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A Abdullah Sidiq, 232, 233 Abdurrahman Wahid, 4, 15, 50, 52 INDEX A military atrocities, 285–86, 292–93, Abdullah Sidiq, 232, 233 321 Abdurrahman Wahid, 4, 15, 50, 52, military emergency, 291–94 175, 197, 201, 271, 302 MoU (Memorandum of Aceh, protest against MoU, 305–06 Understanding), 303–07, 317, biography, 41 327 dismissal of, 30, 55, 60–61, 78 natural resources, 280–81, 320 impeachment, 149, 172, 195–96, negotiations, 151, 297–300 266, 288 refugees to Malaysia, 324 military reform under, 136–40 separatism, roots of, 282–85 rule of, 28–32, 137 separatist challenge, resolving, ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 279–319 Indonesia), 129, 131–32, 144 “special autonomy”, 94, 282, 286, police integration, 134–35 289, 300–01, 303 police separation from, 135, 156, sultanate, 282, 284 179 survey of conflict-affected people, 324 see also military; TNI TNI economic stake in, 281, 318 Aburizal Bakrie, 36, 217, 238 TNI lack of professionalism in, 284 “accountability report”, 52, 54, “Verandah of Mecca”, as, 284 111–12 see also AMM; GAM; NAD Aceh, 4, 12, 17, 23, 91, 95, 141–42, Aceh National Army (Tentera Neugara 155, 166, 176, 338, 347–48 Aceh), 314 cease-fire agreement, 289–91 Aceh Referendum Information Centre, central government apology, 285 see SIRA DPRD in, 308, 312, 327 Aceh Reintegration Agency, see BRA ethnicity, 284, 320–21 Aceh Transition Committee, see KPA Helsinki talks and peace agreement, Acknowledgement of Debt, see AKU 300–05 Adam Damiri, Maj. Gen., 172 “Humanitarian Pause”, 287 ADEKSI (Asosiasi DPRD Kota Seluruh local elections in, 314–16 Indonesia), 105, 226 373 11 P_Reform Index.indd 373 3/11/10 1:26:47 PM 374 Index Adi Upaya, 188 APPSI (Asosiasi Pemerintah Provinsi Administrative Law Court, 231 Seluruh Indonesia), 105 Adrian Kiki Ariawan, 235 Arifin Panigoro, 60, 82 Agum Gumelar, Gen., personal Army Strategic Reserve Command, see wealth, 238 Kostrad Agung Laksono, 114, 301, 306, 326 Artidjo Alkoster, 208 Agustadi Sasongko Purnomo, General, Arun LNG Company, 280, 283, 320 152 Asia Foundation, study, 101 Agus Widjojo, see Widjojo, Agus, Asian Financial Crisis, 1, 14, 19, 76, Agus Wirahadikusumah, see 130, 175, 203, 209, 245, 331, Wirahadikusumah, Agus 333 Ahtisaari, Martti, 298–300 ASNLF (Acheh-Sumatra National AKU (Akta Pengakuan Utang), 234 Liberation Front), 283, see also Alagappa, Muthiah, 127, 161 GAM Aland Islands, 301 association of kabupaten governments, Al-Qaeda, 5, 155, 258, 267, 285 see APKASI Ambon, 244 association of municipal governments, Christian dominance, 243–44 see APEKSI conflict in, 247–48 association of municipal parliaments, response by government and see ADEKSI military, 248–51 association of provincial governments, see also Maluku; RMS see APPSI Amien Rais, 28, 41, 50, 58, 67, 76, ATA (Anti-Terrorist Assistance), 184 80, 82–83, 91, 105, 183, 252 Attamimi, Muhammad, 259, 267, 275 personal wealth, 238 Aulia Pohan, 239 AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission), authoritarian regime, 3, 20 304, 306, see also Aceh; GAM; collapse of, 1–2, 11, 47, 87 NAD autonomy laws Amnesty International, 296 debate on revision of, 103–06 Andas T. Tanri., 71 implementation of, 95–98 Antasari Azhar, 233 Ayip Syafruddin Soeratman, 253 anti-Chinese riots, 1, 4, 20, 23, 166, 204, 346 B commission of enquiry, 39 Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa), anti-corruption agencies, 212–16 157–59, 185, 186 conflict between, 221–23 Bagir Manan, 195–96, 221–22 Anti-Corruption Court, see Tipikor Baharuddin Lopa, 235 Antonius Sujata, 208 BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis), 144 Antony Zeidra Abidin, 85 Bakorstanas (Badan Kordinasi Bantuan APEKSI (Asosiasi Pemerintah Kota Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional), Seluruh Indonesia), 105 138, 180 APKASI (Asosiasi Pemerintah Bakrie, Aburizal, see Aburizal Bakrie Kabupaten Seluruh Indonesia), Bali bombing, 5, 155, 266–67, 277 105 Bambang Setyo, 71 11 P_Reform Index.indd 374 3/11/10 1:26:48 PM Index 375 Bank Alpha, 234 Boediono, 36 Bank Andromeda, 233 Bondan Gunawan, 180, 288, 322 Bank Artha Graha Internasional, 163, BPD (Bintang Pelopor Demokrasi), 168, 187, 217 307, 313 Bank Aspac (Bank Asia Pacific), 206 BPK (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan), 72, Bank Bali, 41 164, 168, 187, 204, 234 case, Golkar and 1999 elections, BPKP (Badan Pengawasan Keuangan 207–11 dan Pembangunan), 219 Bank Harapan Sentosa, 235 BP Migas, 166 Bank Industri, 233 BRA (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh), 307 banking, and BLBI scandal, 203–06 Brimob (Brigade Mobil), 154, 173, Bank Jakarta, 233 190, 249, 254, 263–64, 273, Bank Mandiri, 222 276, 288 Bank Modern, 206 British Department for International Bank Niaga PT, 71 Development, see DFID Bank of Indonesia Liquidity Broad Outlines of State Policy, 44, Assistance, see BLBI 60–61 Bank of Indonesia, see BI Brunei, loan from Sultan of, 30 Bank Surya, 235 Bulog (State Logistics Board), 30, 202, Bank Umum Servitia, 206 209–11, 236 Bantaqiah, Teuku, 170 BUMN (state corporation), 219 Baramuli, Arnold, 208 Burhanuddin Abdullah, 73 Barnas (Barisan Nasional), 25, 41 Busyro Muquddas, 222 BBM (Butonese, Bugis, Makassarese), Butar Butar, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Rudolf, ethnic groups, 244–47, 272 190 Beddu Awang, 202, 232–33 BI (Bank Indonesia), 72, 204, 206, C 291, 233, 328 Capital Investment Coordination Bibit Waluyo, Lt. Gen., 141, 159, 290 Agency, see BKPM “Big Bang”, decentralization, 92–95, Cardig International Group, 188 118–19 cease-fire agreement, Aceh, 289–91 Bimantara, PT, 188 Central Axis (Poros Tengah), 28–30, BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara), 174, 32 321 central government bin Laden, Osama, 267 apology to Aceh, 285 Laskar Jihad, falsely linked to, 258, authority of, 92–93, 108–09, 124–25 275 fields reserved for, 97 BKPM (Badan Kordinasi Penanaman financial dependency on, 102 Modal), 106 grants from, 93 Blair, Denis, 165–66 resentment of, 91 BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank centralized government of Soeharto, Indonesia), 73, 212, 220, 234 88–90 scandal, 203–06, 228 Central Kalimantan, communal block grant, see DAU violence, 167 11 P_Reform Index.indd 375 3/11/10 1:26:50 PM 376 Index CETRO (Centre for Electoral constitutional amendments, 52–62, Reform), 83 113, 196–97 Chief Justice, 193, 195–96, 221–22, Constitutional Commission, 82 227 Constitutional Court, 55–56, 74–75, Chinese, anti-, riots, 1, 4, 20, 23, 166, 79, 81, 113, 124, 196–97, 223, 204, 346 227 commission of enquiry, 39 function of, 61 Choirie, Effendy, 145, 160, 184 constitutional legacies, 44–46 Christian dominance, Ambon, 243–44 electoral system, 45–46 Ciganjur Statement, 50 presidentialism, 45, 53–54, 60, 69 Cik di Tiro, Teungku 283 Constitution, of 1945, 46, 52, 88, civil emergency, 255, 268 154, 192, 231, 340 Laskar Jihad, and, 251–55 “parliamentary” interpretation of, 81 civilian supremacy, 138 Coordinating Agency for the civil-military relations, legislating, Maintenance of National 142–50 Stability, see Bakorstanas civil servants Coordination Team for the Eradication decentralization, and, 99, 121 of the Crime of Corruption, see Golkar, association with, 49–50, 80 Tim Tastipikor “closed list” system, 63, 74, see also corruption district system Akbar Tandjung, charges on, 58 CMI (Crisis Management Initiative), anti-corruption agencies, 212–16, 298, 300, 303 221–23 COHA (cessation of hostilities anti-corruption politics, in regional framework agreement), 290, 322, DPRD, 223–27 324 cases, dropped, 211–12 Cold War, 190 cases, major, 199–211 “collusion, corruption and nepotism”, combating, 197–99 see KKN decentralization, and, 97, 110 “collusive democracy”, 78 DPR, in, 70–73, 84–86 “commercialisation of political offices”, DPRD, in, 111–12, 115–17 63, 83 Indonesia, in, 68–75 Commission on Banking and Finance, judiciary, in, 198–99 DPR, 71, 73 officially encouraged, 17 Commission to Eradicate the Crime of Soeharto family, 200–03 Corruption, see KPTPK “coup clause” 146 Commission to Examine the Wealth “court mafia”, 10, 14, 198, 211 of State Officials, see KPKPN courts Communist Party, see PKI military “impunity”, and, 169–74 Concerned Forum of West Sumatra New Order, and, 192 (Forum Peduli Sumatra Barat), covert operations unit, see Sandhi 224 Yudha constituencies, electoral, 65 Crescent and Star Party, see PBB 11 P_Reform Index.indd 376 3/11/10 1:26:52 PM Index 377 crisis-ridden reforms, 7–10, 13, 15, DFID (British Department for 27, 34, 87, 110, 131, 177, 229, International Development), 184 243, 333, 344 Dili massacre, 293 Diponegoro University, 195 D direct presidential election, 56–59, 62, Dadang Sukandar, 209–11, 236 76, 125, 176, 345 Darul Islam, 282–84, 320 dismissal of President, 55–56, 81 DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum), 93, 100, district government 102, 124 authority of, 93 Deddy Supriadi Bratakusumah, 241 economic inequality among, 101–02 decentralization, 87, 227, 335, 339 revenue sources, 100 “Big Bang” approach, 92–95, district regional command, see Kodim 118–19 district system, election, 63, see also civil servants, and, 99, 121 “closed list” system corruption, 97, 110 Djadja Suparman, 139, 181, 253, 274 financial, 93, 99–102 Djaelani, Maj. Gen., 230 goal of, 94 Djoko Munandar, 224 Latin America, in, 117 Djoko Santoso, General, 37, 152, 155, motives for, 90 160-61, 167, 263–64, 270, 306 regional government, 27 Djoko Suyanto, Air Marshal37, 152, resistance to, 96–97, 120 189 defence budget, 162, 187 Dodi Sumadi, 202, 232 Democracy Forum, 29, 136 DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer), 283, Democrat Party, see PD 320 democratic civilian control, 127 DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), 59 Department of Communications, 218 role of, 61 Department of Defence, 143–47, 150, DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 154, 165, 168, 174–75, 183, Daerah), 61–62, 64, 93, 94, 186, 190 104–05, 108, 165, 282 TNI under, 144–45 Aceh, in, 308, 312,
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