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IHF REPORT 2006 HUMAN RIGHTS in the OSCE REGION 326 RUSSIAN FEDERATION Region for Human Rights Activists to Work In, of Law

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IHF REPORT 2006 HUMAN RIGHTS in the OSCE REGION 326 RUSSIAN FEDERATION Region for Human Rights Activists to Work In, of Law 324 RUSSIAN FEDERATION* IHF FOCUS: human rights defenders; elections; freedom of expression, free media and information; freedom of association; torture, ill-treatment and police miscon- duct;1 conditions in prisons and detention facilities; rights of persons with disabili- ties; national and ethnic minorities; aggressive nationalism, racism, xenophobia and hate speech; economic and social rights; Chechnya and the North Caucasus. The year 2005 saw further consolida- tions of involvement in espionage because tion of the powers of the federal executive they had received funding from the UK and further erosion of democratic checks government. As in previous years, human and balances. This development was re- rights defenders working on issues related flected in the “Freedom in the World” rank- to the conflict in Chechnya were highly vul- ing of the US organization Freedom House, nerable to persecution. which rated Russia as “not free” rather than The so-called anti-terrorism operation “partly free” for the first time since 1991.2 in Chechnya continued for the sixth year. While the political process at the feder- The unilateral political process initiated by al level was already dominated by Presi- the Russian government, which included dent Vladimir Putin, a reform that took ef- parliamentary elections held in November, fect as of the beginning of the year abol- failed to bring peace and stability to the re- ished the direct election of regional gover- public and the cycle of violence and gross nors and thereby served to strengthen fed- abuses continued. As in previous years, fe- eral control over the country’s regions. Offi- deral and local law enforcement authori- cial information policies grew increasingly ties as well as rebel fighters engaged in se- restrictive and state-controlled media repor- rious human rights violations, such as ab- ted about politically sensitive issues, such ductions, illegal detention, torture, disap- as developments related to the fight pearances and extrajudicial executions, against terrorism, in a highly selective man- with little or no accountability. ner. Throughout the country, critical journal- The conflict in Chechnya increasingly ists were subject to intimidation, detention, spilled over to neighboring republics, with criminal prosecution as well as physical at- security forces and insurgents engaging in tacks, and independent newspapers some- abuses of the kind that previously had tak- times experienced difficulties in gaining ac- en place only in Chechnya also in these re- cess to publishing houses or were evicted publics. As a result, the security situation from their offices. Six journalists were killed deteriorated in the entire North Caucasus for apparently politically motivated reasons. region. The IHF, the MHG and other hu- Civil society was also the target of gro- man rights organizations cautioned that wing pressure. Various bureaucratic pro- this development represented a serious cedures were used to obstruct the work of danger to the Russian Federation and, con- NGOs, and a new law that was rushed sequently, to the international community, through parliament toward the end of and called for prompt and concrete meas- 2005 provided for enhanced control of ures to address the lack of rule of law and NGOs, in particular those that receive the climate of impunity reigning in the re- funding from abroad. In a development gion. They also appealed to the interna- that appeared aimed at justifying the adop- tional community to mount a more effec- tion of the new law, in early 2006 the tive and coordinated response to the de- Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) and a velopments in the North Caucasus. number of other leading Russian human A number of victims of human rights rights organizations faced absurd accusa- abuses in Chechnya eventually found jus- * This chapter is based on a report from the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) to the IHF, March 2006, except for the chapters on the rights of persons with disabilities, national and ethnic minorities and Chechnya and the North Caucasus, which have been prepared by the IHF Secretariat or other co- operating organizations (see respective section). RUSSIAN FEDERATION 325 tice at the European Court of Human Yukos oil company, and his business asso- Rights (ECtHR), which ruled that Russia’s ciate Platon Lebedev reflected wider prob- conduct in these cases had violated sever- lems in the Russian criminal justice sys- al key articles of the European Convention tem, in particular lack of independence of on Human Rights (ECHR), including the the judiciary and violations of the right to right to life, the prohibition against torture defense. The two men were sentenced to and ill-treatment and the right to an effec- nine years imprisonment on tax evasion, tive remedy. embezzlement and related charges, which Also outside the North Caucasus, tor- were widely believed to be politically moti- ture and ill-treatment were frequently prac- vated.3 ticed, and detainees were often subject to At the same time as the government humiliating and cruel treatment. Through increased control over the country’s ener- their rhetoric and activities, nationalist mo- gy sector,4 it used economic pressure mo- vements openly exploited and encouraged re actively than previously in its foreign po- xenophobic attitudes, which according to licies. The most prominent example was surveys were widespread among the pop- the so-called gas war with Ukraine that de- ulation. Ethnically and racially motivated at- veloped at the end of the year. The state- tacks remained a serious problem, in par- controlled gas monopoly Gazprom de- ticular since the authorities failed to take manded that Ukraine, as of 2006, pay the adequate measures to prevent and reme- full market price – or four times more than dy such crimes. Moreover, violence and it had previously paid – on gas received abuse against Roma and other ethnic mi- from Russia. As Ukraine refused, Gazprom norities by law enforcement authorities cut off gas supplies to Ukraine until a con- were usually not challenged nor remedied, troversial agreement was reached, under and both direct and indirect discrimination which Gazprom would sell gas for the mar- against minority members was pervasive ket price but Ukraine would pay less since in areas such as education, health care, Russian gas would be mixed with cheaper housing, employment, and public services. Turkmen and Kazakh gas.5 Poor implementation of legislation protect- ing minority rights, lack of awareness and Human Rights Defenders incentive among minority members to pur- Overall Trends6 sue their rights and harassment of nation- In recent years, authorities have al activists seeking to promote minority stepped up their efforts to control the re- rights contributed to further assimilation of gistration and funding of independent hu- small ethnic minorities. man rights NGOs, while encouraging the In the area of economic and social growth of organizations loyal to them. De- rights, the year began with large-scale pro- liberate efforts by authorities to restrict ac- tests – ranging from demonstrations to ac- cess to information of legitimate public in- tions to block highways – against a new terest (such as on so-called anti-terrorism law that replaced social benefits with cash operations in Chechnya and elsewhere) payments. In particular leftist oriented po- have also seriously obstructed human litical parties played a central role in these rights work. protests. The protests continued until the Moreover, human rights defenders government promised to significantly raise have been subjected to pressure, including the level of the new payments. intimidation, arrests, searches and physical The high-profile trial in May against attacks. Over the last few years, the North Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former chair of the Caucasus has been the most dangerous IHF REPORT 2006 HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OSCE REGION 326 RUSSIAN FEDERATION region for human rights activists to work in, of law. The campaign appeared to be a but reports of harassment and persecution demonstration by authorities to justify the of human rights activists have also been adoption of the new restrictive NGO law. received from other regions, especially At the end of January, Russian authorities from Krasnodar, Kalmykia and Tatarstan. made moves to close down one human In 2005, several human rights activists rights NGO.10 died after being attacked by unidentified N On 28 January 2006 the BBC report- perpetrators.7 ed that the Justice Ministry had asked a N On 21 July, human rights activist Lyud- Moscow court to order that the Russian mila Zhorovlya and her son Konstantin Human Rights Research Centre be shut were shot by unknown people in their down. The move was officially justified as home in the city of Vorkuta in the Komi Re- a response to the NGO’s failure to register public. Zhorovlya and her colleagues had any information about its activities for the 11 provided legal assistance to Vorkuta resi- last five years. dents with respect to illegal increases in During the year, the websites of many utility payments required by local authori- human rights organization were hacked ties. The mayor of Vorkuta had reportedly and the material published on the sites criticized her work on repeated occasions was altered. and she had received numerous threats In March 2005, the parliament decid- and demands to stop her activities. At the ed to establish a so-called public chamber end of the year, there was no further in- upon proposal by President Putin. The formation about the investigation into the new institution was charged with analyzing case.8 draft legislation and overseeing the work of the parliament as well as federal and re- N On 13 November, unknown men vio- gional authorities, but it was granted only lently attacked two anti-fascist activists in consultative powers. Out of its 126 mem- St. Petersburg. One of the activists, Timur bers, one third was to be appointed by the Kacharav, died as a result of numerous president, another third to be nominated stab wounds and the other one, Maxim by civil society organizations and the re- Zgibai, suffered serious injuries.
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