THE SECRET AGENT Copyright 1983 Human Arts Association and Green

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THE SECRET AGENT Copyright 1983 Human Arts Association and Green THE SECRET AGENT Copyright 1983 Human Arts Association and Green Mountain Post Films VETERAN 1: The problem got so severe, I couldn’t keep anything in my stomach, I lost a lot of weight. I also developed a rash after I came back from Viet Nam that I didn’t have before I went. VETERAN 2: So when I came back from Viet Nam and this rash wouldn’t go away, I went over to my mother’s house, and I asked her to take a look at the rash. I was told it was jungle rot. As soon as she saw it, she said, “That’s not jungle rot. Your father had jungle rot. I don’t know what that is, but it’s not what your father had.” Words that my mother said then and when Kerry was born almost came back to haunt us, that she had intuitive knowledge that something wasn’t right.” VETERAN 3: I cannot remember, these headaches got so severe. My arms and legs, I have numbness with pain. I can’t move my hands. They give me sheepskin blankets to sleep on at the hospital. My hands shake. VETERAN 4: I’ve got the spine of a 77 year-old man and I’m 33. I cannot have seX with my wife anymore. My wife is 32. VETERAN 5: In 1975, I started having slight peripheral neurological problems, you know, my hands and feet were starting to tingle. I think it was from March of ’77 until January of ’78. I lost the ability to walk. VETERAN 6: It was like looking in a mirror at yourself. Talk to one veteran and he’s got the same things wrong with him that you’ve got wrong with you. All these things are not coincidental; it had to come from somewhere. He might be from New York, and me from South Georgia, the only thing we had in common was we were in Viet Nam. SONG: THE SECRET AGENT [Country Joe McDonald] Looking over my shoulder, behind every tree I got bad paranoia, everything is trying to kill me. Behind every corner, oh, what is it I see? I got bad paranoia, everything seems like it’s trying to kill me. Secret Agent, what can it be? The Secret Agent, it’s trying to kill me. I believe it’s going to kill me. NARRATOR [Max Gail]: Until this century, the damage we could do to each other in war was unlimited: no weapon, we thought, could kill all of our enemies; no war could last forever. But advancing technology has put into our hands weapons and means of fighting wars, which only the gods and heroes of legends have wielded. We can pour fire from the air like Zeus; poison the earth our enemies use. Like magicians, we can alter the chemistries of life. The powers we have acquired can continue to do harm even after our wars are over--- to our old enemies and to ourselves. Some of our weapons are so new and so potent that we don’t even have the means to assess the damage they do. And yet, we who create them are responsible for every effect they have--- on the battlefield, at home, in years to come. We must learn what we have done. Chemical and incendiary weapons have long been used in war. but World War I escalated the consequences of chemical warfare. both sides made use of phosgene, chlorine, and mustard gas, along with many less toXic agents. 1.3 million causalities, including 91,000 deaths were attributed to gas warfare. Worldwide revulsion over the use of these weapons led to the Geneva conference of 1925, which outlawed the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases. but the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to ratify the Geneva Protocols. During World War II, researchers in britain and the United States secretly developed nerve gases and powerful plant-killers that could have military uses. Two of these chemical agents were based on benzene and chlorine--- their names 2, 4-D, and 2, 4, 5-T. They destroyed plant life by imitating the action of plant horomones. DR. MATTHER MESELSON (Harvard University): At the gross level, they cause imbalanced growth. Cells that shouldn’t grow, or shouldn’t divide, do divide, and clog up the channels in plants through which nutrients flow. Root growth becomes unbalanced, the junction between the stem and the branch is disrupted, the leaf falls off, and that’s what causes defoliation. The actual mechanism by which the herbicides work, many theories have been suggested, and so far as I’m aware, there is no definitive proof for any of them. We simply don’t know eXactly how they work. NARRATOR: These chemical weapons were not used in World War II. but after the war, farmers and foresters hailed the weapons as tools. New insecticides and herbicides reduced the major causes of crop loss and allowed higher yields. Man had never had the exhilarating capacity to control and alter the very nature of life like this before. Few imagined the full spectrum of consequences these new powers entailed. The first indication that something in the herbicide 2, 4, 5-T was troublesome came in 1949. In Nitro, West Virginia, 228 Monsanto Chemical Company workers making 2, 4, 5-T contracted an eXtremely disfiguring disease called chloracne. It produces blackheads, cysts, and pustules in all parts of the body. In severe cases it has been known to persist for over 30 years. In 1957, German researchers isolated a chemical that caused not only chloracne, but also damage to the liver, kidneys, and nerves. It was an unwanted byproduct of 2, 4, 5-T, called 2, 3, 7, 8-TCDD. Tests on animals showed it to be eXtremely lethal even in tiny amounts. It has since proven to be the most toXic member of a group of chemicals called dioXins. but the use of 2, 4, 5-T as a weed- killer increased on food-crops, rangeland, forests, and lawns. And soon the herbicide would be reconsidered for a war-time mission. NEWSREEL NARRATOR: United States aid to the Vietnamese and the French in their long war against Viet Minh rebels, is brought sharply into focus in latest news developments. American Air Force technicians are reported servicing U.S. –supplied equipment. Answering critics in the United States, President Eisenhower says, “Every step the government takes in helping to fight the Reds in Indo-China is carefully calculated to keep the country from getting in too deep.” NARRARATOR: Our long war in Southeast Asia would be a guerilla war. Our immense advantage in air and firepower was outweighed by an enemy who could attack by night, then by day slip back into civilian population, into the dense jungle, or into underground tunnel compleXes. There were few distinct battlefields, few conclusive battles. American war planners soon realized that new technologies would be required to fight this kind of war. MAJOR PHILLIP bROWN, USAF: Well, the United States, in the process of entering into Viet Nam, became aware of the problem of ambush, and the inability to detect enemy presence, in Viet Nam. As a result, techniques were developed for detection. One opportunity for doing that was to eXamine the utilization of herbicides for defoliation, to uncover enemy positions, thereby protecting our own personnel. The Department of the Army had undertaken to eXamine the herbicides that were commercially available within the United States. NARRATOR: by the 1960’s the Geneva Protocols had come to include herbicides and riot-control gases in its definition of chemical warfare. So when the Pentagon recommended using herbicides in Viet Nam, not only as a defoliant, but to kill crops and thus deny food to the enemy, it provoked secret debate at the highest levels of our government. In 1962, despite fears of world opinion, President Kennedy approved full- scale crop destruction and defoliation plans for Viet Nam. Initially dubbed Operation Hades, the name of the program was later changed to Operation Ranch Hand. We didn’t consider these substances to be weapons; after all, they had widespread domestic uses in the United States. The Air Force modified C-123 aircraft to dispense 2, 3, 5-T, and other herbicides at as much as 20 times the rate recommended in the US. The herbicides were code-named after the color bands that identified the drums in which they were shipped and stored: Agents White, blue, Green, Purple, and Pink. but the most widely used herbicide of the war was Agent Orange, a blend of 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T. between 1962 and 1971, 19 million gallons of herbicide were poured over South Viet Nam, 11 million gallons of which were Agent Orange. 19% of Viet Nam’s upland forests, 41% of mangrove forests, and 8% of its cultivated lands were affected by Operation Ranch Hand. Civilians and soldiers alike were caught in this chemical storm. VETERAN: The war was my war. My father had served in World War II. My uncles had served in Korea, my grandfathers had served in World War I, so at the time it seemed that it was my place to be. VETERAN: but Cam Ranh bay is so beautiful. Oh, you just can’t believe how pretty that place is to fly into. I just wish I had a movie camera and could’ve gotten pictures of it, it is so pretty, all this country is just really beautiful over here. When you first come in, you’d never think there was a war going on.
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