THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS FROM HERBICIDE
USE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR
by
JEFFREY R. CRAIG
A SENIOR THESIS
in
GENERAL STUDIES
Submitted to the General Studies Council in the College of Arts and Sciences at Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
BACHELOR OF GENERAL STUDIES
Approved
DR. PAUL iiiPPINS 7 Department of Health, Physical Educatio and Recreation Chairperson of the Thesis C 'ttee _......
DR. JAMES RECKNER Department of History
7 / DR. dl(Ry ELBOW //Department of Geography
Accepted
DR. DALE DAVIS Director of General Studies
May 1992 f) no
' ^' ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS JAZ^ HP< 111f- w I would like to thank the members of my Thesis
Committee: Dr. Gary Elbow, Dr. Paul Knipping, and
Dr. James Reckner for giving me their help and valuable time during this project. I would also like to thank Dr. Dale Davis, Director of General
Studies, and Kay Caddel, advisor for General
Studies, for their contributions.
11 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES iv
CHAPTER
I. OPERATION RANCH HAND 1 The Ranch Hand organization 2 Military success 4 Herbicide information 5 Dioxin 11 II. THE ECOLOGY AND HERBICIDE USE 13 Inland forests 13 Mangrove forests 16 Wildlife 17 Government attitudes 18 NAS study 20 III. HUMANKIND AND HERBICIDE USE 22 NAS study 22 CDC studies 23 Ranch Hand study 25 International symposium 27 Legal Battle 28
IV. FINAL OBSERVATIONS 30
BIBLIOGRAPHY 33
111 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
1. Military Herbicides 6 2. Herbicide Composition 7 3. Herbicide Expenditures 9 4. Areas Treated With Herbicides 10 5. Dioxin Applications 12 6. Vegetation Types of South Vietnam 14
7. Map of South Vietnam 32
IV I. OPERATION RANCH HAND
In January 1961, the United States implemented one of the most controversial operations in the Vietnam War: large-scale defoliation. The key question is, did this operation cause any long-term ill-effects to the countryside of Vietnam or to the humans who were exposed? The most recent reports suggest there was damage done to specific areas of Vietnam's environment; however, no concrete proof has shown a link between human health problems and the use of herbicides in the
Vietnam War.
Ranch Hand was the code name given to the U. S. program used to defoliate jungles and forests and to destroy food crops in Vietnam. This operation began as a counter-measure to the Viet Cong guerilla warfare tactics. In January 1961, the United States gained approval from the South Vietneimese government for the use of herbicides to destroy crops that were being used by the National Liberation Front. Shortly thereafter, herbicides were used to defoliate jungles and forests that served as cover for Viet Cong activities.
According to John Vandermeer (1983), the U. S. also used defoliation in Vietnam to destroy the resource base of the South Vietncimese people so that they would be forced to relocate in areas of U. S. control.
There was much debate within the U. S. government over implementation of this policy. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara believed that the herbicide missions should be kept covert in order not to erode public opinion for the war (Pfeiffer, 1982). Ambassador
Frederick Nolting recommended that Ranch Hand aircraft bear civilian markings during the initial missions.
E. W. Pfeiffer (1982) reported that thousands of gallons of herbicide arrived in Saigon via aircraft without the knowledge of the often-ignored International
Control Commission (ICC). The ICC was set up in the
Geneva Accords of 1954 to inspect military equipment that was sent to South Vietnam. One reason the government attempted to conceal early herbicide operations was the fear of international repercussions.
The United States was the only major country not to sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned the use of biological or chemical weapons during war.
The Ranch Hand Organization
In 1961, the Ranch Hand Organization was put under the responsibility of the United States Air Force. The detachment was known as the 12th Air Commando Squadron and, later, the 12th Special Operations Squadron. From the beginning of the operation, field commanders' request for herbicide use exceeded the Ranch Hand organization capacity, even despite repeated expansion of the unit (Cecil, 1986). The crews, who were all handpicked volunteers, totalled 1209 members. The projects' motto, which was often printed under a picture
2 of Smokey the Bear, was "Only we can prevent forests"
(Schell, 1971). The herbicides were sprayed by converted C-123 cargo planes. These planes were fitted with internal 1,000 gallon chemical tanks and removable spray bars under each wing. They flew at slow speeds and at tree top levels. According to Major General
William Augerson (Senate Hearing, 1980), the typical spraying mission was flown at an altitude of 150 feet with a speed of 130 knots. Fighter cover was frequently scheduled to accompany defoliation missions, because the
Ranch Hand flight profile made the aircraft particularly susceptible. Despite such efforts to protect them, the
C-123s, which were unarmored as a necessary trade off for increased herbicide carrying capacity, were hit by more enemy ground fire than any other Air Force unit in the Vietnam War (Cecil, 1986). Given these inherent vulnerabilities of the Ranch Hand missions. Air Force officials kept flight schedules confidential to avoid a buildup of enemy ground fire (Futrell, 1981). During a typical spraying mission, three to five C-123 aircraft flew in a lateral formation (Westing, 1984). Each aircraft sprayed a strip 260 to 280 feet wide and 8.7 miles long. After each mission, reports were submitted to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)
Headquarters. These reports included: target number, number of targets accomplished, reasons for unsuccessful targets, number of gallons used, hits from ground fire,
3 and map coordinates of the spray mission (Senate Hearing, 1980).
Military Success
Operation Ranch Hand was militarily successful. In
1972, the Army's Engineer Strategic Study Group surveyed
U. S. military officers in Vietnam. The study group concluded that combat operations would have been more difficult without the use of herbicides (Buckingham,
1983). The main impact of herbicide use was the increased visibility from the air and the perimeters that were established around fixed bases. Ambassador
Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon, 1968, concluded his detailed study of Operation Ranch Hand by stating that the operation had been militarily successful (Buckingham,
1983).
One of the most successful defoliation operations occurred in the Rung Sat Special Zone. This area was a dense mangrove-covered swamp along the vital shipping channels into Saigon (South Vietnam's main port).
Sheltering in this swamp, the enemy harassed allied shipping that went into and out of Saigon. After 42 defoliation missions were completed, U. S. forces swept through the area and secured the shipping channels
(McConnell, 1970).
Retired Brigader General William Stone, the former director of chemical and nuclear operations for the U.
S. Army in South Vietnam, acknowledged the success of
4 Operation Ranch Hand. Stone stated that the Viet Cong's ability to live off the land had been weakened. He also credited the lower number of ambushes along highways and canals to the removal of vegetation (McDaniel, 1971).
Paul Frederick Cecil (1986) stated that American ground forces suffered fewer casualities because of better visibility due to herbicide operations. However, due to adverse publicity concerning the ecological effects of herbicide, in December 1970 President Nixon called for an end to herbicide warfare in Vietnam, and in April 1975, President Ford banned the use of herbicides in war.
Herbicide Information
Three herbicides (Table 1 and Table 2) were most commonly used by Operation Ranch Hand: agent orange, agent blue, and agent white. These herbicides were identified by the color of the stripe painted on the barrel during the shipping process in the U. S.
The herbicide agent orange has been the focal point of scientists' concern since 1970. Agent orange is a mixture of two herbicides: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T. These two herbicides were developed in the U. S. in 1944. Agent orange was used in more than 50% of the Ranch Hand missions. Approximately 43 million litres (11,359,396 gallons) of agent orange were sprayed on Vietnam
("Vietnam Herbicide Controversy," 1974). Agent orange was used exclusively as a defoliant. It has caused the
5 TABLE 1: Military Herbicides (Senate Hearing, 1971).
1. Agent Orange: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T
Active Ingredients: A 1:1 mixture of the
n-butyl esters of 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid
and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid.
Concentrations: 4.1 and 4.4 lb./gallon.
Application: Undiluted at 3 gallon/acre.
2. Agent White; 2,4-D and Picloram
Active Ingredients: A 4:1 mixture of the tri-
isopropanolamine salts of 2,4-D and 4-amino-
3,5,6- trichloro-picolinic acid in water.
Concentrations: 2.0 and 0.54 lb./gallon.
Application: Undiluted at 3 gallon/acre.
3. Agent Blue: Cacodylic Acid
Active Ingredients: A 6:1 mixture of sodium
dimethyl arsenate and dimethyl arsenic acid in
water.
Concentration: 3:1 lb./gallon.
Application: Undiluted at 3 gallon/acre. TABLE 2 Chemical composition, rates of application, and uses of military herbicides. One lb. per gallon, acid equivalent (AE) = 114 grams per liter. One lb. per acre = 1.12 kilograms per hectare (Orians, 1970).
Composition Concentration Agent (%) (lb/acre)
Orange n-Butyl ester 2,4-D 50 4.2 n-Butyl ester 2,4,5-T 50 3.7
White Triisopropanolamine salt 2,4-D 2.0 Triisopropanolamine salt picloram 0.54 Blue Sodium cacodylate 27.7 Free cacodylic acid 4.8 Water, sodium chloride balance 3.1
Rate of application (lb/acre) Agent Vietncun U.S. Use
Orange 27 General defoliation of forest, brush, and broad- leaved crops.
White 2,4-D 6 Picloram 1.5 0.5-2 Forest defoliation where longer term control is desired.
Blue 9.3 5-7.5 Rapid short-term defoliation. Good for grass control and use on rice. most controversy because one of its ingredients is dioxin, a hazardous chemical that resists biodegradation.
Agent white, which was used in approximately 30% of the defoliation missions, is a mixture of picloram and
2,4-D. It was sprayed in areas in which accurate placement was necessary (Boffey, 1968). Agents orange and white killed plants by interfering with their normal metabolism (Westing, 1984).
Agent blue is comprised of arsenic-containing cacodylic acid. It was used only for crop destruction in Vietnam. Agent blue comprised about 10% of the herbicide used in Vietnam. It was particularly effective in killing rice crops (Boffey, 1968). Agent blue prevented the plant from retaining moisture
(Westing, 1984). Its use in the United States is prohibited.
William Buckingham (1983) stated that over 6 million acres of South Vietncon were sprayed with some type of herbicide. This number does not correct for multiple coverage, though. Approximately 4.2 million acres received at least one application of herbicide
(Table 3 and Table 4). The Republic of Vietnam (South
Vietnam) consisted of over 42 million acres (172,000 kilometers), so that approximately 10% of South Vietnam received at least one herbicide application. The total amount of herbicide used in South Vietnam amounted to
8 TABLE 3: U. S. Herbicide expenditures, in acres, in South Vietnam. A breakdown by vegetation type (Westing, 1984).
Area sprayed once Vegetation type Area or more
Dense Forest 14,355,609 2,665,688 Primary 11,137,972 2,069,187 Primary plus secondary 1,485,063 274,736 Secondary 1,732,573 321,763
Open (clear) Forest 4,950,210 274,510 Bamboo brake 1,980,084 99,004
Mangrove Forest (swamp)1 1,237,525 373,740 True 742,531 306,913 Rear (back) 495,021 66,827 Rubber Plantation 247,510 74,253
Pine Forest 247,510 0 Miscellaneous Woody Vegetation 2,722,615 89,103
Woody sub-total 25,840,096 3,549,300
Paddy (wet) rice 6,187,762 146,031
Field Crops (Upland rice, etc.) 1,237,525 438,093 Agricultural sub-total 7,425,315 584,124
Miscellaneous 9,717,262 0
Total 42,883,669 4,133,425 TABLE 4: Area treated with herbicides in South Vietnam (Senate Hearing, 1971).
ACRES
Year Forest land Crop land Total
1962 4,940 741 5,681
1963 24,700 247 24,947
1964 83,486 10,374 93,860
1965 155,610 65,949 221,559
1966 741,247 101,517 842,764
1967 1-,486,446 221,312 1,,707,57 8
1968 1,,267,11 0 63,726 1,,330,83 6
1969 1-,221,415 65,700 1 ,287,115 1970 * * *
Total 4.,984,95 4 529,566 5 ,514,410
* Data not available.
10 19,020,384 gallons (72,000,000 litres or more than 100 million pounds). Senator Gaylord Nelson of
Wisconsin, who was against the Vietnam War, stated, "The
U. S. has sprayed (in South Vietnam) enough chemicals to amount to six pounds for every man, woman, and child in that country" (Schell, 1971).
Dioxin
As stated earlier, one of agent orange's ingredients contains dioxin. Dioxin, a component of agent orange, is a byproduct from the manufacture of the herbicide 2,4,5-T. Dioxin (2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-dibenzo- paradioxin or TCDD) is formed in low concentrations (25 parts per million) in the manufacture of 2,4,5-T
(Department of The Army, 1988). Arthur Westing (1971) stated that since over 47 million pounds of 2,4,5-T have been sprayed in South Vietnam, 170 kilograms of dioxin have been introduced into the environment (Table 5). It is dioxin that has become the center of legal, scientific, and health questions.
11 TABLE 5: Dioxin applications in the Vietnam War (Westing, 1984).
Military Military Military Military Region Region Region Region Year 1 11 III IV Total A. Amount (kg)
1961 ? 1962 0.1 0, 2 1963 0.2 0, 2 0.6 0, 1 1. 1 1964 0.6 0, 8 1.9 0, 3 3 6 1965 1.2 1, 4 3.6 0, 6 6, 8 1966 4.1 5, 1 12 9 2. 2 24, 4 1967 1. 7 9, 6 24 1 4, 1 45, 5 1968 5 8 7, 1 18 0 3 1 33, 9 1969 8 1 10 0 25 1 4, 3 47, 4 1970 1 2 1, 5 3 7 0 6 6, 9
Total 28.9 35.7 90.1 15.3 170.0
B. Amount per unit area, assuring uniform distribution over the entire region (mg/ha).
1961 ? ? ? ? ? 1962 - - - - - 1963 0.1 - 0.2 - 0.1 1964 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 1965 0.4 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.4 1966 1.5 0.7 4.3 0.6 1.4 1967 2.8 1.2 8.0 1.1 2.6 1968 2.0 0.9 5.9 0.8 2.0 1969 2.9 1.3 8.3 1.1 2.7 1970 0.4 0.2 1.2 0.2 0.4
Total 10.3 4.6 29.8 4.0 9.8
12 II. THE ECOLOGY AND HERBICIDE USE
One of the questions that scientists have asked is, what is the extent of the damage to the ecology from herbicide use? One reason the scientists questioned the amount of damage was in order to reduce the number of flights, defoliants were sprayed in concentrations up to ten times those recommended in the United States (Cook,
Galston, and Haseltine, 1970). It was believed that some change would occur since massive amounts of chemicals were introduced into a complex, tropical ecology. Robert Cook, Arthur Galston, and Willicun
Haseltine (197 0) stated that the complex ecology of a tropical region is like "the interdependence of a pyramid of toy blocks; the removal of one element upsets all the others" (p.21). The focus will now examine the impacts of herbicide spraying in Vietnam (Table 6).
Inland Forests
Woody vegetation covers 60% of South Vietnam. Over half of this is dense inland forest. Approximately
14.3% of the inland forests of South Vietnam were sprayed at least once (Westing, 1984). Arthur Westing
(1971) travelled to Vietnam in 1969 to study the impacts of herbicide on the ecology. He stated that the trees lost their leaves two to three weeks after being sprayed. The trees would remain bare for months. He noticed that sunlight was now able to reach the forest floor and promoted the growth of thick grasses and scrub
13 TABLE 6: Land cover of South Vietnam (Senate Hearing, 1971).
Forest Square Kilometers
Hardwood 100,000
Mangrove 2,800
Rear Mangrove 2,000
Rubber 1,000
Pine 1,800
Approximate total, forest area 107,600
Other
Brush wood, coffee, and tea plantations 11,000
Crops 37,000
Savannah 1,300
Dune grass and trees 1,100
Swamps and marshes 8,500
Urban areas 100
Water and unaccounted 7,200
Total area 173,800
14 bamboo (Westing, 1971). This dense bamboo retarded regeneration of the forest (Tschirley, 1969) and was extremely difficult to eradicate (McDaniel, 1971). When refoliation occurred, 10% of the trees did not survive
(Westing, 1971). The surviving trees showed various levels of injury. The most common injuries were crown
(branch) dieback and temporary sterility (Westing,
1984). With each additional spraying, the tree injuries and deaths increased (depending on the interval between sprayings). Over half of the trees that were sprayed repeatedly with no interval between sprayings were killed (Westing, 1971).
Another problem in the destruction of the inland forest is called nutrient dumping. The natural process where foliage falls to the ground, decays, and returns minerals and nutrients to the earth was being interrupted. Since more foliage was falling to the ground, the soil could not hold all of the nutrients
(Westing, 1984). The nutrients were washed away, along with loose soil. The nutrient dumping continued until a replacement vegetation stabilized the soil. The replacement vegetation did not surface until the next growing season (Westing, 1984).
A final problem with the destruction of the inland forest was the loss of commercial timber. It has been estimated that 10 to 20 million cubic meters of timber was lost due to herbicide induced deaths or damage
15 (Westing, 1984). This timber was valued at over $500 million (Schell, 1971).
Effects on Mangrove Forests
The mangrove forests (which are located along the
South Vietnam coastline) are a transitional zone between the land and the sea. The mangrove forests are important because they protect the coastline against wind, waves, currents, and tides. The mangrove forests have received more damage from herbicide spraying than any other vegetation. The mangrove forest proved to be especially susceptible to the herbicides orange and white, which killed the forests after one treatment
(Schell, 1971). Arthur Galston (1974) determined that
36% of the mangrove forests were killed by herbicide.
Fred Tschirley (1969) visited South Vietnam and stated that seven years after both sides of the Ong Doc
River were sprayed, the treated strips were still visible. The U. S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study team concluded (after visiting Vietnam in 1974) that the mangrove forests were damaged so badly that they would take approximately 100 years to recover
(Westing, 1984). The NAS did, however, state that with human intervention, the mangrove forests could recover within 20 years. Also, with the mangrove forests turned into lifeless swamps, the erosion rate increased significantly (Westing, 1984).
16 Effects on Wildlife
With the destruction of trees and other vegetation by herbicides, the animal populations suffered, too.
Gordon Orians and E. W. Pfeiffer (1970) stated that animal populations could not move to nearby areas after their habitats were defoliated. Orians and Pfeiffer believed that the tropical forest areas could support only a certain number of species. They added that most of the areas in question already supported a maximum number of species. Although the upheaval of insects, birds, and small mammals occurred, it did not have any known long-term effect on their populations.
One area where animal populations suffered long- term effects was the mangrove forests and swamps. The destruction of the mangrove forests has caused three changes. The first change deals with the reduction in fish species diversity (Westing, 1984). This reduction was attributed to the destruction of algae and invertebrates that provide food for these fish. The second change deals with the invasion of fish species alien to the mangrove community. The third change shows a reduction in fish biomass and productivity. This reduction will have a long-term impact on the ecosystem and the human population (Galston, 1974). The local human population will catch fewer and smaller fish and, therefore, not gain the valuable protein and nutrients provided by the fish.
17 Fish from destroyed mangrove communities showed much higher rates of extinction than fish from mangrove forests that were not treated with herbicide (Orians,
1970). All of these changes are linked to the reduction of the fish's natural food supplies, both plant and animal (Westing, 1984).
Government Attitudes
In 1967, the director of Defense Research and
Engineering for the Department of Defense, John Foster, stated that the use of herbicides in Vietnam would not have any adverse ecological impact (Pfeiffer, 1982).
Foster's statement reflected the attitude of the chemical companies who produced the herbicide, the U. S. military, and other government agencies. In 1968, the
Department of Defense released a summary of a report that assessed the ecological impact of herbicides. It stated: 1) Destruction of vegetation is the greatest
direct ecological consequence of using herbicides
. . . .Secondary growth or replacement vegetation
invades rapidly under the tropical conditions of
Vietnam, and partially killed or defoliated trees
exhibit rapid recovery.
2) Long term effects on wildlife may be beneficial
or detrimental. In many temperate zone areas,
herbicidal treatment of forest has improved the
wildlife habitat and favored animal production
18 through increases in wildlife food plants.
3) Herbicides now in use in Vietnam will not persist at a phytotoxic (poisonous to plants) level in the soil for long periods.
4) The possibility of lethal toxicity to humans, domestic animals or wildlife by use of herbicides is highly unlikely. Direct toxicity hazard to people and animals on the ground is nearly nonexistent.
5) Unlike many insecticides, herbicides seldom persist in animal or insect tissues. Transfer of herbicides to the next animal in the food chain on defoliant-treated areas is negligible. Most herbicides, including all of those used in Vietnam, are readily excreted and do not accumulate in the animal body-
6) Indirect effects of herbicides resulting from destruction of aquatic vegetation may produce changes in the biota of the aquatic environment.
Direct toxic effects on fish and aquatic organisms are negligible. Destruction of specific plants used for fish foods will lead to changes in the food chain of the aquatic ecosystem. Application of herbicides to remove floating aquatic weeds will provide important benefits because their (the weeds) presence depletes the oxygen content of the water (Boffey, 1968).
19 The Department of Defense tried to show how beneficial herbicides were to the ecology. Only when test results showed the harmful effects of herbicide use on the Vietnam environment did the government change its position.
National Academy of Sciences Study
In 1974, at the urging of Senators Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin and Thomas Mclntyre of New Hampshire, the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) undertook a study to determine the impact of the defoliation program
(Shapely, 1974). The NAS found only the mangrove forests suffered long-term damage. As noted earlier, they estimated the natural recovery time for the destroyed mangrove forests at 100 years. The rest of the damages was not considered a long-term problem. The
NAS recommended more studies to continue to monitoring the situation. An earlier study in 1967 by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science had come to the same conclusions (Buckingham, 1983).
In January of 1983, an international group of 161 scientists gathered in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) to study the long-term effects of herbicides used during the Vietnam War on humans and the ecology. Their conclusions regarding its effect on its ecology were:
1) The composition of affected soils has changed.
2) Useful micro-organisms have been destroyed and
caused some soils to lose their fertility.
20 3) Areas once covered with trees have become savannas. These savannas are continuing to expand.
4) Particular species of tropical wood are facing extermination.
5) Aquatic plants and animals in the mangrove areas are in danger of extinction.
6) Much more research, in the spirit of international cooperation, on the subject needs to be conducted (Westing, 1984).
21 III. HUMANKIND AND HERBICIDE USE
The biggest controversy involving herbicide use in
Vietnam centered on the effects on the health of U. S. veterans and on the Vietnamese themselves. Although chemical companies claimed agents orange and white were harmless to man, their warning label contradicted this.
The warning label stated: "Do not allow material to contaminate water used for irrigation, drinking, or other domestic purposes" (Orians, 1970). The primary concern over human health effects involved the dioxin impurity that is a byproduct of the manufacture of
2,4,5-T. By 1977, Vietnam veterans had begun complaining to the Veterans' Aciministration about health problems they believed were related to herbicide exposure in Vietnam. Some of the illnesses that the veterans claimed to be caused by herbicide (particularly agent orange) included skin conditions (chloracne), cancer, nervous disorders, reduced libido, birth defects in offspring, impotency, numbness in extremities, miscarriages, gastrointestinal tract disturbances, and vision and/or hearing impairment (Hansen, 1981). The remainder of this section will examine the major studies on long-term effects from herbicide exposure and their conclusions.
National Academy of Sciences
The National Academy of Sciences' (NAS) Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam released its
22 findings in 1974. Their conclusion about the effects on human health stated that the only long-term effect from herbicides containing dioxin was the skin condition known as chloracne (Holden, 1979). The committee said that the probability of long-term effects on Americans were highly remote. The NAS added that "no conclusive evidence of an association between herbicides and human birth defects" existed (Shapely, 1974). The NAS did uncover a pattern of secondhand reports which stated that the herbicides had caused respiratory problems in
Vietnamese children (Buckingham, 1983). However, the
NAS could not confirm these reports. They did recommend more studies to look at other possible links between herbicides and health problems.
Center For Disease Control
The Center For Disease Control (CDC) completed major studies in 1983, 1987, and 1990. The first study
in 1983, involved more than 15,000 veterans. The
conclusion of this study said veterans were "generally"
in good health (Long, 1983). The CDC's epidemiologists
stated that the Vietnam veterans exposed to agent
orange had no greater likelihood of fathering children
with serious birth defects. The following health
problems were not found to be associated with herbicide
or dioxin exposure: liver dysfunction, impaired immune
function, porphyria, and lipid abnormalities (Long,
1983). 23 In 1987, the CDC tested blood from 500 Vietnam veterans. The CDC found that dioxin had a half-life of seven years in humans. This would mean dioxin levels would still be at higher levels. By examining the lipids in the blood, the CDC could determine the dioxin amounts in the veterans (Booth, 1987). This test was to lead to a larger study. However, the results showed that the dioxin levels were at 3.8 parts per trillion; the same amount of dioxin one would expect to find in individuals of industrialized countries (Booth, 1987).
The CDC now attempted a large epidemiological study by using military records to determine which troops had been exposed to agent orange. The CDC determined that the military records were inadequate for a scientific study. The Office of Technology Assessment backed up the CDC's conclusion, much to the disappointment of veteran groups. In addition, the CDC concluded that the self-assessments of veterans were not reliable guides for identifying people who were exposed (Booth, 1987).
In 1990, the CDC released its findings from a controversial study. It determined that Vietnam veterans faced a 50% greater risk of developing cancer of the lymph nodes (non-Hodgkin's lymphoma). The
Vietnam veteran had a risk of 1.5 per 10,000, compared with the risk of 1 in 10,000 among the control group.
However, the CDC stated that this increase could not be linked to herbicide or dioxin exposure. The CDC
24 reported that U. S. Navy men on ships had higher risks than land veterans who were exposed more often.
Ranch Hand Study
In 1978, researchers at the Air Force laboratory concluded that any adverse effect from herbicide exposure would have manifested itself shortly thereafter. The researchers stated that symptoms which appeared months or years later were probably not caused by herbicides (Buckingham, 1983). The Air Force found no connection between cancer, fetal deformities, or mutations and herbicide exposure.
In 1979, the Air Force announced it would study
1,174, or 97%, of the personnel of Project Ranch Hand.
The Ranch Handers would be compared to a group of 1,532 matched controls. The study would use the following criteria:
1) Personnel tracking procedures and
medical/personnel record reviews to pinpoint
mortality patterns.
2) Extensive baseline telephone questionnaires to
ascertain current and past symptoms of health
events.
3) Comprehensive physical examinations to determine
exact health status and to provide a baseline data
platform with which to correlate the symptoms.
4) Additional questionnaires and physical
examinations to be administered periodically during
25 the follow-up phase (Senate Hearing, 1980).
The Air Force felt the Ranch Hand group would be the best group to study because of their frequent exposure to herbicides. On September 15, 1982, the Air
Force Deputy Surgeon General, Major General Murphy
Chesney, released the results of the Ranch Hand study.
Chesney reported that Ranch Hand veterans showed death rates equivalent to the comparison group and significantly lower mortality rates than the general population of white American males of the same age.
Veteran groups were quick to point out the following statistics from the study:
1) Higher than normal incidences of nonmelanoma
skin cancer, 3.4% versus 2.1% in controls.
2) Minor birth defects (such as birthmarks), 9.1%
versus 6.5% in controls.
3) More deaths among newborns, 1.7% versus 0.4%
cunong controls.
4) Somewhat higher incidences of subjective
psychological disorder, with enlisted men in the
Ranch Hand group scoring higher on indexes
measuring hypochondria, psychosomatic tendencies,
and ^denial.'
5) Certain liver disorders, including 1.56% in the
Ranch Hand group having enlarged livers versus
0.78% among controls. The Ranch Hand group had 23%
more skin changes usually associated with disturbed
26 porphyrin metabolism in the liver, a syndrome
called porphyria cutanea tarda (Fox, 1984).
The Air Force stated these statistics could not be linked to dioxin exposure. The mean serum level of dioxin was 49 parts per trillion (ppt) in Ranch Handers compared to 5 ppt in the controls. Five of the Ranch
Handers had dioxin levels between 200 to 300 ppt. The study did not show statistical differences between the
Ranch Handers and controls in the occurence of soft- tissue sarcomas. Several veteran groups claim that the soft-tissue sarcomas will eventually show up in Ranch
Handers. The veteran groups feel that the size of the
Ranch Hand group, the rarity of this type of cancer, and the time it takes to develop explain why it has not yet been observed in this group (Fox, 1984). This study seems to be open to different interpretations. With the addition of the follow-up studies, the picture regarding long-term effects on human health may become clearer.
International Symposium
In January 1983, the "International Symposium on
Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature" was held in Ho Chi Minh City
(Saigon). The symposium included scientists from the
United States, Vietnam, and 19 other countries. The conclusion of the scientists was that exposure to agent orange did cause health problems in humans
(Congressional Hearing, 1984). The symposium also
27 recommended that further studies should be conducted to specify exactly what ill-effects the human population suffered. The symposium concluded that apparent adverse reproductive effects were occurring among the civilian population in Vietneun (Westing, 1984). However, the
Veterans' Administration and the White House both discounted the findings and recommendations of the symposium (Congressional Hearing, 1984).
Vietnamese scientists reported that in areas where herbicide was sprayed, increased rates of birth defects have occurred (Vandermeer, 1983). Also reported were more frequent problems with pregnancies, a higher incidence of chromosomal abnormalities, and higher rates of carcinomas. However, these reports cannot be considered valid. The major problem with these reports is the lack of technical and monetary resources available to the scientific community in Vietnam
(Vandermeer, 1983). Also, grossly inadequate demographic and public health statistics have detracted
from the validity of the reports. While these reports may eventually be validated, it will be extremely
difficult without financial and scientific support
from the United States.
Legal Battle
In 1979, thousands of Vietnam veterans filed a
class action suit against five chemical companies who
manufactured agent orange. The veterans wanted a trust
28 fund to be created to compensate all veterans and their children that were injured by dioxin. The fund, which could have been over a billion dollars, would be financed by the five chemical companies: Dow Chemical
Company, Monsanto Company, Thompson Hayward Chemical
Company, Hercules, Inc., and the Diamond Shamrock
Corporation (Hansen, 1981). The chemical companies asked that the U. S. Government be named as a defendant, also. The chemical companies felt that any harm caused by agent orange was due to the military's misuse of a proven safe product. The case was dismissed in November
1980 on procedural grounds (Hansen, 1981).
In May 1987, after years of legal manuvering, a settlement was reached. Judge Jack B. Weinstein approved an $180 million settlement between Vietnam war veterans and seven chemical companies (Uniroyal and TH
Agriculture & Nutrition were added to the lawsuit).
Judge Weinstein called on the government to help those veterans who claimed they were harmed by agent orange.
However, both the government and the chemical companies both contended that no proof has been shown that dioxin causes any ill-effects (other than chloracne) in humans.
29 V. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Vietnam veterans have stated that the White House and the Veterans' Administration invariably lean toward findings that do not show a connection between agent orange and veteran health problems. Veterans also claim that the government dismisses any findings that do show a connection. The problem that arises is that the research findings are open to different interpretations.
A key question that has yet to be answered is, how much evidence is necessary to prove or disprove adverse health effects and a veteran's right to disability compensation (Hansen, 1981)?
What long-term ecological damage was caused by
Operation Ranch Hand? Both sides can agree on only one region: the mangrove forests. The damage to the rest of
South Vietnam's ecology has been less than originally feared. Thomas Perry (1968) predicted that Vietnam could become a "land without green foliage . . . without insects, without birds, without animal life of any form." Mr. Perry's prediction did not prove to be correct. Still, more research at a later date will be necessary to determine the long-term harm, if any, of herbicide use in Vietnam.
In terms of adverse effects on human health, both sides agree only on the skin condition called chloracne.
Conclusive evidence, pro or con, will be required to end the controversy over human health problems caused by
30 dioxin. The facts state that dioxin is carcinogenic, teratogenic, and mutagenic in laboratory rats and mice (Thomasson, 1979). The facts also state that currently dioxin can not be linked to cancer and birth defects in humans (Gunby, 1983).
To date, there is a lack of conclusive proof of long-term ill-effects from herbicide operations during the Vietnam War on either Vietnam or the Vietnam veteran. Further research should be continued for many years to determine what effects the use of herbicide will have on nature and humans. Given the adverse publicity surrounding herbicidal warfare, it is unlikely that the United States will ever again use herbicide on a large-scale in wartime.
31 Figure 1.1. South Viet Nam during tlie Second indocliina War (Westing , 1984) (Populations shown are estimates for 1969.)
Military Region I Area \ 2 812x10'ha \ PopulationVa 076X10' South Viet Nam ^ Density U)9/lon* Area 17 326x10'ha Population 17 633x10' Density 102/km'
14'
AY
itary wt|ipn HI „^^ SdilxlO'ha ^toUon 4t»#MlO'(VinhdtitCialbo«it9lt) ^ionlV ^3 797X10'ha Populatlflu 6 814x10' 174/km' 50 too 160 200 km ^ CalAau <9 _j I 1 1 I 106 Longitude East 108° of Greenwich iity* LiberKanor. Stockholm 1984 32 BIBLIOGRAPHY Boffey, Philip M. "Defense Issues Summary of Defoliation Study." Science 159 (1968): 613. Booth, William. "Agent Orange Study Hits Brick Wall." Science 237 (1987): 1285-1286. Buckingham, William. "Operation Ranch Hand: Herbicides in Southeast Asia." Air Universitv Review 34 (1983): 42-53. Cecil, Paul Frederick. Herbicidal Warfare: The Ranch Hand Project in Vietnam. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986. Cook, Robert E., Arthur W. Galston and William Haseltine. "What Have We Done to Vietnam?" The New Republic 162 (1970): 18-21. Department of the Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group. Herbicide Status Report. Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1988. Fox, Jeffrey L. "Agent Orange Study is Like a Chameleon." Science 223 (1984): 1156-1157. Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965. Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1981. Galston, Arthur W. "The Ungreening of South Vietnam." Natural History 83 (1974): 10-14. Gunby, Phil. "More Questions, Not Answers, Emerge from Agent Orange Studies." American Medical Association Journal 249 (1983): 2743-2746. Hansen, John C. "The Vietnam Veteran vs. Agent Orange: The War That Lingers." The GAO Review 16 (1981): 29-36. Holden, Constance. "Agent Orange Furor Continues to Build." Science 205 (1979): 770-772. House of Representatives. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Agent Orange in Vietnam. Washington, D. C: 1984. 33 Long, Janice R., David J. Hanson. "Dioxin Issue Focuses on Three Controversies in U. S." Chemical and Engineering News 61 (1983): 23-30. McConnell, Arthur F. "Mission: Ranch Hand." Air University Review 21 (1970): 89-94. McDaniel, Charles-Gene. "Herbicides in Vietnam: Violating the Laws Starving Our Allies." Christian Centurv 88 (1971): 195-197. Orians, Gordon H., E. W. Pfeiffer. "Ecological Effects of the War in Vietnam." Science 168 (1970): 544- 554. Perry, Thomas 0. "Vietnam: Truths of Defoliation." Science 160 (1968): 601. Pfeiffer, E. W. "Operation Ranch Hand: The U. S. Herbicide Program." Bullentin of The Atomic Scientist 38 (1982): 20-24. Schell, Orville Jr. "Silent Vietnam." Look 35 (1971): 55-58. Shapely, Deborah. "Herbicides: Academy Finds Damage in Vietnam after a Fight of It's Own." Science 183 (1974): 1177-1180. Thomasson, W. A. "Deadly Legacy: Dioxin and the Vietneun Veteran." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 35 (1979): 14-19. Tschirley, Fred H. "Defoliation in Vietnam." Science 163 (1969): 779-786. United States Senate. Committee on Veteran Affairs. Vietnam Veterans' Readjustment. Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1980. United States Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. War- Related Civilian Problems in Indochina, Part I- Vietnam. Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1971. Vandermeer, John. "Ecological Warfare." Science For The People 15 (1983): 11-16. "Vietnam Herbicide Controversy." Chemistry 47 (1974): 23-25. Westing, Arthur H. "Ecocide in Indochina." Natural History 80 (1971): 56-61. 34 Westing, Arthur H. Herbicides in War; The Long-Term Ecological and Human Consequences. London: Taylor and Francis, 1984. 35