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The Great Expectations of the Armenian Revolution: Democracy V

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The Great Expectations of the Armenian Revolution: Democracy V In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2019, Baden-Baden 2020, pp. 65-80. Ekaterina Dorodnova The Great Expectations of the Armenian Revolution: Democracy v. Stability? Introduction The purpose of this contribution is to explore and discuss one of the most re- markable developments in Armenia over the course of the past two years. Un- like many other incidents that shattered stability in the country following inde- pendence, the non-violent yet revolutionary events of April 2018 reverberated positively not only in Armenia, but far beyond its borders too. One and a half years later, the peaceful transition of power in Armenia is still largely regarded as an undeniable achievement in democracy-building. In many ways, it did exceed the most optimistic expectations of domestic and international observers. However, deeply-rooted and systemic challenges in ensuring the country’s security and resilience are mounting, and many remain unresolved despite the high expectations placed on the new authorities. Given the rapid pace, complexity, and uncertainty of these developments, this contribution reviews the most relevant events that unfolded during and after the revolution, and the most likely further scenarios. Mobilization and Non-Violence Beyond Expectation The world applauded the Armenians for the non-violent transfer of power in April-May 2018, known as the “Velvet Revolution” or “the Revolution of Love and Solidarity”.1 Without a single shot being fired, on 23 April 2018, former president-turned-prime minister Serzh Sargsyan handed the reins of power to Nikol Pashinyan after a decade in power. Pashinyan was a former journalist and political prisoner-turned-opposition MP, and an exceptionally charismatic and talented revolutionary leader. Who could have thought that a protest march by the politically marginal Pashinyan and a handful of protesters – triggered by Sargsyan’s move to run for prime minister once his second pres- idential term expired2 – would result in an almost total popular mobilization in Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the position of the European Union. 1 Cf. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Press release: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan delivers speech at UN General Assembly, 26 September 2018, at: https://www. primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/09/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-speech/. 2 Cf. Richard Giragossian, Armenia 2018: Political Transformation & Transition, A Summa- ry Political Assessment, RSC Regional Studies Center, Yerevan, Armenia, 22 January 2018, at: https://regional-studies.org/images/pr/2018/january/22/RSC_Armenia_Political_ Assessment_January_2018.pdf. 65 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2019, Baden-Baden 2020, pp. 65-80. only two weeks, with the financial involvement of the Armenian diaspora around the world? The international community was certainly taken by surprise; so were the old authorities and, most likely, Pashinyan and his closest support circles them- selves. The Armenian revolution, in that sense, exceeded all expectations – both in terms of the scale of mobilization, the social composition, and the ge- ography of the protest movement, which covered the whole country and in- volved many women and young people, and in terms of the response from the ruling elite, who chose not to resort to the use of force. Whether their restraint was due to the approaching Genocide Remembrance Day on 24 April, tradi- tionally a day to mark national unification, their unwillingness to compromise relations with the West, which had given clear signals it would not tolerate the use of force,3 the lack of clear encouragement from the country’s main strategic ally Russia,4 or the hope for maintaining power through other channels, there was no crackdown on the tens of thousands of protestors. Instead, Sargsyan peacefully resigned. This puts the situation in Armenia in stark contrast to what was going on, for example, in Nicaragua at roughly the same time, where mass demonstra- tions led President Ortega to order the massacre of hundreds of peaceful pro- testors. The recent situation in Venezuela where President Nicolás Maduro’s regime resorted to violence, and the situation in Sudan at the time of writing, where military forces cracked down on democratic protestors in Khartoum, killing scores of innocent people, also demonstrate Armenia’s great achieve- ment in not losing a single life during the revolutionary events of 2018. The protesters behaved peacefully throughout the protest marches, turn- ing them into near festivities, with some of the leaders of the movement claim- ing to have drawn inspiration from the theory and practice of non-violent civil disobedience as taught by Martin Luther King and Mahatma Ghandi. All of this in Armenia, which does have a history of forceful dispersal of rallies and suppression of opposition. The most tragic event of this nature, and the one Armenian society has not come to terms with, occurred on 1 March 2008, when ten people lost their lives as a result of a government crackdown amid street protests over the contested elections that brought Sargsyan to power the first time around. Pashinyan was a prominent opposition figure then, supporting Sargsyan’s rival, Armenia's first president Levon Ter-Petrosyan. He was sen- tenced for inciting mass disorder and spent two years in prison. The violence of 1 March 2008 – extremely traumatic for a small and united Armenia – also had remarkable political ramifications, seen by many as setting the political 3 Statement by the Delegation of the European Union and EU Member State Embassies in Armenia on recent political developments in Armenia, Yerevan, 19 April 2018, at: https:// eeas.europa.eu/delegations/rwanda/43169/statement-delegation-european-union-and-eu- member-state-embassies-armenia-recent-political_en. 4 Cf. “Pochemu Moskva dolzhna vmeshivatsya?” [“Why Should Moscow Interfere?”], Ar- menia Sputnik, 23 April 2019, at: https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/society/20180423/ 11635410/pochemu-moskva-dolzhna-vmeshivatsya-peskov-o-protestah-v-armenia.html. 66 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2019, Baden-Baden 2020, pp. 65-80. price for retaining or gaining power in the country. For years, this anticipated “price” was among the issues that derailed any serious attempt at mobilizing the public for change. A Purely Armenian Revolution Observers of other revolutions and power shifts in the post-Soviet space may also have expected a geopolitical twist to the Armenian revolution – after all, in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as in Moldova, it was all about the “integration vector”. Corruption and lack of economic progress were associated with main- taining close ties with Russia, whereas democratic reforms, greater freedoms and economic prosperity meant working together with the European Union (EU). There was no such divide in Armenia at all with no expression of geo- political preferences and no hailing of foreign flags. People rallied under Ar- menian flags, defending a purely domestic agenda – they mobilized on an anti- corruption platform, expressing indignation with the situation in which the country’s wealth had been concentrated in the hands of a few privileged indi- viduals closely linked to the ruling elite, with the rest of the population hardly making ends meet.5 “Democracy is a system of values for our society, internal belief, not geopolitical orientation”6 was the message Pashinyan sent repeat- edly to Armenia’s international partners. The absence of EU flags may be explained by the lack of a clear pro-EU discourse in the country. Such a discourse would represent an alternative to Armenia’s strategic alliance with Russia and its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This is particularly relevant in view of the fact that in 2013, Armenia unexpectedly and virtually at the last minute rejected the fully negotiated Association Agreement with the EU, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The leaders of the revolu- tion consciously sought not to antagonize Russia in this context. On the other hand, it was evident that Russia would not proactively sup- port any sort of upheaval in Armenia. Contrary to widely held expectations, Russia also chose not to intervene with visible attempts to reverse the revolu- tion, despite having a credible candidate in place. In spite of the general unease with the revolutionary changes, the recognition of Armenia’s inexorable de- pendence on Russia most likely contributed to this surprising “laissez-faire”. Russia chose not to alienate Armenia, which generally remains friendly com- pared to some other former USSR Republics, for example, despite periodic 5 Armenia was among the three poorest countries in Europe in 2018 according to GDP per capita; cf. Poorest Countries In Europa, Graphicmaps, at: https://www.graphicmaps.com/ poorest-countries-in-europe (last updated on 10 October 2018). Armenia was also facing one of the highest brain drain rates among the former USSR Republics. 6 Democracy is value, not geopolitical orientation: Pashinyan tells Johannes Hahn, News.am, 29 January 2019, at: https://news.am/eng/news/493341.html. 67 In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2019, Baden-Baden 2020, pp. 65-80. outrages against the sales of arms to Azerbaijan or instances of violent behav- iour by the Russian military stationed in Armenia. It was, therefore, in Russia’s interest not to create a new hotspot in its neighbourhood and run the risk of losing control over its main ally in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, Moscow sent
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