The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (A) 2016-189.1
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ANZSOG Case Program From emergency to urgency: the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (A) 2016-189.1 On 29 March 2011, the New Zealand Government announced the creation of a new government department. To be known as the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority or CERA (pronounced Sarah), it would have extensive powers to override legislation and regulations deemed to stand in the way of a speedy recovery from the earthquake that had devastated the city of Christchurch, causing 185 deaths, a month earlier. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (CER) Act, which would pass with multi-party support, outlined a formidable list of tasks for CERA. These included ensuring that greater Christchurch would make a ‘focussed, timely and expedited recovery’ from damage and destruction on an epic scale, enabling community participation in the planning. CERA was to coordinate and direct the repair and rebuilding of affected communities, and restore their ‘social, economic, cultural and environmental wellbeing’. In order to achieve this in its five-year life, the CER Act gave CERA the final say on where, how and in what priority both demolition and reconstruction could take place; CERA could acquire land compulsorily and enter private property, and prosecute people who failed to comply with directions given under the Act.1 The establishment of CERA as a government department meant that its Chief Executive would report directly to its Minister. The Hon Gerry Brownlee, Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, third-ranked in Cabinet, was a long-serving Christchurch MP. This case was written by Janet Tyson for Associate Professor Michael Di Francesco, the Australia and New Zealand School of Government. It has been prepared from published materials as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. Cases are not necessarily intended as a complete account of the events described. While every reasonable effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, subsequent developments may mean that certain details have since changed. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence, except for logos, trademarks, photographs and other content marked as supplied by third parties. No licence is given in relation to third party material. Version 05092016. Distributed by the Case Program, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.anzsog.edu.au 1 Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, Briefing to the Incoming Minister, December 2011 pp23-25 (hereafter Briefing 2011). The unprecedented recommendation for a government department was made because the scale of the situation called for a high degree of central control to co-ordinate the diverse parties to successful recovery: local and central government, residents of greater Christchurch, Ngāi Tahu, business interests and the private sector.2 It was a departure from usual international practice, which was to build on existing institutional frameworks to set up a stand-alone agency or statutory authority for disaster recovery.3 As if to underline the point, major New Zealand government departments were already represented in Christchurch, for example the Inland Revenue Department with 800 staff, mostly based in a multi-storey building no longer habitable after 22 February, or the Ministry of Social Development which lost the use of 13 of its 25 premises. In addition, the 25 members of the Christchurch Government Leaders Group had been active in response to the September quake. Senior State Services Commission (SSC) officials, in their paper to Cabinet, had considered two options for post-quake governance: either a crown agency, reporting through a board and therefore at arms’ length to the Minister, or a new government department.4 The direct relationship between departmental chief executive and minister would enable the speed essential for successful recovery. The officials were well aware of issues that had developed with the governance arrangements established after the earthquake of 4 September 2010, which caused extensive property and infrastructure damage, but no loss of life (Exhibit 1 is a timeline). Canterbury was a proudly self-reliant community. Cantabrian sensitivities about intervention by central government in Wellington had been heightened since the appointment of Commissioners to replace Environment Canterbury, their elected regional council, in May 2010.5 Immediately after 4 September, the affected local councils (Selwyn and Waimakariri Districts as well as Christchurch City) and citizen groups indicated they were ready to lead recovery efforts once the civil defence emergency was lifted. The Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery (CERR) Act 2010 brought central government into the mix, and some immediate concern about the extent of powers provided to Gerry Brownlee. The Minister could use Orders in Council 6 to override legislation such as the Resource Management Act in order to speed up rebuilding and recovery. The three councils would plan and implement their recovery, with both Minister and councils advised by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission (CERC) (Exhibit 2 is a glossary of organisations and entities mentioned in this case study). At the local body elections in October 2010, Christchurch Mayor Bob Parker, who had seemed heading for heavy defeat before the earthquake struck, was resoundingly re-elected. He had been a highly effective communicator in the early days of the response. Progress on recovery planning then seemed to stall (especially by comparison with Selwyn and Waimakariri) while the City Council returned to business as usual. There was widespread confusion about the role and function of CERC. Aftershocks were continuing, and on 26 December 2010, a 4.9 quake rattled Boxing Day shoppers in the city. In early February 2011, The Press ran a week-long series of articles describing frustration, confusion, and poor communication about progress on recovery. There were calls for the Minister to use his powers to get things moving faster and to introduce an earthquake ‘tsar’ with a dedicated 2 Cabinet Paper 1: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery: Proposed Governance Arrangements. 28 March 2011, p1 (Hereafter Cabinet Paper 1) Ngāi Tahu is the principal Maori tribe in Canterbury. 3 Brookie, R. Governing the Recovery from the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-11: the debate over institutional design, Victoria University Institute of Governance and Policy Studies, Working Paper 12/01 June 2012. 4 Cabinet Paper 1, p4. 5 The background to this is covered in ANZSOG Case Study The Canterbury Water Management Strategy: smart management of collaborative processes 2016-186. 6 An Order in Council is made without the approval of parliament. This means that legislative changes can be made and assented quickly (Brookie, p21). 2016-189.1 Version 05092016 2 www.anzsog.edu.au local leadership role.7 At a meeting on 11 February, Brownlee urged people to have patience with the huge job to be done.8 The killer quake Just over a week later, these concerns were put in context. A state of national emergency was declared in the immediate aftermath of the 22 February earthquakes9, with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management again the governing authority in Christchurch. The following days and weeks unleashed a nationwide response, as the loss of life and the scale of damage to infrastructure and property became evident. Every part of the Christchurch community was disrupted: the lives of the residents who worked, used or provided services in it: schools and universities, hospitals and health providers, sports and cultural facilities. Tourism, international education and inner city retail businesses were hard hit. It was estimated that, in the central business district alone, some 1200 buildings would have to be demolished. The iconic Christ Church Cathedral standing shorn of its spire in Cathedral Square was a potent visual symbol of the quake’s impact. Less obvious but more significant for efforts to rebuild the city was the extensive land damage, worse than any other earthquake site in the world.10 Uplift of the water table put new areas at risk of flooding, while at least one of the yacht clubs based around the Avon and Heathcote Estuary had to relocate to find water deep enough to sail in. Vast volumes (400,000 tonnes) of liquefaction11 spewed out on the flat land of the city, while collapsing cliffs and unstable boulders threatened the surrounding Port Hills. All sectors of the community found common purpose in responding to the exceptional circumstances created by the quake. Non-government agencies like the Red Cross and groups like the Student Volunteer Army and the Farmy Army came out in force, their efforts supported by volunteers from around the country and overseas. Urgently passed Orders in Council enabled changes to information sharing, planning, transport and taxation laws. The usual rules and bureaucratic processes were suspended as the public service, by general consensus, excelled itself (Exhibit 3), inspired by Minister Brownlee’s directive not to wait for permission to do what was needed. Mayor Bob Parker, in his hi- vis parka, was everywhere. Prime Minister John Key, raised in Christchurch, was a frequent visitor, along with all other local MPs. International agencies flew in to assist with search and rescue and essential services such as policing.12 Gerry Brownlee, flown over the devastated