C Iv Il S O Cie Ty a G a in St C O Rru P Tio N
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Civil Society Against Corruption POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSISPOLITICAL problem in spite of the several spite proclaimed several inof the measures governments problem to by evolved on the control of corruption if not why and what can notbe corruption and done. evolvedofwhat ifwhy control on the democracy in Africa. On the other hand, corruption continues to be in democracya corruption Africa. On other hand, the Cooperation, the Romanian Academic andthe Romanian Hertie Society, Cooperation, the Ghana on one hand, since its return to democratic 1993 on onesince rule has inGhana return to hand, its curb it. This paper hence seeks to explore the question; has Ghanapaper question;to the seeksexplore Thishence it. curb CORRUPTION INGHANA CORRUPTION experienced a continuous growth in consolidating continuous its growth in democracy; experienced a leading it to be one of the most referred to to success referred most the to of it be stories of leading one Sponsored by the Norwegian Agency by theAgency Norwegian Development Sponsored for A report by Fortune Agbele Agbele byFortune report A OF School of Governanceof School i . Student Master Thesis Advisor Partner Institution Fortune Agbele Alina Mungiu-Pippidi NORAD Master of Public Policy Fredrik Eriksson, Class of 2011 Senior Advisor Statement of Authorship I hereby certify that this Master Thesis has been composed by myself and describes my own work, unless otherwise acknowledged in the text. All references and verbatim extracts have been properly quoted and all sources of information have been specifically and clearly acknowledged. DATE: April 9th, 2011 ii Abbreviations AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary PNDC Provisional National Defense Council Council ARIC Audit Report Implementation PPA Public Procurement Act Committee PUFMARP Public Financial BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Management Reform Program Index SFO Serious Fraud Office CCU Commercial Crimes Unit WGI Worldwide Governance CDD Center for Democratic Indicator Development CHRAJ Commission for Human Right and Administrative Justice CID Criminal Investigation Department CPI Corruption Perception Index CPP Convention People’s Party CSO Civil Society Organization DCE District Chief Executives EOCOEconomic and Organized Crimes Office FAA Financial Administration Act FAR Financial Administration Regulation GII Ghana Integrity Initiative GIR Global Integrity Report GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammarbeit ICRG International Country Risk Guide IEA Institute for Economic Affairs NDC National Democratic Congress NPP National Patriotic Party PAC Public Accounts Committee iii Table of Content 1. Executive Summary 1 2. Introduction 3 Theoretical Framework 4 Approach and Methodology 6 Structure 7 Limitations of the study 8 3. Control of Corruption 9 Ghana on Corruption Indices 15 Ghana’s Performance compared to Regional Average 19 4. Diagnosis 20 Neo-Patrimonial Regime in Ghana 20 Competitive Particularism in Ghana 22 Power Distribution 23 Rent and State Ownership 24 Distribution of Public Goods 27 Distinction between Public and Private Spheres 28 5. Dimension of Effective Anti Corruption !ec"anism 30 Power Discretion 31 Material Resource 33 Constraints 34 Legal 34 Normative 37 Institutional 38 6. Drivers of Change Analysis and #essons #eant $% Drivers of Change Analysis 48 Lessons Learnt 51 Bibliography 54 Annex 58 1& Executive Summary Political Context Ghana on one hand, since its return to democratic rule in 1993 has experienced a continuous growth in consolidating its democracy; leading it to be one of the most referred to success stories of democracy in Africa. On the other hand, corruption continues to be a problem in spite of the several proclaimed measures by governments to curb it. This paper hence seeks to explore the question; has Ghana evolved on the control of corruption if not why and what can be done. Main Findings Although data from the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) on the control of corruption shows that the country has in the last five to six years progressed from the 50th to the 75th percentile, a deeper look into other indicators like the Bertelsmann Transformation Index on resource efficiency and the Afro barometer surveys indicate that the recorded changes in the fight against corruption are not substantive. This has also been substantiated by data gathered by the author through expert interviews. Evidence presented in this study partly attributes this relatively poor performance in the fight against corruption to how politics relates to governance in the country. The author argues that although Ghana’s transition to pluralism managed to introduce competition into the selection of governing parties, it did not however result in governance based on ethical universalism. Prior to the return to pluralism, access to and the distribution of power were closed, but only opened to those within the ruling elite. And although the return to democratic rule in the 1990s led to more groups getting involved in the contestation for power, access is still limited. Currently, power alternates only between the two major parties; moreover once a political party takes office; all top public appointments tend to be limited to members from the winning party; an all inclusive government is hardly formed. This creates an environment conducive for the system to be played out to favor those in the ruling group; rent seeking opportunities for instance are easily created and exploited to their advantage. Findings from this study also show that the situation is even aggravated by the fact that the country is very low on incumbent accountability, and low on the implementation of the many anticorruption laws. There is also very low normative constraint; for instance ordinary citizens hardly mobilize themselves to demand for a more accountable and transparent governance. However, one positive finding is that, the media and civil society organizations in the country are very vibrant and have been at the forefront in the fight against corruption. Lessons Learnt Lesson 1: The consistent progress in consolidating democracy in Ghana has not led to a corresponding progress in the fight against corruption. There is therefore the need for agents who have contributed to the country’s success in the consolidation of democracy to also aim at helping the country to end governance by particularistic norms. Lesson 2: Measures aimed at establishing an anticorruption legal framework should go beyond just ensuring the passage of anticorruption bills to the proper and effective implementation of these frameworks. The CSOs and the media can be supported to constantly publish blacklist of public officials who have not complied with anticorruption laws, and also to bring up law suits against government when it fails to properly implement these laws. Lesson 3: The lack of an effective accountability or system for proper check and balances on governments create a field day for corrupt agents. Agents like the media and the CSOs could be strengthened to make the government more accountable. The CSOs can engage in project aimed at tracing how allocated public fund are spent. Lesson 4: The CSOs and the media in Ghana have been imperative agents in the fight against corruption, and as such they need to be supported to enhance their effectiveness. External stakeholders can help these agents through funding, and supporting training and capacity building programs to enable them serve as effective watchdogs on governments. 2&Introduction Corruption continues to be a global menace in spite of the many campaigns aimed at curbing it. Within the Sub-Saharan African region, corruption has been considered as one of the key factors undermining development (Uneke, 2010). In the case of Ghana the situation is not any different; the political history of the country (Ayee, 2000; Heidenheimer, 2009; Mukum Mbaku, 2004) shows that corruption got rooted since the early days after independence (and this may have even been the case during the colonial era). Virtually any government that takes office tends to engage in the various forms of corruption like patronage, and nepotism. The situation unfortunately has not changed despite a history of the use of both radical and civil measures to address it. The last two military interventions (in 1979 and 1981 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council headed by the Flight – Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings) in the politics of the country were all partly done to end corruption (Ayee, 2000). However due to the already entrenched nature of the phenomenon in the political system, the governments that took office after the coups ended up being corrupt themselves. For example, the Provisional National Defense Council1 (whose leadership conducted both coups), which took over after the 1981 coup was later found not to have been “corruption-free”. Some members of this party were for instance named to be among officials who had received bribes from the UK civil engineering company, Maybey and Johnson, so as to influence the issuing of public contracts2. Since the return to democratic rule in 1993, Ghana has experienced a consistent growth in the consolidation of its democracy. The term democracy as used in this study looks beyond Schumpeter’s minimal procedural definition which implies the existence of a free and fair election, political right and civil liberties to also include elements from Merkel’s vision of embedded democracy3. In addition to the consistent effort to consolidate democracy, governments that have taken office since the