THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS FROM HERBICIDE USE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR by JEFFREY R. CRAIG A SENIOR THESIS in GENERAL STUDIES Submitted to the General Studies Council in the College of Arts and Sciences at Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of BACHELOR OF GENERAL STUDIES Approved DR. PAUL iiiPPINS 7 Department of Health, Physical Educatio and Recreation Chairperson of the Thesis C 'ttee _........ DR. JAMES RECKNER Department of History 7 / DR. dl(Ry ELBOW //Department of Geography Accepted DR. DALE DAVIS Director of General Studies May 1992 f) no ' ^' ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS JAZ^ HP< 111f- w I would like to thank the members of my Thesis Committee: Dr. Gary Elbow, Dr. Paul Knipping, and Dr. James Reckner for giving me their help and valuable time during this project. I would also like to thank Dr. Dale Davis, Director of General Studies, and Kay Caddel, advisor for General Studies, for their contributions. 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES iv CHAPTER I. OPERATION RANCH HAND 1 The Ranch Hand organization 2 Military success 4 Herbicide information 5 Dioxin 11 II. THE ECOLOGY AND HERBICIDE USE 13 Inland forests 13 Mangrove forests 16 Wildlife 17 Government attitudes 18 NAS study 20 III. HUMANKIND AND HERBICIDE USE 22 NAS study 22 CDC studies 23 Ranch Hand study 25 International symposium 27 Legal Battle 28 IV. FINAL OBSERVATIONS 30 BIBLIOGRAPHY 33 111 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 1. Military Herbicides 6 2. Herbicide Composition 7 3. Herbicide Expenditures 9 4. Areas Treated With Herbicides 10 5. Dioxin Applications 12 6. Vegetation Types of South Vietnam 14 7. Map of South Vietnam 32 IV I. OPERATION RANCH HAND In January 1961, the United States implemented one of the most controversial operations in the Vietnam War: large-scale defoliation. The key question is, did this operation cause any long-term ill-effects to the countryside of Vietnam or to the humans who were exposed? The most recent reports suggest there was damage done to specific areas of Vietnam's environment; however, no concrete proof has shown a link between human health problems and the use of herbicides in the Vietnam War. Ranch Hand was the code name given to the U. S. program used to defoliate jungles and forests and to destroy food crops in Vietnam. This operation began as a counter-measure to the Viet Cong guerilla warfare tactics. In January 1961, the United States gained approval from the South Vietneimese government for the use of herbicides to destroy crops that were being used by the National Liberation Front. Shortly thereafter, herbicides were used to defoliate jungles and forests that served as cover for Viet Cong activities. According to John Vandermeer (1983), the U. S. also used defoliation in Vietnam to destroy the resource base of the South Vietncimese people so that they would be forced to relocate in areas of U. S. control. There was much debate within the U. S. government over implementation of this policy. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara believed that the herbicide missions should be kept covert in order not to erode public opinion for the war (Pfeiffer, 1982). Ambassador Frederick Nolting recommended that Ranch Hand aircraft bear civilian markings during the initial missions. E. W. Pfeiffer (1982) reported that thousands of gallons of herbicide arrived in Saigon via aircraft without the knowledge of the often-ignored International Control Commission (ICC). The ICC was set up in the Geneva Accords of 1954 to inspect military equipment that was sent to South Vietnam. One reason the government attempted to conceal early herbicide operations was the fear of international repercussions. The United States was the only major country not to sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned the use of biological or chemical weapons during war. The Ranch Hand Organization In 1961, the Ranch Hand Organization was put under the responsibility of the United States Air Force. The detachment was known as the 12th Air Commando Squadron and, later, the 12th Special Operations Squadron. From the beginning of the operation, field commanders' request for herbicide use exceeded the Ranch Hand organization capacity, even despite repeated expansion of the unit (Cecil, 1986). The crews, who were all handpicked volunteers, totalled 1209 members. The projects' motto, which was often printed under a picture 2 of Smokey the Bear, was "Only we can prevent forests" (Schell, 1971). The herbicides were sprayed by converted C-123 cargo planes. These planes were fitted with internal 1,000 gallon chemical tanks and removable spray bars under each wing. They flew at slow speeds and at tree top levels. According to Major General William Augerson (Senate Hearing, 1980), the typical spraying mission was flown at an altitude of 150 feet with a speed of 130 knots. Fighter cover was frequently scheduled to accompany defoliation missions, because the Ranch Hand flight profile made the aircraft particularly susceptible. Despite such efforts to protect them, the C-123s, which were unarmored as a necessary trade off for increased herbicide carrying capacity, were hit by more enemy ground fire than any other Air Force unit in the Vietnam War (Cecil, 1986). Given these inherent vulnerabilities of the Ranch Hand missions. Air Force officials kept flight schedules confidential to avoid a buildup of enemy ground fire (Futrell, 1981). During a typical spraying mission, three to five C-123 aircraft flew in a lateral formation (Westing, 1984). Each aircraft sprayed a strip 260 to 280 feet wide and 8.7 miles long. After each mission, reports were submitted to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters. These reports included: target number, number of targets accomplished, reasons for unsuccessful targets, number of gallons used, hits from ground fire, 3 and map coordinates of the spray mission (Senate Hearing, 1980). Military Success Operation Ranch Hand was militarily successful. In 1972, the Army's Engineer Strategic Study Group surveyed U. S. military officers in Vietnam. The study group concluded that combat operations would have been more difficult without the use of herbicides (Buckingham, 1983). The main impact of herbicide use was the increased visibility from the air and the perimeters that were established around fixed bases. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon, 1968, concluded his detailed study of Operation Ranch Hand by stating that the operation had been militarily successful (Buckingham, 1983). One of the most successful defoliation operations occurred in the Rung Sat Special Zone. This area was a dense mangrove-covered swamp along the vital shipping channels into Saigon (South Vietnam's main port). Sheltering in this swamp, the enemy harassed allied shipping that went into and out of Saigon. After 42 defoliation missions were completed, U. S. forces swept through the area and secured the shipping channels (McConnell, 1970). Retired Brigader General William Stone, the former director of chemical and nuclear operations for the U. S. Army in South Vietnam, acknowledged the success of 4 Operation Ranch Hand. Stone stated that the Viet Cong's ability to live off the land had been weakened. He also credited the lower number of ambushes along highways and canals to the removal of vegetation (McDaniel, 1971). Paul Frederick Cecil (1986) stated that American ground forces suffered fewer casualities because of better visibility due to herbicide operations. However, due to adverse publicity concerning the ecological effects of herbicide, in December 1970 President Nixon called for an end to herbicide warfare in Vietnam, and in April 1975, President Ford banned the use of herbicides in war. Herbicide Information Three herbicides (Table 1 and Table 2) were most commonly used by Operation Ranch Hand: agent orange, agent blue, and agent white. These herbicides were identified by the color of the stripe painted on the barrel during the shipping process in the U. S. The herbicide agent orange has been the focal point of scientists' concern since 1970. Agent orange is a mixture of two herbicides: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. These two herbicides were developed in the U. S. in 1944. Agent orange was used in more than 50% of the Ranch Hand missions. Approximately 43 million litres (11,359,396 gallons) of agent orange were sprayed on Vietnam ("Vietnam Herbicide Controversy," 1974). Agent orange was used exclusively as a defoliant. It has caused the 5 TABLE 1: Military Herbicides (Senate Hearing, 1971). 1. Agent Orange: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T Active Ingredients: A 1:1 mixture of the n-butyl esters of 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid. Concentrations: 4.1 and 4.4 lb./gallon. Application: Undiluted at 3 gallon/acre. 2. Agent White; 2,4-D and Picloram Active Ingredients: A 4:1 mixture of the tri- isopropanolamine salts of 2,4-D and 4-amino- 3,5,6- trichloro-picolinic acid in water. Concentrations: 2.0 and 0.54 lb./gallon. Application: Undiluted at 3 gallon/acre. 3. Agent Blue: Cacodylic Acid Active Ingredients: A 6:1 mixture of sodium dimethyl arsenate and dimethyl arsenic acid in water. Concentration: 3:1 lb./gallon. Application: Undiluted at 3 gallon/acre. TABLE 2 Chemical composition, rates of application, and uses of military herbicides. One lb. per gallon, acid equivalent (AE) = 114 grams per liter. One lb. per acre = 1.12 kilograms per hectare (Orians, 1970). Composition Concentration Agent (%) (lb/acre) Orange n-Butyl ester 2,4-D 50 4.2 n-Butyl ester 2,4,5-T 50 3.7 White Triisopropanolamine salt 2,4-D 2.0 Triisopropanolamine salt picloram 0.54 Blue Sodium cacodylate 27.7 Free cacodylic acid 4.8 Water, sodium chloride balance 3.1 Rate of application (lb/acre) Agent Vietncun U.S.