DOCSLIB.ORG

Mt Mt Mozzjoni Għal Riżoluzzjoni

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Mt Mt Mozzjoni Għal Riżoluzzjoni Parlament Ewropew 2014-2019 Dokument ta' sessjoni B8-0169/2016 29.1.2016 MOZZJONI GĦAL RIŻOLUZZJONI imressqa wara d-dikjarazzjoni tal-Viċi President tal-Kummissjoni/tar- Rappreżentant Għoli tal-Unjoni għall-Affarijiet Barranin u l-Politika ta' Sigurtà skont l-Artikolu 123(2) tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura dwar is-sitwazzjoni fil-Libja (2016/2537(RSP)) Pavel Telička, Petras Auštrevičius, Dita Charanzová, Gérard Deprez, Filiz Hyusmenova, Ivan Jakovčić, Petr Ježek, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Javier Nart, Norica Nicolai, Urmas Paet, Jozo Radoš, Marietje Schaake, Jasenko Selimovic, Ivo Vajgl, Johannes Cornelis van Baalen, Hilde Vautmans, Renate Weber, Nedzhmi Ali f'isem il-Grupp ALDE RE\1085441MT.doc PE576.530v01-00 MT Magħquda fid-diversità MT B8-0169/2016 Riżoluzzjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew dwar is-sitwazzjoni fil-Libja (2016/2537(RSP)) Il-Parlament Ewropew, – wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjonijiet preċedenti tiegħu dwar il-Libja, b'mod partikolari dawk tal-15 ta' Settembru 20111, tat-22 ta' Novembru 20122, tat-18 ta' Settembru 20143 u tal-15 ta' Jannar 20154, – wara li kkunsidra d-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2013/233/PESK tat-22 ta' Mejju 2013 li permezz tagħha nħolqot il-Missjoni tal-Unjoni Ewropea ta' Assistenza għall-Ġestjoni Integrata tal-Fruntieri fil-Libja (EUBAM Libya)5, – wara li kkunsidra d-dikjarazzjonijiet reċenti tal-Viċi President tal- Kummissjoni / Rappreżentant Għoli tal-Unjoni għall-Affarijiet Barranin u l-Politika ta' Sigurtà, Federica Mogherini, dwar il-Libja, inklużi dawk tas-7, il-11 u t- 18 ta' Jannar 2016, – wara li kkunsidra l-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill dwar il-Libja tat-18 ta' Jannar 2016, – wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehim Politiku Libjan iffirmat fis-17 ta' Diċembru 2015, – wara li kkunsidra l-Komunikat ta' Ruma tat-13 ta' Diċembru 2015, – wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni 2259 tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-NU, adottata b'unanimità fit-23 ta' Diċembru 2015, – wara li kkunsidra r-riżoluzzjoni tiegħu tad-9 ta' Lulju 2015 dwar ir-rieżami tal-Politika Ewropea tal-Viċinat6, – wara li kkunsidra l-konferenza nazzjonali tat-tribujiet Libjani li saret fi Tripli f'Lulju 2011, li appellat għal liġi dwar amnestija ġenerali sabiex tintemm il-gwerra ċivili, – wara li kkunsidra d-dikjarazzjoni ta' appoġġ għall-Gvern ta' Kunsens Nazzjonali fil- Libja mill-Gvernijiet tal-Alġerija, ta' Franza, tal-Ġermanja, tal-Italja, tal-Marokk, ta' Spanja, tat-Tuneżija, tal-Emirati Għarab Magħquda, tar-Renju Unit u tal-Istati Uniti, – wara li kkunsidra l-Artikolu 123(2) tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu, A. billi l-Libja hija pajjiż magħmul minn tliet partijiet tradizzjonali (Tripolitania, Fezzan u Cyrenaica) li saru renju indipendenti fl-1951; billi fl-1969 kolp ta' stat militari mmexxi 1 ĠU C 51 E, 22.2.2013, p. 114. 2 ĠU C 419, 16.12.2015, p. 192. 3 Testi adottati, P8_TA(2014)0028. 4 Testi adottati, P8_TA(2015)0010. 5 ĠU L 138, 24.5.2013, p. 15. 6 Testi adottati, P8_TA(2015)0272. PE576.530v01-00 2/5 RE\1085441MT.doc MT minn Gaddafi neħħa lir-Re mis-setgħa; billi sa minn dak iż-żmien bdiet soppressjoni brutali ta' persuni dissidenti f'isem ir-"Rivoluzzjoni Libjana", taħt reġim despotiku li dam 42 sena; billi taħt id-dittatura ta' Gadhafi, il-Libja kienet l-ikbar ħażna ta' armamenti fil-kosta tan-Nofsinhar tal-Baħar Mediterran, u saret sors maġġuri ta' kummerċ u traffiku illeċitu tal-armi, żona ta' forniment għat-terroristi u l-estremisti kollha fiż-żona tas-Saħel (il-Mali, in-Niġer, in-Niġerja); B. billi, fil-kuntest tar-"Rebbiegħa Għarbija", fi Frar 2011 il-Libjani niżlu fit-toroq għal disa' xhur ta' kunflitt ċivili; billi n-NATO appoġġat lir-ribelli li kienu jħabbtu wiċċhom ma' repressjoni mingħajr distinzjoni min-naħa tal-Istat, u dan l-appoġġ wassal għat- tneħħija tar-reġim ta' Gaddafi; billi wara l-irvell u bit-tmiem tad-dittatorjat ta' Gaddafi, bosta mexxejja tribali rtiraw b'mod pubbliku l-alleanza tagħhom lejn il-gvern, kien hemm ukoll l-abbandun ta' uffiċjali u ġenerali (bħal Abdul Fatah Younis, Suleiman Mahmood), kif ukoll is-sakkeġġ ta' ħażniet tal-armata, li flimkien huma s-sorsi ewlenin tal-istabbiliment u t-tkattir ta' gruppi ta' milizzji tribali fit-tliet reġjuni tal-pajjiż; C. billi s-soċjetà Libjana kienet minn dejjem – kemm qabel kif ukoll b'mod partikolari wara l-kolp ta' stat – organizzata abbażi ta' sistema tribali magħmula minn madwar 140 tribù maqsuma fi 30 tribù/koalizzjoni etnika ewlenija; billi l-kunsill ġenerali tat- tribù huwa responsabbli għall-orjentazzjoni spiritwali kif ukoll għal dik politika; billi l- alleanzi tribali fost l-identitajiet etniċi (il-maġġoranza Għarab, u l-minoritajiet Amazigh, Toubou u Tuareg) għad għandhom rwol sinifikanti fit-taqlib li għaddejja minnu l-lum il- ġurnata l-Libja; D. billi l-gruppi Iżlamisti ffurmaw parti mill-biċċa l-kbira tal-milizzji li ġġieldu kontra Gaddafi u wħud minnhom kellhom rwol ewlieni fil-kunflitt taħt mexxejja bħal Ismail al-Salabi, kmandant tal-Brigata 17 ta' Frar li hija bbażata f'Benghazi, jew Abdelhakim Belhadj, il-mexxej tal-Kunsill Militari ta' Tripli; billi l-mexxejja ta' dawn il-gruppi huma membri tal-kunsill tat-tmexxija tar-ribelli, tal-Kunsill Transizzjonali Nazzjonali (KTN) li ħa f'idejh it-tmexxija tal-pajjiż f'Ottubru 2011; billi l-KTN b'diffikultà kellu jimponi ordni fuq il-ħafna milizzji armati li saru attivi fix-xhur li waslu għat-tneħħija ta' Gaddafi; E. billi f'Awwissu 2012 il-KTN għadda s-setgħa lill-Kungress Nazzjonali Ġenerali (KNĠ), parlament elett li ħatar kap ta' stat temporanju; billi l-gvern ċentrali ddgħajjef u ma rnexxilux jeżerċita l-awtorità tiegħu fuq il-pajjiż; billi l-votanti għażlu parlament ġdid li f'Ġunju 2014 ħa post il-KNĠ - il-Kunsill tar-Rappreżentanti (KtR) li mexa lejn Tobruk; billi il-KNĠ ta' qabel, li fil-biċċa l-kbira kien magħmul mill-Iżlamisti, iltaqa' mill-ġdid ftit wara u għażel il-Prim Ministru tiegħu, b'hekk sfida l-awtorità tal-Kunsill tar- Rappreżentanti fi żmien ta' ġlied fejn anke l-kapitali Tripli biddlet it-tmexxija; F. billi sa minn Awwissu 2014 iż-żewġ korpi politiċi (il-Kunsill tar-Rappreżentanti f'Tobruk – li huwa rikonoxxut mill-komunità internazzjonali - u l-KNĠ il-Ġdid li impona ruħu fi Tripli) iddikjaraw li huma l-gvernijiet li qegħdin imexxu lill-pajjiż, u t- tnejn huma appoġġati minn bosta milizzji armati sew, affiljati ma' reġjuni, bliet u tribujiet b'diversi sfondi; billi ż-żewġ amministrazzjonijiet huma prattikament fi gwerra kontra xulxin fiċ-Cyrenaica u fit-Tripolitania, u t-tnejn li huma qegħdin jaħdmu biex ixewxu u jappoġġaw l-inkwiet tribali u etniku fir-reġjun abbandunat ta' Fezzan; billi t- tribujiet lokali fil-Fezzan, b'mod speċjali it-Toubou u t-Tuareg, huma inkwetati dwar il- RE\1085441MT.doc 3/5 PE576.530v01-00 MT futur tagħhom wara l-Ftehim Politiku Libjan, peress li qegħdin jibżgħu minn ċerti dispożizzjonijiet li ġew żvelati tal-abbozz tal-Kostituzzjoni Libjana futura, peress li ma kinux involuti bis-sħiħ fl-abbozzar tagħha; G. billi l-frammentazzjoni, il-polarizzazzjoni u n-nuqqas ta' leġittimità huma l-indikaturi tax-xenarju politiku tal-pajjiż li huwa mifni b'qasmiet bejn ir-reġjuni u t-tribujiet, bejn bliet u gruppi politiċi u reliġjużi, bejn ġenerazzjonijiet, u bejn l-eliti l-ġodda u l-qodma li jitħalltu f'kombinamenti u alleanzi li ħafna drabi huma volatili; billi din is-sitwazzjoni hija l-kawża ewlenija li r-reġjun tan-Nofsinhar tal-Libja waqa' b'mod rapidu f'kaos vjolenti kkaratterizzat minn ġlied permezz ta' persuni li ma għandhomx interess dirett bejn it-Toubou u t-Tuareg li huwa instigat mit-tribujiet Għarab lokali Ouled Slimane u Zawiya, li l-mexxejja tagħhom jinsabu fit-Tramuntana tal-pajjiż; billi n-negozjaturi ma jidhrux li huma partikolarment imħassba dwar din is-sitwazzjoni (il-kunflitti lokali fil- Fezzan) u l-fatt li gruppi li kien għad fadal mill-forzi ta' Gaddafi reġgħu organizzaw ruħhom wara li aktar qabel kienu f'diżordni (u li jinsabu f'Beni Walid, Benghazi, Sirte u Sebha); H. peress li l-vojt li nħoloq mid-dgħufija taż-żewġ gvernijiet rivali qiegħed jimtela b'mod gradwali mill-Iżlamisti Libjani li qegħdin jirritornaw lejn pajjiżhom mill-ġlied fl-Iraq u s-Sirja; billi l-persuni li rritornaw flimkien mal-Iżlamisti minn pajjiżi oħra f'Novembru 2014 ħatfu l-belt ta' Derna li tinsab fil-Lvant ta' Benghazi u għamlu wegħda ta' lealtà lejn id-Daesh; billi dawn il-forzi jew l-alleati tagħhom saru attivi kważi tul il- kosta kollha minn Derna sa Tripli, inklużi Bayda, Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Abugrein u Misrata, b'kontroll sħiħ ta' aktar minn 200 km madwar Sirte, u għandhom ukoll bażi ta' taħriġ fil-Punent ta' Tripli qrib il-fruntiera Tuneżina; billi d-Daesh nieda kampanja lokali ta' biża' – bi qtugħ l-irjus, sparar u attakki bil-bombi – filwaqt li kabbar it- territorju tiegħu, ħa kontrol tat-toroq u jista' jfixkel il-konnessjonijiet bejn il-Lvant u l- Punent; I. billi l-Libja saret id-dar tal-akbar forzi tad-Daesh 'il barra mill-Lvant Nofsani u tifforma pont għad-Daesh mal-kosta tan-Nofsinhar tal-Mediterran, b'hekk hija ta' theddida perikoluża għall-pajjiżi ġirien fis-Saħel u s-Saħara, kif ukoll għall-Ewropa permezz ta' azzjonijiet terroristiċi; billi d-Daesh nieda bosta attakki mingħajr distinzjoni mmirati lejn il-persuni ċivili f'Benghazi, Ajdabiya u Derna, u huwa responsabbli għal attakk permezz ta' bomba fi trakk li qatlu lil ħafna nies quddiem il-kamp ta' taħriġ tal-pulizija fi Zliten fis-7 ta' Jannar 2016; billi mill-4 ta' Jannar 2016 id-Daesh għandu l-objettiv li jespandi l-gwerra tiegħu billi jokkupa u jikkontrolla l-faċilitajiet enormi taż-żejt li jinsabu fil-Lvant f'al-Sidra, Ras Lanuf u Marsa al-Brega; J.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A Strategy for Success in Libya
    A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 A Strategy for Success in Libya Emily Estelle NOVEMBER 2017 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2017 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................1 Why the US Must Act in Libya Now ............................................................................................................................1 Wrong Problem, Wrong Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 2 What to Do ........................................................................................................................................................................ 2 Reframing US Policy in Libya .................................................................................................. 5 America’s Opportunity in Libya ................................................................................................................................. 6 The US Approach in Libya ............................................................................................................................................ 6 The Current Situation
    [Show full text]
  • Crisis Committee
    CRISIS COMMITTEE Lyon Model United Nations 2018 Study Guide Libyan Civil War !1 LyonMUN 2018 – Libyan Civil War Director: Thomas Ron Deputy Director: Malte Westphal Chairs: Laurence Turner and Carine Karaki Backroom: Ben Bolton, Camille Saikali, Margaux Da Silva, and Antoine Gaudim !2 Director’s Welcome Dear Delegates, On behalf of the whole team I would like to welcome you to LyonMUN 2018 and this simulation of the Libyan Civil War. It is strange to feel that such an important topic that we all remember happening is already over 7 years old. Therefore, we felt it would be a good time to simulate it and think about the ways it could have gone. As delegates you will each be given characters to play in this crisis. These were real people who made a difference within the actual Civil War and have their own objectives and goals. You are tasked with advancing the goals of your character and making sure that they end up doing well out of this crisis. Every action will have consequences, everything you do will have ramifications, and mistakes can be deadly. Your chairs will be there to help but they will also be representing characters and have their own interests, meaning they may not be fully trustworthy. Behind the scenes you will have a backroom which will interpret your directives and move the plot forward. We will be there to read what you say and put it into action. However, a word to the wise, the way your wish may be interpreted may not be ideal.
    [Show full text]
  • Devising New European Policies to Face the Arab Spring
    Papers presented 1 to Conference I and II on Thinking Out of the Box: Devising New European Policies to Face the Arab Spring Edited by: Maria do Céu Pinto Lisboa 2014 With the support of the LLP of the European Union 2 Table of Contents Introduction 4 EU´s Policy Responses: Exploring the Progress and Shortcomings 6 The EU “Paradigmatic Policy Change” in Light of the Arab Spring: A Critical Exploration of the “Black Box” 7 Iole Fontana Assessing European Mediterranean Policy: Success Rather than Failure 18 Marie-Luise Heinrich-Merchergui, Temime Mechergui, and Gerhard Wegner Searching For A “EU Foreign Policy” during the Arab Spring – Member States’ Branding Practices in Libya in the Absence of a Common Position 41 Inez Weitershausen The EU Attempts at Increasing the Efficiency of its Democratization Efforts in the Mediterranean Region in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring 53 Anastasiia Kudlenko The Fall of Authoritarianism and the New Actors in the Arab World 62 The Arab Uprisings and its Impact on Islamist actors 63 Sandra L. Costa The Arab Uprisings through the Eyes of Young Arabs in Europe 75 Valeria Rosato and Pina Sodano Social Networking Websites and Collective Action in the Arab Spring. Case study: Bahrain 85 Seyed Hossein Zarhani The Contradictory Position of the EU towards Political Islam and the New Rapprochement to Islamist Governments 100 Sergio Castaño Riaño THE NEW SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 110 3 Lebanon and the “Arab Spring” 111 Alessandra Frusciante Sectarianism and State Building in Lebanon and Syria 116 Bilal Hamade Civil-Military Relations in North African Countries and Their Challenges 126 Mădălin-Bogdan Răpan Turkey’s Potential Role for the EU’s Approach towards the Arab Spring: Benefits and Limitations 139 Sercan Pekel Analyzing the Domestic and International Conflict in Syria: Are There Any Useful Lessons from Political Science? 146 Jörg Michael Dostal Migration Flows and the Mediterranean Sea.
    [Show full text]
  • 23 September 2011 Volume: 21 Issue: 18 Muslim
    23 September 2011 Volume: 21 Issue: 18 Muslim artists’ vision of multifaith Australia Peter Kirkwood ..........................................1 Palestine takes a stab at statehood Binoy Kampmark ......................................... 3 The mystical art of rudeness Tim Kroenert ............................................6 Simple answers to economic blues Andrew Hamilton .........................................8 Media Inquiry won’t go far enough Tim Dwyer ............................................ 10 My father’s good death Gillian Bouras .......................................... 12 Chance meeting with an inventor James Waller ........................................... 14 Former terrorist pres a hard sell for Irish voters Frank O’Shea .......................................... 19 Managing our mining windfall Michael Mullins ......................................... 21 Rudd resurrection no miracle cure for Labor John Warhurst .......................................... 23 Sex discrimination by the book Ellena Savage .......................................... 25 Vigilante Xenophon’s name shame Andrew McGowan ....................................... 27 Why Gillard is the PM we deserve ............................ 29 Exposing UN sex and violence Tim Kroenert ........................................... 31 Carbon tax saves Gillard (for now) Tony Kevin ............................................ 33 Inhaling God Jessica Voelker ......................................... 35 Favourite body parts Jordie Albiston .........................................
    [Show full text]
  • LIBYA CONFLICT: SITUATION UPDATE March 2011
    Opposition Movements and Statements LIBYA CONFLICT: SITUATION UPDATE March 2011 MARCH 31: Two Obama administration officials have reported that the U.S. is unlikely to provide arms to opposition forces. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have both stated their caution on issuing weapons, due to a lack of information on the dynamics and make-up of the rebel forces. Secretary Gates has suggested that, “the United States should stick to offering communications, surveillance and other support, but suggested that the administration had no problem with other countries sending weapons to help the rebels.” Secretary Gates additionally told members of the House Armed Services Committee that, “What the opposition needs as much as anything right now is some training, some command and control, and some organization.” (New York Times) MARCH 31: Rebels have begun deploying fishing boats to carry medicine and supplies from Benghazi to Misrata in the west. (LA Times) MARCH 31: The LA Times reports that the rebel effort has begun to fray due to ineffective leadership, a lack of weaponry, decreased morale, and the continued ambush by pro-Qaddafi forces. Some rebels have retreated over 200 miles to Benghazi to regroup, while others have remained at points outside of Ajdabiya. (LA Times) MARCH 30: A statement on counter-terrorism has been published to the Transitional National Council website, affirming the rebels,’ “commitment to the moderate Islamic values, its full rejection to the extremist ideas and its commitment
    [Show full text]
  • Event Transcript
    1 DOHA-2015/01/19 BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER LIBYA’S POLITICAL TRANSITION: THE PATH AHEAD Doha, Qatar Monday, January 19, 2015 ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 2 DOHA-2015/01/19 PARTICIPANTS: Moderator: IBRAHIM SHARQIEH Fellow, Brookings Doha Center Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University in Qatar Panelists: GUMA EL-GAMATY Leader Taghyeer Party MOHAMED ELJARH Nonresident Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East Political Analysts on Libya OSAMA KUBBAR Political Activist, Senior Consultant, and Special Advisor Qatar Strategic Studies Centre ABDALLAH ATAMNA Consultant in Strategic Studies and International Business Management * * * * * ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 3 DOHA-2015/01/19 P R O C E E D I N G S MR. SHARQIEH: Hello, everyone. This seems to work just fine. First of all, I'd like to welcome everyone for our discussion today on a very important topic on Libya. As you know, there have been a lot of developments in Libya. First of all, let me just explain that there is a preference since this is going to be broadcast on Al Jazeera Arabic and also all the speakers, they speak Arabic, so there is a preference to have the discussion in Arabic. So we will be talking Arabic, so we have simultaneous translation. When it comes to the questions, please feel free to ask in English or any other language that we have translation for it. German or French.
    [Show full text]
  • Tribes and Revolution; the “Social Factor” in Muammar Gadhafi's
    Tribes and Revolution; The “Social Factor” in Muammar Gadhafi’s Libya and Beyond Joshua Jet Friesen Department of Anthropology, McGill University June 2013 Thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Masters of Art in Anthropology © Joshua Friesen 2013 i Abstract: A revolt against Colonel Muammar Gadhafi’s Libyan government began in February of 2011. The conflict lasted for eight months and affected the entire country. Two distinct sides fought for control during those eight months making the conflict a civil war. This master’s thesis uses a series of interviews as well as the academic and journalistic literature produced about the Libyan conflict to argue that the war should also be understood as a revolution. Considering the war a revolution introduces a number of puzzles. Firstly, Colonel Gadhafi’s position within Libya was officially symbolic in much the same way Great Britain’s royalty is in Canada, yet Gadhafi was named as the revolution’s primary enemy. Secondly, Libya was officially a popular democracy with no executive administrative branches. A revolution against a political elite was therefore theoretically impossible. Nonetheless, the Libyans I interviewed considered Gadhafi more than the purely symbolic leader of Libya, and felt that Libya was actually closer to a dictatorship than a popular democracy. This thesis investigates the discrepancies between official and unofficial realities in Libya by exploring the role of society in the history of Colonel Gadhafi’s government. My analysis is focused by the question, “what role did tribes play in Libya’s revolution?” I argue that tribes provided a system for conceptually organizing Libya’s society during Colonel Gadhafi’s tenure.
    [Show full text]
  • Cuaderno De Documentacion
    SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE ECONOMIA Y APOYO A LA EMPRESA MINISTERIO DIRECCION GENERAL ANALISIS MACROECONOMICO DE ECONOMÍA Y Y ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL &203(7,7,9,'$' SUBDIRECCION GENERAL DE ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL CUADERNO DE DOCUMENTACION Número 94 ANEXO IX Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor 24 de Enero de 2012 ENTRE EL 1 DE SEPTIEMBRE Y EL 15 DE OCTUBRE DE 2011 BACKGROUND PAPERS:* 1. La excepción del Golfo, Fp de Ana Echangüe …11 2. Un final infeliz para Yemen, Fp de Carles Schmitz…14 3. Depende: Siria, Fp de Barah Mikail…18 4. El gran patio trasero de Rusia, Fp de Mikhail Metzel…23 5. What’s the future for Facebook revolutions?, Political Bookworm by Jeffrey C Alexander…27 6. Egypt trip update, Tale University by Jeffrey Alexander…29 7. What President Obama must do to save Egypt’s democracy, http://ccs research.yale.edu by Jeffrey C Alexander…36 8. Shmuel Noah (SN) Eisenstadt, ASA Footnotes …40 9. The performance of politics, http://www.asanet.org by Jeffrey C Alexander…42 10. In Tunisia, waiting for the morning after, The New York Times by By HDS Greenway…45 11. Alarmante Egipto, El País.com…47 12. Popular candidate worries secular Tunisians, Spiegel OnLine by Mathieu von Rohr…48 13. The military has gone too far, Almasryalyoum …52 14. A massacre at the hands of the authorities, Almasryalyoum by Karima Kamal…54 15. Don’t be blind to Erdogan’s flaws, Financial Times by Gideon Rachman…56 16. Sanctions pose growing threat to Syria’s Assad, The New York Times by Nada Bakri…59 17.
    [Show full text]
  • Alternatif Politika Is Devoted to the Arab Revolts of 2011 –The Series of Dynamic Social and Political Developments Not Seen in the Arab World for Over Fifty Years
    alternatif politika Cilt 3, Sayı 3, Kasım 2011 Misafir Editör: Prof. Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ Timeline of the Arab Revolt: December 2010-June 2011 Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ Social Media Tools and the Arab Revolts Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ The Social Opposition Movement in Syria: The Assad Regime in the Context of Reform and Revolution Veysel AYHAN European Union’s Ineffective Middle East Policy Revealed after Revolution in Tunisia Bahar Turhan HURMİ Libyan Uprising And International Intervention: NATO’s Mission and Libya’s Gridlock Veysel AYHAN Arab Spring and Israeli Security: The New Threats Dünya BAŞOL Background of the Tunisian Revolution Nebahat TANRIVERDİ alternatif politika Cilt 3, Sayı 3, Kasım 2011 Introduction- Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ, i-ii. Timeline of the Arab Revolt: December 2010 – June 2011- Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ, 256-419. Social Media Tools and the Arab Revolts-Bogdan SZAJKOWSKİ, 420-432. The Social Opposition Movement in Syria: The Assad Regime in the Context of Reform and Revolution-Veysel AYHAN, 433- 454. European Union’s Ineffective Middle East Policy Revealed after Revolution in Tunisia-Bahar Turhan HURMİ, 455-489. Libyan Uprising And International Intervention: NATO’s Mission and Libya’s Gridlock-Veysel AYHAN, 490-508. Arab Spring and Israeli Security: The New Threats-Dünya BAŞOL, 509-546. Background of the Tunisian Revolution-Nebahat TANRIVERDİ, 547-570. INTRODUCTION Guest Editor: Prof. Bogdan Szajkowski This special issue of Alternatif Politika is devoted to the Arab revolts of 2011 –the series of dynamic social and political developments not seen in the Arab world for over fifty years. Throughout 2011 the Middle East, the Gulf region, Arab Peninsula and North Africa have witnessed social and political turmoil that has fundamentally impacted not only on these regions but also on the rest of the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Les Enjeux Géostratégiques De La Guerre Civile En Libye Par Tarek Megerisi
    NO 37 | juin 2020 BULLETIN DE LA SÉCURITÉ AFRICAINE UNE PUBLICATION DU CENTRE D’ÉTUDES STRATÉGIQUES DE L’AFRIQUE Les enjeux géostratégiques de la guerre civile en Libye PAR TAREK MEGERISI POINTS SAILLANTS • Le conflit en Libye s’est intensifié pour devenir une lutte d’influence géostratégique de plus en plus dangereuse opposant les Émirats arabes unis, l’Égypte et la Russie au Qatar, à la plupart des pays européens et à la Turquie dans un pays disposant de réserves de pétrole importantes situé à la croisée de l’Afrique du Nord, du sud de l’Europe, du Sahel et du Moyen-Orient. • Le général Khalifa Haftar ne bénéficie pas d’un réel soutien national et sert plutôt les intérêts d’acteurs extérieurs. En outre, il a toujours fait obstacle aux tentatives de désescalade et de stabilisation. Ainsi, il ne bénéficie pas d’une légitimité suffisante pour être traité politiquement sur le même pied d’égalité que le gouvernement soutenu par les Nations Unies. • Un accord négocié sous l’égide des Nations Unies et soutenu par les États non alignés est le seul moyen de parvenir à une désescalade durable susceptible d’apaiser les rivalités régionales, tout en permettant à la Libye de retrouver sa souveraineté. Le conflit en Libye a coûté la vie à des dizaines de milliers Selon la MANUL, l’ANL et les forces armées affiliées ont lancé de personnes, entraîné une instabilité dans toute l’Afrique au moins 850 tirs aériens de précision depuis des drones et 170 du Nord et le Sahel et est devenu un enjeu géostratégique autres tirs depuis des chasseurs-bombardiers entre avril 2019 et de plus en plus important, propre à exacerber les rivalités.
    [Show full text]
  • ANNEX 5A.1 PUBLIC ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx5a.1 03-10-2012 2/50 RH PT
    ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx5A.1 03-10-2012 1/50 RH PT ANNEX 5A.1 PUBLIC ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx5A.1 03-10-2012 2/50 RH PT DIVIDED WE STAND: LIBYA’S ENDURING CONFLICTS Middle East/North Africa Report N°130 – 14 September 2012 ICC-01/11-01/11-216-Anx5A.1 03-10-2012 3/50 RH PT TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND: LIBYA’S COMMUNAL CONFLICTS ........................................... 2 A. LEGACIES OF QADHAFI AND THE 17 FEBRUARY REVOLUTION ...................................................... 2 B. THE TUMULTUOUS BORDERLANDS: ZUWARA, KUFRA AND SEBHA .............................................. 5 III. FILLING THE SECURITY VACUUM .......................................................................... 8 A. MILITARY COUNCILS ................................................................................................................... 8 B. THE FLEDGLING STATE .............................................................................................................. 10 C. REVOLUTIONARY COALITIONS AND THE LIBYAN SHIELD FORCES .............................................. 17 IV. IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIRES ................................................................................ 21 V. UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS IN THE WEST ........................................................... 24 VI. FORGING PEACE ........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Libya Country of Origin Information (Coi) Report
    LIBYA COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT BACKGROUND AND SECURITY SITUATION COI Service 25 July 2011 LIBYA 25 JULY 2011 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN LIBYA FROM 15 JULY 2011 TO 20 JULY 2011 Useful news sources for further information Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 1.01 Map ........................................................................................................................ 1.07 Geographic and tribal issues .............................................................................. 1.10 The east ................................................................................................................. 1.11 Islamism ............................................................................................................. 1.11 State policy towards the east ............................................................................. 1.12 Transport ............................................................................................................... 1.13 Roads ................................................................................................................. 1.13 Railways ............................................................................................................. 1.14 International and internal airports and flight routes ............................................ 1.15 Sea ports ...........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]