Defensible Borders to Secure Israel's Future
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DEFENSIBLE BORDERS TO SECURE ISRAEL’S FUTURE Former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff; Maj.-Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan former National Security Advisor Israel’s 1949 Armistice Lines Were compelled to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. As noted elsewhere in this policy study, Israel Indefensible is a tiny country of about 10,000 square miles, approximately the size of New Jersey in the Israel’s fundamental right to “defensible United States or slightly smaller than Belgium. borders” is grounded in the special legal Compounding Israel’s small size is the fact that and strategic circumstances it faced in the 70 percent of its population and 80 percent of aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, when the its industrial capacity are concentrated in the West Bank and other territories were captured. narrow coastal strip sandwiched between the The armistice line of 1949, from which Israel Mediterranean Sea and the West Bank. was attacked, had only been a military boundary between the Israeli and Jordanian To make matters worse, the adjacent hills armies, and not a permanent political border, of the West Bank topographically dominate according to the 1949 Armistice Agreement the coastal plain, which is a relatively flat itself. This provided the background for and exposed area. This provides distinct UN Security Council Resolution 242 of advantages to an attacker for observation, fire, November 1967, which did not call on the and defense from an Israeli ground response. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw And there are many targets located along fully to that line. Instead, it concluded that Israel’s coastal plain: Ben-Gurion International Israel would need “secure and recognized Airport, the Trans-Israel Highway (Route 6) boundaries” which could be different from which runs north-south only tens of meters the indefensible pre-war lines. Prior to 1967, west of the West Bank, Israel’s National Israel’s waistline between its major coastal Water Carrier, and its high-voltage electric cities and the Jordanian-occupied West Bank power lines. If the West Bank were to fall into was approximately eight miles wide at its hostile hands, the resulting situation would narrowest point, and provided no strategic pose a constant threat to Israel’s national depth in case of invasion. infrastructure. Today, it is commonly misunderstood just For this reason, the architects of Israel’s how vulnerable Israel actually was then national security doctrine from Yigal Allon and would become once again if it were to Moshe Dayan to Yitzhak Rabin found 22 Defensible Borders A commercial jetliner (circled) taking off from Ben-Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv as seen from adjacent Palestinian territory in the West Bank. A SA-7 shoulder fired missile or a Kassam rocket fired from this vantage point would stop all commercial aviation into and out of Israel. Dore Gold 23 compelling reasons to insist that it must not IDF is made up largely of reserve units that return to the vulnerable 1967 lines, which need approximately 48 hours to completely only appeared to invite aggression and mobilize. The military formations of the Arab imperil Israel’s future rather than set the states are mostly active-duty units, with a stage for peace. These Israeli leaders sought small role for reserves. Defensible borders will new boundaries that would allow Israel to provide the optimal topographical conditions defend itself, by itself. Thus there emerged for Israel’s active-duty forces to withstand a within the national security establishment ground assault by numerically superior forces a broad consensus that called these new while the mobilization of the reserves is lines “defensible borders” and urged that completed. they be sought in any future negotiations.1 In 2004, the U.S. provided Israel with a letter of The IDF is made up largely assurances recognizing its right to defensible borders; it was signed by President George of reserve units. Defensible W. Bush and was backed by a bi-partisan borders will provide the optimal majority in both houses of the U.S. Congress. topographical conditions for Israel’s active-duty forces to The Threat of Conventional Attack withstand a ground assault by The logic behind Israel’s need for defensible numerically superior enemy forces borders is based on four principal threats: conventional attack; terrorism; mortar and while the mobilization of the rocket fire (as well as ballistic missiles); and reserves is completed. unconventional attacks. When it comes to conventional attack, in contrast to the armed Even after the mobilization of the reserves is forces of the surrounding Arab states, the completed, defensible borders additionally LEBANON Israel’s Geographic and Topographic Vulnerabilities Haifa Opposite a Prospective JORDAN Palestinian State Approximately 40 Miles Jenin › The Israeli coastal plain adjacent Hadera Tulkarem Nablus to the West Bank includes 70% of Israel's population and 80% of its industrial capacity. Netanya 9 Miles Kalkilya Ra'anana Kfar Saba Ramat HaSharon Kfar Qasem Rosh Haayin Giv'at Shmu'el Petah Tikva Giv'atayim El'ad Ramat Gan Kiryat Ono Tel Aviv-Yafo Ben-Gurion International Shoham W EST Holon Airport 6 Miles BANK Bat Yam Rehovot Beit Nehemia Ashdod Ben Shemen ISRAEL Lod Rishon LeTsiyon Ramla Modi'in Ness Tsiyona 24 Defensible Borders provide the IDF with the necessary strategic The Threat of Terrorism depth it requires for managing a defensive battle, in the event Israel comes under attack. Since its foundation, Israel has faced state- Should Israel lack this minimal battle space, supported terrorism emanating from then its deterrence posture will be weakened the entire Middle East region, and this and the propensity of regional armies to consideration is especially relevant today. By initiate a surprise attack will grow, in order to its presence along the eastern perimeter of achieve a decisive outcome against the IDF as the West Bank in the Jordan Valley and the rapidly as possible. Judean Desert, Israel has been able to prevent weapons smuggling and the infiltration of These have been the main considerations for hostile forces. As a result, the West Bank has defensible borders, given that conventional not become a battlefield for global jihadists, Arab war coalitions formed in 1948, 1967, and like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Indeed, 1973 that featured the deployment of Iraqi one of the most important preconditions of expeditionary forces to Israel’s east. Since the a successful counter-insurgency or counter- end of the 1991 Gulf War and the advent of terrorism strategy is isolating the area of peace between Israel and Jordan, this danger conflict in order to cut off any reinforcement has diminished in the near term. Yet no one of hostile forces with manpower and material. can be certain how Iraq will evolve in the long term: perhaps it will become a new Arab As we have seen in Gaza, the inability to democracy seeking peace with Israel – or it prevent precisely this flow of weapons and might become a satellite state of Iran, seeking manpower has been the source of years of to spread Iranian influence in the Arab world. attacks, instability, and diplomatic problems. No one can be certain how the alliances and alignments of states in the Middle East will evolve in the years ahead. Israel cannot plan its security around a snapshot of the current The Threat of Rocket and Mortar Middle Eastern political situation, but rather Fire must take into account several possible scenarios for the evolution of the region. Should terrorist forces in the West Bank employ mortars or rockets, as they have in It should be stressed that guaranteeing Gaza, Israel’s interior would be fully exposed. its security in the event of a massive Given the fact that the West Bank virtually conventional attack will remain critical for overlooks Israel’s main cities, sitting several Israel, since even today, in the age of missile thousand feet above major population proliferation, wars are ultimately decided centers such as Tel Aviv, it is critical to avert by the movement of armies and not by the the introduction of mortars, rockets, and employment of air strikes alone. Factually, surface-to-air missiles into the West Bank. This the massive airpower employed by the is not just a theoretical concern or based only United States against Iraq in both 1991 and on a worst-case analysis: Al-Qaeda launched in 2003 did not bring Saddam Hussein’s an SA-7 shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missile regime to agree to the terms demanded by at an Israeli commercial airliner in Mombasa, the UN Security Council. Only the movement Kenya, in 2002. Since then, Hamas has made of coalition ground forces deep into Iraqi a determined effort to smuggle anti-aircraft territory ended the conflict. As long as missiles into Gaza. ground forces remain the decisive element in determining the outcome of wars, then Short-range rockets pose a particular the conditions affecting land warfare, like challenge for Israel, rendering the little terrain, topography, and strategic depth, land that Israel possesses as a particularly will continue to be vital elements of Israeli important defensive barrier. Ironically, the national security. Indeed, most of Israel’s powerful long-range rockets possessed by neighbors still stress the role of heavy armor neighboring states are less of a problem than in their order of battle, making land warfare a short-range rockets would be in the West major component of the Middle East military Bank. Long-range rockets are expensive and balance of power.2 require large launching pads or vehicles that Uzi Dayan 25 are easily identifiable. Short-range rockets, together averages about 40 miles from the and even shorter-range mortars, are much Mediterranean to the Jordan River.