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Armenia: Change of Power SPECIAL RAPORT 18/06/2018 ARMENIA: CHANGE OF POWER The Warsaw Institute Foundation ARMENIA: CHANGE OF POWER • Armenia’s new government was formed by Nikol Pashinyan, the leader of the April protests that had eventually led to the change of power in the country. For his cabinet, he has appointed ministers of foreign affairs and national defense, both of them being experienced specialists; such a decision should foster non- revolutionary politics in these domains. • The new authorities do not intend to re-evaluate relations with the Russian Federation as the country guarantees Armenia’s security. They also assume that the alliance with Russia will be developed simultaneously with strengthening cooperation with the United States and the European Union. • The main threat is the instability of the new government and its dependence on the support from representatives of the previous system of power. A possible inability to call snap elections may result in the country’s destabilisation and, as a result, may lead to an escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA NIKOL PASHINYAN. SOURCE: PRIMEMINISTER.AM 2 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org ARMENIA: CHANGE OF POWER THE PRIME MINISTER NIKOL PASHINYAN WITH THE NEWLY APPOINTED CABINET MINISTERS. SOURCE: PRIMEMINISTER.AM On May 8, the Armenian parliament voted in overtly declared lack of support for Mr favour of the candidacy of Nikol Pashinyan Pashinyan, decided not to block his candidacy (leader of the Civic Contract party allied in for the head of the government. As a result, the Yelk electoral block) for the country’s Mr Pashinyan was supported by 59 MPs, including a dozen of the RPA members, which made it possible to avoid early elections. Snap elections would The new cabinet included Mr Pashinyan’s close collaborators from the Yelk electoral be organised within block (such as two deputy prime ministers) as well as ministers delegated by two a year after changing political parties: Prosperous Armenia and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation the electoral law. (Dashnaktsutyun; in April this year, they finally supported the protesters) as well as new prime minister. Such a breakthrough non-partisan technocrats. In most cases, the was possible thanks to the approval from composition of the new government received the previously ruling Republican Party of a positive response, especially in terms of Armenia (also referred to as RPA; the party ministries being of key importance from the had an absolute majority in the National point of view of foreign policy. Armenia’s Assembly). Its members, even though they ambassador to the United Nations until now, www.warsawinstitute.org Special Report 3 ARMENIA: CHANGE OF POWER Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, will serve as foreign to choose new members of the National minister while the new Defence Minister Assembly. Snap elections would be organised Davit Tonoyan (former Deputy Minister of within a year after changing the electoral law Defence) worked as minister for emergency and implementing all necessary systems that situations in the previous government. Both would ensure their full integrity. ministers hold necessary competences and experience that should ensure relative stability APRIL REVOLUTION in Armenia’s security policy. Nikol Pashinyan was elevated to the post of prime minister after mass demonstrations that The process of shaping new government took place for over a month in Yerevan and was completed on June 7 when the National other Armenian cities. The protests broke out Assembly approved the program of after electing and appointing Serzh Sarksyan Pashinyan’s cabinet. The document, apart the prime minister of Armenia. Mr Sarksyan from the „standard” agenda of work in is the chairman of the Republican Party of particular areas, emphasised the need to Armenia (RPA); in 2008-2018, he also served separate business and politics (including the as Armenian president in 2008-2018 and fight against corruption) as well as it urged was the author of the constitutional reform to call snap elections. The content of the changing the country’s political system from program states that the Armenian parliament semi-presidential to parliamentary one. It was in its present shape does not reflect the real generally believed that the amendment could will of the nation, which implies the need have been imposed by Mr Sarksyan’s personal MAY 2018. ARMENIAN PEOPLE ATTEND AN OPPOSITION RALLY IN YEREVAN, ARMENIA. SOURCE: ZURAB KURTSIKIDZE (PAP/EPA) 4 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org ARMENIA: CHANGE OF POWER interests as, according to the current law, independent oligarchs who had managed former prime minister could not be elected to build their empires before 1998 (such as for his third presidential term. As a result, for example former leader of the Prosperous Sarksyan’s desire to retain power (interestingly, Armenia political party Gagik Tsarukyan). The consolidation of this type of system over he denied rumours that he would take the the last 25 years has led to social stratification post of prime minister after the amendment in the country, and the percentage of people came into effect) has led to the outbreak of living below the poverty line fluctuates around the largest social protests since the 1990s. 30 percent, even despite widespread economic The demonstrations were organized both by emigration. As a result, the forced resignation grassroots civic initiatives as well as political of Serzh Sarksyan from the prime minister’s groupings related to Mr Pashinyan who office (April 23) did not satisfy the demands of quickly became the leader of the movement. the protesters who claimed the appointment of a „provisional government” as well as urged Although Mr Sarksyan’s candidacy for the for fair parliamentary elections. prime minister’s office was the catalyst for the outbreak of social discontent, in fact, ARMENIA’S DOMESTIC MATTERS Surprisingly, protesters’ demands did not concern foreign policy and, importantly, the country’s relations with the Russian Federation. It should be emphasized that Many protesters during this year’s demonstrations neither were not against the anti-Russian slogans nor postulates of former president but they rather expressed Other countries their disapproval got involved in the of political and development of oligarchic system he Armenia’s political seems to represent. situation only to a many protesters were not against the former limited extent. president but they rather expressed their disapproval of political and oligarchic system he seems to represent. Since Armenia’s palace integration with the EU could be spotted, and coup (1998), the country has been ruled by the protests agenda concerned essentially the the so-called „Karabakh clan”, whose members Armenian policy. It is important inasmuch (including Serzh Sargsyan or his predecessor Robert Kocharyan) started their political as in recent years Armenians have expressed careers in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. their increasing distrust towards Russia. The politicians gained a dominant position Even though the Russian Federation is still in the country, although they also functioned perceived as the country’s only protector with the coexistence of a number of partially in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh www.warsawinstitute.org Special Report 5 ARMENIA: CHANGE OF POWER NIKOL PASHINYAN MEETING WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN IN SOCHI. SOURCE: PRIMEMINISTER.AM conflict and the blockade imposed by Turkey, as evidenced by unexpected landing of the the Armenian perceptions of its activities Russian government aircraft in Yerevan and its are becoming more and more varied. In departure less than an hour later. this respect, one can mention such factors as adverse effects on the country’s national economy due to its integration with the Eurasian structures, increases in gas and Now new prime electric prices (as both are provided by minister urges to Russian companies) and such events as the Gyumri massacre (2015) when a Russian maintain an alliance soldier stationed at the local military base murdered an Armenian family of seven. between Armenia In their slogans, the protesters did not refer and Russia but, to geopolitics, which may explain why other countries got involved in the development at the same time, of Armenia’s political situation only to a he also pursues limited extent. Obviously, special attention was paid to the authorities in the Kremlin to strengthen the who traditionally perceive all kinds of color revolutions in the region as a threat to the country’s relations legitimacy of their own system. In this case, the Russian activity that could be observed with the United included primarily consultations with the current power camp (also between high- States and the ranking officials) as well as Nikol Pashinyan European Union. and other protest leaders. The talks had both official and behind-the-scenes character, 6 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org ARMENIA: CHANGE OF POWER ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA open approach to cooperation with Western According to the previous statements, it can partners (for instance by implementing be now assumed that the Russian authorities provisions of the comprehensive and had actually accepted the power change enhanced partnership agreement concluded by Armenia and the European Union in 2017). in Armenia. Such a state of matters could be potentially explained by the fact that KARABAKH ISSUE the new government apparently lacks real Armenia’s new prime minister issued a opportunities (and, perhaps, also the will) declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to change its hitherto relations with Russia. It results from the scale of the dependence of Armenia on the Russian protector; the Russians provide key military guarantees in the context of the conflict with Azerbaijan Armenian prime (including the military base in Gyumri and checkpoints on the Armenian borders); in minister urged fact, they also control Armenian energy and host hundreds of thousands of Armenians about the need to guest workers whose cash transfers from Russia correspond to over 8 percent of allow the region of Armenia’s GDP.
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