Formal and Substantive Voluntarism in the Work of Talcott Parsons: A Theoretical and Ideological Reinterpretation Author(s): Jeffrey C. Alexander Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 177-198 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094698 Accessed: 24/09/2008 15:50

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http://www.jstor.org FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM IN THE WORK OF TALCOTT PARSONS: A THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL REINTERPRETATION*

JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER University of California, Los Angeles

American Sociological Review 1978, Vol. 43 (April):177-198

Contemporary discussions of Parsons's thought have faltered because they are insufficiently generalized. Only after his theoretical and epistemological logic has been explored, for exam- ple, can his more specific, ideological purpose be correctly understood. Parsons's theoretical ambition has been to resolve long-standing antinomies in social thought. His theory, to the degree it succeeds, formulates two central points: the social basis of individual autonomy and the multidimensional basis of social order. These positions present the heart of Parsons's formal theory. In his analysis of historical development as differentiation-cultural, structural, and psychological-Parsons combines this formal logic with an ideological commitment to the expansion of individual freedom and conscious control. Incorporating elements of liberal, idealist, and materialist arguments, he outlines a theory of substantive voluntarism that is, potentially, neither conservative nor static. Considered as a whole, Parsons's theory contains serious contradictory strains. Nevertheless, his analysis of formal and substantive freedom represents a major contribution to social thought.

The charismaticpower of a greatthinker the case of Durkheim.As a forceful figure raises to a heightened pitch the normal both intellectually and personally, Durk- level of irrationality produced by para- heim created a powerful sociological digm conflict. In defense against such a school which followed Durkheimian powerful intellectual center, there theory in a manner which greatly ex- emerges alongside the usual thrusts of tended its scope and application but did serious theoreticalcombat an antagonistic little to articulate its foundations or to tradition of misinformed, often trivial, clarify its critical weaknesses (Clark, sometimes grossly distorted commentary 1973). At the same time, Durkheim's that attempts to present itself, and is theory was subject to a barrage of what partly accepted as, critical truth. At the was often distorted and tendentious criti- same time, the attractive power of this cism, directed not only towards his center is such that those who follow the theoretical conceptions but in addition thinkerprove unable to present an objec- towards his ideologicalinvolvement in the tive critical evaluation of his intellectual reconstruction of the French republic contributions. Only with the passage of (Lukes, 1972). Only in the late 1930s and time, as the center loses its immediate the 1940s, with the work of sociologists power, can a perspective which is both like Parsons and Merton and an- critical and appreciative be attained and thropologists like Radcliffe-Brown and the thinker's permanent contributions to Evans-Pritchard-and, indeed, after the intellectualtradition be properlyassessed. decline of almost all literalistic We can observe this tortuous path of Durkheimianism-was the attempt begun assimilation in the reception of Marx's to reappropriate Durkheim's theoretical work and Weber's, but the process seems work. And only in the last decade has the particularly striking, and particularly debate about his ideological perspective apropos of the subject of this essay, in been sufficiently separatedfrom the rigid radical/conservativedichotomy to enable the true humanitarianand progressive im- * Many of the ideas in this essay have germinated in conversation with Robert N. Bellah, Neil J. petus of his work to be understood Smelser, and PhilippeNonet. I would like to express (Lukes, 1972: Chaps. 17, 26; Giddens, my gratitudeand appreciation. 1971:Chap. 7; Marks, 1974;Bellah, 1973). 177 178 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW A remarkablysimilar process of assimi- sons's work would involve exploring a lation and its vicissitudes appears to be wide range of diverse issues. In the the fate of Talcott Parsons's work. After present context I will limit my focus to an initialperiod of the inflationof his intel- only one aspect of the problem; namely, lectual prestige and the creation-of a large to the issues of voluntarismin Parsons's number of distinguishedfollowers, there thought.2 After elaborating, in a con- emerged a second period during which it densed manner, the nature of Parsons's suffered an intensification of the same theoretic-epistemicposition on this issue, kind of distortedcritical appraisalon both I will demonstrateits relevance for practi- the theoretical and ideological levels. cal sociological work by indicating how There have been recent indications that a Parsons combines his commitmentsin this more balanced sort of critical assessment realm with the ideological and empirical is in the process of emerging, as thinkers positions which govern his theory of so- of differenttheoretical and political tradi- cial change. I will call the position Parsons tions have returnedto Parsons's work and has articulatedon the theoretic-epistemic argued for the centrality and significance level his "formal voluntarism" and its of its central concerns (Atkinson, 1972: empirical-ideological articulation, his 1-143; Jessop, 1972;Gintis, 1969;Rocher, commitmentto the standardof "substan- 1975; Bershady, 1973; Turner, 1974: tive voluntarism." 15-76, 193-210; Turner and Beeghley, In social theory, the issue of volun- 1974; Lipset, 1975; Johnson, 1976; Men- tarismrevolves, on the most generallevel, zies, 1977; Alexander, 1979). It is as a around two long-standing debates, the contribution to this theoretical and arguments over nominalism vs. realism, ideological reassessment that this essay is and subjectivism vs. objectivism (Aristo- intended. tle, 1962: Bk. 7, 3, 4; Plato, 1945: 80-5, 88-92, 321-36; Augustine, 1948:Chap. 14; Halevy, 1901-1904; Stark, 1962; Sartre, MISINTERPRETATION AND THE VOLUNTARISM PROBLEM sons's functionalcommitment has had an important The sociological conventional wisdom impact on his theoretical system, the influence has has pegged Parsons as a functionalist, an been on the level of model ratherthan on the level of equilibrium or consensus theorist, an epistemic presuppositions-a level which, because ideologist. Such characterizations have of its greatergenerality, is theoreticallymore signifi- cant. Furthermore,even as a model, the functional been promoted not only by his critics system provides wide limits of flexibility which can but often by his supporters as well in no sense be associated with propositions about (Lockwood, 1956; Coser, 1956; Dahren- empirical equilibriumor conflict, or with notions dorf, 1958; 1959; Mills, 1959; Martindale, about idealism-materialism,individualism-sociolo- 1960; Gouldner, 1967; 1970; Rex, 1961; gism, conservatism-radicalism-ashas so often been assumed(Sztompka, 1968; 1974; Stinchcombe, 1968: Foss, 1963; Friedrichs, 1970; Wallace, Chap. 3; Smelser, 1972; Hobsbawm, 1973; Lipset, 1969; Bottomore, 1974; Levy, 1952; 1975). This literature indicates that the notion of Smelser, 1959; Mayhew, 1968b; Rocher, system is an open one, which assumes a particular 1975; Johnson, 1973; 1975; Lipset, 1975; content only in relation to specific theoretic- Zule epistemic, ideological, and empiricalcommitments. Baum, 1976; Loubser, 1976; Van Little significantunderstanding of the varied course Slabbert, 1976). None of these descrip- of Parsons'sintellectual development can be derived tions, however, is sufficientlygeneralized from studying his theory's functionalist aspects, to comprehendParsons's most fundamen- whereas a great deal of that variationcan be illumi- tal theoretical contribution. This lies, I nated by focusing on its theoretic-epistemicassump- would more in the realm of what tions. argue, 2 Though voluntarismplays a crucial role in Par- mightbe called sociological epistemology, sons's work, it should not be consideredthe master in the formulation of a distinctive epis- key that unlocks his entire theory. For a fuller dis- temological position and in its translation cussion of the different levels involved in his into the realm of sociological explana- analysis-and a methodologicaljustification for the I distinction between the theoretic-epistemical, tion. To fully illuminatethis realm of Par- ideological, and empiricallevel of sociological dis- course which I assume here-see Alexander(1979: ' For example, while there is no doubt that Par- Vol. 2, Pt. 3; and Vol. 1, Chap. 2). FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 179 1968; Martindale, 1960; Hughes, 1958; thought can be regardedas involving two Habermas, 1973a; Wilson, 1970). Par- great traditions (Ekeh, 1974): the indi- sons's position on these questions has vidualist (nominalist) and collectivist been as radically misinterpreted as his (realist), each of which in turn includes position on the less generalized issues of both romantic(subjectivist) and rationalist system models, consensus theory, and (objectivist) strands. To correctly com- ideological commitments. Basically two prehend one majorthrust of Parsons's in- kinds of charges have been made. Accord- tellectual project, and certainly to pene- ing to one strand of the critical literature, trate his most importantcontributions, his oriented to the nominalist-realistdebate, writing must be viewed as a vigorous Parsons is decidedly an antivoluntarist. dialoguewith each of these traditions.We These critics portray Parsons's writings, will see that in his formal, theoretic- particularlyhis later ones, as concerned epistemic work, Parsons sought to articu- only with the organic whole, as taking an late a structure for social action that as- antiindividualist, determinist position cribed voluntarismto the influence of sub- (Scott, 1963;Martindale, 1960; Friedrichs, jective ideal elements, which are intern- 1970; Atkinson, 1972; Pope, 1973; Men- alized by the individual and which allow zies, 1977). The other critical strand, him or her autonomy vis-h-vis material oriented to the subjective-objectiveques- constraints. In this manner, Parsons re- tion, takes a rathercontradictory position. jects the nominalist notion that freedom According to these critics, Parsons is an involves the complete lack of constraint. idealist who envisions no significantcon- On the other hand, in his application of straints on individual action (Lockwood, this position to concrete empirical situa- 1956; Dahrendorf, 1959; Gouldner, 1970; tions, Parsonshas utilizedthis structureto Heydebrand, 1972). For critics of the first articulate a model of historical develop- persuasion, Parsons's stand on the ment keyed to the standardof individual subjective-objective issue is irrelevant; control over both materialand ideal con- what matters is simply that he postulates straints. Parsons's relation to these two supraindividualconstraint per se (Atkin- critical traditions, in other words, at- son, 1972: 1-145). For critics of the sec- tempts to achieve a dialectical kind of ne- ond persuasion, however, it is Parsons's gation, an aufhebung which preserves position on the nominal-realist, or kernels of theoretical truth while it tran- individual-society, question which is un- scends the theoreticalposition as a whole. important.For them, Parsons's emphasis on norms in itself commits him to an un- acceptable degree of voluntarism.On one FORMAL VOLUNTARISM: THE matter, however, both of these critiques THEORETIC-EPISTEMIC SYNTHESIS are in agreement: Parsons's failings, whatever they may be, are vitally con- nected to his ideological conservatism. The Individualist Tradition The great contradictionbetween these The most important source for Par- two critical positions should alert us to sons's explicit emphasis on voluntarismis their problematicstatus. In the following, the individualiststrands of Enlightenment I will demonstrate that both of these thought. These are the traditions which critiques are mistaken, not only in their stand at the heart of nineteenth century characterization of Parsons's theoretic- liberalideology and emphasizefree will as epistemic position, but in their ideological the principalethical criterion of freedom. critique as well. In its social scientific form, this ideologi- What neither group of critics has seen, cal point is transposedinto a distinctively apparently,is the synthetic nature of Par- individualistictheoretical position, which sons's theoreticalintention, the mannerin perceives social action as initiatedby, and which a major segment of his work has society as resting upon, discrete individuals been directed, from the beginning,toward who are free to pursue their interest as bridgingthese fundamentaltheoretical di- they have defined it. Historically, in terms lemmas (see Devereux, 1961). Western of nineteenth century thought, this indi- 180 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW vidualist social science was articulatedby of their situation.If what appearsto be the neo-Kantian and Utiltarian theory individualexpression of free will is actu- (Martindale,1960:216-66; Halevy, 1901- ally the determinationof a certain type of 1904). In contemporary terms, the indi- social force, namely, normative sym- vidualist tradition manifests itself in the bolism, it is at the same time a very differ- sociological schools of symbolic inter- ent kind of social force than that exercised actionism, exchange theory, and by materialconditions. Parsons's point, in phenomenological and existentialist so- other words, is that in order to preserve ciology, all of which consider the free- the voluntarismof the individualiststrain dom of the individualperson as the start- of social thought, any conception of mate- ing point for theoretical analysis. rial forces as the exclusive determinants Parsons's response to this tradition of social action must be overcome. "The arguesthat its voluntarismis based upon a voluntaristic system," Parsons (1937:82) radical misunderstandingof the theoreti- writes, "does not in the least deny an cal role of the concept "individual," a important role to conditional . . . non- problem which he attributes to a normative elements." It does, however, metamethodologicalproblem; namely, the "consider . . . them as interdependent empiricistconfusion of concrete and ana- with the normative." lytic frames of reference (Parsons, 1937: The originality of this aspect of Par- 72-4, 87-125; see also Whitehead, 1925; sons's contribution,which has been thor- Schwanenberg, 1971; 1976; Fararo, 1976; oughly misconstrued by interpreters Burgher, 1977; Parsons, 1970a).The con- within the individualisttradition, is, then, crete individual,i.e., the living, breathing, his comprehension of the essential com- visible person, is of course free and au- patibilityof an emphasis on voluntary in- tonomous in a certain limited sense. This dividual will with a collectivist emphasis describes the picture of the individualin on normative interpenetration.It was, in society described by the nominalist crit- fact, precisely to achieve this synthesis ics. But when such empiricism is pene- that Parsons (1937:343-409)in The Struc- trated, when this person is viewed ana- ture of Social Action launched his at- lytically rather than concretely, we can tack on Durkheim's unsophisticated see that he is, in fact, a composite of sociologism. After this critique, Parsons differentsocial forces, the most important could fully accept Durkheim'sinsight that of which are the symbolic forces which the reconciliationbetween individualand contain normative elements. Since these society could be achieved only by accept- elements are internalized,they are in em- ing certain elements-norms-of the pirical concrete terms invisible: hence, idealist position, a position often associ- when we look at an individualperson, he ated with political conservatism. Yet con- appears to be discrete when in fact he is trary to conservative theory, Parsons re- interpenetratedwith other individualsby jected the individualistperspective while virtue of shared symbolic norms. It is at pointedly retaininga voluntaristicempha- this point that Parsons arrives at his great sis. Parsons criticized Durkheim for ob- insight into the voluntary quality of ac- fuscating this voluntarism, but he did so tion. He reasons that if no individualcan only in order to formulate more effec- actuallybe free of constraintin the radical tively Durkheim's proposition that indi- sense propoundedby individualisttheory, vidualism, in an ideological sense, need then what we normally perceive as free, not imply individualism in a theoretical intentional activity must in fact involve one (Giddens, 1972:364;Bellah, 1973a). the actor's applicationof an internalnor- Contraryto conventional wisdom, it is mative standardof judgment. this solution to the individualistproblem, If the fact of normative internalization this attemptto articulatevoluntary action, eliminatesthe pure voluntarismof the per- that constitutes one part, and by far the fectly free will, it simultaneouslyimplies most conspicuous part, of Parsons's voluntarismof a more limitedyet nonethe- famous solution to the problem of order. less significanttype: the autonomy of in- Normative interpenetrationis induced by dividuals vis-a'-vis the material elements two individuals sharing or internalizinga FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 181 common symbol. Symbols are invariably deed, if Parsons's theory of action was organized into certain kinds of patterns, limited to the elements discussed thus far, that is, into nonrandom kinds of ar- this criticism would be a telling one, and rangements. For this reason, Parsons Parsons's theory would have to be con- states that just as a discrete individualis sidered a variation, albeit a sophisticated an impossible social fact, so is nonordered and voluntarist one, of the idealist tradi- social action...Symbolic interpenetration tion along the same lines as Durkheim's means that a certain element of order work. This, however, is not the case. We exists between individuals(Parsons, 1937: will see, in fact, that Parsons's theory of 59-60, 94-6, 314, 337, 738-9; see also formal voluntarism embraces and tran- Levine, 1969). Order means nonrandom- scends both major variants of the collec- ness, not equilibrium. tivist tradition. In additionto the confusion of order and equilibrium, there have been two other kinds of criticism of Parsons's theory of The Collectivist Tradition order, both of which involve misinterpre- In addition to incorporatingthe indi- tations so basic as effectively to turn his vidualist theory associated with nine- theory on its head. The first type of teenth century liberalism and the norma- critique equates Parsons's use of order tive emphasis associated with romanti- with an emphasis on conformity or cism, Parsons's synthesis is also intended passivity. Yet to make such an equation, to subsume theoretical strandsmost often as the preceding argument has demon- associated today with certain kinds of ex- strated, is to misconstruethe entire thrust change and Marxianapproaches-in par- of Parsons's work and to commit the very ticular the perception of individual free- theoretical error which his own formula- dom as dependenton certain kinds of sup- tion of individual action was intended to raindividualmaterial conditions. Yet, as circumvent. Parsons's point, of course, is in the case of individualist theory, this that whether independentor passive, ac- incorporationis partial and accompanied tion always involves an internalizedcom- by a formal theoretical critique. In The ponent. It is, therefore, perfectly consis- Structure of Social Action and throughout tent that such criticisms of the order his later work, Parsons (1937:87-125) theory have been associated with the labels the exclusive emphasis on material nominalist, individualist tradition, which conditions the "Hobbesian tradition"and' views Parsons's emphasis on suprain- he devotes himself to illuminatingits in- dividual force inherently antivoluntary herent weaknesses, not by referring to (Pope, 1973;Cohen et al., 1975;Atkinson, some problem of order and consensus, 1972:181,213; Bendix, 1970:121). and certainly not by weighing its ideologi- The other type of criticism levelled it cal merit, but ratherby analyzingthe fail- Parsons's theory of order differs radically ures of its sociological epistemology. Par- from the preceding by contending that sons develops his critique primarily Parsons's formulationactually allows too through a discussion of variants of much voluntarism rather than too little. nineteenth century social Darwinism. To This accusation usually is made by mate- make our analysis more contemporary, rialist critics who themselves oppose the we will take some literary license and individualistic strand of social theory. illustrateParsons's reasoning, in a manner Their attack, therefore, focuses on the in which Parsons himself does not, with ideal elements in Parsons's order proposal reference to the Marxist version of the rather than on his emphasis on suprain- Hobbesian tradition. In doing so, we will dividualorder per se. By relatingaction to further indicate the tension between internal normative elements, it is said, ideological and theoretic-epistemic ap- Parsonshas ignoredthe very type of supra- proaches to freedom. individual social forces which constrain A fundamental irony of the Marxian action ratherthan facilitate it (Lockwood, strand of the socialist tradition is that, 1956; Pahrendorf, 1959; Rex, 1961:78- while its theory of materialconstraints has 155; Gouldner, 1970; Burgher, 1977). In- vastly increased our insight into the requi- 182 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW sites for voluntary action, its theory of ity with the libertarian aspirations of social action-at least action before the Marx's socialist theory. Because of its achievement of a truly Communist so- similarly rationalist perspective on moti- ciety-perceives actions as being exter- vation, realpolitik theory also perceives nally determined,and holds that the struc- social processes as determinedby condi- ture of objective factors squashes the tions which are over and above the volun- human potential for intentional action or taristic control of ethical norms (Aron, praxis. Aside from the ideological reasons 1971; Mommsen, 1971). for such a position, Marx's denial of vol- Parsons's strategy vis-h-vis such collec- untarismin capitalist society has two fun- tivist instrumentalismis to transform its damental causes which are theoretically problematicelements while incorporating sui generis. In the first place, voluntarism these features that are compatible with a is impossible because Marx's theory re- voluntaristicposition. To accomplish this mains implicitly committed to a concrete task, Parsons (1937:91-4, 99-100, 106, perception of the individualactor, which 109, 290-1, 344-9, 508-9, 576, 658) refers means that freedom can be portrayedonly back to his earlier solution of the indi- as a condition in which external, material vidual and order problems and, simulta- constraint is actually abolished. In the neously, moves to fill out this earlier for- realm of scarcity, therefore, freedom is mulationby embracingelements from the not possible. However, the antivoluntarist materialisttradition. Relying on this first implicationof the Marxiantheory of free- formulation, Parsons can state that be- dom does not derive primarilyfrom this cause action is symbolically guided and concrete perception of the individualper internallydirected, it contains a normative se. Rather, it stems more from Marx's component and therefore cannot be re- commitment to a certain perception of duced to a reflex of external materialcon- that individual'smotivation; namely, a ra- ditions. But by also orientinghimself in a tionalist one-once again, a theoretical positive way to the materialisttradition, commitmentthat holds only for the period Parsons completes this earlier construc- of capitalist and socialist scarcity. The tion by assertingthat this symbolic action same tradition that emphasizes material always occurs within a conditional conditions portrays human action vis-a- environmentof materialfacts which pro- vis these forces as thoroughlyutilitarian. duces pressure for the pursuit of efficient Therefore, although Marx envisions means. The key intellectual figure in this human action as potentially voluntary, as final element of Parsons's theoretical syn- praxis, he conceived the capitalist pro- thesis is Weber, who outlined a method cesses of objectification, alienation, and for carrying forward Marx's materialist fetishism as reducing the scope of action concerns without the latter's exclusive purely to a focus on means to the exclu- emphasis on instrumentalism.It was for sion of ends. this reason that, despite his own inconsis- It is here that Parsons's second great tency in applying this method, Weber insight in The Structure of Social Action constituted, along with Durkheim, not comes into play. He argues that such an only a principalreference in The Structure exclusive focus on technical rationality of Social Action, but a continuing source reduces ends to the status of means. As a of theoretical and empirical guidance for result, the internationalelement of action Parsons throughoutthe rest of his career. is eliminated and determinationby condi- It is Weber's voice we hear, not Durk- tions becomes all-pervasive (see Halevy, heim's, in Parsons's protest that a volun- 1901-1904). The logic here is fundamen- tarist theory must be resolutely anti- tally theoretic-epistemic rather than idealist. Whereas "the voluntaristic type ideological or empirical. It implies, in of theory involves a process of interaction other words, that by virtue of its in- between normative and ideal elements," strumentalistposition, Marxiantheory is Parsons (1937:82, 466) writes, "at the in the same logical camp as theories of idealist pole the role of conditional ele- political Hobbesianism or realpolitik, de- ments disappears . . . and 'action' be- spite the latter's ideological incompatibil- comes a process of emanation. . . . FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 183 Parsons's (1937:77) definition of the unit The Structure of Social Action. In his act, the basic element of social life, is middleperiod, he developed this approach thoroughlymultidimensional: much further, in the analysis of allocation instru- In a unit act there are identifiable as and integration, the dichotomy of minimum characteristics the following: (1) mental and expressive action, the differ- an end, (2) a situation,analyzable in turninto entiation of cultural, social and person- (a) means and (b) conditions, and (3) at least ality systems, the notions of cultural one selected standardin terms of which the generalizationand organizationalspecifi- end is relatedto the situation[i.e., a norm]. cation, the analysis of patternvariables as characterizing both cultural and organ- izational patterns, and in his analyses of rhe Theoretical Synthesis and Parsons's the socialization of autonomy (Parsons Program and Shils, 1951:53-110; Parsons, 1951; Action may be described, in other 1954; 1955; 1964). In his later work, he words, as both instrumentaland norma- continued the search for synthesis in his tive. In terms of the subjective-objective A-G-I-L formulation, which concep- debate, action's voluntarist quality is tualized society as resting on the interac- preserved by the latter, its determinist tion of four subsystems: economics, poli- quality by the former. In terms of the tics, integration and value maintenance. nominalist-realistdebate, action is both Despite the widespreadbelief to the con- individualand social. Individualaction is trary, this new vocabulary represents not ordered by the patterning of normative so much an effort to articulatethe logic of symbols and by the organizationof mate- functional systems per se, but an attempt rial constraints. Yet, since normativepat- to delineate in a systematic manner the terns are internalized,a significantcause degrees of materialand ideal focus in any of any action rests with the willed be- social system. In his formulationsof the havior of the concrete individual. concrete media representing each such In order to understandfully this attempt analytic dimension of interchange be- at theoreticalsynthesis, it is vital to assess tween subsystems, Parsons carriedthis in- its peculiar status in Parsons's work. By terrelationship to its most refined level transformingthe distinctive elements of (Parsons et al., 1953; Parsons and individualist, idealist, and materialist Smelser, 1956; Parsons, 1969:157-522; theory into a broaderwhole, Parsons's in- 1967:385-520; Parsons and Platt, 1973). tention has been to delineate the structure of action and society apartfrom any of its SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM: particular manifestations, in the same THE IDEOLOGICAL-EMPIRICAL manner that Chomsky has focussed on SYNTHESIS generativegrammar as the universalstruc- ture of language (Chomsky, 1968; Ber- A theory of formal voluntarism is shady, 1973). In Parsons's (1937:733)own necessary but not sufficientfor a theory of terms, the elements of action he has ar- substantive voluntarism because such a ticulated have phenomenological status, substantive theory is linked not only to in Husserl's sense. Accordingto this ana- presuppositionsabout theoretic-epistemic lytic perspective, voluntarismis a formal strategy but also to explicit ideological propertyof action; it does not depend on standardsand propositions about the em- the particularhistorical nature of the ideal pirical world. Parsons's approachto sub- and material conditions which constrain stantive voluntarism is embodied in his it. theory of social change as differentiation. A major part of Parsons's intellectual This change theory has been widely misin- effort has been devoted to developing this terpreted. It has long been argued, of understandingof the formal structure of course, that Parsons does not have a multidimensionalcausality and value in- theory of systemic change at all. Recently, ternalizationinto a fully elaboratedtheory however, in response to the voluminous of social life. We have dealt here mainly scholarly writing on differentiation, the with his first and classic formulation in anti-Parsoniancritique has evolved into 184 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW an argument that the functionalist ap- that the concrete person exercises au- proach to change is, in fact, overly sys- tonomy vis-h-vis both the normative and temic (Smith, 1973). On the other side conditionalaspects of his situation.To de- of the debate, Parsons (1967; 1970b; termine the degree of autonomy of the 1971c:27)himself has tried to describe his concrete person, however, Parsons (1967) approach to change as being completely must examine the nature of its collective nonideological, as basing its analysis of constraints. Just as Parsons accepts the evolving social structures exclusively on individualisticposition in his substantive, the criteria of which structures bring if not his formaltheory, so too he incorpo- greateradaptive capacity to the social sys- rates the collectivist ideological commit- tem. Neither of these interpretations is ments to freedom into his substantive valid. Once again, we must step outside theory while rejecting its formal theoreti- the polarizationbetween Parsons and his cal framework. Whereas in the formal critics to gain the proper perspective. theory, Parsons's challenge is the task of We have seen that Parsons criticallyre- interweavingnorms and conditions, in his formulatesthe theoretic-epistemiccontent substantive theory his concern becomes of the rationalist, progressive strands of the quality of norms and the quality of individualistand collectivist thought. By particularconditions. no means, however, does he simulta- To comprehend this substantive strat- neously abandon their ideological com- egy, it is necessary to appreciatethat both mitmentsto the expansion of voluntarism. the traditions of critical idealism and To the contrary, it might be argued that materialismcan be seen as defining free- Parsons has reformulatedthese theories dom as the achievement of differenttypes precisely to preserve the essential libertar- of differentiation.3 Within the socialist ian aspects of their ideological perspec- materialist tradition, for example, the tives. In formulatinghis own ideological most persistent strand of Marx's perspective, in other words, Parsons's re- lation to these traditionsis very different 3 The normativeapproach to freedomis obviously than in his formulationof the theoretic- complex, but its very centralityin Westernthought problem. makes it a vital part of any ideological evaluation. epistemic Freedom can, of course, be viewed as natural or If formal voluntarismrefers to a univer- given, as an inherentpart of any individualaction. sal property of all action abstractedfrom Beyond this individualistposition, freedom can be time and space, and from any specifically viewed as dependenteither upon external, suprain- ideological properties, substantive volun- dividualcircumstances or uponconditions internal to the individual. Hobbes (1651:Chap.21), for exam- tarism refers exactly to the opposite: to ple, points to externalcircumstances: a "freemanis the degree that particularhistorical and he that, in those thingswhich by his strengthand wit social conditions allow the realization of he is able to do, is not hinderedto do what he has a individual freedom defined in terms of a will to do." For those in the internalisttradition, ideological perspective. There- however, it is precisely the natureof this will which particular is at issue, not the circumstances that hinder it. fore, although Parsons has discarded the Thus, as Marcus Aurelius is reportedto have said, individualistic position as a formal influencedas he was by the Stoics: "It is possible to framework, his theory of differentiation live well even in a palace." Or as the early Christian, accepts it as providing the basic param- John, proclaimed, "Know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Freedom,in other words, is a eters within which any theory of sub- matter of the quality of insight and perception. stantive freedom must be rooted (see Withineach of these generaltraditions there are, of Tiryakian, 1975:27-31). In contrast to his course, various more specific controversies; viz., formal theory, Parsons's (1967; 1971b; does external freedom depend on the acquisitionof Parsons and Platt, 1973:42ff)substantive individualliberty or on equality?For a broaddiscus- sion of these issues and theirtreatment in the history theory does, in fact, take the concrete of Western thought, see Adler (1958). person as the point of reference. Parsons As a sociological theorist, however, Parsons's accepts, in this case, the classical liberal major contribution to this discussion lies, like emphasison the autonomyof the concrete Weber's, in his provision of historical-empirical categories for normative argument. He argues, in individual, although this autonomy is, effect, that the internal and external conditions of once again, a multidimensionalone. Sub- freedomdepend on the extension of cultural,social, stantive voluntarismobtains to the extent and psychologicaldifferentiation (see Bay, 1958). FORMAL. AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 185 (1875:16-37; see Jessop, 1972: 46-7) law traditions of the French Enlighten- sociological theory can be viewed as iden- ment (Weber, 1952; 1954; Nelson, 1949; tifying structuralfusion as the source of Becker, 1935);the Protestantnotion of the the inequity and domination of capitalist sanctity of individualconscience and the society. Stated negatively, only by divest- legitimation of individual doubt and its ing the economic structuresand its domi- secular expression in theories of demo- nant class of their dedifferentiatedrela- cratic rights (Weber, 1958b; 1958a; Par- tionship to and control over the other in- sons, 1937:51-8; Little, 1969; Walzer, stitutionaldimensions of social life can in- 1965;Tiryakian, 1975: 24-30); and the var- dividualfreedom over the environmentbe ious conceptions of freedom tied to the attained. In a positive sense, the state, as autonomy of secular intellectual thought an expression of an autonomous elector- from the Greeks and the Humanists to ate, must be able to assert its control over Bacon (Voegelin, 1956; Strauss, 1953; the economy. In general, there should be Shils, 1972). free competition of ideas and an expan- It is, then, out of these two conceptions sion of the range of opportunitiesfor indi- of liberty, the individualist and collec- vidual action. Ratherthan dependenton a tivist, that Parsons has forged the princi- type of property, law must become the pal part, and certainly the most enduring expression of an independent sense of part, of his substantive theory of social right (Marx, 1843; 1875; Smelser, 1972; change. He embraces the ideologicalposi- Avineri, 1969: Chaps. 1, 2, 6-8; Botto- tion that the freedom of the concrete indi- more, 1974: 72-84). Although this moral vidual depends on the differentiationof position on substantive development has both conditional and normative struc- become distorted in the Leninist and tures, but at the same time he articulates romantic forms of Marxist thought, both these substantive goals through the syn- of which propose forms of dedifferentia- thetic perspective which he used to tion, it has been carriedon by the social- criticize the formal aspects of these same democratic tradition of Marxism traditions. In fact, it is possible to argue (Lichtheim, 1961:Chaps. 5-6; Bottomore, that only by transcending the formal, 1974:97-113). In addition to Marx, of theoretic-epistemic problems of these course, there are other significantintellec- arguments can certain long-standing tual formulatorsof the socialist theory of ideological problems be overcome (Bay, freedom as increased differentiation,the 1958). For example, by ignoring the im- most important of whom extend the pact of collective forces, particularlythe conception more explicitly to the accumulation of economic and political noneconomic dimensions of life. Perhaps power, individualistperspectives risk the the most important of these figures are social irrelevance of traditional liberal Michels (1962) with his theory of political ideology (Parsons, 1928; 1929; see also democracy as the competition of elites, Lipset and Ladd, 1972). On the other and T.H. Marshall (1965), who empha- hand, by postulating only rationalist- sizes the social aspects of citizenship (see utilitarian motivation, Marxist theory also Lipset, 1962). risks the ideological acceptance of anti- The Western intellectual tradition that normative,nondemocratic force (Trotsky, emphasizes freedom as differentiationon 1938; Merleau-Ponty, 1947; Parsons, the ideal or normativelevel ratherthan on 1967:102-35). Finally, by ignoring the the material one is less explicit although conditional, constraining dimensions of no less significant.Its premise is that indi- social life, idealist democratic ideology vidual autonomy defined as the individu- risks the possibility of an abstract al's control over his or her internal utopianism (Parsons, 1967; Marx and environment occurs to the degree that Engels, 1848:61-4). spiritual and ethical issues are tran- By groundinghis theory of substantive scendent vis-a-vis earthly concerns. This voluntarism in the formal integration of position has been articulatedby such di- these three positions, Parsons attempts to verse traditions as the Judaic and Chris- avoid such pitfalls. According to his tian notions of divine law and the natural theory of social change, personal au- 186 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW tonomy is achieved to the degree that the general framework of Parsons's formal institutions associated with the different theory, of the relation between stages of dimensions of society, the functionalsub- religious transcendence, social reform, systems of economics, politics, integra- and the achievementof substantivevolun- tion, and value maintenance, become tarism (see also Eisenstadt, 1973: Chaps. differentiatedfrom one anotherand, in the 6-9). Little's (1969) highly originalhistor- process, develop (1) their own indepen- ical monograph, Religion, Order, and dent criteriafor performanceas expressed Law, demonstrates how the differentia- in institutionallyseparated media; and (2) tion of the symbolic order is a basic pre- the capacity to mobilize the resources of requisitefor political and legal differentia- other dimensionsby assertinga partialbut tion and, in general, for the increase of independent regulation over them. Al- individual autonomy. On a more specific though these developments-which Par- level, symbolic differentiation has been sons calls the growth of institutionalized dealt with in terms of the differentiationof individualism-are viewed as occurring specialized types of culturalpatterns. Par- within the context of the social system as sons (1961b; Parsons and Platt, 1973; a whole, they can be seen as involving Chap. 6), Eisenstadt (1969:64-7), Geertz differentiationof three distinctive types: (1973), and Barber (1971) emphasize the cultural, structural, and psychological significantsocial leverage providedby the (Parsons, 1966: 20-9; 1971b; 1971c: 18- emergence of secular political moralityor 28). ideology. Parsons (1951: Chap. 6; Parsons and Platt, 1973: Chap. 6) and Barber Cultural Differentiation (1952: Chaps. 2, 1 1) analyze the In terms of the formal theory of mul- emergenceof social and naturalscience in tidimensionalcausality, cultural, or value terms of the historical impact of this patterns constitute a dimension of every differentiationof an autonomous cultural social structureand, at the same time, an pattern of secular rationality. independent dimension subject to an in- The most systematic and widely tested dependentset of causal forces. In terms of Parsonianframework for dealing with the- Parsons's substantive theory of social relation between the development of sub- change, it is necessary to consider the de- stantive voluntarismand the emergence of velopment of these patterns as an inde- autonomous cultural levels is the pat- pendent process of differentiationwith a tern variable scheme, especially the distinctiverelationship to the achievement universalism-particularismdichotomy. In of substantive voluntarism. The achieve- Parsons's perspective, the culturalpattern ment by the value dimensionof society of of universalism promotes critical judg- transcendent regulative power vis-h-vis ment because it demands that all particu- more conditionally-orientedsocial struc- lar traits be evaluated according to a tures, Parsons believes, is directly related broader, more general set of principles. to the capacity of a society, or a particular Universalism, in other words, is a form of society group within it, to engage in re- differentiation: it creates distance be- form and directed social change (see tween the culturalnorms and the object of Durkheim, 1893). judgment. In a series of essays on Japan, Parsons (1966; 1961; 1963) follows Turkey, the nations of Western Europe, Weber in viewing the most significanthis- and the United States, Bellah (1970: 53- torical periods of cultural differentiation 189; see also Geertz, 1971)has traced the as the radical breaks in normative order effect of religious particularismand uni- created by religiousupheaval, particularly versalism on the possibility for achieving the rise of transcendentreligions that oc- democratic political activism. Lipset's curred in differentcivilizations duringthe (1967) The First New Nation is the most first milleniumand the later culturalbreak importantapplication of the pattern vari- created by the Protestant Reformation. able schema to the specific question of the Bellah's (1970:20-50) article, "Religious impact of differentkinds of Westernpolit- Evolution," represents the most sophisti- ical cultures on the possibility for struc- cated formulation, couched within the tural reform. FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 187 Finally, it is important to emphasize, tonomy, as when a central government particularlybecause of the critical misun- structurebecomes constitutionallydemo- derstandingof Parsons's level of abstrac- cratic or achieves the ability to command tion, that this Parsoniananalysis of devel- economic resources for public action. opmental changes in ideas is not an Each phase of structuraldifferentiation is idealist, emanationistapproach any more linked to greater self-expression, to in- than is Freud's developmental theory of creased voluntarism, for a particular personality or Weber's sociology of re- group, and usually to an increase in the ligious change. Although Parsons's mul- supply of resources-economic, political, tidimensional theory allows isolation of integrative,or value-oriented-for the ex- the independenteffect of developments in pansion and growth of groups in certain the culturalsphere, it simultaneouslyindi- other sectors. At the same time, any given cates that such changes must always be phase will usually also involve the sup- related to developments in other dimen- pression of rights and the restriction of sions. The movements towards cultural voluntarismfor certain other groups, and differentiation and universalism are for this reason any instance of structural movements by social groups, who have differentiation often triggers renewed responded to conflicts and strains which struggle. may have originated in any dimensional The differentiation of the economic location by formulating new and more marketsystem, with its power to command transcendent symbolic patterns. The resources from other sectors and its de- interpenetrationof self-interest, religious velopment of an independent form of interest, and religious differentiation is media in money, represents a classic nowhere more effectively demonstrated example of how structuraldifferentiation than in Eisenstadt's (1969: Chaps. 4-9; can interweave autonomy, expansion of see also Eisenstadt 1964a; 1964b; 1965; resource production, and the partial sup- 1973:119-50) discussion of the struggle pression of rights. Parsons (Parsons and between bureaucracy and church in the White, 1964; Parsons and Smelser, 1956: historical empires. Chap. 5) and Barber (1974) have com- pared the degree of substantive volun- tarism associated with a differentiated Structural Differentiation economy to the situation in preindustrial, Struggles by groups to maintain and undifferentiatedsituations. Economy and usually to increase their scope of action Society (Parsons and Smelser, 1956) re- also initiate differentiation in the struc- mains the most sophisticated general tural sphere, which in Parsons's terms re- statementof the relationbetween a differ- fers not to material conditions per se but entiated economic system and other sec- ratherto institutionalorganization in each tors of the social system. The historical of the four differentdimensions of the so- processes by which successful economic cial system. What is at stake in this aspect differentiation and the expansion of the of differentiationis the long and painful scope of action have been achieved, and growth of the autonomy of different in- through which successive noneconomic stitutional sectors, the evolution from an differentiationin turn has been produced historical situation in which single institu- in response to the suppression of pre- tions, groups, and leaders perform, and industrial modes of societal integration, therefore monopolize, multifunctional have been the main concern of Smelser's tasks to a more diversified structuralsitu- (1959; 1968: Chaps. 6-8) discussions of ation in which there is more of a single modernization.Eisenstadt's (1969:Chaps. function focus. Differentiation. in any 2, 3, 8, 11, 12; see also 1964a;1964b; 1965) given dimensional sphere can be de- The Political System of Empires contains scribed as a never-endingprocess. It be- an historical and theoretical analysis both gins with the simple emergence of a new of the conditions that make economic structure(for example, a centralized gov- differentiation problematic and of how ernment bureaucracy)and only gradually economic dedifferentiation prevents the achieves a certain level of substantiveau- expansion of substantive voluntarism 188 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW through its dampening effect on the 1960; Almond and Powell, 1966), Apter possibility for differentiationin other di- (1958; 1966; 1972), Easton (1953; 1965), mensional spheres. Deutsch (1963; 1964), Mitchell (1958; Another majorfocus of the multidimen- 1972), and Johnson (1966). In her work, sional approachto the problemof substan- Keller (1963; see also Eisenstadt, 1971c) tive voluntarismhas been the process of formulatedthe implicationsof differentia- the differentiationof political structures. tion theory for institutional stratification Political differentiationcreates the struc- studies; she argued that the process re- tural apparatus for a society to define places "ruling class" by "functional self-conscious goals and in doing so to elite." discipline and regulate the resource pro- The other dimensions of structural duction of other spheres. Such capacity is differentiationand the types of substan- achieved throughthe differentiationof or- tive voluntarism which they entail have gans for executive administration, like been accorded less attentionto the degree bureaucracies,and of organs for mobiliz- they depart from the traditionalconcerns ing support and articulating grievance, with economy, polity, and religion. In re- like parties and constitutions. These de- gardto the integrativedimension, with the velopments depend on, first, such internal exception of the phenomenon of citizen- factors as the quality of political leader- ship to be discussed below, the focus has ship, and, second, the differentiationof been limited to the problem of the differ- external resources, like economic adapta- entiationof legal structures.In additionto tion sufficient to produce tax revenues, the discussions by Parsons (1971c: Chap. the increasing breadth of integrative 2) himself, the work of Little (1969) and groupings necessary for mobilizing sup- Mayhew (1968a)traces a continuumfrom port, and the growth of transcendentcul- the first delineation of distinctive secular tural standardsas references for political rights to the successive attempts at their reform. Eisenstadt's (1969) writingon the real institutionalization.In terms of dif- historicalempires representsthe broadest ferentiation in the value dimension- empiricalanalysis of this kind of interrela- excluding religious patterns, which we tionship, a frameworkextended over the have already analyzed as cultural de- full historical range of political structures velopments-the emerging autonomy of in Eisenstadt's (1971b) Political Sociol- families, peer groups, schools, and sci- ogy. On a more abstract level, Parsons entific institutions has been dis- (1967:422-65; 1969:163-78; 1971c) has cussed, respectively, by Smelser(1959), by written extensively on the different kinds Eisenstadt (1971a) and Parsons (1964: of dimensionalinputs associated with the 155-82), by Parsons and Platt (1973), by emergence of dictatorship, bureaucracy, Dreeben (1968) and Ben-David (1971). democracy, and collegiality as forms of The mannerin which these developments political organization. In discussing the facilitate the growth of substantive volun- differentiatedconditions necessary for the tarismwill be the subjectof the analysis of democraticcompetition of political elites, psychological differentiationbelow. Lipset (1962; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Little theoretical or empiricalwork has see also Surace, 1976)has moved beyond been done on bringing these various the rationalistic formulations of Michels analyses of structural differentiationto- (1962) and placed that central ideological gether to develop a more integratedtheory issue on a different plane of analysis. of multidimensionalcausality and a fuller Smelser (1973; 1974;see also Huntington, notion of the ramificationsof the growth 1968:93-139; Rueschmeyer, 1977) has of substantive voluntarism in a differ- analyzed recently the political forces that entiating system. Perhaps the closest at- maintained a condition of functional de- tempt to such a synthesis is Parsons's differentiationin the Californiasystem of (1971c: Chaps. 2, 6; 1967: 490-520; Par- higher education in the 1960s. These no- sons and Platt, 1973: Chap. 4) analysis of tions have also been pursued at length the differentiation of the integrative di- within the Parsoniantradition of political mension of the nation, the dimension he science, particularly by Almond (1956; labels the "societal community." To the FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 189 degree that the societal community is that arguing within the general mul- differentiated, the national community tidimensional framework of his formal becomes defined universalistically; such theory, Parsons has attemptedto develop universalism implies that in crucial in- an empirical and historical theory of the stances an egalitarian national solidarity structuralrequisites for freedomand of the will supercede the more particularistic structuralcontradictions that constrain its definitions of national community gener- achievement. As such, despite the still ated by class, race, ethnicity, region, or elementary level of its articulation, Par- religion. Clearly, the emergence of such a sons's theory of historical development societal communityis a majorprerequisite presents the possibility for advancingwell for the achievement of substantive volun- beyond the individualist,idealist, or mate- tarism, for the ability to control and re- rialist approaches to the problem of the form the production of different dimen- institutionalizationof individual freedom sional resources in an egalitarianway. As in social life. such, this differentiationis dependent on in very distinctive kinds of developments Psychological Differentiation the economic, political, value and norma- tive spheres. It can be viewed, in fact, as As I mentionedearlier, the most impor- the result of the interminablestruggle by tant explicit source of voluntarism as a social groups in each of these different hegemonic ideological principle in Par- spheres for continually more effective in- sons's theory has been the individualist clusion into the national society (see focus of liberalthought. Parsons's dialecti- Eisenstadt, 1969: 248). Obviously such a cal relation to this tradition, theoretically process raises the continualpossibility for and ideologically, reaches its apogee in his dedifferentiation,which can be defined as analysis-of the psychological aspects of a narrowingof the definition of national the differentiation process. Through his community in a particularisticdirection, conception of what he called the Resource resultingin the constraintand reductionof Chart, Parsons (Parsons and Smelser, substantive voluntarism. It is possible to 1956:139; see also Smelser, 1959; 1962) draw a direct relationship between Par- integratesFreudian and Piagetiantheories sons's (1954:104-44, 298-322; 1969) dis- of individual development with his cussions of such dedifferentiationin inte- analyses of cultural and structuraldiffer- grative structures-his essays on the entiation. The Resource Chart concep- sources of Fascism and political aggres- tualizes the sequential stages involved in sion in Western society and McCarthyism the production of an individual from the in American society-and the conception earliest stage of childhoodto achievement of status politics developed by Hofstadter of the adult role. In terms of Parsons's (1952) and Lipset. Lipset (1967: Chaps. 7, later theory of subsystem interchange, 9; see also Pitts, 1964), in fact, has used this process can be described as the pas- extensively an implicit dedifferentiation sage from full-timeparticipation in the in- notion to trace the mannerin which domi- stitutions of the value maintenance di- nant class, political, and solidary groups mension to participationin the institutions have skewed European social devel- of the more conditionally-orientedorgan- opments towards Fascism or Com- izations of adult society. Since the effect munism. More generally, this notion of of culturaland structuraldifferentiation is differentiationand the societal community to separatevalue maintenanceinstitutions directly connects Parson's (1967: 385- both from one another and from institu- 421;1960: 295-321; 1971c: 30-2, 92-3; tions in other dimensionsof the social sys- Eisenstadt, 1969:80) theory of substantive tem, the impact of such differentiationof voluntarism, as I have developed that the Resource Chart can be visualized as conception here, to the more empirical increasing the number of developmental theory of voluntary groups and voluntary stages involved in the passage from child- associations developed in other sociologi- hood to adulthood. In terms of Freudian cal literature. theory, the greater mobility required for In this section, I have demonstrated this transitionto adulthoodcan be accom- 190 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW polishedonly by increased ego autonomy This kind of historical analysis of the and control over affective dependency. interplay between psychic and social Conversely, in terms of differentiation differentiationhas also been pursued by theory, this social demandfor psycholog- Bellah (1970:76-99)in a suggestive essay, ical voluntarismmeshes with the psycho- "Father and Son in Confucianism and logical opportunitiesprovided by certain Christianity." Bellah (1970) follows Erik- structural developments: the growing son (1950)in describinghow universalistic separation between the increasingly developments in the religious sphere pro- functionally-specific nuclear family and vide a point of leverage for the develop- the institutionsthat develop to fulfill other ment of greaterpsychological control over social functions facilitates rebellion, sep- primaryobject relations, particularlyover aration, and neutralizationvis-a-vis basic those objects associated with authority object relationships. and domination. This interweaving of the Freudian The moral development side of the understanding of individual personality Resource Chart concerns the issue of growth with the broader theory of sub- socialization rather than personality de- stantive voluntarismas the productof cul- velopment per se, and rests upon two tural and structural differentiation has basic insights by Parsons (1964:17-33, been developed most by Weinstein and 78-111): (1) no aspect of affective devel- Platt (1969). In The Wish To Be Free, they opment, even within the nuclear family contend that it was the development of itself, is ever separatedfrom the develop- structural differentiation-in Parsons's ment of symbolic-moralmatters; and (2) technical sense, the expansion of the Re- structuraldifferentiation and the increas- source Chart-which eventually created ing isolation of the nuclear family create in nineteenth century Western society the the necessity for the differentiationof a opportunityfor successful Oedipal rebel- range of transitionalstructures to mediate lion and separation from authority. In the passage from childhood to adulthood. turn, they argue that this expansion of the On the basis of these propositions, Par- developmental process and increase in sons (Parsons and Bales, 1955:119-23, psychological autonomy were themselves 136, 155; see also Menzies, 1977:104-9) crucial and independent variables in the integrates his analysis of personality de- subsequent development of substantive velopment with the pattern variable voluntarismthrough the differentiationof schema of cultural differentiation and other institutional spheres. At the same Piaget's theory of moral and cognitive de- time, Weinstein and Platt (1969) empha- velopment. According to Parsons, the re- size that just as social and psychological lation between motherand child transmits differentiation are related in a positive to the child a thoroughly particularistic manner, so can they be negatively interre- moralpattern, in that it presents, from the lated. The lengtheningof the passage from child's perspective, the very prototype of full-time participation in value mainte- a relationship in which no higher differ- nance institutionsto more participationin entiated standardor judgmentis possible. conditional dimensions is not only a Furthermore,even though relative to this liberatingbut also a perilous development. initial relationship moral development in By radically increasing the challenge of the family becomes increasingly univer- the transitionalprocess, it also increases salistic, family morality remains par- the likelihood for failures, for the ticularistic relative to other institutions pathological dedifferentiationthat Wein- because of its primarilyaffective function. stein and Platt (1969:Chap. 7) call the uni- It is clear, in other words, that if substan- versal reactions to modernization.In his tive voluntarismis to be achieved-in pat- essay on youth culture, Parsons (1964: tern variable terms, if the universalistic 155-82; see also Slater, 1961a; 1961b; pattern is to be internalized-further Chodorow, 1974; 1978)has described one stages of affective and moral socialization stage of this dedifferentiationas a basic beyond the nuclearfamily are a necessity. structuralproblem of modern society. The school is perhapsthe most significant FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 191 institution which becomes differentiated conservation-of the status quo, of the in response to this need, and the most seamless webb of social intercourse,of the important discussions of schooling in supraindividualsystem-that his critics terms of the pattern variables are Dree- have charged. ben's (1968) On What Is Learned in To the contrary, Parsons's (1961:344; School and Parsons and Platt's (1973: Parsons and Shils, 1951:216)differentia- Chaps. 2, 4) The American University. tion theory proposes, in principle,that the The successful contribution to this ex- process of differentiation,and the increas- tended socialization process of the other ing independence of structures and indi- newly differentiatedstructure, the adoles- viduals which results from it, will increase cent peer group, has been analyzed the general level of social conflict, al- by Eisenstadt (1971a;see also Fass, 1977) though it may at the same time increase in From Generation to Generation; the institutional flexibility in handling and more particularisticpathological aspects channelingconflict's repercussions. Since of peer groupculture by Pitts (1964:49-59) societies, particularlymodern and moder- and Parsons (1951:286-93). nizing ones, are continually subject( to As this brief section indicates, Par- strains at all levels and at varying inten- sons's work contains a complex theory of sities, social change must be viewed as a psychological differentiation which is constant and highly uneven process thoroughlyinterwoven with his theoriesof (Smelser, 1971: 7). According to the Par- differentiationon the cultural and struc- sonian theory of change outlined above, tural levels (see also Inkeles, 1971). It societies have two options in response to should also be clear that, within the gen- such strain: either differentiationor de- eral frameworkof his formal theory, this differentiation.Because it allows flexibil- analysis of psychological developments is ity in the face of vested interests, both keyed to the evaluative conception of materialand ideal, differentiationis linked freedom as the achievement of individual to the capacity for system reform and to autonomy and control. The view of Par- the extension of individualfreedom. If a sons's theory as an oversocialized con- society is unable to engage in differentia- ception of man completely ignores this tion, the social response will be to sup- vital aspect of Parsons's substantivework press the reaction to strain ratherthan to and, in turn, the distinctiveformal appara- eliminate its source. The possibility will tus upon which it is built (Wrong, 1961; be raised for the conflation of differ- Gouldner, 1970: 218-39). entiated structures and the reduction, ratherthan expansion, of the possibilities for individual autonomy and control as a Conflict Theory Differentiation (Smelser, 1962; 1974; Eisenstadt, 1964c; Parsons has utilized his theoretical 1969;Weinstein and Platt, 1969).By creat- framework of formal voluntarism to ex- ing an historical theory that describes a plore the requisites for a theory of indi- continuumof differentkinds of reactionto vidual control in the cultural, structural, strain and the conditions under which and psychological spheres. No matter each might occur, Parsons has developed how differentiated, of course, individual a perspective that, far from neglecting action remains connected and disciplined conflict, presents the framework for a by the environmentsof nature, on the one comprehensive approach to its explana- hand, and by what Parsons(1966; Chap. 1) tion and evaluation (see also Ruesch- calls the ultimate reality of existential meyer, 1977).4 meaningon the other. Parsons's theory of institutionaldifferentiation is not intended 4 In fact, Parsons'stheory of social changecan be to deny this fundamental connection. seen as providing a more general frameworkfor Nevertheless, he has clearly proposed a analyzing the very theoretical points advanced by the .three conflict theorists who have been some of change theory which is geared to the prob- his sharpest critics (see Atkinson, 1972);the ruling lem of the expansion of individual free- class situation described by Rex (1961); the dom and choice. It is far fromthe theoryof superimposition/pluralizationtheory proposed by 192 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

IRRESOLUTION IN THE THEORETICAL often occurs in the value or normativedi- AND IDEOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS mensions and in the tension between these dimensions and the more conditional As I noted at the outset of this essay, ones, than within the economic and politi- my purpose has been to initiate a new cal spheres themselves. In addition to reading of Parsons's work. In supporting these problems, a strain of holism char- my proposalthat the notions of formaland acteristic of an unreconstructed realism substantive voluntarismprovide one ele- coexists alongside Parsons's focus on the ment of such a framework,I have ignored independent role of the individual in ac- aspects of Parsons's writing which are tion. For example, Parsons emphasizes contrary to this major thrust. Although a conflict between internallyintegrated sub- lengthy analysis of these contradictory systems and between groups which share strands does not have a place here, I will the same overarching value commit- mention the kinds of problems I have in ments ratherthan conflict between groups mind (see Alexander, 1979). within the same subsystem which, to use The problematic aspects of Parsons's Evans-Pritchard's(1953) term, "refract" theory are elements that reflect an am- common value patterns into partial and bivalence about the very theoretical and opposed commitments. ideological tensions that Parsons has re- The same kinds of ambiguitiesof resolu- solved so effectively in the strands of his tion represent significant strains in Par- work analyzed above. Because of this sons's ideologically related approach to ambivalence, his work, considered as a social change. For example, in his de- whole, contains major contradictions on scription of cultural differentiation as both formal and substantive levels. generalization,there is a tension between On the formal level, the synthetic ap- a rather conservative emphasis on proach that Parsons so carefully develops generalizationas simply the provision of is crosscut by a significantidealist strain. greater integrationand the other empha- Simply in terms of his focus of attention, sis, described above, on its promotion of the internal dimensions of values and increased critical activism and, indirectly, norms, both as institutionalspheres and as social conflict (Parsons, 1971b; Toby, cultural patterns, have received vastly 1975). Or again, there are clear signs that more of his attention than the conditional Parsons has only incompletely resolved dimensions of economics and politics. his relation to the individualistemphasis More importantly, when these latter di- of traditionalliberal ideology. In compari- mensions do become the focus of Par- son to some other analysts of differentia- sons's extended attention, they are de- tion at the psychological level, Parsons's scribed empiricallyin such a mannerthat recognitionof the alienative psychic costs they facilitaterather than conflict with the of substantivevoluntarism has been strik- normative inputs to their production (see ingly inconsistent. While in some essays Gouldner, 1970:286-325). Furthermore, he traces with great subtlety the alienation the systemic conflict that Parsons does attendant on the realization of autonomy find throughout social life much more and differentiation(1954: 89-103, 177-96, 298-322; 1964: 112-26, 257-96; 1971a),in Dahrendorf(1959); and the notion propoundedby others he portraysthe achievement of in- Coser (1956) that conflict can have a positive func- dividualizationand affective autonomy as tion for societies with sufficiently flexible social (1967:3-34; Par- structures. Compare, for example, the following relatively unproblematic quotationfrom Coser (1956:154)with the differentia- sons and White, 1969). And although his tion theory outlined above: basic commitmentto the collectivist tradi- A flexible society benefits from conflict because tion is clear in his support of welfare such behavior, by helping to create and modify state laissez-faire ideology, Parsons norms, assures its continuance under changed (1954:386-439) underplays, in a manner conditions. Such mechanismsfor readjustmentof characteristic of traditional liberal indi- normsis hardlyavailable to rigidsystems: by sup- pressingconflict, the lattersmother a useful warn- vidualism, the social costs of economic ing signal, thereby maximizingthe dangerof cata- systems that institutionalizeprivate prop- strophic breakdown. erty (1954; see Gouldner, 1970:302-4, FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM 193

320-3). Despite the effective argument CONCLUSION that can be made that democratic socialism represents an advance towards I have arguedhere against a numberof social differentiation and towards the standard interpretations in the rapidly achievement of substantive voluntarism, growing commentarialliterature on Par- Parsons has always dismissed out of hand sons' s theory. In opposition to these the developmental advantages to be charges, I have proposed that one of Par- gained from institutionalizingpublic own- sons's major contributions can be most ership and redistributive public policies effectively appreciated in terms of the (see also Rocher, 1975:144). dichotomous classification of a concept It should be clear, in light of the entire which has been central to Western preceding analysis, that none of these thought, the concept of voluntarism. In emphases is a logical or necessary part of his formalframework, Parsons articulated Parsonian theory, in either its formal or a self-conscious integration of indi- substantive versions. It is not accidental, vidualist, idealist, and materialisttheories in this regard, that our references in the which describedthe propertiesof action in preceding section were to Parsons's stu- terms of an interweaving of the volun- dents and coworkers as much as to Par- tarism produced by the pursuit of norma- sons himself. It has often been Parsons's tive ideals and the constraint induced by students, not Parsons, who have explored the chains of material necessity. By de- the full range of the theory's appli- veloping within this formal approach a cation-in the formal realm to the prob- theory of historical change as differentia- lems of political and economic conflict, tion, Parsons proposed a framework in the substantive theory to the applica- which potentially integrates the eman- tion of the social criticism inherent in its cipatory aspects of individualist, idealist central logic. Withinthe frameworkof the and materialistideology and, in doing so, formal theory, for example, Smelser provides the basis for evaluatinghistory in (1973:390-7; 1971:8-9; see also Ruesch- terms of its realizationof voluntarismin a meyer, 1977) has recently criticized substantive sense.5 Yet despite the enor- Parsons's underemphasison the problem of power; and in his own work, Smelser 5 Because of this synthetic intention, I would has portrayed the differentiationof the argue, Parsons's change theory has potentiallyuni- political, not the culturaldimension as the versal application,far beyondthe rangeof Parsons's crucial factor in the development of sub- own usage. It is revealingin this respect to compare differentiationtheory with the approachto change stantive voluntarism. Similarly, taken by Jirgen Habermas, the Frankfurtschool Eisenstadt (1969) has written at great Marxist. The purpose Habermas has set for length, in the formal frameworkof mul- himself-to preserve Marx's ideological commit- tidimensionality, about the often insur- ment to freedom while transformingthe instrumen- talism of his theoretical apparatus-leads him in- mountable conditional problems eluctably to a change theory that resembles Par- presented by economic classes and by the sons's own. Differentiationtheory, however, can centralizationof political power. And Lip- clearly be viewed as subsumingHabermas's theory set's (1967; see also Pitts, 1964)utilization of communicationdistortion. In workingout the lat- of the patternvariable scheme contains an ter idea, Habermas's(1973a:315) intention is to con- struct a theory of human "evolution toward au- extensive analysis of political conflict in tonomy and responsibility" keyed to the ideal of terms of subgroupsrepresenting opposing increased "freedom from domination."In order to value patterns. On the ideological side, do so, he realizes that his theory must measurepro- the last decade has produced a distinctly gress toward"human adulthood" on the psycholog- ical level, and he incorporatesFreudian concepts to leftward movement among some Parson- accomplish this (1970:119; 1973b:256).Habermas ians, who are responsible for a series of acknowledgesfurther that, in additionto including essays which critique contemporary the structuralemphasis of Marx,he mustaddress the Western society from the generalperspec- problemof the historicaldevelopment of moral sys- tive established by differentiationtheory tems (1973b:2-3) and the preconditionsof an au- tonomous public opinion, one with the capacity to (Pitts, 1974; Bellah, 1970: 193-257; 1975; mediate between a society and its social values Eisenstadt, 1973: 231-57; Gould, 1976; (1970:72-4).Despite the often brillianttexture of his Smelser, 1975). argument,however, Habermashas failedthroughout 194 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

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