Apartheid by air

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Author/Creator Ruyter, Theo Publisher Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (KZA) Date 1990-00-00 Resource type Pamphlets Language English Subject Coverage (spatial) , , United Republic of, Coverage (temporal) 1985 - 1990 Source NIZA Description On air links with South Africa and the international campaign against them; special attention paid to KLM and action initiated in 1985 by Dutch SNV volunteers working at Mazimbu (ANC’s Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College) and other places in Tanzania. Format extent 42 (length/size)

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APARTH BY AIR., BY THEO RUYTER . APRIL 1990 ID

Contents Sanctions 3 Ban on air traffic 6 Advocates 9 Ban adherents 11 The U.S. stand 13 Sanction busters 15 South Africa's favourite: 17 under pressure 20 Business as usual: Swissair 23 Psychological impact: 25 The others 26 The symbol of kinship: KLM 28 A growing coalition against KLM 33 In short 36 A campaign against air links with South Africa 38 Colofon. Publisher: Holland Committee on . Author: Theo Ruyter. Editor: Frank Hendriks. Correction: Rory Campbell, Ditty Eimers. Design: Erik Brouwer. Printing: Mebo. Amsterdam, April 1990 ISBN 90.70331.22.5

SANCTIONS Bishop Tutu 'It is obvious that sanctions can only be abolished after the establishment of a really democratic government, because only then can South Africa take its rightfull place as a respected member of the international community.' In this way, the anglican archbishop of Capetown Desmond Tutu concluded an article published in several newspapers abroad, after he and his fellow- churchleaders Frank Chikane and Alan Boesak had met South African president De Klerk on the 11 th of October 1989. More specifically he wrote: 'The , Commonwealth, European Community and the rest of the international community should not reduce their pressure on the South African government because of some fine words. They must continue to do what is necessary to maintain strict financial sanctions and to prohibit direct air traffic with South Africa.' Boycot measures International talks about the need for sanctions against the white minority regime in South Africa have been going on for over a quarter of a century. In 1963, three years after the Sharpeville massacre, the Security Council of the United Nations declared a voluntary arms embargo. Since then the Council has adopted several other resolutions meant to increase the pressure. They mostly dealt with the provision of arms to or the purchase of arms from South Africa, sometimes with other subjects as well like resolution 566 (1985) urging the 're-examination of maritime and aerial relations with South Africa'. As the internal repression in South Africa continued and even intensified, resulting in the declaration of the state of emergency in 1 985, international pressure for economic sanctions increased. One group of countries which has come out clearly in favour of sanctions is the Commonwealth, especially after the failure of the Eminent Persons' Group mission to South Africa to work out a peaceful solution (1986). In fact, the British government of prime minister

Thatcher was ( and still is) the only member of the organization opposing sanctions. In September 1985, the ministerial council of the European Community (EC) agreed, for the first time, on a package of sanctions, restricting or prohibiting the import and export of arms, military and nuclear collaboration, the export of sensitive equipment destined for police or armed forces, oil exports and cultural, scientific and sporting contacts. Most of them were in line with earlier resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations. One year later, following a deterioration of the situation in South Africa, the EC council initiated the following additional measures: a boycott of South African iron, steel and gold coins (Krugerrands) and a ban on new investments in South Africa. The boycott of iron, steel and gold coins was enforced by the EC, whereas the ban on new investments was left to member-states to implement as they saw fit. Regarding the rest of the world-community, communist states have been consistent in restricting official relations with the apartheid regime. At present, however, they seem to step down from their policy of isolation. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has been playing a prominent role in the international struggle against apartheid, though for economic reasons some of its members - especially in Southern Africa - have not broken all relations with South Africa. The United States has distinguished itself by adopting a comprehensive anti-apartheid act in 1986. Among the capitalist industrialized countries the Nordic States (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and ) have been most radical in the application of sanctions, applying total trade boycotts. A call from South Africa The main justification of sanctions is the call for such pressure from South Africa itself. Over the years a large number of mass organizations in South Africa with millions of members have expressed themselves to be in favour of sanctions. These are: the catholic and anglican bishops, the protestant Council of Churches, the unions of COSATU and NACTU, the United Democratic Front, the Mass Democratic Movement and the African National Congress. Archbishop Tutu, in his article refered to earlier, assured his readers that sanctions do work and that the concessions made by the De Klerk government so far would have been unthinkable without the international pressure that has already been exerted. And Nelson Mandela, after his release on the 11 th of February 1990, expressed the feelings of millions of South Africans when he declared: 'We call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate the apartheid regime. To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid'. Nelson Mandela. Foto: Defence and Aid Fund (Utrecht)

BAN ON AIR TRAFFIC Economic effect Air traffic plays an essential role in the transport and communication within as well as between countries. This is certainly true in the case of South Africa, a country situated far from the other industrialized capitalist countries it is closely connected with. So if one was to look for vulnerable spots in the South African economy, the traffic of passengers and freight by air is certainly one of them. At present almost all regular air traffic between South Africa and the rest of the world is handled by 23 . Of these, three are South African ( (SAA), Luxavia (registered in Luxembourg) and Commercial Airways). Nine are European (British Airways (BA), KLM (Holland), Swissair, Olympic Airways (), (), Sabena (), TAP (), UTA () and Lufthansa ()). One is based in South America (Varig- ) and one in the (-). The rest consists of Air and airlines from countries in Southern Africa, namely: Linhas Areas de (LAM), Air , Air , Air , Airways, Lesotho Airways, Royal Swazi National Airways and Namib Air. The number of passengers involved is about one million a year and the amount of freight runs into 80.000 tons, whereby more goods are imported into South Africa than exported by it. Other effects Besides the effect on the South African economy, a ban on air traffic is considered to have other significant advantages. First of all, there's a psychological effect, which reinforces the feeling in South Africa of being isolated by the international community. South Africa's Minister of Finance Barend du Plessis, in his budget speech of 1989, for instance, said: 'There can be little doubt that history will pronounce this era to have been not one in which the main question was the degree of progress that could be attained, but rather one where the first concern was economic survival in the face of an internationally organised assault on the economy'.

Jan Smuts Airport (). Foto: Kadir van Lohuizen. Most whites now realize that their country cannot survive as a modern state without the benefit of good relations with other countries. Another consideration is that the underprivileged black majority in South Africa is hardly affected by a ban, except for indirect effects like a decrease of employment in the air services or a price rise for imported goods. At any rate, the white minority is overrepresented among the clients of the international airlines. So that part of the population would 'feel the pinch' of an effective ban most of all. Furthermore, it is likely that a ban on air traffic with South Africa will result in an economic push for other countries in the region, in particular for the so called Front Line States (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola and Botswana) which together with Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi form the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an organisation trying to promote economic independence from South Africa. Transport and communication feature high in

SADCC's development programmes. Expansion of airport and related facilities is indispensable from the point of view of national self-reliance and without such self-reliance none of the countries in the region can be expected to join a ban on air links with South Africa. Some advocates of a ban, such as the Americans Andrew Young and Robert Kennedy and the British former foreign secretary David Owen, believe that a ban will 'tilt the regional balance of power'. Their reasoning is that goods and passengers destined for South Africa should be flown to airports of frontline- states, resulting in increased economic activity (transshipment) at these airports and in a stimulus for local companies transporting the goods and passengers to South Africa. In reverse, people and goods leaving South Africa, would be forced to travel to the front-line states first, before taking off for their international destinations. Such a reversal of roles would imply that the airports nearest to South Africa, particularly those of (Botswana) and Manzini (Swaziland), would have to embark on a large scale expansion of their facilities in order to handle the increase of transshipment. Governments of developed countries would have to commit themselves to supporting such programmes. Finally, the argument may be put forward that a ban is beneficial to the reputation of airlines participating in it. Both in Africa, where anti-apartheid feelings are strongest, and at home in e.g. , where the opposition against apartheid in South Africa has been growing over the years. Also western governments which declare a ban may benefit with an improvement in their international relations, certainly with black Africa.

ADVOCATES South African churches Within South Africa, a ban on air traffic is one of the least controversial economic sanctions. Prominent church leaders have been particularly clear about this, one of whom being former president of the South African Council of Churches the Rev. Beyers Naud6 who said in November 1987: "It is not a violent method. The airports of Botswana and Zimbabwe are quite suited to replace those of South Africa. Then South African passengers have to go to their neighbours in order to fly abroad. That is time consuming and cumbersome and will hopefully cause them to consider the consequences of apartheid." His colleague, the Rev. Alan Boesak, was quoted around the same time by a Swiss paper as saying: "If you would interrupt all air connections with South Africa and if Lufthansa, KLM and British Airways would do what the Americans have done already, then you would not harm one single black person.' The fact that people like he himself would not as easily fly abroad as they do now did not bother him, he said, because it would be in the interest of changes in South Africa. A ban on direct flights to and from South Africa was included in the so called minimum action programme proposed by a broad church delegation from South Africa, which visited Europe in the spring of 1 988. The four other demands in this action programme dealt with a reduction of diplomatic services, the imports of coal from South Africa, the supply of credits to South Africa and the policy regarding visas. Commonwealth On the international level the idea of a ban on air-links got more attention than ever before, when the Commonwealth Conference of October 1985 in Nassau proposed it as one of several measures to be taken by governments, in case Pretoria failed to treat the dismantling of apartheid as a matter of immediate urgency. The Eminent Persons' Group sent to South Africa by the Conference in a last attempt to find a peaceful solution, reiterated the idea in its report published in June 1986. African members of the Commonwealth clearly declared their support of a ban. The president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, said at the end of 1986 that he would not only sever all air links, but also close his country's air space for all planes bound for South Africa. Some months later, however, he declared more specifically, together with the Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, that theywould take concrete steps only in the event of a totally unified African air boycott against apartheid. OAU In June 1987 the summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called once again upon the member-states to ban South African Airways and other airlines en route to or from South Africa from their air space. In practice, however, for economic reasons many countries have not responded to this call. Similarly, as the list of airlines in the previous chapter shows, a number of countries in Southern Africa still have direct air links with South Africa solely because of their continuing economic dependence on it. Western countries The discussion on the ban as advocated by the Commonwealth has made clear that western countries and their airlines had to take the lead in implementing a ban on air traffic with South Africa. In economic respect and also from the point of view of security, the position of African states is so vulnerable that they cannot be expected to act on their own. Consequently, the discussion on a ban of air traffic with South Africa has focused increasingly on the role of the West. In several parliaments, including the British House of Commons, the American House of Representatives and the EC parliament, the issue was raised. However, disappointingly few governments took concrete measures, as we will see later.

BAN ADHERENTS Categories In the mid eighties, when for the first time the call for a ban on air traffic with South Africa received world-wide attention, the countries maintaining air links with South Africa could be put into two basic categories: industrialized capitalist countries in various continents and countries in Southern Africa. Most other countries did not even have diplomatic ties with the white minority regime in Pretoria. Industrialised capitalist countries The countries that have heeded the call for a ban since 1985 are the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), the United States, , , and New Zealand. The Spanish national ended its flights to South Africa in September 1986 for commercial reasons, but the South African national carrier SAA could continue its flights to as usual (until November 1988, when it dropped Madrid in a major reorganization of its flights to Europe). Denmark, Norway and Sweden participate in the System (SAS). Their decision to end SAS' flights to Johannesburg from September 1985 was inspired by the international calls for a boycott, even though it is well known that SAS was already considering to close down the line because of losses in previous years. The decision of the government in Washington to join the boycott was the result of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act adopted by the U.S. Congress in September 1986. The government did not bother about the term of notice prescribed by the then existing treaty. So within ten days SAA's landing rights were withdrawn and were prohibited from flying to South Africa. As we will see in the next chapter, the decision mainly hit SAA and hardly affected any American airline.

In Australia shortly after a new labour government led by Prime Minister Bob Hawke came to power in 1983, certain measures were taken to limit air traffic with South Africa. The government made the national airline stop its flights to Johannesburg so that instead the airline opened a new line to the Zimbabwean capital . At the same time SAA's flights to Australia were reduced to one per week. Meanwhile the Australian government became a major advocate of sanctions within the Commonwealth which called for a number of sanctions, including a ban on air traffic, in 1985. Canberra denounced the aviation treaty with South Africa in October 1986 and at the end of 1987 the last SAA plane, for some time to come, arrived in Sydney. The government also closed down the SAA offices in Australia. The governments of Canada, Japan and New Zealand decided to preclude their airlines from opening direct lines to South Africa as long as apartheid remained in place. Canada and Japan closed the SAA offices, wheras New Zealand stopped its national airline from acting as SAA agent. Additionally, the Japanese government instructed its officials not to fly with SAA. SAA announces a direct flight to (U.K.) with effect from 26 March 1990 (Financial Mail, 2 Feb.1990). IF IT WASN'T FOR MV\N(IIESTER THIS PROBABLY \OULI) ILVE BEEN AN AD FOR A 3-WEEK JOURNEY IN A BALLOON.

THE U.S. STAND Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act One of the most extensive laws ever adopted by an individual western country in the fight against apartheid in South Africa is the American Public Law 99-440 dating from October 2 1986. The law was called the 'Comprehensive Anti- Apartheid Act of 1986'. It was certainly not the act of a government eager to embark upon an active policy against the apartheid regime. On the contrary, till the very end of his last term president Reagan kept playing down the need and the effect of sanctions. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was the result of a long and persistent campaign in which many organizations and institutions took part and which finally got a strong-hold in the American parliament. The Act has six major chapters, successively dealing with the new policy of the U.S.with respect to ending apartheid, measures to assist victims of apartheid, measures by the U.S. to undermine apartheid, multilateral measures to undermine apartheid, the future policy toward South Africa and finally with the enforcement and administrative provisions. Among the 23 measures in the third chapter is the prohibition on air transportation with South Africa (sec. 306). Prohibition on air links The Act ordered the Secretary of Transportation to forbid any air carrier from the U.S. or South Africa to provide services between the two countries ten days after the the date of enactment of the law. It also ordained that the Secretary of State (minister of Foreign Affairs) fully terminate the agreement on air services signed in May 1 947. The only exception made by the Act enables the Secretary of Transportation 'to provide for emergencies in which the safety of an aircraft or its crew or passengers is threatened'. Provisions against sanction-busting It is interesting to see how the fourth chapter of the Act deals with those in and outside the U.S. who dodge the sanctions included in the Act. The American President is 'authorized to limit the importation into the United States of any product or service of a foreign country to the extent to which such a foreign country benefits from, or otherwise takes commercial advantage of, any sanction or prohibition against any national of the United States imposed by or under this Act' (sec. 402). Also American nationals may bring a civil action for damages against anybody taking advantage of the fact that they were required by the Act to end or limit business activities in South Africa (sec. 403a). So far, the latter provisions of the Act have not been applied to air services offered by foreign airlines. The explanation may be that American airlines were not affected significantly by the act. Panam had already done away with its Johannesburg connection before the law was passed and other airlines, including the western world's biggest airline American Airlines, never flew directly to South Africa. Bending the Act Meanwhile, it is surprising to see how U.S. based airlines are bending the provisions of the American anti-apartheid act. Some companies have become even more active on the South African market in the past few years. In its issue of October 1988 e.g. the aviation magazine Airtrade quoted a route director of SAA about a deal between his company and a number of carriers across the Atlantic including Delta and American Airlines in order to get American cargo to South Africa as quickly as possible. Around the same time the influential West German newspaper Frankfurter Algemeine published a report about four American companies offering special rates to the South African public for connecting flights from Europe to the U.S. According to the paper one of them, , had just opened a new office in South Africa. The number of South Africans flying to the United States is estimated at 50,000 per year.

SANCTION-BUSTERS Europeans lagging behind Until now only a rather small number of airlines providing flights to and from South Africa have heeded the call for a ban and an equally small number of governments have denounced existing aviation agreements with the apartheid regime. A number of airlines and governments in Western Europe have bluntly refused to join the boycott. Consequently, the anti-apartheid lobby in the United States has clearly expressed its disappointment regarding the Europeans lagging behind and even reaping benefits from the American measures. After the U.S. severed its air links with South Africa, British Airways, Lufthansa and Swissair increased the capacity of their flights to South Africa. These airlines and two other major sanction busters (KLM and Sabena) are dealt with later on in this booklet. Four more European airlines are dodging the ban: UTA, Alitalia, TAP and Olympic Airways. Generally speaking these airlines, no matter if they are state-owned or private, feel not the slightest urge to change routes for other than purely commercial reasons. In other words: they won't stop flying to and from South Africa unless they are forced to do so by their respective governments. The overseas airlines which still co-operate with South Africa, except for Swissair, El Al and Varig, are based in member-states of the European Community (EC). So the EC's foreign policy is playing a major role in this respect. Unfortunately decisionmaking in the Council of Ministers is dominated by those governments which are most reluctant to apply sanctions against the apartheid regime and a sheer lack of power prevents the European Parliament from imposing its will on the Council. This is exemplified by the fact that while in October 1986 the Parliament declared itself in favour of severing airlinks and other strong sanctions against South Africa, the Council had never even had the air links with South Africa on the agenda. Therefore, pressure on the EC needs to be paralelled with pressure on individual governments.

Africa wants Europe to take the lead The non-European airlines co-operating with South African are mostly African. As especially the governments of Zimbabwe and Zambia have made clear, they should not be expected to join the ban on air traffic unless the European countries set a clear example. Generally speaking for the African countries there is much more at stake than for European countries. But there is no doubt that almost complete unanimity exists among African countries about the need for sanctions including an air ban. Unfortunately, countries like the Cape Verde Islands and enable SAA to use their airports, while extends landing rights to the South African owned Luxavia (registered in Luxemburg). African countries favouring a ban, feel that, for financial and practical reasons, they are not in a position to take the lead. It should be borne in mind that the SADCC countries are systematically trying to decrease their dependence on South Africa. As a result Harare has already passed Johannesburg as the most important centre for the regional traffic of passengers, but many more investments are needed to enable these countries to decrease their dependence on South Africa. ,,WIN fO FItE TICKTS TO BODO All Computer Mail Conference delegates are eligible for this fabulous prize of two return air tickets from Johannesburg to plus two nights and three days In a top hotel - kindly sponsored by Alitalla and Euro Express Travel Agency. A litalia Alitalia puts a prize to visitors of a South African computer conference

SOUTH AFRICA'S FAVOURITE: BRITISH AIRWAYS Filling the gap 'Turn left at for seventeen American destinations and halt for a free stopover in a London hotel.' This is how British Airways (BA) advertised itself in the South African Financial Mail of May 1 1987, after the Anti-Apartheid Act in the United States had imposed a ban on air traffic with South Africa. Offering 20 Daily flights from Heathrow to the United States and the bonus of a stopover in London, the airline proudly called itself "South Africa's favourite". BA was one of the European airlines which tried to fill the gap, after the American government had terminated the aviation agreement with South Africa. , however, is far less important in the market of air services from and to South Africa than Europe itself: before the sanctions took effect the latter's share was 66 per cent, and the former's only 9 per cent. BA is one of the biggest airlines in air traffic between Europe and South Africa. It flies nine times a week between London and South Africa, having added two more flights since the American boycott started. According to the statistics of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) the number of passengers carried by BA from London to Johannesburg rose from 12.471 in 1986 to 28.342 in 1 987 and the amount of cargo from 119 to 511 tonnes. The route is considered to be highly profitable for BA, but the company is not very revealing about exact figures in this respect. Africa as a whole accounted for 20 million in a total operating surplus of 1 73 million pound sterling in the year 1 986-1987. Giant airline On the world aviation stage BA is a giant airline. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) placed it number one in its 1 986 list regarding the international transportation of passengers and in the 6th place regarding the international transportation of freight. In the period 1986-1987 BA carried alltogether over 20 million passengers and 291 .000 tonnes of freight (domestic traffic included), it employed nearly 40.000 people and its number of aircraft in service was 164. Like other state companies in Britain, BA was privatized by the conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher and is now owned partly by financial institutions, employees and other private individuals. Actually BA stands for a group of about ten companies, which includes related airline operations and package tour holidays. Lobbying hard BA has three destinations in South Africa: Johannesburg, Durban and . Though it has been lobbying hard to prevent a Turn left at London for 17 Ameican destinations. (Ard halt ir a free swpoir in a Londn hotel.) Advertisement Toh do- tHeahronBntt- h Yo.h-htnk-ltght, l d . -dtfoda .9nald ll A-wayt and ttplttun leftt . r, N oth Sto - .& d,-,oleeto g our Foghh brekf-tt. T. N,' ¢jotod- etthro . F hAt-.-w 0')trnt.tyll0httftghto Jo A-n .....flt ,Khardugpot A 1,-,k. .... ,o.... . Financial M ail -mut. land, you go d mie to ctch - -e o-.your baggage while oo rtlx ot a tight, ttour way ho'te ofrhte20flghweha-,e].gHeath . .ntfittablt ...... -o~atgeatl ntutttal4 Atnherthat.hh-lde-pl..nwhyap-t (1987) datly Inldngll te ttajor U S cit A- a Iyeeal hotot, were trwotg t a tro. . lo g t,, fttt .. to Noth Att (8e)a, Aid a good few m Catltd, U h ut.,ttwoer- wh in]d' tt wert alto toit, Artat' la ottttte ban on air services to and from South Africa, it has not failed to prepare itself for such a ban by e.g. opening a new line with Gaborone (Botswana). In general BA's connections with Africa are confined to East and Southern Africa. Political efforts, especially by the Labour Party, the S.D.P. and the Liberal Party, to make the join the proposed ban on air links have been firmly opposed by the BA directors and the British government. So far British anti-apartheid organizations, though in favour of a ban, have not embarked on a massive campaign on the issue. The only slight concession made by BA in this field is the 'conscience clause', which enables BA staff to be exempted from working on South African flights. ~Tum ri t at London Sfor 44 European destnadons. (And halt fr a free stopovr in a Laidon hotel.) Ttt,,lg fo~t h., yt -had Heah- o d--n-ol h-- miud d-tl' fi ~ N1 -, -* .wre Al., gpvW a Gee 2 ph,~l Lonk. %lll n r t~lnlnuncleabn t4irn,,,lg ]rh Jan ,Slnun stopa. cr to all F tlmpc'a,,bound plassegea Be yo 're j-s ahop - the AM ga.4aJl l e g * a- y agen Bnnh ch-e1t44naJorEuroPcale.-e~~..",-1ll -t--X de1x. -Iu~~~- A- ca, fo de-L, byBahAtra, And---ata. berIgno61 fit- Andd. ehy-W notonivthefliht aangf-rW,(onnne,n ndxadgp-aa ,nhad -aedad- n Eurnpentba.sothn no mm tdia a a r o l fit l O . - in to u US route VonIn ,,u . .... l , . A A.- , , ,A, , r..... l , 11,1 1 11\ ' d,.,.,h, BRITISH AIRWAYS The worldkrsfavourire airline.

LUFTHANSA UNDER PRESSURE By camel 'How would those South African delegations, which speak out against apartheid all over the world, get to Europe, by camel perhaps?' In this presumably ironic way Lufthansa's top director Heinz Ruhnau answered calls for a stop of flights to South Africa by 'critical shareholders' during the company's annual meeting in 1988. He also pointed out that since 1986 Lufthansa had reduced its flights to Johannesburg by one and claimed that a retreat from South Africa would especially harm Lufthansa's black and coloured employees in the country. Lufthansa may have reduced the flights (from five to four), but by introducing new aircraft - even Lufthansa's flagship the Super-jumbo B 747-400 called is engaged on the line - and by cancelling the former stop in , the airline has increased its capacity. ICAO statistics show that the number of passengers between and Johannesburg jumped from 18.082 in 1986 to 32.690 in 1987 and the amount of freight from 2184 to 3226 tons. It transpired lastyear that the Lufthansa directors would like to start a fifth flight again, a proposal which got some support in government circles, but apparently the Foreign Office was not enthusiastic about the idea of its national airline undercutting the American sanctions so openly. Top airline Like BA Lufthansa belongs to the category 'top airlines in the world'. In 1986 it reached the number three position so far as the international traffic of passengers was concerned and in the field of international freight it became the world's number two. The corresponding figures were 1 6.6 million passengers and nearly 635 thousand tonnes of freight. The net income of the airline over 1 986 amounted to 64.4 million mark. Last September Lufthansa increased its capital stockwith 304 million mark. As a result the share of the German state in Lufthansa decreased from 70 to 52 per cent. Besides Johannesburg the airline has 1 7 other destinations in Africa, but Africa's share in the airline's turnover is rather limited (less than 6 per cent in 1986). The only Front Line State included in its flight schedule is Tanzania. It claims the airline is popular with black politicians from both South Africa and neighbouring states, because it is 'neither the airline of the former colonial masters nor identified with apartheid'. Lufthansa attacked In June 1 986 in the town of Frankfurt a working group established itself under the name "Keine Flkge fOr Apartheid" (No flights for apartheid). Among the founders were people from the churches, anti-apartheid organizations and from labour unions, including Lufthansa employees. The group has taken on the job of putting pressure on both Lufthansa and the government in Bonn and mobilizing public support for a ban on air traffic with South Africa.The group has organized picket-lines in front of Lufthansa offices in major towns in West Germany, has engaged in talks with political parties and made a striking appearance in the Lufthansa's shareholders' meetings of 1988 and 1989. Though the 'critical shareholders' failed in their attempt to make these meetings reject the annual reports, they forced the to go to great lengths in justifying its policy regarding South Africa. Another indication that Lufthansa cannot ignore its critics was the presence of a Lufthansa-representative at the 1 989 Evangelical Church Day in Berlin, which had the involvement of German companies in South Africa on the agenda. While declaring that Lufthansa condemns apartheid, the representative argued it is "not Lufthansa's business to interfere in the politics of all those 84 countries we are flying to'. However, he said, Lufthansa plays a role in bringing about change in South Africa by e.g. providing training opportunities to black people. Meanwhile among the political parties in the Federal Republic the Social Democrats(SPD) and the Greens have come out most clearly in favour of a ban, although Lufthansa's top-director Ruhnau is a member of the SPD. The Free Democrats (FDP) are divided among themselves and the (governing) Christian Democrats (CDU) are firmly against. If the lobby for a ban succeeds, it would be the first time Lufthansa closes a line for political reasons. thank you for your continuous support Dear Client, Dear Travel Agent, Dear Cargo Agent, Dear South African Airways Dear Airline Community, Dear Swissair Staff Merry Christmas and happy landings in 1990 Yours Cordially swissairff Advertisement in Financial Mail (1989). BUSINESS AS USUAL: SWISSAIR Increasing capacity In 1959 and South Africa concluded an aviation agreement, which provided for two weekly flights between the two countries by both the South African and the Swiss national airline. In 1977 Swissair was allowed to start a third flight to South Africa. It was not surprising that South African airways failed to apply for a third flight,because it was using Jumbos on the line as opposed to the smaller DC-1 0 used by Swissair. Moreover Swissair is making a stop in Kenya on its way to South Africa. So part of its capacity on the line is taken up by the market in East Africa. In recent years the situation has changed considerably. First of all the Swiss government gave the green light to South African Airways for a third flight in the beginning of 1987. Secondly, Swissair decided to replace the DC-1 0 by the on the route to and Johannesburg starting in November 1988. The third flight for SAA was connected in many newspaper reports with the negotiations between and Pretoria about the Reverend Francois Bill, who was released in Johannesburg at the end of March 1988 after an imprisonment of nine months without trial. The Swiss authorities however, denied such a connection. Similarly it was denied that the Swiss undermine the sanctions applied by other countries. Nevertheless the increase of capacity in the air transport between Switzerland and South Africa is a fact. Part of this increase is filling the gap left by airlines participating in the ban, but even more important may be the capacity required by travel agencies advertising holidays in South Africa with increasing fervour. Swissair plays a prominent role in this tourist business. Medium-sized airline Among the international airlines Swissair is considered to be a medium-sized one, employing 18.5 thousand people and operating 53 in 1988. Its capital stock amounts to 615 million , almost a quarter of which is owned by such public entities as cantons and municipalities. The company's net profit in 1988 was over 76 million franc. The African network, which includes 17 destinations amongst which Johannesburg, contributed over 10 per cent of the total revenue of the same year. Flying South African gold On different occasions Swissair has made it clear that it won't withdraw from South Africa, unless the Swiss government declares a ban or the security situation in South Africa deteriorates like it did in . Actions asking for a ban on air traffic have been rather limited so far, as the local anti-apartheid movement was concentrating on other issues. Although about 60 members of the national parliament have joined the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid, the political climate in Switzerland is not very much in favour of economic sanctions against South Africa. This explains the official reception by the social democratic minister of Foreign Affairs Rene Gelber to the South African prime minister and his minister of Foreign Affairs, when they paid a 'strictly private' visit to Switzerland in 1988. No wonder Swiss companies continue 'business as usual' with South Africa. This does not only apply to Swissair, but to many other companies and in particular to banks. More than half of the South African gold is marketed in Switzerland. In the paper of the 'Anti-Apartheid Bewegung' in a manager of a South African goldmine is quoted as saying: 'The major purchasers of gold are for us of decisive importance (...) The last leaving South Africa will certainly be a Swissair plane of the "Schweizerischen Bankgesellschaft".'

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT: SABENA Minor airline One of the minor airlines operating between Europe and South Africa is the Belgian national airline Sabena, ranking 21 st in the IATA list of international carriers of passengers and 1 5th in the international air transport of freight (1 986). The figures for 1 987 were over 2.3 million passengers and nearly 105.000 tonnes of freight. The number of employees remained just under ten thousand that year. The company is presently state-owned, its capital stock amounting to nine billion Belgian franc. With a turnover of almost 39 billion franc, it arrived at a gross profit of over 507 million in 1987. In comparison with the major airlines dealt with earlier, the African network is quite important for Sabena, representing over 30 per cent of its services. Not much fuss The airline is flying twice a week to South Africa, against sharply competitive prices, and is hardly criticized for doing so. The anti-apartheid organizations in Belgium haven't made much fuss about it yet, as they have set themselves other priorities. However, VAAK, the Flemish consultative commission in which a few dozen organizations are cooperating on the issue of apartheid, has adopted the minimal package of sanctions proposed by the South African church delegates visiting Europe in 1988. As we have seen earlier, this package includes a ban on direct flights to and from South Africa. So far there have been only a few preliminary contacts between VAAK members and members of parliament about the issue of an air ban. Particularly involved in this was Wereldsolidariteit, an organization closely linked up with the christian labour movement. These talks have created the impression that advocates and adversaries of a ban are found in all political parties represented in the parliament. A major objection raised by several politicians was the psychological impact of a ban on the Belgian community living in South Africa, which might as a result feel isolated.

THE OTHERS UTA Apart from KLM which is high-lighted in the next chapter, four more European airlines have scheduled flights to South Africa. The private French airline UTA has two flights a week between and Johannesburg. In September of last year the airline caused controversy, because it had taken on lease a Boeing 747 from South African Airways. The union of French pilots SNPL protested against this in a message to the French prime minister Michel Rocard. Alitallia, Olympic Airways and TAP The national airlines of Italy, Greece and Portugal (Alitalia, Olympic Airways and TAP) have two flights a week between their respective capitals (Rome, and ) and Johannesburg. In addition to that, TAP was allowed to engage a third flight during the high season of December 1 989 -January 1990. El Al and Varig El Al and Varig, the only two national airlines outside Europe and Africa dealing with South Africa, have one flight a week from and respectively. Since the American boycott started, the Brazilian Airline has tried to attract passengers on their way to the United States. ICAO statistics, however, show that the number of passengers between Rio and Johannesburg dropped from 3501 in 1986 to 3327 in 1987. In September 1989 the airline still advertised in the South African press by offering 'the shortest, quickest route available between South Africa and the USA'. South African Airways Looking at the flights from South Africa, the SAA schedule of flights shows weekly connections with eight major airports in Europe: London (8), Zurich (3), Amsterdam (2), Frankfurt (5). Rome (1), Paris (2), Lisbon (2) and (1). In the cases of Lisbon and Rome SAA has the possibility of adding an extra flight in the high season.

The only other South African airline carrying passengers from and to Europe is Luxavia, which offers two flights a week from Luxembourg. This airline caters especially for tourists. The USA... as you've never experienced it before. Take SAA orVarigs shorte Rio route to theUSA or enjoy a fun-filled Sba Stop! If you fly to Rio with SAA or Varig, you'll have a connecting flight to the United States within hours, which makes this the shortest, quickest route available between South Africa and the USA. Best of all, if you want to discover the glitter and glamour of Rio, we offer you a free stopover for one night ... orafew days at very special rates! 11METABLE SA TO RIO RIO TO USA Depal Johueolrg & Cape Town Dight Ri 5F,"ya ft O VmS9 on,00 to W &SA SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS Advertisement in Financial Mail (1990). 0 VARIG

THE SYMBOL OF KINSHIP: THE KLM Special interest in South Africa For many countries in the world the national airline is still a favourite showpiece of the nation. Therefore, it is likely to become the object of strong nationalist feelings. This certainly applies to the Dutch national airline KLM, which is considered a pioneer in international aviation - between the two world wars it exploited the longest route in the world, between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies and which has been designed 'royal' from its very inception in 1919. Taking into consideration that there are special historical ties between the Netherlands and South Africa since the Dutch established a colony there in 1652, it is not surprising that KLM as the national airline developed a special interest in South Africa. So in 1938, when the Afrikaners celebrated the centenary of the 'Big Trek', KLM was sending a plane to South Africa for the first time to add lustre to the occasion. In 1940, some months before the Netherlands were invaded by the German army, the same plane made the flight again, and after the war KLM was one of the first Dutch companies to restore relations with South Africa. In 1947 the two countries signed an aviation treaty, and the next year the number of KLM flights rose from one to three every week. Since that time the KLM has become the outstanding symbol of the kinship relations between South Africa and the Netherlands. Aligned with the apartheid regime KLM not only flew lots of Dutch people across the African continent, from government officials and businessmen to individual emigrants, it also aligned in many ways with the apartheid regime dominated by the Afrikaner National Party since the 1948 elections. In 1952 e.g. it undertook a special flight to Cape Town at the occasion of the third centenary of the establishment of the Cape Colony and in 1953 it enticed the Dutch prime minister Drees (Social Democrat Party, PvdA) to pay a visit to South Africa, on the occasion of the employment of a new type of airplane on the route. A year later, the Dutch Prince Consort (Prince Bernhard) went to South Africa at the invitation of the South African government. Both visits, those of Mr.Drees and Prince Bernhard, were related to plans of the South African government to reduce KLM's weekly number of flights from 3 to 1. They managed to reach a compromise implying 2 flights a week. Though after 1960 the Dutch government gradually became more critical of the apartheid system, its relations with South Africa remained rather ambiguous. In spite of long debates in parliament really drastic steps to put pressure on the apartheid regime never materialized. The national airline was even slower in recognising that times were changing. In 1977 it was revealed that the KLM operated a list of non-white stewardesses who were not allowed to serve on planes to South Africa. In 1979 it was discovered that KLM distributed South African propaganda magazines in Western Europe, called To the Point, Encounter and Vox Africana. Vox Africana had been identified as forming a part of 'Muldergate', a propaganda offensive of the South African government which involved the bribing of foreign journalists and newspapers in order to make them write positively about South Africa. In 1981, when the international sports boycott had already gone a long way and when the Dutch government decided to denounce the cultural treaty with South Africa, KLM distributed a leaflet among white South African sports unions, offering its co-operation in organizing tours in Western Europe. In the beginning of 1984, despite of protests of its own works-council and of leading politicians in the Dutch parliament, the KLM did not see any harm in organizing a golf and lawn tennis tournament for KLM staff in the South African 'home land' of Bophuthatswana. It has also contributed to marketing campaigns for South African products like wines and the promotion of investments and tourism in South Africa. Sanctions busted Against this background it is obvious that the KLM would be the last to heed the call for sanctions. After 1986, when the American congress approved the Anti-Apartheid Act, KLM acted quickly to expand its market. It advertised in South African papers with the suggestion that Amsterdam airport (Schiphol) was the most suitable stop-over on the way to the States. This explains to some extent the increase of passengers on the Johannesburg-Amsterdam line by 35 per cent to 45.000 in 1988. One of these passengers was Alan Boesak, the South African church leader. At the time, KLM admitted If you are travelling to the United States or Canada, your best entry point really is Schiphol airport. Why? Because, to start, there are no longer any direct flights. And then with four flights a week, KLM flying every Tuesday and Friday, SAA every Thursday and Saturday. And direct through-connections to all the major gateways of America - New York; ; ; Houston; Atlanta; Anchorage; Montreal; ; and Calgary - your travelling can be nothing but convenient. And since your transfer point is Schiphol* you're assured of fast, efficient and luxury service. * So when you do reach your destination in either the States or Canada, youll know you were right. But then, you make it your business to be. *1986. Schiphol Airport once aa voted "Best Airport in the World ThReliableAirline K LuM South African advertisement (1987). that it had supplied information to the South African intelligence service about mr. Boesak's travelling scheme. More cautious Only in recent years, because of the growing pressure within and outside the company, the KLM management has become more cautious in its dealings with South Africa. So it has decided not to make publicity for its flights to South Africa any more and in December 1988 it deliberately refrained from participating in the South African celebration of the 50th anniversary of the first KLM flight. On the other hand, KLM still advertises in South Africa. The number of passengers carried by KLM from Amsterdam to Johannesburg dropped from 34.700 in 1986 to 32.800 in 1987. The amount of cargo dropped from 2740 to 2190 tons. Medium-sized airline Internationally KLM is more or less on a par with airlines such as Swissair and SAS. In the IATA statistics for 1986 it occupies the 9th place in so far as the international traffic of passengers is concerned, and the 5th place in the field of international freight by air. The amount of freight carried in 1 988-1989 was 423.000 tonnes and the number of passengers counted in the same year was almost seven million. The company is planning to expand its fleet, standing at 41 in 1989, with a few dozen aircraft in the nineties. The number of employees was close to 24 thousand in that year. Over the years the measure of state control has decreased. At present 38.2 percent of the shares is state-owned. Both the turnover and the after-tax profits have risen spectacularly in the past decade. Since 1989 KLM reaches 141 cities in 77 countries. Its African network, which started with the link between the Netherlands and South Africa, now includes 1 5 countries. In the end of 1 983 KLM opened its first line to a country neighbouring South Africa, Zimbabwe. In the beginning of 1 985 however the line was closed down as a result of a row over landing charges. KLM has five offices in South Africa, employing about 50 people alltogether. Its main other investment in South Africa involves three hotels through 31

Golden Tulip International, which was a full subsidiary of KLM until it sold 75 per cent of its shares in October 1989. ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES aI HElD " KLM operates weekly flights to Johannesburg. * Other airlines like SAS, Quantas and TWA, stopped flying to South Africa, thus supporting the anti-Apartheid struggle. * Support our campaign by urging KLM to stop flying apartheid. KLM OUTO SOUTH RIC) * For further information: Dutch Committee ,,KLM out of South Africa" P.O. Box 1873, Moshi. F Pamphlet of Dutch volunteers in Tanzania.

A GROWING COALITION AGAINST KLM Dutch volunteers In action In November 1985 a group of Dutch volunteers, under contract with the government-financed development organization SNV, got together in central Tanzania for a meeting. Some of them were working in Mazimbu, a settlement of the ANC near the town of Morogoro. On the agenda was the question of how the SNV in Tanzania could contribute to the anti-apartheid struggle. The meeting concluded that one of the few things that SNV itself could do, was to reconsider its own links with companies which are on good terms with the apartheid regime in South Africa, in particular the national airline KLM. So after another meeting, in which the group managed to get the support of most of its colleagues in Tanzania, SNV severed its ties with the local KLM office and entered into talks with other airlines not flying to South Africa. The first reaction of the SNV headquarters in The Hague following the move in the Tanzanian branche was rather encouraging. For a while it even looked possible SNV as a whole would join the action. Soon, however, the wind started blowing from another quarter, stimulated by indications that Dutch volunteers in other countries preferred to continue flying with KLM. A new SNV director was appointed in Tanzania, who wouldn't rest until the decision had been reversed. In 1988 he even threatened individual volunteers with dismissal, if they continued acting against KLM. This threat followed an advertisement exposing KLM as an airline flying to the country of apartheid, which was offered to a local newspaper by a group of Dutch development workers and which was intercepted by the local KLM manager. The advertisement caused a commotion in The Hague up to ministerial level and since then the SNV has been instructed to remain loyal to the KLM. Meanwhile the board of SNV, in which NGOs have a majority, had started talks with other development oriented organizations about the airlinks between the Netherlands and South Africa in general. They all felt their development work, especially in African countries, was lacking credibility unless accompanied by opposition against Dutch collaboration with the apartheid system. They initiated a discussion with the KLM directorate and wrote to the Dutch government. Neither way did they get very far. The KLM management simply took the stand that apartheid is a matter for politicians and not for a commercial business like KLM, which provides air services without regard to political systems. The Dutch government, in a letter by Foreign Affairs minister van den Broek of December 1987, replied it was not in favour of policy measures like a ban on air services, because such measures would isolate South Africa and thereby would not be in the interest of peaceful reforms in that country. Aviation treaty Finally the SNV delivered a report in 1988 entitled 'Zuid Afrika vliegt eruit', in which they called for a denunciation of the aviation treaty that regulates air links between South Africa and the Netherlands. By now this call has got the support of almost 30 other organizations. A considerable part of the organizations supporting a ban on air traffic is church-based. Among them are the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference, two of the three largest Churches in the country, as well as the Dutch council of Churches. The Synod has summoned all its members to avoid Johannesburg when flying to destinations in Southern Africa. The catholic bishops explicitely responded to the call for a minimal package of sanctions, as proposed by the broad South African church delegation which visited Europe in May 1988. The ban was even included in the recommendations of a report on South Africa published in may 1 989 by the think-tank of the Christian Democratic Party CDA, the largest political party in the Netherlands. The report, however, only favoured a ban if declared by the other members of the European Community as well. Trade unions opposed to air links The list of supporters also features the Netherlands Trade Union

Confederation FNV with about one million members, which has for several years advocated unilateral Dutch sanctions against the apartheid regime. The most involved FNV member in this respect is the Transportation Union, which occupies one third of the seats in the works-council of the KLM. In 1987 the Union established an action group on South Africa in its branch at Schiphol, the home-base of KLM. The major aims of the group are to influence the KLM policy facing South Africa and to mobilize the members of the Union in the struggle against apartheid. According to the chairman of the group, Mr. Piet Kuin, who is at the same time chairman of the works-council of KLM, the group is facing problems in both tasks, as most KLM employees are rather reluctant to take any action, though he observes a more critical attitude towards KLM amongst the younger generation. The KLM management, moreover, pursues what he calls 'an intimidation policy'. Two members of the group received a formal warning in June 1989 after they had joined a protest at Schiphol Airport against Dutch police officers leaving for a "study tour" in South Africa. Also in June the directors issued a prohibition against a list circulated by the group in order to collect signatures of employees sympathizing with anti-apartheid activities. The Dutch parliament In the Dutch parliament the issue of a ban on air traffic has been raised many times since 1986. The Dutch Labour Party PvdA and a number of small left-wing parties have clearly expressed themselves in favour of a ban, but a majority of christian-democrats and conservatives blocked every move in that direction. In the autumn of 1989 the christian-democrats and the PvdA forged a coalition government, which decided to adopt a wait-and-see attitude regarding South Africa in the near future. This government will only consider a tightening of economic sanctions, if fundamental reforms in South Africa are not implemented soon.

IN SHORT A partial success When assessing the results of the call for a ban on air traffic with South Africa, we must conclude that is has been only marginally successful up to now. Let us catalogue once more the successes, before examining the steps to be taken in order to tip the balance. While doing so we must bear in mind that most countries in the world never even had direct air links with South Africa in the first place. Looking at developments since 1985, the United States and Australia cancelled the landing rights of South African Airways (SAA) and prohibited national carriers from flying to South Africa. Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the common home base of Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), have cut all air links. Canada, Japan, Finland and New Zealand, which did not have direct air links with South Africa, have prohibited any future links as long as apartheid continues to exist. Canada, Japan and Australia closed the local offices of SAA while the Japanese Government prohibited its officials and diplomats from using SAA planes. The major sanction busters in the field of traffic are to be found in Western and Southern Europe: British Airways-United Kingdom, Olympic Airways-Greece, KLM-the Netherlands, SwissairSwitzerland, Alitalia-Italy, TAP-Portugal, Sabena-Belgium, Lufthansa-Federal Republic of Gemany and UTA-France. Eight of these nine countries are member-states of the European Community (EC), based in . There are also, apart from the national airlines of Israel and Brazil, countries in Africa that maintain direct air links with South Africa, especially in Southern Africa. These countries, however, should not be expected to sever links as long as their economic dependence on South Africa continues and countries in Europe refuse to heed the call for a ban. Why did the call for a ban have so little succes so far? One reason is that it is rarely backed up by effective enforcement measures. Mandatory decisions by the Security Council have been blocked by western vetoes. The Commonwealth call, lacking supranational power anyway, failed to attain its objectives because of strong opposition from the British government. Even in the case of the anti-apartheid legislation in the United States enforcement appears to be rather half-hearted, if one takes into account the deals made by American airlines to reap some of the benefits in the traffic from South Africa to the States via Europe. Another reason for the lack of success is probably that nowhere has the ban on air traffic been the central theme of a strong and lasting campaign, as in the case of certain American and European companies (Mobil, Shell, banks) which have been systematically attacked for their interests in South Africa. In fact only in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the Netherlands is the support of a ban on air traffic slowly growing into a campaign, although even there, there is much more that could be done. Demonstration against the KLM sports tournement in South Africa (1984).

A CAMPAIGN AGAINST AIR LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA The international campaign Campaigning against air links with South Africa takes place in three different ways or fronts: internationally, nationally and on the individual level. On the international level it is almost self-evident that any campaign should concentrate in one way or another on the decision-makers of the European Community. The European anti-apartheid organisations, meeting twice a year in the 'Liaison Group of anti-apartheid organisations with the EC', could play an initiating role. Though the new European Parliament which was inaugurated in 1989 does not have more powers than the old one which came out in favour of a ban in 1986, it should definitely be considered as an ally in bringing pressure to bear on the European Commission and the Ministerial Council. One of the aspects to be investigated in the international campaign is in how far American as well as European airlines are violating the American Anti-Apartheid Act of 1 986. As we have seen before, the Act enables the American President to apply sanctions against any third country taking advantage of the sanctions against South Africa. This of course can only be dealt with in close collaboration with the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. National campaigns Campaigns on the national level are a necessary supplement to the international campaign, especially in countries where political parties are willing to apply bilateral sanctions when international agreement can't be reached. Experience so far has shown that it is not sufficient to aim at airlines only, because they tend not to change their policy unless forced to do so by their governments. Therefore it makes sense to call for the severance or the denouncement of an aviation treaty or other bilateral agreement on which the existing air links are based. Severance is a more radical step as it cuts air links away immediately, whereas denouncement respects terms provided for in the treaty or agreement. The American government opted for the former approach and the Australian for the latter. Of crucial importance in any national campaign is the mobilization of public opinion. Apart from the anti-apartheid organizations, three types of organizations may be instrumental in this: churches, development organizations and labour unions. From the very beginning churches in many countries have played a prominent role in the struggle against apartheid. In the coordination of their efforts, the -based World Council of Churches (with its programme to combat racism) has done a lot of work. So it is no wonder that churches and church-based organizations have come to the fore in actions aimed at a ban on air links, such as: lobbying with related political parties and governments, organizing picket-lines, speaking in share-holders' meetings of national airlines etc. Development organizations, have also shown sensitivity to the massive and systematic violation of human rights which is taking place in South Africa. They are by definition bridges between North and South, and as such they are quite able to see parallels between what is happening in South Africa and developments on a global level. This explains why even government-financed development organizations like in the Netherlands took initiatives in support of a ban. The importance of trade unions in particular is that they can take the campaign to the door-step of those responsible for maintaining links by air to apartheid South Africa: the managers and directors of airlines, airports, freight companies etc. Labour unions are able to raise the issue in the governing bodies of such companies, they can mobilize their members working there and they can initiate actions which touch the heart of the matter, like the ground staff in the airport of Rome which refused to handle SAA aircraft in September 1985. An Individual campaign Finally, as long as neither internationally nor nationally a real break-through can be expected, an individual can still resort to his or her personal 'campaign'. Not only to soothe one's own conscience but also to exert influence on decisions taken by companies and governments and to raise public support. An individual air-traveller may have an opportunity to choose between a carrier that has South Africa on its list of destinations, and one that does not fly to the land of apartheid. And if one choses the latter carrier, one may declare so openly by talking to people e.g. in the travel agency or by writing to the airline which was deliberately avoided. To enhance the effectiveness of such individual actions, anti-apartheid and other organizations might promote this possibility by distributing standardised letters and other aids. They might also start registering individual actions and use them in their national or international campaigns. In that way, also those who don't feel like joining an organization, demonstration or picket-line or simply have very little time to spare, are still able to contribute. In other words: everybody convinced of the need for a ban on air links with South Africa as long as apartheid reigns, can do something. After all constant dropping wears away the stone. So every drop counts. Da Drawing: Peter van Straaten (Vrij Nederland, 2 Sept. 1988)

Since 1985, leaders of the South African liberation movements have been calling for a ban on air traffic with South Africa. Reverend Beyers Naud6 said in November 1987: "It is not a violent method. The airports of Botswana and Zimbabwe are quite suited to replace those of South Africa. Then South African passengers have to go to their neighbours in order to fly abroad. That is time consuming and cumbersome and will hopefully cause them to consider the consequences of apartheid". Apartheid by Air describes the successes and failures of the ban on air links with South Africa. It presents information about the international airlines, such as KLM, Lufthansa and British Airways, which are still supporting, supplying and flying to the apartheid state. It finally suggest ways to promote the effectiveness of the ban on apartheid flights. Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika Holland Committee on Southern Africa Oudezijds Achterburgwal 173 1012 DJ Amsterdam Telephone: (020)-270801 Fax:(020)-270441