Formal and Substantive Voluntarism in the Work of Talcott Parsons: A Theoretical and Ideological Reinterpretation Author(s): Jeffrey C. Alexander Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 177-198 Published by: American Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094698 Accessed: 24/09/2008 15:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asa. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Sociological Review. http://www.jstor.org FORMAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOLUNTARISM IN THE WORK OF TALCOTT PARSONS: A THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL REINTERPRETATION* JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER University of California, Los Angeles American Sociological Review 1978, Vol. 43 (April):177-198 Contemporary discussions of Parsons's thought have faltered because they are insufficiently generalized. Only after his theoretical and epistemological logic has been explored, for exam- ple, can his more specific, ideological purpose be correctly understood. Parsons's theoretical ambition has been to resolve long-standing antinomies in social thought. His theory, to the degree it succeeds, formulates two central points: the social basis of individual autonomy and the multidimensional basis of social order. These positions present the heart of Parsons's formal theory. In his analysis of historical development as differentiation-cultural, structural, and psychological-Parsons combines this formal logic with an ideological commitment to the expansion of individual freedom and conscious control. Incorporating elements of liberal, idealist, and materialist arguments, he outlines a theory of substantive voluntarism that is, potentially, neither conservative nor static. Considered as a whole, Parsons's theory contains serious contradictory strains. Nevertheless, his analysis of formal and substantive freedom represents a major contribution to social thought. The charismaticpower of a greatthinker the case of Durkheim.As a forceful figure raises to a heightened pitch the normal both intellectually and personally, Durk- level of irrationality produced by para- heim created a powerful sociological digm conflict. In defense against such a school which followed Durkheimian powerful intellectual center, there theory in a manner which greatly ex- emerges alongside the usual thrusts of tended its scope and application but did serious theoreticalcombat an antagonistic little to articulate its foundations or to tradition of misinformed, often trivial, clarify its critical weaknesses (Clark, sometimes grossly distorted commentary 1973). At the same time, Durkheim's that attempts to present itself, and is theory was subject to a barrage of what partly accepted as, critical truth. At the was often distorted and tendentious criti- same time, the attractive power of this cism, directed not only towards his center is such that those who follow the theoretical conceptions but in addition thinkerprove unable to present an objec- towards his ideologicalinvolvement in the tive critical evaluation of his intellectual reconstruction of the French republic contributions. Only with the passage of (Lukes, 1972). Only in the late 1930s and time, as the center loses its immediate the 1940s, with the work of sociologists power, can a perspective which is both like Parsons and Merton and an- critical and appreciative be attained and thropologists like Radcliffe-Brown and the thinker's permanent contributions to Evans-Pritchard-and, indeed, after the intellectualtradition be properlyassessed. decline of almost all literalistic We can observe this tortuous path of Durkheimianism-was the attempt begun assimilation in the reception of Marx's to reappropriate Durkheim's theoretical work and Weber's, but the process seems work. And only in the last decade has the particularly striking, and particularly debate about his ideological perspective apropos of the subject of this essay, in been sufficiently separatedfrom the rigid radical/conservativedichotomy to enable the true humanitarianand progressive im- * Many of the ideas in this essay have germinated in conversation with Robert N. Bellah, Neil J. petus of his work to be understood Smelser, and PhilippeNonet. I would like to express (Lukes, 1972: Chaps. 17, 26; Giddens, my gratitudeand appreciation. 1971:Chap. 7; Marks, 1974;Bellah, 1973). 177 178 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW A remarkablysimilar process of assimi- sons's work would involve exploring a lation and its vicissitudes appears to be wide range of diverse issues. In the the fate of Talcott Parsons's work. After present context I will limit my focus to an initialperiod of the inflationof his intel- only one aspect of the problem; namely, lectual prestige and the creation-of a large to the issues of voluntarismin Parsons's number of distinguishedfollowers, there thought.2 After elaborating, in a con- emerged a second period during which it densed manner, the nature of Parsons's suffered an intensification of the same theoretic-epistemicposition on this issue, kind of distortedcritical appraisalon both I will demonstrateits relevance for practi- the theoretical and ideological levels. cal sociological work by indicating how There have been recent indications that a Parsons combines his commitmentsin this more balanced sort of critical assessment realm with the ideological and empirical is in the process of emerging, as thinkers positions which govern his theory of so- of differenttheoretical and political tradi- cial change. I will call the position Parsons tions have returnedto Parsons's work and has articulatedon the theoretic-epistemic argued for the centrality and significance level his "formal voluntarism" and its of its central concerns (Atkinson, 1972: empirical-ideological articulation, his 1-143; Jessop, 1972;Gintis, 1969;Rocher, commitmentto the standardof "substan- 1975; Bershady, 1973; Turner, 1974: tive voluntarism." 15-76, 193-210; Turner and Beeghley, In social theory, the issue of volun- 1974; Lipset, 1975; Johnson, 1976; Men- tarismrevolves, on the most generallevel, zies, 1977; Alexander, 1979). It is as a around two long-standing debates, the contribution to this theoretical and arguments over nominalism vs. realism, ideological reassessment that this essay is and subjectivism vs. objectivism (Aristo- intended. tle, 1962: Bk. 7, 3, 4; Plato, 1945: 80-5, 88-92, 321-36; Augustine, 1948:Chap. 14; Halevy, 1901-1904; Stark, 1962; Sartre, MISINTERPRETATION AND THE VOLUNTARISM PROBLEM sons's functionalcommitment has had an important The sociological conventional wisdom impact on his theoretical system, the influence has has pegged Parsons as a functionalist, an been on the level of model ratherthan on the level of equilibrium or consensus theorist, an epistemic presuppositions-a level which, because ideologist. Such characterizations have of its greatergenerality, is theoreticallymore signifi- cant. Furthermore,even as a model, the functional been promoted not only by his critics system provides wide limits of flexibility which can but often by his supporters as well in no sense be associated with propositions about (Lockwood, 1956; Coser, 1956; Dahren- empirical equilibriumor conflict, or with notions dorf, 1958; 1959; Mills, 1959; Martindale, about idealism-materialism,individualism-sociolo- 1960; Gouldner, 1967; 1970; Rex, 1961; gism, conservatism-radicalism-ashas so often been assumed(Sztompka, 1968; 1974; Stinchcombe, 1968: Foss, 1963; Friedrichs, 1970; Wallace, Chap. 3; Smelser, 1972; Hobsbawm, 1973; Lipset, 1969; Bottomore, 1974; Levy, 1952; 1975). This literature indicates that the notion of Smelser, 1959; Mayhew, 1968b; Rocher, system is an open one, which assumes a particular 1975; Johnson, 1973; 1975; Lipset, 1975; content only in relation to specific theoretic- Zule epistemic, ideological, and empiricalcommitments. Baum, 1976; Loubser, 1976; Van Little significantunderstanding of the varied course Slabbert, 1976). None of these descrip- of Parsons'sintellectual development can be derived tions, however, is sufficientlygeneralized from studying his theory's functionalist aspects, to comprehendParsons's most fundamen- whereas a great deal of that variationcan be illumi- tal theoretical contribution. This lies, I nated by focusing on its theoretic-epistemicassump- would more in the realm of what tions. argue, 2 Though voluntarismplays a crucial role in Par- mightbe called sociological epistemology,