Herzliya Conference 2001
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Israel's National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict
Leap of Faith: Israel’s National Religious and the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict Middle East Report N°147 | 21 November 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iv I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Religious Zionism: From Ascendance to Fragmentation ................................................ 5 A. 1973: A Turning Point ................................................................................................ 5 B. 1980s and 1990s: Polarisation ................................................................................... 7 C. The Gaza Disengagement and its Aftermath ............................................................. 11 III. Settling the Land .............................................................................................................. 14 A. Bargaining with the State: The Kookists ................................................................... 15 B. Defying the State: The Hilltop Youth ........................................................................ 17 IV. From the Hills to the State .............................................................................................. -
Israel: Alternative Regional Options in a Changing Middle East
Report June 2013 Israel: alternative regional options in a changing Middle East By Yossi Alpher1 Executive summary Today Israel confronts broad regional security challenges reminiscent of those it faced in the early decades of its existence. Then it responded to the threat posed by the hostile Arab states that surrounded it by developing the “periphery doctrine”. It formed strategic ties with Iran, Turkey and other non-Arab, non- Muslim or geographically distant Arab states and minorities that shared its concerns. The original periphery doctrine ground to a halt between 1973 and 1983 and was in many ways replaced by the Arab-Israel peace process, both bilateral and multilateral. Eventually, the failure to register significant progress toward a solution of the Palestinian issue blunted this momentum. Currently Israel sees itself increasingly ringed by hostile Islamists in Egypt, Gaza, southern Lebanon and probably Syria, as well as non-Arab Turkey and Iran. Once again it confronts the spectre of regional isolation. But it is far better equipped than in the past to deal with a hostile ring of neighbours. Its policy options include not only a “new periphery” (Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Greece and Ethiopia, among others), but also the projection of both soft (particularly economic) and hard power, a search for accommodation with political Islam beginning with Hamas in Gaza, and a partial or comprehensive two-state solution agreement with the West Bank-based PLO. Introduction hostile Arab states motivated by Arab nationalism and led Today Israel confronts broad regional security challenges by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. These neighbouring that in some ways are reminiscent of those it faced in the countries were smarting from a string of military defeats at early decades of its existence. -
A Plan for Allocating Successor Organization Resources
A Plan for Allocating Successor Organization Resources Report of the Planning Committee, Conference On Jewish Material Claims Against Germany June 28, 2000 25 Sivan 5760 1 Rabbi Israel Miller, President, Conference On Jewish Material Claims Against Germany 15 East 26 Street New York, New York Dear Israel, I am pleased to enclose A Plan for Allocating Successor Organization Resources, the report of the distinguished Planning Committee which I have had the honor of chairing. The Committee has completed a thoughtful ten-month process, carefully reviewing the issues and exploring a variety of options before coming to the conclusions contained in this document. We trust that you will bring these recommendations to the Board of Directors of the Claims Conference for review and action. Through this experience, I have become convinced that the work of the Claims Conference is not adequately understood or appreciated. I hope that this report and the results of this planning process will help dispel the confusion about the past and future achievements of the Claims Conference. No amount of money can compensate for the destruction of innocent human beings and thriving communities or the decimation of the Jewish people as a whole by the Nazis. We can try to use available resources - specifically the proceeds of the sale of communal and unclaimed property in the former East Germany - to respond to the most critical needs related to the consequences of the Shoah. This is what the enclosed Plan tries to accomplish. I want to thank the members of the Committee who came from near and far for their attendance and commitment, and for the high quality of their participation. -
Masterscriptie Staats- En Bestuursrecht
Masterscriptie Staats- en Bestuursrecht Het vrije mandaat: feit of fictie? Beperkingen aan fractieafsplitsingen getoetst aan het vrije mandaat van Tweede Kamerleden Auteur A. (Arie) Vonk Noordegraaf LL.B. Studentnummer 3675386 Begeleider prof. mr. R. Nehmelman Datum 22 maart 2017 Sol Iustitiae Illustra Nos - Zon der Gerechtigheid, verlicht ons 2 Voorwoord Maartensdijk, 22 maart 2017 Met het afronden van mijn masterscriptie Staats- en Bestuursrecht komt er einde aan mijn studietijd aan de Universiteit Utrecht. Ik heb de afgelopen jaren enorm veel geleerd en ook genoten van de vele juridische vraagstukken die besproken werden. Na het afronden van de bachelor Rechtsgeleerdheid met een scriptie over de vrijheid van onderwijs was de master Staats- en Bestuursrecht een voor de hand liggende keuze. De master sloot goed aan op mijn (politieke) interesses. Hoewel ik zowel het staatsrecht als het bestuursrecht bestudeerde, ligt mijn hart toch echt bij het staatsrecht. Deze scriptie is daar een bewijs van. Het is mooi om juist in dit voorjaar mijn masterscriptie af te ronden. Het jaar 2017 is in het licht van het onderwerp van deze masterscriptie namelijk een bijzonder jaar. Het is dit jaar precies honderd jaar geleden dat in 1917 het stelsel van evenredige vertegenwoordiging werd ingevoerd. Het jaar 1917 is een keerpunt in de parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland. Enerzijds is dit het begin van de hedendaagse parlementaire democratie. Anderzijds is de invoering van het stelsel van evenredige vertegenwoordiging ook een bedreiging voor het vrije en persoonlijke mandaat van Tweede Kamerleden. De partijmacht wordt groter terwijl individuele Tweede Kamerleden ook in 2017 worden geacht zonder last te stemmen. -
HHRG-115-GO06-Wstate-Goldphdd
Written Testimony Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today’s hearing. A discussion about the Golan Heights today may seem baffling. Increasingly, in recent years, many Israelis have expressed a huge sigh of relief that previous rounds of Israeli-Syrian negotiations did not go anywhere and the Golan remains under Israeli control. They imagine that had these earlier talks been concluded, then in 2011, with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the forces of Jabhat al-Nusra, Da'ish (ISIS), not to mention Assad’s own ruthless forces, would have been be sitting along the coastline of the Sea of Galilee, with their weapons aimed at the city of Tiberius across the lake. What has changed today is that with the imminent victory of the forces of President Bashar Assad in the sector of South Syria, new diplomatic initiatives by outside actors cannot be ruled out. Already in March 2016, the U.N.'s Special Envoy on Syria, Staffan de Mistura, proposed a paper on "Essential Principles of a Political Solution in Syria." The first point of his paper specifically called for "the restoration of the occupied Golan Heights" to Syria. This past February at the Valdai Conference in Moscow, Vitaly Naumkin, the leading Russian authority on Syria insisted that Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights could not be accepted. He raised doubts about its very legality.1 Past US Assurances US recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights would constitute the fulfillment of a series of previous diplomatic assurances given to Israel by past administrations regarding the international status of Israel's position on that strategic plateau. -
Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law International Program
Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law International Program About the Faculty of Law at Bar-Ilan University The Faculty of Law of Bar-Ilan University offers a special international program in En glish where foreign students are invited to study in Israel for the fall semester. Courses are taught by Bar-Ilan’s own law professors, a s well as visiting scholars from the world’s leading law schools. Stude nts in the international program may also sit in on regular Hebr ew-language courses, if their knowledge of Hebrew is sufficient. ersity’s Faculty of Law was founded in 1970 and is today Bar-Ilan Univs leading law schools with over 2,000 students in its one of Israel’M .A. and Ph.D. programs. Classes are supplemented by LL.B., LL.M., y of seminars, workshops and legal clinics. The clinics, a wide varietp rovide free legal services to Israelis who cannot afford Studying law in Israel is a for examplean, excellent way for Israeli students to gain hands-on them and areex perience and develop social responsibility. unique opportunity to watch professional arm community and supportive learning environment, a young society grapple with Through its wty of Law graduates have ranked number one for three the nuances of democratic, Bar-Ilan Faculw in Israel’s Bar Exams. Current head of the Kadima years in a ro sraeli Knesset and former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni as universal rights, while at the party in the I ter of the Environment Gilad Erdan are both graduates same time acknowledging the wofe tllh aes la Mwinis fac ulty, and Justice Minister Yaakov Neeman is one of its founding professors. -
Fathom Journal Issue 22
Fathom Journal Issue 22 DEBORAH FINEBLUM AMOS YADLIN SHABTAI SHAVIT GARY KENT JOEL SINGER NADAV EYAL RAPHAEL ALMAGOR PAUL IDDON JOHN LYNDON LIAM HOARE ADAM LEBOR JAMES SORENE PHILIP MENDES ALAN JOHNSON JOHN STRAWSON YOCHANAN PLESNER ERAN EZTION 1 YADLIN| ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOUR STRATEGIC THREATS ON ISRAEL’S RADAR | A SPECIAL BRIEFING BY FORMER IDF INTELLIGENCE HEAD AMOS YADLIN AMOS YADLIN Speaking at a private forum in late 2018, Director of the Institute for National Security Studies, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin presents an overview of the different regional threats facing Israel as well as the ongoing challenge of the Russian presence in the Middle East. Below is an edited transcript of his remarks. Introduction Israel faces numerous strategic security challenges both on its borders and hundreds of miles away. Its main security challenges come from Hamas in Gaza, Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, Leb- anese Hezbollah, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In order to fully understand the scope of these threats, one must analyse them on a scale of immediacy and severity [see infographic 1]. Hamas is the most immediate threat Israel faces, but the least severe. The next most immediate threat is the Syrian civil war coupled with Iran’s entrenchment in the country. After that comes the medi- um-term threat posed by Hezbollah, a far more severe challenge. The most severe and long-term threat Israel faces is Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This essay will analyse the scope, severity, and im- mediacy of these threats. Infographic 1: Threats to Israel’s National Security 2 FATHOM 22 The threat from Hamas When analysing the situation in Gaza, one cannot disconnect it from Israel’s other three main se- curity challenges – the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah, and the Iranian nuclear threat. -
4537-ZOA Report SP07.P4
report A Publication of the Zionist Organization of America Spring 2007 PUTTING PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY’S MAHMOUD ABBAS INTO FOCUS “It is our duty to implement the principles of Yasser Arafat” INSIDE: ZOA’s JUSTICE LOUIS BRANDEIS ANNUAL DINNER FEATURED: MORT ZUCKERMAN, RONALD LAUDER & JAMES TISCH ZOA NATIONAL CONVENTION ZOA ON THE BAKER REPORT ANSWERING JIMMY CARTER ZOA CAMPUS NETWORK ZOA RESPONDS TO ATTACKS ON PRO-ISRAEL LOBBY 4537-ZOA Report SP07.p6 2/12/07 11:21 AM Page 2 ZOA President’s Message Abbas: Promotes Terrorism – Not Peace Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas – labeled as a “moderate” by both Washington and the media – spoke to a rally of Fatah supporters in Ramallah. His message was for Palestinians to stop killing each other. But rather than merely call for communal peace, he urged them to murder Israeli Jews instead. Abbas called for Palestinians to turn their guns and rifles on Israeli Jews, “saying: “We have a legitimate right to direct our guns against Israeli occupation. It is forbidden to use these guns report against Palestinians. ... Our rifles, all our rifles are aimed at the occupation.” Spring 2007 Iran’s notorious President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have been proud to deliver a speech such as that given by the supposed moderate Abbas. Published by the This was not just a case of one small, revealing statement of extremism from the P.A. leader. On the contrary, in this Zionist Organization of America speech, Abbas praised the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat and other Fatah terrorists killed in attacks on Israelis as Jacob and Libby Goodman ZOA House 4 East 34th Street, New York, NY 10016 “martyrs,” as well as specifically saluting Sheik Ahmed Yassin, one of the founders of the terrorist group Hamas. -
ISRAEL Israel Is a Multiparty Parliamentary Democracy with A
ISRAEL Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy with a population of approximately 7.7 million, including Israelis living in the occupied territories. Israel has no constitution, although a series of "Basic Laws" enumerate fundamental rights. Certain fundamental laws, orders, and regulations legally depend on the existence of a "State of Emergency," which has been in effect since 1948. The 120-member, unicameral Knesset has the power to dissolve the government and mandate elections. The February 2009 elections for the Knesset were considered free and fair. They resulted in a coalition government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israeli security forces reported to civilian authorities. (An annex to this report covers human rights in the occupied territories. This report deals with human rights in Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.) Principal human rights problems were institutional, legal, and societal discrimination against Arab citizens, Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see annex), non-Orthodox Jews, and other religious groups; societal discrimination against persons with disabilities; and societal discrimination and domestic violence against women, particularly in Bedouin society. While trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution decreased in recent years, trafficking for the purpose of labor remained a serious problem, as did abuse of foreign workers and societal discrimination and incitement against asylum seekers. RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life The government or its agents did not commit politically motivated killings. The petitioners withdrew their appeal to the High Court against the closure of the inquiry by the Department for Investigations against Police Officers' (DIPO) into the 2008 beating and subsequent coma and death of Sabri al-Jarjawi, a Bedouin. -
Palestine Water Fact Sheet #1
hrough e t hu ic m t a FACT SHEET s n ju r l i a g i h c t o s THE RIGHT TO WATER IN PALESTINE: A BACKGROUND s 11 C E S R he Israeli confiscation and control of LEGEND ability to manage water resources and just Palestinian water resources is a defining Groundwater flow allocates the limited supply made available by T feature of the Israeli occupation and a LEBANON Groundwater divide Israel, the PWA, rather than the Occupation, is GOLAN major impediment to a just resolution of the Israeli National Water HEIGHTS blamed for water scarcity. Moreover, the Oslo Israel-Palestine conflict. Furthermore, Israel’s Carrier Sea of II agreement does not call for redistribution of control of Palestinian water resources Armistice Demarcation Galilee Line, 1949 existing water sources nor require any undermines any possibility for sustainable Haifa Tiberias Syria-Israel Cease Fire reduction in water extraction or consumption development and violates Palestinians’ human Line, 1967 Nazareth by Israelis or settlers. right to safe, accessible, and adequate drinking Palestinian Territory Occupied by Israel (June n Jenin a water. Israel’s discriminatory water policy 1967) d r • Since 2000, after the onset of the Second o Northern J maintains an unequal allocation of water between Aquifer r e v Intifada in September, the Israeli army has Tu l k a re m i Israel, illegal Israeli settler communities and R intensified the destruction of water infrastruc- Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian Nablus Western ture and confiscation ofwater sources in the 7 territory (oPt), while appropriating an ever greater Te l Av i v Aquifer WEST r BANK West Bank and Gaza. -
The Hamas Military Buildup
The Hamas Military Buildup Kobi Michael and Omer Dostri Notwithstanding the existing tension between Hamas’s political wing and the organization’s military wing, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, over strategic priorities, and in tandem with the ongoing and concentrated effort invested by the military wing in military buildup, there is general agreement throughout the organization on the question of a direct conflict with Israel at the present time. The consensus is that under current conditions, particularly in view of the scale of the casualties and destruction in the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge, another round of fighting now is not in the organization’s interest. Hamas’s military infrastructure was severely damaged in the 2014 conflict, and the Gaza population is in dire straits due to the damage caused to residential buildings and infrastructure. The overall economic situation is extremely difficult, and public criticism is directed at Hamas for inciting a conflict with Israel. Added to these constraints are the restrictions imposed by Egypt on the movement of residents to and from the Gaza Strip in the framework of its struggle against Hamas itself, and as part of its conflict with jihadists active in the Sinai Peninsula, particularly Wilayat Sinai, identified with the Islamic State. The region’s economy has also been affected by the obstruction of the smuggling tunnels on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. In order to avoid another conflict with Israel, Hamas has taken action to prevent attacks against Israel by the jihad factions operating in the Gaza Strip, and the organization has even established a restraining force that prevents shooting incidents from the border area with Israel or makes arrests if shooting incidents occur. -
Israel's Unilateral Withdrawals from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip
Israel’s Unilateral Withdrawals from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip: A Comparative Overview Reuven Erlich Introduction In the last decade, Israel unilaterally withdrew from two areas: the security zone in southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Israel had previously withdrawn unilaterally from occupied territories without political agreements, but these two withdrawals were more significant and traumatic, both socially and politically, than any prior withdrawal. The time that has passed since these unilateral withdrawals affords us some historical perspective and allows us to compare them in terms of their outcomes and the processes they generated, both positive and negative. This perspective allows us to study the larger picture and trace influences that in the heat of the dramatic events were difficult to discern and assess. When looking at Lebanon and Israel’s policies there, my approach is not purely academic or that of an historian who wrote a doctoral thesis on Israeli-Lebanese relations. I participated in some of the events in Lebanon, not as a decision maker but as a professional, whether in the course of my service in Israeli Military Intelligence, both in Tel Aviv and in the Northern Command, or in my position with the Ministry of Defense, as deputy to Uri Lubrani, Coordinator of Government Activities in Lebanon. My perspective today on Lebanon and the Gaza Col. (ret.) Dr. Reuven Erlich is Head of the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC). This essay is based on a lecture delivered at the conference “The Withdrawal from Lebanon: Ten Years Later,” which took place at the Institute for National Security Studies on June 28, 2010.