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Indonesia's Politically Driven Anti-Corruption Agenda and the Post-Election Future

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Indonesia's Politically Driven Anti-Corruption Agenda and the Post-Election Future Volume 7 | Issue 15 | Number 2 | Article ID 3117 | Apr 12, 2009 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Indonesia's Politically Driven Anti-corruption Agenda and the Post-Election Future Gerry van Klinken Indonesia's Politically Driven Anti- corruption Agenda and the Post- Election Future Gerry van Klinken Introduction Despite the apparent appeal of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's record of fighting corruption foreigners would be wise not to jump to simple conclusions about the Yudhoyono and Megawati centrality of the anti-corruption agenda in this year’s presidential contest. Not every group of Most polls are predicting that Indonesians will voters views the corruption issue the same way. re-elect President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono After a detailed review of recent anti- (SBY) in July this year. Many commentators add corruption activities and a strong counter- that they will do so mainly because of his reaction, van Klinken concludes that the strong record of fighting corruption. “Graft- contest between Yudhoyono and Megawati Busting Yudhoyono To Keep Reins In Jakarta”, could bring to light differences over the read a headline in The Age, 2 January 2009. direction in which Indonesia as a whole should Australian foreign policymakers from the prime be going. Class is making its presence felt in minister down are reportedly hoping quietly subtle ways. An essentially negative anti-graft SBY will win (AAP, 5 March 2009). The polls program by itself is not enough to transform predicting an SBY win are certainly strong, and Indonesian governance. Anti-corruption talk, there is widespread agreement in Indonesia and the increasingly verbalised resistance to it, that corruption is a bad thing. Even so, is merely one part of a broader (though foreigners would be wise not to jump to simple understated) debate about the nature of the conclusions about the centrality of the anti- state in Indonesia. corruption agenda in this year’s presidential contest. Not every group of voters views the corruption issue the same way. Some of those who appear to prioritise other agendas might have good reasons to do so. As far as foreign policymakers are concerned, trying to hear what Indonesians are saying they want their government to do might be more important 1 7 | 15 | 2 APJ | JF than deciding it for them. The Lobby Queen and Post-New Order Corruption The SBY government’s fight against corruption certainly made headlines in 2008. With Just how little has changed inside the regular elections around the corner, it became an judicial system became clear in several high- increasingly political theme. It moved into the profile cases in 2008. The most spectacular was upper echelons of parliament, the central bank, the case of the ‘Lobby Queen’. Many corruption and even the cabinet. A review of the key scandals are still emerging from the aftermath stories of last year will demonstrate just how of the banking bail-out that occurred during the serious his government’s anti-corruption Asian Economic Crisis of 1998. As in the West credentials are. But more than that, it will today, so in Indonesia in 1998, Indonesia’s illustrate some of the complexities of the issue. central Bank Indonesia (BI) gave ‘last-resort These must qualify the rather black-and-white lending’ to dozens of commercial banks in the storyline about corruption in the western press early months of the crisis. It totaled some Rp as the central governance issue in Indonesia. 144.5 trillion (US$14 billion). But the recipient banks misused a substantial part of this so- The country’s premier anti-corruption agency is called Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance for a superbody named the Corruption Eradication various illegal purposes. Of the dozens of Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, recalcitrant debtors and errant bankers KPK). In 2008 it continued to make spectacular implicated in the scandal, only three have ever arrests of top officials and parliamentarians. been imprisoned. One of the few not to escape But its very success also stimulated the threat of prosecution was the tycoon increasingly organised resistance. The outgoing Sjamsul Nursalim, who has chosen to live in parliament has just dealt it a blow by failing to Singapore for the time being. Attorney General ratify a law to ensure its continuation. M.A. Rachman dropped his case as a ‘special gift’ in June 2004. Six months later the new An end to ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’ attorney general, Abdul Rahman Saleh, re- was among the central demands of the 1998 opened it. It took his successor, Hendarman reformasi movement that brought down Supandji, actually to form a team to take the President Suharto’s New Order regime. Since case forward in mid-2007. Heading the team then, public pressure has continued through a was prosecutor Urip Tri Gunawan. much more open press and frequent elections. Reforms occurred both inside the existing Press accounts say Sjamsul Nursalim employed system and by creating special bodies outside Artalyta Suryani, a skilled businesswoman, to it. Internal reforms have included the de- try to get the case dropped again. She lobbied politicisation of the courts and the frequent effectively through the busy round of appointment of new ‘clean’ attorneys. But they receptions by which members of Indonesia’s have been largely ineffective. Although the elite keep in touch, focusing on developing a regular system enthusiastically prosecutes friendship with Deputy Attorney General for corrupters, the main motive appears to be to Special Crimes, Kemas Yahya Rahman. On 29 extort them, not to clean up corruption. February 2008, Kemas Yahya announced that Reports from the civil society organisation the case against Nursalim had been dropped Indonesia Corruption Watch have detailed the for lack of evidence. Two days later the KPK complex of techniques that police, prosecutors caught prosecutor Urip, one of Kemas’s and judges have deployed at every step of the underlings, carrying US$660,000. It also way to extort bribes from those who enter the arrested Artalyta. The embarrassed attorney system. general, Hendarman Supandji, made a public 2 7 | 15 | 2 APJ | JF apology and removed Kemas Yahya and familiar failures embarrassing political another implicated colleague named burdens. They supported the establishment of Muhammad Salim from office. It was the first an anti-corruption ‘superbody’ outside the time an active deputy attorney general had regular system. The need for foreign approval been removed. Artalyta was sentenced in July also played a role at first. The World Bank and 2008 to five years in prison, and Urip in USAID had done preparatory studies on legal September to an unprecedented 20 years. But development in the 1990s, and their the attorney general did not resign, nor was he recommendations proved influential in sacked. designing many reforms in 1998–99. When Law 31/1999 on the Eradication of Corruption The courts are as contaminated as the Attorney required the establishment of a Corruption General's Office, and two big cases in the past Eradication Commission, the Asian 12 months did nothing to alter this image. Most Development Bank helped with the planning corruption cases still go to the regular district and the International Monetary Fund made courts, and most of the accused have been success one of its conditions for continued regional parliamentarians. In 2006, there were assistance. The law on the KPK and its 265 corruption cases involving local legislative associated Anti-Corruption Court was enacted bodies with almost 1,000 suspects handled by in 2002, but some foot-dragging meant it took prosecutorial offices across Indonesia. They until the last days of President Megawati’s term handled 46 corruption cases implicating 61 in office in mid-2004 for it to become a reality. provincial governors and district heads in the The KPK replaced the Civil Servants Wealth same year. One indicator suggesting judicial Audit Commission (Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan corruption is the high acquittal rate in the Penyelenggara Negara, KPKPN), which had regular courts—just over half in 2008. The bulk made many embarrassing revelations. The of West Sumatra’s provincial parliament was KPK’s terms of reference are designed to short- convicted of corruption by a district court in circuit problems with the existing system, such 2004 for embezzling half a million dollars of as police–public prosecutor rivalry, excessive state funds two years earlier. But upon appeal, prosecutorial discretion, and judicial the Supreme Court threw out the charges procrastination. It has a substantial budget against them all between late 2007 and (US$25 million in 2007) and around 450 mid-2008, without any prison time being ‘embedded’ staff from the police and the served. In November 2007 the Medan district Attorney General's Office. Even so, it can only court acquitted ‘Timber King’ Adelin Lis of all take on the most high-profile among the charges of illegal logging in North Sumatra’s corruption cases that arise. It sees itself as a protected forests. Adelin’s case had been ‘trigger mechanism’ for further reform. strengthened by a letter from the forestry minister, M.S. Kaban, stating that this case was In 2004 the outsider presidential candidate ‘only’ an administrative matter. On the day of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) made his release, the police announced they were fighting corruption a central plank of his laying fresh charges against Adelin, for money election campaign. When he entered the palace laundering. However, he had already slipped in October 2004 he gave the KPK its head. On out of the country. The Judicial Commission the strategy of starting with ‘low-hanging fruit’, announced it was preparing to investigate the it kicked off by detaining Aceh’s governor, five judges who ruled on this case. Abdullah Puteh, that December.
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