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ANZSOG Case Program From emergency to urgency: the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (A) 2016-189.1

On 29 March 2011, the Government announced the creation of a new government department. To be known as the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority or CERA (pronounced Sarah), it would have extensive powers to override legislation and regulations deemed to stand in the way of a speedy recovery from the earthquake that had devastated the city of , causing 185 deaths, a month earlier. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (CER) Act, which would pass with multi-party support, outlined a formidable list of tasks for CERA. These included ensuring that greater Christchurch would make a ‘focussed, timely and expedited recovery’ from damage and destruction on an epic scale, enabling community participation in the planning. CERA was to coordinate and direct the repair and rebuilding of affected communities, and restore their ‘social, economic, cultural and environmental wellbeing’. In order to achieve this in its five-year life, the CER Act gave CERA the final say on where, how and in what priority both demolition and reconstruction could take place; CERA could acquire land compulsorily and enter private property, and prosecute people who failed to comply with directions given under the Act.1 The establishment of CERA as a government department meant that its Chief Executive would report directly to its Minister. The Hon , Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, third-ranked in Cabinet, was a long-serving Christchurch MP.

This case was written by Janet Tyson for Associate Professor Michael Di Francesco, the Australia and New Zealand School of Government. It has been prepared from published materials as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. Cases are not necessarily intended as a complete account of the events described. While every reasonable effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, subsequent developments may mean that certain details have since changed. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence, except for logos, trademarks, photographs and other content marked as supplied by third parties. No licence is given in relation to third party material. Version 05092016. Distributed by the Case Program, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.anzsog.edu.au

1 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Briefing to the Incoming Minister, December 2011 pp23-25 (hereafter Briefing 2011).

The unprecedented recommendation for a government department was made because the scale of the situation called for a high degree of central control to co-ordinate the diverse parties to successful recovery: local and central government, residents of greater Christchurch, Ngāi Tahu, business interests and the private sector.2 It was a departure from usual international practice, which was to build on existing institutional frameworks to set up a stand-alone agency or statutory authority for disaster recovery.3 As if to underline the point, major departments were already represented in Christchurch, for example the Inland Revenue Department with 800 staff, mostly based in a multi-storey building no longer habitable after 22 February, or the Ministry of Social Development which lost the use of 13 of its 25 premises. In addition, the 25 members of the Christchurch Government Leaders Group had been active in response to the September quake. Senior State Services Commission (SSC) officials, in their paper to Cabinet, had considered two options for post-quake governance: either a crown agency, reporting through a board and therefore at arms’ length to the Minister, or a new government department.4 The direct relationship between departmental chief executive and minister would enable the speed essential for successful recovery. The officials were well aware of issues that had developed with the governance arrangements established after the earthquake of 4 September 2010, which caused extensive property and infrastructure damage, but no loss of life (Exhibit 1 is a timeline). Canterbury was a proudly self-reliant community. Cantabrian sensitivities about intervention by central government in had been heightened since the appointment of Commissioners to replace Environment Canterbury, their elected regional council, in May 2010.5 Immediately after 4 September, the affected local councils (Selwyn and Waimakariri Districts as well as Christchurch City) and citizen groups indicated they were ready to lead recovery efforts once the civil defence emergency was lifted. The Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery (CERR) Act 2010 brought central government into the mix, and some immediate concern about the extent of powers provided to Gerry Brownlee. The Minister could use Orders in Council 6 to override legislation such as the Resource Management Act in order to speed up rebuilding and recovery. The three councils would plan and implement their recovery, with both Minister and councils advised by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission (CERC) (Exhibit 2 is a glossary of organisations and entities mentioned in this case study). At the local body elections in October 2010, Christchurch Mayor , who had seemed heading for heavy defeat before the earthquake struck, was resoundingly re-elected. He had been a highly effective communicator in the early days of the response. Progress on recovery planning then seemed to stall (especially by comparison with Selwyn and Waimakariri) while the City Council returned to business as usual. There was widespread confusion about the role and function of CERC. Aftershocks were continuing, and on 26 December 2010, a 4.9 quake rattled Boxing Day shoppers in the city. In early February 2011, ran a week-long series of articles describing frustration, confusion, and poor communication about progress on recovery. There were calls for the Minister to use his powers to get things moving faster and to introduce an earthquake ‘tsar’ with a dedicated

2 Cabinet Paper 1: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Proposed Governance Arrangements. 28 March 2011, p1 (Hereafter Cabinet Paper 1) Ngāi Tahu is the principal Maori tribe in Canterbury. 3 Brookie, R. Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-11: the debate over institutional design, Victoria University Institute of Governance and Policy Studies, Working Paper 12/01 June 2012. 4 Cabinet Paper 1, p4. 5 The background to this is covered in ANZSOG Case Study The Canterbury Water Management Strategy: smart management of collaborative processes 2016-186. 6 An Order in Council is made without the approval of parliament. This means that legislative changes can be made and assented quickly (Brookie, p21).

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local leadership role.7 At a meeting on 11 February, Brownlee urged people to have patience with the huge job to be done.8 The killer quake Just over a week later, these concerns were put in context. A state of national emergency was declared in the immediate aftermath of the 22 February earthquakes9, with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management again the governing authority in Christchurch. The following days and weeks unleashed a nationwide response, as the loss of life and the scale of damage to infrastructure and property became evident. Every part of the Christchurch community was disrupted: the lives of the residents who worked, used or provided services in it: schools and universities, hospitals and health providers, sports and cultural facilities. Tourism, international education and inner city retail businesses were hard hit. It was estimated that, in the central business district alone, some 1200 buildings would have to be demolished. The iconic Christ Church Cathedral standing shorn of its spire in Cathedral Square was a potent visual symbol of the quake’s impact. Less obvious but more significant for efforts to rebuild the city was the extensive land damage, worse than any other earthquake site in the world.10 Uplift of the water table put new areas at risk of flooding, while at least one of the yacht clubs based around the Avon and Heathcote Estuary had to relocate to find water deep enough to sail in. Vast volumes (400,000 tonnes) of liquefaction11 spewed out on the flat land of the city, while collapsing cliffs and unstable boulders threatened the surrounding . All sectors of the community found common purpose in responding to the exceptional circumstances created by the quake. Non-government agencies like the Red Cross and groups like the and the Farmy Army came out in force, their efforts supported by volunteers from around the country and overseas. Urgently passed Orders in Council enabled changes to information sharing, planning, transport and taxation laws. The usual rules and bureaucratic processes were suspended as the public service, by general consensus, excelled itself (Exhibit 3), inspired by Minister Brownlee’s directive not to wait for permission to do what was needed. Mayor Bob Parker, in his hi- vis parka, was everywhere. Prime Minister , raised in Christchurch, was a frequent visitor, along with all other local MPs. International agencies flew in to assist with search and rescue and essential services such as policing.12 Gerry Brownlee, flown over the devastated city centre that was now behind an army cordon, was critical of the council’s refusal to consent to the demolition of older (including heritage) buildings after September, saying he ‘couldn’t wait to see all those old dungas (sic) go under the hammer…Old , if it’s got any damage at all, needs to be got down and got out, because it’s dangerous and we don’t need it’.13 With the CERA Act, passed on 18 April 2011, the Minister had the additional powers to push ahead with demolition and changes to land use. The Chief Executive of CERA was charged with developing an overarching recovery strategy, with which all additional plans, such as the CBD recovery plan to be prepared by Christchurch City Council, must be consistent. There would be a four person independent

7 Smith, L. ‘Who’s in charge?’, The Press, 7-02-2011 downloaded 16-07-2012. 8 Brownlee, G. ‘Rebuilding requires proper process’, The Press, 11-02-2011 downloaded 16-07-2012. 9 The first at magnitude 6.3, right under the city with huge ground acceleration, was followed the same afternoon by aftershocks of 5.8 and 5.9 as people desperately tried to make their way home. 10 to Government Finance and Expenditure Committee 2010/2011, p25. 11 Liquefaction occurs when sandy soil under pressure, as in an earthquake, loses much of its strength and behaves like a liquid. 12 Australian police were sworn in as NZ police. 13 Chapman, K. ‘Lives before Christchurch Earthquake Damaged buildings’ cited in Once in a Lifetime: City-Building After Disaster in Christchurch, Freerange Press, 2014, p211.

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review panel14 to advise the minister; a cross-party parliamentary forum for MPs with an interest in greater Christchurch issues; and a community forum of 20 people, to be selected by the Minister, to provide information and advice on earthquake recovery matters. As the Cabinet paper had noted, international experience reinforced the importance of community engagement during the recovery, and the forum would give the opportunity for the Minister ‘to encourage meaningful participation by community representatives in the process’.15 CERA must provide quarterly reports to Parliament, and would be reviewed annually. Welcoming the CER Act Gerry Brownlee said, ‘The bill provides a transition from the national to a state of urgency, and eventually a full recovery for the people of Canterbury’. Opposition Labour spokesman described ‘wartime powers’ and said ‘the minister has embarked on a course akin to a parliamentary steamroller’.16 Labour MP , whose constituents had suffered most in the September quake, was, along with a group of legal academics, among the critics of the decision not to follow international examples17 and have a layer of governance between the authority and the politicians. In her view: ‘they have replaced an independent body with no power (CERC) with a powerful body without independence (CERA)’. Professor Bruce Glavovic, a Massey University disaster researcher and holder of the (EQC) chair in natural hazards planning, was concerned that instead of following best practice, CERA was ‘untried, untested’.18 Its command and control structure would be top-heavy, while the appointed forum would limit community involvement. Despite the focus on a speedy start to recovery, there was a delay when the original nominee for CE19 of CERA turned the offer down. On 29 April it was SSC Deputy Commissioner , one of the officials who had prepared the Cabinet paper recommending a government department, who moved to Christchurch as acting CE. Starting work with six seconded public servants, CERA’s first meetings were held around a colleague’s dining table. Early in May, the fledgling CERA was instrumental in setting up the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Trust (SCIRT), an alliance that included the city council and several major construction companies, to start the huge task of repairing and reinstating all ground level and below ground infrastructure, including drinking water, wastewater and stormwater systems. Half of all roads in the city (1021 kilometres), 300km of sewer pipes and 124km of water mains were damaged. Later that month, the Christchurch City Council, required under the CER Act to produce a central city recovery plan within nine months for ministerial approval, called for community contributions to the Share an Idea Campaign. Share an Idea was phenomenally successful, attracting over 106,000 responses which were analysed and grouped. Six thousand people attended the associated Roadshow, with over four hundred making personal presentations to council. Clear themes that came through included the desire for a low-rise, ‘accessible city’ with improved public transport including light rail, and a greater focus on the Avon River.

14 The Canterbury Recovery Review Panel, which included in its membership Murray Sherwin who had chaired the CERC 15 Cabinet Paper 1, p7. 16 Hartevelt, J. ‘Wartime quake recovery law passes’, The Press, 15 April 2011, downloaded 16-07-2012. 17 For instance the Queensland Reconstruction Authority introduced after a month of flooding topped off by a tropical cyclone in 2010-2011. 18 McCrone cited in Brookie p27. 19 Widely reported as former Customs Comptroller (and former army Major General) Martyn Dunne but consistently denied by Brownlee.

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Riding to the rescue On 12 May 2011, Roger Sutton was named as the new CERA Chief Executive. Casual and approachable in style, he had been a very effective communicator as head of the lines company Orion, which had worked minor miracles reconnecting the city’s power within days of the February quake. The appointment was acclaimed as a ‘knight riding to Canterbury’s rescue’ (on his bicycle).20 The man himself, noting that from such heights the only way was down, felt it was probably his commitment to transparency that had won him the job. ‘People want honest, straight communication,’ he told The Press, ‘I’m happy to front up and talk. People thought I was willing to front up with good news and bad news and be accountable’.21 As chair of the Energy Efficiency Conservation Agency he had worked with Gerry Brownlee, but he did not underestimate the contrast between the private sector and public service.22 CERA had to be a government department, he later said, ‘There had to be direct control over the recovery if the Government was going to use emergency powers, over-ride laws and planning restrictions to get things done, and commit billions of taxpayer dollars to the effort’.23 Roger Sutton took up his job on 13 June, a day when Christchurch suffered two further big aftershocks. Schools were closed, new volcanoes of liquefaction erupted, and the new premises prepared for CERA was badly damaged. Starting work the same day, and also having to move to temporary quarters, was Bill Bayfield as the new chief executive of Environment Canterbury (ECan). While the Christchurch City Council would maintain a distance from CERA, ECan would become one of its strongest supporters, carrying out a number of key tasks including (from late 2013) the Land Use Recovery Programme.24 The Ministry of Social Development made its mission to support CERA with ‘whatever is needed’, providing a building and office equipment, and running CERA’s payroll and HR systems. A number of its staff were seconded to CERA, while others such as the former Regional Commissioner Michelle Mitchell joined permanently, becoming the General Manager in charge of Community Wellbeing.25 Another early addition to the CERA team was Warwick Isaacs, formerly chief executive of , who as General Manager, Operations, would become known as ‘the demolition king’.26 Into the red zone Immediately after the 13 June aftershocks, a group of government ministers established27 new responsibilities for CERA that would see it implementing, as well as leading and co-ordinating aspects of the recovery, notably, to do everything possible to facilitate the start of insurance payments and home repairs. The process began with a city-wide survey to categorise the damage according to colour-coded zones. More than 7000 properties, including the whole suburb of Brooklands, were red- zoned (Exhibit 4), in other words, to be demolished and removed once compensation had been agreed with the owners. Soon, some 2000 people had accepted one of the compensation options offered to insured homeowners,28 many then moving away from Christchurch entirely.

20 Hewitson, M. ‘Michelle Hewitson Interview: Roger Sutton’, The NZ Herald, 7-04-2012 accessed 17-07-2012. 21 Wright, M. ‘Sutton plays long game one year on’, The Press, 13 June 2012, downloaded 16/07/2012. 22 Eleven, B. Sutton ‘happy to front up’, The Press, 11 June 2011 accessed 17-07-2012. 23 McCrone, J. ‘Lego man puts blocks in place’, The Press, 10-12-2011, accessed 17-07-2012. 24 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Land Use Recovery Plan, December 2013. LURP as it was commonly known was a comprehensive plan for the future development of land in Christchurch City, and . 25 Michelle Mitchell, who died unexpectedly in January 2016, was described as ‘an absolute pillar of the recovery.’ Sherwood, S. ‘Dedicated champion of recovery dies’, The Press, 20-0-2015 accessed 9-06-2016. 26 2010/11 financial review of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority and the Earthquake Commission, Report of the Finance and Expenditure Committee, p25. 27 Minute of Decision, CAB Min (11) 23/19 of 20 June 2011. 28 By 31 December 2011, CERA’s Section 88 quarterly report to parliament noted that 1791 properties from the red zone area had been acquired (526 under Option 1: selling the land and home to the Government at the most recent (2007)

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By the end of 2011, 180,000 houses had been assessed29 but the way was not yet clear for rebuilding. More investigations were needed for land zoned orange, or white. People living in the green zones could rebuild – once geotechnical investigations had identified whether ‘remediation’ was possible or feasible, and what type of foundations would protect against future seismic activity. In December 2011, following the general election that had returned a National-led government, CERA published its briefing to Gerry Brownlee as the incoming minister. It described a management structure designed to deliver eight key functions: Economic Recovery; Community Wellbeing; Infrastructure; Operations; Strategy, planning and policy; Communications, Corporate services, and Ministerial and Executive Support. The briefing noted ‘major efforts in’ demolition; policy and planning development including the Recovery Strategy; community wellbeing and land and structure assessment. Land issues ‘add a layer of additional complexity, time and cost to recovery efforts,’ it said, and ‘the challenge is more profound than simply repairing or replacing damaged or destroyed buildings or infrastructure from the ground up’. Repairs must be cost effective over time, and not unduly disruptive to the community. The briefing concluded on an optimistic note, despite admitted difficulties in actioning insurance claims while aftershocks were occurring every day. The manufacturing and agricultural sectors had escaped major impacts, as had large parts of the residential and suburban retail base. Economic activity and employment were exceeding expectations, and most services had been restored. The CBD cordon should be lifted by April 2012, imbuing confidence and encouraging investment. On 21 December 2011, a 6.2 earthquake – strong enough to cause more building damage – put a dent in the positive outlook. However a generally upbeat mood continued, assisted by activities like the ‘Gap Filler’ enterprises creating pop up public art and informal meeting places like the Pallet Pavilion. The influential Future Canterbury Network had given CERA a glowing review, with only one criticism, for ‘lack of transparency’. By contrast, its report on the City Council was scathing.30 Thousands of citizens had turned out to protest the $68,000 pay rise for Council CE . Shortly after, Gerry Brownlee told the Council to ‘start working together’ as ‘political squabbling between councillors was a distraction from the challenges facing the city’.31 On the anniversary of his appointment as CE, the widely-read political newsletter TransTasman would name Roger Sutton the top public servant of 2012, with CERA runner-up as best government department.32 In December 2011, the City Council had provided Minister Brownlee with its City Central Recovery Plan, incorporating many of the community ideas that came forward in Share an Idea. His response came on 18 April 2012, with the announcement that CERA would set up a new Development Unit (CCDU), to be headed by Warwick Isaacs. CCDU would implement a Central City Blueprint, to be developed over the next 100 days by a range of invited experts led by consultants Boffa Miskell. Standing beside Bob Parker, the Minister praised the work done by the Council, but many, including the Mayor himself, saw the council as sidelined.33 Prime Minister John Key launched the Blueprint on 30 July 2012. Significant concepts included dedicated precincts for justice, health, innovation, a defining ‘green frame’ around the CBD, and 16 big-ticket ‘anchor projects’ including a , a convention centre, a cultural centre and a sports stadium. Millions of dollars would be spent to acquire the necessary land, some of which would require the removal of heritage buildings that had withstood seismic activity so far. Up to

rateable value, and 1265 under option 2: negotiating a better price for their house with insurers). 2214 sale and purchase agreements were pending. 29 Briefing 2011, p12. 30 Heather, B. ‘Cera could emerge as star of Canty recovery’, The Press, 3-01-2012, accessed 17-07-2012. 31 ‘Get over this stupid way of operating – minister’, The Press, 25-01-2012, accessed 17-07-2012. 32 Vance, A. ‘Quake recovery boss recognised for efforts’, The Press, 7-06-2012, accessed 16-07-2012. 33 ‘A City Recovers: Christchurch two years after the quakes’, The Press, 2013, p 77.

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840 properties were ‘designated’ for purchase. Debate immediately arose about how much the Blueprint reflected the public’s ‘shared’ ideas. Though the low rise concept and focus on the river remained there was no mention of light rail; transport planning was deferred to an addendum. Implementing the Blueprint further underlined the divide between activity behind the cordon in the CBD (which stayed in place to some extent for 859 days), and life in the outer suburbs where frustration, mainly with insurance delays, was building. Assurance of insurance? New Zealand was one of a few countries with dedicated disaster insurance, through the Earthquake Commission (EQC), which covered the first $100,000 of damage on an insured house or business (but not land). It was also the second most-insured nation in the world, and unique in having full- replacement cover for the over 90% of Christchurch properties that were insured. As Christchurch residents were discovering, holding an insurance policy did not assure a quick pay out, and getting coverage for a proposed new building was almost impossible. As aftershocks continued, challenges included proving which seismic event damage was related to. EQC had ballooned out from a small entity of 22 staff to an enterprise with 1800 employees, many of them assessors recruited from overseas. There were numerous reports of wildly varying assessments of the extent and likely cost of damage. The question of apportionment – how much repair work would come under the EQC cap of $100,000 – was a fruitful area for dispute (Exhibit 5). It was EQC’s responsibility to ensure that people on green-zoned land could safely rebuild. With 12 drill rigs on the job, it would still be late 2013 before geotechnical assessments were completed and homeowners knew which of three technical categories their land came into. If it was TC3, with significant damage from liquefaction likely in future earthquakes, engineering advice about foundations would be needed before building. Zoning continued to be a source of dissatisfaction, with some refusing to leave the red zone, despite lack of services, and others petitioning to be included in the red zone to qualify for compensation. Thirteen hundred people responded to CERA’s invitation to apply for a zoning review.34 Around the same time, Gerry Brownlee vented his frustration at the stalled settlement progress, which he blamed on the private insurance market. ‘I think it’s time for us to stop talking about the problems, recognise the Government has stepped up, EQC has stepped up and CERA has stepped up,’ The Press reported him saying. ‘Now the private sector needs to do the sort of things that the private sector claims it can do so particularly well. I’ve lost my patience.’ Talk that it might take five to eight years for claims to be settled was ‘unacceptable’.35 A chorus of insurance representatives described themselves disappointed that the minister had not acknowledged the work they had been doing to find long-term solutions. The Christchurch City Council was among those calling for the government to establish an independent insurance tribunal, which Minister Brownlee indicated he would consider. Though CERA’s statutory responsibility was limited to ensuring an effective insurance market,36 the community expected that CERA could and should be ‘doing something’.37 Subsequently CERA, with EQC and the Insurance Council, set up a Residential Advisory Service to assist residents with insurance issues. Already very active on insurance issues was CanCERN, the Canterbury Communities Earthquake Recovery Network, one of a proliferation of resident and community advocacy groups tackling specific aspects of quake-related

34 Greenhill, M. ‘Sutton softens on zone changes’, The Press 18-07-2012. 35 Wright, M. ‘Brownlee loses patience with insurance companies’, The Press 26-07-2012 and ‘Call to identify insurers at fault’, The Press 27-07-2012 accessed 27-07-2012. 36 In April 2011 the government had stepped in with $1 billion to rescue home insurance company AMI, selling part of its business to IAG and setting up Southern Response as a new claims agency. 37 Norton, J. ‘Performance Improvement Framework Review of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority’ Memorandum to Iain Rennie, Head of State Services and State Services Commissioner, 10 July 2014, p.4 (hereafter PIF Review).

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problems. A new advocacy group was formed, and a new debate over liability and recompense arose when houses in the central city area known as the Flockton Basin began to suffer repeated flooding. From 2012, some of the energy and enthusiasm that had sustained the early part of recovery began to dissipate. CERA’s regular surveys began to show reductions in community wellbeing. No international comparisons existed for the sustained level of stress caused by insurance delays and ongoing aftershocks, or the magnitude of the impact of Christchurch’s problems. (In December 2011, it was estimated that 10% of New Zealand GDP would be devoted to Canterbury recovery, compared to 4% for Japan’s combined earthquake and tsunami in March 2011.)38 But international advice that psycho-social recovery would be a slower process, with mental health problems likely to peak up to seven years after a major event, was highly relevant to the work being done by CERA’s Community Wellbeing initiatives (Exhibit 6). Communicate, communicate, communicate In its December 2011 Briefing CERA had emphasised the importance that the whole community has information about how to participate in relevant recovery decision making processes, the progress that is being made, the work that is being done to ensure recovery moves as quickly as possible, and the forward plan and timing going forward. For these reasons, CERA takes seriously its obligation to communicate effectively with the people of the Christchurch area. These tightly targeted efforts, using all forms of communication, will continue throughout the recovery effort.39 CERA had a comprehensive website40 which linked to Cabinet papers and other official decisions, as well as describing the division of roles and responsibilities between itself and entities such as the City Council (Exhibit 7). Roger Sutton published regular newsletters and comment pieces, and attended numerous community meetings. A number of workshops were held in red zone areas. The 20-person Community Forum specified by the CER Act was meeting regularly and had grown to 38 members representing a wide range of sectors, ethnic groups, age groups, and geographic areas of the city. It had advised the minister on a range of issues including ensuring that new developments were accessible to the disabled, and expressing concerns about the liveability and impact on infrastructure of intensified housing development.41 Despite these initiatives, the refrain of ‘lack of communication’ persisted, raised not only by the community but also in reviews such as the annual ones by the Cabinet Financial Review and Expenditure Committee. In April 2013, a State Services Commission Performance Improvement Framework Review team visited CERA. They concluded that it was not appropriate to apply the full PIF framework to the unique situation of CERA as a ‘time limited, single purpose, regionally located public service department’. The report noted CERA’s work to implement a community engagement framework, and support by its Community Resilience team for residents, for instance ahead of red zone announcements. Surveys showed confidence that CERA was making decisions in the best interests of greater Christchurch, and with communications and information about earthquake recovery decisions. At the same time, there were strong stakeholder messages about feeling excluded from key information and decisions. ‘The Lead Reviewers were unable to identify what was driving the perception of a lack of community engagement and empowerment.’42

38 Doherty, E. ‘Economic effects of the Canterbury earthquakes’, Parliamentary Library Research Paper, December 2011, , p1. 39 Briefing 2011, p14. 40 All CERA documents are now in the archives of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, www.dpmc.govt.nz. 41 Community Forum, Report to the Minister for Earthquake Recovery, June 2015. 42 PIF Review, p7.

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The PIF report concluded that ‘CERA, led by Roger Sutton, has made excellent progress in the face of enormous challenges’ and would continue to face new and emerging challenges. Acknowledging the difficulties people were working under, including staff still dealing with their own earthquake-related problems, the Reviewers recommended strengthening the leadership team, being smarter in leading and coordinating other departments, focus on staff wellbeing and greater clarity for stakeholders about its current and future roles. By contrast, the City Council continued to struggle. In June 2013 a Crown Commissioner was appointed to manage the building consent process. Applications were piling up but the council had lost its accreditation to issue them. Controversial CE Tony Marryatt was put on ‘gardening leave’.43 The October 2013 local government elections brought about a change in dynamic between CERA, the Minister and the Council. Former MP Lianne Dalziel was elected , and all but six of the previous council voted out. Despite their opposing politics, Dalziel and Brownlee developed a working rapport. In for the long haul The October 2014 Ministerial Briefing for Gerry Brownlee was measured in tone: There has been some progress in the recovery of people and places in greater Christchurch but there remains a lot to do as recovery takes time. The key recovery issues are a mix of the last remaining issues in the restoration phase (particularly those that affect people’s well-being) and ensuring the conditions and arrangements are in place for an effective reconstruction phase over the next decade or more. People and their wellbeing lie at the heart of all reconstruction and recovery effort.44 An ongoing challenge for CERA was the fluctuating number and type of people working for it, as roles and responsibilities changed over time. As at 1 September 2014, CERA had 445 staff, a mix of employees on fixed term agreements, secondments from government departments, local authorities or the private sector, and short term and part time contracts. Approximately 40% of the workforce was devoted to recovery of the built environment; 15% on issues, 15% on removing constraints to a timely and efficient residential rebuild; 15% on supporting improvements in community wellbeing; 15% in shared services and provisions of cross agency advice.45 It was CERA’s employment of and expenditure on communications staff that attracted most comment, especially when it became known that the budget was increasing dramatically (from $672,000 in 2013-14 to $1 million in 2014-15 and $1.5 million predicted for 2015-16). On top of that $2.5 million was allocated to pay the salaries of public relations consultants and in-house communications staff (up from 18 to 25 in 2014-15).46 While the increase was justified as ‘getting information out there so the community is properly informed… putting out the exact story to people all the time honestly,’47 it was not matched by an increase in public confidence about its involvement in decision-making, as tracked by CERA’s own wellbeing surveys.48 The focus was about to turn to the transition to ‘life after CERA’ and the expiry of the CER Act after five years. Change was already coming, with preparations to transfer some functions to other agencies and departments. In February 2015, CERA would become an agency within the Department

43 Conway, G. ‘Marryatt not seen at Council for months’, The Press, 18-11-2013 accessed 13-07-2016. Tony Marryatt had been on full pay and left with a severance package of $269,264. 44 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Briefing for the Incoming Minister, October 2014, p12. 45 Ibid, p9. 46 Meier, C. ‘Cera doubles PR budget, staff, as “work increases”’, The Press, 20-07-2015. 47CERA Acting CE John Ombler, quoted in ‘Cera defends spending $2.5 m on PR in one year’, The Press, 12-02-2016 accessed 9-06-2016. 48 Ibid, quoting Labour MP that 71% of respondents lacked confidence in CERA’s decision making and 75% were unhappy with their opportunities to influence decisions.

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of Prime Minister and Cabinet, with a new leader. In a surprise development, Roger Sutton had resigned in November 2014 as CE following accusations of inappropriate conduct with female staff. The life of CERA would end, as it had begun, with John Ombler as Acting Chief Executive.

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Exhibit 1: Timeline of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority *

Date Earthquakes and seismic activity Political actions Planning decisions and other events 2010 4 September 4.37 am – magnitude 7.1 ‘the Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) declares local state of September quake’ emergency. Followed by a 5.8 and 5.5 Five Orders in Council amend Tax Administration, Local Government and Resource Management Acts 14 September The Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery (CERR) Act 2010 is passed. Gerry Christchurch City Council to lead the recovery, prepare recovery Brownlee Minister for Earthquake Recovery; advised by Canterbury Earthquake plan (according to CDEM) Recovery Commission (CERC) 16 September Order in Council amends Building Act October Local body elections: Christchurch Mayor Bob Parker re-elected with majority. EQC has received 175,000 claims; 3000 properties have suffered major damage. 16, 23, 24 Orders in Council amend Cadastral Survey, Building, and Social Security Acts December 26 December 10.30 am – magnitude 4.9 ‘the Boxing Day quake’ 2011 11 February Citizens complain about delay, call for ‘earthquake tsar’ 22 February 12.51 pm – magnitude 6.3 ‘the Six orders in Council amend the Reserves, ACC, Tax Administration, Land Transport February quake’ and Education Acts; Privacy Code amended. Followed by 5.8 at 1.04pm and 5.9 at 2.50 pm 23 February National State of Emergency is declared 24 February; Orders in Council amend Tax Administration Act, Social Security Act, Local 1, 5 & 15 Government and Resource Management Act March 29 March The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Bill and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery authority (CERA) is announced. 18 April The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 is passed; Gerry Brownlee continues Christchurch City Council required to produce a central city as Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, CERR and CERC disbanded, new recovery plan within 9 months.

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Date Earthquakes and seismic activity Political actions Planning decisions and other events independent advisory body; additional powers. Orders in Council under new Act amend Road User Charges, Local Government Act May Cross- parliamentary forum meets weekly SCIRT alliance is formed to begin repair of infrastructure. 10 May National State of Emergency ends 12 May Roger Sutton named as new CE of CERA 14 May Order in Council amends Resource Management Act (demolition spoil for repair of Six week Share an Idea consultation begins with a two day expo. Lyttelton port) 13 June 12.30 pm – magnitude 5.9 Roger Sutton’s first day at CERA 2.20 pm magnitude 6.4 20, 25, 27 OICS amend Rating Valuations Act, Transport and Land Transport Act, Historic Places June Act and Resource Management Act (waste recovery at Burwood) 23 June Zoning system announced; red, orange, white and green zones July Minister’s appointed community forum holds first meeting 4 September Earthquake Commission (EQC) to manage repair of land and property. 10 September OIC amends Resource Management and Building Acts Draft Recovery Strategy completed 1 November OIC amends Tax Administration Act, Reserves Act, Local Government Act 26 November Nationwide election: National Party receives the largest proportion of the vote and forms a government with support from ACT, and the Maori Party. December Briefing to the Incoming Minister (Gerry Brownlee) 520 CBD demolitions completed, 155 underway; 180,000 residential properties assessed. Public outcry after CCC CE Tony Marryatt gets $68,000 pay rise. 21 December Revised CCC Draft City Central Recovery Plan is presented to Minister Brownlee. 23 December 3.18 pm – magnitude 6.2 2012 2 January 5.45 am – magnitude 5.5 10 January Owners of 5078 of 6500 red-zone properties have accepted offer to sell, will leave before April 2013. CERA paid more than $250 m. 30 March OIC amends State Services Commission Act 18 April Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) is established. Minister Brownlee announces the 100-day blueprint design process. Warwick Isaacs Director of CCDU.

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Date Earthquakes and seismic activity Political actions Planning decisions and other events April OIC extends amendments to Tax Administration Act, Education Act EQC begins geotechnical drilling to categorise green zone land for rebuilding. May CERA publishes Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch 25 May 5.5 earthquake 30 July Christchurch Central Recovery Plan (including the Blueprint spatial plan) launched by Prime Minister John Key; becomes law next day. 4 September 13,296 quakes in two years since 4 Sept 2010; 19 of them 5 or above. 30 October All residential land zoning decisions completed. 132 Port Hills rezoning applications received. 30 November OIC amends Rating Valuation Act, Local Government Act. 2013 April OIC amends Education Act, Local Government Act 27 June Major cost-sharing agreement between the Crown and Local Government for CBD redevelopment is announced. 30 June Central city red zone cordon is removed after 859 days. 8 July Building consent crisis at City Council; government appoints Crown Manager 17 September OIC amends Rating Valuation, Building Act 12 October Local body elections. Lianne Dalziel new Christchurch mayor, only four out of thirteen councillors re-elected. 30 October CERA releases Accessible city transport plan. December CERA releases Land Use Recovery Plan. 5 December Port Hills review zoning decisions announced 2014 30 March OIC Amends Reserves Act April OIC amends Education Act and Social Security Act July OIC amends Resource Management Act (replacement district plan) 10 July State Services Commission PIF review released: ‘excellent progress in the face of enormous challenges’.

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Date Earthquakes and seismic activity Political actions Planning decisions and other events July-Sept Consultation on Waimakariri Red Zone 2750 ideas, 600 presentations. October National Majority Government re-elected. Advises that remaining 38,000 EQC and insurer dwelling claims Briefing to incoming Minister Brownlee ‘expected to be difficult to settle’. November Roger Sutton resigns following charge of inappropriate conduct. John Ombler acting CE. November Ministry of Culture and Heritage: Canterbury Earthquakes Heritage Recovery Programme. 250 heritage buildings have been demolished. 2015 21 February Press reports 1240 demolitions within ‘Four Avenues’ (central city and CBD), 292 building consents issued. 1 March CERA becomes a departmental agency within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet; government agencies e.g. Land Information New Zealand take over some functions. 21 April Crown announces plan for new red zone offers. July 2015 18,000 aftershocks, 63 over Residents given a month to comment on draft CERA transition plan including what 1600 submissions on draft plan including detailed one from magnitude 5, 578 over will replace it. Christchurch City Council. magnitude 4 (WBP report) 10 December 100 people have not accepted buyout offers. CERA has spent $1.5 billion buying 7500 red-zoned properties. At 2007 rateable values. 19 October Greater Christchurch Regeneration Bill introduced to Parliament 20 December 32 demolitions to be done by LINZ in flat land red zones. More than 260 demos to be carried out in Port Hills red zones. 2016 14 February 5.2 ‘St Valentine’s Day quake’ 31 March Greater Christchurch Regeneration Act passed unanimously. 19 April Regenerate Christchurch replaces CERA, along with Ōtākaro Ltd to complete anchor projects. Gerry Brownlee becomes Minister Supporting Canterbury Recovery.

* With acknowledgement to Bennet, B., Dann, J., Johnson, E., and Reynolds, R. Eds, Once in a Lifetime: City Building After Disaster, Freerange Press, 2014, for format and some content.

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Exhibit 2: Glossary of organisations and entities mentioned in the case study Anchor projects – initially 16 ‘big ticket’ construction projects to revitalise the central city, to include a cultural centre, sports stadium and convention centre. was the first to be completed in time for the 2014 World Cup of , followed by the Bus Exchange, and the Family Playground (named after the famous children’s book author.) The Blueprint – plan for redevelopment of Christchurch Central Business District, devised in 2012 in 100 days by a team of experts led by Boffa Miskell. CanCERN – Canterbury Communities Earthquake Recovery Network – voluntary community organisation that focused on interaction with insurance companies. CERC – The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Committee established in September 2010 to advise the minister and councils. Members included the mayors of Christchurch City, Selwyn District and Waimakariri district, recently retired Director-General of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Murray Sherwin (chair) and Dame Margaret Bazley chair of Environment Canterbury. CETAS – Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Service. Partnership between Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Ministry of Social Development, Inland Revenue and property management company Darroch. Financial assistance and matching services to find housing; low cost accommodation in three temporary villages. Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) – established in 2012 to implement the Blueprint in the CBD. Headed by Warwick Isaacs. Earthquake Assistance Centres – Multi-agency hubs for accessing services. EQC – Earthquake Commission – initially responsible for administering New Zealand’s disaster insurance which provided cover for up to $100,000 of damage for insured properties. Role was expanded to include supervision of Fletcher Challenge, the sole contractor for earthquake repairs, and to undertake geotechnical investigations ahead of rebuild. Farmy Army – volunteers from the rural areas around Christchurch, one of the many groups that came to assist the city after the 22 February quake. Future Canterbury network – a group of prominent citizens including former National Cabinet Minister . Gap Filler – the name given to a wide range of art and activity based community initiatives, such as the temporary grandstand known as the Pallet Pavilion, the Dance-o-mat, commercial refrigerators converted to street corner book exchanges, with regular new pop-up installations on vacant city sites. Residential Advisory Service – partnership between CERA and the Insurance Council to advise citizens and help break insurance claim deadlocks. Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Trust (SCIRT) – Partners include: CERA, the Christchurch City Council, the NZ Transport Agency, Fulton Hogan, Downer Construction, Fletcher Construction, MacDow New Zealand and City Care. Student Volunteer Army – first established after the September quakes, using social media to involve tertiary students in projects to assist affected residents, for example by shovelling away liquefaction. Revived and extended after the February quake. Acknowledged internationally. WeCAN – wider Earthquake Communities Action Network, a pressure group speaking for some of the property owners who felt that they had been compelled to accept CERA’s offer at a loss to themselves.

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Exhibit 3: Sharing information for social recovery Collaboration and information-sharing among government agencies and other entities was a feature of the immediate response to the 22 February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, but became progressively more limited from the start of the longer-term recovery phase – when it would seem even more necessary to rebuild community wellbeing and resilience. Frustrated by refusal to provide information to, for example, ensure homeowners in the red zone got government purchase offers, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) commissioned an ANZSOG Work-Based Project group49 to investigate: What are the barriers to and enablers of sharing information following a national disaster, and how may these factors be addressed to support social recovery? New Zealand’s Privacy Act 1993 defines ‘personal information’ as information about an identifiable individual. It states that, with specified exceptions relating to public health and safety, information can only be used for the purpose for which it was collected and must not be disclosed to others. Information sharing is interpreted to mean providing and exchanging personal information between agencies. It is equivalent to ‘disclosure’. The day of the 2011 earthquake, New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner issued the Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) code 2011 (Temporary) to allow organisations to share personal information to assist victims of the earthquake and support coordination and management of the response. The Code was extended twice before expiring on 30 June 2011, and has subsequently been amended to facilitate information sharing in the event of any future disaster. The special circumstances of the immediate earthquake response in many ways contributed to a culture of sharing, with people having a common focus on helping those in need, and the wholesale endorsement of their activities by top management (see links below to examples of public sector innovation). Because of the extensive damage to buildings, more than one agency might be housed in the same temporary accommodation (for example amongst the penguins at the Antarctic Centre). 50 Having police and corrections staff co-located was an advantage in identifying individuals likely to pose a risk to the community. Staff of Inland Revenue and the Ministry of Social Development – two very different cultures – joined forces to set up campervan offices to visit the most devastated areas. Earthquake Assistance Centres brought agencies together in one place for the benefit of citizens, many of whom were not used to needing any support services and were now facing multiple disruptions to home, schools and workplace. Similarly, a number of insurance assessors found themselves in the unfamiliar role of ‘first responder’ when they discovered a home owner in need of support and assistance (such as the elderly lady who would not leave a badly damaged house), but did not know how to refer them for help. Initial reports of successful cross-agency activities usually emphasised the intent to see changes continue beyond the emergency response.51 Yet, as interviewees told the Project Group, within two years, almost all had retreated to the most risk-averse view of information sharing. Often, this coincided with a return of decision-makers to Wellington and a removal of local autonomy. But five years after the earthquake, most of the collaborative mechanisms put in place to support recovery were still in operation, including the Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation Service (CETAS), the Earthquake Support Co-ordination Service, the Residential Advisory Service and the Canterbury Supportline 0800 Service (see links below to these and other initiatives). CETAS

49 ANZSOG EMPA 2014 Work Based Project Team 11 report (WBP report), Andrew Bichan, Bruce Findlay, Cathy Philo, Danielle Pile, Matthew Power with academic adviser Dr Todd Bridgman of Victoria University of Wellington. Unless otherwise specified, information in this exhibit is drawn from the WBP report. 50 Personal communication with author. 51 For example as described in Birchfield, R. ‘State Sector Shakeup Canterbury Earthquake drives change’, New Zealand Management, Vol 59, Issue 7, 2012, pp26-32.

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continued to make use of a case management system originally developed by the Waimakariri District Council, based on the triage process used by the Red Cross to capture information on interactions with clients at Earthquake Assistance Centres and save people from the stress and trauma of having to repeatedly give their details and tell their story. Almost all of the 37 people interviewed by the Work-Based Project group thought there would be advantages in continuing collaborative and information-sharing activities well beyond the time of emergency response, seeing an ongoing need for better co-ordination of services for the community. Some also highlighted the negative impact of a lack of co-ordination and information-sharing, for instance in delaying insurance settlements or not alerting the community to a person posing a risk. Sharing property information – in particular for insurance claims – was seen as essential in speeding up decisions, with EQC setting an example by making its geotechnical information freely available. However insurance also emerged as one of the most problematic areas, with interviewees giving a number of examples where insurers had refused contact information. This made it harder for CERA to make purchase offers to Red Zone residents, or to suggest alternative heating to homeowners who had lost chimneys. At the same time, some individuals were suspicious of how their damage assessments might be used, one even invoking the Privacy Act. One of the most significant barriers that emerged was understanding of privacy legislation. A large number, including those in frontline positions, were unaware of the provisions of the Privacy Act and the Code amendments made immediately after the earthquake. Often they thought the legislation was more restrictive than it in fact was; usually, they had asked clients to sign their consent for their information to be shared. Ultimately, it was the whole organisation’s tolerance for risk, and readiness to collaborate, that could prove either enabler or barrier to information sharing; problems with information technology or professional protocols were much less influential, but having trust relationships was essential. One interviewee suggested that training should focus more on the benefits of information sharing, rather than possible legal consequence. This would also raise awareness of new protocols such as the Approved information Sharing Agreements (AISAs). Another interviewee argued for cross government information sharing to be the default position, as in Chile following its 2011 earthquake. The Project report acknowledges that, although the interview data provides valuable insights from perspectives and experiences of a range of participants, it does not provide a definitive picture. However its findings could be used by organisations to ‘build understanding of how sharing information can support better outcomes for clients, assess their current capacity to share information and explore options to improve that capacity’, by asking questions such as: • Could service planning and delivery be improved by sharing information held by the agency with other organisations, under appropriate conditions? • Do staff know when they are legally allowed to share information? • Does the organisation have protocols in place to support information sharing? While information-sharing initiatives need to be driven from the top, with staff given a clear mandate to share information. However those permanently based in Canterbury emphasised the importance of a mandate for senior leaders in Christchurch to make decisions about deployment of resources, collaboration and innovation in the delivery of services, including the authority to make decisions about sharing information. There were ‘fewer ideas and initiatives generated locally when senior support for innovative models that shared people, resources and information diminished, and decision making transitioned back to Wellington’.

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References for additional information about public sector innovation following the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquakes: ANZSOG Case Study 2016.164.2: Fast forward to a sustainable future for the Canterbury (Part B) describes the development of Health One, the pioneering shared electronic record system. Controller and Auditor-General: Realising benefits from six public sector technology projects (Part 3: Financial support in Christchurch after February 2011 earthquake www.oag.govt.nz). State Services Commission, ssc.govt.nz Case Studies of public sector innovation. Links to examples of technology-enabled response and recovery: http://thegovlab.org/tech-enabled-disaster-response-and-recovery/ http://odimpact.org/static/files/case-studies-new-zealand.pdf

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Exhibit 4: The red zone

Source: http://maps.cera.govt.nz/html5/?viewer=public Accessed 27 July 2016

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Exhibit 5: What the Crown’s offer to buy properties means for people living in the red zone

Source: pages figure 13, page 65 of the Auditor General October 2012 report Roles, Responsibilities and funding of public entities after the Canterbury earthquakes. http://www.oag.govt.nz/2012/canterbury/docs/canterbury.pdf Accessed 25 July 2016

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Exhibit 6: The roller coaster of wellbeing

Source: page 5, Briefing for the Incoming Minister October 2014 http://ceraarchive.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/Documents/cera-briefing-for-the-incoming-minister- october-2014.pdf Accessed 25 July 2016

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Exhibit 7: Roles and Responsibilities

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Source: pages 10 and 11, Briefing for the Incoming Minister October 2014 http://ceraarchive.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/Documents/cera-briefing-for-the-incoming-minister- october-2014.pdf Accessed 25 July 2016

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Exhibit 8: Earthquake on 22 February 2011

Christchurch Cathedral before

Christchurch Cathedral after

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Arts Centre

CTV Building

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Liquefaction

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