The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies The Teddy Kollek Center for Jerusalem Studies A Fence Around Jerusalem The Construction of the Security Fence Around Jerusalem General background and implications for the city and its metropolitan area Kobi Michael and Amnon Ramon 2004 Introduction In April 2002, following a lengthy series of brutal terrorist attacks, the Ministerial Committee for National Security (hereafter: the Security Cabinet), headed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, decided to establish a security fence between Israel and the West Bank.1 Two months later, the government authorized the route of the fence as proposed by the security establishment, between Sallem, in the northwest area of the West Bank, and Kafr Kassem, as well as two sections in the Jerusalem area. Three major sections have been completed since work began in August 2002: the central section between Sallem and Elkana, constituting the main part of the fence; the northeastern section, in the Mount Gilboa region, between Sallem and Kibbutz Tirat Zvi; and two sections in the south and north of Jerusalem. In addition, parts of the obstacle were built east of Jersualem. Both the decision-making process with regard to the fence and the geographic reality and the political consciousness it has created reflect the problematic and complex nature of decisions concerning national security in Israel. More specifically, this enormous project will have far-reaching consequences for the mutual relations between Israelis and Palestinians and between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in the shadow of the ongoing violent confrontation between the sides. The initial conception and incipient planning of the fence date back to the second government of Yitzhak Rabin, when Moshe Shahal, the Minister of Interior Security, initiated planning for the “seam zone.” However, the security situation between 1995 and 2002 did not generate massive public and political pressure to 1 In this document the terms “security fence,” “seam zone,” “obstacle” (the official ter- minology of the security establishment), and “separation/disengagement fence,” which is commonly used by the Israeli media, will be used alternatively. In the international media the prevalent term is “wall.” It should be emphasized that the Israeli security establish- ment also uses several terms interchangeably, as can be seen, for example, on the official Israeli websites relating to the fence project. The Defense Ministry’s site is called “The Seam Zone” in Hebrew and “The Security Fence” in English. See: www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/default.htm. 5 build a fence. Consequently, the Israeli governments in this period found no justification to embark on such a project, not least because of their concern that a fence would effectively determine the eastern border between sovereign Israel and the West Bank. By the summer of 2002, however, the fence project was virtually forced on the government, as the public demanded an adequate response to Palestinian terrorism which had brought about a severe deterioration of the security situation and left Israelis feeling highly vulnerable and deeply insecure in every sense. Although the fence originated as a “security necessity,” the planners, who came from the security establishment, were compelled to consider numerous “civilian” aspects (including domestic and external political pressure). The vast complexity of the project meant that the planners were unable to anticipate all the implications, consequences, and ramifications of the fence and its operational regime in many “civilian” and security spheres. These inherent difficulties were often compounded due to the absence of clear guidance by the political level, which, subjected to contradictory domestic and international pressures, found it difficult to decide the route of the fence. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the security establishment was the only planning and operational body in Israel capable of coping with a project on this scale within a reasonable period. Another result of the complexity of this “national project” was “conceptual confusion” that characterized the process. From the outset, a number of terms have been used to describe the project, each representing a different rationale. In part, the conceptual confusion appears to reflect an inherent tension between considerations of a strictly security character (as in the terms “security fence” or “separation fence”) and political-state considerations, both internal and external, which bring about a blurring of the separation boundary (as in the term “seam zone”). Indeed, as will be seen later, in present-day Israel it is all but impossible to differentiate between “pure” security considerations (within the Green Line and for the settlements in Judea and Samaria) and domestic and external political and state-policy considerations. Particularly acute problems in planning and building the fence have arisen in and around Jerusalem, one of the most complex and complicated cities in the world. The major difficulty lies in the fact that in many cases the fence in the Jerusalem area does not separate Jewish and Arab populations, but instead cuts off 6 Arabs living in the West Bank from Arabs living within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, despite the close family, social, and economic ties that bind the two groups. In light of the fact that the Jerusalem fence project is the most significant Israeli undertaking in the city since 1967, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies decided, in the spring of 2003, to examine the consequences and implications of the route of the fence around Jerusalem. In this connection, a special research team (consisting of Israel Kimhi, Maya Choshen, Amnon Ramon, and Kobi Michael) was established to study the tangled issue. The present document is the first in a series of planned research papers on the subject of the separation fence and Metropolitan Jerusalem. Its aims are to analyze the decision-making process underlying the fence and its route, with the focus on mapping and elucidating the main problems that have already arisen and that are likely to arise in the future. In the concluding section of the paper we set forth three possible sequences of events in the situation of a fence around Jerusalem. Finally, we offer initial operative recommendations, which will be further developed in the next stage, following an in-depth examination of the problems set forth in the paper. We hope the paper will assist the policy makers at the various levels to cope with this complex issue and will also shed light on the subject for lay readers who want to learn more about one of the monumental developments in the history of Jerusalem since 1967. We are grateful to Israel Kimhi and Maya Choshen, our dedicated partners on the research team, and to the interviewees and participants in the discussions conducted by the think tank of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies: Shalom Goldstein, political adviser to the mayor of Jerusalem for East Jerusalem affairs; attorney Daniel Seidemann; senior officers of the Border Police; Major Gil Limon from the military legal adviser’s office of Judea and Samaria; Colonel (res.) Danny Tirza, a senior planner of the fence in Central Command’s “Keshet Tzva’im” Directorate; and to Israelis and Palestinians who agreed to be interviewed on condition of anonymity. Special thanks to the members of the Jerusalem Institute think tank (particularly Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, who made important comments about the legal section) and to Ora Achimeir and Prof. Yaakov Bar-Siman-Tov, the directors of the Jerusalem Institute, who oversaw the study and supported it from 7 its inception. We are especially grateful to Ms. Hamutal Appel for her work in editing the manuscript and seeing it through the printing process; to the Hebrew editor, Shlomo Arad; to the photographers Nati Shohat and Yossi Zamir (Flash 90); to the English translator and editor, Ralph Mandel; and to Yair Assaf-Shapira and Vered Shatil, for preparing the maps. Kobi Michael and Amnon Ramon November 2004 8 Chapter One: The Decision-Making Process A. Evolution of a concept: Obstacle, security fence, separation fence, or seam zone? Already in 1992-1993, as stabbing attacks on Israelis by Palestinians became rampant, Israel placed controls on the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into its territory. However, since early 1995 and the onset of the large-scale terrorist attacks that accompanied the Oslo process, Israel had to consider the creation of a physical obstacle to block the entry of terrorists from the West Bank. At the same time, concern that such an obstacle would predetermine the limit of Israel’s concessions to the Palestinians has led the political echelon to downplay its political implications. The relentless terrorist attacks, Israel’s inability to set a final policy goal and decide the route of the eastern border, together with international pressure on Israel to avoid unilaterally “biting off” parts of the West Bank, prevented systematic thinking and planning in regard to the fence and generated “conceptual confusion” reflecting different approaches that are in part self-contradictory.2 The separation fence is being planned and built as a security necessity that will stop potential terrorists and channel and systematize the entry of Palestinians into Israel, while denying entry to individuals on security or criminal grounds (“shabahim” — illegally present — as such persons are known in the security