A Tale of Missed Chances
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
A tale of missed chances The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission did not set out to apportion blame for the Canterbury Television building collapse, but several key parties will be uneasy at its findings. The commissioners pointed to errors and problems over many decades which contributed to a under-engineered building and flawed structure. The building collapsed when the magnitude-6.3 quake hit on February 22, 2011. It was a failure that caused the deaths of 115 people. It started with the design of the building and supervision of a relatively inexperienced struc- tural engineer. Further, the building should not have been issued a permit but pressure allegedly applied to consenting staff in the Christ- church City Council meant concerns raised were apparently ignored. The design flaws were missed by those building the CTV structure, and added to some non- conforming construction prac- tices not picked up by the absentee construction manager, fake engineer Gerald Shirtcliff. That alone makes for ‘‘grim and sobering reading’’, as Prime Minister John Key labelled yesterday’s report, but the most frustrating part was yet to come. In 1990, an engineer noticed the floors were not properly connected to the support walls. Here was something structurally wrong. The strengthening work was carried out in November 1991, nearly two years after the weakness was found, but not enough was done. The commissioners noted an opportunity lost: ‘‘It should have been apparent . that the report was not a full review of the struc- tural integrity of the building.’’ The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission report, which STEPS TO TRAGEDY is the result of an eight-week hearing by the commissioners, will be difficult reading for the Victims of the Canterbury Design Consent Construction Retrofit Inspection families of those who died. It exposes just how many Television building times something could have been collapse were let down by Structural engineer David Christchurch City Council Williams Construction, led by In January 1990, Holmes The building was green- done to prevent the collapse. Harding, of Alan Reay consenting officer Graeme managing director Michael Consulting Group prepared a stickered after the September Every section throws up a succession of blunders Consultants, was given the CTV Tapper had misgivings about Brooks, construction manager structural report for a potential 2010 quake. Building manager another opportunity lost. assignment in March 1986. the structural integrity of the Gerald Shirtcliff and foreman buyer that noted a ‘‘vital area of John Drew employed structural If just one had played out over more than two He had limited experience design, but no record of his Bill Jones, began building work non-compliance’’ in the tying of engineer David Coatsworth, differently, the building and decades. designing multilevel buildings, concerns being addressed in October 1986. floors to shear walls and that who assessed it as safe. everyone in it may have been but was left largely exists. Tapper told his wife he The commissioners found the building could separate Coatsworth asked for structural handed a different fate. This was The Canterbury unsupervised by principal Alan felt pressured by council chief Jones was competent but from the shear core in a quake. drawings, but did not get them the perfect storm, and the results Earthquakes Royal Reay. engineer Bryan Bluck to lacked supervision and that Holmes recommended reme- in time. His recommendations were horrifying. The commissioners found approve the permit in Shirtcliff did not spend enough dial work, including steel drag for further assessment were not Commission’s final report that there were non-complying September 1986. time on site. Defects were bars on all levels above the carried out. aspects of the design because The commissioners found it identified after the collapse, ground floor. The bars were A rapid assessment was done ■ Michael Wright was among a team highlighted a number of Harding was working ‘‘beyond was likely Reay convinced including the lack of roughening installed in November 1991, but after the Boxing Day quake in of Press reporters assigned to cover failures that, if rectified at his competence’’ and Reay did Bluck that concerns about the of joints and reinforcing bars in only on levels four, five and six, 2010. the CTV building collapse and not review the design. design were unfounded. precast beams not conforming to and no permit was sought. The The commissioners found subsequent royal commission inquiry. the time, could have This led to a building design The permit should not have design. The report said this commissioners found the iden- Coatsworth could have clearly prevented the tragedy. that was ‘‘deficient in a number been issued because the design should have been visible to the tification of that should have explained the ‘‘nature, extent ❯❯ of important respects’’, the did not comply with building engineer, foreman and signalled the need for a more and limitations’’ of his The details A4-A5 Among them were: report said. bylaws, the report said. construction manager. detailed review of the design. assessment. ❯❯ Editorial A12 TO SUBSCRIBE PH 0800 THE PRESS AIR FREIGHT EXTRA 50¢.