel by the PLO was replaced by the Iranian-backed Since the 2006 war, and despite the Hizbullah. In the years that followed, the IDF introduction of more than 10,000 additional acted correctly. It would enter Lebanon when UNIFIL troops into southern Lebanon necessary as a regular army, with a flag and a under the auspices of UN Security Council uniform. It coordinated its entry in advance in Resolution 1701, Hizbullah has rearmed at a an effort to avoid injuring UN personnel. torrid pace. The group has accumulated more than 50,000 rockets despite the fact that UNIFIL was supposed to have upgraded its UNIFIL in southern Lebanon is peacekeeping mandate. True, the increased more prone to intervene against UN and Lebanese Army presence in southern Lebanon has made Hizbullah activity more Israeli self-defense operations difficult south of the Litani River and has than against acts of aggression by forced the group to move the bulk of its operations north of that line. However, Hizbullah. Hizbullah continues to operate openly, in contravention to UN Resolutions 425 and Hizbullah, by contrast, was an armed 1701, and has never adhered to UNIFIL force of irregulars that attacked from, and requirements. disappeared into, the civilian population of Lebanon. They informed no one when they In fact, in July and October 2009, large were going in or pulling out of an area. The weapons caches exploded in UN-controlled UN never caught any Hizbullah terrorists territory and the UN had known nothing and took no action against them – even of the existence of either cache. There are after Hizbullah opened fire. When Hizbullah tens of such arms caches scattered across moved its artillery positions to within 50 southern Lebanon and hundreds of Hizbullah meters of a UN position and then fired on operatives training there. Have any been Israeli targets, UNIFIL did nothing. But if arrested? No. In short, the presence of UN Israel employed counter-fire against the very forces in Lebanon has not been a helpful same Hizbullah artillery, then the UN Division factor, even when the Lebanese government for Peacekeeping Operations would issue has wanted the UN to curb Hizbullah. a formal diplomatic complaint. As a result, the UN was more prone to intervene against Israeli self-defense operations than against acts of aggression by Hizbullah. International Forces and Palestinians UNIFIL has been a constant reminder to the Israeli public of the fecklessness of What will happen if UN forces are sent international forces in preventing an Islamist to a sovereign Palestinian state whose insurgent force like Hizbullah from carrying government does not want an international out terrorist warfare against Israel. Following force to neutralize or disrupt the activities Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern of organizations like Hizbullah or Hamas. If Lebanon in May 2000, Hizbullah undertook a international forces are deployed in order massive weapons buildup, accumulating some to ensure that the Palestinians fulfill the 20,000 rockets, more than 4,000 of which it security clauses in their agreement with launched at Israeli towns and cities in the 2006 Israel, yet the Palestinian government retains Second Lebanon War. Moreover, in a major strong reservations about certain security Hizbullah operation in October 2000, its forces restrictions – like demilitarization – which it crossed into Israeli territory from an area of believes to be an infringement on Palestinian Lebanon supposedly controlled by the UN and sovereignty, then that government will show

82 Foreign Peacekeepers little interest in the continued presence of The presence of international forces is supposed Two members of the these international forces. to provide the Israeli public with a solution to European Union’s border the security problems resulting from a territorial monitor mission look at a In Gaza, European monitors had been stationed withdrawal. However, from Israel’s experience, scanner screen operated by a Palestinian border along the Egyptian border in accordance with the only successful security forces that can be police officer at the relied upon are its own. Therefore, the presence the 2005 Rafah border crossing agreement Rafah border crossing, brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza of a UN force, as it has been in the past, will November 25, 2005. Rice. But the Europeans fled their positions merely create an obstacle to Israel’s ability European monitors fled when internecine fighting between Hamas to defend itself. This is why Israel must retain their posts shortly after and Fatah heated up after the Hamas victory in the exclusive right to act against armed terror Palestinian internecine the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. The groups – thereby ruling out the option of an violence broke out monitors also fell victim to kidnappings by local international force. between Fatah and Hamas, after Hamas won Palestinians, which contributed to their decision the 2006 Palestinian to quit their post. Israel Seeks to Defend Itself elections. At the Jericho prison in PA-controlled territory By Itself in the West Bank, in 2006 British and U.S. prison guards proved unable to enforce Israel’s need to “defend itself by itself” is not prison sentences on Palestinian terrorists, as a new idea. It is based on Israel’s national agreed under international understandings. ethos since its War of Independence. It is also In the end, the IDF was compelled to act, rooted in Israel’s internationally-sanctioned entering the prison to take Palestinian right to “secure and recognized boundaries” terrorist prisoners to Israeli prisons, including or “defensible borders” that was enshrined Ahmed Saadat, leader of the Popular Front in UN Security Council Resolution 242 that for the Liberation of Palestine, who was followed the 1967 war and has governed all responsible for the murder of Israeli cabinet Arab-Israeli diplomacy ever since. President minister Rehavam Ze'evi in 2001. George W. Bush used this language in the

Yaakov Amidror 83 presidential guarantee he provided to former not include any form of Palestinian or Hamas Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a quid surrender, nor is surrender a status sought by pro quo for withdrawing from Gaza in 2005, either the Palestinians or Israel. Subsequently, stating, “The United States reiterates its the Yugoslav army retreated from Kosovo steadfast commitment to Israel's security, to Yugoslavia, creating a physical reality in including secure, defensible borders, and to which there was no longer contact between preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to the warring factions. Such conditions have deter and defend itself, by itself, against any yet to be achieved in the Israeli-Palestinian threat or possible combination of threats.” conflict and are not likely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. Generally, international forces can only work when both parties exhibit the required political will to observe bilateral agreements. Whether an international force In such cases, an international force can assist is deployed under a NATO or a in supervising treaty implementation, as in the case of the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace UN mandate, all peacekeeping in the Sinai Peninsula. Since August 3, 1981, forces will seek to maintain a when the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was agreed to and funded by Israel, good working relationship with the Egypt, and the United States, the security militias and terrorist groups that clauses of the peace treaty have been upheld by both parties. It is important to note that engage in violence. both Egyptians and Israelis have maintained a bilateral interest in upholding its terms. But In earlier phases of the Bosnian War, there was even in this scenario, should either party ever a largely Western military presence that had choose to breach the agreement, the MFO been deployed under a UN mandate, known would be unable to prevent it. as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). NATO was already involved at this early stage, supporting UNPROFOR. Even though it was a well-equipped Western army, The Track Record of NATO/Western UNPROFOR failed to stop horrible massacres Peacekeepers in that conflict. Most notably, the Dutch UN contingent abandoned the Muslims of Because of the poor track record of UN forces, Srebrenica as they were attacked by the sometimes the suggestion is made to send Bosnian Serb Army, leading to the mass NATO forces instead, with the assumption that murder of over 8,000 civilians in 1995. NATO they are more robust and will be better able was only to intervene if it had UN approval; to handle the mission. Whereas UN forces can there was a “dual-key” mechanism which come from many non-Western states, from required the agreement of both organizations Fiji to Nigeria, whose soldiers may be poorly to activate NATO’s power. trained and underequipped, a NATO force is presumably more reliable. While for the most Regardless of whether an international force part UN forces serve as peacekeeping troops is deployed under a NATO or a UN mandate, – observing that the terms of an agreement as long as the forces are deployed into are upheld – a NATO deployment may include the midst of hostilities, they will face the more ambitious goals of peace enforcement: same fundamental problem that all such imposing on warring parties a cessation of peacekeeping forces face: their need to hostilities to which they have not agreed. But maintain a good working relationship even even NATO has many limitations that must be with the militias and terrorist groups that noted. engage in violence and aggression against them. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR did not want to For example, in the case of Bosnia, NATO alienate the Bosnian Serb Army, which was forces were deployed to uphold the 1995 known at times to threaten UN troops and Dayton Agreement and were effective once take them as hostages. In Lebanon, UNIFIL Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally. did not want to anger Hizbullah, for similar However, the Israeli-Palestinian case does reasons.

84 Foreign Peacekeepers Rescue workers search for bodies in the rubble of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut following a Hizbullah suicide bomb attack on April 18, 1983, that killed over 60 people. On October 23, 1983, two truck bombs struck buildings housing U.S. and French military forces in Beirut, killing 241 American and 58 French servicemen.

For peacekeeping forces in particular, made up of units from Britain, France, Italy, assuming a posture of strict neutrality and the U.S. In October 1983, both the French between the side that seeks to undermine paratrooper barracks and the U.S. Marine peace and security and the side that they headquarters were attacked by Shiite suicide are supposed to defend emanates, above all, bombers, on orders from Tehran, causing the from considerations of survival. This need deaths of nearly three hundred servicemen. for neutrality is one of the major factors Within a year, both forces withdrew from guaranteeing that peacekeeping forces will Lebanon, demonstrating not just the dangers be ineffective and unreliable when they are that peacekeepers face, but the reality that most needed. they will quickly leave the theater when attacked. This fact gives the peacekeeping Their need for neutrality, and the danger forces an additional bureaucratic incentive that peacekeepers face when they try to do to ingratiate themselves to the terrorist their jobs, is not just a theoretical concept. or insurgent side of a conflict, because a The force that was dispatched to Lebanon in confrontation with such forces will lead to August 1982 was closer to a fully-armed NATO the failure of the peacekeeping mission. This force than to a UN Observer Mission. It was fact of life for peacekeepers has been borne

Yaakov Amidror 85 out again and again by UNIFIL, whose officials on “caveats” for the employment of their have repeatedly denied and downplayed, forces, restricting their use for only the despite abundant and obvious evidence to safest missions. There were national caveats the contrary, that Hizbullah was violating banning nighttime operations and restricting Resolution 1701. the geographic deployment of forces to specific areas which were known to be more There are those who believe that providing secure. Some caveats required consultations a Western force like NATO, with UN backing, between commanders in the field and can help offset the risks derived from western national capitals in Europe before tactical deployments in the Middle East. In the decisions could be taken. Most importantly, past, a UN Security Council mandate was there were national caveats that excluded supposed to provide a peacekeeping force the use of certain forces that were part with added legitimacy, which would offer of the NATO alliance in counterterrorism some protection to peacekeeping forces. But operations.1 General John Craddock, the when the threat to international forces comes former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, from militant Islamist groups, a UN mandate admitted in 2009 that NATO forces were does not necessarily make the force any more burdened with 83 national caveats, which acceptable. In August 2003, Al-Qaeda directly were reduced to about 70.2 attacked the Baghdad headquarters of the UN Special Representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de NATO remains a cumbersome Mello, killing him and 16 others with a truck bomb. How is the UN supposed to retaliate or organization. Given its track record punish a terrorist group? in Afghanistan, it is difficult to When facing increasing fatalities, international imagine the efficacy of similar forces often lose the original political support they had from the states that contributed forces in the West Bank. them for any peacekeeping mission. In the NATO remains a cumbersome organization, Iraq War, the U.S.-led coalition lost national especially when it comes to decision- contingents from counties concerned with making and processing urgent operational their security. After Madrid was attacked by requirements from commanders. In counter- Al-Qaeda, Spain elected a new government terrorism operations, it is precisely the ability that withdrew all Spanish troops from Iraq. to act quickly and decisively that keeps the The continued deployment of Dutch troops in peace and prevents attacks. Given the track Afghanistan, under NATO, became politically record of NATO in Afghanistan, it is difficult controversial in the Netherlands during 2010, to imagine the efficacy of similar forces in the leading to their withdrawal. West Bank. Whether they engage in peacekeeping or peace enforcement, there is always the question of what are the precise rules of International Forces Constrain engagement of international forces, including Israeli Self-Defense a NATO force. For example, are international forces only permitted to open fire in self- Israel needs to be prepared for the possibility defense when they come under attack? Or that even after agreements are signed and a alternatively, can international forces use their demilitarized Palestinian state is established, firepower to prevent an act of aggression? groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, As UN peacekeepers, the Belgian forces in or even U.S.-trained PA security forces Rwanda in 1994 were denied permission themselves, may act in contravention of the to take action against the Hutu militia that agreements. Israel should take into account initiated the genocide against the Tutsi tribe. that in such situations international forces would likely not take action. In fact, the rocket Even in a robust NATO deployment in assault against Israel by Hamas following Afghanistan, which is not a peacekeeping Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza suggests that mission, European states have insisted a similar scenario could unfold in the West

86 Foreign Peacekeepers Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser with UN Secretary General U Thant, May 24, 1967, two weeks before the outbreak of the Six-Day War. Thant agreed to Nasser’s request to withdraw UN Emergency Forces that had been stationed in Sinai as a buffer since the 1956 war. Nasser replaced the UNEF with Egyptian military divisions ready to attack Israel, precipitating the outbreak of hostilities.

Bank, placing Israel’s coastal plain under Who Will Guarantee rocket attack. Demilitarization? In such a scenario, as long as a UN force is present on Palestinian territory, the IDF’s The prospective establishment of a operational freedom of action will be limited. Palestinian state poses substantial security The Israeli army cannot open fire against the challenges for Israel. Even with a fully and enemy as it deems appropriate without first verifiably demilitarized Palestinian sovereign verifying the location of the UN personnel. entity, without security control over the West Israel faces the risk of being placed in a Bank, Israel will be confronted with enormous bind in which nobody will be able to act uncertainties over how to assure its future against terrorists: the international forces will security. simultaneously fail to prevent terrorist attacks on Israel but succeed in preventing Israel Will a future Palestinian sovereign entity from defending itself. become a state with a strong commitment to the rule of law? Without the assistance of Prime Minister Rabin said in his last speech to the IDF, which has assumed the bulk of the the Knesset in September 1995 that the IDF responsibility for combating terrorism, will PA must control the Jordan Valley “in the broadest security forces be able to establish full control meaning of that term.”3 Israel must isolate the and completely dismantle terror groups territory along the Jordan River to prevent the such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and smuggling of arms, personnel, and know-how. Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades? Inside the territory there must be a Palestinian police force to deal with internal problems During the implementation of the Oslo whose principal power is limited to machine Agreements, Yasser Arafat created a separate guns that are unable to penetrate IDF armored military force outside of the Palestinian vehicles. It must be agreed in advance that Authority, known as the Tanzim, which was in the event of an act of terror or a revolving- under the control of Fatah and was not door policy of arresting and then freeing constrained by bilateral agreements. It was terrorists, as in the past, the IDF will be able to employed during a period of escalation against enter the area in order to detain suspects and Israel, like the Second Initifada. What is to prevent further attacks. prevent such paramilitary groups from arising

Yaakov Amidror 87 again? What will the Middle East look like in the 1. No foreign army will enter the territory of coming years in view of Iranian-backed regional a Palestinian authority or state. subversion and Al-Qaeda activity that is moving 2. No military organization of any kind will closer to Israel’s borders? be established in the territory in question, whether or not it belongs to the state. Meanwhile, Palestinian control of an 3. No weapons of any kind may be independent territory might reenergize smuggled into the territory, whether from Palestinian confidence to attempt to deal the east or from another direction. a fatal blow by launching major strategic attacks against Israel. Such a scenario could If any of these scenarios take place, the IDF become more likely in view of the short needs to be in a position to intervene and distance – a mere 8 to 12 miles – between eliminate the threat. the Mediterranean Sea and the Palestinian state. In practical terms, this means that These three conditions are derived from any sustained Palestinian rocket assault or the Israeli requirement that any Palestinian combined military offensive from the West entity be fully demilitarized. But it would Bank, if successful in its initial stage, will pose be a serious mistake to believe that Israeli a serious threat to Israel’s interior. Israel will requirements for verifying complete live under a far greater threat and will be Palestinian demilitarization could be forced to prepare ways to neutralize an initial guaranteed by international forces operating Palestinian offensive. in the West Bank. International forces have never been successful anywhere in the Israel will also need to develop defense plans world in a situation where one of the parties without the critical topographical advantage was ready to ignore the fulfillment of its of controlling the West Bank mountain ridge. responsibilities. There is no reason to expect From the dominant terrain facing west, any that this case would be any different. Palestinian with a Kassam rocket would be able to hit Israel’s main airport and major cities that lie along the coastal plain – the The killing of peacekeepers is country’s “strategic center of gravity,” as it is one of the most effective means known in combat doctrine. This new reality will make it difficult to defend Israel – either in the terrorist arsenal to weaken against mobile forces or against rocket or and break the political will of other weapons fire – creating a new and constant preoccupation for Israeli military states who contribute forces to planners: figuring out how Israel, under such peacekeeping operations. conditions, is to provide for its own defense.

There will be no way to neutralize this untenable situation entirely, but the danger Conclusions can be greatly reduced by creating a In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the world, situation that will prevent the Palestinian international forces have been notoriously side from thinking in terms of building up its unreliable, especially when they have been conventional military and clandestine terror challenged by one of the parties, as in the case capabilities in the West Bank. It will also mean of Nasser’s Egypt in 1967 or Hizbullah today. that any security arrangements in the West The killing of peacekeepers is one of the most Bank must preclude the reinforcement of the effective means in the terrorist arsenal to Palestinians by Arab or Iranian forces from the weaken and even break the political will of east. In short, this means preventing the rise of states who contribute forces to peacekeeping any conventional military or terrorist threat in operations. In any event, international forces the entire territory between the “green line” and have historically shown a reluctance to the Jordan Valley. militarily confront those challenging them, and even in the case of NATO, they are likely Given these concerns, the following security to operate under highly restrictive rules conditions must be guaranteed: of engagement and confused chains of

88 Foreign Peacekeepers UN Secretary General Kofi Annan with Hizbullah leader Shiek Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon, June 20, 2000. The meeting gave recognition to Hizbullah’s influence in Lebanon. Since its 2006 war with Israel, Hizbullah’s power has extended well beyond southern Lebanon to the central and northern parts of the country.

command which will limit their value in the fall on Israel to block the attack in the Jordan scenarios that Israel will likely face. Valley.

Therefore, the requirement articulated by It is thus important to understand the limited Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that any utility of international forces in a future Palestinian state must be demilitarized must Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. As one necessarily preclude the presence of any analyst of peacekeeping operations has armed third party or international forces on warned: “Peacekeeping is a very useful tool prospective Palestinian territory. of international politics, but an inherently limited tool. It can and must take on violent Above all, even if NATO solves its problems local challenges to peace implementation, with national caveats and rules of but only at the margins of a peace process. engagement that limit the effectiveness Should the core of that process lose cohesion, of its troops, and the efficacy of UN a multinational operation will itself have peacekeeping forces vastly improves, there is insufficient cohesion – and likely insufficient still a fundamental principle in Israeli military military strength – to make the center hold.”4 doctrine for Israel to “defend itself by itself.” This inherent weakness of international forces Israel has taken great pride in the fact that it makes Israel’s doctrine of self-reliance all the has never asked Western soldiers – including more relevant, even after peace agreements American troops – to risk their lives in its are signed. defense. Notes Israel’s requirement of self-reliance is particularly important in view of possible and 1. James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO: From Kosovo even probable threat scenarios following the to Kabul,” International Affairs 85:3 (2009):509. 2. Arnaud De Borchgrave, “’Caveats’ Neuter NATO Allies,” signing of an agreement with the PA. Today, Washington Times, July 15, 2009. and for the foreseeable future, no PA force 3. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ has the strength to dismantle Palestinian MFAArchive/1990_1999/1995/10/PM+Rabin+in+Knesset +Ratification+of +Interim+Agree.htm. factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. And 4. William J. Durch, with Madeline England, The Purpose should Israel come under conventional attack of Peace Operations (New York: Center on International in the future from the east, it would clearly Cooperation, New York University, 2009), p. 8.

Yaakov Amidror 89 ISRAEL’S RETURN TO SECURITY-BASED DIPLOMACY

Secretary General, World Jewish Dan Diker Congress; Foreign Policy Fellow, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute

Diplomacy-Based Security vs. Israel’s previous policy of making concessions first and trying to enforce its vital security Security-Based Diplomacy rights and requirements second has raised international expectations that For most of the past 17 years of Israeli peace Israel will continue to offer an intransigent diplomacy, since the 1993 Oslo Declaration Palestinian leadership greater concessions as of Principles signed with Yasser Arafat’s “sweeteners” to coax them into negotiations. Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel’s vital The Palestinians, in contrast, have been security requirements have been relegated sensitizing the international community to to a position of secondary importance in the what the PA leadership calls “Palestinian rights” service of reaching a final peace agreement. underpinning their statehood quest.2 The public Israel’s traditional “security-based diplomacy” silence of Israeli governments on Israel’s own approach to foreign relations that had anchored rights-based case for a viable, secure Jewish the Jewish state’s defense doctrine since the state with defensible borders has encouraged Six-Day War in 1967 had been reversed. Instead, confusion among allies and exacerbated the a doctrine of “diplomacy-based security” had antagonism of adversaries. come to dominate Israeli diplomatic thinking, as peace agreements were thought to be the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign guarantor of Israel’s safety. policy speech at Bar-Ilan University on June 14, 2009 – the first one of his administration In service to this new doctrine, Israeli efforts – represented a fundamental restoration of to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s security- and rights-based approach the Annapolis process in 2008, the Gaza to the conflict. Netanyahu’s sharp break from disengagement in 2005, the Lebanon past policy was his insistence, up front, that withdrawal in 2000, and the Camp David reciprocity govern relations between the sides: Summit in 2000, were marked by far-reaching that Israel be recognized as the nation-state and often unilateral Israeli concessions. At of the Jewish people,3 that a future Palestinian the same time, the Israel Defense Forces were state be demilitarized, and that Israel’s critical called upon to retrofit Israel’s security needs security needs be honored. into a political model instead of establishing security “red lines” prior to or in the initial stages of diplomatic initiatives.1

90 Security-Based Diplomacy Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers a major policy speech at Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009. Netanyahu called for the Palestinian leadership to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, called for the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, and stated that Jerusalem would remain Israel’s united capital city.

Dore Gold 91 Netanyahu was indeed articulating a new Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan Speech Israeli political consensus about the peace process, and at the same time restoring When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Israel’s traditional, “security-first” approach stood before a packed auditorium at the to diplomacy that had been reflected in Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Israeli policy by every Israeli government Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, it was a defining from 1967 until the first years of the Oslo moment. Several months earlier, he had peace process. established a strong center-right coalition that reflected a 30 percent rise in public Israel’s return to security-based support for right-of-center parties.4 The Israeli public was looking to move away diplomacy and insistence on from the policies of former Prime Minister Palestinian demilitarization Ehud Olmert, whose unsuccessful bid to negotiate a peace accord and establish a and defensible borders are vital Palestinian state had brought him to offer guarantors of Israel’s security unprecedented concessions to Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas.5 Despite Abbas’ in the face of the profound public admission of Olmert’s far-reaching uncertainties surrounding both concessions, the Palestinian leader noted that there remained “wide gaps between the Palestinians and the rise of the sides” that had led to the collapse of peace talks.6 Newly-elected President Iranian power in the region. Barack Obama had placed exceptional pressure on the Netanyahu government When it came to the West Bank, the for additional concessions, including a full security-first approach was guarded by freeze on Jewish building in the West Bank Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Benjamin and parts of Jerusalem that contradicted Netanyahu. Ariel Sharon would also protect firm understandings reached with the Bush Israel’s rights and security interests there, administration and even collided with the despite his unilateral withdrawal from Oslo Accords and the policies of the Clinton Gaza. Netanyahu’s revival of this approach administration.7 since his 2009 election seems particularly relevant in the context of Iranian- and Netanyahu accepted the notion of a future Al-Qaeda-backed campaigns to threaten Palestinian state,8 but insisted that the Arab regimes amenable to the West, such Palestinians would need to make reciprocal as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, gestures and accept two principles: and the Gulf States. At the same time as recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Iranian regime leads a campaign to the Jewish people; and demilitarization of destabilize the Sunni regimes that have a future Palestinian state and accession to either made formal or de facto peace with additional security guarantees, including Israel, the Iranian regime funds, trains, and defensible borders for Israel.9 He also stated arms terror groups on Israel’s northern and that Jerusalem would remain a united city southern borders, and even in the West under Israeli sovereignty. Bank. Netanyahu placed Israel’s national rights In this context, Israel’s return to security- and vital security needs first, and only then based diplomacy and insistence on accepted Palestinian demands. This was a Palestinian demilitarization and defensible major shift away from the Olmert approach borders are vital guarantors of Israel’s at Annapolis, where many of the fundamental security in the face of the profound security requirements that Israel had insisted uncertainties surrounding both the upon in the past were dropped in the context Palestinians and the rise of Iranian power in of far-reaching concessions he had offered to the region. Mahmoud Abbas.10

92 Security-Based Diplomacy Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Knesset debate on the Oslo peace accords signed with the Palestine Liberation Organization, September 21, 1993. Rabin foresaw Israeli control of the Jordan Valley and a united Jerusalem in any final status agreement with the Palestinian Authority.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s commitment from southern Lebanon in 2000 led to an to a security-first paradigm has been well- emboldened Hizbullah firing more than received by Israelis because nearly two 4,000 rockets at Israeli cities in the 2006 decades of concession-driven diplomacy Second Lebanon War. Furthermore, Israel’s not only failed to yield security or earn withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 multiplied international goodwill, but led to broad the rocket and mortar attacks from there on public understanding that Israel’s security southern Israel – more than 12,000 since 2001 situation had become perilous. – and resulted in Israel’s defensive operation in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 During the first three years of the Oslo that was condemned around the world.13 process, more Israelis were killed by The failure of Oslo, Annapolis, and territorial Palestinian terror attacks than during the withdrawals to improve the prospects for fifteen years prior to the signing of the Oslo peace did not deter Israelis from yearning for accords in 1993.11 The collapse of the Camp peace. But they did offer a sobering lesson David Summit in 2000 and the ensuing to the Israeli public about the dangers of suicide bombing war claimed the lives of indulging in wishful thinking. The public more than 1,100 Israelis.12 Israel’s withdrawal today is in no mood for unrealistic plans that

Dan Diker 93 are long on hope and short on credibility. an important principle of his approach to They want security first, and a united peacemaking on which he insisted then and Jerusalem. Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan speech was still embraces today: Israel’s formal diplomatic so well received in Israel because it articulated positions on the peace process must be this broad public consensus.14 derived by first establishing its security needs, rather than the reverse. Netanyahu’s approach won the support of more than 70 percent of the Israeli public, according to a poll conducted by Ha’aretz Restoring Israel’s Security-First the day after the speech.15 Ha’aretz columnist Ari Shavit called the speech “Netanyahu’s Approach Revolution,” compared the prime minister Netanyahu’s insistence on a demilitarized to Theodor Herzl – the founder of modern Palestinian state and defensible borders Zionism, and noted: “With the seven-word did not represent a new strategy. Prime formula – a demilitarized Palestinian state Minister Yitzhak Rabin had presented his alongside a Jewish Israeli state – he changed vision for defensible borders at the height of the discourse on the conflict from its very the Oslo peace process, on October 5, 1995, foundations. He set an unprecedented during the Knesset ratification of the Oslo challenge before the Palestinian nation and II interim agreement. He said of the final- the international community.”16 status arrangement with the Palestinians: “The borders of the State of Israel, during the Elaborating on his thinking, Netanyahu permanent solution, will be beyond the lines noted in a November 2009 speech, “We which existed before the Six-Day War. We will have to ensure that weapons do not flow not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”20 In fact, into the Palestinian areas of the West Bank, Rabin told the IDF leadership that Israel would which overlooks Tel Aviv and surrounds need to retain approximately 50 percent of Jerusalem.”17 On March 3, 2010, Netanyahu the West Bank in any future settlement.21 told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Jordan Valley’s strategic importance along the eastern border of the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, West Bank made it impossible for Israel to like Netanyahu today, insisted on withdraw from there.18 retaining the Jordan Valley, telling This was not the first time that Netanyahu stressed the security-first paradigm for the Knesset in 1995: “The security peacemaking. In early 1997, during his first border of the State of Israel will be term in office, Netanyahu was asked by the Clinton administration to agree to a “further located in the Jordan Valley, in the re-deployment” (FRD), in accordance with the broadest meaning of that term.” Oslo Agreements, that required Israel to make a new withdrawal of an unspecified size in the Rabin, like Netanyahu today, insisted on West Bank. retaining the Jordan Valley, telling the Knesset at the time: “The security border of the State Instead of engaging in a debate with of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, the administration over the terms of a in the broadest meaning of that term.”22 “credible” re-deployment, including specific Rabin meant that the Jordan River alone was percentages of territory, Netanyahu asked an inadequate defensive barrier to prevent the IDF to provide him with a security map hostile forces and weaponry from reaching delineating Israel’s vital territorial needs in the West Bank’s high ground, and that Israel the West Bank that would be required for the would need to rely on the eastern slopes of country’s defense. The IDF map came to be the 2-3,000-foot-high West Bank mountain known as “The Interests Map,” and Netanyahu ridge that rises from the Jordan riverbed, took a version of it to Washington to present constituting the Jordan Rift Valley. This was to President Bill Clinton.19 Netanyahu’s clearly Rabin’s intention when he stipulated decision-making at the time illustrated that Israel needed this zone in “the broadest

94 Security-Based Diplomacy meaning” of the term. Rabin also insisted on One does not have to be a military expert maintaining a united Jerusalem under Israeli to easily identify the critical defects of sovereignty. the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967....The gravest problem is Rabin had rejected a fully sovereign on the eastern boundary, where the Palestinian state, telling Israeli lawmakers entire width of the coastal plain varies in 1995, “We would like this to be an entity between 10 and 15 miles, where the main which is less than a state, and which will centers of Israel’s population, including independently run the lives of the Palestinians Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated, under its authority.”23 and where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. Within these lines a On April 14, 2004, Prime Minister Ariel single successful first strike by the Arab Sharon exchanged letters with President armies would be sufficient to dissect George W. Bush in which Israel committed to Israel at more than one point, to sever its withdraw from Gaza and the United States essential living arteries, and to confront endorsed defensible borders for Israel.24 A it with dangers that no other state would week later, Sharon explained the language be prepared to face. The purpose of of the U.S. letter to the Knesset, noting that defensible borders is thus to correct the U.S. guarantees included two territorial this weakness, to provide Israel with the components: Israel would retain the major requisite minimal strategic depth, as settlement blocs in the West Bank and would well as lines which have topographical also obtain defensible borders. In the midst strategic significance.28 of his Hebrew address, Sharon repeated “defensible borders” in English to emphasize In Allon’s view, which was shared by the American presidential commitment. successive Israeli prime ministers, the concept Implicit in Sharon’s review of the U.S. letter of defensible borders means that Israel was that beyond the large settlements has a right and a responsibility to establish close to the pre-1967 lines, there was also boundaries that provide for its citizens’ recognition of a vital geographic zone in the basic security requirements, as opposed to West Bank, namely the Jordan Valley.25 Sharon accepting a geography that invites attack. told Ha'aretz on April 24, 2005, “The Jordan This has always meant that Israel would retain Rift Valley is very important and it's not just some territories east of the 1949 armistice the rift valley we're talking about [but]... lines as part of any peace agreement with up to the Allon road and a step above the the Palestinians, especially in the largely Allon road. In my view, this area is of extreme unpopulated Jordan Valley.29 importance.”26 Allon’s plan for defensible borders has been a key point of reference for Netanyahu over Defensible Borders: Historical the past 14 years. Netanyahu’s former foreign Context policy advisor, Dr. Dore Gold, noted that in 1997 Netanyahu proposed a plan for a final The 1949 armistice lines, which stood as agreement with the Palestinians based on Israel’s de facto eastern border from the end what he termed “Allon plus.”30 of the War of Independence until the 1967 Six-Day War, left the Jewish state with critical vulnerabilities and were therefore unsuitable as permanent borders. Israel’s former foreign Israel’s Confused Diplomatic minister, Abba Eban, referred to these lines in Messages 1969 as “Auschwitz borders that must not be restored.”27 The international criticism of Netanyahu’s security-first posture is more comprehensible Yigal Allon, a commander of the pre-state when considered in the context of the Palmach and foreign minister under Rabin, heightened expectations that were created was the architect of the defensible borders by the willingness of previous Israeli doctrine. In a 1976 essay in Foreign Affairs, he governments to make deep concessions wrote: first, and only then attempt to retrofit Israeli

Dan Diker 95 security requirements. The following three As Vice Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon notes cases illustrate the perils of concession-driven in the Introduction to this study, “from diplomacy: that point on, Israel was expected to live within the curtailed borders that Barak had proposed. Even more far-reaching, Ehud Barak at Camp David in 2000 the Palestinian leadership succeeded in establishing in the minds of Western Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s determination policymakers the idea that the 1967 lines to reach an “end of conflict” agreement with – that is, the 1949 armistice lines – should Yasser Arafat at Camp David in July 2000 be the new frame of reference for all future and again at Taba in early 2001 was the negotiations.” driving force behind his idea of creating a new concept of security arrangements in the territory of a future Palestinian state. Barak’s Sharon’s Unilateral Gaza Withdrawal proposals reflected the first abandonment by an Israeli government of defensible borders Ariel Sharon, too, would whet the in the West Bank. He apparently believed it international appetite for a full return to possible to keep Israel safe by settling for the 1949 lines stemming from his decision Israeli control of 12 percent or less of the West to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Sharon Bank,31 as opposed to the 33 to 45 percent conceded the Gaza Strip in 2005, believing required by a defensible borders strategy.32 that he would provide security for Israelis Barak may have made his proposal in order to and win international praise and goodwill “unmask” Yasser Arafat, but his ideas would for handing the Palestinians their first mini- shape the intellectual legacy of the peace state.34 However, Israel’s generosity did not process for years to come. earn durable support from Europe and even provoked fears that the Gaza pullout was a Barak also proposed a sovereign Palestinian ploy to avoid further territorial concessions.35 state with the proviso that the West Bank be demilitarized and Israeli early-warning stations Israel's concession of Gaza has been and IDF troops be placed on Palestinian soil. minimized internationally as organizations However, despite Barak’s unprecedented offer, such as the United Nations, Amnesty then-Palestinian security chief Mohammed International, and Human Rights Watch Dahlan, who has again reemerged as a major continue to refer to Gaza as “occupied force in Fatah, categorically refused to accept territory.”36 Europe’s expectation of future the proposed Israeli security arrangements. Israeli withdrawals reflects the degree to As former U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross which Israel's unconditional unilateral pullout wrote, “Dahlan was dead set against any Israeli in Gaza undermined its territorial rights in or foreign presence in the West Bank border the West Bank. This was the central reason crossing and rejected the idea that the Israelis that Israel's former Deputy Chief of Staff and should have guaranteed access routes into the National Security Council head Maj.-Gen. Uzi 33 West Bank.” Dayan had publicly opposed full withdrawal from Gaza. He noted on June 4, 2007, that Barak’s seeming abandonment of defensible Gaza established an “immoral and dangerous borders and his acquiescence to security diplomatic precedent for the West Bank.”37 arrangements in their stead whittled down and even undermined Israel’s long-standing insistence on retaining the Jordan Valley and other vital security areas in the West Olmert’s Unprecedented Concessions Bank. Despite the fact that during the Bush Backfire on Israel administration, the Clinton parameters and the Camp David proposals were off the table, The idea that Israeli concessions only drive the Palestinians pocketed the concessions international expectations for further and would always be able to insist on them as concessions was best illustrated by former a starting point for future negotiations. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert during the Annapolis peace process that collapsed in

96 Security-Based Diplomacy late 2008. Olmert went beyond any other proposals re-emerged: Israel’s unprecedented Former Prime Minister prime minister in the concessions he was concessions were rejected by the Palestinians Ehud Barak and willing to make to strike an agreement with but simultaneously pocketed, so as to form Palestinian leader Yasser the Palestinians. He offered between 93.5 the basis for the next round of negotiations. Arafat, July 11 1999. and 97 percent of the West Bank, half of Barak’s adoption of a new concept for Jerusalem including an international regime security arrangements for the “Holy Basin” containing the Temple Reconsidering Israel’s Legal and on the territory of a Mount and Muslim shrines, and expressed future Palestinian a willingness to allow 10,000 Palestinian Diplomatic Rights state, essentially on refugees to resettle in Israel on humanitarian the 1967 lines, would grounds.38 One of the basic sources of tension between recalibrate international the Obama and Netanyahu administrations expectations of Israel. Olmert’s negotiation team, headed by Brig.- regarding the peace process is that the U.S. Gen. Udi Dekel, an author in this study, also has grown accustomed to a concessions- tried to retrofit security demands into the based Israeli diplomacy that sidelines Israel’s final agreement, such as the demilitarization legal and diplomatic rights. Israel’s return to of a Palestinian state, special security security-based diplomacy is both rooted in arrangements in the Jordan Valley, and Israeli and protected by international resolutions security control of the Gaza coast, all of which such as UN Security Council Resolution 242 were rejected by the Palestinians.39 It was also of November 1967, which was unanimously clear to Palestinian and Israeli negotiators approved and protected Israel’s rights in that nothing was agreed until everything the West Bank as a result of having fought was agreed.40 However, when negotiations a war of self-defense there.41 For the past collapsed, the pattern from the Barak four decades, Resolution 242 has governed

Dan Diker 97 all Arab-Israeli diplomacy and has been the the administration weakens its commitment legal backbone upholding Israel’s right to to Resolution 242 and other guarantees, the “secure and recognized boundaries” – that is, Israeli government must insist even more on defensible borders – that the Security Council the salience of these legal precedents and recognized as part of its determination diplomatic guarantees. that the Arabs, not Israelis, were the war’s aggressors.42 Regional Threats and Israel’s Return Resolution 242 would also form the legal infrastructure for future peace processes, to Security-Based Diplomacy such as the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, the 1991 Madrid conference, the 1993 exchange Regional threats both to Arab states and Israel of letters with the PLO, the 1994 peace treaty from a nuclearizing Iran, its Syrian ally, and with Jordan, and the 2004 presidential letter regional terror proxies, as well as the ongoing commitment from Bush to Sharon.43 activities of Al-Qaeda ever closer to Israel’s borders, further justify Israel’s insistence on a security-first, diplomacy-second approach The U.S. has grown accustomed to the Palestinians. While Al-Qaeda first to a concessions-based Israeli emerged in Afghanistan in 1989, it has moved its subversive activities closer to Israel’s diplomacy that sidelines Israel’s borders and has inspired new followers in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and legal and diplomatic rights. Gaza. Jordan has been the repeated target of Yet Israeli concessions only Al-Qaeda assaults, and today Hamas is having difficulty preventing Al-Qaeda groups in Gaza drive expectations for further from firing rockets at Israel.45 concessions. Every Israeli territorial withdrawal A major challenge for Israel’s return to security-based diplomacy is that the Obama since 2000 has created a security administration seems to have broken vacuum that has been exploited sharply from past U.S. agreements. It has been virtually silent on Resolution 242 by Iran-backed forces in Lebanon and has apparently disregarded Bush’s 2004 presidential letter guarantee to Israel and Gaza to improve their position that was overwhelmingly approved by against Israel. bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate. President Bush had quoted the exact These developments – especially the language of Resolution 242 for emphasis and rise of the Iranian-backed “resistance reassured Sharon: “As part of a final peace bloc,” consisting of Syria, Hizbullah, and settlement, Israel must have secure and Hamas – have shattered the illusion that recognized borders, which should emerge the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be from negotiations between the parties in isolated from larger regional trends and accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and that a stable territorial settlement could be 338....The United States reiterates its steadfast reached without considering these regional commitment to Israel's security, including developments. secure, defensible borders, and to preserve and strengthen Israel's capability to deter and Every Israeli territorial withdrawal since defend itself, by itself, against any threat or 2000 has created a security vacuum that has possible combination of threats.”44 been exploited by Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Gaza to improve their position As the Obama administration breaks from against Israel. The 2006 Israel-Hizbullah war the traditional practices and understandings and the 2008-2009 Israel-Hamas war have that have governed Middle East diplomacy underscored the threat of short-range rockets for decades, the Israeli government will have and highlighted the importance of territorial to adjust its practices and understandings. As protection for Israel.46

98 Security-Based Diplomacy Conclusion Under these adverse conditions, a security- Former Israeli Prime first diplomatic posture is needed more than Minister Ehud Olmert ever. Israel will continue to find itself under and PA Chairman By all indications, President Barack Obama Mahmoud Abbas, August intense pressure to make concessions to continues to make the Palestinian-Israeli 28, 2009. Regarding his peace process and the establishment of a the Palestinians; frequently, no reciprocal unprecedented offer of Palestinian state along the 1949 armistice gestures will be demanded from them, and 93.5% of the West Bank lines a centerpiece of his agenda. He may Israel’s failure to comply with Washington’s and a shared Jerusalem, even present an American plan, perhaps demands will likely be met with criticism Olmert recalled in forcefully, if the peace process does not and punishment. In this environment, a November 2009 interview: “I told him progress to his liking, and despite intense the Israeli government must stake out its (Abbas) he’d never get 47 position on a rock-solid foundation. The only opposition to the idea in Israel. This new U.S. anything like this again diplomatic approach has put the Netanyahu foundation that provides the strength and from an Israeli leader for government on the defensive, and has solidity to resist U.S. diplomatic pressure for 50 years.” allowed the Palestinians to harden their additional concessions and Palestinian plans positions on the core issues even beyond for a unilaterally-declared state along the their demands at Annapolis. It has also 1949 armistice lines is a confident insistence provided succor to Palestinian hopes for a on Israel’s fundamental and non-negotiable unilaterally-declared Palestinian state, which security requirements, whose centerpieces the PA leadership has referred to as their are defensible borders in the West Bank and a “Kosovo strategy.”48 demilitarized Palestinian state.

Dan Diker 99 Notes

1 Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s attempts to speechbarilan140609.htm. concede territories to reach a peace agreement with 10 Abbas acknowledged to the Washington Post’s Jackson Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and then negotiate Diehl after the failure of Annapolis that Olmert’s offer Israeli security arrangements during the Camp David of between 93.5 and 97 percent of the West Bank, and Taba summits in 2000 and early 2001 respectively eastern Jerusalem, a special custodial regime for the are good examples of this strategy. See Dan Diker, “A “Holy Basin,” and the recognition of the right of return Return to Defensible Borders,” Azure, no. 21 (Summer (that included the return of 10,000 refugees to Israel for 2005), http://www.azure.org.il/article.php?id=174. humanitarian reasons – according to a senior official on 2 See, for example, Arafat’s address to the World Olmert’s negotiating team) was more generous to the Economic Forum in Davos, January 28, 2001, http:// Palestinians than the offers of either George Bush or www.gamla.org.il/english/article/2001/jan/ler4.htm. Bill Clinton, and yet Abbas said: “The gaps were wide.” 3 See Netanyahu’s speech at http://www.mfa.gov.il/ See Jackson Diehl, “Abbas’ Waiting Game,” Washington MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/200 Post, May 29, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 9/ Address_PM_Netanyahu_Bar-Ilan_University_14- wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR2009052803614. Jun-2009.htm. Netanyahu’s insistence that the PA html. recognize Israel as a Jewish state had also been raised 11 “The number of people killed by Palestinian terrorists by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert as part of the in the five years immediately after the Oslo Accord Annapolis peace process. However, the Palestinian (256), was greater than the number killed in the 15 years leadership refused to accede on this issue. See http:// preceding the agreement (216).” See “Terrorism and www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/923076.html. Oslo,” Daily Forward, September 19, 2003, http://www. 4 In the 2009 elections for the 18th Knesset, Israeli forward.com/articles/8161/. center-right parties increased their strength from 50 to 12 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism- 65 seats (out of 120), representing, among other issues, +Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/V the public’s displeasure with Olmert’s unprecedented ictims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc. concessions to the Palestinian Authority, including the htm. concession of defensible borders in the strategically 13 Dore Gold, “Israel’s War to Halt Palestinian Rocket vital West Bank and the division of Jerusalem. Attacks,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 7, no. 34, March 3, 5 Greg Sheridan, “Olmert Still Dreams of Peace,” 2008, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage. The Australian, November 28, 2009, http://www. asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=283&PID=0&II theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/ehud-olmert-still- D=2049. dreams-of-peace/story-e6frg76f-1225804745744. 14 Yossi Verter, “Sharp Rise in Support for Netanyahu 6 See Jackson Diehl, “Abbas’ Waiting Game,” Washington Following Speech,” Ha’aretz, June 16, 2009. Regarding Post, May 29, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ the Israeli public’s support for a united Jerusalem, wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR2009052803614. see Dore Gold, The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, html. the West, and the Future of the Holy City (Washington: 7 Elliot Abrams, “Hillary is Wrong about the Settlements,” Regnery, 2007), pp. 277-8. Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/ 15 Verter, “Sharp Rise.” article/SB124588743827950599.html. The insistence 16 Shavit, “Netanyahu’s Revolution.” of the Obama administration that Israel undertake a 17 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Speech to the full cessation of building in the West Bank and east Jewish Federations of North America General Assembly, Jerusalem had no precedent in U.S. policy in the November 11, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/ Middle East peace process. The 1995 Oslo interim spages/1127027.html. agreements, which still govern Palestinian-Israeli 18 Jonathan Lis, “Netanyahu: Israel Will Never Cede Jordan relations pending a final agreement between the sides, Valley,” Ha’aretz, March 2, 2010. do not prohibit either Palestinian or Israeli building in 19 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the the West Bank or Jerusalem, whose final status was to Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and be negotiated between the sides. See Dan Diker, “Does Giroux, 2005), p. 327. the International News Media Overlook Israel’s Rights 20 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Knesset, in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,” Jerusalem Viewpoints, October 5, 1995, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ no. 495, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, April 2003, MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1995/10/ http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp495.htm. PM+Rabin+in+Knesset- 8 Ari Shavit, “Netanyahu’s Revolution,” Ha’aretz, June 19, +Ratification+of+Interim+Agree.htm. 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1093877. 21 Meeting with former senior IDF official in Jerusalem, html. April 4, 2010. 9 Netanyahu insisted on Israel maintaining defensible 22 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the Knesset. borders, Israeli control of a unified airspace over 23 Ibid. the Palestinian state, and electromagnetic security. 24 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ He stated that a future Palestinian state would be releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html. prohibited from engaging in military covenants with 25 Diker, “A Return to Defensible Borders,” pp. 52-53. foreign armies, and that no foreign forces would 26 Dan Diker, “Sharon’s Strategic Legacy for Israel: be allowed in Palestinian territory. Netanyahu also Competing Perspectives,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, vol. 5, declared that “Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, must no. 15, January 12, 2006. remain undivided with continued religious freedom 27 Interview with Der Spiegel magazine, November 5, 1969. for all faiths.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 28 Yigal Allon, “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders,” Speech at Bar-Ilan University, June 14, 2009, http:// Foreign Affairs, vol. 55 (October 1976), pp. 41-42. www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/ 29 Specifically, the Allon Plan, which has guided the

100 Security-Based Diplomacy thinking of Prime Minister Netanyahu since his first 36 See, e.g., John Dugard, Report of the United Nations administration from 1996 to 1999, holds that Israel’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights new defensible borders would mean “retaining in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, A/ absolute control of the 700-square-mile strategic HRC/4/17, January 29, 2007 (esp. paragraphs 1, 6 and 22 Jordan Rift Valley east of the major Arab population referring to Gaza as part of the “Occupied Palestinian centers,” a zone that lies between the Jordan River Territory” and applying the Fourth Geneva Convention to the east and the eastern slopes of the Samarian regarding “occupied” territory). and Judean mountains to the west, as well as greater 37 Speech by Maj.-Gen. Uzi Dayan at the conference on Jerusalem and certain relatively unpopulated sections “40 Years of UNSC Resolution 242,” Jerusalem Center of the Judean Desert. Allon’s recommendation for for Public Affairs and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, annexing the Jordan Valley was supported by the Jerusalem, June 4, 2007. fact that this area was – and continues to be – largely 38 Jackson Diehl, “Abbas’ Waiting Game.” The number of unpopulated, aside from the approximately thirty Palestinian refugees Olmert offer to accept is a matter thousand Arab residents of Jericho, which would not be of debate. Arab diplomatic sources have indicated part of the annexed territory. This demographic reality that Olmert would accept 100,000 over 10 years. and the need for control of the Jordan Valley would However, an IDF official involved in the Annapolis peace remain true over the following years and would be a negotiations told the author that the number did not key benefit for Israel, as reflected in President George exceed 10,000. Meeting in Jerusalem, April 17, 2010. W. Bush’s presidential letter in exchange for Israel’s 39 Udi Dekel, Demilitarization – Preventing Military and 2005 withdrawal from Gaza. It has also been noted in Terrorist Threats from Within and By Way of the Palestinian recent interviews with Netanyahu, preserving the plan’s Territories, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2010. relevance for today. 40 Aluf Benn and Barak Ravid, “Olmert’s Negotiator: Full 30 Dore Gold, “Defensible Borders for Israel,” Jerusalem Mideast Peace Impossible,” Ha’aretz, January 25, 2010, Viewpoints, no. 500, June 15, 2003, http://www.jcpa.org/ http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1144854.html. jl/vp500.htm. 41 Yehuda Blum, “The Territorial Clauses of Security 31 Barak was reported to have approved an offer of Council Resolution 242,” in Israel’s Rights to Secure between 93 and 95 percent at Camp David and 97 Boundaries: Four Decades Since UN Security Council percent at Taba in line with the Clinton bridging Resolution 242, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2009, proposals. He also was believed to have offered the pp. 32-33. Palestinians at the Taba talks a compensatory 3 percent 42 Gold, “Defensible Borders for Israel”; Israel’s Rights land swap from pre-1967 Israel, although this was to Secure Boundaries: Four Decades Since UN Security denied by MK Danny Yatom, Barak’s national security Council Resolution 242; and Defensible Borders for a adviser, during a Knesset conference on defensible Lasting Peace, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008. borders on October 19, 2004, sponsored by the Knesset http://www.defensibleborders.org/db_introb.pdf. Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. 43 Gold, Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace, 32 The Allon Plan was based primarily on Israel retaining Introduction. the Jordan Valley, a full third of the West Bank. The 44 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ “Allon-plus” doctrine adopted by Prime Ministers Rabin releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html. and Netanyahu would also include other strategically 45 Dore Gold and Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “Al- vital settlements that would constitute approximately Qaeda, Zarqawi, and Israel: Is There a New Jihadi Threat 45 to 49 percent of West Bank land. This assessment is Destabilizing the Eastern Front?” Jerusalem Viewpoints, based exclusively on Israel’s defense needs and does no. 538, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 1, not include other national security interests such as the 2006, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp538.htm. West Bank aquifers from which Israel draws a third of 46 Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, “The Second Lebanon War: its potable water. A former IDF official told the author From Territory to Ideology,” in Iran’s Race for Regional that in the beginning of the Oslo process in 1994, Prime Supremacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008, p. Minister Rabin had determined that Israel would need 33, http://www.jcpa.org/text/iran2-june08.pdf. to retain 63 percent of the West Bank, which he had 47 Gil Hoffman, “Poll: 91% Against Obama Imposing Deal,” seen as a security red line. Meeting in Jerusalem, April Jerusalem Post, April 14, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/ 4, 2010. Israel/Article.aspx?id=173093. Notably, the numbers 33 Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 703, cited in Dore Gold and were similar for the Jordan Valley, where 90 percent David Keyes, “What If Bush Invited Sharon and Abu opposed relinquishing Israeli control and 10 percent Mazen to Camp David?” Jerusalem Viewpoints, no. 526 were in favor. (January 2, 2005), p. 10. 48 Dan Diker, “The Palestinians’ Unilateral ‘Kosovo 34 Dan Diker, “Why Israel Must Now Move from Strategy’: Implications for the PA and Israel,” Jerusalem Concessions-Based Diplomacy to Rights-Based Viewpoints, no. 575, Jerusalem Center for Public Diplomacy,” Jerusalem Issue Brief, no. 554, June-July Affairs, January 2010, http://jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ 2007, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage. ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=443 asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=582&PID=2225 &PID=0&IID=3271. &IID=1607. 35 Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana warned at the time that the European Union would not support the Gaza disengagement if it did not lead to a full Israeli pullout from the West Bank. Solana called that scenario “nightmarish.” Diker, ibid.

Dan Diker 101 Appendix 1 Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Begin-Sadat Center at Bar-Ilan University

June 14, 2009

Peace has always been our people’s most Obama, and I fully support the idea of a fervent desire. Our prophets gave the world regional peace that he is leading. the vision of peace, we greet one another with the word "peace" and our prayers I share the President’s desire to bring about conclude with the hope for peace. a new era of reconciliation in our region. To this end, I met with President Mubarak in We are gathered this evening in an institution Egypt and King Abdullah in Jordan to elicit named for two pioneers of peace, Menachem the support of these leaders in expanding the Begin and Anwar Sadat, and we share their circle of peace in our region. vision. I turn to all Arab leaders tonight and I say: Two and half months ago, I took the oath of Let us meet. Let us speak of peace and let us office as the Prime Minister of Israel. I pledged make peace. I am ready to meet with you at to establish a national unity government any time. I am willing to meet in Damascus, – and I did. I believe that unity is essential in Riyadh, in Beirut, anywhere – including for us now more than ever as we face three Jerusalem. immense challenges – the Iranian threat, the economic crisis, and the advancement of I call on the Arab countries to cooperate peace. with the Palestinians and with us to advance an economic peace. An economic peace is The Iranian threat looms large before us. The not a substitute for a political peace but an greatest danger facing Israel, the Middle East important element in achieving it. Together and the entire world is the joining of radical we can undertake projects that overcome Islam with nuclear weapons. I discussed this the scarcities of our region, like water matter with President Obama during my desalination, or maximize its advantages, recent visit to Washington, and I will raise like developing solar energy, and exploiting it again in my meetings next week with our geographic location by laying gas European leaders. For years, I have been and petroleum lines and establishing working tirelessly to forge an international transportation links between Asia, Africa and alliance to prevent Iran from developing Europe. nuclear weapons. The economic success of the Gulf States has Confronting a global economic crisis, the impressed us all and it has impressed me. government acted swiftly to stabilize Israel’s I call on the talented entrepreneurs of the economy. We passed a two-year budget in Arab world to come and invest here and to the government – and the Knesset will soon assist the Palestinians and us in spurring the approve it. economy.

And the third challenge, so exceedingly Together we can develop industrial areas that important, is the advancement of peace. I will generate thousands of jobs and develop spoke about this as well with President tourist sites that will attract millions of visitors

102 Bar-Ilan Speech eager to walk in the footsteps of history – in the question: What is the root of the conflict? Nazareth and in Bethlehem, around the walls In his speech to the first Zionist Conference in of Jericho and the walls of Jerusalem, on the Basel, the founder of the Zionist movement, banks of the Sea of Galilee and the baptismal Theodor Herzl, said about the Jewish national site on the banks of the Jordan. home: “This idea is so big that we must speak of it only in the simplest terms.” Today I will There is an enormous potential here for speak about the immense challenge of peace archeological tourism, if we can only learn to in the simplest words possible. cooperate to realize it. Even as we look toward the horizon, we I turn to you, our Palestinian neighbors led must be firmly connected to reality, to the by the Palestinian Authority, and I say: Let truth. And the simple truth is that the root of us begin negotiations immediately without the conflict was and remains the refusal to preconditions. recognize the right of the Jewish people to a state of their own in their historic homeland. Israel is obligated by its international commitments and expects all parties to keep In 1947, when the United Nations proposed their commitments. the partition plan of a Jewish state and an Arab state, the entire Arab world rejected We want to live with you in peace, as good the resolution. The Jewish community, neighbors. We want our children and your by contrast, welcomed it by dancing and children to never again experience war: that rejoicing. The Arabs rejected any Jewish state, parents, brothers and sisters will never again in any borders. know the agony of losing loved ones in battle; that our children will be able to dream of Those who think that the continued enmity a better future and realize that dream; and toward Israel is a product of our presence in that together we will invest our energies in Judea, Samaria and Gaza are confusing cause plowshares and pruning hooks, not swords and effect. and spears. The attacks against us began in the 1920s, I know the face of war. I have experienced escalated into a comprehensive attack in 1948 battle. I lost close friends. I lost a brother. I with the declaration of Israel’s independence, have seen the pain of bereaved families. I do continued with the fedayeen attacks in the not want war. No one in Israel wants war. 1950s, and reached their peak in 1967, on the eve of the Six-Day War, in an attempt to If we join hands and work together for peace, tighten a noose around Israel’s neck. there is no limit to the development and prosperity we can achieve for our two peoples All this occurred during close to fifty years – in the economy, agriculture, trade, tourism before a single Israeli soldier ever set foot in and education – and most importantly, in Judea and Samaria. providing our children a better world in which to live, a life full of tranquility, creativity, Fortunately, Egypt and Jordan left this circle opportunity and hope. of enmity. The signing of peace treaties with them brought about an end to their claims against Israel and an end to the The Root of the Conflict conflict. But regrettably, this is not the case with the Palestinians. The closer we get to If the advantages of peace are so evident, we an agreement with them, the further they must ask ourselves why has peace eluded us, retreat from it and raise demands that are even as our hand remains outstretched to inconsistent with a true desire to end the peace? Why has this conflict continued for conflict. more than sixty years? Many good people have told us that In order to bring an end to the conflict, we withdrawal from territories is the key to peace must give an honest and forthright answer to with the Palestinians. Well, we withdrew. But

Benjamin Netanyahu 103 the fact is that every withdrawal was met with as the nation-state of the Jewish people. massive waves of terror, by suicide bombers To vest this declaration with practical and thousands of missiles. meaning, there must also be a clear understanding that the Palestinian refugee We tried withdrawal with an agreement and problem will be resolved outside Israel’s withdrawal without an agreement. We tried borders. Clearly, any demand for resettling a partial withdrawal and a full withdrawal. In Palestinian refugees within Israel undermines 2000 and again last year, Israel proposed an Israel’s continued existence as the state of the almost total withdrawal in exchange for an Jewish people. end to the conflict, and twice our offers were rejected. The Palestinian refugee problem must be solved, and it can be solved, as we ourselves We evacuated every last inch of the Gaza proved in a similar situation. Tiny Israel, with Strip, uprooted over twenty settlements a speck of land and no natural resources, and evicted thousands of Israelis from their successfully absorbed hundreds of thousands homes. In response, we received a hail of of Jewish refugees who left their homes and missiles on our cities, towns and children. belongings in Arab countries.

The claim that territorial withdrawals will Justice and logic therefore demand that bring peace with the Palestinians, or at least the Palestinian refugee problem be solved advance peace, simply does not square with outside Israel’s borders. On this point, there the facts. is a broad national consensus. I believe that with goodwill and international investment, In addition, Hamas in the south, like this humanitarian problem can be settled Hezbollah in the north, repeatedly proclaims once and for all. its commitment to “liberate” the Israeli cities of Ashkelon and Beersheba, Acre and Haifa, So far I have spoken about the need for Ashdod and Tiberias. Palestinians to recognize our rights. In a moment, I will speak openly about our need Territorial withdrawals have not lessened the to recognize their rights. hatred. And to our regret, even Palestinian moderates are not yet ready to say the simple But let me first say that the connection words: Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish between the Jewish people and the Land of people, and it will stay that way. Israel has lasted for more than 3500 years. Judea and Samaria – the places where Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, David and The Principle of Recognition Solomon, and Isaiah and Jeremiah lived – are not alien to us. This is the land of our Achieving peace will require courage and forefathers. candor from both sides, not just from the Israeli side. The Palestinian leadership must The right of the Jewish people to a state rise and say: “Enough of this conflict. We in the Land of Israel does not derive from recognize the right of the Jewish people to the cascade of catastrophes that befell our a state of their own in this land, and we are people. True, for 2000 years the Jewish prepared to live beside you in true peace.” people suffered expulsions, pogroms, blood libels, and massacres which culminated in the I am yearning for that moment, for when Holocaust, a chain of suffering which has no Palestinian leaders say those words to our parallel in the history of nations. people and to their people, the path will be opened to resolving all the other problems There are those who say that if the Holocaust between us, however difficult. had not occurred, the State of Israel would never have been established. But I say Therefore, a fundamental prerequisite for that if the State of Israel would have been ending the conflict is a public, binding and established earlier, it is the Holocaust that unequivocal Palestinian recognition of Israel would not have occurred.

104 Bar-Ilan Speech The tragic history of powerlessness of our is – demilitarization. The territory under people explains why the Jewish people need Palestinian control must be demilitarized with a sovereign power of self-defense. But our ironclad security provisions for Israel. right to build our sovereign state here, in the Land of Israel, arises from one simple fact: this Without these two conditions, there is a real is the homeland of the Jewish people, this is danger that an armed Palestinian state would where our identity was forged. emerge that would become another terrorist base against the Jewish state, such as the one As Israel’s first Prime Minister David in Gaza. Ben-Gurion said in proclaiming Israel’s independence: “The Jewish people arose We do not want Kassam rockets on Petach in the Land of Israel and it was here that its Tikva, Grad rockets on Tel Aviv or missiles on spiritual, religious and political character was Ben-Gurion airport. We want peace. shaped. Here they attained their sovereignty, and here they bequeathed to the world their In order to achieve peace, we must ensure national and cultural treasures, and the most that Palestinians will not be able to import eternal of books.” missiles into their territory, to field an army, to close their airspace to us, or to make pacts But we must also tell the truth in its entirety: with the likes of Hezbollah and Iran. On this Within this homeland lives a large Palestinian point as well, there is wide consensus within community. We do not want to rule over Israel. them, we do not want to govern their lives, we do not want to impose our flag and our It is impossible to expect us to agree in culture on them. advance to the principle of a Palestinian state without assurances that this state will In my vision of peace, in this small land of ours be demilitarized. On a matter so critical to two peoples will live freely, side-by-side, as the existence of Israel, we must first have our good neighbors with mutual respect. Each security needs addressed. will have its own flag, its own anthem, its own government. Neither will threaten the We therefore ask our friends today in the security or survival of the other. international community, led by the United States, for what is critical to the security These two realities – our connection to the of Israel. We ask for clear commitments Land of Israel and the Palestinian population that in a future peace agreement, the living within it – have created deep divisions territory controlled by the Palestinians in Israeli society. But the truth is that much will be demilitarized: namely, without an more unites us than divides us. army, without control of its airspace, and with effective security measures to prevent I have come tonight to give expression to weapons smuggling into the territory – real that unity, and to the principles of peace and monitoring, and not what occurs in Gaza security on which there is broad agreement today. And obviously, the Palestinians will not within Israeli society. These are the principles be able to forge military pacts. that guide our policy, a policy that must take into account the international situation that Without this, these territories will sooner or has recently developed. We must recognize later become another Hamastan, something this reality and at the same time stand firmly we cannot accept. Israel must control its on those principles essential for Israel. security and its destiny.

I told President Obama when I visited The Principle of Demilitarization Washington that if we could agree on the substance, then terminology would not pose I have already stressed the first principle – a problem. recognition. The Palestinians must clearly and unambiguously recognize Israel as the state And here is the substance which I now clearly of the Jewish people. The second principle state:

Benjamin Netanyahu 105 If we receive this guarantee regarding Hamas will not even allow the Red Cross to demilitarization and Israel’s security needs, visit our kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit, who and if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the has spent three years in captivity, cut off from state of the Jewish people, then we will be his parents, his family and his people. We are ready in a future peace agreement to reach committed to bringing him home, safe and a solution where a demilitarized Palestinian sound. state exists alongside the Jewish state. With a Palestinian leadership committed Regarding the remaining important issues to peace, the active participation of the that will be discussed as part of a final peace Arab world, and the support of the United settlement, my positions are known: Israel States and the international community needs defensible borders, and Jerusalem, the there is no reason why we cannot achieve a capital of Israel, must remain undivided with breakthrough to peace. continued religious freedom for all faiths. Our people have already proven that we The territorial question will be discussed can achieve the impossible. Over the past as part of the final peace agreement. In 61 years, while constantly defending our the meantime, we have no intention of existence, we have performed wonders. building new settlements or of expropriating additional land for existing settlements. Our microchips are powering the world’s computers. Our medicines are treating But there is a need to enable the residents diseases once considered incurable. Our to lead normal lives, to allow mothers and drip irrigation is bringing arid lands back to fathers to raise their children like families life in five continents. And Israeli scientists elsewhere. The settlers are neither the are expanding the boundaries of human enemies of the people nor the enemies knowledge. of peace. They are an integral part of our people, a principled, pioneering and Zionist If only our neighbors would respond to our community. call – peace too will be in our reach.

Unity among us is essential and will help us I call on the leaders of the Arab world and on achieve reconciliation with our neighbors. the Palestinian leadership: Let us continue That reconciliation must begin today by together on the path of Menahem Begin and altering realities on the ground. I believe that Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein. a strong Palestinian economy will bolster Let us realize the vision of the prophet Isaiah, peace. It will strengthen the moderates and who said in Jerusalem 2700 years ago: “Nation weaken the radicals. shall not lift up sword against nation, and they shall learn war no more.” If the Palestinians turn toward peace – in fighting terror, in building governance and With God’s help, we will know no more war. the rule of law, in educating their children We will know peace. for peace and in stopping incitement against Israel - we will do our part in making every effort to facilitate freedom of movement and access, and to help them achieve prosperity. Source: Prime Minister's Office website All of this will help us advance a peace treaty http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Archive/ between us. Speeches/2009/06/speechbarilan140609.htm

Above all, the Palestinians must make a critical choice between the path of peace and the path of Hamas. The Palestinian Authority will have to establish the rule of law in Gaza and overcome Hamas. Israel will not sit at the negotiating table with terrorists who seek our destruction.

106 Bar-Ilan Speech Appendix 2

Address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress

May 24, 2011

I am deeply moved by your warm welcome. East, between tyranny and freedom. A great And I am deeply honored that you have given convulsion is shaking the earth from the me the opportunity to address Congress a Khyber Pass to the Straits of Gibraltar. The second time. tremors have shattered states and toppled governments. And we can all see that the Mr. Vice President, do you remember the time ground is still shifting. Now this historic that we were the new kids in town? moment holds the promise of a new dawn of freedom and opportunity. Millions of young And I do see a lot of old friends here. And I see people are determined to change their future. a lot of new friends of Israel here. Democrats We all look at them. They muster courage. and Republicans alike. They risk their lives. They demand dignity. They desire liberty. Israel has no better friend than America. And America has no better friend than Israel. We These extraordinary scenes in Tunis and Cairo, stand together to defend democracy. We evoke those of Berlin and Prague in 1989. stand together to advance peace. We stand Yet as we share their hopes, we must also together to fight terrorism. Congratulations remember that those hopes could be snuffed America, congratulations, Mr. President. You out as they were in Tehran in 1979. You got bin Laden. Good riddance! remember what happened then. The brief democratic spring in Iran was cut short by a In an unstable Middle East, Israel is the one ferocious and unforgiving tyranny. This same anchor of stability. In a region of shifting tyranny smothered Lebanon’s democratic alliances, Israel is America’s unwavering ally. Cedar Revolution, and inflicted on that Israel has always been pro-American. Israel long-suffering country, the medieval rule of will always be pro-American. Hezbollah.

My friends, you don’t need to do nation- So today, the Middle East stands at a fateful building in Israel. We’re already built. You crossroads. Like all of you, I pray that the don’t need to export democracy to Israel. peoples of the region choose the path less We’ve already got it. You don’t need to travelled, the path of liberty. No one knows send American troops to Israel. We defend what this path consists of better than you. ourselves. You’ve been very generous in This path is not paved by elections alone. It is giving us tools to do the job of defending paved when governments permit protests in Israel on our own. Thank you all, and thank town squares, when limits are placed on the you President Obama, for your steadfast powers of rulers, when judges are beholden commitment to Israel’s security. I know to laws and not men, and when human rights economic times are tough. I deeply appreciate cannot be crushed by tribal loyalties or mob this. rule.

Some of you have been telling me that your Israel has always embraced this path, in the belief has been reaffirmed in recent months Middle East that has long rejected it. In a that support for Israel’s security is a wise region where women are stoned, gays are investment in our common future. For an hanged, Christians are persecuted, Israel epic battle is now unfolding in the Middle stands out. It is different.

Benjamin Netanyahu 107 As the great English writer George Eliot be upon us: A militant Islamic regime armed predicted over a century ago, that once with nuclear weapons. established, the Jewish state will "shine like a bright star of freedom amid the despotisms of Militant Islam threatens the world. It the East.” Well, she was right. We have a free threatens Islam. I have no doubt that it will press, independent courts, an open economy, ultimately be defeated. It will eventually rambunctious parliamentary debates. You succumb to the forces of freedom and think you guys are tough on one another in progress. It depends on cloistering young Congress? Come spend a day in the Knesset. minds for a given amount of years and the Be my guest. process of opening up information will ultimately defeat this movement. But like Courageous Arab protesters are now other fanaticisms that were doomed to fail, struggling to secure these very same rights militant Islam could exact a horrific price from for their peoples, for their societies. We're all of us before its inevitable demise. proud that over one million Arab citizens of Israel have been enjoying these rights A nuclear-armed Iran would ignite a nuclear for decades. Of the 300 million Arabs in the arms race in the Middle East. It would give Middle East and North Africa, only Israel’s terrorists a nuclear umbrella. It would make Arab citizens enjoy real democratic rights. the nightmare of nuclear terrorism a clear I want you to stop for a second and think and present danger throughout the world. I about that. Of those 300 million Arabs, less want you to understand what this means. If than one-half of one percent are truly free, we don't stop it, it's coming. They could put and they're all citizens of Israel! the bomb anywhere. They could put it on a missile. They're working on missiles that could This startling fact reveals a basic truth: Israel reach this city. It could be on a container ship is not what is wrong about the Middle East. in a port, or in a suitcase on a subway. Israel is what is right about the Middle East. Now the threat to my country cannot Israel fully supports the desire of Arab be overstated. Those who dismiss it are peoples in our region to live freely. We long sticking their heads in the sand. Less than for the day when Israel will be one of many seven decades after six million Jews were real democracies in the Middle East. murdered, Iran's leaders deny the Holocaust of the Jewish people, while calling for the Fifteen years ago, I stood at this very podium annihilation of the Jewish state. and said that democracy must start to take root in the Arab world. Well, it's begun to take Leaders who spew such venom should be root. This beginning holds the promise of a banned from every respectable forum on the brilliant future of peace and prosperity. For I planet. But there is something that makes the believe that a Middle East that is genuinely outrage even greater: The lack of outrage. democratic will be a Middle East truly at In much of the international community, peace. the calls for our destruction are met with utter silence. It is even worse because there But while we hope and work for the best, are many who rush to condemn Israel for we must also recognize that powerful forces defending itself against Iran’s terror proxies. oppose this future. They oppose modernity. They oppose democracy. They oppose peace. But not you. Not America. You have acted differently. You've condemned the Iranian Foremost among these forces is Iran. The regime for its genocidal aims. You’ve passed tyranny in Tehran brutalizes its own people. It tough sanctions against Iran. History will supports attacks against American troops in salute you America. Afghanistan and Iraq. It subjugates Lebanon and Gaza. It sponsors terror worldwide. President Obama has said that the United States is determined to prevent Iran from When I last stood here, I spoke of the dire developing nuclear weapons. He successfully consequences of Iran developing nuclear led the Security Council to adopt sanctions weapons. Now time is running out, and against Iran. You in Congress passed even the hinge of history may soon turn. For the tougher sanctions. These words and deeds greatest danger facing humanity could soon are vitally important.

108 Speech to Congress Yet the Ayatollah regime briefly suspended I am willing to make painful compromises to its nuclear program only once, in 2003, when achieve this historic peace. As the leader of it feared the possibility of military action. Israel, it is my responsibility to lead my people That same year, Muammar Qadaffi gave up to peace. his nuclear weapons program, and for the same reason. The more Iran believes that all This is not easy for me. I recognize that in a options are on the table, the less the chance genuine peace, we will be required to give up of confrontation. This is why I ask you to parts of the ancestral Jewish homeland. In continue to send an unequivocal message: Judea and Samaria, the Jewish people are not that America will never permit Iran to develop foreign occupiers. We are not the British in nuclear weapons. India. We are not the Belgians in the Congo.

As for Israel, if history has taught the Jewish This is the land of our forefathers, the Land people anything, it is that we must take calls of Israel, to which Abraham brought the idea for our destruction seriously. We are a nation of one God, where David set out to confront that rose from the ashes of the Holocaust. Goliath, and where Isaiah saw a vision of When we say "never again," we mean never eternal peace. No distortion of history can again. Israel always reserves the right to deny the four-thousand-year-old bond defend itself. between the Jewish people and the Jewish land. My friends, while Israel will be ever vigilant in its defense, we will never give up on our But there is another truth: The Palestinians quest for peace. I guess we’ll give it up when share this small land with us. We seek a we achieve it. Israel wants peace. Israel peace in which they will be neither Israel’s needs peace. We've achieved historic peace subjects nor its citizens. They should enjoy agreements with Egypt and Jordan that have a national life of dignity as a free, viable and held up for decades. independent people in their own state. They should enjoy a prosperous economy, where I remember what it was like before we had their creativity and initiative can flourish. peace. I was nearly killed in a firefight inside the Suez Canal. I mean that literally, inside the We've already seen the beginnings of Suez Canal. I was going down to the bottom what is possible. In the last two years, the with a 40-pound ammunition pack on my Palestinians have begun to build a better life back, and somebody reached out to grab for themselves. Prime Minister Fayad has led me, and they're still looking for him, for the this effort. I wish him a speedy recovery from guy who did such a stupid thing. I was nearly his recent operation. killed there. I battled terrorists along both banks of the Jordan River. Too many Israelis We've helped the Palestinian economy have lost loved ones. I know their grief. I lost by removing hundreds of barriers and my brother. roadblocks to the free flow of goods and people. The results have been nothing short So no one in Israel wants a return to those of remarkable. The Palestinian economy is terrible days. The peace with Egypt and booming. It's growing by more than 10% a Jordan has long served as an anchor of year. stability and peace in the heart of the Middle East. Palestinian cities look very different today than they did just a few years ago. They have This peace should be bolstered by economic shopping malls, movie theaters, restaurants, and political support to all those who remain banks. They even have e-businesses. This is committed to peace. all happening without peace. Imagine what could happen with peace. Peace would herald The peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan a new day for both peoples. It would make are vital. But they're not enough. We must the dream of a broader Arab-Israeli peace a also find a way to forge a lasting peace with realistic possibility. the Palestinians. Two years ago, I publicly committed to a solution of two states for two So now here is the question. You have peoples: A Palestinian state alongside the to ask it. If the benefits of peace with the Jewish state. Palestinians are so clear, why has peace eluded us? Because all six Israeli Prime

Benjamin Netanyahu 109 Ministers since the signing of the Oslo accords importance, will be incorporated into the final agreed to establish a Palestinian state. borders of Israel. Myself included. So why has peace not been achieved? Because so far, the Palestinians The status of the settlements will be decided have been unwilling to accept a Palestinian only in negotiations. But we must also be state, if it meant accepting a Jewish state honest. So I am saying today something alongside it. that should be said publicly by all those who are serious about peace. In any real You see, our conflict has never been about peace agreement that ends the conflict, the establishment of a Palestinian state. It some settlements will end up beyond Israel’s has always been about the existence of the borders. The precise delineation of those Jewish state. This is what this conflict is about. borders must be negotiated. We will be In 1947, the United Nations voted to partition generous on the size of a future Palestinian the land into a Jewish state and an Arab state. state. But as President Obama said, the border The Jews said yes. The Palestinians said no. will be different than the one that existed In recent years, the Palestinians twice refused on June 4, 1967. Israel will not return to the generous offers by Israeli Prime Ministers to indefensible lines of 1967. establish a Palestinian state on virtually all the territory won by Israel in the Six-Day War. I want to be very clear on this point. Israel will be generous on the size of the Palestinian They were simply unwilling to end the state but we'll be very firm on where we conflict. And I regret to say this: They put the border with it. This is an important continue to educate their children to hate. principle. It shouldn't be lost. They continue to name public squares after terrorists. And worst of all, they continue to We recognize that a Palestinian state must perpetuate the fantasy that Israel will one day be big enough to be viable, independent be flooded by the descendants of Palestinian and prosperous. President Obama rightly refugees. referred to Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, just as he referred to the My friends, this must come to an end. future Palestinian state as the homeland of President Abbas must do what I have done. the Palestinian people. Jews from around I stood before my people, and I told you it the world have a right to immigrate to the wasn’t easy for me, and I said… "I will accept one and only Jewish state. Palestinians from a Palestinian state." It is time for President around the world should have a right to Abbas to stand before his people and say… "I immigrate, if they so choose, to a Palestinian will accept a Jewish state." state. This means that the Palestinian refugee problem will be resolved outside the borders Those six words will change history. They of Israel. will make clear to the Palestinians that this conflict must come to an end. That they are As for Jerusalem, only a democratic Israel has not building a state to continue the conflict protected freedom of worship for all faiths in with Israel, but to end it. They will convince the city. Throughout the millennial history the people of Israel that they have a true of the Jewish capital, the only time that Jews, partner for peace. With such a partner, the Christians and Muslims could worship freely, people of Israel will be prepared to make a could have unfettered access to their holy far-reaching compromise. I will be prepared sites, has been during Israeli sovereignty to make a far-reaching compromise. over Jerusalem. Jerusalem must never again be divided. Jerusalem must remain the This compromise must reflect the dramatic united capital of Israel. I know that this is a demographic changes that have occurred difficult issue for Palestinians. But I believe since 1967. The vast majority of the 650,000 with creativity and goodwill a solution can be Israelis who live beyond the 1967 lines reside found. in neighborhoods and suburbs of Jerusalem and Greater Tel Aviv. This is the peace I plan to forge with a Palestinian partner committed to peace. But These areas are densely populated but you know very well that in the Middle East, geographically quite small. Under any realistic the only peace that will hold is a peace you peace agreement, these areas, as well as can defend. other places of critical strategic and national

110 Speech to Congress So peace must be anchored in security. In I appreciate the President’s clear position on recent years, Israel withdrew from South this issue. Peace cannot be imposed. It must Lebanon and Gaza. We thought we'd get be negotiated. But it can only be negotiated peace, but that's not what we got. Instead, with partners committed to peace. we got 12,000 rockets fired from those areas on our cities, on our children, by Hezbollah And Hamas is not a partner for peace. Hamas and Hamas. The UN peacekeepers in remains committed to Israel's destruction Lebanon failed to prevent the smuggling of and to terrorism. They have a charter. That this weaponry. The European observers in charter not only calls for the obliteration of Gaza evaporated overnight. So if Israel simply Israel. It says "kill the Jews wherever you walked out of the territories, the flow of find them." Hamas’ leader condemned the weapons into a future Palestinian state would killing of Osama bin Laden and praised him be unchecked. Missiles fired from it could as a holy warrior. Now again I want to make reach virtually every home in Israel in less than this clear. Israel is prepared to sit down today a minute. I want you to think about that too. and negotiate peace with the Palestinian Imagine there's a siren going on now and we Authority. I believe we can fashion a brilliant have less than 60 seconds to find shelter from future of peace for our children. But Israel will an incoming rocket. Would you live that way? not negotiate with a Palestinian government Can anyone live that way? Well, we aren’t backed by the Palestinian version of Al Qaeda. going to live that way either. So I say to President Abbas: Tear up your pact The truth is that Israel needs unique security with Hamas! Sit down and negotiate! Make arrangements because of its unique size. peace with the Jewish state! And if you do, Israel is one of the smallest countries in the I promise you this. Israel will not be the last world. Mr. Vice President, I'll grant you this. country to welcome a Palestinian state as a It’s bigger than Delaware. It’s even bigger new member of the United Nations. It will be than Rhode Island. But that’s about it. Israel on the first to do so. the 1967 lines would be half the width of the Washington Beltway. My friends, the momentous trials of the last century, and the unfolding events of Now here’s a bit of nostalgia. I first came this century, attest to the decisive role of to Washington thirty years ago as a young the United States in advancing peace and diplomat. It took me a while, but I finally defending freedom. Providence entrusted the figured it out: there is an America beyond the United States to be the guardian of liberty. All Beltway. But Israel on the 1967 lines would be peoples who cherish freedom owe a profound only nine miles wide. So much for strategic debt of gratitude to your great nation. depth. Among the most grateful nations is my nation, the people of Israel, who have fought for their So it is therefore absolutely vital for Israel’s liberty and survival against impossible odds, security that a Palestinian state be fully in ancient and modern times alike. demilitarized. And it is absolutely vital that Israel maintain a long-term military presence I speak on behalf of the Jewish people and the along the Jordan River. Solid security Jewish state when I say to you, representatives arrangements on the ground are necessary of America, thank you. Thank you for your not only to protect the peace, they are unwavering support for Israel. Thank you for necessary to protect Israel in case the peace ensuring that the flame of freedom burns unravels. For in our unstable region, no one bright throughout the world. May God bless can guarantee that our peace partners today all of you. And may God forever bless the will be there tomorrow. United States of America.

And when I say tomorrow, I don't mean some distant time in the future. I mean ‒ tomorrow. Peace can be achieved only around the negotiating table. The Palestinian attempt to impose a settlement through the United Source: Prime Minister's Office website Nations will not bring peace. It should be http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/ forcefully opposed by all those who want to PMSpeaks/speechcongress240511.htm see this conflict end.

Benjamin Netanyahu 111 About the Authors

Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon is Vice Prime Dr. Dore Gold, President of the Jerusalem Minister and Minister of Strategic Affairs. Center for Public Affairs, served as Israel’s He served as IDF Chief of Staff in 2002- Ambassador to the United Nations (1997- 2005, during which time he led the army’s 1999). Previously he served as foreign policy successful efforts to quell the Palestinian advisor to former Prime Minister Benjamin terror war launched in September 2000. Netanyahu, at which time he served as an Yaalon pursued advanced studies at the envoy to Jordan, Egypt, the Palestinian Command and Staff College in England and Authority, and the Gulf States. He was holds a B.A. in political science from the involved in the negotiations over the 1998 University of Haifa. He was also distinguished Wye Agreement, the 1997 Hebron Protocol, fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem. and in 1996 concluded the negotiations with the U.S., Lebanon, Syria, and France for Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze'evi Farkash the creation of the Monitoring Group for has served in a variety of roles both in the Southern Lebanon. In 1991, he served as an field and on the General Staff, commanding advisor to the Israeli delegation to the Madrid such units as the Technological and Logistics Peace Conference. Gold is the author of Branch, the Planning Branch, and the Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports Intelligence Branch. He serves as Head of the the New Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003); Intelligence and National Defense Program Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has of the Institute for National Security Studies Fueled Global Chaos (Crown Forum, 2004); The (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. He founded and Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and is Chairman and CEO of FST21 Ltd., Advanced the Future of the Holy City (Regnery, 2007); and Security Technology Services, providing The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the technologies and services for home safety West (Regnery, 2009). and container security. He received a B.A. and M.A. in Middle East and Islam Studies from Tel Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror is Aviv University, as well as an AMP/ISMP from Chairman of the Institute for Contemporary Harvard Business School. Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Vice President of the Lander Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan served as Head of Academic Institute in Jerusalem. He is also the Planning Branch of the IDF General Staff the former head of the IDF Intelligence and headed the Israeli security committee Research and Assessment Division, with for peace negotiations with the Jordanians, special responsibility for preparing the Palestinians, and Syrians. He later served as National Intelligence Assessment. In head of the Central Command and as Deputy addition, he served as military secretary to Chief of the General Staff. He also served as the Minister of Defense. Amidror was asked Chairman of Israel's National Security Council by the Israel Defense Forces to analyze the and was the National Security Adviser to intelligence leading up to and during the Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon. 2006 Second Lebanon War. He is the author of Thoughts about Security and Military Affairs (Israel National Security College, 2002); and Intelligence: Theory and Practice (Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 2006). This chapter was written prior to his appointment as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

112 About the Authors Brig.-Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel served in 2008- 2009 as Head of Prime Minister Olmert’s negotiation team with the Palestinians. Previously he headed the IDF Strategic Planning Division. Prior to that he headed the Air Force Research Division, where he was responsible for evaluation of intelligence and missile threats.

Dan Diker is Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress. He was formerly Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. A commentator for Israel Television’s English News on Middle East Affairs, he has also provided political and diplomatic commentary for BBC, Fox News, Al Jazeera, Al Hurra, ABC, and Canadian Television. He is a graduate of Harvard University, an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., and a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Jerusalem Center.

113 About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Websites: English - www.jcpa.org | Hebrew - www.jcpa.org.il

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs is a leading Jerusalem in International Diplomacy – independent research institute specializing in Dr. Dore Gold analyzes the legal and historic rights public diplomacy and foreign policy. Founded of Israel in Jerusalem and exposes the dangers in 1976, the Center has produced hundreds of of compromise that will unleash a new jihadist studies and initiatives by leading experts on a momentum in his book The Fight for Jerusalem: wide range of strategic topics. Dr. Dore Gold, Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy Israel’s former ambassador to the UN, has headed City (Regnery, 2007). Justus Reid Weiner looks at the Jerusalem Center since 2000. Illegal Construction in Jerusalem: A Variation on an Alarming Global Phenomenon (2003). Researcher Nadav Shragai assesses the imminent security Jerusalem Center Programs: threats to Israel’s capital resulting from its potential division, and offers alternative strategies Iran and the New Threats to the West – for managing Jerusalem’s demographic challenge Preparation of a legal document jointly with in his monograph The Dangers of Dividing leading Israeli and international scholars and Jerusalem (2008). public personalities on the initiation of legal proceedings against Iranian President Mahmoud New Models for Economic Growth in Israel – Ahmadinejad for incitement to commit genocide This comprehensive, 10-year project has studied and participate in genocide. This program also the application and impact of privatization features major policy studies by security and policy and other financial innovations in Israel. academic experts on Iran’s use of terror proxies Sponsored by the Milken Institute, the project and allies in the regime’s war against the West includes nine published volumes in Hebrew and and its race for regional supremacy. English. Defensible Borders Initiative – A major security and public diplomacy initiative that analyzes Jerusalem Center Serial current terror threats and Israel’s corresponding Publications: territorial requirements, particularly in the strategically vital West Bank, that Israel must Jerusalem Viewpoints – providing in-depth maintain to fulfill its existential security and analysis on changing events in Israel and the defense needs. (www.defensibleborders.org) Middle East since 1977. Jerusalem Issue Briefs – insider briefings by top- Global Terrorism – Using previously unpublished level Israeli government officials, military experts, documents, Jerusalem Center President Dore and academics, as part of the Center’s Institute for Gold explored the influence of Saudi Wahhabism Contemporary Affairs. on 9/11 in the New York Times bestseller Hatred's Daily Alert – a daily digest of hyperlinked news Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New and commentary on Israel and the Middle East Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003). from the world and Hebrew press. Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism – a monthly Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) – publication examining anti-Semitism after the A diplomacy program, founded in 2002 jointly Holocaust. with the Wechsler Family Foundation, that Jewish Political Studies Review – a scholarly presents Israel’s case on current issues through journal founded in 1989. high-level briefings by government and military leaders to the foreign diplomatic corps and foreign press, as well as production and Jerusalem Center Websites dissemination of information materials. www.jcpa.org (English) Global Law Forum – A ground-breaking program www.jcpa.org.il (Hebrew) that undertakes studies and advances policy www.jcpa-lecape.org (French) initiatives to protect Israel’s legal rights in its www.mesi.org.uk (United Kingdom) conflict with the Palestinians, the Arab world, and www.jer-zentrum.org (German) radical Islam. (www.globallawforum.org) President - Dr. Dore Gold Anti-Semitism After the Holocaust – Initiated and Director General - Chaya Herskovic directed by Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld, this program Chairman of the Board - Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld includes conferences, seminars, and publications discussing restitution, the academic boycott, Holocaust denial, and anti-Semitism in the Arab world, European countries, and the post-Soviet states. (www.jewishaffairs.org)

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